1 According to petitioner, the cases decided by the SC show that the Court has
PATES vs COMELEC, GR No. 184915 consistently held that the order or resolution denying the motion for
RULE 64 reconsideration or new trial is considered as the final order finally disposing
of the case, and the date of its receipt by a party is the correct reckoning
DOCTRINE: Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least point for counting the period for appellate review.
be accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply
with the rules and by a justification for the requested liberal construction. For her part, respondent Amirante filed a comment that the Court is
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any absolutely correct that the petition was filed out of time, and petitioner’s
compelling reason to warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his reliance on Sec. 4, Rule 65 is misplaced as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the
petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal to vehicle for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should adopt COMELEC. They are different in that Rule 65 provides for a 60-day period
and apply the fresh period rule to an election case. for filing petitions for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30 days.
FACTS: The following are the material antecedents of the case: ISSUE: whether or not the “fresh period rule” applicable to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is also applicable to petitions for certiorari of
Feb. 1, 2008 – The COMELEC first division issued the assailed Resolution. COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64?
Feb. 4, 2008 – The counsel for petitioner Nilo Pates received a copy of the
Feb. 1 Resolution. HELD: NO. The Court held that Rule 64 cannot be equated to Rule 65 even
Feb. 8, 2008 – Petitioner filed his MR of the Feb. 1, 2008 resolution (4 days if it expressly refers to the latter rule. Procedurally, the most patent difference
from receipt of said Resolution). between the two is the exception that Sec. 2, Rule 64 refers to (is Section 3)
September 18, 2008 -– The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution which is Sec. 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions
denying the petitioner’s MR (also assailed in the petition). for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period
September 22, 2008 – Petitioner received the COMELEC en banc resolution is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that
of Sept. 18. Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any
motion for reconsideration deducible from the originally-granted 30 days
Under the abovementioned facts, the last day of filing the petition for (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).
certiorari is on October 18, 2008 (30 days from notice of the final COMELEC
Resolution), which is a Saturday. As he filed a previous MR, petitioner had To quote, Sec. 3 of Rule 64 provides that “The petition shall be filed within
the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition. Effectively, the last day for thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought
filing was October 20, 2008, the following Monday or the first working day to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said
after October 18, 2008. judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
However, the petitioner filed his petition on October 22, 2008, or two days motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
late. Hence, the COMELEC’s Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008. remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial”.
For his part, petitioner asks in his “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with
Reiteration for the issuance of a TRO” to reverse the dismissal of his petition, Thus, the SC’s ruling of November 11, 2008 to dismiss the petition for late
arguing that the petition was seasonably filed under the “fresh period rule” filing cannot but be correct.
enunciated by the SC in a number of cases decided starting the year 2005.
This fresh period refers to the original period provided under the RoC While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for reconsideration by the that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
tribunal below, without deducting the period for the preparation and filing of procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
motion for reconsideration.
CASE NO. 2 Villanueva and Cruz Gonzales opposed the motion. This case was docketed
Lokin vs. COMELEC as E.M. No. 07-54. On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC resolved E.M.
G.R. No. 179431-32 No. 07-54, confirming the withdrawal of the Petitioner and confirming the
substitution of Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. Lokin thus assailed the September
DOCTRINE: The mandate of the Section 7 Article IX-A of the 1987 14, 2007 COMELEC Resolution through a petition for certiorari. The
Constitution is embodied in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides COMELEC opposed the petition, contending that a certiorari is not the proper
that, in seeking the review of judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the remedy due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as representative; and
COMELEC or the Commission on Audit, the proper remedy is a Petition for that the proper recourse should have been an election protest.
Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption was one of the organized 1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari was properly resorted to/
groups registered under the Party List System of Representation who
manifested their intent to participate in the synchronized national and local HELD:
elections to be held on May 14, 2007. CIBAC’s President, Emmanuel Joel J. 1. YES. An Election Protest aims to oust a winning candidate from
Villanueva, along with its manifestation of its intent to participate, submitted a office on the ground of electoral fraud and irregularities. Quo
list of five (5) nominees upon which the representatives would be chosen Warranto, on the other hand, refers to questions of disloyalty to the
from should CIBAC acquire the requisite number of votes. State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. Lokin’s situation is
peculiar. Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee seeks to
The nominees are as follows: unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; does the instant case involve ineligibility nor disloyalty to the State.
2. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. (The Petitioner); Lokin’s petition for certiorari was properly brought in accordance
3. Cinchora C. Cruz-Gonzales; with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, as embodied
4. Sherwin Tugna; and in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Rule 64 provides that the proper
5. Emil L. Galang. remedy, in actions seeking the review of judgments, final orders,
and resolutions of the COMELEC, is a Petition for Certiorari
Accordingly, the nominees’ certificate of acceptance were attached to the under Rule 65.
very same certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees were,
thereafter, published in The Philippine Star News and The Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Prior to the elections, CIBAC later on filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution, and amendment of the list of nominees.
On June 20, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC, along with the signed
petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the
withdrawal of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang and the substitution of Borje. 6
Days thereafter, CIBAC, allegedly through counsel, filed a motion with
COMELEC seeking the proclamation of Lokin; asserting in that motion that
they were entitled to a second seat with Lokin as the representative.
CASE NO. 3 the COA; however, the same was denied. COA held that under Sec. 447 and
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs.COMMISSION ON Sec. 458 of the LGC, only municipal or city governments are expressly
AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay
VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND workers. Further, COA noted the LGU’s failure to comply with the
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, requirement of publication under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9184 (Government
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015 Procurement Reform Act).
BERSAMIN, J.
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on 14 December 2012,
DOCTRINE: 1) Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the RoC concerns two (2) types of proof and filed its motion for reconsideration (MR) on 14 January 2013. COA
of service, namely: the affidavit AND the registry receipt. The provision denied the said motion, the denial being received by the petitioner on 14 July
requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall 2014. Thereafter, petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on 13 August 2014,
consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing AND the registry but the same was dismissed on the grounds that: (a) the late filing of the
receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
either or both are not submitted. of the respondents.
2) Under Rule 64, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the Hence, the instant recourse.
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER: 1) Petition for certiorari included an
of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the affidavit of service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of
motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the Court; 2) The fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to
remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, a petition for review brought under Rule 42; hence, conformably with the
reckoned from the notice of denial. fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned
from the receipt of the order denying the MR or the motion for new trial.
The belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that
the fresh period rule under Neypes should apply, shall be fatal to the On the claim of grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA: (1) the
recourse. challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA
took almost a year before promulgating its decision, and more than a year in
3) Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise resolving the MR, in contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution;
of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other (3) the resolution denying the MR was made up of only two sentences; (4)
words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of the matter involved a novel issue that called for an interpretation of the
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so pertinent provisions of the LGC; and (5) in issuing the resolution, COA
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal Commissioners made it appear that they knew the LGC better than former
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Sen. Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter.
Thus, the reckoning date to count the remaining 12 days to file his Rule 64
petition should be counted from July 15, 2009, the date Osmea had actual
knowledge of the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision of
the COA and given the opportunity to competently file an appeal thereto
before the Court. The present petition, filed on July 27, 2009, was filed within
the reglementary period.
CASE NO. 5 herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power
PORMENTO vs. ESTRADA & COMELEC of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
RULE 64, SEC. 8 lacking in this case.
DOCTRINE: Under the Rules of Court, the filing of the petition for
certiorari would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari stays the
execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC.
HELD: NO. Under the Rules of Court, the filing of the petition for certiorari
would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even
pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate
for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered
the second highest number of votes.
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be
premised on a person's second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
Case No. 6 they are being punished without hearing. Respondent Molina also added that
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE he had already earned his right to the step increment before Resolution No.
INSURANCE SYSTEM and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as 372 was enacted. Respondents also argued that the three resolutions were
GSIS President and General Manager, vs. ineffective because they were not registered with the University of the
ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463 February Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of
2, 2011 1987.
RULE 65
Petitioners filed their comment with motion to dismiss and opposition.
DOCTRINE: The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and granted respondents’
special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case Hence, this petition.
may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to,
or possession of real property, or interest therein. Issue: Whether or not petition for prohibition is proper?
Held: On the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court said it can take cognizance of
Facts: On 23 May 2002, petitioners charged respondents administratively the petition because the "territorial area" referred to in Section 4, Rule 65 of
with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 the Rules of Court "does not necessarily delimit to a particular locality but
days. Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the rather to the judicial region where the office or agency is situated so that the
demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged prohibitive writ can be enforced."
corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general
manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:
respondent Mario I. Molina (respondent Molina) requested GSIS Senior Vice Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
President Concepcion L. Madarang (SVP Madarang) for the implementation corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
of his step increment. On 22 April 2003, SVP Madarang denied the request judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 (Resolution No. 372)9 issued by with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS (petitioner GSIS Board) which and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
increment and promotion which provides that the step increment adjustment judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
of an employee who is on preventive suspension shall be withheld until such proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
time that a decision on the case has been rendered. x x x x such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee Sec. 4. Where petition filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 (Resolution No. 306) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in
approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees the Supreme Court or, if it related to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
effective year 2002.11 Respondents’ request was again denied because of corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court exercising
their pending administrative case. jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that they were it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
No. 306. Respondents also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. Respondents claimed that the
denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the
administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial
court declare all acts emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void
and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said resolutions. (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents’ habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their
petition for prohibition. respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)25 provides: Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Marikina,
SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The
Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the municipalities of
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional
Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of prohibition issued by the
Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of regional trial court sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in Pasay City.
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents’ petition
for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the action and the venue was
criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
properly laid before it.
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may
exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised
with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the
different parts of the region and making attendance of litigants and witnesses
as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)
In line with this, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 326
defining the territorial jurisdiction of the regional trial courts in the National
Capital Judicial Region, as follows:
a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila – over the City of
Manila only.
b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City – over
Quezon City only.
c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City – over Pasay
City only.
xxxx
The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which
may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan
or the regional trial court, as the case may be. It is also a personal action
because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or
interest therein.
Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco,
plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition
could properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is
sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction:
CASE NO. 7 In this case, petitioners fail to meet the third requisite for the proper
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION vs. CA invocation of Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, to wit: that there is no
G.R. No. 164561 August 30, 2006 appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
R.65 law. They simply alleged that the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its
discretion which amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
DOCTRINE: Accordingly, where the issue or question involves or affects the assailed Decision and Resolution. They did not bother to explain why an
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the appeal cannot possibly cure the errors committed by the appellate court. It
court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a petition must be noted that the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals was
for certiorari. It is obvious in this case that the arguments raised by the already a disposition on the merits; this Court has no remaining issues to
petitioners delved into the wisdom or legal soundness of the Decision of the resolve, hence, the proper remedy available to the petitioners is to file
Court of Appeals, therefore, the proper remedy is a Petition for Review on Petition for Review under Rule 45 not under Rule 65.
Certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to Additionally, the general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the
dismiss this Petition. remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal
in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Facts:Enrique Tamondong III was the Personnel Superintendent of Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
CAPASCO. The supervisory personnel of CAPASCO organized a union, cumulative.
known as CAPASCO Union of Supervisory Employees (CUSE) wherein he
was active and was elected as one of the officers. He was asked to stop his
union activities but he refused to do so. Thus, CAPASCO terminated his
employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Tamondong then filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, claiming
that there was no just cause for his dismissal, as he was merely exercising
his right to self-organization. On the other hand, CAPASCO claimed that he
was a managerial employee, which means that he was prohibited from
joining a union.
The LA ruled in favor of Tamondong, which the NLRC reversed. Upon MR,
the NLRC affirmed its original decision. Tamondong filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC. The CA granted the petition. The MR was denied.
Hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed. Tamondong
challenged this, asserting that a final decision of the CA is appealable to the
SC by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not Rule 65.
Ruling:NO. The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
Case No. 8 Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the
BANCO FILIPINO vs. CA G.R. No. 132703 June 23, 2000 Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for
RULE 65 certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members of the bench and
bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there
Doctrine: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in of law. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or of appeal. Banco Filipino's recourse to a special civil action for certiorari was
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because of its
failure to file a timely appeal to this Court.
FACTS: The General Banking Act provides that a bank is allowed to own the
land and the improvements thereon used as branch sites but only up to a
maximum of 50% of the bank’s net worth. In 1979, Banco Filipino had
reached such allowable limit so it sold some of its holdings to Tala Realty.
Banco Filipino leased the branch sites from Tala, which was organized as a
transferee corporation by majority stockholders of Banco Filipino. Banco
Filipino alleged that a trust was created by virtue of the transactions since
Tala was established to warehouse the legal title of the properties for the
beneficial interest of the bank. However, Tala demanded payment of
increased rentals from it, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to pay.
Because of such failure, Tala filed numerous ejectment suits against Banco
Filipino. The bank then filed actions for recovery of real properties in the RTC
of Iloilo, Manila, QC, Malolos, and Lucena where it had its branches. The
motions to dismiss were filed on the ground of forum shopping and litis
pendentia, which were granted. On June 27, 1996, the RTC denied the
bank’s MR. The copy of the order was received on July 5, 1996 but instead
of filing an appeal, Banco Filipino filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA on July 24, 1996. The CA dismissed the petition and denied
the MR. The copy was received on January 7, 1998. Banco Filipino filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 on March 9, 1998.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy.
HELD: NO. Banco Filipino's proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of
the Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for
review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Nothing in the record of this case
supports Banco Filipino's bare assertion that the Court of Appeals rendered
its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. The availability to
Case No. 9 of the reglementary period. The CA dismissed the petition and held that the
Navarez v. Abrogar RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 191641, 2 September 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a proper recourse to petition for certiorari
RULE 65 under Rule 65
DOCTRINE: The Court has, on appropriate occasions, treated a petition for HELD: NO. We observe that the petitioner used the wrong remedy to
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly when: (1) the challenge the CA’s decision and resolution. The petitioner filed a petition for
petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period to file a petition certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
for review on certiorari; (2) the petition avers errors of judgment; and (3) A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy of last resort, available only to
when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. raise jurisdictional issues when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy under the law. Nonetheless, in the spirit of liberality
FACTS: Edmundo Navarez engaged the services of Abrogar Valerio that pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this
Maderazo and Associates Law Offices through the respondent, Atty. Manuel Court has, on appropriate occasions, treated a petition for certiorari as a
Abrogar III. The firm was to represent Navarez in the case "Apolonia petition for review on certiorari, particularly when: (1) the petition for certiorari
Quesada, Jr. v. Edmundo Navarez" as collaborating counsel of Atty. Perfecto was filed within the reglementary period to file a petition for review on
Laguio. The case involved the settlement of the estate of Avelina Quesada- certiorari; (2) the petition avers errors of judgment; and (3) when there is
Navarez that was then pending before the Quezon City RTC. Later, Navarez sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
filed a Manifestation with the RTC that he was terminating the services of Considering that the present petition was filed within the extension period
Atty. Abrogar. Navarez also caused the delivery to Atty. Abrogar of a check granted by this Court and avers errors of law and judgment, this Court deems
in the amount of P220,107.51 – allegedly equivalent to one half of 7.5% of it proper to treat the present petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
petitioner’s P11,200,000.00 share in the estate of his deceased wife less Atty. certiorari in order to serve the higher ends of justice.
Abrogar’s cash advances.
Atty. Abrogar manifested that with respect to the petitioner’s one-half (1⁄2)
share in the conjugal partnership, the RTC had already resolved the matter
favorably because it had issued a release order for the petitioner to withdraw
the amount. Atty. Abrogar further declared that the Firm was withdrawing as
counsel effective upon the appointment of an Administrator of the estate from
the remaining proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Avelina
Quesada-Navarez. Navarez then wrote to Atty. Abrogar offering to pay his
attorney’s fees in accordance with their Retainer Agreement minus the
latter’s cash advances – an offer that Atty. Abrogar had previously refused.
Atty. Abrogar filed a Motion to Enter into the Records his attorney’s lien
pursuant to Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court. The RTC issued an
order granting the motion and directed the petitioner to pay Atty. Abrogar’s
attorney’s fees. Navarez elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
certiorari. He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
because: (1) the RTC granted Atty. Abrogar’s claim for attorney’s fees
despite non-payment of docket fees; (2) the RTC denied him the opportunity
of a full-blown trial to contradict Atty. Abrogar’s claims and prove advance
payments; and (3) the RTC issued a writ of execution even before the lapse
CASE NO. 10 Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. v. ANTI- regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog
TERRORISM COUNCIL Region, and individuals followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a
G.R NOS. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461, OCTOBER 5, petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that
2010 replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
CARPIO MORALES, J.
RULE 65 Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Council composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
FACTS: Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo
Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 6, 2007. Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, petitioner Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded
and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-
a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. Terrorism Council.
No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and ISSUE:
Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their Whether or not the six petitions filed challenging the constitutionality of
respective officers who are also bringing the action in their capacity as Republic Act No. 9372 shall prosper.
citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. HELD:
178554.
NO. The petitions fail.
The following day, July 17, 2007, different organizations such as BAYAN,
GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, PETITIONERS RESORT
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham, represented by their TO CERTIORARI IS
respective officers, and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers filed a IMPROPER
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations SELDA, exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
EMJP, and PCPR, which were represented by their respective officers who of Court is clear:
are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890. Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL), Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157. is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of PETITIONERS FAIL TO
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their PRESENT AN ACTUAL
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to CASE OR
lack or excess of jurisdiction. CONTROVERSY
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the case or controversy.
same.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
exacting requisites: established by law.
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi; settle actual controversies involving rights which are
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
and
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
PETITIONERS LACK decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
LOCUS STANDI
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC cannot
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the be more emphatic:
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected however intellectually challenging. The controversy
communist fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the
individual petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is,
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical
danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi. hypothetical state of facts.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then
again, declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where both
the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to
it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack
of ripeness.
SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 11
LUNA v. COURT OF APPEALS The Third Division of respondent Court of Appeals, applying the provisions of
G.R. Nos. 100374-75 the Warsaw Convention and ruling that certiorari was not a substitute for a
RULE 65 lost appeal, dismissed the petition of Luna and Alonso and denied their
motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, on Seventh Division of respondent
DOCTRINE: Considering the broader and primordial interests of justice, Court of Appeals, ruling that the questioned order of the trial court had
particularly when there is grave abuse of discretion, thus impelling occasional already become final, similarly rejected the petition of Rodriquez, and denied
departure from the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present recourse by petitioners
substitute for a lost appeal, respondent appellate court may legally entertain Luna, Alonso and Rodriguez.
the special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari is the proper recourse in this case
FACTS: Rufino Luna, Rodolfo Alonso and Porfirio Rodriguez, herein
petitioners, boarded Flight 020 of private respondent Northwest Airlines HELD: YES. It appears that private respondent Northwest Airlines failed to
bound for Seoul, South Korea, to attend the four-day Rotary International deliver petitioners' baggage at the designated time and place. For this, all
Convention. They checked in 1 piece of luggage each. After boarding, they that respondent carrier could say was that "[w]e exerted all efforts to comply
were asked to disembark due to engine trouble and transfer to a Korean with this condition of the contract." Hence, it is evident that petitioners
Airlines plane scheduled to depart four (4) hours later. They were assured suffered some injury for which they should rightly be compensated. Private
that their baggage would be with them in the same flight. But they discovered respondent cannot be allowed to escape liability by seeking refuge in the
that their personal belongings were nowhere to be found and were allegedly argument that the trial courts' orders have attained finality due to petitioners
flown to Seattle, U.S.A upon arrival. It was not until 4 days later, and only failure to move for reconsideration or to file a timely appeal therefrom.
after repeated representations with Northwest Airlines personnel at the Technicalities should be disregarded if only to render to the respective
airport in Korea were petitioners able to retrieve their luggage. By then the parties that which is their due. Thus, although We have said that certiorari
Convention, which they were hardly able to attend, was almost over. cannot be a substitute for a lapsed appeal, We have, time and again,
likewise held that where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest
Petitioners Rufino Y. Luna and Rodolfo J. Alfonso assert that 13 days after failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed. Hence, considering
they recovered their luggage, they sent a written claim to private the broader and primordial interests of justice, particularly when there is
respondent's office. Rodriquez, on his part, asserverates that he filed his grave abuse of discretion, thus impelling occasional departure from the
claim on 13 June 1989. However, private respondent disowned any liability general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost
for the delay and averred that it exerted "its best efforts to carry the appeal, respondent appellate court may legally entertain the special civil
passenger and baggage with reasonable dispatch." action for certiorari.
Thus, on 14 July 1989, petitioners Luna and Alonso jointly filed a complaint
for breach of contract with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. Rodriquez filed his own complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. However, upon motion of private respondent,
both complaints were dismissed for lack of cause of action due to petitioners'
failure to state in their respective complaints that they filed a prior claim with
private respondent within the prescribed period.
Luna and Alonso then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals to set aside the order of respondent judge granting private
respondent's motion to dismiss, while petitioner Rodriquez proceeded
directly to this Court on certiorari for the same purpose. However, the SC
referred his petition to the Court of Appeals.
CASE NO. 12
RAPPLER INC. vs. ANDRES BAUTISTA Thus, Rappler, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
G.R. No. 222702, APRIL 5, 2016 Andres D. Bautista, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on
CARPIO, J. Elections (COMELEC). The petition seeks to nullify Part VI (C),
RULE 65 paragraph 19 and Part VI (D), paragraph 20 of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) on the 2016 presidential and vice-presidential
DOCTRINE: In several cases, this Court has acted liberally and set debates, for being executed without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
aside procedural lapses in cases involving transcendental issues of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
public interest, especially when time constraint is a factor to be and for violating the fundamental rights of petitioner protected under
considered, as in this case. the Constitution.
FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed by the COMELEC ISSUE/s:
through its Chairman, respondent Andres Bautista, and the Kapisanan ng 1. W/N THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), and the various media networks and PROHIBITION BY RAPPLER IS PROPER?
petitioner Rappler, Inc. Under the MOA, the KBP was designated as Debate
Coordinator while ABS-CBN, GMA, Nine Media, and TV5, together with their 2. W/N RAPPLER HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE STREAM THE
respective print media partners were designated as Lead Networks. DEBATES?
Bautista called for a meeting with various media outlets to discuss the HELD:
"PiliPinas 2016 Debates," for presidential and vice-presidential candidates,
which the COMELEC was organizing. Respondent proposed that petitioner 1. YES
and Google, Inc. be in charge of online and social media engagement. In several cases, this Court has acted liberally and set aside
procedural lapses in cases involving transcendental issues of public interest,
Another meeting was held at the COMELEC office to discuss a draft MOA on especially when time constraint is a factor to be considered, as in this case.
the debates. In the draft, petitioner and Google's participation were dropped The urgency to resolve this case is apparent considering that the televised
in favor of the online outlets owned by the Lead Networks. After the meeting, debates have already started and only two of the scheduled four national
the representatives of the Lead Networks drew lots to determine who will debates remain to be staged. And considering the importance of the debates
host each leg of the debates. Petitioner alleged that the draft MOA permitted in informing the electorate of the positions of the presidential and vice-
online streaming, provided proper attribution is given the Lead Network. presidential candidates on vital issues affecting the nation, this case falls
under the exception laid down in GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on
Petitioner was informed of the date of the MOA signing. Upon petitioner's Elections.
request, the draft MOA was emailed to petitioner. Petitioner communicated
with respondent its concerns regarding certain provisions of the MOA "[T]his Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve
particularly regarding online streaming and the imposition of a maximum limit petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy,
of two minutes of debate excerpts for news reporting. Respondent assured in view of the public importance of the issues raised therein.
petitioner that its concerns will be addressed afterwards, but it has to sign the
MOA because time was of the essence. 2. YES
Petitioner's demand to exercise the right to live stream the debates is
The MOA was finally executed for the conduct of the 3 presidential debates a contractual right of petitioner under the MOA. Under Part VI (C), paragraph
and 1 vice-presidential debate. Petitioner alleged that it made several 19 of the MOA, the Lead Networks are expressly mandated to "allow the
communications with respondent and the COMELEC Commissioners debates they have produced to be shown or streamed on other
regarding its concerns on some of the MOA provisions, but petitioner websites," but "subject to copyright conditions or separate
received no response. negotiations with the Lead Networks." The use of the word "or" means
that compliance with the "copyright conditions" is sufficient for petitioner to
exercise its right to live stream the debates in its website.
Under the MOA, the Lead Networks are mandated to promote the
debates for maximum audience. The MOA recognizes the public function of
the debates and the need for the widest possible dissemination of the
debates. The MOA has not reserved or withheld the reproduction of the
debates to the public but has in fact expressly allowed the reproduction of the
debates "subject to copyright conditions." Once petitioner complies with the
copyright conditions, petitioner can exercise the right to live stream the audio
of the debates as expressly allowed by the MOA.
FACTS: Respondent Estate of the Spouses Toribio Teodoro and Marta HELD: YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Teodoro is presently pending settlement before the Regional Trial Court of Appeals.
Caloocan City, Branch 120. The court-appointed administrator of the said
estate is respondent Prudencio Teodoro. Included in the inventory of the The circumstances obtaining in this present case are indeed peculiar. The
properties of the estate is a 1,704 square meter parcel of land designated as persons who elevated the questioned order of the probate court to the Court
Lot No. 214-A, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (28232) of Appeals, through the special civil action of certiorari, were not parties in
12039. the proceedings before the probate court. The respondent impleaded in the
petition before the probate court, herein public respondent City Engineer of
The Republic of the Philippines expropriated 337 square meters of the said Caloocan, did not pursue his appeal and the ones who elevated the
lot for its C-3 Circumferential Road Project. Thus, Lot 214-A was subdivided questioned order are merely a group of individuals who, being the owners of
into Lot 214A-1, covered by TCT No. 237325 and titled under the name of the lots adjoining Lots 214-A-2-A and 214-A-2-B, claim to have an interest in
the Republic of the Philippines, and Lot 214-A-2, covered by TCT No. 237325 the fencing of the subject lots.
and titled under the name of respondent estate.
The term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean that any person
Since the estate was already in debt due to accruing interests from estate who feels injured by the lower court's order or decision can question the said
taxes, respondent administrator petitioned the probate court for an authority court's disposition via certiorari. To sanction a contrary interpretation would
to mortgage or sell Lot 214-A-2. The petition was granted. The lot was further open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would
subdivided into 2 lots – Lot 214-A-2-A and Lot 214-A-2-B. undeniably lead to the clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the
harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court.
Respondent Administrator then applied with the Caloocan City Engineer for a
permit to fence the two lots. Petitioners (owners of adjoining lots) opposed The Court ruled that the "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of
the issuance of the fencing permit on the claim that the subject lots are street Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one
lots and, as such, its fencing would mean the closure of their access to public who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness
roads. of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action
for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case
Respondent administrator then filed a petition before the probate court to failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision
order the Caloocan City Engineer to issue the fencing permit for the subject before the lower court.
lots. After hearing, the probate court granted the petition.
The Court also ruled that the fact that petitioners are neighboring lot owners
When petitioner Magdalita Tang, a neighboring lot owner, noticed that the whose access to public roads will allegedly be affected by the fencing of the
subject lots were already being fenced, she filed a special civil action for subject lots, merely gives them an incidental interest over the questioned
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. order of the probate court and cannot serve as basis to support their legal
After the Court of Appeals granted her a temporary restraining order, the standing to elevate the order of the probate court to the Court of Appeals and
other petitioners, also neighboring lot owners, joined her cause in opposing before this Court.
the fencing of the subject lots.
CASE NO. 14 SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
LAGUNA METTS CORP v. CA, ARIES CAALAM and GERALDINE motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
ESGUERRA required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
RULE 65 denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
DOCTRINE: As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
motion for reconsideration. by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it
FACTS: This case arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules,
Corporation (LMC). The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
and found that they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, however,
the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. Private respondents No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
motion for reconsideration was denied. Counsel for private respondents of reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.(emphasis supplied)
the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension
of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:
motion alleged that the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals
within the prescribed 60-day period. Thus, a 15-day extension period was SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later
prayed for and was granted by the CA. than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
LMC moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from the notice of
extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under the denial of the motion.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC dated December 4, 2007, but the MR was denied. According to the If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a
appellate court, while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional
Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to discourage the filing of Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the
Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate
exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice. jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
ISSUE: Whether the CA may grant an extension of time filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial
HELD: NO. While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections,
period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,[11] the in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of
time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases
previously permitted such extensions. indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion
would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change
Section 4, Rule 65 previously read: in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such
authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply
meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially
to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph
allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the
filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be
filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying
a motion for reconsideration.
CASE NO. 15 Petitioner argues that in Section 58, the "law conferring on the Supreme
Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc., Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining orders and
vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr., Mayor And Head Of Procuring Unit injunctions relating to Infrastructure Project of Government" refers to RA No.
Of The Municipality Of Valladolid, Negros Occidental; Bids And Awards 8975 in relation to PD No. 1818. Petitioner then submits that "while R.A. No.
Committee, Municipality Of Valladolid, Negros Occidental; And Henry L. 8975 appears to apply only to national government infrastructure projects . . .
Jordan And/Or Hlj Construction And Enterprise the resulting amendment to P.D. No. 1818 (by virtue of Sections 3 and 9 of
G.R. No. 174202, April 07, 2015 R.A. No. 8975) removing any restriction upon the Honorable Supreme Court
RULE 65 to issue injunctive relief, would similarly apply to the infrastructure projects . . .
subject of, or covered by, P.D. No. 1818, which would include those
DOCTRINE infrastructure projects undertaken for or by local governments.
Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in
order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary By Resolution dated September 18, 2006, this court ordered the parties to
restraining order from this court. Also, this law covers only national "MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO as of September 18, 2006 effective
government infrastructure projects. This case involves a local immediately until further orders from the Court."
government infrastructure project.
Public respondents counter that petitioner committed splitting a single cause
Facts of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping and disregarded the rule
Petitioners filed a Petition for prohibition with application for issuance of a on hierarchy of courts. The project undertaken by HLJ Construction 'and
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction Enterprise was almost near completion, and prohibition [was] not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already executed or accomplished. Petitioner
The Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and should have asked for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. 1459 filed before the
Awards Committee, published an invitation to bid for the construction of a trial court. It also argued that RA 9184 and RA 8975 do not envision
1,050-lineal-meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline simultaneous resort to remedies but rather provides for alternative remedies.
to be called the “Construction Shoreline Protection Project.”
ISSUES:
Among the 4 remaining bidders, Mig-Wells Const. Corp (highest bidder), 1. whether Article XVII, Section 58 of RA No. 9184 contemplates
ADP Const. & Supply (3rd lowest bidder), Dynamic Builders & Const. (lowest simultaneous filing of a petition for prohibition seeking injunctive reliefs from
bidder) and HLJ Const. & Ent.(2ND lowest bidder), the Bids and Awards this court and a petition for certiorari before the RTC
Committee issued Resolution No. 6 recommending the award in favor of HLJ 2. whether Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, in relation to
Construction and Enterprise. Dynamic Builders requested that it be submitted Republic Act No. 8975 and Presidential Decree No. 1818, allows Regional
the bid documents and relevant resolutions but this was denied because Trial Courts to issue injunctive relief subject to the presence of certain
such is confidential. Dynamic asked for the reconsideration of the April 25, conditions
2006 Decision declaring Dynamic’s bid not substantially responsive but this 3. whether respondents violated this court's September 18, 2006 status quo
was denied. Dynamic filed a formal protest with the Mayor, as head of the Order in relation to the ongoing Construction Shoreline Protection Project
procuring entity, to set aside the Bids and Awards Committee decision but
this was dismissed. HELD:
1. No. Section 58 could not have envisioned a simultaneous resort to this
Pursuant to Article XVII, Section 58 of RA No. 9184, otherwise known as the court by one that had already filed an action before the Regional Trial Court
Government Procurement Reform Act, Dynamic Builders filed the Petition for without violating the basic rules on proscription against the splitting of a
Certiorari before the RTC assailing Mayor Presbitero's Decision and cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
Resolution. Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed this Petition dated This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public respondent's Decision
September 4, 2006 for prohibition with application for temporary restraining and Resolution on the protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before this court. be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence,
petitioner seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before which had been the existing state of affairs at the time the September 18,
separate courts. This violates the rule against forum shopping. 2006 Resolution was issued.
The second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 This is consistent with Republic Act No. 8975's policy that "the State shall
simply means it does not preclude a direct filing before this court in proper ensure the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of
cases. However, parties must adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts. government infrastructure projects to avoid unnecessary increase in
construction, maintenance and/or repair costs and to immediately enjoy the
2.Yes. When the matter is of "extreme urgency involving a constitutional social and economic benefits therefrom."97 This policy declaration does not
issue," even Regional Trial Courts may grant injunctive reliefs. Considering distinguish between national and local government infrastructure projects.
that petitioner alleges that this matter is "of extreme urgency, involving as it Delay in the project will only mean additional costs for the government and
does the . . . constitutional right[s] to due process and equal protection of the prejudice to the people of the Municipality of Valladolid who will directly
law," it should have prayed for injunctive relief before the trial court where its benefit from the Construction Shoreline Protection Project.
Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 was pending, together with a bond fixed by
the court. PETITION DISMISSED.
This court has set the limit on the prohibition (of lower courts issuing
injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects) found in
Presidential Decree No. 1818 by explaining that lower courts are not
prohibited from enjoining administrative acts when questions of law exist and
the acts do not involve administrative discretion in technical cases
For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial Courts may issue
provisional injunctive reliefs against government infrastructure projects only
when (1) there are compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2)
there clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent grave and
irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable urgency to the issuance of
the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public interest at stake in
restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far
outweighs (a) the inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is
awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from the completion of the
project. The time periods for the validity of temporary restraining orders
issued by trial courts should be strictly followed. No preliminary injunction
should issue unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is clear and
convincing.
3. No. The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last
actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual
controversy. The status quo ante litem is, ineluctably, the state of affairs
which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court
must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.
DOCTRINE: while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is
such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the
The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As
in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary. either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or
jurisprudence.
FACTS: On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, are required to
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding allege any direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the
the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Philippines, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a
mga Bayani (LNMB), in compliance with the verbal order of President consequence of the act complained of. Suffice it to state that the
Duterte to fulfill his election campaign promise to that effect. averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury,
and that their interest in this case is too general and shared by other
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is
corresponding directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General. inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, various parties filed several As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that
petitions for certiorari, prohibitions and mandamus essentially arguing the issues raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching
that the decision to have the remains of former President Marcos interred significance to society, or of paramount public interest. In cases involving
at the LNMB violated various laws Marcos is not entitled to be interred at such issues, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
the LNMB; and that the Marcos family has already waived such burial. constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. In Marcos v.
Manglapus, the majority opinion observed that the subject controversy
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is proper was of grave national importance, and that the Court's decision would
have a profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of
HELD: The Court held that defined as a right of appearance in a court of national life. The ponencia explained that the case was in a class by itself,
justice on a given question, locus standi requires that a party alleges unique and could not create precedent because it involved a dictator
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political,
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon economic and social havoc in the country and who, within the short
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional space of three years (from 1986), sought to return to the Philippines to
questions. Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of die.
sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party
has no standing. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens,
established as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine error and dispose of the case. While there are exceptions to the doctrine
would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the
aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven (27) presence of any of those exceptions.
years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already
passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights. ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek
reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some of Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should
petitioners decry re-traumatization, historical revisionism, and disregard be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP
of their state recognition as heroes. Petitioners' argument is founded on Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions on the
the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National Pantheon intended by implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound
law to perpetuate the memory of all Presidents, national heroes and administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience
patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will be discussed further, reveals its and services of his office to determine technical and intricate matters of
nature and purpose as a national military cemetery and national shrine, fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the
under the administration of the AFP. Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the
President which has control and supervision over the Department of
Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners Senator National Defense (DND).
De Lima, and Congressman Lagman, et al. come before the Court as
legislators suing to defend the Constitution and to protect appropriated Hierarchy of Courts
public funds from being used unlawfully. In the absence of a clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or the institution to which they In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the
belong, their standing as members of the Congress cannot be upheld. extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed
They do not specifically claim that the official actions complained of, i.e., under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners
the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the directive cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC).
encroach on their prerogatives as legislators. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law
in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds
administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the alone. Even if We decide the case based on the merits, the petitions
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of should still be denied.
administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the court's judicial power can be sought. For reasons of comity and
convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to
give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
CASE NO. 17 trading in Palawan; that due to the serious effects of the memorandum, the
THE CHAIRMAN and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR respondent had sent a grievance letter to the Office of the President; and that
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT vs. EJERCITO LIM DOING BUSINESS the PCSD Chairman had nonetheless maintained that the respondent's
AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES, business was not a common carrier, and should comply with the requirement
RULE 65 for PCSD accreditation.
DOCTRINE: A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an In disregard of the prohibition, the respondent continued his business
administrative order issued in the exercise of a quasi legislative function. operation in Palawan until a customer showed him the Notice of Violation
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, and Show Cause Order issued by the PCSD to the effect that he had still
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or made 19 flights in October 2002 despite his failure to secure accreditation
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further from the PCSD; and that he should explain his actuations within 15 days,
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's otherwise, he would be sanctioned with a fine of ₱50,000.00.
or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in According to the respondent, he had not received the Notice of Violation and
the ordinary course of law. Its lies against the exercise of judicial or Show Cause Order.
ministerial functions, not against the exercise of legislative or quasi- The respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA, which issued a
legislative functions. temporary restraining order (TRO) upon his application after finding that
there were sufficient grounds to issue the TR0. After the petitioners did not
FACTS: file their comment despite notice, the CA issued the writ of preliminary
Petitioners were the public officials tasked with the duty of executing and injunction upon his posting of the injunction bond.
implementing A.O. No. 00-05 and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause
Order, while the PCSD was the government agency responsible for the ISSUE:
governance, implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic Whether or not the CA erred in declaring A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002;
Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan. On the other hand, the respondent Resolution No. 03-211, and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order
was the operator of a domestic air carrier doing business under the name null and void for having been issued in excess of the PCSD’s authority.
and style Bonanza Air Services, with authority to engage in nonscheduled air
taxi transportation of passengers and cargo for the public. His business HELD:
operation was primarily that of transporting live fish from Palawan to fish Yes.
traders. Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi-legislative or
The PCSD issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February 25, 2002 to ordain that the rule-making power, and the quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
transport of live fish from Palawan would be allowed only through traders and power. The first is the power to make rules and regulations that results in
carriers who had sought and secured accreditation from the PCSD. On delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
September 4, 2002, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) sent to the PCSD its doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The issuance of the
communication to the effect that A TO-authorized carriers were considered assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution. No. 03-211 and the other issuances by
common carriers, and, as such, should be exempt from the PCSD the PCSD was in the exercise of the agency's quasi legislative powers. The
accreditation requirement. It attached to the communication a list of its second is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
authorized carriers, which included the respondent's air transport service. legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
The respondent asserted that he had continued his trade without securing Clearly, what was assailed before the CA was the validity or constitutionality
the PCSD-required accreditation; that the PCSD Chairman had started of a rule or regulation issued by the PCSD as an administrative agency in the
harassing his clients by issuing Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 2002, performance of its quasi-legislative function. The question thus presented
which contained a penal clause imposing sanctions on the availment of was a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, and exclusively and
transfer services by unaccredited aircraft carriers such as cancellation of the originally pertained to the proper Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
PCSD accreditation and perpetual disqualification from engaging in live fish 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Indeed, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court expressly states that any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation" may bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court "to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder." The judicial course to raise
the issue against such validity should have adhered to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts except only if the respondent had sufficient justification to
do otherwise. Yet, he utterly failed to show justification to merit the exception
of bypassing the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, by virtue of Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court's power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.
Nevertheless, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on this case on the
merits if only to facilitate its speedy resolution. R.A. No. No. 7611 has
adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan consistent with
the declared policy of the State to protect, develop, and conserve its natural
resources. The SEP is a comprehensive framework for the sustainable
development of Palawan to protect and enhance the Province's natural
resources and endangered environment.Towards this end, the PCSD was
established as the administrative machinery for the SEP' s implementation.
The creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16 of R.A. No. 7611.
Accordingly, the PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how
to carry out the objectives of R.A. No. 7611 in protecting and enhancing
Palawan's natural resources consistent with the SEP. In that task, the PCSD
could establish a methodology for the effective implementation of the SEP.
Moreover, the PCSD was expressly given the authority to impose penalties
and sanctions in relation to the implementation of the SEP and the other
provisions of R.A. No. 7611. As such, the PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-
95 and Resolution No. 03-211 was well within its statutory authority.
Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
CASE NO. 18 Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
JUDITH YU v. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD and PEOPLE OF THE substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
PHILIPPINES concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for
Rule 65 new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order
denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that
DOCTRINE: While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in
Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period
in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
FACTS: An information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the
RTC. In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
charged. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
convicted. In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
petitioners motion for new trial for lack of merot.
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of 15 days from (b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. The under Rule 42.
prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late,
arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. x x x x
ISSUE: Whether the Neypes ruling is applicable in criminal cases Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari
HELD: YES. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the under Rule 45.
Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons: its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the
same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases
is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section
and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated
period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or differently.
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any
distinction.
DOCTRINE: The principle of res judicata holds that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot be raised in any future case between
the same parties.
FACTS: INVESTCO entered into a contract to sell with Solid Homes over
parcels of land in Quezon City and Marikina City. Solid Homes, however,
defaulted in its payments, causing INVESTCO to file a case against Solid
Homes for specific performance and damages. During the pendency of this
case, the very same properties were then sold to AFPMBAI. Upon the
latter’s full payment of the consideration, the Register of Deeds issued new
certificates of of title to AFPMBAI. Solid Homes filed an action for
annotation of lis pendens and damages with the RTC of Marikina
(Respondent). Eventually, the SC ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel
the Solid Homes’ notice of lis pendens and declared AFPMBAI as buyers in
good faith. Eventually, Solid Homes filed a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38, alleging extrinsic fraud on the part of INVESTCO
and AFPMBAI. On July 18, 2008, the Respondent issued an ORDER
granting the petition for relief. Hence this Petition for Prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a TRO against the Respondent.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Relief is barred
by res judicata
HELD:
1. YES. Petition GRANTED. In Petitions for Relief from Judgment
under Rule 38, extrinsic fraud, as a ground, must relate to the a
party’s right to be heard. Simply, the extrinsic fraud must have
prevented or otherwise prejudiced a party’s right to be heard. The
contentions raised by Solid Homes in its petition for relief did not
relate to its right to be heard, but rather contended the need to
redetermine whether or not AFPMBAI was truly a buyer in good faith.
This matter had already been ruled upon and res judicata had
already attached. Hence, the ORDER (July 18, 2008) is SET ASIDE.
CASE NO. 20
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC. MTC: Manila RTC declared the subject bidding null and void on the ground
G.R. No. 193796. July 2, 2014 that it was done contrary to the rules and procedure prescribed in RA 9184
PERLAS-BERNABE, J: and its IRR. Consequently, it enjoined the City Government of Iligan and its
RULE 65 BAC from entering into and/or implementing the contract for the supply of
water pipes with Moldex Products, Inc.
Doctrine:
The power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional Trial RTC: The Manila RTC also ruled that the City Government of Iligan cannot
Courts can only be exercised within the limits of their respective districts, claim exemption from the application of RA 9184 and its IRR by virtue of
outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. If the petition relates Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH with the IBRD because it was Land Bank, and
to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a not the City Government of Iligan, which was the party to the same.
board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Issue:
Supreme Court. Does Manila RTC have jurisdiction over the instant prohibition case and
eventually issue the writ prayed for?
Brief Facts:
Land Bank and IBRD entered into Loan Agreement for the implementation of Arguments of the parties:
the IBRD's "Support for Strategic Local Development and Investment Petitioner: Land Bank asserts that the Petition for Prohibition was improperly
Project" (S2LDIP). Land Bank entered into an SLA with the City Government filed before the Manila RTC considering that the acts sought to be enjoined,
of Iligan to finance the development and expansion of the city's water supply i.e., the public bidding for the supply of water pipes, are beyond the said
system. The SLA expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to court's territorial jurisdiction.
be financed out of the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be Respondent: Atlanta, for its part, counter-argues that the acts of Land Bank
"procured in accordance with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines: are as much to be enjoined for causing the City Government of Iligan and its
Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits' . . ., and with the provisions BAC to continuously violate the provisions of RA 9184, its IRR, and the PBDs
of [the] Schedule 4." Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its in the conduct of the public bidding and that the filing of the prohibition case
BAC, conducted a public bidding for the supply and delivery of various sizes in the City of Manila was in accordance with the rules on venue given that
of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings using the IBRD Procurement Guidelines. Land Bank's main office is in the City of Manila.
The bidding was declared a failure upon the recommendation of Land Bank
due to the IBRD's non-concurrence with the Bid Evaluation Report. Held:
During the second bidding, Atlanta called the BAC's attention to its use of NO, the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition
Bidding Documents which, as it purported, not only failed to conform with the and mandamus.
Third Edition of the Philippine Bidding Documents for the Procurement of A petition for prohibition is a special civil action that seeks for a judgment
Goods (PBDs) prescribed by the Government Procurement Policy Board ordering the respondent to desist from continuing with the commission of an
(GPPB) but also contained numerous provisions that were not in accordance act perceived to be illegal. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
with RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). During the reads:
pre-bid conference, the BAC declared that the project was not covered by RA
9184 or by any of the GPPB's issuances. Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal,
Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that appeared to be in corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
contravention of RA 9184 and its IRR, Atlanta filed a Petition for Prohibition judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
and Mandamus with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the re- excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
bidding of the project against the City Government of Iligan, the BAC, and and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
Land Bank before the Manila RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-122643 thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
(Petition for Prohibition). with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or upon judges of the Regional Trial Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs (CFI), can only be exercised within the limits of their respective districts,
as law and justice may require. outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. Applying previous
legislation similar to the present Section 21 of BP 129 and its complementary
While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original provision, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, that the CFI of Leyte had no power to issue writs of injunction and certiorari
if what is assailed relates to "acts or omissions of a lower court or of a against the Justice of the Peace of Manila, as the same was outside the
corporation, board, officer or person," the petition must be filed "in the territorial boundaries of the issuing court. Also, in Samar Mining Co., Inc. v.
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined Arnado, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was
by the Court." filed in the CFI of Manila to question the authority of the Regional
Section 4 of the same Rules provides that: Administrator and Labor Attorney of the Department of Labor in Cebu City to
hear a complaint for sickness compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to
Sec. 4. When and Where to file the petition. — The petition shall be filed enjoin said respondents from conducting further proceedings thereat. The
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Court affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue,
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, holding that the CFI of Manila had no authority to issue writs of injunction,
whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not certiorari, and prohibition affecting persons outside its territorial boundaries.
later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the Further, in both Cudiamat v. Torres (Cudiamat) and National Waterworks and
motion. Sewerage Authority v. Reyes (NAWASA), the losing bidders succeeded in
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal in order to restrain, in
court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be Cudiamat, the implementation of an award on a public bidding for the supply
filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the of a police call and signal box system for the City of Manila, and, in NAWASA,
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed the conduct of the public bidding for the supply of steel pipes for its Manila
with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the and Suburbs Waterworks Project. The Court held in both cases that the
same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves injunction issued by the CFI of Rizal purporting to restrain acts outside the
an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise province of Rizal was null and void for want of jurisdiction.
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. pronouncements to the instant case, the writ of prohibition issued by
the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the
The foregoing rule corresponds to Section 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void.
129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980" (BP
129), which gives Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of In case you want to read the detailed version of the facts:
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and On October 3, 2006, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the
injunction but lays down the limitation that the writs issued therein are International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) entered into
enforceable only within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH for the implementation of the IBRD's "Support
pertinent provision reads: for Strategic Local Development and Investment Project" (S2LDIP). The loan
facility in the amount of JP¥11,710,000,000.00 was fully guaranteed by the
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. — Regional Trial Courts Government of the Philippines and conditioned upon the participation of at
shall exercise original jurisdiction: least two (2) local government units by way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo (SLA) with Land Bank.
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any On February 22, 2007, Land Bank entered into an SLA with the City
part of their respective regions; Government of Iligan to finance the development and expansion of the city's
water supply system, which had two (2) components, namely: (a) the
The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early procurement of civil works; and (b) the procurement of goods for the supply
case of Castaño v. Lobingier, that the power to administer justice conferred and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings. The SLA
expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to be financed out of enjoin the re-bidding of the project against the City Government of Iligan, the
the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to be "procured in accordance BAC, and Land Bank before the Manila RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-
with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD 122643 (Petition for Prohibition).
Loans and IDA Credits' . . ., and with the provisions of [the] Schedule 4." In their separate comments on the said petition, Land Bank and the BAC
Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its BAC, conducted a asserted that the case was dismissible for improper venue, mootness, non-
public bidding for the supply and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE exhaustion of administrative remedies, failure to implead an indispensable
pipes and fittings using the IBRD Procurement Guidelines. party, and the inapplicability of RA 9184.
Respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated in the said bidding In the meantime, with Atlanta's Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
and came up with the second to the lowest bid in the amount of 72-Hour TRO and Special Raffle having been denied, the re-bidding of the
P193,959,354.34. However, in a letter dated July 27, 2009, the BAC project was conducted (as scheduled on December 14, 2009), with four (4)
informed Atlanta that the bidding was declared a failure upon the bidders participating and submitting the following bids:
recommendation of Land Bank due to the IBRD's non-concurrence with the 1.
Bid Evaluation Report. Moreover, in a letter dated August 28, 2009, the BAC Atlanta Industries, Inc.
informed Atlanta of its disqualification from the bidding because it lacked P141,289,680.50
several documentary requirements. 2.
In response, Atlanta, through a letter dated September 8, 2009, sought to Moldex Products, Inc.
correct the BAC's erroneous assumption that it failed to submit the necessary P172,727,052.49
documents and to have its disqualification reconsidered. It expressed its 3.
objection against the BAC's declaration of a failure of bidding, asserting that Dong Won Plastics, Inc.
had it not been improperly disqualified there would have also been no need P189,184,599.74
to declare the bidding a failure because its tender would be the sole 4.
responsive bid necessary to save the bid process. Thai-Asia/Junnie Industries
However, in a Resolution dated September 25, 2009, the BAC deemed it P191,900,020.00
futile to reconsider Atlanta's disqualification in view of the fact that the Thereupon, the case proceeded with the parties' submission of their
bidding had already been declared a failure because of noted violations of respective memoranda and the denial of Atlanta's prayer for the issuance of
the IBRD Procurement Guidelines and that, unless the BAC conducts a new an injunctive writ.
bidding on the project, it would not be able to obtain a "no objection" from the
World Bank. Atlanta did not pursue the matter further with the BAC and opted,
instead, to participate in the re-bidding of the project, the notice of which was
published anew on October 30, 2009.
This notwithstanding, Atlanta, in a letter dated November 16, 2009, called the
BAC's attention to its use of Bidding Documents which, as it purported, not
only failed to conform with the Third Edition of the Philippine Bidding
Documents for the Procurement of Goods (PBDs) prescribed by the
Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) but also contained
numerous provisions that were not in accordance with RA 9184 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). During the pre-bid conference,
the BAC declared that the project was not covered by RA 9184 or by any of
the GPPB's issuances. It further announced that the bid opening would be
conducted on December 14, 2009.
Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that appeared to be in
contravention of RA 9184 and its IRR, Atlanta filed on December 10, 2009 a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with an urgent prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
CASE NO. 21 In a demand letter, Sandra requested the police to release the subject
P/S INSP. SAMSON B. BELMONTE, et al. vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY vehicle. Thereafter, she filed a civil case against herein petitioners for
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT Recovery of Personal Property with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Replevin
OFFICES, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN before the RTC. Conversely, petitioners filed criminal charges against
G.R. No. 197665, January 13, 2016 Sandra for violations of Anti-Carnapping Act and Anti-Fencing Law. In
PERALTA, J. December of 2007, Sandra filed the subject Administrative Complaint for
Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against petitioners before the
Ombudsman. Petitioners were found guilty of Grave Misconduct. The
DOCTRINE: 1) For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must Ombudsman ruled that Sandra presented substantial evidence, such as hotel
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, receipts, to support her allegations that petitioners demanded and received
corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) favors from her as consideration for the processing of the macro-etching
the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its examination of the subject vehicle. Petitioners filed a motion for
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and, (c) there is no appeal or reconsideration (MR), arguing that the Ombudsman’s decision is not
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. supported by evidence and that the penalty of dismissal imposed on them is
oppressive. Before the Ombudsman could resolve the said motion,
The mere fact that the Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of petitioners elevated the matter to the SC by filing the instant Petition for
dismissal from service is immediately executory, alone, does not justify the Prohibition with a prayer of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
issuance of an injunctive writ to stay the implementation thereof.
ISSUE/S:
2) Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of 1) W/N petitioners’ recourse under Rule 65 is proper, considering that the
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty decision of the Ombudsman is immediately effective and executory;
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is 2) W/N the Ombudsman committed grave abuse in discretion amounting to
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility. lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing a decision purportedly without proof
Petitioners, in this case, must prove that public respondent committed not that petitioners are indeed guilty of demanding and accepting favors from
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Sandra;
excess of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave.
RULING:
1) NO. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Petition for
FACTS: A certain Sandra Matiao filed a complaint against herein petitioners,
Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
alleging that sometime in 2007, the latter flagged down her vehicle because
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
the 2007 LTO sticker was not displayed on its windshield. Consequently,
functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
petitioners proceeded to seize and impound the subject vehicle without any
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
warrant or existing complaint for theft. Thereafter, Sandra alleged that they
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
asked her if she could shoulder their lodging expenses and treat them for
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
dinner while an initial macro-etching examination was being conducted on
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
her vehicle. Sandra acceded. While on their way to dinner, however,
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action
petitioner Belmonte told Sandra to just settle the problem for P300,000. The
or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as
next day, the macro-etching examination revealed that the engine, chassis
law and justice may require. For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition,
and production numbers of Sandra’s vehicle were tampered. The vehicle was
he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a
then placed under the list of stolen vehicles and was subsequently brought
tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or
under the custody of the police.
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and, (c) there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the instant petition is likewise dismissible
course of law. for its violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Petitioners, without
awaiting public respondent’s action on their MR, immediately filed the instant
In the present case, the second and third requisites are absent. With respect petition before the SC instead of the appellate court, as required by the said
to the second requisite, the Ombudsman had not acted with grave abuse of doctrine.
discretion (see No. 2 below). Anent the third requisite, petitioners had some
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A 2) NO. Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is
resolution of the lower court or agency. Under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Petitioners, in this case, must prove that public respondent committed not
Order (AO) No. 17, the petitioners can still avail of the remedy of motion for merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
reconsideration, viz: excess of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be
grave. Here, public respondent ruled that Sandra submitted substantial
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or evidence, such as hotel receipts, to support her allegations that petitioners
reinvestigation: Grounds – Whenever allowable, a demanded and received favors from her as consideration for the processing
motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be of the macro-etching examination of the subject vehicle. Thus, that public
entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the respondent’s ruling was unfavorable to petitioners’ interests does not
decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the necessarily mean that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion, especially
following grounds: a) New evidence had been discovered so when such ruling was aptly corroborated by evidence submitted by the
which materially affects the order, directive or decision; b) parties.
Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have
been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The mere fact that the Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of
dismissal from service is immediately executory, alone, does not justify the
issuance of an injunctive writ to stay the implementation thereof. As SC
explained in Villasenor v. Ombudsman, the immediate implementation of an
order of dismissal does not violate any vested right for petitioners are
considered preventively suspended during their appeal, viz.: The Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and,
therefore, may be applied retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were
pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17 xxx It is
important to note that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office,
or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office.
CASE NO. 22 income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to
G.R. No. 73155 less than the minimum requirements under this section."
PATRICIO TAN, et al. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)
Rule 65 PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS The Court was unable to timely consider the petition, and the plebiscite
sought to be stopped was held as scheduled. But the voters of the parent
Doctrine: It was prayed for by petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of
directing the respondent COMELEC to schedule another plebiscite at which the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental shall Also, petitioners contend that the area which would comprise the new
participate and that this Court the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is
legal effect for being a patent nullity. The Court is prepared to declare the lesser than the 3500 sq. km minimum area prescribed by the LGC.
said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the Acknowledging that supervening events rendered moot the prayer in their
Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined,
new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. petitioners filed a supplemental pleading praying that:
-a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent COMELEC to desist
Facts: from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite
The enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885- An Act Creating a New -a writ of Mandamus be issued, directed to the Respondent COMELEC to
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del schedule another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire
Norte, prompted petitioners (affected residents of Negros Occidental) to file a Province of Negros Occidental shall participate, at the same time making
case for Prohibition to stop respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal
from conducting the plebiscite which was scheduled for January 3, 1986. effect
Three cities and eight municipalities from the northern portion of the Island of
Negros, were to be separated from the province and be known as the new Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the challenged statute should be
Province of Negros del Norte. Petitioners contend that B.P. Blg. 885 is accorded the presumption of legality and that it does not infringe the
unconstitutional and not in accord with the Local Government Code. Constitution because the requisites of the LGC have been complied with.
Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become moot and academic
Art XI, Sec 3 of the Constitution provides that: “No province, city, municipality with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte and the
or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary appointments of the officials of said province.
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the Issue:
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected” W/N the questioned statute is constitutional and legal
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates these requisites for Held:
creating a new provincial unit: No.
"..has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a
population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
annual income.., of not less than ten million pesos for the last three compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had
consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the
case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic.
Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be
inquired into by this Tribunal.
The pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation
and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected". Plain and simple logic will
demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be
the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those
in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed
province of Negros del Norte. The plebiscite clearly failed to meet this
Constitutional requirement.
FACTS: ||| This is a petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to compel herein respondent Alberto F. Del Rosario, as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to press the Philippine claim to North Borneo
(Sabah) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or such other fora
authorized under international law.
CASE NO. 26
MBTC vs. REYNADO & ADRANDEA Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1,
RULE 65 2000 by then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero. Aggrieved,
petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.
DOCTRINE: Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall
issue when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the petition for certiorari & mandamus is
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a proper.
duty resulting from an office, trust or station." The writ of mandamus is not
available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise HELD: YES. Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall
of discretion. issue when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine duty resulting from an office, trust or station." The writ of mandamus is not
which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise
the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to of discretion.
charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation,
the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine
which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However,
FACTS: On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to
Company charged respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation,
Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory.
Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the special audit conducted on the
cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before
anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information against the
with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal). person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a
deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Criminal liability for
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public
Debt Settlement Agreement whereby the latter acknowledged its offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its
indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 as of own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the
February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations damage suffered by the offended party.
in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated
checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion
interest and other charges, if any, on December 31." when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as
acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor latter's finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on
Winnie M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution dated July 10, 1997 purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause
found petitioner's evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. as pointed out in Balangauan.
According to Prosecutor Edad, “The execution of the Debt Settlement
Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that the liability is To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review
criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. The present case calls
the relations between the parties have changed, novation has set in and for the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner
prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents.” has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor
Edad to the Department of Justice (DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review. Case No. 27
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition. A Motion for Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission
G.R. No. 211010; March 7, 2017 (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have
Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather
amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury.
Facts: Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and
To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing is a
Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.
This body was reorganized through EO 774. EO 774 expressed what is now
referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle" which Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
contemplates: "Those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning
this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective that since a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan must be filed with
transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train). the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals, then
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable. Petitioners, on the other
Later in 2009, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is
Climate Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to environmental
and became the lead policy-making body of the government which shall be damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower courts.
tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of
the government relating to climate change. Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of
kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty
The Petition of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non-
would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, implementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage.
convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are
entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs of kalikasan and continuing Issue:
mandamus due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform
an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should
resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, issue.
health and property of all Filipinos.
Ruling:
In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the No. The petition must be dismissed.
applicable laws and executive issuances, namely applicable constitutional
provisions, the Road Sharing Principle, and other related mandates of Procedural issues:
concerned government agencies under EO 774 resulted in the continued Legal Standing
degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and may requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the
even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. However, it
and air" by the government without due process of law. bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and
seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only
adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Jurisdiction of Courts
Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on
environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public
a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the actual or
environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of
right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and petitions of this nature.
territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of
large-scale ecological threats. At the very least, the magnitude of the On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not
ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and
the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners. Projects and programs
allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows that seek to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly
direct resort to this Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether and in coordination with stakeholders.
or not to accept petitions brought directly before it.
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
Substantive issue: Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for
A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to continuing mandamus as follows:
show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.
Petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or
prayed for. instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
a balanced and healthful ecology; excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation,
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an
act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages
In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the
health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition
right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the
petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology. First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts
attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ.1âwphi1 While the
Although the petitioners established the correlation of air quality and public requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the
health, petitioners have not been able to show that respondents are guilty of general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing
violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad mandamus.
air quality.
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a
Similarly, petitioners were not able to show with sufficient evidence that principle. It cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon
respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited. In fact, apart the province of public respondents to determine the manner by which this
principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to
compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not
those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by
mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. Thus, the recognized
rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion,
the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not
to act one way or the other.
In this case, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the
performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of
implementation of the Road Sharing Principle.
LAMI filed its Verified Return dated 21 June 2012, controverting Agham’s Respondents, on the other hand, assert that even if the subject land
allegations. LAMI stated that it did not and was not violating any formation is not a mound, hill or mountain, the fact remains that the scraping
environmental law, rule or regulation. and leveling done by petitioner caused serious environmental damage which
affects not only the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales but also the nearby
towns of Zambales and Pangasinan.
The Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner. The appellate
court found that the government, through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to 1) The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan
cut trees and LAMI strictly followed the proper guidelines stated in the permit. which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.— Section 1,
The appellate court also stated that there can be no flattening of a mountain Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules provides: Section 1. Nature of the writ.—The
when there is no mountain to speak of. Thus, for failing to comply with the writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by
requisites the Court of Appeals declared that Agham’s Motion for law, people’s organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public
Reconsideration was submitted for resolution. Subsequently, Agham filed a interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
Supplemental Reply dated 29 April 2013 reiterating the same arguments. behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
Agham filed an MR ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
In a Resolution dated 31 May 2013, the Court of Appeals set Agham’s involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
Motion for Reconsideration for hearing on 13 June 2013. At the hearing, all health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
parties were given time to argue their case. Thereafter, the Motion for
Reconsideration was submitted for resolution. In an Amended Decision dated 2) The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and
13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its original conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of
Decision dated 23 November 2012 such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two (2) or more cities or provinces.— The writ is available against an
Issue: The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI violated the unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
environmental laws as alleged by Agham, and (2) whether LAMI flattened or entity. The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1)
any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises
provinces. from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
3) The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to
prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to
be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or provinces.— Even the Annotation to
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of
environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.
As indicated in the Field Trial Proposal submitted by the implementing c. Upon filing [of this petition], issue a writ of kalikasan commanding
institution (UPLB), the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was Respondents to file their respective returns and explain why they should not
described as a "bioengineered eggplant." The crystal toxin genes from the be judicially sanctioned for violating or threatening to violate or allowing the
soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant violation of the above-enumerated laws, principles, and international principle
(talong) genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to the target and standards, or committing acts, which would result into an environmental
insect pests. CrylAc protein is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of
such as the fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of petitioners in particular and of the Filipino people in general.
eggplant.
d. After hearing and judicial determination, to cancel all Bt talong field
Under the regulatory supervision of NCBP, a contained experiment was experiments that are found to be violating the above mentioned laws,
started in 2007 and officially completed on March 3, 2009. The NCBP thus principles, and international standards; and recommend to Congress curative
issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment stating that legislations to effectuate such order.
"During the conduct of the experiment, all the biosafety measures have been
complied with and no untoward incident has occurred."BPI issued Biosafety
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, property of inhabitants in two or
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)/BPI/Fertilizer and Pesticide more cities or provinces. Moreover, the issues raised by Greenpeace, et al.
Authority (FPA) and UPLB, ordering them to make a verified return within a largely involve technical matters which pertain to the special competence of
non-extendible period often (10) days, as provided in Sec. 8, Rule 7 of the BPI whose determination thereon is entitled to great respect and even finality.
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.19
ISSUES:
ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLBFI and UPMFI filed their respective verified 1. Whether or not Greenpeace, et al. has legal standing.
returns. They all argued that the issuance of writ of kalikasan is not proper 2. Whether or not the case is moot and academic. (by the
because in the implementation of the Bt talong project, all environmental termination of all field trials on August 10, 2012. In fact, the validity of
laws were complied with, including public consultations in the affected all Biosafety permits issued to UPLB expired in June 2012)
communities, to ensure that the people's right to a balanced and healthful 3. Whether or not there is a violation of the doctrines of primary
ecology was protected and respected. jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
On the procedural aspect, ISAAA sought the dismissal of the petition for writ
of kalikasan for non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts and the RULING:
allegations therein being mere assertions and baseless conclusions of law. 1. YES. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of
EMB, BPI and FPA questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. in Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
filing the petition for writ of kalikasan as they do not stand to suffer any direct environmental cases.44 The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses
injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests. They likewise prayed for the the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
denial of the petition for continuing mandamus for failure to state a cause of humans are stewards of nature," and aims to "further encourage the
action and for utter lack of merit. protection of the environment. There is therefore no dispute on the standing
of respondents to file before this Court their petition for writ of kalikasan and
UPMFI also questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. for failing to writ of continuing mandamus. Oposa v. Factor an, Jr.42 signaled an even
allege that they have been prejudiced or damaged, or their constitutional more liberalized policy on locus standi in public suits. In said case, we
rights to health and a balanced ecology were violated or threatened to be recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology
violated by the conduct of Bt talong field trials. Insofar as the field trials in which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
Davao City, the actual field trials at Bago Oshiro started on November 25, incorporated in the fundamental law." We held that such right need not be
2010 but the plants were uprooted by Davao City officials on December 17- written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
18, 2010. There were no further field trials conducted and hence no violation guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it
of constitutional rights of persons or damage to the environment, with respect is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
to Davao City, occurred which will justify the issuance of a writ of kalikasan. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
UPMFI emphasized that under the MOU, its responsibility was only to handle environment.
the funds for the project in their trial site. It pointed out that in the Field Trial
Proposal, Public Information Sheet, Biosafety Permit for Field Testing, and 2. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic if: first, there
Terminal Report (Davao City Government) by respondent Leonardo R. Avila is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of
III, nowhere does UPMFI appear either as project proponent, partner or the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
implementing arm. Since UPMFI, which is separate and distinct from UP, constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
undertook only the fund management of Bt talong field test project the guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
duration of which expired on July 1, 2011, it had nothing to do with any field repetition yet evading review.48 We find that the presence of the second and
trials conducted in other parts of the country. fourth exceptions justified the CA in not dismissing the case despite the
termination of Bt talong field trials. While it may be that the project
Finally, it is argued that the precautionary principle is not applicable proponents of Bt talong have terminated the subject field trials, it is not
considering that the field testing is only a part of a continuing study being certain if they have actually completed the field trial stage for the purpose of
done to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative impact on data gathering. At any rate, it is on record that the proponents expect to
the environment. There is thus no resulting environmental damage of such proceed to the next phase of the project, the preparation for commercial
propagation of the Bt eggplants. Biosafety permits will still be issued by the into the Philippines in the last decade, it is only now that such controversy
BPI for Bt talong or other GM crops. Hence, not only does this case fall under involving alleged damage or threat to human health and the environment
the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness from GMOs has reached the courts.
principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the
introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very popular staple vegetable
among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.
3. NO. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of
the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court
without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of
the same after due deliberation. However, there are many accepted
exceptions, such as: xxx (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo
warranto proceedings. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In addition to the TEPO and writ of kalikasan, respondents also sought the
issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the respondents to:
(1) comply with the requirement of environmental impact statement; (2)
submit comprehensive risk assessments, field test reports, regulatory
compliance reports and other material documents on Bt talong including
issued certifications on public consultation with LGUs; (3) work with other
agencies to submit a draft amendment to biosafety regulations; and (4) BPI,
in coordination with relevant government agencies, conduct balanced
nationwide public information on the nature of Bt talong field trial, and a
survey of its social acceptability.
ISSUES: The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and
[1] Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered fast rule. It is not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a
moot and academic; legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
[2] Whether or not the petition is premature because petitioner failed to performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the
exhaust administrative remedies before filing this case; respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the
[3] Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually
required by laws and regulations based on the scope and classification of the disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the
project; urgency of judicial intervention.
[4] Whether or not respondent Province complied with all the requirements
under the pertinent laws and regulations; and
Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, mandated under the courts decision and, in order to do this, the court may
speedy and adequate remedy, when there is no due process observed, or compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent
where the protestant has no other recourse. government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance
with its decision.
Although petitioner was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to
issue an ECC was rendered, it stands to be aggrieved by the decision, Petitioner had three options where to file this case under the rule: the
because it claims that the reclamation of land on the Caticlan side would Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
unavoidably adversely affect the Boracay side, where petitioners members actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or this Court.
own establishments engaged in the tourism trade. As noted earlier, petitioner
contends that the declared objective of the reclamation project is to exploit Petitioner had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary
Boracays tourism trade because the project is intended to enhance support course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local
services thereto; however, this objective would not be achieved since the importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental
white-sand beaches for which Boracay is famous might be negatively protection, thus it was justified in coming to this Court.
affected by the project. Petitioners conclusion is that respondent Province,
aided and abetted by respondents PRA and DENR-EMB RVI, ignored the 3) Being the administrator of the EIS System, respondent DENR-EMB RVIs
spirit and letter of our environmental laws, and should thus be compelled to submissions bear great weight in this case.However, the following are the
perform their duties under said laws. issues that put in question the wisdom of respondent DENR-EMB RVI in
issuing the ECC:
***
[1] Its approval of respondent Provinces classification of the project as a
The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, mere expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it
provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which as a new project;
is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of [2] Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-
an act specifically enjoined by law and which provides for the issuance of a located project;
TEPO as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself. The [3] The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government
Rationale of the said Rules explains the writ in this wise: agencies; and
[4] The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the
Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of reclamation project to the environment.
regulation by Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the
appropriate government agencies. As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by
respondent Province above, a significant portion of the reclaimed area would
Thus, a government agency’s inaction, if any, has serious implications on the be devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the area to be
future of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent utilized for the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square
that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely meters (sq. m). To be true to its definition, the EIA report submitted by
on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial respondent Province should at the very least predict the impact that the
component. Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an agency’s construction of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the
action or inaction will need to be analyzed. surrounding environment. These new constructions and their environmental
effects were not covered by the old studies that respondent Province
This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of previously submitted for the construction of the original jetty port in 1999, and
mandamus, which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which it re-submitted in its application for ECC in this alleged expansion,
which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty. instead of conducting updated and more comprehensive studies.
The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs Boracay are separated only by a narrow strait. This becomes more
imperative because of the significant contributions of Boracays white-sand
beach to the countrys tourism trade, which requires respondent Province to Moreover, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides:
proceed with utmost caution in implementing projects within its vicinity. 5.3. Public Hearing / Consultation Requirements
For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the
*** EIS review is mandatory unless otherwise determined by EMB. For all other
undertakings, a public hearing is not mandatory unless specifically required
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government by EMB.
agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to
secure prior public consultation and approval of local government units for Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that
the projects described therein. environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into
consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan.
4. No. In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. All public consultations and public hearings conducted during the EIA
Even if the project proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is process are to be documented. The public hearing/consultation Process
respondent PRA which authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive reportshall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD and shall constitute part of the
agency of the government to undertake reclamation nationwide. Hence, it records of the EIA process.
was necessary for respondent Province to go through respondent PRA and
to execute a MOA, wherein respondent PRAs authority to reclaim was In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public
delegated to respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional consultations, the same should be initiated early so that concerns of
office of the DENR, is also a national government institution which is tasked stakeholders could be taken into consideration in the EIA study. In this case,
with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered by respondent Province had already filed its ECC application before it met with
environmental laws such as the one at bar. the local government units of Malay and Caticlan.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities, and is covered subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang
by the requirements found in the Local Government Code provisions. Barangay of Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Malay onFebruary 28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met achieved at the urging and insistence of respondent Province. As we have
before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological established above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned
balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultationwith the did not render this petition moot and academic.
affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the
projects implementation is illegal. promotion of tourism in Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest
they kill the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of this
5. No. Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval decision, we mentioned that there are common goals of national significance
are required by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent that are very apparent from both the petitioners and the respondents
Province. Accordingly, the information dissemination conducted months after respective pleadings and memoranda.
the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with this
requirement under the Local Government Code. Had they been conducted As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and
properly, the prior public consultation should have considered the ecological smooth resolution of these issues would benefit all the parties. Thus,
or environmental concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures respondent Provinces cooperation with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in the
alternative to the project, to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impact Court-mandated review of the proper classification and environmental impact
or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to obtain the favorable of the reclamation project is of utmost importance.
endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by the
latter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of the
GRANTED. The TEPO issued by this Court is hereby converted into a writ of project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from this
continuing mandamus specifically as follows: Court. For this purpose, the respondents shall report within five (5) days to
this Court the status of the project as of their receipt of this Decision, copy
1. Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources- furnished the petitioner.
Environmental Management Bureau Regional Office VI shall revisit and
review the following matters:
The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the respondents The Province of
Aklan, represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine
Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to
submit their respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance with
the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than three (3) months from
the date of promulgation of this Decision.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC
actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually
render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. Under the Rules, after
the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and
such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing
its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of
said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or
decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus
is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as
it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision."
FACTS: Two days after, TCSI filed Civil Case No. 98-1885 (first TCSI case) for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for Temporary
The rationale behind the requirement of a public bidding, as a mode of Restraining Order (TRO) and Injunction against Gana and Goodline
awarding government contracts, is to ensure that the people get maximum Staffers & Allied Services, Inc. (Goodline), a service contractor that was
benefits and quality services from the contracts. More significantly, the strict awarded the contract heretofore pertaining to TCSI. This was raffled to the
compliance with the requirements of a public bidding echoes the call for RTC, Branch 113, Pasay City.
transparency in government transactions and accountability of public officers.
Public biddings are intended to minimize occasions for corruption and Both Branches 113 and 119 granted TROs to OMSI and TCSI.
temptations to abuse of discretion on the part of government authorities in Subsequently, on November 18, 1998, Branch 119 granted a preliminary
awarding contracts. injunctive writ in favor of OMSI. A day after, Branch 113 also granted a
similar writ in favor of TCSI.
Before us are three separate petitions from service contractors that
question the legality of awarding government contracts without public Without filing any motion for reconsideration, MIAA assailed as void
bidding. the issuance of the injunctive writs before the CA through petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services, Meanwhile, even as the cases were pending before the CA, Branch 113
Inc. (TCSI) were among the five contractors of MIAA which had janitorial and continued to hear the first TCSI case.
maintenance service contracts covering various areas in the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport. Before their service contracts expired on October 31, TRIAL COURT DECISION:
1998, the MIAA Board of Directors, through Antonio P. Gana, then General On February 1, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring as null
Manager (GM) of MIAA, wrote OMSI and TCSI informing them that their and void the negotiated contract award to Goodline and the Resolution of
contracts would no longer be renewed after October 31, 1998. the MIAA Board dated October 2, 1998, which authorized Gana to negotiate
the award of the service contract, and ordered the holding of a public bidding
On September 28, 1998, TCSI, in a letter to Gana, expressed its concern on the janitorial service contract. Branch 113 also ordered the writ of
over the award of its concession area to a new service contractor through a preliminary injunction in the case enforced until after a qualified bidder is
negotiated contract. It said that to award TCSI’s contract by mere negotiation determined.
would violate its right to equal protection of the law. TCSI thus suggested that
a public bidding be conducted and that the effectivity of its service contract Following the denial of Gana’s motion for reconsideration, MIAA and Gana
be meanwhile extended until a winning bid is declared. appealed before the CA, their recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67092.
A similar letter from OMSI to MIAA followed. Civil Case Nos. 02-0517 and 03-0025
In reply, MIAA wrote TCSI and OMSI reiterating its disinclination to renew the During the pendency of the appeal of the first TCSI case before the CA in
latter’s contracts, adding that it was to the government’s advantage to CA-G.R. SP No. 67092, MIAA and TCSI engaged in several exchanges
instead just negotiate with other contractors. regarding payment of TCSI employees’ salaries. On October 30, 2002,
MIAA informed TCSI that it was terminating the latter’s contract effective 10 CA stated that respondents-judges did not gravely abuse their discretion in
days from receipt of the notice or on November 14, 2002. issuing the injunctive writs enjoining MIAA from terminating the service
contracts of OMSI and TCSI. Relying on Manila International Airport
TCSI protested the termination which it viewed as violative of the injunctive Authority v. Mabunay (Mabunay) and National Food Authority, the CA said
writ issued by Branch 113. In its letter-reply of November 13, 2002, MIAA that MIAA and Gana failed to satisfactorily show why the aforementioned
asserted that the termination of TCSI’s service contract did not violate the cases should not apply. Moreover, the appellate court explained that
injunctive writ as the writ covered only the extension of the contract period notwithstanding the expiration of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI,
until such time that a new awardee was chosen through public bidding.On they both have extant interests as possible applicants. Aggrieved by the CA
the eve of November 18, 2002, MIAA refused entry to TCSI employees and Decision, MIAA and Gana filed the instant petition docketed as G.R. Nos.
took over the janitorial services in the area serviced by TCSI. 146184-85.
Subsequently, on November 25, 2002, TCSI filed a Petition for Contempt THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 67092
with Motion to Consolidate, impleading Edgardo Manda who took over as
GM of MIAA. The petition, entitled Triple Crown Services, Inc. v. Edgardo Recall likewise that the RTC in the first TCSI case granted an injunctive writ
Manda, in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International in favor of TCSI. On appeal, on November 28, 2003, the CA in CA-G.R. SP
Airport Authority and docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0517 (second TCSI No. 67092 rendered the assailed Decision, affirming that of the RTC and
case for contempt), was raffled to the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City. In it, reasoning that Sec. 1(e) of EO 301, series of 1987, entitled Decentralizing
TCSI mainly alleged that the unilateral termination by MIAA of their Actions on Government Negotiated Contracts, Lease Contracts and Records
service contract on alleged contract violation brought about by MIAA’s Disposal, relied upon by Gana and MIAA, does not apply to service contracts
refusal to pay TCSI was a blatant and contumacious violation of the but only to requisitions of needed supplies. The CA applied our ruling in
injunctive writ issued by Branch 113. TCSI also prayed that the petition for Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato (Kilosbayan), where we held that the
contempt be consolidated with the first TCSI case. "supplies" mentioned as exceptions in EO 301 refer only to contracts for the
purchase of supplies, materials, and equipment, and do not refer to other
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the second TCSI case for contempt, TCSI contracts, such as lease of equipment, and that in the same vein, "supplies"
filed on January 24, 2003 a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against in Sec. 1(e) of EO 301 only include materials and equipment and not service
MIAA entitled Triple Crown Services, Inc. v. Manila International Airport contracts, which are included in the general rule of Sec. 1. The CA, relying
Authority, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0025 (third TCSI case for on Mabunay and National Food Authority, explained that Sec. 9 of EO 903,
mandamus) and again raffled to Branch 115, wherein TCSI sought to Sec. 82 of RA 8522, and Sec. 417 of the GAAM must be harmonized with the
maintain the status quo order issued by Branch 113 in the first TCSI case provisions of EO 301 on public biddings in all government contracted
and to compel MIAA to pay PhP 18 million to TCSI. services. The rationale for public bidding, the CA said, is to give the public
the best possible advantages through open competition.
In its Comment, MIAA denied all of TCSI’s allegations and accused
TCSI of forum shopping. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Gana and MIAA now question the
above Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 67092 through a
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE CONSOLIDATED Petition for Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 161117 before us.
CASES DOCKETED
CA-G.R. SP NOS. 50087 AND 50131 INVOLVING THE INJUNCTIVE THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 76138
WRITS On September 9, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting
ISSUED IN THE OMSI CASE AND FIRST TCSI CASE MIAA’s petition for certiorari. It annulled and set aside the March 4, 2003
Order and March 19, 2003 Writ of Mandamus and dismissed the third TCSI
Recall that MIAA assailed the injunctive writs issued by the trial court thru case for mandamus with prejudice. The CA found TCSI guilty of forum
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP shopping when it filed the third TCSI case for mandamus while the second
Nos. 50087 and 50131. On November 24, 2000, the CA rendered the TCSI case for contempt was pending. Further, the CA observed that the two
assailed Decision, denying due course to and dismissing the petitions. The cases have identical parties, prayed for the same reliefs, and were anchored
on the same writ of preliminary injunction issued in the first TCSI case. Citing and Gana posit that the exceptions in Sec. 1 cover both contracts for public
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, the CA services and contracts for supplies, materials, and equipment. And, since
concluded that elements of litis pendentia were present and TCSI was guilty TCSI’s contract expired on October 31, 1998, and MIAA refused to extend
of forum shopping. the contracts, OMSI and TCSI have no right of renewal or extension of their
service contract.
TCSI’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the April 13, 2005
CA Resolution. TCSI now assails the above Decision and Resolution before We agree with MIAA and Gana.
us in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 docketed as G.R. No.
167827. It is undisputed that the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI expired on
October 31, 1998 and were not extended by MIAA. Hence, all the rights and
ISSUES: obligations arising from said contracts were extinguished on the last day of
In G.R. No. 167827, TCSI raises the following issues for our consideration: the term. As a result, OMSI and TCSI had already lost their rights to render
janitorial and maintenance services for MIAA starting November 1, 1998.
I. Whether or not the respondent can be compelled by Mandamus to
maintain the status quo ante, as earlier ordered by this Honorable Court and Such being the case, the Court rules that the TROs and writs of preliminary
be held liable for damages for unilaterally terminating the service contract of injunction issued in favor of OMSI and TCSI are irregular and without legal
the petitioner in violation of said status quo order. basis. The November 18, 1998 injunctive writ in favor of OMSI in the OMSI
case and the November 19, 1998 injunctive writ in favor of TCSI in the first
II. Whether or not the herein petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. TCSI case were in the nature of writs of mandatory preliminary injunction.
In Bautista v. Barcelona, we made clear that a mandatory injunction is an
III. Whether or not the herein private respondent complied with the requisites extreme remedy and will be granted only on a showing that (a) the invasion
for the institution of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear
Appeals. and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. It is apparent that OMSI and TCSI have no
HELD: more legal rights under the service contracts and, therefore, they have not
PROPRIETY OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE INJUNCTIONS met the vital procedural requirement that they must have material and
substantial rights that have to be protected by courts.
The Court will jointly tackle G.R. Nos. 146184-85 and 161117 since the
issues raised are closely interwoven. The incidents in the two assailed It is undisputed that the service contracts were to terminate on October 31,
decisions not only arose from the first TCSI case, but also involved the same 1998. Thus, by the lapse of such date, where no contract extension had been
issue of the propriety of preliminary and permanent injunctions. mutually agreed upon by the parties, the trial court cannot force the
parties nor substitute their mutual consent to a contract extension
MIAA and Gana strongly assert that OMSI and TCSI have no right to be through an injunction.
protected by the injunctive writs as the term of their service contracts had Indeed, MIAA’s decision not to extend the service contracts of OMSI
already expired on October 31, 1998. Petitioners rely on National Food and TCSI is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Certainly, there
Authority, where we held that no court can compel a party to agree to a is no law that prohibits management discretion, even if it be a governmental
contract or its extension through an injunctive writ since an extension of a agency or instrumentality or a government-owned or controlled corporation,
contract is only upon mutual consent of the parties. from extending or not extending a service contract. Certainly, MIAA’s
management can determine, in the exercise of its sound discretion and the
MIAA and Gana also argue that OMSI and TCSI are estopped from options available, given the factual and economic milieu prevailing, whether
questioning the validity of a contract acquired through negotiations or not it is to its interest to extend a service contract for janitorial and
since the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI with MIAA were also maintenance services.
negotiated contracts and did not undergo public bidding. These
negotiated contracts are among the exceptions in Sec. 1 of EO 301. MIAA
From the foregoing premises, the RTCs in Civil Case Nos. 98-1875 and
98-1885 have erred in issuing the assailed writs of mandatory MIAA RAISED ISSUES ALLEGING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
injunction. Hence, these writs must be nullified. ON THE PART OF THE RTC
The next issue to be resolved is whether MIAA, in the context of this case, TCSI argues that MIAA only raised factual matters before the CA which the
can be barred from entering into negotiated contracts after the trial court has ruled upon in the exercise of its jurisdiction and thus are not
expiration of the service contracts of OMSI and TCSI on October 31, reviewable by certiorari but only by appeal.
1998. Contrary to TCSI’s contention, a close perusal of the issues raised by MIAA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76138 shows that not all the issues the latter raised were
The answer is in the affirmative. factual issues. MIAA assailed the lack or excess of jurisdiction of the RTC
resulting from grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned orders.
Abuse of discretion is precisely the thrust in a petition for certiorari under
CERTIORARI IS A PROPER REMEDY FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY Rule 65.
ORDER
GRANTING MANDAMUS (THIRD TCSI CASE FOR MANDAMUS)
The March 4, 2003 and March 19, 2003 Orders granting mandamus and FORUM SHOPPING EXISTS
denying MIAA’s motion for reconsideration, respectively, are clearly TCSI contends that the CA committed reversible error when it held TCSI
interlocutory orders. What we held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. resorted to forum shopping. TCSI argues it was not guilty of forum shopping
Court of Appeals is instructive, thus: when it filed the second TCSI case for contempt and the third TCSI case for
mandamus. According to TSCI, as these are two distinct and separate cases,
It has been held that "[a]n interlocutory order does not terminate or the elements of litis pendentia amounting to res judicata do not exist.
finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits." TCSI’s contention is devoid of merit.
It "refers to something between the commencement and end of the
suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
on the whole controversy." Conversely, a final order is one which when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the case. The test There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of
to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: "Does it the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is
merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
final." particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
TCSI argues that since the trial court still has to hear the issue on damages pendentia.
in Civil Case No. 03-0025 for mandamus and no final decision has yet been
rendered, the mandamus writ is an interlocutory one, and cannot be subject We uphold the CA’s finding that TCSI was guilty of forum shopping.
of an appeal. However, Rule 41 clearly states that while an interlocutory
order cannot be subject of an appeal and the aggrieved party has to await If the first TCSI case for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Damages with Prayer
the decision of the court, still it allows the filing of a special civil action of for TRO and Injunction would not be considered in determining whether
certiorari under Rule 65 when there is grave abuse of discretion in the forum shopping was resorted to by TCSI when it subsequently filed the
issuance of the order. Moreover, under the circumstances of the case, second TCSI case for contempt and the third TCSI case for mandamus, then
MIAA had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than a there could have been merit in TCSI’s claim of non-forum shopping. The fact,
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. however, is the second and third TCSI cases stemmed from the first TCSI
case, anchored as they were on the alleged breach by MIAA of the
November 19, 1998 writ of preliminary injunction. Such being the case, the
court a quo did not err when it ruled that the reliefs in the second and third
TCSI cases in effect prayed for the enforcement of the November 19, 1998
injunctive writ. Moreover, the causes of action in the second and third cases
are substantially identical because the basis is the disobedience or breach of
the writ of injunction. Hence, forum shopping is present.
The petition in G.R. No. 167827 is DENIED for lack of merit and the
September 9, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76138 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 35
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of HELD: YES. The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.
Manila Bay Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand,
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008 and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
Rule 65 concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act
DOCTRINE: The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
ministerial duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither official discretion compelled by mandamus.
nor judgment.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set
FACTS: Some concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government agencies for the clean-up, charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system
rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated; discretion
the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
set by law such as those set out by the Philippine Environment Code or PD officially according to their judgment or conscience.
1152.
The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to
the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for cleaning, and
asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be
compelled by mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do
tasks outside of their usual basic functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not
ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus