Soliven vs.

Makasiar

Constitutional Law; Due Process; Preliminary Investigation; Due process does not require that respondent
in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits, all that is required is for said respondent to be given
an opportunity to submit his counteraffidavits.—It may also be added that with respect to petitioner
Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the
fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed,"
in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filling counter-affidavits. Due process of law does
not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

Same; Bill of Rights; Warrant of Arrest; Probable Cause, Determination of; Personal Examination by the
Judge; Based on Circular No. 12, to satisfy the existence of probable cause for issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge may rely on the report of the fiscal, and need not personally examine the complainant
and the latter's witnesses.—What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. On June 30,1978, the Supreme
Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of
arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.

Same; Executive Department; The President; Immunity from Suit; The presidential privilege of immunity
from suit may be invoked only by the holder of the office; and not by any other person in the President's
behalf.—The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's
time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.
Lim, Sr. vs. Felix

Political Law; Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrant of Arrest; Probable Cause; A judge may rely
upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of a probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest. The certification however, does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of
arrest.—This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled
that a judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the “search and seizure” provision of the 1973
Constitution which provides: “x x x no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce x x x.” We ruled: “x x x The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for
the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Warrant of arrest, when issued.—If the judge be
satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the
offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable grbund to believe that the
accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest. Under this section, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on
the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification
and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v.
Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned
orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the
information filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination
of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required
affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he was
satisfied that probable cause existed.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In satisfying the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and witness.—What
the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him iii arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Meaning of “personal determination by the judge”; The phrase
“personal determination by the judge” means, the determination of probable cause is a function of
the judge; second, the preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge; and third,
judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.—The decision in People v.
Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated the above interpretation of
“personal” determination by the Judge: “We emphasize important features of the constitutional
mandate that “xxxno search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge x x x’ (Article III, Section 2, Constitution) First, the determination of
probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the
Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. Second,
the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to
him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. And third,
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrasment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RTC judges no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
investigations, said authority was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Neither
did the 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure restore that authority to judges of
the RTCs.—The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [1989]): ‘Judges of
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443,
cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984)
which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. We had occasion to point this out in
Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely:
(1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is ‘not a judicial function x x x (but) part of the
prosecution’s job, a function of the executive,’(2) that whenever ‘there are enough fiscals or prosecutors
to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially
executive to them,’ and the fact ‘that a certain power is granted does not necessary mean that it should
be indiscriminately exercised. The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared
effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of
October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did
not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a
preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power—indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a
power—has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935,
the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. The
distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary
investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or
information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether
there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this
distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in
restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be judicial in nature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation
be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is a probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.—x x x in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September
18, 1990) there is a statement that the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the
information by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who
conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also
reiterated that “xxx the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted
to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.”
(Section 2, Article III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor’s certification
presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the
Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the
recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because
of the records which sustain it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent judge committed a grave error when he issued the
questioned order without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the
existence of a probable cause.—Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he
relied solely on the Prosecutor’s certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990
without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause.

Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz

Remedial law; Search warrant; Procedure for the issuance warrant; Examination of the complainant and
witnesses by the judge himself.—The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, required by Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself and net by others. The implementing
rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the
judge, before issuing a search warrant, to personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause,
pursuant to Art. 111, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon probable cause.” The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a
judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the
contrary

Same; Same; Deposition taken by Deputy Clerk of Court does not comply with constitutional mandate.—
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s reading of her notes, to a few words of
warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be considered as a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the
complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But the
Constitution and the rules required a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of
the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention. The reading of the
stenographic notes to respondent judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent judge did not have opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which
the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important
in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable
cause.

Same; Same; Search warrant to issue for one specific offense. —The Supreme Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court, that “a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense.” Not satisfied with this qualification, the Supreme Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that “no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.”

Same; Same; Particular description of things to be seized.— Under Art. 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and
of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, the warrant should particularly describe the things to
be seized.

Same; Seizure; Seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions not a particular description.—
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights—that the things to be seized be particularly
described —as well as tending to defeat its major objective; the elimination of general warrants.
Same; Same; Purpose of particular description of things to be seized.—A search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and
intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant—to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that “unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made,—that
abuses may not be committed.

Same; Same; Where there is a particular description of things to be seized.—A search warrant may be
said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact—not of law—
by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and
the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.

Special civil action; Certiorari; When motion for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the institution of
petition for certiorari.—When the questions raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those
which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is no longer a
prerequisite. The rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ
of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances. The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due
process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with
nullity.

Remedial law; Search and seizures; Right of corporation against unreasonable searches and seizures.—A
corporation is entitled to immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after
all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of
law, and is protected against unlawful discrimination.

Same; Same; Who can contest legality of seizure.—It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
Roan vs. Gonzales

Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Words and Phrases; “Probable cause” defined—Probable cause was
described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff as referring to “such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” As
held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.

Same; Same;Judge should not limit his inquiry on complainant’s affidavit only.—By his own account, all
he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only “to ascertain, among others, if
he knew and understood the same,” and only because “the application was not yet subseribed aad
swora to.” The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had
already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching
questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant’s deposition
in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.