2017 BAR EXAMINATIONS

POINTERS IN CIVIL LAW

based on Bersamin Cases and Latest Jurisprudence
Atty. Victoria V. Loanzon
with the assistance of Atty. Martin Syjuco

PART I – GENERAL PRINCIPLES

I. Effect and Application of Laws (Civil Code)

Include: Conflict of Laws (Private International Law)

Article 3 – Ignorance of the law

MIRALLOSA v. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC., GR No. 194538, 27
November 2013 [Sereno, C.J.]
Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should
be on one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other,
ignorantia. legis non excusat.

Article 4 – Retroactivity
SPOUSES DACUDAO v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 188056
January 8, 2013 [Bersamin, J.]
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions
exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The
reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing
rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.

Article 5, NCC - Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws

BEUMER v. AMORES, GR No. 195670, 3 December 2012 [Perlas-Bernabe,
J.]
An alien cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that
he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against
foreign ownership of land.
The Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a
rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all.

Article 15 – Nationality Principle

FUJIKI v. MARINAY, GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013 [Carpio, J.]
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

Page | 1
 A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into
the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven
in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. ,
"want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of
other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not
involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his
or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which
are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General,
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."

II. Human Relations (Arts. 19-22, Civil Code)

Exclude: Independent civil actions and prejudicial questions which will be
covered by the examinations in Remedial Law

Article 19 – Abuse of Rights

Elizabeth L. Diaz v. Georgina R. Encanto, et al., GR No. 171303, 20 January
2016 [Leanardo-De Castro, J.]
Article 19 of the Civil Code “prescribes a ‘primordial limitation on all rights’ by
setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof.” Abuse of
Page | 2
 right under Article 19 exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is
a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held
liable for any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. “The law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal wrong.
Situations like this have been appropriately denominated damnum absque
injuria.

Article 22 – Unjust Enrichment

DOMINGO GONZALO vs. JOHN TARNATE, JR., G.R. No. 160600 15 January
2014 [BERSAMIN, J.]
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public
policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very
person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." It is well to note that
Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social
order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through
society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway
and dominance of justice."

PART II – PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

I. Persons and Personality (Civil Code)
II. Marriage (Family Code)
Exclude:
1. Muslim Code (P.D. 1083)
2. Duties of a Civil Registrar under Articles 12-19, 23-25 (Family Code)
3. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages; R.A. No. 6955, entitled “An
Act to Declare Unlawful the Practice of Matching Filipino Women for Marriage
to Foreign Nationals on a Mail Order Basis and Other Similar Practices xxx”.
R.A. No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003

Void Marriages
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594.
November 12, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a
spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not
enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.
The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively
Page | 3
 incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be
shown.
The pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential
guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse.
But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological
incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should
be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity.

NOEL A. LASANAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 159031 23

June 2014 [BERSAMIN, J.]
The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to
contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to
wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee
which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also
for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Renato A. Castillo v. Lea P. De Leon Castillo, GR No. 189607, 18 April 2016

[Sereno, C.J.]
Considering that their marriage was celebrated in 1979, or prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the applicable law is the Civil Code, which
does not require a judicial declaration of nullity before a person can remarry. The
validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage.

Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines, GR No. 187462, 1 June 2016

[Peralta, J.]
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.

III. Legal Separation (Family Code)

Exclude: A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, or the Rule on Legal Separation
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594.
November 12, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
Abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under
the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being
instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code.
IV. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Family Code)
Exclude: R.A. No. 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building
Act; R.A. No. 8187, or the Paternity Leave Act of 1996; R.A. No. 9710, or the
Magna Carta of Women

V. Property Relations of the Spouses (Family Code)

Exclude: Summary Judicial Proceedings in Family Law Cases
PNB v. Venancio C. Reyes, Jr. GR No. 212483, 5 October 2016 [Leonen, J.]
Page | 4
 The real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the non-contracting
spouse did not give consent.
The Family Code is clear: the written consent of the spouse who did not
encumber the property is necessary before any disposition or encumbrance of a
conjugal property can be valid.
It is not disputed that the Reyes Spouses were married in 1973, before the
Family Code took effect. Under the Family Code, their property regime is
Conjugal Partnership of Gains; thus, Article 124 is the applicable provision
regarding the administration of their conjugal property. It states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one
spouse must be consented to by the other; otherwise, it is void.

Article 122 provides:

ARTICLE 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed
upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded to
the benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that respondent's wife
Lilia contracted, but not to the mortgage.
There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case,
the wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business and the other is
when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or guarantor,
evidence that the family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the
conjugal partnership can be held liable. On the other hand, if the loan was taken
out to be used for the family business, there is no need to prove actual benefit.
The law presumes the family benefited from the loan and the conjugal
partnership is held liable.

According to petitioner, the Regional Trial Court found that the loan was used as
additional working capital for respondent's printing business. As held in Ayala
Investment, since the loaned money is used in the husband's business, there is a
presumption that it redounded to the benefit of the family; hence, the conjugal

Page | 5
 partnership may be held liable for the loan amount. Since there is a legal
presumption to this effect, there is no need to prove actual benefit to the family.
In Philippine National Bank v. Banatao, "a mortgage is merely an accessory
agreement and does not affect the principal contract of loan. The mortgages,
while void, can still be considered as instruments evidencing the indebtedness[.]"

Conjugal property
Sps. Rex and Concepcion Aggabao vs. Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. and Ma.
Elena Parulan, G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010. [Bersamin, J.]
What law applies to a sale or purported sale of a conjugal property entered into
after the Family Code’s effectivity? The Family Code, even if the couple owning
the conjugal property were married before the Family Code took effect.
Under the Family Code, conjugal property can only be sold with the consent of
both spouses.
For a buyer of conjugal property to be considered a purchaser in good faith, he
must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in
verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in
inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in
behalf of the other spouse.

VI. The Family (Family Code)

1. The family as an institution
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), et al. v. LEONARDO R. VEGA, et al., G.R.
No. 174727 August 12, 2013 [DEL CASTILLO, J.]
Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

2. The family home

FLORANTE VITUG vs. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA G.R. No. 201264, January

11, 2016, [Leonen, J.]
Petitioner’s property is not free from execution, forced sale, or attachment. Even
though petitioner's property has been constituted as a family home, it is not
exempt from execution. Article 155 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
debts secured by mortgages are exempted from the rule against execution,
forced sale, or attachment of family home:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale
or attachment except:
xxx
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution [.]
Since petitioner's property was voluntarily used by him as security for a loan he
obtained from respondent, it may be subject to execution and attachment.

VII. Paternity and Filiation (Family Code)

Exclude: A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC or Rule on DNA Evidence

VIRGINIA CALIMAG v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ G.R. No. 191936,

June 1, 2016 Reyes,J.]
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding
the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). Thus, being public documents, the
respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.

Page | 6
 NARCISO SALAS v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM G.R. No. 180284, September
11, 2013 [VILLARAMA, JR., J.]
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Certificate of Live Birth: A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the

putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. 25 Thus, if
the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.
Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged
father.
Baptismal Certificate: While baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
Pictures: Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged
father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. Exhibits “E” and “F”32 showing
petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account (Exhibit “C”) from the Good
Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the
payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the
expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity.

Handwritten Notes: As to the handwritten notes f petitioner and respondent

showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are
not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not
signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that
he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do
not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of
Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with
details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence, documentary and
testimonial” presented in Ilano.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create
an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.
Page | 7
 VIII. Adoption
A. Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (R.A. No. 8552)
1. Who can adopt
2. Who can be adopted
3. Rights of an adopted child (include Art. 189-190, Family Code)
4. Instances when adoption may be rescinded
5. Effects of recission

Exclude:
1. Rule on Adoption (A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC)
2. R.A. No. 9523, entitled “An Act Requiring Certification of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development to Declare a ‘Child
Legal Available for Adoption’ as a Prerequisite for Adoption
Proceedings xxx.”
B. Inter-Country Adoption Act of 11995 (R.A. No. 8043)
1. When allowed
2. Who can adopt
3. Who can be adopted
C. Distinction between domestic adoption and inter-country adoption
Exclude: Articles 183-188, 191-193 (Family Code)

IX. Support (Family Code)

Mabugay-Otamias, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, GR No. 189516, 8
June 2016 [Leonen, J.]
A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of assignment
drawn by him granting support to his wife and five (5) children. The benefit of
exemption from execution of pension benefits is a statutory right that may be
waived, especially in order to comply with a husband's duty to provide support
under Article XV of the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code.
This Court has recognized the importance of granting support to minor children,
provided that the filiation of the child is proven. In this case, the filiation of Jeffren
M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias was admitted by Colonel Otamias in the
Deed of Assignment.

Even before the passage of the Family Code, this Court has given primary
consideration to the right of a child to receive support provided that the filiation of
the child is proven.

SUSAN LIM-LUA vs. DANILO Y. LUA, G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
[VILLARAMA, JR., J.]
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from
school, or to and from place of work.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce
decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children
and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he
cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made
directly to the children. However, special considerations of an equitable nature
Page | 8
 may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother,
when that can be done without injustice to her.

X. Parental Authority (Family Code)

Include: Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610), specifically Sec 10 (c).
Exclude:
1. Rule on Guardianship of Minors (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
2. Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-SC)
3. Solo Parents’ Welfare Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8972)
4. The Early Childhood Care and Development Act (R.A. No. 8980)
5. R.A. No. 9231, entitled “An Act Providing for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labor and Affording Stronger Protection for the Working
Child xxx,” which will be covered under Labor Law

GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., A.M. No.

RTJ-12-2326 January 30, 2013 [VELASCO, JR., J.]
As aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody
agreement can never be regarded as ‘permanent and unbending,’ the simple
reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change,
such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s
best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a
minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.”
In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule
is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over
7 years of age, the child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be
under custody shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit.
Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals, We held that in custody cases, the foremost
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in
no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that
‘in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.’”

XI. Emancipation (Art. 234 and 236, Family Code, as amended by R.A. No.
6809 which lowered the age of majority)
XII. Retroactivity of the Family Code (Art. 256)
Exclude: Arts.254-255, 257 (Family Code)
XIII. Funerals (Arts. 305-310, Civil Code)
Exclude: Care and Education of Children (Arts. 353-364, Civil Code)

FE FLORO VALINO, v. ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, et al. G.R. No. 182894 April

22, 2014 [MENDOZA, J.]
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family
Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order
established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants
of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better
right.
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

Page | 9
 Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred,
disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons
mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The
immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person,
regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall
devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of
the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she
possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, the Court ruled that
xxx Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally married
in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty.
Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario
had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The
right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children
when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more
often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member
joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no
time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days
so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon
as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December
19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately
contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but
to no avail.

XIV. Use of Surnames

Arts.364-380, Civil Code (other articles not repealed by Family Code)
Include: R.A. No. 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of Their Father)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY
UY, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013 [PERALTA, J.]
Where substantial changes in the birth Certificate are sought for, all parties that
stand to be affected by the change must be impleaded in the Petition. In this
case, Nora sought the correction of her first name and surname, her status from
“legitimate” to “illegitimate” and her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino.” Thus,
she should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but
also her parents and siblings because her relationship with them will be
substantially affected by such corrections.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court mandates
two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons
named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in
the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
Summons must, therefore, be served on them not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due
process affording the person/s concerned with the opportunity to protect their
interest if they so choose.

Page | 10
 Failure to implead indispensable parties in Petitions seeking substantial and
controversial alterations such as legitimacy of marriage, citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, would open the doors to fraud or other mischief, the
consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching

XV. Absence
1. Art. 41, Family Code
2. Art. 381-389, Civil Code
3. Art. 390-392, Civil Code (Presumption of Death)

PART III – PROPERTY

I. Characteristics
II. Classification
III. Ownership
Possession as right of the owner
Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata Abobon, et al.; G.R. No. 155830,
August 15, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
It is beyond question under the law that the owner has not only the right to enjoy
and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law, but
also the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it. He may exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal of the
thing, and, for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property.

Mirror Doctrine; Innocent Purchaser for Value

SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES CUSI v. LILIA V. DOMINGO,
G.R. No. 195825 February 27, 2013; RAMONA LIZA L. DE VERA v. LILIA V.
DOMINGO AND SPOUSES RADELIA AND ALFRED SY, G.R. No. 195871
[BERSAMIN, J.]
Under the Torrens system, therefore, "a person dealing in registered land has the
right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry".
Under the Torrens system of land registration, the registered owner of realty
cannot be deprived of her property through fraud, unless a transferee acquires
the property as an innocent purchaser for value. A transferee who acquires the
property covered by a reissued owner's copy of the certificate of title without
taking the ordinary precautions of honest persons in doing business and
examining the records of the proper Registry of Deeds, or who fails to pay the full
market value of the property is not considered an innocent purchaser for value.
As the purchasers of the property, they also came under the clear obligation to
purchase the property not only in good faith but also for value.
Therein lay the problem. The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in
their vigilance as buyers of the property. It was not enough for them to show that
the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it would be too easy for any
registered owner to lose her property, including its possession, through illegal
occupation. Nor was it safe for them to simply rely on the face of Sy’s TCT No.
186142 in view of the fact that they were aware that her TCT was derived
from a duplicate owner’s copy reissued by virtue of the loss of the original
duplicate owner’s copy. That circumstance should have already alerted them to
the need to inquire beyond the face of Sy’s TCT No. 186142. There were other
circumstances, like the almost simultaneous transactions affecting the property
within a short span of time, as well as the gross undervaluation of the property in
the deeds of sale, ostensibly at the behest of Sy to minimize her liabilities for the
capital gains tax, that also excited suspicion, and required them to be extra-
cautious in dealing with Sy on the property.
Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious
advantage of another. It means the "freedom from knowledge and circumstances
which ought to put a person on inquiry."

Page | 11
 Given this notion of good faith, therefore, a purchaser in good faith is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same. As an
examination of the records shows, the petitioners were not innocent purchasers
in good faith and for value. Their failure to investigate Sy's title despite the nearly
simultaneous transactions on the property that ought to have put them on inquiry
manifested their awareness of the flaw in Sy's title. That they did not also appear
to have paid the full price for their share of the property evinced their not having
paid true value.

CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MATEO, GR No. 175485, July

27, 2011 [Bersamin, J.]
To start with, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system
need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of
title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated
on the title.
The vendees notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in order for it to
amount to bad faith, should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel
a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiry into the vendors title, or
facts and circumstances that would induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in litigation. In other words, the presence
of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to
look beyond the certificate and to investigate the title of the vendor appearing on
the face of said certificate.

ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN v. NORMITA PADLAOAN, et al.

G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016; [Brion, J.]
One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system has a right to
rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title and need not inquire
further as to the property's ownership. A buyer is charged with notice only of the
claims annotated on the title. The Torrens system was adopted to best guarantee
the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.

IV. Accession
Accretion
REX DACLISON v. EDUARDO BAYTION G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016;
[Mendoza, J]
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters. The following requisites must concur in order
for an accretion to be considered, namely: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
and, (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers.
Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos,
Jr. G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012 [Bersamin, J.]
By law, accretion – the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the
effects if the current of the water – belongs to the owner if the land adjacent to
the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion.
Hence, the dried-up riverbed belongs to the State as property of public dominion,
not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other
person.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of
soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that
pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the
deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest has no applicability
herein. This is simply because the lot was not formed through accretion. Hence
the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of the subject lot that
would ripen to acquisitive prescription.
Page | 12
 Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument that respondents possessed the
subject lot for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not
thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any
competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable
by the government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as
part of its public dominion.

V. Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud

over Title or Interest in Real Property
HEIRS OF DELFIN AND MARIA TAPPA v. HEIRS OF BACUD,
CALABAZARON, AND MALUPENG, G.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016;
[Jardaleza, J.]
The two requirements for the successful prosecution of a quieting of title case, as
laid down in Articles 476 and 477, are not present, mainly: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or
record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or
effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.

VI. Co-ownership

SPOUSES PRIMO AND JULIANA INALVEZ v. BAYANG NOOL, et al. G.R. No.
188145, April 18, 2016; [Velasco, Jr., J.]
Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to
any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust
is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. Evidently, a
coownership existed between the parties prior to the foreclosure and
consolidation of title in favor of TDB and the subsequent re-acquisition thereof by
the petitioners.
Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the
alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. In case of foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission only of
whatever rights the seller had over of the thing sold. Indeed, a co-owner does
not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the former’s knowledge and
consent as in the case at bar. The mortgage of the inherited property is not
binding against co-heirs who never benefited. When the subject property was
sold to and consolidated in the name of TDB, the latter merely held the subject
property in trust for the respondents. When the petitioners and Spouses Baluyot
bought back the subject property, they merely stepped into the shoes of TDB and
acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.

HEIRS OF FELICIANO YAMBAO v. HEIRS OF HERMOGENES YAMBAO G.R.

No. 194260, April 13, 2016; [Reyes, J.]
A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other.
Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession
of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or
co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and
he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-
owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property.
Prescription may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned property by the other co-
owner/s. In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the
Page | 13
 cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that
he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners; and (3) that
the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear
repudiation of any trust. In such a case, an action to demand partition among co-
owners prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of the
issuance of certificate of title over the property. But this rule applies only when
the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be
the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to demand
partition does not prescribe.

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) vs. HEIRS

OF GAVINA IJORDAN, ET AL. G.R. No. 173140, January 11, 2016, [C.J.
Sereno]
Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name
of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right
to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who
has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting
party.
But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with
respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square
meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As
ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:
x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who
did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other
disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the thing owned in common.

ROSARIO VICTORIA AND ELMA PIDLAOAN v. NORMITA PADLAOAN, et al.

G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016; [Brion, J.]
Mere construction of a house on another's land does not create a co-ownership.
Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that co-ownership exists when the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Verily, a
house and a lot are separately identifiable properties and can pertain to different
owners, as in this case: the house belongs to Rosario and the lot to Elma.
Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on another's land in
good faith, the land owner may either: (a) appropriate the works as his own after
paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. The law
does not force the parties into a co-ownership.

HEIRS OF THE LATE GERRY ECARMA v. COURT OF APPEAS AND

RENATO A. ECARMA G.R. No. 191936, June 1, 2016; [Reyes, J.]
The oppositors to the partition cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in
perpetual co-ownership over the subject properties. Notwithstanding the
objections of the oppositors, the latter cannot compel other co-heirs to remain in
perpetual co-ownership over the subject properties as expressly provided by
Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code. As mere co-owners, herein petitioners,
representing the share of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other
owners likewise compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda,
from exercising all incidences of their full ownership.

ANGELES v. PASCUAL GR No. 157150 September 21, 2011 [Bersamin, J.]

Article 448 contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith
on land owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or
plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and
declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith. We cannot veer away from their
Page | 14
 unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles
insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists
in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his
ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.
With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual,
and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil
Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well
as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being the
principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the
owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or
obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the
insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of
good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of
the Civil Code.

VII. Possession
VIII. Usufruct
IX. Easements
HELEN CALIMOSO, et al. vs. AXEL D. ROULLO G.R. No. 198594, January
25, 2016, [Brion, J.]
To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites should be
met:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
and
4. The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established
on the tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and
where the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance
and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the
past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest
distance criterion.
We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer
way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there
are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way."

X. Nuisance
CRUZ vs. PANDACAN HIKER’S CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 188213, January 11,
2016, [Velasco, Jr., J.]
The basketball ring can be considered, at most, as a nuisance per accidens.
There is a nuisance when there is “any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health
or safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property.” But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence
recognizes that the term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied
to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in
person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort.
A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2)
according to its susceptibility to summary abatement.
As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a
nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which “affects a
Page | 15
 community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although
the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal”; or (b) a private nuisance, or one “that is not included in the foregoing
definition” which, in jurisprudence, is one which “violates only private rights and
produces damages to but one or a few persons.”
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal
summary abatement, in which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when
it affects the immediate safety of persons and property, which may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per accidens,
which “depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance;” it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and
may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.
There is no factual finding that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se that is
susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what appears in the records,
it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an
immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property, the definition of a
nuisance per se.
But even if it is assumed, ex gratia argumenti, that the basketball ring was a
nuisance per se, but without posing any immediate harm or threat that required
instantaneous action, the destruction or abatement performed by petitioners
failed to observe the proper procedure for such an action which puts the said act
into legal question.
Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including one without judicial
proceedings, of a public nuisance is the responsibility of the district health officer.
Under Article 702 of the Code, the district health officer is also the official who
shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the
best remedy against a public nuisance. The two articles do not mention that the
chief executive of the local government, like the Punong Barangay, is authorized
as the official who can determine the propriety of a summary abatement.
Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is
specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing
a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is
necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the
property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer
and executed with the assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three
thousand pesos.

XI. Modes of Acquiring Ownership

XII. Donations

Prescription
I. Definition
II. Acquisitive and Extinctive Prescription
III. Instances when prescription is not allowed
IV. Prescription or limitation of actions

SPOUSES VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.

185757, March 2, 2016; [Velasco, Jr., J.]
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through
mistake or fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based
on an implied trust generally prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point of which
is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of
title over the property.
Page | 16
 Under the Public Land Act, no sale or encumbrance of the homestead within 5
years shall be allowed.
UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS,
ET AL. G.R. No. 194964, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
The prescriptive period for actions on mortgages is ten (10) years from the day
they may be brought. Actions on mortgages may be brought not upon the
execution of the mortgage contract but upon default in payment of the obligation
secured by the mortgage. A debtor is considered in default when he or she fails
to pay the obligation on due date and, subject to exceptions, after demands for
payment were made by the creditor.
As a general rule, a person defaults and prescriptive period for action runs when:
(1) the obligation becomes due and demandable; and
(2) demand for payment has been made.
In other words, prescriptive period runs from the date of demand, subject to
certain exceptions.
Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, prescription of actions may be interrupted
by (1) the filing of a court action; (2) a written extrajudicial demand; and (3) the
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

PART IV – OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Obligations
I. Definition, Elements
II. Sources of Obligation
III. Nature and Effects of Obligations

Article 1169 – When demand by creditor is not necessary in order that delay may
exist

VICENTE D. CABANTING and LALINE V. CABANTING vs. BPI FAMILY

SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 201927, February 17, 2016, [Peralta, J.]
Article 1169 (1) of the Civil Code allows a party to waive the need for notice and
demand. In this case the PN with Chattel Mortgage clearly stipulated that notice
and demand are being waived. Petitioners are bound by the said stipulation.

Reciprocal Obligations
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL
AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [Bersamin, J.]
Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its
obligation, the other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected of it
while the other's obligation remains unfulfilled. In other words, the latter party
does not incur delay.
It is true that loans are often secured by a mortgage constituted on real or
personal property to protect the creditor's interest in case of the default of the
debtor. By its nature, however, a mortgage remains an accessory contract
dependent on the principal obligation, such that enforcement of the mortgage
contract will depend on whether or not there has been a violation of the principal
obligation. While a creditor and a debtor could regulate the order in which
they should comply with their reciprocal obligations, it is presupposed that
in a loan the lender should perform its obligation - the release of the full
loan amount - before it could demand that the borrower repay the loaned
amount.

Article 1170 – Remedies for Breach of Obligations – Damages

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION,*Petitioner, v. MA. ANTONIA R.
ARMOVIT, Respondent. G.R. No. 163654, October 08, 2014 [Bersamin, J.]
The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card
membership agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between
the parties. In case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
Page | 17
 purpose or moral obliquity. However, a conscious or intentional design need not
always be present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to
amount to malice or bad faith. Hence, bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of
the Civil Code includes gross negligence.

IV. Kinds of Obligations

1. Pure and Conditional
Article 1191 – Judicial Rescission
SPS. ALEXANDER and JULIE LAM vs. KODAK PHILIPPINES, LTD. G.R. No.
167615, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
Rescission under Article 1191 has the effect of mutual restitution. Both parties
must be restored to their original situation as far as practicable, as if the contract
was never entered into. The effect of rescission under Article 1191 is to bring the
parties back to their original positions before the contract was entered into.
When rescission is sought under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, it need not be
judicially invoked because the power to resolve is implied in reciprocal
obligations. The right to resolve allows an injured party to minimize the damages
he or she may suffer on account of the other party’s failure to perform what is
incumbent upon him or her.
When a party fails to comply with his or her obligation, the other party’s right to
resolve the contract is triggered. The resolution immediately produces legal
effects if the non-performing party does not question the resolution. Court
intervention only becomes necessary when the party who allegedly failed to
comply with his or her obligation disputes the resolution of the contract.

NISSAN CAR LEASE PHILS., INC. vs. LICA MANAGEMENT, INC. and
PROTON PILIPINAS, INC. G.R. No. 201417, January 13, 2016, [Jardeleza, J.]
A contract can be rescinded extra-judicially despite the absence of a special
contractual stipulation therefor.
Art. 1191 provides that the power to rescind is implied in reciprocal obligations, in
cases where one of the obligors should fail to comply with what is incumbent
upon him. Otherwise stated, an aggrieved party is not prevented from extra-
judicially rescinding a contract to protect its interests, even in the absence of any
provision expressly providing for such right.
The rationale for this rule is that the law definitely does not require that the
contracting party who believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a
judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the
party injured by the other's breach will have to passively sit and watch its
damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until the final judgment of
rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he should exercise due
diligence to minimize its own damages (Civil Code, Article 2203).
2. Obligations with a Period
3. Alternative Obligations
4. Joint and Solidary Obligations
5. Divisible and Indivisible Obligations

SPS. ALEXANDER and JULIE LAM vs. KODAK PHILIPPINES, LTD. G.R. No.
167615, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
This intent must prevail even though the articles involved are physically
separable and capable of being paid for and delivered individually, consistent
with the New Civil Code:
Article 1225. For the purposes of the preceding articles, obligations
to give definite things and those which are not susceptible of partial
performance shall be deemed to be indivisible.
When the obligation has for its object the execution of a certain
number of days of work, the accomplishment of work by metrical
units, or analogous things which by their nature are susceptible of
partial performance, it shall be divisible.
However, even though the object or service may be physically
divisible, an obligation is indivisible if so provided by law or
intended by the parties.

Page | 18
 In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, the indivisibility of an obligation is tested against
whether it can be the subject of partial performance:
An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in
parts, whatever may be the nature of the thing which is the object
thereof. The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not to the
object thereof.

6. Obligations with a Penal Clause

V. Extinguishment of Obligations
1. Payment or Performance
Article 1245 – Dacion en pago
SPOUSES ROBERTO and ADELAIDA PEN vs. SPOUSES SANTOS and
LINDA JULIAN G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016, [Bersamin, J.]
For a valid dacion en pago to transpire, the attendance of the following elements
must be established, namely:
(a) the existence of a money obligation;
(b) the alienation to the creditor of a property by the debtor with the consent of
the former; and
(c) the satisfaction of the money obligation of the debtor.
To have a valid dacion en pago, therefore, the alienation of the property must
fully extinguish the debt.

2. Loss of the Thing Due

3. Condonation or remission of debt
4. Confusion or merger of rights of creditor and debtor
5. Compensation
6. Novation
ROBERTO R. DAVID, vs. EDUARDO C. DAVID G.R. No. 162365 January 15,
2014 [Bersamin, J.]
The issue of novation involves a question of fact, as it necessarily requires the
factual determination of the existence of the various requisites of novation,
namely: (a) there must be a previous valid obligation; (b) the parties concerned
must agree to a new contract; (c) the old contract must be extinguished; and (d)
there must be a valid new contract.
Heirs of Servando Franco vs. Sps. Veronica & Danilo Gonzales; G.R. No.
159709, June 27, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
A novation arises when there is a substitution of an obligation by a subsequent
one that extinguishes the first, either by changing the object or the principal
conditions, or by substituting the person of the debtor, or by subrogating a third
person in the rights of the creditor. For a valid novation to take place, there must
be, therefore: (a) a previous valid obligation; (b) an agreement of the parties to
make a new contract; (c) an extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) a valid
new contract. In short, the new obligation extinguishes the prior agreement only
when the substitution is unequivocally declared, or the old and the new
obligations are incompatible on every point. A compromise of a final judgment
operates as a novation of the judgment obligation upon compliance with either of
these two conditions.
To be clear, novation is not presumed. This means that the parties to a contract
should expressly agree to abrogate the old contract in favor of a new one. In the
absence of the express agreement, the old and the new obligations must be
incompatible on every point. There is incompatibility when the two obligations
cannot stand together, each one having its independent existence. If the two
obligations cannot stand together, the latter obligation novates the first. Changes
that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental.
The incompatibility must affect any of the essential elements of the obligation,
such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change is
merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
Indeed, the Court has ruled that an obligation to pay a sum of money is not
novated by an instrument that expressly recognizes the old, or changes only the
terms of payment, or adds other obligations not incompatible with the old ones,
or the new contract merely supplements the old one. A new contract that is a
Page | 19
 mere reiteration, acknowledgment or ratification of the old contract with slight
modifications or alterations as to the cause or object or principal conditions can
stand together with the former one, and there can be no incompatibility between
them. Moreover, a creditor’s acceptance of payment after demand does not
operate as a modification of the original contract.
Lastly, the extension of the maturity date did not constitute a novation of the
previous agreement. It is settled that an extension of the term or period of the
maturity date does not result in novation.

Contracts
I. Essential Requisites

Principle of Mutuality of Contracts – Article 1308

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SPOUSES ENRIQUE MANALO &
ROSALINDA JACINTO, et al. G.R. No. 174433 February 24, 2014 [Bersamin,
J.]
Although banks are free to determine the rate of interest they could impose on
their borrowers, they can do so only reasonably, not arbitrarily. They may not take
advantage of the ordinary borrowers' lack of familiarity with banking procedures
and jargon. Hence, any stipulation on interest unilaterally imposed and increased
by them shall be struck down as violative of the principle of mutuality of
contracts.
The Court has declared that a contract where there is no mutuality between the
parties partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion, and any obscurity will be
construed against the party who prepared the contract, the latter being presumed
the stronger party to the agreement, and who caused the obscurity. PNB should
then suffer the consequences of its failure to specifically indicate the rates of
interest in the credit agreement. We spoke clearly on this in Philippine Savings
Bank v. Castillo, to wit:
The unilateral determination and imposition of the increased rates
is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts under Article
1308 of the Civil Code, which provides that ‘[t]he contract must bind
both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to
the will of one of them.’
xxx
Any contract which appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of
the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result, thus partaking
of the nature of a contract of adhesion, is void. Any stipulation
regarding the validity or compliance of the contract left solely to the
will of one of the parties is likewise invalid.
SPOUSES JONSAY v. JUAN G. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION G.R. No.
206549, April 6, 2016; [Reyes, J.]
An escalation clause in a loan agreement granting the lending bank authority to
unilaterally increase the interest rate without prior notice to and consent of the
borrower is void.

TIMOTEO BACALSO and DIOSDADA BACALSO vs. GREGORIA B. ACA-AC,

ET AL. G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016, [Reyes, J.]
Under the Civil Code, a contract is a meeting of minds, with respect to the other,
to give something or to render some service. Article 1318 provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites
concur:
(l) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Contrary to the petitioners' claim, this is not merely a case of failure to pay the
purchase price which can only amount to a breach of obligation with rescission
as the proper remedy. As correctly observed by the RTC, the disputed sale
produces no effect and is considered void ab initio because it lacks cause - one
of the three essential requisites of a valid contract. Failure to pay the
consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a
Page | 20
 right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing
valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.
It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase
price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the contract of sale is null
and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Here, o portion of the P8,000.00
consideration indicated in the Deed of Absolute Sale was ever paid by the
petitioners.

INTERESTS
SPOUSES ROBERTO and ADELAIDA PEN vs. SPOUSES SANTOS and
LINDA JULIAN G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016, [Bersamin, J.]
Interest that is the compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance
of money is referred to as monetary interest. On the other hand, interest that may
be imposed by law or by the courts as penalty or indemnity for damages is called
compensatory interest.
Pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest shall be due unless it has
been expressly stipulated in writing. In order for monetary interest to be imposed,
therefore, two requirements must be present, specifically:
(a) that there has been an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and
(b) that the agreement for the payment of interest has been reduced in writing.
Considering that the promissory notes contained no stipulation on the payment of
monetary interest, monetary interest cannot be validly imposed.
The imposition of the legal rate of interest should be modified from 12% to 6%.
This is pursuant to BSP Monetary Board Resolution No. 796, lowering to 6% per
annum the legal rate of interest for a loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credit starting July 1, 2013. It should be noted, however, that imposition of the
legal rate of interest at 6% per annum is prospective in application.
FLORANTE VITUG vs. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA G.R. No. 201264, January
11, 2016, [Leonen, J.]
Parties are free to stipulate interest rates in their loan contracts in view of the
suspension of the implementation of the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective
January 1, 1983. In stipulating interest rates, parties must ensure that the rates
are neither iniquitous nor unconscionable.
Iniquitous or unconscionable interest rates are illegal and, therefore, void for
being against public morals. Thus, even if the parties voluntarily agree to an
interest rate, courts are given the discretionary power to equitably reduce it if it is
later found to be iniquitous or unconscionable.
The interest rates should be modified according to the guidelines set forth in
Nacar v. Gallery Frames:
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as
the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment
of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of
6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand
can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest
shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
Page | 21
 damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6%
per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.

II. Kinds of Contracts

III. Objects, Cause and Form of Contracts
IV. Reformation of Instruments
V. Interpretation of Contracts

Interpretation of Contracts – Articles 1370 – 1379

FOREST HILLS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. GARDPRO, INC. G.R.
No. 164686, October 22, 2014 [Bersmin, J.]
Our ruling in Benguet Corporation, et al. v. Cesar Cabildo is instructive:
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in
the first paragraph of Article 1370 of the Civil Code: “[i]f the terms of
a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.” This provision is akin to the “plain meaning rule” applied by
Pennsylvania courts, which assumes that the intent of the parties to
an instrument is “embodied in the writing itself, and when the words
are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from
the express language of the agreement.” It also resembles the “four
corners” rule, a principle which allows courts in some cases to
search beneath the semantic surface for clues to meaning. A
court’s purpose in examining a contract is to interpret the intent of
the contracting parties, as objectively manifested by them. The
process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a
preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is
ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of
two reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written terms
of the contract are not ambiguous and can only be read one way,
the court will interpret the contract as a matter of law. If the contract
is determined to be ambiguous, then the interpretation of the
contract is left to the court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of
the intrinsic evidence.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is thoroughly discussed in Bautista v. Court of
Appeals:
The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference
to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be
gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated
differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and
unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its
face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be
assigned to show that the words should be understood in a different
sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or
rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to
one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to
the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the
parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose
on him those which he did not.
The CA was also guided by Article 1374 of the Civil Code, which declares that
“[t]he various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to
the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.”
Verily, all stipulations of the contract are considered and the whole agreement is
Page | 22
 rendered valid and enforceable, instead of treating some provisions as
superfluous, void, or inoperable.
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION, v. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT G.R.
No. 163654, October 08, 2014 [Bersamin, J.]
With BPI Express Credit being the party causing the confusion, the interpretation
of the contract could not be done in its favor. Moreover, it cannot be denied that a
credit card contract is considered as a contract of adhesion because its terms
and conditions are solely prepared by the credit card issuer. Consequently, the
terms and conditions have to be construed against BPI Express Credit as the
party who drafted the contract.

VI. Rescissible Contracts

VII. Voidable Contracts

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS,
ET AL. G.R. No. 194964, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
Corporate acts may be ultra vires but not void. Mere ultra vires acts, or those
which are not illegal and void ab initio, but are not merely within the scope of the
articles of incorporation, are merely voidable and may become binding and
enforceable when ratified by the stockholders.

VIII. Unenforceable Contracts

HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD and JULIANA V. NATIVIDAD vs. JUANA
MAURICIONATIVIDAD and SPOUSES JEAN NATIVIDAD CRUZ and JERRY
CRUZ G.R. No. 198434, February 29, 2016, [Peralta, J.]
Under the Statute of Frauds, an agreement to convey real properties shall be
unenforceable by action in the absence of a written note or memorandum thereof
and subscribed by the party charged or by his agent. The respondents'
acknowledgment of Sergio's loan obligations with DBP as embodied in the
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as well as the cash voucher which
allegedly represents payment for taxes and transfer of title in petitioners' name
do not serve as written notes or memoranda of the alleged verbal agreement.

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS,

ET AL. G.R. No. 194964, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
Contracts entered into in another’s name without authority or valid legal
representation are generally unenforceable, pursuant to Articles 1317 and 1403
of the Civil Code.

IX. Void and Inexistent Contracts

DOMINGO GONZALO v. JOHN TARNATE, JR. G.R. No. 160600 January 15,
2014
The illegality of the Sub-Contract Agreement necessarily affects the Deed
of Assignment because the rule is that an illegal agreement cannot give
birth to a valid contract. To rule otherwise is to sanction the act of entering into
transaction the object of which is expressly prohibited by law and thereafter
execute an apparently valid contract to subterfuge the illegality. The legal
proscription in such an instance will be easily rendered nugatory and
meaningless to the prejudice of the general public.
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law is a void or inexistent contract. As such, a void contract
cannot produce a valid one. To the same effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code,
which declares that "a contract, which is the direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent."

REBECCA FULLIDO vs. GINO GRILLI G.R. No. 202223, February 29, 2016,
[Mendoza, J.]
Contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer
because, precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the

Page | 23
 source of any rights. Void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or
defense in any court proceeding, including an ejectment suit.
Where a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer
of lands to aliens is readily revealed as the purpose for the contracts, then the
illicit purpose becomes the illegal cause rendering the contracts void. Thus, if an
alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by
virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property,
this to last for 50 years. However, a lease contract in favor of aliens for a
reasonable period was valid as long as it did not have any scheme to circumvent
the constitutional prohibition.

TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. JOSE G. HOSANA G.R. No. 190846, February 3,
2016, [Carpio, J.]
A void or inexistent has no force and effect from the very beginning. This rule
applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the
case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A
void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It
cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. When, however, any of
the terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.

Article 1412- Doctrine of In Pari Delicto

DOMINGO GONZALO vs. JOHN TARNATE, JR. G.R. No. 160600 January 15,
2014 [Bersamin, J.]
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal
contract cannot recover from one another and are not entitled to an affirmative
relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The doctrine of in pari
delicto is a universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or at law,
from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or
to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be
paid, or damages for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no
affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other.
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid.
An accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established
public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that principle
of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good."
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public
policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very
person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." It is well to note that
Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social
order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through
society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway
and dominance of justice."

Natural Obligations
Estoppel
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) vs. HEIRS
OF GAVINA IJORDAN, ET AL. G.R. No. 173140, January 11, 2016, [C.J.
Sereno]
Estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of
their shares in the subject lot does not apply. The doctrine of estoppel applied
only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-
interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that
Page | 24
 was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing
for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on
the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

PART V – SALES
I. Nature and Form of Contract
CONTRACT OF SALE
FABIO CAHAYAG and CONRADO RIVERA vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT
CORPORATION, ET AL. / DULOS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.
vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, ET AL. G.R. No. 168078 / G.R.
No. 168357, January 13, 2016, [C.J. Sereno]
For title to pass to the buyer, the seller must be the owner of the thing sold at the
consummation stage or at the time of delivery of the item sold. The seller need
not be the owner at the perfection stage of the contract, whether it is of a contract
to sell or a contract of sale. Ownership is not a requirement for a valid contract of
sale; it is a requirement for a valid transfer of ownership.

CONTRACT TO SELL
FABIO CAHAYAG and CONRADO RIVERA vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT
CORPORATION, ET AL. / DULOS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.
vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, ET AL. G.R. No. 168078 / G.R.
No. 168357, January 13, 2016, [C.J. Sereno]
A contract to sell, standing alone, does not transfer ownership. At the point of
perfection, the seller under a contract to sell does not even have the obligation to
transfer ownership to the buyer. The obligation arises only when the buyer fulfills
the condition: full payment of the purchase price. In other words, the seller
retains ownership at the time of the execution of the contract to sell.

EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
OSCAR S. VILLARTA. vs. GAUDIOSO TALAVERA, JR. G.R. No. 208021,
February 3, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
The relevant provisions of the Civil Code read:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase
another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a
new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase
price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing
sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real
intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to
be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered
as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a
contract purporting to be an absolute sale.
Respondent was able to sufficiently explain why the presumption of an equitable
mortgage does not apply in the present case. The inadequacy of the purchase
price in the two deeds of sale was supported by an Affidavit of True
Consideration of the Absolute Sale of the Property.
Respondent did not tolerate petitioner’s possession of the lots. Respondent
caused the registration and subsequent transfer of Titles in his name, and paid
taxes thereon. There were no extensions of time for the payment of petitioner’s
loans; rather, petitioner offered different modes of payment for his loans. It was
only after three instances of bounced checks that petitioner offered the Titles as
payment for his loans and executed deeds of sale in respondent’s favor. The
Page | 25
 transaction between petitioner and respondent is thus not an equitable mortgage,
but is instead a dacion en pago.

PACTUM COMMISSORIUM
Heirs of Jose Reyes, jr. namely; Magdalena C. Reyes, et al. vs. Amanda S.
Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 158377, August 13, 2010. [Bersamin, J.]
The existence of any one of the conditions enumerated under Article 1602 of
the Civil Code, not a concurrence of all or of a majority thereof, suffices to give
rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage.
The provisions of the Civil Code governing equitable mortgages disguised as
sale contracts are primarily designed to curtail the evils brought about by
contracts of sale with right to repurchase, particularly the circumvention of the
usury law and pactum commissorium. Courts have taken judicial notice of the
well-known fact that contracts of sale with right to repurchase have been
frequently resorted to in order to conceal the true nature of a contract, that is, a
loan secured by a mortgage. It is a reality that grave financial distress renders
persons hard-pressed to meet even their basic needs or to respond to an
emergency, leaving no choice to them but to sign deeds of absolute sale of
property or deeds of sale with pacto de retro if only to obtain the much-needed
loan from unscrupulous money lenders. This reality precisely explains why the
pertinent provision of the Civil Code includes a peculiar rule concerning the
period of redemption, to wit:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of
the following cases:
xxx
(3)When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase
another instrument extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed;
xxx
Ostensibly, the law allows a new period of redemption to be agreed upon or
granted even after the expiration of the equitable mortgagor’s right to repurchase,
and treats such extension as one of the indicators that the true agreement
between the parties is an equitable mortgage, not a sale with right to
repurchase.

ARTICLES 1601 AND 1616 – SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE

ROBERTO R. DAVID v. EDUARDO C. DAVID, G.R. No. 162365 January 15,
2014 [Bersamin, J.]
A sale with right to repurchase is governed by Article 1601 of the Civil Code,
which provides that: "Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor
reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with
the provisions of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been agreed
upon." Conformably with Article 1616,14 the seller given the right to repurchase
may exercise his right of redemption by paying the buyer: (a) the price of the
sale, (b) the expenses of the contract, (c) legitimate payments made by reason of
the sale, and (d) the necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
In a sale with right to repurchase, title and ownership of the property sold are
immediately vested in the vendee, subject to the resolutory condition of
repurchase by the vendor within the stipulated period.

REGISTRATION OF SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

Sps. Nestor and Felicidad Dadizon vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Sps.
Dominador and Elsa Mocorro, G.R. No. 159116, September 30, 2009.
[Bersamin, J.]
The reliance of the Dadizons on the unnotarized and unregistered deed of
absolute sale of real property executed by Bernadas in their favor was misplaced
and unwarranted, for the non-registration of the deed meant that the sale could
not bind third parties like the respondents. The transaction affecting unregistered
lands covered by an unrecorded contract, if legal, might be valid and binding on
the parties themselves, but not on third parties. In the case of third parties, it was
necessary for the contract to be registered.
Page | 26
 Pursuant to Sec. 113, Presidential Decree No. 1529, the recording of the sale
was necessary.

II. Capacity to Buy or Sell

III. Effects of the Contract when the Thing Sold has been lost
IV. Obligations of the Vendor
V. Obligations of the Vendee
VI. Breach of Contract
Include:
1. Recto Law; sale of movables on installment (Articles 1484-1486, Civil
Code)
2. Maceda Law; sale of immovable on installment (RA 6552)
VII. Extinguishment of Sale
VIII. Assignment of Credits
PART VI – LEASE
I. General Provisions
1. Lease of Things
2. Lease of Work and Services
II. Lease of Rural and Urban Lands

HEIRS OF EXEQUIEL HAGORILES v. HERNAEZ, ET AL. G.R. No. 199628,

April 20, 2016; [Brion, J.]
The obligation to provide home lots to agricultural lessees or tenants rests upon
the landholder in accordance with Section 26(a) of R.A. No. 1199 or the
"Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines," as amended by R.A. No. 2263.
Under Section 22(3) of RA No. 1199, as amended, a tenant is entitled to a home
lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than three percent (3%) of the
area of his landholding, provided that it does not exceed one thousand square
meters (1,000 sq.m.). It shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within
the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall
construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals
and engage in minor industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant
exclusively. The agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the
exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied,
upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 3844, which shall be considered as included in
the leasehold.

III. Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee

IV. Special Rules for Lease of Rural/ Urban Lands

Exclude: Household Service, Contract of Labor, Contract for Piece of Work
(for inclusion in Labor Law)

PART VII – PARTNERSHIP

I. Contract of Partnership
II. Rights and Obligations of Partnership
III. Rights and Obligations of Partners Among Themselves
IV. Obligations of Partnership/ Partners to Third Persons

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT G.R. No. 206147, January
13, 2016, [Mendoza, J.]
Article 1821 of the Civil Code does not state that there is no need to implead
a partner in order to be bound by the partnership liability. The provision shows
that notice to any partner, under certain circumstances, operates as notice to or
knowledge to the partnership only. It does not provide for the reverse situation, or
that notice to the partnership is notice to the partners. Unless there is an
unequivocal law which states that a partner is automatically charged in a
complaint against the partnership, the constitutional right to due process takes
precedence and a partner must first be impleaded before he can be considered
as a judgment debtor. To rule otherwise would be a dangerous precedent,
harping in favor of the deprivation of property without ample notice and hearing,
which the Court certainly cannot countenance.
Page | 27
 Article 1816 of the Civil Code governs the liability of the partners to third persons,
which states that “[a]ll partners, including industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata
with all their property and after all the partnership assets have been
exhausted.”
This provision clearly states that, first, the partners’ obligation with respect to the
partnership liabilities is subsidiary in nature. It provides that the partners shall
only be liable with their property after all the partnership assets have been
exhausted. To say that one’s liability is subsidiary means that it merely becomes
secondary and only arises if the one primarily liable fails to sufficiently satisfy the
obligation. The subsidiary nature of the partners’ liability with the partnership is
one of the valid defenses against a premature execution of judgment directed to
a partner.
Second, Article 1816 provides that the partners’ obligation to third persons with
respect to the partnership liability is pro rata or joint. Liability is joint when a
debtor is liable only for the payment of only a proportionate part of the debt. In
contrast, a solidary liability makes a debtor liable for the payment of the entire
debt. In the same vein, Article 1207 does not presume solidary liability unless: 1)
the obligation expressly so states; or 2) the law or nature requires solidarity.
With regard to partnerships, ordinarily, the liability of the partners is not solidary.
The joint liability of the partners is a defense that can be raised by a partner
impleaded in a complaint against the partnership.
In other words, only in exceptional circumstances shall the partners’ liability be
solidary in nature. Articles 1822, 1823 and 1824 of the Civil Code provide for
these exceptional conditions. These provisions articulate that it is the act of a
partner which caused loss or injury to a third person that makes all other
partners solidarily liable with the partnership.

V. Dissolution and Winding Up

VI. Limited Partnership

PART VIII – AGENCY

I. Definition
II. Nature, Form and Kinds of Agency
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND FGU INSURANCE, CORP. v.
LAINGO G.R. No. 205206, March 16, 2016; [Carpio, J.]
Under Articles 1884 and 1887 of the Civil Code, an agent is bound to carry out
the agency. The relationship existing between principal and agent is a fiduciary
one, demanding conditions of trust and confidence. It is the duty of the agent to
act in good faith for the advancement of the interests of the principal.
DRA. MERCEDES OLIVER v. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK and LILIA
CASTRO G.R. No. 214567, April 4, 2016; [Mendoza, J.]
A contract of agency may be inferred from all the dealings between petitioner and
Castro. Agency can be express or implied from the acts of the principal, from his
silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority. The question of whether
an agency has been created is ordinarily a question which may be established in
the same way as any other fact, either by direct or circumstantial evidence. The
question is ultimately one of intention.
Accordingly, the laws on agency apply to their relationship. Article 1881 of the
New Civil Code provides that the agent must act within the scope of his authority.
He may do such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose
of the agency. Thus, as long as the agent acts within the scope of the authority
given by his principal, the actions of the former shall bind the latter.

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS,

ET AL. G.R. No. 194964, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
The relationship between a corporation and its representatives is governed by
the general principles of agency. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that
there must be authority from the principal before anyone can act in his or her
name. Without delegation by the board of directors or trustees, acts of a person
—including those of the corporation’s directors, trustees, shareholders, or officers

Page | 28
 —executed on behalf of the corporation are generally not binding on the
corporation.
Contracts entered into in another’s name without authority or valid legal
representation are generally unenforceable, pursuant to Articles 1317 and 1403
of the Civil Code.
Even though a person did not give another person authority to act on his or her
behalf, the action may be enforced against him or her if it is shown that he or she
ratified it or allowed the other person to act as if he or she had full authority to do
so.
Implied ratification may take the form of silence, acquiescence, acts consistent
with approval of the act, or acceptance or retention of benefits. However, silence,
acquiescence, retention of benefits, and acts that may be interpreted as approval
of the act do not by themselves constitute implied ratification. For an act to
constitute an implied ratification, there must be no acceptable explanation for the
act other than that there is an intention to adopt the act as his or her own. "[It]
cannot be inferred from acts that a principal has a right to do independently of the
unauthorized act of the agent." No act by petitioner can be interpreted as
anything close to ratification. Ratification must also be knowingly and voluntarily
done

III. Obligations of the Agent

IV. Obligations of the Principal
V. Modes of Extinguishment

PART IX – TRUST
I. Definition
II. Kinds of Trust
1. Express Trust
2. Implied Trust
PART X – CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
I. Loan
II. Deposit
III. Guaranty and Suretyship
ORIX METRO FINANCE CORPORATION vs. CARDLINE, INC., ET AL. G.R.
No. 201417, January 13, 2016, [Brion, J.]
The terms of a contract govern the parties’ rights and obligations. When a party
undertakes to be "jointly and severally" liable, it means that the obligation is
solidary. Furthermore, even assuming that a party is liable only as a guarantor,
he can be held immediately liable without the benefit of excussion if the
guarantor agreed that his liability is direct and immediate. In effect, the guarantor
waived the benefit of excussion pursuant to Article 2059(1) of the Civil Code.

ROSALINA CARODAN vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION G.R. No.

210542 February 24, 2016, [C.J. Sereno]
An accommodation mortgagor is not a party to the principal obligation but
secures the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. Ordinarily, he is
not a recipient of the loan.
A surety is a person who binds himself solidarity with the principal debtor. A
surety is distinguished from a guaranty in that a guarantor is the insurer of the
solvency of the debtor and thus binds himself to pay if the principal is unable to
pay while a surety is the insurer of the debt, and he obligates himself to pay if the
principal does not pay.
A surety may only be discharged for the following reasons:
a) the creditor has acted negligently or has caused the material alteration of the
contract; or
b) the creditor has granted the principal debtor an extension of time to pay for a
definite period, pursuant to an enforceable agreement, which was made without
the consent of the surety or with the reservation of rights with respect to him.

IV. Pledge, Mortgage and Antichresis, Chattel Mortgage (include Act 1508)

Page | 29
 ROSALINA CARODAN vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION G.R. No.
210542 February 24, 2016, [C.J. Sereno]
A mortgage is simply a security for, and not a satisfaction of indebtedness. If the
proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the debt in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, the mortgagee is entitled to claim the deficiency from
the debtor.

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS,

ET AL. G.R. No. 194964, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
The prescriptive period for actions on mortgages is ten (10) years from the day
they may be brought. Actions on mortgages may be brought not upon the
execution of the mortgage contract but upon default in payment of the obligation
secured by the mortgage. A debtor is considered in default when he or she fails
to pay the obligation on due date and, subject to exceptions, after demands for
payment were made by the creditor.
As a general rule, a person defaults and prescriptive period for action runs when:
(1) the obligation becomes due and demandable; and
(2) demand for payment has been made.
In other words, prescriptive period runs from the date of demand, subject to
certain exceptions.
Under Article 1155 of the Civil Code, prescription of actions may be interrupted
by (1) the filing of a court action; (2) a written extrajudicial demand; and (3) the
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

FABIO CAHAYAG and CONRADO RIVERA vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT

CORPORATION, ET AL. / DULOS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.
vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, ET AL. G.R. No. 168078 / G.R.
No. 168357, January 13, 2016, [C.J. Sereno]
Registration of the mortgage establishes a real right or lien in favor of the
mortgagee, as provided by Articles 1312 and 2126 of the Civil Code. Corollary to
the rule, the lien has been treated as "inseparable from the property inasmuch as
it is a right in rem." In other words, it binds third persons to the mortgage.
The purpose of registration is to notify persons other than the parties to the
contract that a transaction concerning the property was entered into. Ultimately,
registration, because it provides constructive notice to the whole world, makes
the certificate of title reliable, such that third persons dealing with registered land
need only look at the certificate to determine the status of the property.

EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
FABIO CAHAYAG and CONRADO RIVERA vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT
CORPORATION, ET AL. / DULOS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.
vs. COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, ET AL. G.R. No. 168078 / G.R.
No. 168357, January 13, 2016, [C.J. Sereno]
When it comes to extrajudicial foreclosures, the law grants mortgagors or their
successors-in-interest an opportunity to redeem the property within one year
from the date of the sale. The one year period has been jurisprudentially held to
be counted from the registration of the foreclosure sale with the Register of
Deeds. An exception to this rule has been carved out by Congress for juridical
mortgagors. Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000 shortens the
redemption period to within three months after the foreclosure sale or until the
registration of the certificate of sale, whichever comes first. The General Banking
Law of 2000 came into law on 13 June 2000.
If the redemption period expires and the mortgagors or their successors-in-
interest fail to redeem the foreclosed property, the title thereto is consolidated in
the purchaser. The consolidation confirms the purchaser as the owner of the
property; concurrently, the mortgagor-for failure to exercise the right of
redemption within the period-loses all interest in the property.

SPOUSES GALLENT v. JUAN G. VELASQUEZ G.R. No. 203949 & 205071,

April 6, 2016; [Reyes, J.]
The general rule in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is that after the
consolidation of the title over the foreclosed property in the buyer, it is the
Page | 30
 ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession upon an ex parte
petition by the new owner as a matter of right. Furthermore, when the thing
purchased at a foreclosure sale is in turn sold or transferred, the right to the
possession thereof, along with all other rights of ownership, follows the thing sold
to its new owner.
However, as an exception, the ministerial duty of the court to issue an ex parte
writ of possession ceases once it appears that a third party, not the debtor-
mortgagor, is in possession of the property under a claim of title adverse to that
of the applicant. Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that in an
execution sale, the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or
last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely
to the judgment obligor.

PACTUM COMMISSORIUM
SPOUSES ROBERTO and ADELAIDA PEN vs. SPOUSES SANTOS and
LINDA JULIAN G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016, [Bersamin, J.]
Article 2088 of the Civil Code prohibits the creditor from appropriating the things
given by way of pledge or mortgage, or from disposing of them; any stipulation to
the contrary is null and void.
The elements for pactum commissorium to exist are as follows, to wit:
(a) that there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein property is pledged or
mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation; and
(b) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the
creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the
principal obligation within the stipulated period.
The first element was present considering that the property of the respondents
was mortgaged by Linda in favor of Adelaida as security for the farmer's
indebtedness. As to the second, the authorization for Adelaida to appropriate the
property subject of the mortgage upon Linda's default was implied from Linda's
having signed the blank deed of sale simultaneously with her signing of the real
estate mortgage. The haste with which the transfer of property was made upon
the default by Linda on her obligation, and the eventual transfer of the property in
a manner not in the form of a valid dacion en pago ultimately confirmed the
nature of the transaction as a pactum commissorium.
It cannot be argued that the transaction was a dacion en pago. For a valid dacion
en pago to transpire, the attendance of the following elements must be
established, namely:
(a) the existence of a money obligation;
(b) the alienation to the creditor of a property by the debtor with the consent of
the former; and
(c) the satisfaction of the money obligation of the debtor.
To have a valid dacion en pago, therefore, the alienation of the property must
fully extinguish the debt. Yet, the debt of the respondents subsisted despite the
transfer of the property in favor of Adelaida.

V. Quasi-Contracts

VI. Concurrence and Preference of Credits

Include: Section 133 of Republic Act No. 10142 (An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation or Liquidation of Financially Distressed Enterprises and
Individuals)

PART XI – SUCCESSION
I. General Provisions
Heirs Of Magdaleno Ypon, et al. v. Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte, G.R. No.
198680, July 08, 2013 [Perlas-Bernabe, J.]
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The
Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of

Page | 31
 heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding.

II. Testamentary Succession/Wills

RESERVA TRONCAL
Maria Mendoza, vs. Julia Pollcarpio Delos Santos G.R. No. 176422 March
20, 2013 [Reyes, J.]
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to
the line from which said property came.
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission
is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or
reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third
degree from which the property came.
1. The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the
ascendant from whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous title.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus
and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
2. Ascendants, descendants and collateral relatives under Article 964 of the Civil
Code.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and
descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either
direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come
from a common ancestor.
3. First cousins of the descendant/prepositus are fourth degree relatives and
cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios.
4. A reservista acquires ownership of the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is extinguished.

PRETERITION
MORALES vs. OLONDRIZ, et al. G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016, [Carpio,
J.]
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is
neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly
being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime.
Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also
receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime. In other words,
preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir fromthe
testator’sinheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:

Page | 32
 Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall
annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid
insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute
any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will
result in total intestacy.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is
limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only
determine the will’s formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is not
inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional
circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet
the issue

COMPULSORY HEIRS
Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon, et al. vs. Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S.
De Magtanum, G.R. No. 153736, August 12, 2010. [Bersamin, J.]
A decedent’s compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the
decedent’s estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887 of the
Civil Code.

III. Legal or Intestate Succession

ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), et al. v. LEONARDO R. VEGA, et al., G.R.
No. 174727 August 12, 2013 [DEL CASTILLO, J.]
Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

IV. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession

Exclude: Executors and administrators (Articles 1058-1060, Civil Code),
which will be covered under Remedial Law

PART XII – LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

I. Torrens System (General Principles)

DOCTRINE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE
Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata Abobon, et al.; G.R. No. 155830,
August 15, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The
certificate of title thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land;
hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the Torrens system may
rely on the title and need not go beyond the title. This reliance on the certificate
of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title, which has long been
well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of the title is
attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no
application.

Page | 33
 MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) vs. HEIRS
OF GAVINA IJORDAN, ET AL. G.R. No. 173140, January 11, 2016, [C.J.
Sereno]
Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the registered
owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the Torrens System is to
quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once
title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of
losing his land.

MAE FLOR M. GALIDO vs. NELSON P. MAGRARE, ET AL. G.R. No. 206584,
January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go
beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. Every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and
in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted
on said certificate and any of the encumbrances provided by law.
Preference is given to the prior registered adverse claim because registration is
the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as third persons are
concerned. Thus, upon registration of respondents’ adverse claims, notice was
given the whole world, including petitioner.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before
he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property.

GINA ENDAYA vs. ERNESTO V. VILLAOS G.R. No. 202426, January 27,
2016, [Del Castillo, J.]
In resolving the issue of possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner
of the property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of
sale.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the
whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon
the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the
Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled
to possession thereof.

P.D. No. 1529 collateral attack on titles is not allowed

Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata Abobon, et al.; G.R. No. 155830,
August 15, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
In order for him to properly assail the validity of the respondents’ TCT, he must
himself bring an action for that purpose. Instead of bringing that direct action, he
mounted his attack as a merely defensive allegation herein. Such manner of
attack against the TCT was a collateral one, which was disallowed by Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE

Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos,
Jr. G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012 [Bersamin, J.]
Under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the
following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June
12, 1945.

II. Original Registration

Page | 34
 III. Subsequent Registration
1. Voluntary dealings
2. Involuntary dealings
B. Non-registrable Properties
C. Dealings with Unregistered Lands
Exclude:
1. History of land laws
2. Remedies sufficiently covered under Remedial Law
3. Registration of Judgments, orders and partitions
4. Assurance fund
5. Registration of patents
6. Administrative structure of the Register of Deeds
7. Consultas

PART XIII – TORTS AND DAMAGES

Book I – Torts/ Quasi-Delicts

Articles 2176-2194 (Civil Code)
I. Definition, Elements
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
RAUL H. SESBREÑO v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
160689 March 26, 2014
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an
abuse of rights, like when the act is performed without prudence or in bad faith.
In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the
following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or
duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another. There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of
the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.

QUASI-DELICT
Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort v. Ellen Johanne Harper, et al., G.R. No.
189998, August 29, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also
security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes
the essence of the business. Applying by analogy Article 2000, Article 2001 and
Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which concerned [sic] the hotelkeepers’
degree of care and responsibility as to the personal effects of their guests), we
hold that there is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree of
care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety of their guests are
involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers would simply stand idly by as strangers
have unrestricted access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors
of the guests, without being held liable should anything untoward befall the
unwary guests. That would be absurd, something that no good law would ever
envision.

II. Classification of Torts

1. Negligent Torts

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CARLOS BORROMEO vs. FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL, INC. and RAMON S.
INSO, M.D. G.R. No. 191018, January 25, 2016, [Brion, J.]
In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its elements,
namely: (1) a duty of the defendant to his patient; (2) the defendant’s breach of
this duty; (3) injury to the patient; and (4) proximate causation between the
breach and the injury suffered. In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these
elements by a preponderance of evidence.
A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care and exercise
the degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other similarly
Page | 35
 trained medical professionals acting under the same circumstances. A breach of
the accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders
the defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient.
The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably competent
members of the profession practicing the same field of medicine. Because
medical malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert testimony is usually
essential to establish: (1) the standard of care that the defendant was bound to
observe under the circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell below the
acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant’s failure to observe the industry
standard caused injury to his patient.
The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician. Thus,
a pulmonologist is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of an
anesthesiologist and an autopsy expert is not qualified to testify as a specialist in
infectious diseases.
2. Intentional Torts
3. Strict Liability
III. The Tortfeasor
1. Direct tortfeasor
2. Persons made responsible for others

Article 2180 – Vicarious Liability

TRAVEL & TOURS ADVISERS, INC. v. CRUZ, SR., ET AL. G.R. No. 199282,
March 14, 2016; [Peralta, J.]
Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code provides that the
employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises
a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer
either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such
selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the
part of the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape
solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must
adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other
hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees, the issuance of
proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition
of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may
be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should
regularly report on their supervisory functions.
3. Nature of liability

IV. The Concepts and Doctrines of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Last Clear Chance,
Proximate Cause, Damnum Absque Injuria, Presumption of Negligence,
Vicarious Liability.

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., ET AL. vs. ERNESTO V. YU
AND MANUEL C. YUHICO G.R. No. 191033, January 11, 2016, [Velasco, Jr.,
J.]
“One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur
nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal
rights, it is damnum absque injuria.” In this case, respondents failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence that there is fault or negligence on the part of
petitioners in order to oblige them to pay for the alleged damage sustained as a
result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly, membership in the Club is
a privilege. Regular members are entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of
Page | 36
 the Club, subject to its rules and regulations. As correctly pointed out by
petitioners, the mental anguish respondents experienced, assuming to be true,
was brought upon them by themselves for deliberately and consciously violating
the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that respondents were validly
suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate them. Indeed, the
penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article XIV of the By- Laws is a
means to protect and preserve the interest and purposes of the Club. This being
so, the suspension of respondents does not fall under any of the provisions of the
Civil Code pertaining to the grant of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, and litigation costs.

COMMON CARRIER
Spouses Teodorico and Nanette Pereña v. Spouses Nicolas and Teresita L.
Zarate, et al.; G.R. No. 157917. August 29, 2012.
The operator of a. school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of the law.
He is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of his business. He
is presumed to be negligent when death occurs to a passenger. His liability may
include indemnity for loss of earning capacity even if the deceased passenger
may only be an unemployed high school student at the time of the accident.

V. Legal Injury

Book II – Damages
Articles 2195 – 2235 (Civil Code)
I. General Provisions

II. Actual and Compensatory Damages

SUBROGATION – ARTICLE 2207
Vector Shipping Corporation, et al. v. American Home Assurance Co., et
al., G.R. No. 159213, July 3, 2013. [Bersamin, J.]
In legal contemplation, subrogation is the “substitution of another person in the
place of the creditor, to whose rights he succeeds in relation to the debt;” and is
“independent of any mere contractual relations between the parties to be affected
by it, and is broad enough to cover every instance in which one party is required
to pay a debt for which another is primarily answerable, and which in equity and
conscience ought to be discharged by the latter.”

III. Moral Damages

SPS. ALEXANDER and JULIE LAM vs. KODAK PHILIPPINES, LTD. G.R. No.
167615, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
Moral damages are granted to alleviate the moral suffering suffered by a party
due to an act of another, but it is not intended to enrich the victim at the
defendant’s expense. It is not meant to punish the culpable party and, therefore,
must always be reasonable vis-a-vis the injury caused.

DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D. vs. HANZ CALAPIZ,

REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA
CALAPIZ G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014 [Bersamin, J.]
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although we have
long advocated the view that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the
use of any part of one’s body, is not equitable to a pecuniary loss, and is not
susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed
once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an imperfect
estimation of the true value of one’s body. The usual practice is to award moral
damages for the physical injuries sustained.

Numeriano P. Abobon vs. Felicitas Abata Abobon, et al.; G.R. No. 155830,
August 15, 2012. [Bersamin, J.]
To be recoverable, moral damages must be capable of proof and must be
actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages. Yet, nothing was adduced here to justify the grant of moral damages.
Page | 37
 What we have was only the allegation on moral damages, with the complaint
stating that the respondents had been forced to litigate, and that they had
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings from the
petitioner’s refusal to restore the possession of the land in question to them. The
allegation did not suffice, for allegation was not proof of the facts alleged.
The Court cannot also affirm the exemplary damages granted in favor of the
respondents. Exemplary damages were proper only if the respondents, as the
plaintiffs, showed their entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages. Yet, they did not establish their entitlement to such other damages.
As to attorney’s fees, the general rule is that such fees cannot be recovered by a
successful litigant as part of the damages to be assessed against the losing party
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Indeed, prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code, such fees could be
recovered only when there was a stipulation to that effect. It was only under the
present Civil Code that the right to collect attorney’s fees in the cases mentioned
in Article 2208 of the Civil Code came to be recognized. Such fees are now
included in the concept of actual damages.
Even so, whenever attorney’s fees are proper in a case, the decision rendered
therein should still expressly state the factual basis and legal justification for
granting them.

IV. Nominal Damages

V. Temperate or Moderate Damages

VI. Liquidated Damages

VII. Exemplary or Corrective Damages

SPS. ALEXANDER and JULIE LAM vs. KODAK PHILIPPINES, LTD. G.R. No.
167615, January 11, 2016, [Carpio, J.]
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded when the injurious act is
attended by bad faith. In this case, respondent was found to have
misrepresented its right over the generator set that was seized. As such, it is
properly liable for exemplary damages as an example to the public. Since the
award of exemplary damages is proper in this case, attorney’s fees and cost of
the suit may also be recovered as provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

VIII. Damages in Case of Death

Page | 38