It ought to first be established that Aristotle intended for his Categories to be read
ontologically—that is, describing facts of being. However, problems follow from an ontological
reading of his Categories. An epistemological reading retains the utility while voiding the critical
To grant an ontological reading of the Categories in the context of the rest of Aristotle’s
philosophy, several other positions must be granted. The first of these is a sense of naïve
realism—that is, granting that our senses accurately perceive a complete and mind-independent
world and that if we build theories from our perceptions, they will correspond to reality.
Additionally, one must grant Aristotle’s thoughts on the role of deduction and induction:
Aristotle argues that true first premises are found by induction, and, as with his realism, thus
Why must these positions be granted? Consider the actual mechanisms by which an
observer might grow to understand the categories of a thing. The most obvious example of this is
how one might grow to understand a primary substance such as Socrates. Socrates is clearly nota
meaningful term a priori but, rather, a particular that can only be understood through perception.
1 This paper as such is written with a modern understanding. Aristotle’s problems are not to be considered a flaw of
character, but, rather an issue with his continued relevance. This paper then, is not an attack on Aristotle per se, but rather
an attempt to place his method, if not his facts, in modern terms. It is not about what Aristotle said, but, rather, a
reimagining of his Categories.
2 Terence Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles 33
Similarly, attempting to understand something such as Socrates’s place or quantity independent
objective, real perception of things that can be used to make such conclusions; if our perception
is to get at the real nature of things, it must give a complete picture. A strict Aristotelian ontology
Does Aristotle agree? He certainly assents to a kind of naïve realism. In the De Anima,
Aristotle means those objects which can be sensed only by one perceptual faculty. The fairest
reading of this is to say that, at least when only one sense is involved, the perception of
phenomena is infallible. Thus, Aristotle has committed himself to a particular brand of naïve
realism.
However, there are serious problems for the naïve realist. The most famous of these is the
problem of secondary qualities.4 Consider color, which could best be considered a relational
property. Color, as a special object, applies: it is only visible by sight. Things are not blue in
themselves; things reflect blue light such that a particular perceiver sees it as blue. The blueness,
as such, cannot be considered mind-independent as color is a relation between both the object
and a mind.
Illusions too present an issue for the naïve realist. Consider an oasis, which one may see
in a desert. Granted some distance, only the sight is brought in, thus making it a special object.
Yet, depending on one’s distance, the oasis appears and disappears. It seems a confused,
problematic position to take that oases truly exist and stop existing: instead, it must be granted
3
Aristotle, De Anima, 427b8-9
4 This should not be confused with any potential Aristotelian term of “secondary substance.”
that, sometimes, the senses report back false information. A naïve realist could attempt to
dispense with this problem by arguing that this is an error of judgement, not of sensation, but
such a stance seems problematic; there is no imaging of sensation independent of the phenomena
we notice, and, as such, cannot meaningfully take sensation independent of this “judgement.”
The senses, it seems, cannot always be trusted, and must be adjudicated by reason.
The third and perhaps most difficult challenge to the naïve realist comes from biology—
namely, the generalized umwelt principle. The notion of “umwelt” was developed by German
biologist Jakob von Uexküll and refers to, in a rough translation, to the notion of a being’s “view
of the world.”5 Von Uexküll argued that there were as many “worlds” perceived as there were
beings, and there is meaningful evidence to support this. Consider, for instance, the bee, which
can sense magnetic fields6, or coral fish, which sense color far beyond the spectrum of humans.7
While humans can sense these phenomena indirectly and can, in some sense, be aware of their
presence, our umwelt does not include them.8 With this in mind, it is difficult to claim that
human perception is the absolute arbiter of the world, and, thus, is, at best, an incomplete picture
of reality. The naïve realist holds that a sensation is accurate, while the generalized umwelt
principle forces us to hold that a sensation is only accurate given our perceptual faculties.
A strictly naïve realism is thus problematic, and, in turn, Aristotle’s categories lose much
5 See his work “Theoretische Biologie” for a deeper analysis of the biological evidence for the umwelt principle.
6 See CH Lang, “Magnetic Sensing through the Abdomen of the Honey bee.” Scientific Reports (23 March 2016)
7 See CM Cham, M. Vorobyev, and N.J. Marshall, “Colour thresholds in a coral reef fish.” Royal Society Open Science, 3
(2016).
8 While an argument could be made that the noetic (human) umwelt is expanding—consider how radio telescopes allow
the viewing of RF radiation while our eyes do not—the noetic umwelt is not complete and it is excessively optimistic to
assume it ever will be.
Consider Aristotle’s method of genius-differentia definition wherein he establishes a
thing’s secondary substance—the universal it can be classified as. Aristotle wishes to argue that
this is reflective of an essence in a particular, contra Plato, who argues that essence is outside of
a particular and merely something a particular participates in. This conception of ontological
essence allows Aristotle to hold both that primary substances are not secondary to some spooky
essence out there, but also allows him to privilege human sensation in acquiring a thing’s
essence. Aristotle holds that this metaphysical conception of essence is “self-evident.”9 The
to regard essences as such? If essences are epistemological, they cease to claim knowledge of a
thing-in-itself and, instead, describe the human knowledge and categorization of it. Predicating
something like “that is a cow,” then, is not identifying an essence, but, rather, identifying the
characteristics which we have defined as a “cow.” This kind of couched talk avoids the problems
identifications—but still allows the predication of the same things the Aristotelian would.
Some of Aristotle’s distinctions get lost in the process. For instance, a bed, which
Aristotle wants to claim is nothing more than the “wood which shows that arrangement”10 would
have a kind of essence—a bed is something we speak about and think of as an object with
essence, and, thus, is not merely spoken about as such by metaphor, but, rather, in fact. Anything
maintained.
9
Aristotle, Physics, 193A6
10
Aristotle, Physics, 193A14
What, then, are the uses for Aristotle’s categories? While they may not help approach an
understanding of the one, absolute world the metaphysician11 desires, the categories are
nevertheless useful tools for describing phenomena. For instance, defining the nature of
something is a useful scientific endeavor and one with much practical effect: definitions allow
time, for instance, also allows for a meaningful understanding of events—if not an objective one.
It seems, then, that the core of the Aristotelian project is saved. We needn’t admit that the
notion of epistemological essences forces our speech to be purely arbitrary: there are ways of
describing things that better account for the phenomena that appear to us. This kind of speech
resolves the conflict between the phenomenologist and the naïve realist: the noetic umwelt
allows for classification of phenomena only as they appear while nevertheless granting preferred
ways of speaking—that is, the way of speaking that accounts for the speech that appears to us.
Aristotelian metaphysics. What authoritativeness is lost is made up for by a more consistent, less
problematic system.
11
See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity for more on the metaphysician’s tactics.