SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., vs.

ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

FACTS:
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under
RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:
Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines?

RULING: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.

1
RAMON MILO V. CFI JUDGE ANGELITO SALANGA
G.R. No. L-37007, July 20, 1987

Facts:
Certiorari of CFI Pangasinan order, granting motion to quash information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Jr.
Issue is whether or not a barrio captian (Tuvera Sr.) can be charged of arbitrary detention.

10/12/1972, information for Arbitrary Detention filed against Tuvera and 2 others:
4/21/1973, 10PM in Manaoag, Pangasinan, accused with aid of some private persons, conspiring, maltreated
Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists and immediately thereafter locked Valdez inside the
municipal jail for 11hours. Respondent judge quashed motion on ground that Tuvera Sr. was not a public officer
who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention.

Issue:
Whether or not a barrio captian (Tuvera Sr.) can be charged of arbitrary detention.

Held:
Arbitrary Detention is commited by a public officer, who, without legal grounds, detains a person. Elements are: 1)
Offender is a public officer/employee; 2) detains a person; 3) detention without legal grounds. PR says the facts
alleged in information do not constitute Arbitrary Detention. Persons helping him were members of the police force
of Manaoag, detaining Valdez for 11hours. Arbitrary detention existent, and question is whether or not barrio captain
can commit it. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the
2
judges or mayors.4 It was erroneously reasoned that captain did not detain Valdez, being merely a captain, no
authority, and that barrio captain was not a publoc official, not considered persons in authority, only upon PD299.
No. Long before PD299, recognized as persons in authority, as in various cases (US v. Gellada, US v. Braganza).
Under Revised Barrio Charter Act, powers and duties of barrio captain include maintenance of public order and to
assist mayors and councilors in performing the same, enforce all laws and ordinances operative within the barrio.
Peace officer, in authority, can make arrest within legal limits. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors
would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller.

PEOPLE V. BURGOS, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)

Facts:
Burgos was convicted for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. One Masamlok
claimed that he had been forcibly recruited by Burgos to the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against
his life and family. Masamlok was also allegedly threatened to attend an NPA seminar.

The next day the authorities went to arrest Burgos without a warrant. They found him in his residence plowing his
field. Burgos denied the accusation, but his wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in
the ground. After the firearm was recovered, Burgos allegedly pointed to a stock pile of cogon where he had hidden
subversive documents.
The prosecution presented an extrajudicial confession made by Burgos. However, Burgos claimed that he had been
mauled and hit repeatedly until he would admit and sign an extrajudicial confession.

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Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Burgos is valid.

Held:

Exceptions to warrant of arrest: Art. IV, Sec. 3 of the Constitution safeguards against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers, and effects. Rule 113, Sec. 6 of the Rules
of Court provides the exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, the instant case does not fall under any of
the exceptions in Rule 113, Sec. 6.First, it requires that the officer arresting a person who has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must be
committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case:

• The knowledge as to the offense was furnished by Masamlok.

• The location of the firearm was given by the Burgos’ wife.
• At the time of the arrest, Burgos was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document.
• Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was in fact plowing his field at the
time of his arrest.

It is clear that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of the commission of the offense because such
information was only supplied to them by an informant. Neither has Burgos committed any offense in their presence
as he was merely plowing his field at the time of arrest. On the other hand, Sec. 6 (b) of Rule 113 requires that a
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
4
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. In the instant case, it was not even established that indeed a crime has been committed. The
information that a crime was probably committed was supplied by Masamlok who did not even give his testimony
under oath.

Finally, the Court finds no compelling reason for the haste of the arresting officers to arrest Burgos if indeed he
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was real apprehension that Burgos was on the verge of flight or
escape and that his whereabouts are unknown.

UMIL VS. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991]

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was
among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January
1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of
Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded
man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

5
Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection there with constitute direct assaults against the
state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

BENITO ASTORGA, PETITIONER ,VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Facts: Benito Astorga is the mayor of Daram, Western Samar. A group of people from Regional Special Operations
Group which includes Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources were sent to conduct an investigation together with
SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police as their escort, regarding
possible illegal logging activities.

On September 1, 1997, at around 4:30 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the team found two boats measuring 18
meters in length and 5 meters in breadth. They found out that those boats belong to Mayor Astorga, when Mayor
Astorga found out about this, he went to the place and had a heated altercation with the team that lead to Mayor
Astorga calling for backups, when he saw that they were outnumbered by the DENR team, ten armed men arrived.

Mayor Astorga asked the DENR team to come with him to his house to have dinner, and it was 2:00 o’clock in the
morning when they let them leave his house.
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Mayor Astorga was charged with Arbitrary Detention for illegally detaining the DENR team, where he was found
Guilty by the trial Court.

Issue: Whether or not Benito Astrorga was correctly charged with Arbitrary Detention.

Held: No, Benito Astorga was wrongfully charged of Arbitrary Detention. The DENR team failed to prove that they
were illegally detained by Astorga against their will.

When Astorga invited them to his home, had dinner and even drank wine with them, converse with them and even
laughed with them, this creates reasonable doubt and clearly shows that fear did not exist in the minds of the DENR
team, and that they were not detained against their consent. Adding to the fact that it was raining that day which
prevented the DENR team to leave the island.

One of the requisites of Arbitrary Detention is when the offended party is placed in confinement or there is restraint
on his person or even if he could move freely, as long as he could not escape for fear of being apprehended again,
which is not present in this case.

DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS

SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA80 PHIL 859 (1948)

FACTS: Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of
robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and
7
presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, the petitioners were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper
court of justice.

ISSUE: a.Whether or not petitioners had been illegally restrained of their liberty?
b. Whether or not the city fiscal of manila is a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions
of article 125 of the RPC?
c. Who are authorized to make a preliminary investigation?
HELD:
a. Yes. Petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is
hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by acompetent court
of justice. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “the penalties provided in the next preceding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
hours.” Without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the
detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a
clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering
the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that
the petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with
the city fiscal, The court holds that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their
release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court
of justice.

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 b. The surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a peace officer,
does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of an information
against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction
to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because the arresting officer cannot transfer
to the judge and the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. The judicial
authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be construed to include the fiscal of
the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or
temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without
warrant. For the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than
six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of
arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal
to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in
section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First
Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the
corresponding information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila
if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the
defendant.

c. The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of
temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the
municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant

9
 of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule
109.)

MEDINA VS. OROZCO

FACTS:

On November 7, 1965 at 12:00PM, petitioner Arthur Medina was arrested and incarcerated in the Caloocan City
Jail. He was allegedly one of those responsible for the death of one Marcelo Sangalang. At around 9:00AM of that
same day, the case against Medina and two others was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted preliminary
investigation in petitioner's presence. Only on November 10, 1965 that an information was filed against them in the
Caloocan of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The court promptly ordered them to be committed to jail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Orozco committed arbitrary detention by delay in the delivery of the detained person to proper
judicial authorities.

HELD:

No, Orozco did not violate article 125, arbitrary detention by delay in the delivery of the detained person to proper
judicial authorities.

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It was a fact that only after 75 hours that an information was filed at the Caloocan Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal but this does not equate to arbitrary detention because to consider that November 7 was a Sunday,
November 8 was declared an official holiday and November 9 was an election day. It would not be an easy task for
a fiscal to look for personnels of the court and the judge likewise to properly file the complaint. These considerations
were taken into by the Supreme Court in holding that Orozco can't be liable for arbitrary detention under article 125.

JASPER AGBAY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4
NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner, together with one SHERWIN Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro
Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610. The following day, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed
against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu. Subsequently,
counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering
that the latter had failed to deliver the petitioner to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from his
detention. September 7, 1997, this was not acted upon. When petitioner was able to post bond and was released,
he filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private respondents. By virtue of
Memorandum Circular No. 14 of the Office of the Ombudsman,[11] the case for delay in delivery filed by petitioner
against herein private respondents was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its proper
disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint, and issued the Resolution recommending its
dismissal against herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but it was
denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
11
Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.
Held:
No, there was not, the petition is thus dismissed. The filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes
delivery to a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by
law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art.
125 without such detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities.

The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested
with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a
public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by law.

In contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his function to
conduct preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment [32]. Furthermore,
upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that
by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the
court, he may be released on bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the
filing of the complaint with the MCTC.

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SORIA VS DESIERTO

Facts:
Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were arrested on May 13, 2001 (a Sunday and the day before
May 14 elections) without a warrant by respondents for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. One
police identified Bista to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6.From the time of Soria’s detention
up to the time of his release, 22 hours had already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26 days.
The crimes for which Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent,
thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his
arrest. The crimes for which Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent,
thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the
proper judicial authorities.

Article 125 stated that Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period
of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

Petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents. The office dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. Petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second
assailed Resolution.
13
Issue:
W/O officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons)

Held:

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the respondents. Their disposition of petitioners' complaint for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was
properly backed up by law and jurisprudence.

Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday,
should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in
courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office day. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because
the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the
time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation
of B.P. Blg. 6 and he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous
detention.
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SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED AND ABUSE

STONEHILL VS DIOKNO

Facts:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of
which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or
“used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and
the Rules of Court for being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into
two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b)
those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue: Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held: No.
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As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted
to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.

JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum”
newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a
writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only
one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
16
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error
and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application.
The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by
the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners
did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure
under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
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Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State
of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not
indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

PEOPLE VS. MANDORIAO, JR.

FACTS: The Iglesia ni Cristo held a religious rally at a public place in Baguio. About 200 people attended the
meeting, about 50 of whom were members of the Iglesia ni Cristo but the rest were outsiders and curious listeners.
While Salvio, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo, was expounding on his topic to the effect that Christ is not God, but only
man, the crowd became unruly. Some people urged Mandoriao to go up the stage and have a debate with Salvio.
Mandoriao however, was not able to speak before the microphone because the wire connecting it was abruptly
disconnected.

ISSUE: Whether or not the meeting was a religious ceremony.

HELD: The meeting here was not a religious ceremony. A religious meeting is an “assemblage of people meeting
for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform religious services in recognition
of God as an object of worship…” The meeting here was not limited to the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The
supposed prayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental because the principal object of the rally was to
persuade new converts to their religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot be

18
said to have performed acts or uttered words offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The act complained of must be
directed against a dogma or ritual, or upon an object of veneration. There was no object of veneration at the meeting.

Reyes Book II, page 80:

When the application of the Iglesia ni Cristo was to hold the meeting at a public place and the permit expressly
stated that the purpose was to hold a religious rally, what was held on that occasion was not a religious ceremony,
even if a minister was then preaching (“that Jesus Christ was not God but only a man”). The rally was attended by
persons who are not members of the sect.

Reyes Book II, page 81:

Remarks that those who believed that Christ is God are anti-Christ, that all the members of the Roman Catholic
Church are marked by the demon, and that the Pope is the Commander of Satan are notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.

PEOPLE VS. BAES

FACTS: Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged the accused with an
offense against religion for causing the funeral of a member of the “Church of Christ” to pass through the churchyard
fronting the Roman Catholic Church, belonging to said church and devoted to the religious worship thereof. The
parish priest opposed this, but through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to
allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics,
thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which
the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained
of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which
must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones.
Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon the more or less broad or narrow
conception of any given particular religion, but should be gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed
and after scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance which should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial
criterion. Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the subjective characterization of the act
from the point of view of a given religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the application of the law would
be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance
and persecution.”

Article 133, RPC:

Offending the religious feelings. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the
celebration of any religious ceremoncy, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EPIFANIO NANOY, ALIAS NANIE

20
FACTS:
 While the congregation of the Assembly of God was having its afternoon services in its chapel, accused
Epifanio Nanoy, who was drunk, entered with uplifted hands, approached Levita Lapura, the song leader,
and attempted to grab her.
 Levita Lepura ran away from Nanoy. Romeo Zafra, also a member of said congregation, held the accused
and led him outside the church.
 The other members of the sect also ran out of the church and the religious services were discontinued.
 Accused was charged with the crime of offending religious feelings penalized under Art. 133 of the RPC.
The complaint alleged that he had the intention of stopping the said rite in an unholy manner.
 Trial court found Nanoy guilty of disturbance or interruption of a religious ceremony, penalized under A153
of the RPC and sentenced him to 10 months and 21 days of imprisonment, plus a fine of Php50 with
subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency.
 Accused appealed, arguing that the offense, if any is unjust vexation.

ISSUE/S
1. WON the TC erred in convicting Nanoy of disturbance or interruption of a religious ceremony.
 WON the offense was unjust vexation.

Rules
 Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious
worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.
 There must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful.
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ANALYSIS
1. YES. The appellant did NOT perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. Neither did he
cause such a serious disturbance as to interrupt or disturb the services of the said congregation. That he
had no intention of interrupting the services was shown by the fact that appellant allowed himself to be
led outside the church by Zomeo Zafra.

CONCLUSION/HELD/DISPOSITIVE:
Decision MODIFIED. Accused-appellant guilty of only unjust vexation and sentenced to pay a fine of Php100 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

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