LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 1
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007 dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case
No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45,
Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated
June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the
MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz,
is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies
his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc
in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear
before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano
Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground
that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging
that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to
interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme
Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public
respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-
1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution
on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal
Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being
no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law
provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last,
petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly
provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts,
as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of
a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration
before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the
reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the
strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the
Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the
outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the
petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold
in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied
the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant
Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved
to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner
despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS
THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW
WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR
MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES,
AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS
(MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if
warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance
of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and
implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar
Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan,
the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as
encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the
petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of
his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the
supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed
law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before
any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the
law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and
in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the
Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of
the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 2
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the
bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730
is subsequently changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now
appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of
an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of
Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction
exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule
138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as
an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter
rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule
138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that
petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying
permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple
reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts
by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law
student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very
nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and,
for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been
intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the injunctive court,
the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability
by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the
case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore,
petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally
untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual
damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of
neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 3

reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action

prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation,

waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-
1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private
prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and

Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under
the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in
1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from
the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in
September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused
later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded
guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11
February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to
four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application
for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report
dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending
petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge
from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C.
Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded
as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less
than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2)
senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious
orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the
hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8)
accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan,
father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led
to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The
offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused
took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of
confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 4
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the
mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who
went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday
1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused
had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the
incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the
death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom
he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the
pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of
his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for
admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound
discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the
strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is
the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have
become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing
of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the
practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission
to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled
for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was
then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared
to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment
of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a
most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes
other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of
third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having
forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It
is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find
room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state
if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 5

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner

Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of
Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes
that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary,
the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the
benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of
youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere

ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL
TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby

ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to
sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,

Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 5499. August 16, 2005]
WILSON PO CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO D.
PIZARRO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment
filed by Wilson Po Cham (complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D.
Pizarro (respondent) for commission of falsehood and
misrepresentations in violation of a lawyers oath.
Complainant gives the following account of the facts that spawned
the filing of the present administrative complaint.
Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete), Elenita Alipio
(Alipio), and now deceased Mario Navarro (Navarro) who was then the
Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to him a parcel
of land with an area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified
as Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262, situated at Sitio Gatao,
Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the property).
He having expressed interest in the offer, Caete and Navarro
arranged a meeting between him and respondent at the latters
residence in Balanga, Bataan[1] where respondent categorically
represented to him that the property being offered for sale was alienable
and disposable.[2] Respondent in fact presented to him 1) Real Property
Tax Order of Payment[3] dated July 10, 1995 covering the property
signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal Treasurer and Navarro as
Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] dated July 25, 1995
purportedly executed by the alleged previous actual occupant of the
property, one Jose R. Monzon (Monzon), transferring all his rights,
interest and possession thereover in favor of Virgilio Banzon (Banzon),
Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed
consideration of P500,000.00; and 3) Special Power of
Attorney[5] dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala
authorizing him (respondent) to:
1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land, which is
more particularly described as follows:
AREA: 40 has. more or less
situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong,
Morong, Bataan covered by Tax Declaration No. 6066 PIN
#108-08-044-05-126
2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of
sale of the subject property; and to sign the same.
3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation to distribute the
corresponding share of each co-owner;
x x x[6] (Underscoring supplied)
On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed
an Option to Buy,[7] the pertinent portions of which provide:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and Attorney-In-Fact of his co-
owners of rights with planted trees (improvements) containing an area
of FORTY THREE (43) hectares, situated in Pook Batangas,
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 6
Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan; (Portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong
Cadastre), covered by Tax Declaration 6066.
WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the same for a total price
of THREE MILLION AND SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic), as follows:
a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract and the
balance of full payment within three (3) weeks from date hereof which
offer the SELLER accepts;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises
and the terms and conditions hereunder specified the parties have
agreed on the following:
1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and earnest (sic)
of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract, which shall form part of the
contract price if and when the buyer comply (sic) with his obligation to
pay in full within three (3) weeks from date hereof, otherwise should the
BUYER fails (sic) to comply with his obligation to pay in full on the
scheduled period the P10,000.00 earnest money shall be forfeited in
favor of the SELLER and the Option to Buy is automatically cancelled.
2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price shall execute a final
Deed of Sale and shall surrender all documents, plans and paper
relative to the properties subject of sale;
3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights and claims over the
above stated properties including the trees planted on it as against the
rights of third party except that of the government. [8] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid
respondent the amount of P10,000.00 for which respondent issued the
corresponding Receipt[9] reading:
Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) from MR.
WILSON CHAM, representing earnest/option money for Lot 1683 of
Cad. Case No. 262 situated at Boundaries:
NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo
SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong
WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta
EAST : Sapang Batang Panao
including the trees and improvement situated thereon.
Full payment shall be paid within three (3) weeks from date
hereof.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale[11] over the property in his favor, the pertinent portions of which
read as follows:
For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE (P3,372,533.00), Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged from the BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the
SELLERS, the said SELLERS do by these presents SELL, TRANSFER
and CONVEY, in manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the said
BUYER, his heirs and assigns, all

their rights, interest and participation over that certain real estate
destined for, and in actual use as fruit land, situated at Pook Batangas,
Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan and more particularly described as
follows:
Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan
Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre, containing
an area of 392,155 square meters more or less.
Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo
South : National Road,
Bagac-Morong
West : Right of Nicasio
Canta
East : Sapang Batang Panao
The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the foregoing
land are visible by means of monuments, creeks and trees; that the land
including the permanent improvements existing thereon consist of fruit-
bearing trees assessed for the current year at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY
TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED P262,400.00 as per Tax
Declaration No. 5010; and that the property is presently in the
possession of the SELLERS.
The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the
absolute owners of the rights over the said property; that they have
the perfect right to convey the same; that they acquired their rights over
the said property by absolute deed of sale from Jose R. Monzon who
acquired his rights over the property from Marianito Holgado; that
Marianito Holgado acquired his right from Pedro de Leon who, in turn,
acquired his right from Julian Agujo who was the original owner who
cleared the land and who was in possession of the same immediately
after the Second World War.
The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the aforedescribed
real estate including the trees planted thereon and they undertake to
defend the same unto said Vendee, his heirs and assigns against the
claims of any third person whomsoever.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 5010[13] with Property Index No. 018-08-004-05-126
issued in his (respondents) name and his alleged co-owners, and Real
Property Tax Receipt No. 025201[14] dated August 17, 1995 issued in
his (respondents) name.
He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21,
1995 representing the purchase price of the rights over the property,
Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA063210[15] in the amount
of P168,627.00 payable to respondent, and Asian Bank Managers
Check No. 004639GA[16] in the amount of P3,193,906.00 payable to
respondent, Banzon and Zabala.
He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a
barbed wire fence at its front portion. Soon after, however, a forest
guard approached him and informed him that the property could not be
fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park.[17]
Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an
alienable or disposable land susceptible of private ownership. He thus
secured a Certification[18] from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 7
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated July 2, 1998,
signed by CENR Officer Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:
This pertains to your request for a certification as to the status of land
claimed by spouses Perfecto and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al,
Virgilio Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located at Nagbalayong,
Morong, Bataan.
Please be informed that per verification conducted by the personnel of
this Office, said lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park per L.C.
Map/N.P. Map No. 34 as certified on December 1, 1945. Under
the Public Land Law, lands within this category are not subject for
disposition.[19] (Underscoring supplied)
He also obtained a Letter-directive[20] dated August 31,
1995 issued by Officer-in-Charge Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENR) of
Balanga, Bataan to the Municipal Assessor, the pertinent portions of
which read:
Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are some
forest occupants that are securing land tax declarations from your
office in (sic) the pretext that the area they
occupied (sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable
lands. Presently, this tax declaration is being used in the illegal
selling of right [of] possession within
the Bataan Natural Park which is prohibited under our laws.
xxx
In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way of
informing us and in controlling this land rush and massive selling and
buying of rights of possession within prohibited areas as stated
above.[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification[22] dated March
14, 1996 stating that those named by respondent as prior owners of
rights over the property from whom respondent and his alleged co-
owners acquired their alleged rights were not among those inventoried
as occupants per the PENRs 1978 to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census
(IFO) Survey.
Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the
purchase price of the rights over the property. [23]
In his present complaint[24] dated September 10, 2001,
complainant charges respondent to have violated his oath as a member
of the Bar in committing manifest falsehood and evident
misrepresentation by employing fraudulent means to lure him into
buying rights over the property which property he represented to be
disposable and alienable.[25]
In his Comment[26] dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied
having employed deceit or having pretended to co-own rights over the
property or having represented that it was alienable and disposable. He
claimed that complainant, being engaged in speculation in the purchase
of property, knew exactly the character and nature of the object of his
purchase;[27] and that despite complainants awareness that he was
merely buying rights to forest land, he just the same voluntarily entered
into the transaction because of the propertys proximity to the Subic Bay
Economic Zone.
Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the
property in the hope that lands belonging to the public domain in

Morong would be eventually declared alienable and disposable to meet
the rising demand for economic zones.[28]
By Resolution[29] of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from notice.
On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply [30] to
respondents Comment, maintaining that the sale of rights over the
property was attended with deceit as respondent deliberately did not
disclose that the property was within the confines of the Bataan National
Park.[31] And he denied being engaged in speculation, he claiming that
with his purchase of the property, he would venture into low-cost
housing for the employees of the nearby Subic Bay area.[32]
To complainants Reply, respondent filed his Rejoinder on June
21, 2002.[33]
Complainant later filed his Affidavit [34] and Position
Paper[35] on June 21, 2002 and September 17, 2001, respectively,
reiterating his assertions in his previous pleadings.
The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for
estafa against respondent, Banzon, Zabala, Caete, Alipio and Navarro
in 1999[36] arising from the questioned sale of rights. The complaint was
twice dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On petition for
review, however, the Department of Justice, through then Secretary
Hernando B. Perez, by Resolution[37] of March 6, 2002, reversed the
dismissal of the complaint as it found probable cause to indict
respondent et al. in court. An information for estafa was thereupon filed
against respondent et al. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-00-94232.
By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his oath as a member of
the Bar to do no falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months, subject to the
approval of the members of the Board of Governors. Pertinent portions
of the Report and Recommendation read:
. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of NIPAS ACT[38] prohibited the illegal selling of rights
or possession of the areas occupied within the Bataan Natural Park, the
subject property not excluded as per letter of OIC CENRO Laurino D.
Mapadanig [illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to
the Municipal Assessor therein and certified on December 1, 1945 that
subject property which is within this category was not subject for
disposition; a fact supposed to be known by the respondent being a
resident of Balanga, Bataan and was in the practice of his profession
also in said area.
Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner Monzon was not
among those inventoried occupants as per Forest Occupancy (IFO)
Survey since 1978 up to the latest census in 1994 from whom
respondent allegedly bought the subject property; the Absolute Deed of
Sale executed between the complainant Wilson Po Cham and the
respondent relative to the same subject property was not
notarized which partook the nature of a private and not official
document.
Although respondent furnished complainant the foregoing documents
to prove their rights, interest and possession to the subject
property, respondent and his co-owners failed to show a permit from
the government conferring upon them rights or concessions over the
subject property, which formed part of the Bataan Natural Park
classified as public and not subject to disposition, therefore respondent
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 8
and his co-owners have no rights and interests whatsoever over the
subject property and their representations to complainant were simply
not true but a falsehood.
Respondent being extensively conversant and knowledgeable about
the law took advantage of his versatility in the practice of law and
committed misrepresentations that he and his co-owners have
irrevocable rights, interests and possession over the subject property
which convinced complainant into purchasing subject property
unmindful that the same is not alienable or disposable being a portion
of the public domain; whereby respondent violated his solemn oath as
member of the Philippine Bar for having committed such falsehood and
misrepresentations to the complainant.[39] (Underscoring supplied).
By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the April 20,
2004 Committee Report and Recommendation.
The case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[40]
The IBP findings are well-taken.
The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal
proficiency but of honesty and fair dealing. [41] Thus, a member should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the legal profession.[42]
The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be
sanctioned with disbarment or suspension. [43]
Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers oath; 6)
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.
And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code
specifically enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule, is not limited to
conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of professional
duties.[44]
In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented
certifications from the DENR that the property is part of the public
domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan National
Park. Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 24[45] issued on December
1, 1945, all properties of the public domain therein designated as part
of the Bataan National Park were withdrawn from sale, settlement or
other disposition, subject to private rights.
On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate
his documented claim of having irrevocable rights and interests over the
property which he could have conveyed to complainant. E.g., he could
have presented any document issued by the government conferring
upon him and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged
predecessors-in-interest, with any such right or interest, but he
presented none. He merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale
purportedly executed by a certain Jose R. Monzon in his, Banzons and

Zabalas favor on July 25, 1995, a month shy of the execution on August
21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do
not help his cause any as neither tax receipts nor realty tax declarations
are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over realty unless
supported by other effective proof.[46] The presentation of a tax
declaration must indeed have been a pretext, as observed by the PENR
in its earlier-quoted portion of its letter-directive to the Balanga
Municipal Assessor that the area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and
disposable land.
Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing
complainant to purchase, for P3,372,533.00, non-existent irrevocable
rights, interest and participation over an inalienable property.
In Lizaso v. Amante[47] where therein respondent lawyer enticed
the therein complainant to invest in the casino business with the
proposition that her investment would yield her substantial profit, but
therein respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the
investment but also the principal thereof, this Court took occasion to
expound on sanctioning lawyers for committing fraud, deceit or
falsehood in their private dealings:
It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship
between respondent Amante and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The
transaction that complainant entered into with respondent did not
require respondent to perform professional legal services for
complainant nor did that transaction relate to the rendition of
professional services by respondent to any other person.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente
Pelaez the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers
for causes which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and
client. x x x
x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline
one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his
private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. The
courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown, through
misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such
professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and
an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The
reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court
which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for such
admission the possession of a good moral character.
xxx
The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness,
whether relating to professional or non-professional matters, justifies
suspension or disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Prentice
in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and restraint:
As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the
oftentimes intricate matters which may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely
more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy
to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard
of test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for
if, in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-
professional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be
ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. x x
x misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 9
it be professional or non-professional, justifies dismission as well as
exclusion from the bar.
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v.
Abordo x xx:
The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time
the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorneys character is bad in such respects as to
show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.[48] (Italics in the
original)
This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v. Bernardino[49] and Lao
v. Medel.[50]
To be sure, complainant is not entirely blameless. Had he
exhibited a modicum of prudence before entering into the transaction
with respondent, he would have spared himself from respondents
sham.
It is jurisprudentially established though that in a disbarment
proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is not blameless or is in
pari delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant,
but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members to protect the
public and the courts.[51]
The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against
respondent. His conviction or acquittal is not, however, essential insofar
as the present administrative case against him is concerned. [52]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of x x
x criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case
for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that
is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case
will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a
criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from vigorously applying
the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate.[54]
While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the
imposition of so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of
this Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless,
be exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his solemn
oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful
conduct.[55]
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 10

The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by

the IBP is not, however, commensurate to the gravity of the wrong
committed by respondent. This Court finds that respondents
suspension from the practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro,
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Year
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will merit a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of
respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney
in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65
in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership
Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP
since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice
of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment
on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976,
they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification
of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings
would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter
referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of
the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-
Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order
applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 11
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject
to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default
in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is
stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby
organized an official national body to be known as
the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of
all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following
words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike
his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is
not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating
to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law,
define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for
the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526,
In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar

is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such
an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing
the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained
as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State — the administration of justice —
as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As
the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S.
502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into
a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 12
principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into
anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power
of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article
X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of
this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at
once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission
to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession,
his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect
the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the
extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 13

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he
is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court
— appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice
... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real
because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment
upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts
are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The
very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be
misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution
when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to
pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of
the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-
A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the
Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty

provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of
the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct
and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth
Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS,
DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N.
SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG
POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL
KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO
RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC
HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT
CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP.,
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS,
INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING
CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with
significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to
upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other,
its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to
defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)
encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the
Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK
had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and
related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central
Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a
total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank
issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of
GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the
Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then
Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of
the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos
government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was
to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate,
the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio
T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 14
Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel
Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola,
William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance
Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost
Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development
Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw
Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp.,
Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as
respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and
Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith,
the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of
their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs
of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties
comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for
proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent
Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central
Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the
acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his
capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks
officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and
appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition
for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGGs motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. [11] It found that
the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. [12] It
further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period
under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be
Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from
his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. [13] The
PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. [14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division. [15] In its

resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were
the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No.
0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was
denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. [17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the
resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [18] The
PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from
accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that
Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas
appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case
No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of
law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive
issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition
states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace
the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards
for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The
early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of
conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but
surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of
the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It
underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as
superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation
duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an
obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties --
competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and
service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately
had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-
revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England.
The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight,
and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from
England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation.
The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 15
single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had
the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was
sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the
traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the
formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the
duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. [20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal
ethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers
were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of
the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of
uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of
eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of
the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were
working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These
reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus
brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of
mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code,
governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the
do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some
states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an
attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized
basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.
Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-
client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of
the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had
some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not
provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers,
by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's
duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical
standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association
code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards
formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary
sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the
academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the
statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic
lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the
official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them
as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes
was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they
disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth
century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their
colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations,
most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of
conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive
bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was
the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the
American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. [23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a
lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to
which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar
Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form
and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving
door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter
government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in

private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service.[25] These concerns were
classified as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in which
the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is
substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while
employed by the government and the interests of the current and former
are adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-interest
representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply
primarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA
attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA
amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with
problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was
minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and
congruent-interest representation conflicts. [29] The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers
largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to
take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients.[30] Canon 36provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter
upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment
in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of
the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937,
respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its
own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. [32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing
consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In
1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a
committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons.
The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial
revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between
the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise
observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible
participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in
the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The
basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were
supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of
conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR
9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting
committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained
unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-
101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 16
format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with
comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only
enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules
eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting
comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model
Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with
regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with
Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as
the norms indefinite nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21,
1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[39]Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the
general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated
and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect
of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan.
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the
meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and
bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer on
the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the
subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the
Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent
Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions
dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to

disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The
PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on
how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29,
1977 prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then
Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor
Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela,
then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.,
where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with
the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to
proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the
said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor
General and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the
Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation
had been made since the last examination of the bank
as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank
can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that
it may be permitted to resume business with safety to
its depositors and creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it
shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders
of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the
bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in
the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of
the Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was
furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order
to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor
General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank dated March
29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor,
Supervision and Examination Sector, to
the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 17
1977, containing a report on the current
situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re:
General Bank and Trust Co., dated March
23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank, to the
Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A.
No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a
repot on the state of insolvency of
Genbank, together with its attachments;
and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary
or needed by the Solicitor General for his
use in then CFI-praying the assistance of
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent
Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and
even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine,
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank
on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is
given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever,
upon examination by the head of the appropriate
supervising or examining department or his examiners or
agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be
disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the
duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing,
to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board
may, upon finding the statements of the department head to
be true, forbid the institution to do business in the
Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central
Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets
and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit
of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these
purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and
foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm
within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is
insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the
public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The

Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in
the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in
the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed
claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to
preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the
liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The
Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to
money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to
creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the
debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions, institute such actions as may be
necessary in the appropriate court to collect and recover
accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this
Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the
court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly
arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or
injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central
Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there
is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or
plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the
action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central
Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining
order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be
dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which
shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s)
check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the
petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages
which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or
the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58
of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall
govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order
or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to
mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its
liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of
business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by
financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-
A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 18
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the
contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts
which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that
the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter
per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of
respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that
respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got
himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts
and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then
Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,
therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the
subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does
not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the
reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of
the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated
by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking
malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of
the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution
and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of
the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or
circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or
events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification:
INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the
same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) [41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;
2: interference that may affect the interests of others. [42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word
intervene. Under the first interpretation, intervene includes
participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has
no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation,
intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaning

is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government
lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x
x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former government
lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad
sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted
in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code
restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended
only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service,
had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall
not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer
or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent
Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We
disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record
is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a
long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early
termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the
Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but
as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the
interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility
represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the
ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a
take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy
considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the
case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other
values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At
present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation
offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be
able to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the
only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them
defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. [45]Rightly,
Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government
service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules
prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 19
which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which
they become associated to be disqualified. [46] Indeed, to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing
to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its
use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as
deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that
the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere
guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted
the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and
harass and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was
so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent
judicial and academic commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme
Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of
disqualification motions as a dangerous game. [49] In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine.
The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead
issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent
Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case
at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions
forcertiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which
were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances
under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put
petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not
unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by
its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but
probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. [51] The
client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit
of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right
to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in
denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of
a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of
lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: An
individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private
employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error,
and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this
assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He
adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects the
ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot
be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be
endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal
of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse
to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue
dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a
corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the
former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 20

appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in
government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public
perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best [56] which can lead to
untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the
government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to
protect.[58]Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct[59] and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification
based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and
demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government,
the witnesses in the case, and the public. [60]
x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on
friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials
than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or
talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or
intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to
disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of
favoritism.[68]
III

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its The question of fairness
strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is
claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former government
employee may compromise confidential official information in the Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period.
Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by
is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General,
Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court,
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. For lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as
there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of
respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at
Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed
of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this
reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of
Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
involved.
No cost.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is
intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government SO ORDERED.
employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.
less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting
Committee in 1960: The greatest public risks arising from post opinion.
employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
through the dampening of aggressive administration of government Chico-Nazario, J., No part.
policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably
excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm
would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or
her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently
confirm that law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who
were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous
advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the
case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he
advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later
defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues
defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et
al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what
is perceived as the excessive influence of former officials or their
clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too
far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears
to be an employees influence may actually be the power or authority of
his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from
government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can
be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x

A.C. No. 4346 April 3, 2002
ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO
MERCADO, PATERNO TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER
SALVADOR, EDNA SAPON, JULIANA CUENCA, ESPERANZA
BUENAFE, VICENTE BARNAGA, MARTHA SAPON, JOSEFINA
OPEÑA, PUREZA WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ, DOMINADOR
HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE, ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY SAPON,
CONCEPCION MATANOG, and PABLO SALOMON, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting
interests. They taint not only their own professional practice, but the
entire legal profession itself.1âwphi1.nêt
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Petition1 praying for the disbarment of Atty.
Maximo G. Rodriguez because of alleged illegal and unethical acts. The
Petition relevantly reads as follows:
"2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services
of the respondent and the latter, represented the former in the
case entitled PABLO SALOMON et al vs. RICARDO
DACALUZ et al., before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3 docketed as Civil Case No.
11204, for Forcible Entry with Petition for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages, [and] a Certified True and Correct
Copy of the COMPLAINT by Clerk of Court III Gerardo B. Ucat
of the said Court, is herewith attached to the original of this
PETITION, while photocopies of the same are also attached
to the duplicate copies of this same Petition and marked as
Annex 'A' hereof;
"3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ
of Execution was issued by the Honorable Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the same
respondent lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
"4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association
(Cagayan de Oro Landless Residents Association, Inc.), to
which all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously selling
some rights to other persons without the consent of the
petitioners herein, they decided to sever their client-lawyer
relationship;
"5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of
Cagayan de Oro City, is presently undertaking an
investigation on the illegal activities of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez pertaining to his express involvement in the illegal
and unauthorized apportionment, assignment and sale of
parcels of land subject to the Case No. 11204, where he
represented the poor landless claimants of Cagayan de Oro
City, which include your petitioners in this case;
"6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt
charge under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando
Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services of
Atty. LORETO O. SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 21
law of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and
correct copy of the complaint thereat consisting of four (4)
pages is herewith attached and photocopies of which are also
attached to the duplicates hereof, and correspondingly
marked as their Annex 'B';
"7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the
Indirect Contempt Case under the same Civil Case No.
11204,) REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense of
FERNANDO LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage
and prejudice of the herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty.
Rodriguez's Answer, which is also certified true and correct
by Clerk of Court III Gerardo Ucat of Branch 3 of MTCC –
Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of three (3) pages, is
attached to the original of this Petition, while photocopies of
the same are attached to the other copies hereof and
accordingly marked as Annex 'C';
"8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their
counsel, Atty. SALVA SR. later on withdrew the case of
Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez; and instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of
an Alias Writ of Execution;
"9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without
consulting the herein Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant
of court procedures and the law, filed in behalf of the plaintiffs
(which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204,
a Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs' Exhibits, [and] a certified true
and correct copy of said Motion by Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC
Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the
original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are also
attached to the rest of the copies of this same Petition, and
are correspondingly marked as their Annex 'D'.
"10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez are most obnoxious, condemnable, and highly
immoral, to say the least, more so if we consider his social
standing and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de
Oro City;
"11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are
voluminous will bear the petitioners' allegations against the
herein respondent, who, after representing them initially, then
transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties
(Lonchion, Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to
represent the herein petitioners without any regard [for] the
rules of law and the Canons of Professional Ethics, which is
highly contemptible and a clear violation of his oath as a
lawyer and an officer of the courts of law;
"12. That these acts are only those that records will bear,
because outside of the court records, respondent, without
regard [for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has
assigned, apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject
matter in Civil Case No. 11204 which legally have been
pronounced and decided to be in the possession of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11204, who are partly the
petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot yet enjoy the fruits of the
tedious and protracted legal battle because of respondent's
illegal acts, which have instilled fear among the plaintiffs and
the petitioners herein;

"13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA
ABRAGAN, one of the herein petitioners, in a later
proceedings in Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the
apportionment of parcels of land was erroneously,
unprocedurally and illegally submitted to a commissioner, and
that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in the said Civil Case
was later on dispossessed of her rights by respondent
counsel's maneuver, after the decision (in Civil Case No.
11208) became final executory;
"14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez
eventually fenced an area consisting of about 10, 200 square
meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the subject matter in Civil Case
No. 11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He
even openly and publicly proclaimed his possession and
ownership thereof, which fact is again and also under NBI
investigation;
"15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his
continuing and ongoing illegal and unethical maneuvers have
deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights to
possess and eventually own the land they have for decades
possessed, and declared as such by final judgment in Civil
Case No. 11204."
In his Comment,2 respondent flatly denied the accusations of
petitioners. He explained that the withdrawal of the exhibits, having
been approved by the trial court, was not "illegal, obnoxious,
undesirable and highly immoral." He added that he took over the 8,000
square meters of land only after it had been given to him as attorney's
fees. In his words:
"14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about
8,000 sq. [m]. after the association had awarded the same as
attorney's fees in Civil Case Number 11204, the dismissal of
the appeal by the NHA, the successful handling of three (3)
cases in the SUPREME COURT, the pending case of
QUIETING OF TITLE filed by the NHA, and for the pending
reconveyance case, Civil Case No. 93-573, supra. These
area of 8,000 sq. [m]., was awarded as attorney's fees, which
[were] supposed to be ten percent of the 22 hectares, Lot No.
1982, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 11204, but the
association and its members were able to take actual
possession by judgment of the courts only o[f] the twelve (12)
hectares. [This] area consisting of 8,000 sq. [m]., and
consisting of two (2) lots [was] fenced by the respondent to
prevent squatters from entering the area. The rights of
possession and ownership o[f] this area by the respondent
depends upon the outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra,
for reconveyance of title by the association and its members
versus the NHA, et. al. If it is true that this is under
investigation by the NBI, then why, not wait and submit the
investigation of the NHA, instead of filing this unwarranted,
false and fabricated charge based on preposterous and
ridiculous charges without any proof whatsoever, except the
vile [language] of an irresponsible lawyer."3
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply4 in which they reiterated their
allegations against respondent and added that the latter likewise
violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and/or decision.5
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 22
In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001,
Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for
violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Her report reads in part as follows:
"From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent
represented conflicting interest considering that the
complainants were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were
duly specified in the pleadings particularly in the caption of the
cases. Under the said predicament even if complainants were
excluded as members of the Association represented by the
respondent; the latter should have first secured complainants'
written consent before representing defendants in the Indirect
Contempt case particularly Macario Palacio, president of the
Association, or inhibited himself.
"It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his
client, respondent overlooked the fact that he already violated
Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
'Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.'
"We have no alternative but to abide by the rules." 6
IBP Board of Governors' Resolution
Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001
Resolution that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors, but hold that the penalty should be six-month suspension
as recommended by the investigating commissioner.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarro's conclusion that
apart from their allegations in their various pleadings, petitioners did not
proffer any proof tending to show that respondent had sold to other
persons several rights over the land in question; and that he had
induced the former counsel for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw
the indirect contempt case that they had filed. Neither did the IBP find
anything wrong as regards the 8,000 square meters awarded to
respondent as payment for his legal services. Petitioners' bare
assertions, without any proof to back them up, would not justify the
imposition of a penalty on respondent.
Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. They are
expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The
trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and
appreciation of the latter's duty to the former, the legal profession, the
courts and the public. Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end,

lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their
profession.7
In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts."
The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:8
"[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from
others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed."9 (Italics
in the original)
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the
indirect contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil
Case No. 11204.10 Respondent should have evaluated the situation first
before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect
contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their
clients, and should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their
dealings with the latter and the public at large. They must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times.
The Court will not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow"
path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.1âwphi1.nêt
In Hilado v. David,11 which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers
to be like Caesar's wife – to be pure and to appear to be so.
"This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect
the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice."
Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than
enhanced, the public perception of the legal profession. His divided
loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may be suspended,
following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – Any member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 23
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. x x x."
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that
suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law, as recommended
by Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to discipline respondent.
A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel
reveals that the Court has imposed on erring attorneys12 either a
reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from five (5)
months13 to as high as two (2) years.14
WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as
attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator
who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J.,abroad on official business.
DISSENTING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes
proverbial bad man who wants to know just how many corners he may
cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble with
the law. Rather, it is drawn for the good man as a beacon to assist him
in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of
professional conduct.[1]
With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that
the present case behooves the Court to strictly apply the Code of
Professional Responsibility and provide an ethical compass to lawyers
who, in the pursuit of the profession, often find themselves in the
unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly,
without exception, no profession in which so many temptations beset
the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity; in which so many
delicate and difficult questions of duty are continually arising. [2] The
Code of Professional Responsibility establishes the norms of conduct
and ethical standards in the legal profession and the Court must not
shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its provisions.
Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any departure from the straight
and narrow path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession and
enjoin all lawyers to be like Caesars wife to be pure and appear to be
so.[3]
Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order
No. 1[4] of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio
T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano
Tanenglian,[5] Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong (represented by Tarciana
C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung
Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation, Allied
Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings
Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development
Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,
Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp.,
Virgo Holdings and Development Corp. (collectively referred to herein
as respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea,
Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection
therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former
President Marcos.
Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among
others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the
filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein
as follows:
a. Civil Case No. 0096 Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied
Banking Corp., Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo
Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v.
PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGGs Order dated June
19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Allied Banking
Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio
Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development
Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel
Holdings, Inc.;
b. Civil Case No. 0097 Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio
T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., and
Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
PCGGs Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the
name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;
c. Civil Case No. 0098 Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano
Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune
Tobacco Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGGs
Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock
in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the name of
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian,
Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.; and
d. Civil Case No. 0099 Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano
Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and
Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 24
PCGGs Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares
of stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian,
Florencio T. Santos and Natividad Santos.
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by
their counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor
General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former
President Marcos.
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The
PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and
counsel to the Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. As shown above, among the litigated properties
are the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case
No. 0096).
The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is
outlined by the PCGG as follows:
1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into
financial difficulties. The Central Bank then extended an emergency
loan to GENBANK reaching a total of P310 million. In extending this
loan, the Central Bank, however, took control of GENBANK with the
execution of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANKs outstanding
shares in favor of the Central Bank and the election of seven (7) Central
Bank nominees to the 11-member Board of Directors of GENBANK.
Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank issued a Resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it
to do business and placing it under receivership.
2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets
and liabilities was scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March 28, 1977. Among
the conditions for the bidding were: (a) submission by the bidder of a
letter of credit issued by a bank acceptable to Central Bank to guaranty
payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and (b) a
2-year period to repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On March
29, 1977, the Central Bank, through a Monetary Board Resolution,
approved the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy Co.
This bid, among other things, offered to pay only P500,000.00 for
GENBANK assets estimated at P688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts
of P103,984,477.55; Cash of P25,698,473.00; and the takeover of the
GENBANK Head Office and branch offices. The required letter of credit
was also not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a
letter of Panfilo O. Domingo, as PNB President, promising to open an
irrevocable letter of credit to secure the advances of the Central Bank
in the amount of P310 million. Without this letter of commitment, the
Lucio Tan bid would not have been approved. But such letter of
commitment was a fraud because it was not meant to be fulfilled.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O. Domingo
conspired together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as
the doing away with the required irrevocable letter of credit, the
extension of the term of payment from two years to five years, the
approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank
advances which was deficient by more than P90 Million, and many
other concessions to the great prejudice of the government and of the
GENBANK stockholders.
3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April
1977. Respondents Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and Florencio T. Santos are
not only incorporators and directors but they are also the major
shareholders of this new bank.[6]

Atty. Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of
GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. since Atty. Mendoza, in his
capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Banks officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation. Further, he
appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition
for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. He filed the said petition
with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 107812. [7]
The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendozas present appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the
sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former
government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
issued the assailed Resolution dated July 11, 2001 stating:
Acting on the PCGGs MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER dated February 5, 1991
which appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of
this Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in
substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty.
Mendoza in his OPPOSITION dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he
was just adopting his opposition to the same motion filed by PCGG in
Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Courts Order dated March 7, 1991,
the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in
Civil Case No. 0005 (pp. 134-135, Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No.
0096), this Division hereby reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated
April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp. 1418-
1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said motion
as its Resolution in the case at bar.[8]
The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was
denied in the assailed Resolution dated December 5, 2001, which
reads:
Acting on respondent PCGGs MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated August 1, 2001 praying for the reconsideration of the Courts
Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion to disqualify Atty.
Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have
filed an OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DATED AUGUST 1, 2001 dated August 29, 2001, as well as the
respondents REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration)
dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the
same in substance as that motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by
the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.)
and the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005 denying the main motion as well as of the motion for
reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when PCGG
failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant
motion is hereby DENIED.[9]
The Resolution[10] dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005, which was adopted by the
Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, denied the similar motion
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
holding, in essence, that the PCGG has failed to prove that there exists
an inconsistency between Atty. Mendozas former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group.[11] The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained, thus:
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 25
... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the
character under consideration is not whether the attorney has ever
appeared for the party against whom he proposes to appear, but
whether his accepting the new retainer will require him, in forwarding
the interests of his new client, to do anything which will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which he formerly represented against
him, and whether he will be called upon, in his new relation, to use
against his former client any knowledge or information acquired through
their former connection. Nor does the rule imposing disability on the
attorney mean that he, having once been employed by a client, shall
never thereafter appear in any matter against him but merely forbids the
attorneys appearance or acting against the client where the attorney
can use, to the detriment of such client, the information and confidences
acquired during the existence of their relation as attorney and client (7
C.J.S., Pp. 828-829, cited in Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs.
PCGG, supra). Significantly, PCGGs Reply does not controvert Atty.
Mendozas claim that in appearing in the instant case, he does not take
a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of the Central Bank of
the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty.
Mendozas claim that the position he took as Solicitor General in behalf
of the Central Bank in 1977 when he filed the said case (SP No. 107812)
has been maintained by his successors in office. In fact, even
incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed no
objection to Atty. Mendozas appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan
group for as long as he maintains the same position he has taken on
behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which
position refers to the various resolutions of the Monetary Board and
actions of the Central Bank in regard General Bank and Trust Co. as
being regular and in accordance with law (Annex A, Rejoinder, Records,
Pp. 1404-1405).[12]
The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty.
Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was well
beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic
Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be the Solicitor General in the year
1986. The said provision prohibits a former public official or employee
from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement
or separation from public office.
As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was adopted by the Fifth Division in
the resolutions now being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the recourse
to this Court by the PCGG.
Procedural Issues
The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et
al.: (1) whether the assailed Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) Resolutions
dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final and executory;
hence, the PCGG should have filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof; and (2) whether the instant
petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
Resolution dated April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata.
In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy
in filing the instant petition for certiorari, respondents Tan, et al. rely on
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a

verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7975, likewise, states:
Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions.
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court.
I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents
Tan, et al. The above-mentioned rules do not preclude the resort to this
Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court of orders or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The special civil
action of certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[13]
In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG
because the denial of its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order; hence, not
appealable. The word interlocutory refers to something intervening
between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some
point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.[14]An
interlocutory order does not terminate nor does it finally dispose of the
case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each
other but leaves something yet to be done by the court before the case
is finally decided on the merits.[15]
Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance
of petitions for certiorari of resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which
were in the nature of interlocutory orders. For example, in Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan,[16] we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition
for certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
denying the petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to
quash filed by accused Edward Serapio. Also, in San Miguel
Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,[17] we took cognizance of, albeit
dismissed, the petitions for certiorari of several resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan involving the sequestered shares of stock in the San
Miguel Corp.
To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos.
0096-0099.
With respect to the second procedural issue raised by
respondents Tan, et al., i.e., the instant petition is already barred by the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in
Civil Case No. 0005 under the doctrine of res judicata, I submit that the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application in this case.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 26
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-
in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts
(1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment.[18] Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine of res judicata or res
adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while paragraph (c) estoppel by
judgment or conclusiveness of judgment.[19] In Macahilig v. Heirs of
Grace M. Magalit,[20] Justice Artemio Panganiban explained that the
term final in the phrase judgments or final orders in the above section
has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that
one can no longer appeal because the period to do so has expired, or
because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal
involved.[21] The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves
nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is
interlocutory.[22] The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed
to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary
or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order
postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention.
Orders that give rise to res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment apply only to those falling under the second category. [23]
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent
action, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a final judgment
or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4)
there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action.[24] When there is no identity of causes of action, but
only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment.[25]
In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept
of conclusiveness of judgment, the doctrine of res judicata applies only
when there is a judgment or final order which, as earlier discussed,
leaves nothing else to be done. As explained by Justice Panganiban, a
judgment or an order on the merits is one rendered after a determination
of which party is upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.[26] To reiterate, the
said judgment or order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some
incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action.
The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the PCGGs similar
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. therein was evidently an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or
finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or
collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the
filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases
because, strictly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve
as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating
interlocutory motions.[27]
Substantive Issue
The substantive issue in this case is whether the present
engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in
Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
CANON 6 THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL
DUTIES.
Rule 6.01 The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter
to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.
A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional
Responsibility were adopted from the Canons of Professional Ethics of
the American Bar Association (ABA).[28] Rule 6.03, in particular, is a
restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provided:
36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT.
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter
upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment
in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public
position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends
beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public
official.[29] Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to
lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows
that the interdiction (1) applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government, and (2) relates to his accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical
considerations applicable to former government lawyers is called the
revolving door the process by which lawyers temporarily enter
government service from private life then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence
garnered in government service.[30] To address this, the disqualification
of a former government lawyer who has entered private practice may
be sought based either on adverse-interest conflict or congruent-
interest representation conflict.
In the adverse-interest conflict, a former government lawyer is
enjoined from representing a client in private practice if the matter is
substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while
employed by the government and if the interests of the current and
former clients are adverse.[31] It must be observed that the adverse-
interest conflict applies to all lawyers in that they are generally
disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 27
if the interests of the former client and the present client are adverse
and the matters involved are the same or substantially related. [32] On
the other hand, in congruent-interest representation conflict, the
disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all, because it
prohibits the lawyer from representing a private practice client even if
the interests of the former government client and the new client are
entirely parallel.[33] The congruent-interest representation conflict,
unlike the adverse-interest conflict, is unique to former government
lawyers.
I believe that Atty. Mendozas present engagement as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096, which involves the
sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp., violates the
ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, which is akin to the doctrine of congruent-interest
representation conflict.
Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject
matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with
or related to a matter, i.e. the liquidation
of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had
intervened as the Solicitor General
The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule
6.03 are (1) any matter and (2) he had intervened thereon while he was
in the government service.[34]
The United States ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that
it is difficult to formulate a precise definition of matter as used in their
Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested that the term
contemplates a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transaction
between identifiable parties.[35]
There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General,
advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation
of GENBANK. It is, likewise, admitted by respondents Tan, et al. that
Atty. Mendoza filed with the then CFI of Manila, the petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK (Special Proceeding No.
107812).[36] GENBANK was subsequently acquired by respondents
Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corp., whose shares of stocks
have been sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil
Case No. 0096.
The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by
stating that he merely advised the Central Bank on the
legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK which procedure is given in
black and white in R.A. No. 265, section 29. This procedural advice,
according to the majority opinion, is not the matter contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully
considered as falling within the contemplation of the term matter within
the meaning of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty. Mendozas giving counsel
to the Central Bank on the procedure to go about GENBANKs
liquidation and the filing of the petition therefor in Special Proceedings
No. 107812 did not merely involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law.[37] These acts were discrete, isolatable as
well as identifiable transactions or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, i.e., the procedure for the liquidation of
GENBANK. Consequently, the same can be properly considered matter
within the contemplation of Rule 6.03.
Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al.,
the interdiction in Rule 6.03 does not only apply if precisely the same

legal issues are involved in each representation. [38] The Comments of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) that drafted our Code of
Professional Responsibility explained that the restriction covers
engagement or employment, which means that he cannot accept any
work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter
in which he intervened as a public official. [39] The sequestration of the
shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. in the names of respondents
Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case No. 0096, necessarily involves
or relates to their acquisition of GENBANK upon its liquidation, in which
Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General.
It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendozas participation in
GENBANKs liquidation is sufficient to place his present engagement as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096 within the
ambit of Rule 6.03. His role was significant and substantial. The
Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials[40] of the Central Bank, is revealing:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the
Solicitor General and he advised that the following procedure
should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary
Board reporting that studies and evaluation had been made
since the last examination of the bank as of August 31,
1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized
or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to
resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors
and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall
order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of
its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of
Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which had been
taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.[41]
The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board
likewise shows that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the
court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent
portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General
with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated
March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and
Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current
situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank
and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 28
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial
and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29
of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a
report on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or
needed by the Solicitor General.
for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank. [42]
By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the
liquidation of GENBANK and, more significantly, by filing the petition for
assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had clearly intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK and its subsequent acquisition by respondents
Tan, et al.
I disagree with the ponencias holding that Atty. Mendoza could
not be considered as having intervened as it describes the participation
of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he had no iota of participation in the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK.
That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made
wholly by the Central Bank, without the participation of Atty. Mendoza,
is not in question. Rather, it was his participation in the proceedings
taken subsequent to such declaration, i.e., his giving advise to the
Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANKs liquidation and his
filing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to
Section 29[43] of Rep. Act No. 265, that constitutes intervention as to
place him within the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or
circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or come between points of time or
events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie between two things [44]
Further, intervention is defined as
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;
2: interference that may affect the interests of others [45]
With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving
counsel to the Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANKs
liquidation and filing the necessary petition therefor with the court, Atty.
Mendoza had intervened, had come in, or had interfered, in the
liquidation of GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by
respondents Tan, et al. of the said banking institution. Moreover, his
acts clearly affected the interests of GENBANK as well as its
stockholders.
Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies
even if Atty. Mendoza did not switch sides or did not
take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if
no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendozas
former government client (Central Bank) and
his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of
the ABAs Canons of Professional Ethics, now superseded by the ABAs

Code of Professional Responsibility. In lieu of the old Canon 36, Canon
9 of the ABAs Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.
Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR)
9101(B) commands, thus:
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he
had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 37, is
[to avoid] the manifest possibility that [a former Government lawyers]
action as a public legal official might be influenced (or open to the
charge that it had been influenced) by the hope of later being employed
privately to uphold or upset what he had done. [46]
The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-
101(B), rest on the policy consideration that an attorney must seek to
avoid even the appearance of evil.[47]
Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted
by the American courts and the ABA has persuasive effect on the
interpretation of Rule 6.03.[48] Accordingly, I find the case of General
Motors Corporation v. City of New York, [49] where the pertinent ethical
precepts were applied by the United States Court of Appeals
(2nd Circuit), particularly instructive. The said US court disqualified the
privately retained counsel of the City of New York in the antitrust case
it filed against the General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a
former lawyer of the US Department of Justice, had not only participated
in the latters case against General Motors Corp. but signed the
complaint in that action.
George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was
sought in that case, served as a trial attorney assigned at the General
Litigation Services of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of
Justice from 1952 to 1962. Sometime in 1954, he participated in the
investigation of the alleged monopolization by General Motors Corp. of
the city and intercity bus business. The investigation culminated with
the filing of the antitrust complaint against General Motors Corp. in
1956. Reycraft signed the said complaint but alleged that after 1958
through the time that he left the Department of Justice in 1962, he no
longer had any participation in that case.
In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the
argument that Reycraft has not changed sides i.e. there is nothing
antithetical in the postures of the two governments in question, stating
that, per Opinion No. 37 of the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics,
the ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply irrespective of
the side chosen in private practice. The said court believed that it is as
it should be for there lurks great potential for lucrative returns in
following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of
governmental resources.[50]
The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the
investigation, but he signed the complaint in that action and admittedly
had substantial responsibility in its investigatory and preparatory
stages. It thus concluded that where the overlap of issues is so plain
and the involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the
appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification. [51]
The General Motors case is illustrative of the congruent-interest
representation conflict doctrine. It bears stressing that this doctrine
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 29
applies uniquely to former government lawyers and has been
distinguished from the normal rule applicable for non-government
lawyers in this wise
To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that
the lawyer has represented passenger A and has recovered substantial
damages in a suit against a driver. No conflict of interest principle or
rule restricts the lawyer from later representing passenger B against the
driver with respect to exactly the same accident. B may obtain the
benefits of the lawyers help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might
be able to employ to Bs advantage information and strategies
developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the
interest of A and B do not conflict.
The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely
private into one that is arguably more connected with the public interest.
Suppose a lawyer in private practice represents Small Soap Company
in its suit for damages under the federal antitrust laws against Giant
Soap Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified from representing
Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for
damages based on precisely the same conspiracy. The congruence of
interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost certainly
mean that the lawyer could represent both clients. In the absence of a
conflict an opposing interest between the two clients the existence of a
substantial relationship between the matters involved in both cases is
irrelevant.
Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government
against Giant Soap Company to force divestiture of an acquired
company on a theory that, because of the acquisition, Giant Soap has
monopolized an industry in conflict with antitrust laws. May the lawyer,
after leaving government service and while in private practice, represent
Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a suit for damages
based on the same antitrust conspiracy? Does the absence of opposing
interests between Medium Soap and the lawyers former government
client similarly mean that there should be no disqualification?
At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply
from the normal former-client conflict rules: the lawyer is disqualified
from representing the successive client in private practice, despite the
fact that the interests of the client and the lawyers former government
client are apparently aligned. All that is required for disqualification is
the relationship between the former and the succeeding
representations.[52]
The rationale for the congruent-interest representation conflict
doctrine has been explained, thus:
The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact
that any other rule would have upon the decisions and actions taken by
the government lawyer during the course of the earlier representation
of the government. Both courts and commentators have expressed the
fear that permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf of a government
client that later could be to the advantage of private practice client would
present grave dangers that a government lawyers largely discretionary
actions would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure private
practice employment or to favor parties who might later become private
practice clients
The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that
way is not idle. Lawyers who represent the government often exercise
enormous discretion unchecked by an actual client who oversees the
lawyers work. For that reason a special rule is needed to remove the
incentive for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions with

an eye cast toward advantages in future, nongovernmental
employment. The broad disqualification accomplishes that and,
particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification
of the entire firm with which the former government lawyer practices,
does it without unnecessarily discouraging lawyers from entering
temporary public service.[53]
The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza.
Indeed, a textual reading of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility reveals that no conflict of interests or adverse interests
is required for the interdiction to apply. If it were so, or if conflict of
interests were an element, then the general conflict of interests rule
(Rule 15.03)[54] would apply. Rather, the interdiction in Rule 6.03
broadly covers engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. To reiterate,
the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility had construed
this to mean that a lawyer cannot accept any work or employment from
anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which he intervened as
a public official, except on behalf of the body or authority which he
served during his public employment.[55]
In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not
representing the Central Bank but respondents Tan, et al.
Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private practice
clients (respondents Tan, et al.) and former government client (Central
Bank) are apparently aligned, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.
Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit
temporal limitation because cases have to be
resolved based on their peculiar circumstances
Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a
prescriptive period for any of the provisions therein. That Rule 6.03, in
particular, contains no explicit temporal limitation is deliberate. It
recognizes that while passage of time is a factor to consider in
determining its applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be
considered. For example, in Control Data Corp. v. International
Business Mach. Corp.,[56] the US District Court of Minnesota held that
the lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an employee of the Department
of Justice had been in charge of negotiations in antitrust case against a
corporation, was not disqualified from acting as counsel for the plaintiffs
suing such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose conduct
was the subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited, was himself
10 years removed from the matter over which he had substantial
responsibility while in public employ at the time he accepted the private
engagement relating to the same matter. [57] Clearly, it is the degree of
involvement or participation in the matter while in government service,
not the passage of time, which is the crucial element in Rule 6.03.
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal
ethics, that body of principles by which the conduct of members of the
legal profession is controlled. More specifically and practically
considered, legal ethics may be defined as that branch of moral science
which treats of the duties which the attorney-at-law owes to his clients,
to the courts, to the bar, and to the public. [58] In this connection, the
Court has consistently characterized disciplinary proceedings, including
disqualification cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, thus:
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor pure criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 30
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio.
Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice[59]
For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions
finds no application in disqualification cases against lawyers.
In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977,
the period that had lapsed is not sufficient to consider it far removed
from the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096. In fact, the validity of the
said liquidation is still pending with the Court. [60] The validity of the
sequestration of the shares in Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is necessarily intertwined with Special
Proceeding No. 107812 involving the liquidation of GENBANK and the
acquisition thereof by respondents Tan, et al. The issues presented in
the two proceedings are so overlapping and the involvement of Atty.
Mendoza while in government employ is so plain, direct and substantial,
his disqualification as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0095 is warranted under Rule 6.03.
Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar
circumstances of this case justify the strict application
of Rule 6.03
The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03
because it would have a chilling effect on the right of government to
recruit competent counsel to defend its interests. This concern is similar
to that raised by the City of New York in the General Motors case where
it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would chill the
ardor for Government service by rendering worthless the experience
gained in Government employ.[61] It appeared that the City of New York
relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v.
Standard Oil Co,[62] known as the Esso Export Case, thus:
If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large
an area of law for too long a time, or will prevent him from engaging in
the practice of a technical specialty which he has devoted years in
acquiring, and if that sterilization will spread to the firm which he
becomes associated, the sacrifice of entering government service will
be too great for most men to make.[63]
Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court,
through Justice Irving F. Kaufman, also the ponente of the Esso Export
Case, distinguished the two cases. It noted that the said court denied
the motion to disqualify the former government lawyer in Esso Export
Case because the lawyer therein never investigated or passed upon the
subject matter of the pending case never rendered or had any specific
duty to render any legal advice in relation to the regulations involved in
the litigation.[64] Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high
ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand,
and encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, was
struck under far different circumstances of the Esso Export Case.
In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in
his article The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of
Professional Ethics[65] was considered more to the point:
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 31

If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending

matter reached the attorney, although he did not investigate or pass
upon it, , there would undoubtedly be an appearance of evil if he were
not disqualified.[66]

Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably

presented a case for the cautious application of the appearance-of-evil
doctrine because the former Government lawyers connection with the
matter at issue was the tenuous one of mere employment in the same
Government agency.
In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in
the investigatory and preparatory stages, but also signed the complaint
in the action. Thus, according to the US court, where the overlap of
issues is so plain, and the involvement while in Government employ so
direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided through
disqualification.
From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that
disqualification cases involving former government lawyers will have to
be resolved on the basis of peculiar circumstances attending each case.
A balance between the two seemingly conflicting policy considerations
of maintaining high ethical standards for former Government
employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry into Government
service, on the other, must be struck based on, inter alia, the
relationship between the former and the succeeding representations of
the former government lawyer. Likewise, as already discussed, the
degree of his involvement in the matter while in Government employ is
a crucial element in determining if his present representation is within
the purview of Rule 6.03.

In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty.

Mendoza in the liquidation of GENBANK while he was the Solicitor
General is so direct that the appearance of impropriety must be avoided
through disqualification.

Conclusion

Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that
Atty. Mendoza was improperly influenced while in government service
or that he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to represent
respondents Tan, et al. However, I am constrained to vote for his
disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid
any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both the public and private
segments of the legal profession.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The
Motion to Disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza is GRANTED insofar as
Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned.

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by
petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special
Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a
Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent
Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for
making certain public statements.
I additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases
Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The
Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation
and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP
Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707)
naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5
February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending
the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and
his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September
1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the
criminal informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In
this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
was no longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees, and hence that the
informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-
12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 32
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul
M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent
motion for preliminary elimination injunction,
the Court Resolved, without giving due course
to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from
notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, ordering respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to
12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner
Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing
and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion
to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987,
initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That
Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the
"Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that
petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner
raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the
1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the
same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with
G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving
due course to the second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to
submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from
filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same
date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered
consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior
to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No.
80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No.
12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987
an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this
Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul
M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed
by the Solicitor General for respondents for an
extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of
the original period within which to file comment on
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order is GRANTED.

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the
Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court
Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In
pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering
respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-
01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing
the criminal information consequent thereof and
from conducting preliminary investigation therein"
ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, ordering respondents Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE
and DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case
No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs.
Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the
order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said
case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No.
80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to
Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited
as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the
filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570
before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in
G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion
a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared
in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said
yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him
from investigating graft cases involving Antique
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought
that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a
trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order)
is that it appears that while rich and influential
persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the
Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens
the people's apprehension over the justice system
in this country, especially because the people have
been thinking that only the small fly can get it while
big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the
tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court
to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft
cases filed against him.
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 33
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in
his investigations because the latter wanted to help
promote the political fortunes of a friend from
Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped
Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against
the governor, and from instituting any complaint with
the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to
prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high
and mighty, the Supreme Court had been
restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez
said he had filed graft cases against two "very
powerful" officials of the Aquino government-
Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and Secretary
Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs
and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the
Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a
little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the
thinking of some people that affluent persons can
prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief
Executive over the weekend and that while she
symphatizes with local officials who are charged in
court during election time, 'She said that it might be
a disservice to the people and the voters who are
entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against
local officials during election time could be mere
harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right
of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile
candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny.
(Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16
February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on
aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988,
the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated
Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by
petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal
informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan;
and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and
desist from conducting investigations and filing
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the
next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after
having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the
Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a
leading member of the court ... and he was asked to
'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;'
" their colleagues and friends;"
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain
from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten
notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members of this
Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e.,
the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration
with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the
above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next
several days carried long reports on those statements and variations
and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the
following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon.
Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A.
Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988,
the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to
COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez
has made public statements to the media which not
only deal with matters subjudice but also appear
offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its
individual members and calculated, directly or
indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit
and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the
administration of justice, the Court Resolved to
require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing
within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making
such public statements reported in the media,
among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer,"
the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine
Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and
the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May
1, 1988, to wit:
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 34
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely
"an offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors or
motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating
cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court
"interceded for and on behalf of persons with
pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought
"to pressure him to render decisions favorable to
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go
slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on him and
to refrain from investigating the Commission on
Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the
dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices;
and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without
rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative
to the purpose of and circumstances attendant upon
the notes written to said public respondent by three
(3) members of the Court have since been
submitted to the Court and now form part of its
official records, the Court further Resolved to require
the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution
copies of said sworn statements and the annexes
thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent
Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same
period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of
February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent
Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not
served on him, the Court Resolved to require the
Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said
Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the
latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988
an Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among
other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court
"appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against
him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an
impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4
members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with
substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out
his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court
Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the
deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per
curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately
executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of
record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to
Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21 dated 20 May
1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to
File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated
26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the
IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with
Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May
1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with
Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted
earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer
with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges
presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex
"A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called
"Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on
22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline
officers of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as
regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary
authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from
the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice
of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to
an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 35
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with
a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is
"necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with
the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play
in cases like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline
attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for
contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and
non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor
is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. 35Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the
Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged
also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of
court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court
over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to
the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.
Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede
and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him,
and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at
one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent
Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit
themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice
against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit
itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to
pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due
process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging
him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the
nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members
of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re
Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had
occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the
exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members
of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and
judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is
an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not
only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also
of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary
proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is
not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a

suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the property and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a
certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably
as much so against the individual members thereof
But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from
the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as
such individuals but only as a duly constituted court.
The distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of
their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be
any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the
Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as
well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be
placed at grave hazard should the administration of
justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of
men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the
practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate
just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce
jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it
be conceded that the members collectively are in a
sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not
and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the
power because public policy demands that they,
acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such
a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to
disclaim any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would
prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 36
of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the
members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate
the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them.
Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under
the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where
the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is
no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not
substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote
certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had
the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that
he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be
resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not
any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez
was saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied
making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially
correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme
Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it
rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent
Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him
for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot
claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors,"
and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of
(the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court
cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of
27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying
respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated
Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter,
is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court
set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated
Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of
the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the
appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of
administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the
Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal
merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose
private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken
(unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very
difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon,
the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement
is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in
complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10
September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is,
more than seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision.
Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering
the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases
filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent
also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a
second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court

issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring
the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No.
87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988
on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the
preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a
reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of
the Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to
render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including
dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This
particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a
cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent
attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court
of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and
respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject
matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order
to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to
the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately
rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with
great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court.
Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear
designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among
the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and,
more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing
him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in
effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and
the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and
powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing
or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation
can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely
bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the
Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of
revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed
judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to
the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total
picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of
an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous"
decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts
arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of
law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court
as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of
the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his
Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those
administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and
submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that
there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the
disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing
effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the
Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a
constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the
trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 37
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to
explain why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected
to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to
above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to
inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the
following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit
[themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the
manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the
resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has
already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge'
[to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the
contempt citation as well as in the possible
administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as
angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no
china man's chance to get fair hearing in the
contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this
Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation
running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated
with such venom by the entire Court in its decision
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not
have confidence in the impartiality of the entire
Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to
believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act
with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined
to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that
a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked
to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision."
(Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier
made, respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court,
accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly
and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not
only capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed
determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public
scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by
passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult
for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez
could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be
ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to
gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The
universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and
justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group
of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may
reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting
exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the
Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of
statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting
contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for
Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a
decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled
threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the
Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied
that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del
Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals. He
then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable
for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was
terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar
apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and
agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time
later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition
for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the
names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those
who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion
for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk
of Court furnished me with certified true copies of
the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court
confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge
Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices
supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did
to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who,
rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by
Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City
Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not
with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein
but for the purpose of exposing to the people the
corroding evils extant in our Government, so that
they may well know them and work for their
extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making the above statements. In his additional
explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and
outside of the Government. It is this state of things
that convinced me that all human efforts to correct
and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already
decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies.
(60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the
practice of law saying:
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 38
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as
state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as
justification for his contemptuous statements. In
other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an
alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and
injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our
act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing injustice.
We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del
Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated
to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys
to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b)
Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them
of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren
its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising
a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its
evaluation of the evidence on only one specific
issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision
because We found no reason for disturbing the
appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court
exercised judicial discretion in a case under their
respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and
imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to
veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the resolution
that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything
but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant
respect for the two highest Court of the land when
on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a
case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both
Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his
client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those
who in the future will choose to enter this profession,
We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them
to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney
owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and

its officers as a fealty for the stability of our
democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247:
emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members
of the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals
Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the
applicable law due to the mis-representation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last
sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal
ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to
reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or just plain fraud ...
and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing
and schooling, even under many of the incumbent
justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends
to create a decision that in effect does precisely that
in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par.
7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to
Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any
issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11,
1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-
president of the favored party who is the chief
beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal
decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-
parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-
entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of
an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states
[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in
the Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered in this case. The appointment referred to
was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy
discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of
side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the
motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's
belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it
and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of
'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 39
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur
and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court,
which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned
by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral
Argument of the above-entitled case—which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who
may take part—... . Only those members present
when any matter is submitted for oral argument will
take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ."
This requirement is especially significant in the
present instance because the member who penned
the decision was the very member who was absent
for approximately four months or more. This
provision also applies to the Honorable Justices
Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in
the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will
inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine
the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the
World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
confiscation of property and/or to the United States
Government, either its executive or judicial
branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation
or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the
sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we,
indeed, find language that is not to be expected of
an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as
'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a
'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph
categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false,
erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner.
He then charges that the ex parte preliminary
injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and
predetermined the case even before the joining of
an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two
justices of this Court for being interested in the
decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz

Castro, because his brother is the vice president of
the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-
created Board of Investments, 'a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President, a short time before the decision of July
31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he
proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by
the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further
removed conditions have been known to create
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no
reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in
the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro
would be less likely to engender favoritism and
prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.'
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which
could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro not only were not free from the appearance
of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like
Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed
to happen in our country, 'although the process has
already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The
slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the
whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of
the petitioners or any members of any board-
petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court
are appointed by the President and in that sense
may be considered to have each received a favor
from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the
Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof
would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court.
We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country.
Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not too-well
concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing
gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's
words are intended to create an atmosphere of
distrust, of disbelief.
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 40
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just
recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style
that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of
the Rules against improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice is thus
transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of
court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to
take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
In doing so, unnecessary statements were in
ejected. More specifically, the motion announced
that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of the Philippine government officials in
the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court'
and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind
of this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A notice
of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned
any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is
being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the
decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard
explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can
never be protected where infraction of ethics meets
with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with
the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor
amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of
justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard
of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a
cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23;
emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest
against what he asserted was "a great injustice committed against his
client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by
this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not

only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know
of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be
repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his
Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published
statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented
petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen
deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen
said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of
his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court 'will become
responsible to all cases brought to its attention
without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or
"denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him. His explanation,
which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in
paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more
symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the
sense that no members of this Court has ever heard
our cries for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in
the sense, that inspire of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why
our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was
spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement. We only described
the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and
confidence in the members of this Court and for
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 41
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has
been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice,
then we alone may decide as to when we must end
our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between
forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution
and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned
by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis
supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected.
The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law
holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was
dismissed by this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for
Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a
reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable
Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it
constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of
the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is
likewise a violation of the most important right in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be
upheld and protected by all means, because the rule
of law creates and preserves peace and order and
gives satisfaction and contentment to all
concerned. But when the laws and the rules are
violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed
force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not
want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again,
killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in
those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people
should keep their temper under control at all times!
But justice should be done to all concerned to
perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of
the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity
of the Court and required counsel to show cause why administrative
action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he
had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes)
and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court,
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations
unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for
reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of
two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. ... That such threats and
disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed
in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has
been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez,

61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz.
769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September
19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959;
Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the
present case more deplorable is that the guilty party
is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People
vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges
who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right
to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending
the cause and rights of his client, should do so with
all the fervor and energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise
said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity
of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re
Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812;
emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking
the Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item
which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication
of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act
No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who
now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his
refusal to divulge the source of a news published in
his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has
not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it
is once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members. In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end
to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one
of the first measures, which I will introduce in the
coming congressional sessions, will have as its
object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court
of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so
that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of
today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis
supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his
avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 42
requiring him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for
the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has
been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
coincidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower and degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court
and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might
be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer
of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of
other institutions, which without such guaranty
would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82
Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion
before the Supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in
translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of
record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality
of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within our power in order that this error may
be corrected by the very court which has committed
it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which
the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the
prestige of this honorable court and of each and
every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But,
at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in
the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726;
emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be
declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was
not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above,
the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court,
an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the
court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less
than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws,
the rights of the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging
and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and
mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly
the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of
the Spanish Language published by the Spanish
Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th
ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said
motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many
years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither
justified nor in the least necessary, because in order
to call the attention of the court in a special way to
the essential points relied upon in his argument and
to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in his said motion were sufficient and the
phrases in question were superfluous. In order to
appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper
and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can
ever sanction them by reason of their natural
tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of
a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in
judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or
less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in
case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to
the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has
been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the
court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices
against it in order to make it odious in the public
eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to
in his motion to promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes
of sakdalism a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as
is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect
of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the
court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he
did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 43
error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven,
with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court,
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to
defend its integrity, not only because it had
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio
St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing,
he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in
many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at
727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed
exhaust our case law on this matter. In the following cases, among
others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from
those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67
(1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441
(1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per
curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29
April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt
Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312
(1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which
the Court has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting
application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that
the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that

the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this
Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the
Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had
some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly
demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen
(13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a
complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim
of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as
an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the
related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair
criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context,
in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an
independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary
to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other;
both are indispensable to a free society. The
freedom of the press in itself presupposes an
independent judiciary through which that freedom
may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of
speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under the Libel Law which come
dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue
in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must
be preserved in all of its completeness. But license
or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens
should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense.
As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizens is the maintenance of the independence of
the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 44
had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of
the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means
to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and
the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity
of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct
on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts
have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free
expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer
and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties
of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government
of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing
lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to
criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism
is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re
Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination
to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of
their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has
criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism
or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the
Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his
words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance. 56
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 45

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to

the judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court
denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27
April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution
of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by
a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of
contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.
Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after
careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public
pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through
his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being
required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of
a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a
right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this
kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general
and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions
might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there
will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not
effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of
the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not
easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and
confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is

not the proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of
this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of
libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available
against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive
remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the
individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that
has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of

contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M.

Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders
from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the

Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA
SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDWIN A.
HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18,
2001,[1] spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused
respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they
purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale
was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his
notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series
of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the
date of notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over
the ownership of the land. The case was estafa through falsification of
a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit
executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the
deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on
said deed.[2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that
the disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly
notarized document, including an impression of respondents notarial
dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have
forged the signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no
access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have
made any imprint of respondents seal or signature on the subject deed
of sale or elsewhere.[3]
In his answer[4] to the complaint, respondent denied the
allegations against him. He denied having notarized any deed of sale
covering the disputed property. According to respondent, he once
worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office
where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he
admitted that he notarized several documents in that office, these,
however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as
a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the
senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that
notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the
secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the
junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law
firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit
their community tax certificates and made them personally
acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would
have remembered complainants had they actually appeared before
him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said
he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on November 5,
1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the
deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his
alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the
strokes were smooth and mild. He suspected that a lady was
responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated
that, at the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on
December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that
complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the
secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 46
document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated
by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a
report[5] it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged
signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different from his
signatures in other documents he submitted during the investigation of
the present case.[6] However, it ruled that respondent was also
negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his
notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and
notarial register.[7] It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that respondents commission as notary public be
revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he should
not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2) years upon
receipt hereof.[8]
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties,
complainants did not categorically state that they appeared before
respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before
him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the
document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show
that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed,
signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his
signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well
as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention
that he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the
alleged notarization of the deed of sale. Respondents assertion was
corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on
November 17, 2001[9] wherein she stated that complainant Editha
Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to
meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other.
The meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent
was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally
acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property that the
spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial
functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is
sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in
the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly
entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have
been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the
document for notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that
even the respondents signature which is the only one left for him to do
can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been
the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed
notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to
make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed
to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on
somebody else.[10]
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 47

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby

found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as notary
public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary
public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he
is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two
years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of
similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-
Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 5864. April 15, 2005]
ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E.
ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,[1] complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged
respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of
Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly
the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly
executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant,
respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on
January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25,
2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta
had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical
Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost
houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs
amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to
supervise the project. For the services of the consultants, the
Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the
amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and
Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received
and encashed by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA
notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of
falsification penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by
making it appear that certain persons participated in an act or
proceeding when in fact they did not.
In his Comment,[2] respondent explained that, as early as May 12,
2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to
inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to
notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001
was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in
favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it
was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he
notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that existed.
Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of
forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on
findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing
rules and regulations of PD 1594,[3] PD 1445,[4] RA 7160[5] and other
pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no
criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing
against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, [6] the Court referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its
investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of
Attorney dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C.
Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that
respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr.
Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member
of the Prequalification and Awards Committee of the Municipality of
Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before
LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 48
the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special Power
of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals
to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was allegedly due
them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney
helped said parties succeed in their plans. [7]
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondents notarial
commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year.[8]
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent
never disputed complainants accusation that he notarized the SPA
purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never
took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His
act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was
his duty to serve the ends of justice,[9] not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he
was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and
if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also
bring reproach upon an honorable profession. [10]
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J.
Montalvan,[11] where the respondent notarized certain documents and
made it appear that the deceased father of complainant executed them,
the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [12] The Court was
emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not
authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the
very same persons who executed them and personally appeared before
them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
Court added that notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic
requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence
of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be
undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October
25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing
the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months
after the latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent
declared that Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the
instrument was his free and voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and
intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless and routinary act.[13] It converts a private document
into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the
necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. [14]
Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in question was
superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of
accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document
contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession
and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act.
As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware
of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public
officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not
have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing
an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without
the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could
not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not
have foisted on the public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme
prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator.
According to the COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in
Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were
evident in the transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez
 LEGAL ETHICS 1/22/2018 ACJUCO 49

& Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the

conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design
of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low
Cost Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent
resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious
document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and
counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating a
fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated
against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial
payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of
the required outputs. x x x[15]

We need not say more except that we are constrained to change

the penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found
guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the
immediate attention of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.