Attribution Theory and Discipline Arbitration

Author(s): Brian Bemmels

Source: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Apr., 1991), pp. 548-562
Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations
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 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE ARBITRATION

BRIAN BEMMELS*

Thisstudyfocuseson 230 malearbitrators' decisionsin a hypothetical

dischargegrievancecase. An analysisof the responsessupportsthe
central propositionof attributiontheory that a decision-maker's
responseto an individual'saction largelydepends on the decision-
maker'sattributions of causalityor responsibilityfor the action.The
analysisalso showsthat,all elseequal,thearbitratorstendedto specify a
more lenientpenaltywhen the grievantwas femalethan when the
grievantwas male; and moreexperiencedarbitrators tendedto decide
eithercompletely in favorof thegrievant or completely in favorof the
employer,whereas less experienced arbitratorstended to make
compromisedecisions.

M OST researchon grievancearbitra- arbitrators'decision-makingin discipline

tion has focused on legal processes
and doctrines, and very little has been
grounded in the behavioral sciences. Re-
cently,several studies have found that the
outcomes of the arbitrationof discipline
grievances are affected by the grievants'
gender, and other studies have suggested
thatthe personal characteristicsof arbitra-
tors are related to their decisions. But
preciselyhow grievantgender and arbitra-
tor characteristicsaffect arbitrationout-
comes remains unknown. Legal doctrines
are of little use in explaining these
phenomena.
In this investigation,I utilize a behav-
ioral theory in an experimental study of
* The author is Associate Professorof Industrial
Relations at the Faculty of Business, Universityof
Alberta.He thanksRay Rasmussen for many helpful
suggestionson this research project, E. G. Fisher,
Yonatan Reshef, Kay Stratton-Devine,and C. Brian
Williams for comments on an earlier draft of this
paper, and Caroline Taylor for research assistance.
Copies of the case transcript,questionnaire,data,
and computerprogramsused to generate the results
of this study are available from Brian Bemmels,
Facultyof Business, Universityof Alberta, Edmon-
ton, Alberta,CANADA T6G 2R6.
arbitration.Attributiontheory is used to
investigatethe sources of grievantgender
effects and the impact of arbitrators'
experience on theirdecisions.
AttributionTheory
Attributiontheoryhas been developed
to explain the behavior of decision-makers
who must decide on a response to the
behavior of other individuals, such as
managers responding to the performance
of their subordinates (for example, see
Green and Mitchell'1979) and officialsin
the criminaljustice systemresponding to
individuals alleged to have committedan
offense (Greenberg and Ruback 1982).
Attributional processes are a form of
cognitive information processing that
helps decision-makersto categorize infor-
mation, reduce ambiguity, and under-
stand the behavior of others. Mitchell
(1982) notes that attributiontheoryis one
of the most prominentand activeresearch
topics in social psychology and related
subjects.
Attribution theory is well suited for

Industrialand LaborRelationsReview,Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1991). ? by Cornell University.

0019-7939/91/4403$01.00

548

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 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE
studying the arbitration of discipline
grievances,since in theirdecisions arbitra-
tors are respondingto the behavior of the
grievant in the case. A first step in
disciplinearbitrationis to decide if thereis
adequate evidence that the alleged inci-
dent or behavior occurred. Attribution
theory is not applicable to this decision,
whichis based on the factsconcerningthe
incident apart from any consideration of
who may have caused the incident. In
many discipline arbitration cases, how-
ever, the occurrence of the incident or
behavior that led to the discipline is not
disputed, and the arbitrator'sprimary(or
sole) duty is to decide if the penalty
assessed by the employeris appropriate-
a decision that mightwell be explained by
attributiontheory.
The basic premise of attributiontheory
is thatthe decision-maker'sresponse to an
individual's behavior will depend in large
part on how the decision-makerviews the
causes of the behavior. Attributionre-
search has shown that causal attributions
vary on an internal-externaldimension
relating to the locus of control. An
internal causal attributionis made when
the decision-makerbelieves factorswithin
the individual'scontrol caused the behav-
ior in question, and thereforethe individ-
ual is responsible for the behavior. An
external causal attributionis made when
the decision-makerbelieves somethingin
the environmentor circumstancesbeyond
the individual'scontrol caused the behav-
ior.
The decision-maker'scausal attributions
will influence his or her response. If the
cause of the behavior is attributedto the
individual (such as lack of effortcausing
poor job performance),then a response
directlyaffectingthe individual (such as a
reprimand) is appropriate. If, however,
somethingin the individual'senvironment
is determined to be responsible for the
behavior (such as poor management or
equipment failures), then a response af-
fectingthe individual is not appropriate
(Lord and Smith 1983).
Thus, the attributionmodel is a recur-
sive (or stepwise) systemwith two struc-
tural relations. First,the factsof the case
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ARBITRATION 549
determine the decision-maker's attribu-
tions of causality for the individual's
behavior; second, the decision-maker's
causal attributionsdetermine the appro-
priate response to the individual's behav-
ior. The causal attributionsare an inter-
mediate step in the decision-making
process, and facilitate a connection be-
tween the facts of the case and the
decision. By substitution,in the reduced-
form relation, the facts of the case
determinethe final decision.
Kelly (1967) argues that the formation
of causal attributions(that is, the first
structuralrelation) is governed primarily
by information relating to three vari-
ables-consensus, distinctiveness, and con-
sistency.Consensus is the extent to which
otherindividualsin the same environment
exhibit the same behavior. If many other
individuals exhibit the same behavior
(high consensus), causality is likely to be
attributedto the environment.If no other
individualsexhibitthe same behavior (low
consensus), causalityis likelyto be attrib-
uted to the individual. Thus, consensus
relates to variation in behavior across
individuals,all else held constant.
Distinctivenessis the extentto whichthe
behavior in question is unique to a specific
entity.For example, suppose an employee
has missed a deadline for completing a
project (entity). If this employee has
frequently missed deadlines on other
projects (low distinctiveness),causality is
more likelyto be attributedto the individ-
ual (the employee does not plan ahead or
does not considerdeadlines important).If,
however, this employee has always met
deadlines on other projects (high distinc-
tiveness),then causalityis more likelyto be
attributedto the situation (this deadline
was unreasonable). Thus, distinctiveness
relates to variation in behavior across
entitiesfor the same individual.
Consistencyis the extent to which the
behavior in question has been exhibitedby
the individual on this entityin the past.
For example, suppose the deadline the
employee has missed is for a routine
project. If this employee has frequently
missed this deadline in the past (high
consistency),then causalityis more likely
550 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
to be attributedto the individual. If this
employee has never missed this deadline
in the past (low consistency),then causality
is more likely to be attributed to the
environment(othercircumstancesprohib-
ited meeting the deadline this time).'
Thus, consistencyrelates to variation in
behaviorover timeforthe same individual
and the same entity.
Information pertaining to these three
variables-consensus, distinctiveness,and
consistency-isoftenmade available to the
arbitrator.Informationrelatingto distinc-
tiveness and consistencywill be revealed
by the grievant'sprior disciplinaryrecord.
For example, prior disciplinaryactionsfor
related incidentswill indicate high consis-
tency,and prior discipline for unrelated
incidentswill indicate low distinctiveness.
If the behavior that led to the discipline
under dispute is common among other
employees,indicatinghigh consensus,this
fact may be pointed out by the union in
defense of the grievant.
Moderators in AttributionTheory
Other factors,termed moderatorshere,
may affect the attributional decision-
making process. Green and Mitchell
(1979) discuss a number of potential
moderators, such as self-servingattribu-
tions,the seriousnessof the behavior, the
relationship(if any) between the decision-
maker and the individual, and the per-
sonal characteristicsof the decision-maker
or the individual (also see Kelly and
Michela 1980). Moderatorsmaybe sources
of error or bias in the decision-making
process, or they may be legitimatecon-
cerns that the decision-maker should
consider.2
1
Althoughpoor job performanceis used here for
illustration,attributiontheorycan easily be applied
to otherbehaviorsthatcommonlylead to disciplinary
action.
2 In addition to moderatorsin attributiontheory,
Green and Mitchell (1979) also discuss boundary
constraintsaffectingthe attributiondecision-making
process. Boundary constraintsare limitationson the
applicabilityof causal attributionsto the decision.
The collective agreement may be an important
boundary constraint in grievance arbitration. For
example, an arbitratormay arrive at one decision
based on causal attributions,but be constrained to
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The followingdiscussion of moderators
will be limitedto the personal characteris-
ticsof the decision-makerand the individ-
ual, specifically,the experience of the
arbitratorand the gender of the grievant.
These moderators are chosen for discus-
sion because research has found that they
influence arbitrators' decisions (Nelson
and Curry 1981; Bemmels 1991).
In the attributionmodel, moderators
could enterthe decision-makingprocess in
several ways. They could influence the
firststructuralrelation,that is, theycould
influence the formationof causal attribu-
tions. For example, studies of supervisors'
attributionsof causality for job perfor-
mance have found that supervisors are
more likelyto attributesuccess to external
causes and failureto internalcauses when
they are evaluating women than when
they are evaluating men (Deaux and
Emswiller 1974; Dobbins 1985; Feldman-
Summers and Kiesler 1974; Garland and
Price 1977; Nieva and Gutek 1980; and
Rose 1978). If a gender bias occurs in the
causal attributionsof arbitrators,this bias
could explain the gender effectsthatwere
found in the arbitration studies noted
above (see Heilman and Guzzo 1978).
Kelly (1972) has also argued that deci-
sion-makersdevelop "causal schemata" or
simplifiedrules to help them formcausal
attributions. Causal schemata may be
developed from experience by observing
cause and effect relations or may be
borrowed frompopular wisdom about the
causal structure of certain behaviors.
These schemata may be importantwhen
relevantinformationis not available. They
allow the decision-maker to reach an
acceptable causal attributionby relyingon
a common causal scheme and the informa-
tion that is available, and inferringthe
missinginformationto fill out the causal
scheme. Gender effects in arbitrators'
causal attributions might indicate that
pronounce another decision by the collectiveagree-
ment. In the experimentalstudydiscussed below, the
clauses fromthe collectiveagreementincluded in the
case were writtento avoid boundary constraintson
the applicabilityof the arbitrators'causal attributions
to theirdecisions.
 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE
arbitratorshave differentcausal schemata
for men and women, or that gender is a
key piece of informationused to infer
other information in their causal sche-
mata. If arbitrators'experience moderates
their causal attributions,it may be that
experience has changed theircausal sche-
mata.
Moderators could also influence the
second structuralrelation in the attribu-
tion model, that is, they could affectthe
decision given the causal attributionsof
the decision-maker.For disciplinearbitra-
tion,grievantgender effectsin the second
structuralrelationwould indicatea double
standard in terms of the appropriate
penalty for a given behavior. That is,
given the arbitrators'attributionsof cau-
salityfora certainbehavior,the appropri-
ate penaltywould depend on the gender
of the grievant.If arbitrators'experience
moderates the second structuralrelation,
it follows that arbitrators' standards in
terms of the appropriate penalty vary
according to theirexperience.
Moderatorscould also enter each of the
structuralrelationsin two ways, either as
main effectsor as interactioneffects.Main
effectsalone would indicate a direct bias
on the causal attributionsor the final
decision,but no effecton the processes of
formingcausal attributionsfromthe facts
of the case or reachinga decision fromthe
causal attributions. Interaction effects,
however,would indicatethatthe processes
are altered. Interaction effects between
the moderatorsand the factsof the case in
the firststructuralrelationwould indicate
that the process by which the factsof the
case are used by the arbitratorsin forming
causal attributions (that is, the weight
assigned to the various facts)is altered by
the grievant's gender or the arbitrator's
experience. Interaction effects with the
causal attributionsin the second structural
relationwould indicatethatthe process by
which the arbitrators'attributionsof cau-
salitydetermine the appropriate decision
is altered. Thus, main effects would
indicate that the moderators produce a
shift in the outcome of each structural
relation,whereas interactioneffectswould
indicate a more fundamental change in
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ARBITRATION 551
the cognitive processes underlying each
structuralrelation.
Methods
The present studyis a field experiment
that teststhe attributiontheoryof arbitra-
tor decision-makingin discipline cases. A
transcriptof a discharge case was mailed
to a sample of arbitrators.The arbitrators
were asked to read the case and complete
a questionnaireindicatinghow theywould
decide the case and other information
necessary to test the theory. Facts of the
case were manipulated to test attribution
theory.The grievant'sgender and arbitra-
tor'sexperience were testedas moderators
in the attributionaldecision-makingpro-
cess.
The Case
The case used in thisstudywas adapted
from an actual discharge arbitrationcase.
In experimentalstudies such as this one,
in which arbitratorsmust make a decision
based on a transcriptof the case without
the advantage of a hearing, it is very
importantto ensure that the case clearly
presents sufficientinformationto enable
the arbitratorsto make a sound decision.
The transcriptincluded background in-
formationabout the case, edited testimony
fromthe hearing, and relevantprovisions
from the collective agreement. The case
was previewed by several experienced
arbitrators (including a member of the
National Academy of Arbitrators) and
several industrial relations professors to
ensure thatthe informationwas appropri-
ate, clearly presented, and sufficientto
allow an informeddecision.
The case involved an employee in the
composing room of a daily newspaper.
The grievant'sjob was to "lay out" the
Classified Advertisement section. The
grievant was discharged after failing to
place an 8-by-12-inch display advertise-
ment in the newspaper. The composing
room supervisortestifiedthat he checked
the computer files and found that the ad
had been included in the ProductionPrint
Out. When asked about the ad during the
supervisor's investigation prior to the
552 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
discharge,the grievant'sresponse was that
"it must have gotten lost somewhere."
There was no dispute that the grievant
had omittedthe ad.
The testimonyand evidence in the case
focused on a dispute about whether
management (external causes) or the
grievant(internalcauses) was responsible
for the incidentthat led to the discharge.
The Company argued that the omission
was due to negligenceand carelessnesson
the part of the grievantand there was just
cause for discharge. The union argued
that laying out the Classified Advertise-
ment section each day was an unreason-
able amount of work for one person, that
management had been notified of this
staffingdeficiencyon severaloccasions but
failed to take appropriate action, and the
grievantshould not be punished for poor
management. Except for the variations
described below, all of the arbitrators
received identicaltranscripts.
Manipulations
Three manipulationswere made in the
factsof the case to representhigh and low
consensus,distinctiveness,and consistency.
The factsaffectedby these manipulations
werediscussedin themainbodyof thetran-
scriptand were repeated in the closing ar-
guments of either management or the
union. In addition,the gender of the griev-
ant was manipulated to test for grievant's
gender as a moderatorin the attributional
decision-making process.Consequently,the
experiment is a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2, fully
crossedfactorialdesign(Campbelland Stan-
ley 1963), with 16 cells and 16 different
versionsof the case. The cases were ran-
domlydistributedamong thearbitratorson
themailinglist,withapproximatelyan equal
numberof each versionof the case mailed
to the arbitrators.
Consensus.Consensus is the extent to
which other employees exhibit the same
behavior as the grievant. In the low-
consensus versions of the case, the com-
posing room supervisortestifiedthatnone
of the other 11 people employed in the
composing room had ever omitted a
necessaryitem (such as a paid advertise-
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ment) from the paper. In the high-
consensus versionof the case, the supervi-
sor statedunder cross-examinationthathe
was aware of several other incidents in
which other employees had omitted an
item fromthe paper.
Distinctiveness.
Distinctivenessis the ex-
tent to which the behavior that led to the
discharge is the only behavioral problem
with the grievant. In the low-distinctive-
ness versions of the case, the composing
room supervisor testifiedthat on both of
the grievant'stwo performanceappraisals
since joining the company he had rated
the grievant's overall performance as
"needs improvement,"and had pointed
out specific respects in which improve-
ment was needed. In the high-distinctive-
ness version, the supervisor testifiedun-
der cross-examinationthat he had rated
the grievant'sperformanceas "good," but
had pointed out specificways in which he
or she could improve.
Consistencyis the extent to
Consistency.
which the grievanthas exhibitedthe same
behavior in the past. In the low-consis-
tencyversions of the case, the composing
room supervisor testified under cross-
examination that the grievant had never
before omittedan itemfromthe paper. In
the high-consistencyversion, the supervi-
sor testifiedthatthe grievanthad received
a writtenwarning (submittedas evidence)
approximately three months earlier for
omittingan In Memoriam ad from the
paper.
Gender.Half of the cases identifiedthe
grievantas male (John) and half as female
(Karen). The grievant'sname appeared 6
times, and pronouns (such as 'he" and
"him" or "she" and "her") referringto the
grievant appeared 21 times throughout
the transcript.
The Sample
The arbitrationcase was mailed to 580
arbitratorslisted in the National Academy
of Arbitrators'1986/87 Membership Direc-
toryor the Industrial Relations Research
Association's 1987 MembershipDirectory.
The latter included only IRRA members
who indicated arbitrationas their princi-
 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE ARBITRATION 553

pal occupation. To encourage participa- Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.

tion in the study,a summaryof the results Variablea Frequency Percent
was returned to arbitratorswho partici-
Causal Attributions
pated in the study. Two weeks after the
MRESP jgsb 93c
cases and questionnaires were mailed, a
GRESP 4.09b .83c
follow-upreminderwas mailed.
Thirty-twoof the cases and question- Decisions
naires were returned as undeliverable, SUSTAIN
Yes 168 73.0
leaving 548 successfulmailings.Responses No 62 27.0
were received from 290 arbitrators,for a AWARD
response rate fromthe successfulmailings Full Reinstatement 35 20.8
of 52.9%. Thirty-eightarbitrators indi- Partial Reinstatement 133 79.2
cated they were unwilling or unable to SUSPENSION (in days) 55.42b 49.97c
participate in the study; five forms were FactsoftheCase
unusable due to ambiguous or incomplete CONSEN
responses; and responses from the seven- High 108 47.0
teen arbitratorswho were female were Low 122 53.0
excluded from the study because they DIST
were too fewto controlforthe arbitrator's High 122 53.0
gender in the empirical analysis.3Thus, Low 108 47.0
the responses that were used were from CONSIS
High 127 55.2
230 arbitrators,all male. Low 103 44.8
Moderators
Variables GENDER
Male 116 50.4
Table 1 gives descriptive statisticsfor Female 114 49.6
the variables in the study. Two variables EXP (in years) 18.90b 11.15C
reflectthe arbitrators'causal attributions: a MRESP= extent to which the arbitrator deems
MRESP indicates the extent to which the managementresponsibleforthe incidentcausing the
arbitratorsbelieved management was re- discharge; GRESP= extent to which the arbitrator
deems the grievantresponsible;CONSEN = dummy
sponsible (externalcauses) forthe incident variable indicatingwhetherthe arbitratorreceived a
that led to the discharge, and GRESP high- or low-consensusversion of the case (see text
indicatesthe extentto whichtheybelieved for explanation); DIST=dummy variable indicating
the grievant was responsible (internal whether the arbitrator received a high- or low-
distinctivenessversion of the case; CONSIS= dummy
causes). These variables, which are from variable indicatingwhetherthe arbitratorreceived a
two correspondingitems on the question- high-,or low-consistencyversion of the case; GEN-
naire, are on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 DER = gender of the grievant; EXP = the arbitrator's
(entirely). The means indicate that the experience, in years.
arbitrators,on average, believed the griev- Mean.
c Standard deviation.
ant was primarilyresponsible, but that
management shared some responsibility
for the incident.4
totallyresponsibleat one end and the grievanttotally
responsible at the other end could indicate that the
3Controlling for the arbitrator'sgender is neces- arbitratorfelteitherthatboth were equally responsi-
sary when studying grievant gender effects in ble or that neither was responsible for the incident
arbitration,since grievantgender effectshave been (the arbitrator might attribute the incident to
found for male arbitratorsbut not female arbitrators coworker interference,bad luck, or chance, for
(Bemmels 1988c, 1990b). example). These two possible determinationsregard-
4MRESP and GRESP are included as two separate ing who was responsiblefor the incidentwould most
variables rather than as opposite ends of one likelylead to differentdecisions by the arbitratoron
continuum, since a single measure of responsibility the appropriatenessof penalizing the grievant.The
could not adequately capture and distinguish be- two scales used will adequately capture and distin-
tween all relevant possibilities. For example, a guish betweenthese two possibilities.The correlation
midpoint response on a scale with management between GRESP and MRESP is -.505.

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554 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
Three variables reflectthe arbitrators'
decisions. SUSTAIN indicates whether the
grievance was sustained or denied. The
grievance was sustained by 168 of the
arbitratorsand denied by 62.5 The second
decision variable (AWARD) is the award
named by the 168 arbitratorswho sus-
tained the grievance. Thirty-fivearbitra-
tors reinstated the grievant with full
backpay, and 133 reinstatedthe grievant
but substituteda suspension as a lesser
penalty.The thirddecision variable is the
lengthof SUSPENSION (in days) imposed by
the 133 arbitrators who reinstated the
grievantbut substituteda suspension as a
lesser penalty. Fifty-sevenof the arbitra-
tors imposed a suspension equal to the
entiredelay fromthe date of the discharge
untiltheirdecision. These suspensionsare
coded as 112 days, which is estimated as
the average delay from the date of the
dischargestatedin the case to the date the
case was received by the arbitrators.
Three dummy variables represent the
factsof the case that were manipulated in
the experimentaldesign. CONSEN indicates
whetherthe arbitratorreceived a high-or
low-consensusversionof the case, DIST in-
dicates whetherthere was high or low dis-
tinctiveness,and CONSIS indicateswhether
there was high or low consistency.Two
moderator variables are included. GENDER
indicates the grievant's gender as identi-
fied in the transcript.The questionnaire
also asked each arbitratorhow manyyears
experiencehe had as an arbitrator,and EXP
is the second moderatorvariable.6
Manipulation Checks
In experimental studies it is important
that the manipulationsbe successful,that
is, thatthe informationcues relatingto the
manipulationsbe noted by the subjects.If,
5 The fact that most arbitrators believed the
grievantwas primarilyresponsible for the incident,
but the majority also sustained the grievance,
indicates that most of the arbitrators felt that
dischargewas too severe in thiscase.
6 The experience variable reflectsonly one dimen-
sion of arbitrators'experience, how long they have
been practicingarbitrators.It does not reflectthe
number of cases theyhave decided.
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in the presentcase, the manipulationsare
not noted by the arbitrators,it is not likely
that theywill influencethe causal attribu-
tions or decisions as theoreticallypre-
dicted.
Three items were included on the
questionnaire asking the arbitratorsabout
the factsof the case relatingto consensus,
distinctiveness, and consistency. These
items (all on 5-point scales) measure the
arbitrators'perceptionsof the factsof the
case and are used as manipulationchecks.7
The mean difference on the question
relating to consensus between arbitrators
who received the high-and low-consensus
versionsof the case is .96 (t = 10.90), and
the comparable mean differences for
distinctivenessand consistencyare .98 (t
= 9.36) and 1.09 (t = 10.56), respectively.
All threedifferencesare statisticallysignif-
icant and in the expected direction.Thus,
the manipulationsof the factsof the case
apparentlywere successful.
A manipulationcheck was not included
for the grievant'sgender manipulation in
order not to give the arbitratorsa clue that
gender was an aspect of the study. Since
the grievant'sname and pronouns refer-
ring to the grievantappeared frequently
throughout the transcript,it is highly
unlikely that the grievant's gender was
unnoticed by the arbitrators.
EstimationProcedures
Since attribution theory is a simple
recursive model, assuming normally dis-
tributed error terms allows both the
structuraland reduced-formequations to
be estimatedby single equation methods.
The structuralequations are the causal
attributionsregressed on the facts of the
case and the decision variables regressed
on the causal attributions.The reduced-
form equations are the decision variables
regressed on the facts of the case. The
7For example, the item used as a manipulation
check for the consensus manipulation asked the
arbitrators,"Do you feel thatomittingitemsfromthe
paper is a common problem withother employees?"
The 5 response categoriesranged from"not at all" to
"verycommon."
 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE ARBITRATION 555

moderatorvariablesare included in all the Table 2. FactorsAffecting

Arbitrators'
Causal
equations, since in attributiontheorymod- Attributions
in a Hypothetical
Discipline
erators can affecteither of the structural Arbitration
Case: RegressionAnalysis.
relations. Ordinary least squares is used (N = 230 Male Arbitrators;
t-Statistics
for the regressionson the causal attribu- in Parentheses)
tionsand SUSPENSION. For the two dummy Variablea MRESP GRESP
dependent variables,SUSTAIN and AWARD,
logit regressionis used. Constant 2.203*** 3.939***
(13.65) (25.02)
Three sets of interactionsamong the
independent variables were tested in the FactsoftheCase
estimation procedures, First, interactions CONSEN .527*** -.396***
among the variablesrepresentingthe facts (4.51) (- 3.74)
- .244** -.012
of the case (CONSEN X DIST, DIST X DIST
(- 2.09) I_ 11)
CONSIS, and CONSEN X CONSIS) or the
CONSIS -.321*** .267**
attributions(MRESP X GRESP) were tested.
(-2.76) (2.53)
These interactionscould provide informa-
tion about the arbitrators'causal schemata. Moderators
As it happens, however,these interactions GENDER -.039 -.056
were statistically insignificantin all of the (-.33) (-.85)
regressions,and theyare thereforeomit- EXP -.007 .010**
(-1.40) (2.06)
ted from the models reported below.
Second, interactionsbetween each moder- R-squared .13 .10
ator variable and the factsof the case or F forGENDER Interactionsb .94 .87
the attributionswere tested. These were F forEXP Interactionsb .74 .13
also statisticallyinsignificantin all of the For definitions,
a see note'a' to Table 1, or text.
b
regressions. Finally, an interaction be- F-ratioforinteractions withthefactsof thecase.
tween the two moderators(GENDER X EXP) ** Significant at the .05 level;***at the .01 level
(2-tailedtests).
is included in the regressionswhere it is
statistically
significant.
decision variables are presented in
AWARD
Table 3. Models 1 and 3 are the structural
Results
equations for the second link in attribu-
Table 2 presents the regression results tion theory for the SUSTAIN and AWARD
for the structuralequations representing variables,respectively.Models 2 and 4 are
the firstlinkin the attributionmodel. The the reduced-formequations.
coefficientestimateson CONSEN and CON- In Model 1, both MRESP and GRESP are
sis are statisticallysignificant with the statisticallysignificantwith the expected
expected sign for both MRESP and GRESP. signs,indicatingthatthe arbitrators'causal
The estimatein DIST, however,is insignif- attributionsdid influence their decisions
icant in the GRESP regression, and is to sustain or deny the grievance. GENDER,
significantbut witha sign opposite of what EXP, and all of the interactions are
is expected in the MRESP regression. statisticallyinsignificant.
GENDER is not statisticallysignificantin In Model 2, the reduced-formequation
either regression. EXP is positive and forthe SUSTAIN decision variable,all of the
statisticallysignificantin the GRESP regres- coefficientestimates on the facts of the
sion, indicating that more experienced case are statisticallysignificantwith the
arbitratorswere more likely to attribute expected sign. All of the interactionsare
responsibility for the incident to the insignificant.
grievant.The F-ratiosfor the GENDER and As in Model 1, GENDER is not significant
EXP interactionswith the factsof the case in Model 2. The estimateon EXP, however,
are insignificantand the GENDER X EXP is negative and statisticallysignificantin
interactionis also insignificant. Model 2, indicatingthatmore experienced
The logit results for the SUSTAIN and arbitratorswere less likely to sustain the

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556 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

of WhethertheGrievanceWas Sustainedand theAward.

Table 3. LogitAnalysis
(Z-Valuesin Parentheses)
SUSTAIN AWARD

Variablea 1 2 3 4
Constant 3.518** 1.838*** - 2.572* - 2.409***
(2.30) (5.39) (-1.75) (-4.50)
CausalAttributions
MRESP .606** .705***
(2.55) (2.67)
GRESP -.793*** -.328
(-2.84) (-1.17)
FactsoftheCase
CONSEN .545*** 1.046***
(3.24) (3.85)
DIST .345** -.143
(2.15) (-.62)
CONSIS -.418** - 744***
(-2.51) (-3.13)
Moderators
GENDER -.200 -.223 1.457*** 1.668***
(- 1.22) (- 1.39) (3.06) (3.24)
EXP -.021 -.033** .035* .026
(-1.42) (-2.34) (1.75) (1.25)
EXP*GENDER -.041** -.049**
(-2.12) (-2.32)
Log of Likelihood Function -112.66 -119.62 -69.97 -63.96
X2for GENDERinteractionSb 3.06 2.32 1.09 2.28
X2fOrEXP InteractionSb .20 1.38 1.26 3.78
Sample Size 230 230 168 168
a For definitions,see note 'a' to Table 1, or text.
b
Likelihood ratio X2for interactionswiththe causal attributionsor the factsof the case.
* Significantat the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailedtest).

grievance.Comparing Model 2 to Model 1 equation (Model 2) reflectsthe combined

(that is, comparing the reduced-form
equations to the structuralequation for
the second link in the attributionaldeci-
sion-making process), the EXP estimate
declines by approximatelyone-third.Also,
recall that EXP had a significanteffecton
the arbitrators'attributionsof causalityto
the grievant in Table 2 (that is, in the
structuralequation for the firstlink of the
attributional decision-making process).
Together, these resultssuggest that about
one-thirdof the effectof the arbitrators'
experience on theirdecision to sustainthe
grievanceoccurs in the firststructurallink
of the attributionaldecision-makingpro-
cess, and about two-thirdsoccurs in the
second structural link. The estimated
experience effect in the reduced-form
experience effectfrom both of the struc-
tural equations.
In Model 3, AWARD is regressed on the
causal attributionsand the moderators.
The estimate on MRESP is statistically
significantwiththe expected sign,but that
on GRESP is insignificant.The estimateon
grievant's gender is positive and statisti-
cally significant,indicating that the arbi-
tratorswere more likely to award a full
reinstatementrather than a partial rein-
statementif the case identifiedthe griev-
ant as female rather than male. The
estimate on EXP was also positive and
significant.The GENDER X EXP
statistically
interaction is negative and statistically
significant, indicating that the gender
effect diminishes for more experienced

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 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE ARBITRATION 557

arbitrators.The relativemagnitudesof the structurallink of the attributiondecision-

GENDER and GENDER X EXP parameter
estimatesindicate that the gender effectis
positive for inexperienced arbitrators,di-
minishesto zero at approximately35 years
of experience (1.457/.041), and becomes
negativeforarbitratorswithmore than 35
years of experience.
In Model 4, the reduced-formequation
for the AWARD decisionvariable,CONSEN
and CONSIS are statistically The
significant.
pattern of results for the moderator
variables is similar to that in Model 3,
except that EXP is insignificant. The
GENDER and EXP X GENDER estimates
change very littlebetween the structural
equation (Model 3) and the reduced-form
equation(Model 4), and GENDER does not
have a significanteffecton the arbitrators'
causal attributionsin Table 2, indicating
that all of the gender effecton the AWARD
decision variable occurs in the second
making process.
The regression results for the SUSPEN-
SION decision variable are presented in
Table 4. Models 1 and 2 are estimates
using the subsample of all the arbitrators
who substituteda suspension in place of
the discharge (n = 133). Models 3 and 4
use a smaller subsample (n = 76) of only
the arbitratorswho substituteda suspen-
sion thatwas not equal to the lengthof the
delay fromthe date of the dischargeto the
date of theirdecision. This lattersubsam-
ple includes only the arbitratorswho, in a
sense, exercised greater discretion in
choosing the appropriate length of sus-
pension. In this subsample the average
suspension was 12.9 days (s.d. = 11.7).
Models 1 and 3 are estimates of the
structuralequation for the second link in
the attributionaldecision-makingprocess,

Table 4. Regression Analysis of the Suspensions.

(t-Statistics in Parentheses)
Variablea 1 2 3 4
Constant 22.05 81.58*** - 3.20 11.80***
(.65) (7.20) (-.33) (3.29)
Causal Attributions
MRESP 7.43 1.95
(1.26) (1.15)
GRESP 1 L.01* 2.93*
(1.66) (1.84)
FactsoftheCase
CONSEN -8.27 2.18
(-.94) (.80)
DIST -9.96 -1.29
(-1.13) (-.46)
CONSIS 2.65 .28
(.30) (.10)
Moderators
GENDER -18.13** -18.19** 5.89** 6.35
(- 2.08) (- 1.97) (-2.29) (-2.39)
EXP -.55 -.46 .18 .20
(-1.38) (-1.16) (1.52) (1.65)
R-squared .07 .07 .13 .11
F for GENDER Interactionsb .13 .98 1.78 1.04
F for EXP Interactionsb 1.19 1.31 1.56 1.18
Sample Size 133 133 76 76
a For definitions,see note 'a' to Table 1, or text.
b
F-ratiofor interactionswiththe causal attributionsor the factsof the case.
* Significantat the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailedtest).

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558 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

and Models 2 and 4 are estimatesof the expected sign in only one equation (the
reduced-formequation. reduced-formequation for the decision to
In Model 1, GRESP is statisticallysignifi- sustain or deny the grievance); it was
cant with the expected sign, but MRESP is significantwith the opposite sign in one
not significant.EXP and all of the interac- equation (the structuralequation for the
tions are also insignificant.The estimate attributionsof causality to management),
on GENDER, however, is negative and and insignificant in all of the other
statisticallysignificant,indicatingthat the equations, Thus, although the results are
average length of the suspension was 18 mixed, they provide littlesupport for the
days shorterwhen the grievantwas identi- distinctivenessaspect of the attribution
fied as femalethan when the grievantwas model.
identifiedas male. In the equations for the second struc-
In Model 2, none of the factsof the case tural link in the attributionmodel, at least
are statisticallysignificant.EXP and all of one of the variables reflectingthe arbitra-
the interactions are also insignificant. tors' causal attributionswas statistically
GENDER is the only statistically significant significantwiththe expected sign foreach
variable in the equation, indicating,as in of the three decision variables. Thus, with
Model 1, that suspensions for female the exception of distinctiveness,both of
grievantswere 18 days shorter than for the structuralrelations in the attribution
men. model and the reduced-formrelation are
The pattern of results is the same for supported.
the smaller subsample in Models 3 and 4. Moderators
GRESP is significantin Model 3, but none
of the facts of the case are significantin Both of the moderatorswere statistically
Model 4. GENDER is negative and statisti- significant for parts of the attribution
cally significantin both Models 3 and 4, model. The grievant'sgender did not have
indicating that for the subsample of a significantimpact on the arbitrators'
arbitratorswho substituteda suspension attributionsof causality,thatis, in the first
not equal to the delay, female grievants structuralrelation, but it was statistically
received,on average, a suspension 6 days significantin the second structuralequa-
shorterthan male grievants. tion and the reduced-formequation for
two of the decision variables, the award
and the length of suspension substituted
Discussion by the arbitrators. For both of these
The AttributionModel decision variables, the gender effectwas
toward more lenient treatmentof women
The attribution model of arbitrators' than men. This pattern is consistentwith
decision-making in discipline cases was field studies (Bemmels 1988a,b,c and
generally supported by the experimental 1990b; Ponak 1987) and a field experi-
results. The variables reflectingthe ma- ment (Oswald and Caudill 1988) thathave
nipulated facts of the case relating to found more lenient treatmentof women
consensus and consistency were statisti- in arbitrators'decisions, but contradicts
cally significantwith the expected sign in other studies that have found no gender
the structuralequations forthe firstlinkin effects(Block and Stieber 1987; Scott and
the attribution model, and in all the Shadoan 1989) or more lenient treatment
reduced-form equations except the re- of men (Rodgers and Helburn 1985).
gressionfor the lengthof the suspensions In addition to supporting the studies
substitutedby the arbitrators.Thus, the thathave found more lenienttreatmentof
consensus and consistencyaspects of the women, the results provide furtherclues
attributionmodel are clearlysupported. to the source of gender effectsin arbitra-
The distinctivenessmanipulation,how- tion. A shortcomingof the field studies
ever, was not as successful. The distinc- testingwhethergender effectsare present
tiveness variable was significantwith the is that they reveal littleabout the sources

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 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE
of gender effectsin the arbitrators'cogni-
tive decision-makingprocesses.
In the results reported here, all of the
interactionsbetween gender and the facts
of the case were insignificant,indicating
that gender does not alter how arbitrators
use the facts of the case (such as the
weights they assign the various facts) to
arrive at their causal attributionsor their
decisions. Gender was also insignificantin
the firststructuralrelation,indicatingthat
the grievant'sgender did not distortthe
arbitrators' perceptions of who was re-
sponsible for the incident that led to the
discharge.
Gender was statistically significant,how-
ever, in the second structuralrelationand
the reduced-formrelation,indicatingthat
when the factsof the case and arbitrators'
perceptions of responsibilityfor the inci-
dent are held constant, the arbitrators
decided women should receive a more
lenient penalty than men. This result
suggestsa double standard in selectingthe
appropriate penalty: female gender ap-
pears to be an unacknowledged (and
probablyunconscious) but defactomitigat-
ing factorin deciding on the appropriate
penalty.
These resultsrelevant to the grievant's
gender are partially consistent and par-
tiallyinconsistentwithprevious studies of
gender effectsin the attributionaldeci-
sion-makingprocess. They are consistent
withother findingsthat grievants'gender
affects arbitrators' decisions. They are
inconsistent,however, in terms of where
gender effectsenter the cognitive deci-
sion-making process. Previous studies
have found that gender effectsenter the
firststructuralrelation (Deaux and Em-
swiller 1974; Dobbins 1985; Feldman-
Summers and Kiesler 1974; Garland and
Price 1977; Nieva and Gutek 1980; and
Rose 1978), but not the second structural
relation (Heilman and Guzzo 1978). In
contrast, these results show that gender
effectsentered only the second structural
relation.
In the reduced-formequations for the
length of suspensions substitutedby the
arbitrators,grievant'sgender was the only
significantvariablein the equa-
statistically
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ARBITRATION 559
tions. None of the factsof the case were
statisticallysignificant. Thus, once the
arbitrators decided that the grievant
should be reinstated with a suspension
substitutedfor the discharge, the factsof
the case had no bearing on the length of
suspension chosen. One possible explana-
tion for this result is that individual
arbitrators have a standard suspension
that theysubstitutein cases in which they
reach thisdecision point,but the lengthof
the suspension varies among arbitrators.
For example, some arbitratorsmay rou-
tinelysubstituteone-weeksuspensionsand
others may routinelysubstitutetwo-week
suspensions, regardless of the factsof the
case. The significantgender effect,how-
ever, indicatesa double standard,withthe
standard suspension being shorter for
women than men.
The interactionbetween the grievant's
gender and the arbitrators'experience was
negativeand statisticallysignificantforthe
award decision variable. This negative
interactionindicatesthatthe gender effect
diminishesforarbitratorswithmore expe-
rience, and reaches zero at 35 years of
experience. To the extent that gender
effects are something to be avoided in
arbitrationdecisions, this result suggests
that"practicemakes perfect,"although 35
years is a lot of practice. Only 30 of the
230 arbitratorsin the sample (13.0%) had
35 or more years of experience as an
arbitrator.
The arbitrators'experience also had a
significantmain effect in several of the
equations: more experienced arbitrators
were more likely than those with less
experience to assign to the grievant the
responsibilityfor the incident that led to
the discharge. Similarly,in the reduced-
form equation for the decision to sustain
or deny the grievance,more experienced
arbitratorswere more likely to deny the
grievance.These resultsaccord withthose
of Nelson and Curry (1981),8 but contra-
8 Bemmels (1990a) also found that arbitrators'
decisions are significantlyrelated to their age, but
age may not be a good proxy for experience, since
arbitratorsbegin practice at differentages, often
after retiringfrom a previous career. Nelson and
560 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
dict other studies' findingthat arbitrators'
experience had no effect on their deci-
sions (Fleming 1965; Heneman and Sand-
ver 1983).
In the second structuralequation for
the award decision variable, however,
more experienced arbitratorswere more
likely to award a full reinstatementwith
full backpay (as opposed to substitutinga
suspension for the discharge) than were
less experienced arbitrators.Thus, it ap-
pears that more experienced arbitrators
are more likely than less experienced
arbitratorseitherto decide entirely for
managementand deny the grievance,orto
decide entirelyfor the grievantand award
a reinstatementwith full backpay. Less
experienced arbitratorsare more likelyto
choose a middle ground, sustaining the
grievancebut substitutinga suspension as
a lesser penalty.
In terms of attribution theory,.this
pattern suggests that more experienced
arbitratorsmay have more highly devel-
oped causal schemata than less experi-
enced arbitrators.This interpretationis
consistent with Kelly's (1972) original
conception of causal schemata developing
with experience. The benefit of many
years of experience may allow arbitrators
to feel more certain about their causal
attributionsand, consequently,more com-
fortablewithextremedecisions.
Conclusion
The results of this study generally
support attributiontheoryas an explana-
tion of how arbitratorsdecide discipline
cases. As hypothesized, when the griev-
ant's coworkers were said to have some-
timescommittedthe same error for which
the grievantwas discharged-that is, when
there was high "consensus"-the arbitra-
tors tended to make decisions more
favorable to the grievant than when the
transgressionwas said to be unique to the
grievant;and when the grievantwas said
Curry(1981), however,also found significantdiffer-
ences by arbitrator'sage that were consistentwith
their finding of differencesby arbitrator'sexperi-
ence.
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to have been guilty of a lapse of an
identicalnature in the past-that is, when
there was high "consistency"-the deci-
sions tended to be more unfavorable to
the grievant than when the lapse was a
first offense. The results provide less
support, however, for the predictionthat
the arbitrators'decisions would be more
favorable to the grievantwhen the griev-
ant was said to have performedsatisfacto-
rily on the job in ways unrelated to the
infractionin question-that is, when the
infractionhad high "distinctiveness."
The arbitrators'attributionaldecision-
making process was also found to be
affected by two "moderators": the griev-
ant's gender and the arbitrator'syears of
experience as an arbitrator. Those two
variables, however, entered the decision-
making process in different ways: the
grievant's gender influenced only the
selection of the appropriate penalty (fe-
male grievants were given more lenient
penalties than male grievants), whereas
the arbitrator's experience influenced
both the formationof causal attributions
and the selection of the appropriate
penalty (arbitratorswith more experience
were more likely than less experienced
arbitratorsto judge the grievant,rather
than the environment,responsible for the
incident causing the discharge, and more
likelyto eitherdeny the grievanceentirely
or reinstatethe grievantwithfullbackpay,
as opposed to takingthe middle course of
reinstatementwitha suspension).
The finding that these arbitrators,all
male, tended to impose lesser penalties
on women than on men is consistentwith
the findings of most other research on
the subject-both field studies of actual
arbitrationcases and experimental stud-
ies. Nonetheless, considerable inconsis-
tency exists across the results of those
studies. As pointed out elsewhere (Bem-
mels 1988c, 1991), however, even when
statisticallysignificant,the gender effects
are much weaker than the influence of
other factors (such as the nature of the
offense and the grievant's prior record)
on arbitrators' decisions. One plausible
interpretationof the inconsistenciesacross
studies is, therefore,that gender effects
 ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND DISCIPLINE
are quite weak and are captured at a
statisticallysignificantlevel only in some,
not in all, studies.
The interpretationof the resultsof this
studyis complicatedby the imperfectfitof
the estimated models. Although many of
the variables are statisticallysignificant,
the goodness of fit statisticsindicate that
most of the variation in the arbitrators'
causal attributionsand decisions is left
unexplained. This result is troublesome,
since the transcripts received by the
arbitratorswere identical except for the
variables that are controlled in the esti-
mated equations. Arbitratorcharacteristics
not controlled for in this study may be
moderating the decisions, but that expla-
nation seems unlikely in light of some
other studies (Heneman and Sandver
1983; Bemmels 1990a). Furthermore,
other studies (Thornton and Zirkel 1990)
have found a similar low level of consis-
tency and predictabilityin arbitrators'
decisions. Perhaps, as Rodgers and Hel-
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