LIGHTNING PROTECTION OF 500 kV AIR INSULATED SUBSTATIONS - REVISITED

R. S. Nowell K. W. Priest, Jr.

Georgia Power Company Siemens-Allis, Inc.

ABSTRACT

Substantial lightning damage at Georgia Power Company’s

Villa Rica 500/230/46 kV substation in May of 1976 prompted a re-
view of the EHV lightning protection. Although this subject has re-
ceived attention in the past, improved knowledge and techniques
will provide increased data for the many stress situations involved.
Since twelve substations have either been constructed or are in pro-
gress, physical layouts for the “typical” stages of both the trans-
I
mission and generation plant substation types have been derived.
Specific configurations are simulated and subjected to surges ini-
tiated by lightning along the transmission lines near the substa-
tion and for direct lightning strokes to the substation.

The results of this investigation have confirmed that the dam-

age at the Villa Rica Substation would be expected as a result of a SWZGE
direct substation stroke (shielding failure). In addition, the excel- ENTERS
lent performance experienced with other stations for surges which L I E 1:
enter from the lines was predicted. Specific application of arresters
during the stages of growth of both the transmission and generat-
ing plant substations is presented. Figure 1. Initial development stage of a typical Georgia Power
Company 500-kV transmission substation.
INTRODUCTION

Insulation coordination in air-insulated substations has been a stages of substation development since growth generally reduces
subject of interest for many years. The cost of EHV substations re- the risk of major substation equipment [3-121. The approach used
quires careful assessment of the insulation coordination para- requires several steps. Initially, the definition of impulse stresses
meters. Early work by R. L. Witzke and T. J. Bliss [l]in 1950 pro- (including probability) based on backflashovers, shielding failures,
vided a method to investigate surge arrester location parameters. and direct strokes to the substation buswork will be discussed.
Definitive work on lightning traveling waves was reported by C. F. Next, the results of specific simulations will be illustrated and the
Wagner, I. W. Gross and B. L. Lloyd [Z] in 1954.These techniques method of analysis presented.
provided the basis for a number of papers which conducted in-depth
analysis on both general and specific systems [3-121. Finally, the results will be compared to the Georgia Power
Company experience, the criteria for future design acceptance dis-
In the 19708, attention turned to the coordination characteris- cussed, and conclusions drawn.
tics of sF6 substations [13-201. Also during this time, additional in-
sight into the lightning backflashover and shielding failure char-
acteristics was presented and then summarized by G. W. Brown [Zl,
221. Finally, additional work in impulse wave propagation was pre-
sented [23] and improved computer analysis techniques were de-
scribed [17-191. Based on the substantial field experience of the
Georgia Power Company’s 500-kV outdoor substations, it is impor-
tant tQ re-examine the insulation coordination with the improved
knowledge and tools available to provide an in-depth understand-
ing of the substation performance and to recommend arrester ap-
plication for future situations.

Two aspects of the substation lightning performance will be ex-

amined in detail - the response of the stations to surges from light- SWSTATIOIJ
ning along the lines and directly into the substation. Two types of
substations are considered which will be representative of the Geor-
gia Power Company’s transmission and generating plant stations.
Figures 1 and 2 show the initialstage of development for each type
of station. Insulation coordination emphasis is placed on the early

7th IEEE/PES Transmission and D i s t r i b u t i o n

Conference and Exposition, A p r i l 1-6, 1979 I& ‘tial development stage of a typical Georgia Power
Figure 2.
C ,pany 500-kVgenerating substation.

CHI 139-5 /79/0000-0569$00.75 @ 1979 IEEE

 STRESSES INITIATED BY LIGHTNING direct strokes, current injections of 10, a0, 30, 40, and 80-kA were
considered with different times to crest for each of these currents.
Backflashovers and shielding failures on the line and direct
strokes (shielding failures) in the substation are considered. Sever- It is noted that different investigations have suggested signifi-
al investigations have been conducted 17, 10, 12, 201 and the results cant variation in the "best" waveshape to consider. The range sim-
have generally led to the conclusion that steepfronted waves of ulated in this investigation covers the entire spectrmi of argu-
varying magnitudes will be generated by lightning strokes on the ments.
line. Historically, a single waveshape was considered for the bulk
of the analysis with some provision to show the influence of varia- TRANSMISSION SUBSTATION RESULTS
tion. This waveshape chosen was based on several assumptions
such as the predicted severity and probability of occurence of stroke The initial development stage of a Georgia Power Company
location, amplitude, distance from the substation, and 60 Hz vol- 500-kV transmission substation is shown in Figure 1. It is noted
tage. that since no power transformers are required at this stage of de-
velopment, arresters have nat been applied in this three element
Recent work [18] has indicated that the traditional prediction of ring bus switching station. Figure 1 shows the normal operating
severity based on front time and 60 Hz voltage may not always be situation with three lines connected and all breakers closed. Simu-
valid for all substation configurations and equipment parameters. lated surges are assumed to enter the station from Line C, Node 2
Specifically, the steepest wavefront may not always lead to the (see Figure 1).As described earlier, initial strokes from six different
highest system stress. The most severe stresses for particular com-
travel distances with three different 60 Hz polarities each are simu-
binations of bus lengths and connected equipment will be from dif-
ferent waveshapes. For this reaeon, it is desirable to simulate a lated. The peak voltages listed in Table I are for each node shown
range of different front times and 60 Hz voltages. Based on the in Figure 1. These voltages are in per unit of the 500-kV system (1.0
data gathered in this investigation, the procedure will in most cases p.u. = 408-kV crest).
provide confirmation that the insulation coordination is adequate TABLE I
for nearly any waveshape. However, if a marginal application
arises, the probability of the specific waveshapes in question may Peak voltages in per unit at nodes throughout transmiskion
be assessed. A similar procedure is also efficient for the interpreta- substation (Figure 1).
tion of the surge amplitude. Previous work has taken two DISTANCE FROM SUBSTATION-KM
approaches, either to predict the expected amplitudes or to assume
the highest magnitudes possible. For this investigation, a range of NODE 0.4 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0
magnitudes was considered and, typically, this procedure con-
firmed that the insulation coordination was adequate for all possi- 2 6.09 5.15 5.17 4.70 4.40 4.31
ble magnitudes. Again, for marginal applications, the probability 3 4.42 4.18 3.86 3.75 3.76 3.80
of exceeding specific magnitudes could be estimated. 4 4.33 4.15 3.82 3.71 3.72 3.77
5 4.00 3.94 3.80 3.78 3.70 3.69
7 4.16 4.06 3.78 3.61 3.64 3.67
Three categories of stresses were derived €or analysis - those 8 4.27 4.05 3.63 3.54 3.69 3.49
created by initial lightning strokes to the lines, multiple or follow 9 3.91 3.91 3.84 3.71 3.66 3.67
strokes to the lines and direct strokes to the substation. Figure 3 10 3.92 3.91 3.86 3.78 3.68 3.71
shows six waveshapes considered for initial strokes to the line 11 4.42 4.37 4.26 4.25 4.13 3.77
when the 60 Hz voltage was zero. These shapes represent rough es- 12 4.37 4.33 4.24 4.24 3.96 3.70
timates of surges which traveled 0.4 km (l/i mile) to 4.0 km (2% 14 4.30 4.03 3.87 3.80 3.78 3.76
miles) to the station [2]. These waveshapes were repeated with 60 15 4.37 4.33 3.99 3.74 3.73 3.73
Hz voltages of the same and opposite polarity. The peak ampli- 18 3.88 3.88 3.84 3.74 3.66 3.69
tudes for the initial stroke waveshapes were assumed to be limited A - 60HZ VOLTAGE-ZERO
by the 500-kV line negative critical flashover. Multiple or follow 2 5.93 5.41 5.35 4.94 4.65 4.59
stroke waveshapes were simulated with zero 60 Hz voltage with 3 4.64 4.52 4.34 4.22 4.19 4.16
variations in peak magnitudes and front times, again traveling the 4 4.55 4.46 4.30 4.19 4.13 4.16
0.4 km (514 mile) to 4.0 km (2% miles) to the station. For simulation of 5 4.28 4.24 4.19 4.17 4.18 4.07
7 4.41 4.48 4.20 4.08 4.04 4.04
8 4.47 4.38 4.15 4.03 4.02 3.96
9 4.24 4.22 4.16 4.10 4.08 4.07
10 4.20 4.20 4.18 4.13 4.08 4.07
11 4.60 4.57 4.53 4.47 4.44 4.31
12 4.58 4.55 4.48 4.47 4.38 4.26
c 14 4.54 4.39 4.26 4.20 4.15 4.13
E2.8 15 4.57 4.55 4.39 4.20 4.09 4.07
I 18 4.18 4.17 4.15 4.11 4.07 4.06
N
g1.5
B - 60HZ VOLTAGE-SAME POLARITY
2 6.23 4.91 4.97 4.48 4.12 4.02
G 3 4.22 3.88 3.38 3.28 3.35 3.47
A 4 4.23 3.83 3.35 3.23 3.32 3.42
U1 8 5 3.72 3.65 3.45 3.42 3.32 3.36
0
L 7 3.82 3.76 3.35 3.22 3.25 3.34
T 8 4.06 3.77 3.24 3.16 3.37 3.17
s e.s 9 3.63 3.63 3.53 3.32 3.29 3.31
10 3.63 3.64 3.55 3.45 3.31 3.35
11 4.23 4.16 4.00 4.04 3.88 3.36
12 4.16 4.15 3.97 3.96 3.52 3.34
14 4.06 3.86 3.64 3.42 3.40 3.39
15 4.16 4.16 3.60 3.47 3.42 3.40
Figure 3. Surge voltage waveshapes caused by initial lightning 18 3.61 3.60 3.52 3.40 3.29 3.32
strokes. C - 60HZ VOLTAGE-OPPOSITE POLARITY

570
 Method of Analysis
Before the voltages listed in Table I can be easily interpreted,
equipment insulation levels as outlined in Table I1 should be re-
.viewed. Since transformers are not present in this initial stage of
the transmission substation, all the substation equipment has a
rated BIL of 1800-kV (4.41 P.u.). The actual impulse flashover
strength of the buswork and the transmission line are 2240-kV (5.49
P.u.) and 2180-kV (5.34 P.u.), respectively. Returning to Table I, in-
terest is directed toward situations where the voltage exceeds the
BIL at equipment locations. Reference to Figure 1 indicates that the
breaker voltages are listed at Nodes 5 , 8 and 14. Several significant
observations are made. First, the peak voltage for all but the 4.0 km
(2% mile) waves occurs at the line entrance (Node 2) where the line
with 60 Hz voltage polarity the same as the lightning surge. This is
opposite to the conventional theory. It is also significant to note
that the peak voltage at Node 2! is well below the peak for other 60
Hz polarities; therefore, the most severe duty for the circuit break-
ers in the normal silbstation operating configuration occurs when
surges originate within 0.4 km (% mile) and the 60 H z polarity is
the same as the lightning surge. This result emphasizes the need to
investigate different 60 Hz polarities. The resulting peak voltages
throughout the substation are shown in Figure 4 for this .4 km (l/q
mile) surge.
Since the voltage at the line entrance (Node 2) exceeds the criti-
cal flashover voltage by 8%, it is likely to flashover; however, the
breaker BIL is also exceeded itnd may flashover. Additional in-

TABLE I1
INSULATION LEVELS
(1 D.U. = 408-kV Crest)

* Assumed
** A margin of 10% (1980-kV o r 4.85 P . u . ) i s iissumed f o r CCVTs.
No margin i s allowed-for breakers o r transformers.

surge impedance is connected to the bus surge impedande. Also, cri-
,tical flashover voltage of the buswork is exceeded for the 0.4 km (Ih
mile) waves and the highest voltage 6.23 p.u. occurs when the 60 Hz
voltage is of opposite polarity to the lightning surge. This agrees
with traditional theory that the steepest wavefront and the largest
change in voltage (AV) will produce the most severe transient. In
this transmission substation.air flashovers are not considered ser-
ious long-term problems since no damage will occur and reclosing
will reenergize the system rapidly. Even though the peak voltages
may be somewhat lower, the concern is the possibility of exceeding
the breaker BIL. When the results for Nodes 5, 8 and 14 are re-
viewed, it is noted that the BIL for breakers is exceeded only on one
wave. It is significant that this occurs for the 0.4 km (% mile) wave
c.0+La ' ' ' ' " ' ' ' ' ' ).
P
E
A
K
U 5.8
0
Ill
sight is gained by examination of the transient waveshapes a t
Nodes 2, 8 and 14. Figure 5 shows strip chart recordings for these
locations. It is apparent that thiese transients do not closely ap-
proximate the impulse test waveshapes. For comparison, Figure 6
shows the superposition of impulse test waveshapes of 1.2 x 50psec.
It is difficult to make engineering judgments on the flashover pos-
sibilities, but if it is conservatively assumed that the gap voltage
(Node 2) may not flashover, no margin is provided for the breakers
relative to the BIL test. Therefore, the breakers could be considered
vulnerable in this situation and the chances of a failure should be
evaluated. However, before the probability of this situation is esti-
mated, the application of a rod gap is considered.
1 p.u.
voltage

\
tE 4.0 -0-
I
N NODE 14
P
g 3.8
0-
U
N Figure 5. Figure 6.
I
T2.0
4 is 18 Figure5. Recorded voltage waveshapes a t nodes 2 , 8 , and
.I> 14 (See Figure 1).
Figure 4. Peak voltages for transmission substation (Fig. 1)for a Figure6 BIL and CFO test waveshapes superimposed on
surge originating .4km from line C entrance. transient Waveshapes.
571
 It is not possible to accurately predict the exact flashover char-
acteristics of a rod gap when stressed by unusual waveshapes.
However, for speculative purposes, assume a gap could be designed
to sparkover at approximately 4.5 p.u. and located at the overhead-
bus junction. This would provide additional breaker protection, but
would be likely to sparkover for numerous other surges. For ex-
ample, Table I shows that this gap would sparkover for all surges
occurring within 2.4 km (1%miles) to 3.2 km (2 miles) of the substa-
tion. In addition, the switching surge gap sparkover would make
the system more susceptible to this type flashover. These factors
would possibly increase the line tripout rate; therefore, it is desir-
able to avoid the use of rod gaps unless the probability of breaker
failure is high.
It has been suggested [19] that a probabilistic approach can be
used to evaluate the frequency of occurrence of the stresses des-
cribed above. It is important to estimate this probability at this
time since the substation will remain in this “normal” operating
configuration most of the time during its five-year life.
Lightning Surge Probabilities
The lightning performance of transmission lines has been dis-
cussed in many papers and is beyond the scope of this paper. The
lripout rate has been estimated for the Georgia Power Company
500-kV lines to range from 0.38 per 100 km per year (method simi-
lar to that described in [21,22]) to 0.42 per 100 km per year [23]. Per-
haps more significant than the estimated tripout rate is the line
performance history of 0.27 tripout per 100 km per year average
over a four-year period (Figure 7).
1 .E?
T*
R configuration containing one line terminated with a transformer
1 (Figure 8) is the most severe case with air flashovers a virtual cer-
P
0 tainty for the waves considered, as indicated in Table 111.
U
T0.5
1974 1575 1976 1977
YE*
Figure 7. Historical tripout rate on Georgia Power Company’s
500-kV lines.
If the tripout location is assumed equally probable along the
line, the number of tripout surges per year (n) originating within a
specified length of line (d) for a tripout rate (T) is given by:
and the number of years between tripout surges (N) is given by:
N = -1 (2)
n one of the breakers is exceeded for only five of the waves applied,
As an example, in the previous section the likelihood of tripout
surges originating within 0.4 km mi) of the substation was de-
sired. Based on the observed tripout rate of 0.27 per 100 km per
year, only one surge every 926 years is expected.
572
As previously discussed, the magnitude of these surges will
vary depending upon the initial stroke characteristics; however, it
is conservatively assumed that each surge will approach the peak
voltage which can be transmitted down the line without additional
flashovers.
Substation Performance f o r Normal Operation
In the previous paragraphs, it was shown it is possible that
surges originating within 0.4 km (YImi) of the switching station
could cause voltages in excess of the breaker BIL and that tripout
surges on a particular 0.4 km (Ih mi) section of line could occur
every 926 years. There are three lines entering the switching sta-
tion and the results are similar for each; therefore, 309 years will be
the mean recurrence interval between surges entering the station.
Also, it may be assumed that the peak 60 Hz voltage has approxi-
mately a 113 chance of being the same polarity as the surge lead-
ing to a mean recurrence interval of 926 years for the case
analyzed. The switching station in this initial development stage
will have a n approximate lifetime of only 5 years before expansion.
For this period, the total probability of the occurrence of surges
which exceed the breaker-tested BIL is estimated at 0.0054. It is
also recognized that even though the breaker is not guaranteed for
stresses above the BIL, most flashovers will be in air and not cause
catastrophic failures. Therefore, it is concluded that in the normal
operating configuration, the switching station performance will be
excellent.
More typical configurations, after the intial development
phase, for transmission substations are those dontaining trans-
formers with surge arresters located close to the transformer bush-
ings. Simulations have shown that voltages in these stations
caused by steep-fronted waves are reduced as the number of lines
terminated increases; although, the waves causing the most severe
transients are again not predictable by conventional theory. The
Analysis similar to that done for the switching station initial
stage indicates that station performance under normal operating
conditions will be satisfactory. A mean recurrence interval of 93
years between surges originating within 4.0 km (2% mi) of the sub-
station is expected. When surges do occur in this configuration, the
line entrance performs the function of a protective rod-gap.
L I I
Figure 8. One line, one bank situation for transmission substa-
tion.
The three element ring bus terminating two transmission lines
and a transformer bank (Figure 9) demonstrates the improved sta-
tion performance due to the additional line termination. The BIL of
three of which originate within 0.4 km (Vi mi) of the station. These
waves also cause voltages on the entrance bus in excess of the criti-
cal flashover. Figure 10 illustrates the time relation of the surges at
the line entrance (Node 3) and the breaker (Node 7) with 1.2 x 50
psec impulse test waveshapes superposed. Early flashover of the air
gap at the line entrance is expected which would stress the breaker
with a chopped wave type transient. In this case, the breaker NODE 3 NODE 7
strength would tend to increase to approximately 5.07 p.u. The
other two waves causing voltages in excess of the breaker BIL do 1 p.u.
not cause voltages i n excess of the bus CFO. These tripout surges voltage
originate within 0.8 km (Vi mi) and 1.61 km (1 mi) of the substation
- Analysis similar
and have the same Dolaritv as the 60 Hz voltage. 1
I
..^^^
parr:
to that done for the switching station yields mean recurrence inter- ~i~~ Recorded voltage uraveshapes at and (See
vals of 694 and 345 years, well within acceptable risk levels. Figure 9) with BIL and CFO test waveshapes superim-
posed.
For the developed four element ring bus terminating three trans-
,mission lines and one transformer bank, the 0.4 km (%mi) and the S u b s t a t i o n Performance f o r Contimgency Operation
0.8 km (% mi) same polarity waves cause voltages in excess of the
breaker BIL. Analysis again yields a n acceptable mean recurrence There will be instances when the substation will be operated
interval of 463 years. with a breaker out for maintenance or with a line out for a mechan-
ical reason. The substation lightning performance was investi-
TABLE I11
gated for a variety of realistic operating configurations. A typical
Peak voltages in per unit in transmission substation for the single- situation is illustrated in Figure 11, with a breaker out of service. In
bank, singleline situation (Figure 8). this type situation, with the h o p broken, the surge voltages are
high throughout the substation and would exceed breaker BIL
DISTANCE FROM SUBSTATION-KM levels. The typical resulting transients more closely resemble the
impulse test waveshapes as seen in Figure 12. Figure 12 also shows
NODE .4 .8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0 the time relation of the surge voltage at the line entrance and the
breaker. Based on the volt-time characteristic of the air gap a t the
2 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.64 substation entrance, a n early fl,ashover is expected. As previously
3 6.09 6.05 6.04 6.04 6.04 6.04 discussed, this early flashover of the air gap would cause the
7 6.20 6.16 6.14 6.13 6.12 6.12 breakers to be stressed with a chopped wave type transient and
10 3.60 3.60 3.58 3.57 3.59 3.46 their strength would increase to 5.07 per unit. For most contingency
11 3.53 3.45 3.33 3.30 3.27 3.17 operations, the line entrance again performs the function of a
12 4.54 4.16 3.51 3.34 3.62 3.93 protective rod-gap.
14 6.14 6.12 5.48 5.41 4.78 4.22
A - 60 HZ VOLTAGE - ZERO
2 2.63 2.64 2.65 2.63 2.64 2.64
3 5.93 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91 .5.90
7 6.02 6.01 5.99 5.99 5.98 '5.98
3.56 3.35 3.32
10
11
12
3.53
3.23
4.76
3.57
3.27
4.58
3.26
4.16
3.07
3.91
3.07
3.92
3.21
3.00
3.99
I
14 6.02 6.00 5.66 5.59 5.38 5.14

B - 60 HZ VOLTAGE - SAME POLARITY

2 2.62 2.64 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63
3 6.25 6.19 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17
7 6.34 6.31 6.29 6.27 6.26 6.26
10 3.43 3.48 3.65 3.66 3.74 3.59
11 3.40 3.40 3.43 3.43 3.52 3.33
12 4.34 3.81 3.60 3.62 3.84 3.86
14 6.34 6.22 5.32 5.24 4.32 3.92

C - 60 HZ VOLTAGE - OPPOSITE POLARITY Figure 11. Transmission substation configuration with a breaker
out. for service.
NODE 14 NODE 18

p.u.
TR#SSnISSIM
oltage

1 psec
Figure 12. Recorded voltage waveshapes a t nodes 14 and 18 (See
Figure 11) with BIL and CFO curves superimposed.

One contingency operation in which the breaker may be vul-

nerable is the multiple or follow stroke case. This case occurs when
a fault has caused the breakers to open and a second lightning
surge or a second component of the first surge enters before breaker
reclosure. The voltage will increase most rapidly a t the breaker ter-
minals and may exceed the BII,. It is concluded that the breakers
Figure 9. Additional line termination in transmission substa- will be vulnerable from the timre of fault clearing until breaker re-
tion. closure. Since the tripout rate is low and the reclosure time is 10

573
seconds, a pair of breakers would be vulnerable approximately1.1
seconds per year for the possible second components of tripout
surges within 4.0 km (2% mi) of the substation, or for initial tripout
surges within 4.0 km (2% mi) on adjacent line terminations.
Substation Performance f o r Direct S t r o k e s
Georgia Power Company has experienced substation equip-
ment failures apparently due to direct strokes. The response of sta-
tions to direct strokes was simulated with and without surge
arresters present. In particular, the station configuration in which
failures occurred was simulated (Figure 13). The peak voltages re-
corded in Table IV were highly dependent upon stroke current peak
magnitude and rate of rise. Examination of the table and related
strip charts indicates that voltages in excess of the breaker BIL
and CCVT margin are possible without exceeding the bus critical
flashover, thereby increasing the risk of equipment failure.
Although the shielding design for the substation involved in the
apparent direct stroke was inadequate for some sections of the bus,
confirmation of a direct stroke and its location was never
achieved. This simulation does demonstrate the need for effective
shielding against destructive direct strokes. Modernization of direct
shielding design concepts is being conducted in a separate investi-
gation and is beyond the scope of this paper.
GENERATING PLANT SUBSTATION RESULTS
The lightning performance of the generating plant substa-
tions, whose electrical characteristics and expansion patterns are
somewhat different from transmission substations, was investi-
gated for normal and contingency configurations. Results
analagous to those for the transmission substations were obtained
and a similar method of analysis was applied.
Substation Performance f o r Normal Operation
Figure 2 represents a four element ring bus generating plant
substation typical of initial installations with two sets of surge
arresters well spaced with regard to the major equipment. For the
surges considered, no equipment BIL levels or acceptable margins
were exceeded. Another typical initial installation is that of a three
element ring bus terminating a generator step-up transformer and
two transmission lines (Figure 14). With reference to Table V, the
BIL for the breakers and potential transformer on the bus are ex-
ceeded for all of the surges considered. Additionally, the margin

Figure 14. Typical generating substation configuration.

TABLE V
Figure 13. Substation configuration during experienced lightning
failures.
Peak voltages in per unit in generating substation (Figure 14). Note
TABLE IV the 60 HZ same and opposite polarites gave similar results.

Peak voltages in per unit for direct strokes (Figure 13). DISTANCE FROM SUBSTATION-KM

NODE .4 .8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0

STROKE AMPLITUDE - KA
2 3.00 3.06 3.12 3.04 2.90 2.70
NODE 10 20 30 40 80 3 2.64 2.64 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63
5 4.76 4.67 4.63 4.84 4.93 4.91
1 2.17 4.40 6.03 7.13 10.17 6 4.79 4.68 4.48 4.71 4.82 4.80
3 2.48 4.92 6.97 9.20 14.23 7 4.90 4.79 4.55 4.57 4.b7 4.59
4 3.81 5.02 7.07 9.35 14.32 8 4.94 4.84 4.80 4.71 4.58 4.50
6 2.23 4.37 5.95 7.13 10.13 9 4.74 4.65 4.44 4.67 4.69 4.80
7 2.96 5.85 7.29 8.56 13.32 10 4.72 4.69 4.45 4.62 4.67 4.78
8 2.46 4.87 7.19 9.16 14.22 11 4.92 4.81 5.01 4.94 4.71 4.72
9 2.65 4.08 4.39 4.59 7.13 12 4.76 4.75 4.80 4.83 4.66 4.53
10 2.36 3.15 3.76 4.29 5.05 13 4.47 4.45 4.34 4.52 4.68 4.80
13 3.81 7.15 10.85 13.66 18.28 14 4.35 4.29 4.30 4.44 4.57 4.61
14 3.65 7.44 10.85 14.14 19.85 15 4.61 4.49 4.55 4.42 4.44 4.59
15 3.75 7.45 11.05 14.62 19.18 17 4.82 4.70 4.54 4.75 4.85 4.84
16 3.66 7.31 10.97 14.35 18.77 18 4.99 4.97 4.90 4.82 4.68 4.62
17 2.34 4.54 6.11 7.14 10.23 19 4.35 4.29 4.31 4.44 4.62 4.65
18 2.52 2.55 2.92 2.93 3.89
19 3.83 7.60 11.24 14.21 20.88 60 HzVOLTAGE - ZERO BIAS
574
assumed for the CCvT’s is exceeded for most of the surges. The cri-
tical flashover of the bus was not exceeded anywhere in the station
prompting a reasonable expectation of flashover at the major
equipment. As shown previously, it is possible that tripout surges
originating within 4.0 km (2% mi) of the substation on a particular
section of line could occur every 93 years. Since there are two lines
terminated, the mean recurrence interval between tripout surges
will be 46 years. Again, the risk can be evaluated for some period of
time, e.g., the probability of a surge in a five year period causing
voltages in excess of the equipment BIL is approximately 0.1. This
risk level is higher than acceptable. Additional protection is
indicated.
As for the transmission substations, additional lines at gener-
ating plant substations tends to reduce the voltages caused by
steep-fronted waves for normal operating configurations.
Substation Performance f o r Contingency Operation
The contingency situations evaluated for transmission substa-
tions (breaker maintenance, multiple or follow strokes, and adja-
cent line initial strokes) are applicable to generating plant substa-
tions with similar conclusions.
One contingency configuration worthy of discussion concerns
initial testing of a generating plant unit. Frequently, the unit step-
up transformer high side bank switch would be open resulting in
the configuration with no surge arresters present (similar to Figure
14 minus the step-up transformers and arrester). The critical flash-
over of the bus is exceeded for all waveshapes considered. However,
careful evaluation uncovers that for eight (8) of the eighteen (18)
waveshapes considered, the entrance bus CFO is not exceeded.
Since a potential transformer is on the bus (Node 10 in Figure 14),
additional protection would be recommended.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Georgia Power Company has several years of operating experi-
ence with substations similar to the station configurations investi-
gated with no history of problems for lightning surges entering
from 500kV transmission lines. This in-depth investigation and
analysis have provided an understanding of this good performance
where traditional analysis might not suggest station operation
without surge arresters or rod-gaps.
Conclusions from this 500kV air substation lightning protec-
tion investigation are:
1) Major equipment in transmission and gener-
ating plant substations will be vulnerable to
particular lightning stresses for twain
stages of development and modes of opera-
tion. The probability of occurrence can be re-
lated to the length of time the substation will
exist in the potentially troublesome con-
figuration and the need for additional surge
protection evaluated.
2) Each future design stage should be indivi-
dually evaluated for compliance with the
assumptions of this investigation. However,
it is generally concluded that all stages of
substation development, with infrequent
occurrence of contingency situations, have
acceptable risk levels without additional
surge protection with the exception of the
generating plant aubatation in Figure 14.
Surge arresters should be installed on the
ring bus (in the vicinity of Node 9 in Figure
14) to protect the major equipment. This con-
clusion supports a previous decision to in-
clude additional arrester protection in the
Plant Wansley station.
575
3) Simulations demonstrate that excessive vol-
tages at major equipment due to direct
strokes, without external flashover of the
bus, are possible. Since Georgia Power Com-
pany has experienced damage apparently
from direct strokes, verification of effective
shielding a t all stations is emphasized.
4) Evaluation of substation lightning perfor-
mance in this investigation was based on the
excellent transmisslion line tripout rate ex-
perienced by Georgia Power Company, which
is better than predicted. Tower footing resis-
tances, which directly affect the line tripout
rate, should be monitored and maintained a t
levels sufficient to sustain this excellent out-
age rate.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank Georgia Power Company and
Siemens-Allis, Inc., for permission to publish this paper. Also, the
assistance of Messrs. S. G. Patel and W.S. May of Georgia Power
Company, and Mr. K. B. Stump of Siemens-Allis, Inc., is gratefully
acknowledged.
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