G.R. No.
L-12686 October 24, 1963 alias Baito Haron, Awah Kamsa; Waliul Adjudi; Jaujali Gadjali; Suhalili
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KAMLON HADJI, ET AL., defendants,
KAMLON HADJI, defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged in
the Court of First Instance of Sulu for different crimes in various cases, to
wit: in Criminal Case No. 1162 for rebellion; in Criminal Cases Nos. 1162-A
to 1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple injuries; and in
Criminal Case No. 1353, together with Ulloh Kaddam, et al., for kidnapping
with murder and attempted murder.
The parties stipulated to have these cases tried jointly whereafter the trial
court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 1162, the Court hereby sentences the
accused Kamlon, leader of the sedition, to an indeterminate imprisonment of
FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY ofprision
correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS
of prision mayor as maximum; to pay a fine of P10,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the proportionate
costs.
Each of the accused, Adjudi Asarani and Amsajen Jamah is hereby sentenced
to indeterminate imprisonment of THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS
and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to FIVE (5)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision
correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00, each, and in case of
insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment which,
however, shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the
proportionate costs.
Each and everyone of the accused Jumla Abdukari Abdulialim Adin, Ulloh
Urong Angkang Adiad, Angkang Illama, Sahidula Ajad, lbbing Janah,
Kakari Damboa, Akbara Abduhasman, Hatib Hala Amsajen, Hatib Jaron
Jamli; Sinihag Salihan; Sarahan Ibba; is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTH IMPRISONMENT
and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS,
NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS ofprision correccional as
maximum; to pay a fine of P3,000.00 and in case of insolvency to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate costs.
Each and everyone of the accused Amsah Laih, Jundai Halisan, Taraman
Adil, Kahiral Dastan, Boyongan Sabiban, Sakkam Hussin, Baybayan Asao,
Abdurahman Sahol, Palicta Dugong and Kaligogan Ladialawan is hereby
acquitted of the charges against him with the portionate costs de oficio. Their
immediate release from custody is hereby ordered.
Crim. Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 are hereby ordered dismissed
with costs de oficio. The release from custody of all the accused in those
cases, except those who are charged or convicted in another case, is hereby
ordered.
In Crim. Case No. 1353, the Court hereby sentences the accused Kamlon to
the death penalty for the kidnapping of Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibon
complexed with the murder of Jamalul Alling; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P3,000.00, without imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The instant appeal pertains solely to Criminal Case No. 1353 for which the
accused, Kamlon, was found guilty and sentenced to the death penalty. A co-
accused in this ease, Ulluh, was still at large at the time the lower court
rendered its judgment.
In connection with the conviction of Kamlon, however, it must be stated that
the trial judge recommended the commutation of the penalty imposed to life
imprisonment, The trial judge based his recommendation upon his finding
that the defendant agreed to surrender principally because he was made to
believe by the authorities "that he would be paroled." In the words of the
decision of the lower court, "If the Constabulary officers concerned did not
promise any condition to Kamlon for his surrender, said officers deliberately
misled the negotiator Arolas Tulawie and Kamlon into believing that
Kamlon's parole would be respected or be enforced after all outlaws had
surrendered. In one word, the officers concerned dealt with Arolas Tulawie
and Kamlon in double talk. They were not frank.
The trial court rendered the judgment of conviction upon the following
factual findings:
One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein
defendant, together with two other armed companions, Ulluh and Angkang,
set out to look for two men whom they suspected were responsible for the
disappearance of two of the followers of the defendant. The search ended
when the defendant and his companions chanced upon their quarry, Hatib
Ajibun and Jamalul Alling, in the vicinity of Buhangin Mahaba gathering
vines. Thereupon, threatening to kill unless Ajibun and Alling went with
them, Kamlon and his companions seized the pair and brought them to
Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that time, Kamlon was residing. At the
market place of Tigbas, Kamlon made known to his captives the reason for
their abduction, and, although Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge
or responsibility for the disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was
seeking to avenge, their protestations of innocence were disbelieved and
altogether unheeded.
Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. The following
day, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, they were brought to the
market place and, in a store, they were made to sit on chairs, one beside the
other. On being ordered by Kamlon, their hands were then tied to the roof by
Ulluh. Thus seated and with their hands tied to the roof, Kamlon leveled his
automatic carbine at Jamalul Alling and fired, killing him instantly. Kamlon
then ordered Ulluh to cut the neck of the dead man whereupon Ulluh, with
a barong or native bolo, did as he was bidden.
Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed head to his vinta by the
shore and paddled out far into the sea. When he returned, he no longer had
with him his gruesome load.
Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from the fate he imposed
on Jamalul Alling. Instead, Ajibun was conducted back to Kamlon's house
where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his alleged participation in the
disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial" must have caused Kamlon
to doubt Ajibun's guilt because at its end, he was merely told to raise the sum
of P105.00 as fine and thereafter he was set free.
The account of Alling's murder as above established by the trial court was
denied, disavowed and disputed by the defendant. He offered an entirely
different version of the killing. According to Kamlon, the deceased was shot
to death, not by him, but by some relatives of a woman who, on that
occasion, Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibun were attempting to abduct.
The defendant's version of the killing of Jamalul Alling was sought to be
established by the sisters, Bariha Imam Habilul and Muhayla Iman Habilul,
who testified that one day they went to take a bath at a watering place some
100 brazas from where they were living. While washing their clothes at the
same place and gathering water in bamboo tubes, Bariha suddenly heard
Muhayla shout: "Bariha, you better run away. I am being embraced and held
by Ajibun and Jamalul." Muhayla made the outcry because Jamalul and
Ajibun who emerged from the nearby bushes suddenly took hold of the
hands of Muhayla and pulled her towards the eastern part of the place, a sitio
called Buhangin Mahaba. Upon hearing the scream of Muhayla, Bariha ran
away but was able to see Ajibun and Jamalul holding the hands of Muhayla.
Bariha ran and screamed for help. Among those who came to her succor
were her uncle, Adu, and some other men-folk of the village, Biteng, Tanji
and Uttung, who forthwith armed themselves with guns and went after
Ajibun and Jamalul.
Meanwhile, at Buhangin Mahaba, Jamalul and Ajibun tried to force Muhayla
into a vinta. Ajibun went inside the vinta and pulled the hands of Muhayla as
Jamalul pushed her into the craft in an effort to place her on board. Muhayla,
however, succeeded in frustrating their efforts by pushing the vinta, and
while being engaged in this struggle, she heard her uncle Adu yell:
"Muhayla, duck;" Muhayla ducked by dropping herself on the sea, face
downwards, and as her body hit the shallow water, she heard bursts of
gunfire coming from the place where Adu had given out his order.
After the shots, Muhayla ran towards her uncle. The burst of fire hit Jamalul
who fell on the water almost falling on Muhayla. Ajibun was fired upon, but
he was able to paddle himself away out to the sea.
We cannot find any just or valid cause for rejecting the version accepted by
the trial court. While the defendant had indeed insisted that the prosecution
version was false and untrue, he has failed to demonstrate to this Tribunal
exactly in what area of the proceeding or evidence such fallacy and untruth
obtain. This case has resolved itself into a question of who among the
witness at the trial were telling the truth. We can hardly hold ourselves in a
better position to answer that than the trial judge who had his five physical
senses to aid him reach the fair, correct and just conclusion. While we have
merely the records to guide Us by, the trial judge saw the witnesses, heard
them speak, watched them move. He was, therefore, in the far advantageous
position of being able to discriminate more competently than Us the
prevaricators among the witnesses from those who testified the truth.
Consequently, as the evidence on record sufficiently attest to the findings of
the lower court, We shall not disturb the same.
The defendant contend that the length of time which intervened between the
actual commission of the crime charged and the filing of the same in the trial
court — a period of 21 months — attests to the unreliability of the
prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who testified for the
government did actually witness the defendant commit the murder, they
would have forthwith reported the incident to the authorities and this case
would have been filed sooner. It is vigorously impressed on Us that the delay
betrays the truthfulness of the case for the prosecution.
We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last point raised.
Although it is true that undue delay in the prosecution of criminal actions
speaks of the suspicious veracity of the state's claim, the same observation
cannot be made where the delay or inaction, long though it may be, was
imposed on the government by causes over which it has no control. In the
premises and as explained by the Solicitor General's Office, "the incident
took place 15 days before the last military operations against Kamlon. People
in the area affected were in the grip of fear and felt no other than for their
personal safety. The witnesses could have preferred to remain in silence of
what they knew against Kamlon in the hope, however, that with the military
operations about to be set afoot, retributive justice would catch up with
Kamlon and his henchmen that they might perish in the battle."
The more transcendental aspect of this appeal refers to the view of the
defendant that, by the doctrine enunciated in the cases of People v.
Hernandez, et al., 52 O.G. 5506 and People v. Geronimo, 53 O.G. No. 1, p.
68, "the trial court erred in convicting herein accused for kidnapping with
murder in spite of the fact that said acts of violence were committed in
furtherance of sedition and therefore absorbed in this latter crime."
There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to uphold
the defendant's claim that acts of violence like murder and kidnapping are
absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases of Hernandez and
Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that legal
proposition since those two cases involved the crime of rebellion and not
sedition.
Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the rule
of stare decisis, We deem ourselves unfree at the moment to disregard our
rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, and People v. Umali,
G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case, this Court held:
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as
murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against
persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the
authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a
crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1 Phil.
437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound
mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the
sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are
perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in
point of fact. Not alone are the offenses com nomine different, but the
allegations in the body of the information are different. The gist of the
information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the
constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the
object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police
force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of
Manila; that gist of the information in the murder case is that the
Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight
persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and serious
physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for
sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes
under the first information. (Emphasis supplied)
And, in the case of People v. Umali, supra, after rejecting the government's
theory that the crime committed was rebellion complexed with multiple
murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, but rather sedition and the said
common crimes, We proceeded to convict the defendants therein of the said
crime of sedition and the common crimes of murder, frustrated murder, etc.
The dispositive portion of this last cited case read: "In conclusion, we find
appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. . . ."
Case No. 763 of the Court of First Instance of Sulu. Soon after his
conviction, however, he was extended a conditional pardon by the late
President Elpidio Quirino. There were four (4) conditions to the pardon,
namely: (1) that Kamlon was to report monthly to the nearest constabulary or
Justice of the Peace; (2) that Kamlon would assist the authorities in the
surrender of firearms; and (3) that Kamlon would allow himself to be visited
by any authority of the Government and allow him to question him freely;
and (4) that he would cooperate with the Government in the surrender and
apprehension of wanted persons in Luuk.
Instead of honoring the aforementioned conditions, however, Kamlon
brazenly violated the same. He did not only fail to report regularly to the
authorities as required; he even violently prevented legitimate government
agents from visiting and questioning him. It was these lawlessness and
defiance which ultimately precipitated and resulted into the various criminal
prosecutions enumerated at the start of this decision, including this one on
appeal.

Clearly then, the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the treatment of IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court affirms in full the
the common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts findings and judgment of the lower court. The crime committed is
separable from sedition. kidnapping complexed with murder. We find the death penalty as well as the
indemnity in the amount of P3,000.00 imposed in accordance with law and
In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us that the affirm the same with costs against the defendant.
herein defendant missed a very significant point. When We held in those two
cases that murder and other acts of violence were absorbed by "rebellion,"
the common crimes alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the
rebellion were specifically charged in the information and, for that reason,
were consequently necessarily alleged to have been committed for political
ends. In the prosecution at bar, however, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, "the information makes no allegation of political motivation, and
the evidence is totally devoid of any such motivation, for on the contrary, the
proof adduced shows that the killing had no political or social color, but
purely motivated by personal vengeance."

There is yet one significant fact in this case which must be made of record
before this Tribunal hands down Its judgment on appeal. The defendant
Kamlon, prior to his prosecution for the case at bar, had been convicted for
rebellion with multiple murder and multiple physical injuries in Criminal
G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Carlos P. Garcia, Cosme P. Garcia and B.E. Enerio for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor Jesus A. Avanceña for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write,
publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest
or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people
againts the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said
court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates
inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had
his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end
of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in
fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing
copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers
and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in the
Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it
was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the
latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note in hereunder
reproduced:
Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't
plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery.
Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to burried among
Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out
of your lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I
did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the
whole world about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to
them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in
the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and
Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across
one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I
cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo
all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted
and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas,
Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one
Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter
and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was
shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree."
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our
government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis
and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government. 2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the
government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are
against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite
to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of
the very government itself (See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as
seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings since early
times in England. (V op. cit.).
As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of government, consisting
of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of justice,
must be recognized as holding functions founded on sound principles and to
be defended and treated with an established and well-nigh unalterable
respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar
weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the weakness
predominates, there must be a certain standard of decorum reserved for all.
Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each burst of indignation
must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the depository, for
the time being, of every great constitutional function. Hence another limit of
free speech and writing is sedition. And yet within there is ample room and
verge enough for the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures in
the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority."
Naturally, when the people's share in the government was restricted, there
was a disposition to punish even mild criticism of the ruler or the
departments of government. But as governments grew to be more
representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of
expression strife continue to be prohibited.
The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798
containing provisions parallel to our own article 142. Analogous prohibitions
are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917 and the seditious libel
amendment thereto in May, 1918.
Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a
weapon of intolerance constraining the free expression of opinion, or mere
agitation for reform. But so long as there is a sufficient safeguard by
requiring intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action-such
legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism presents largely a question of
policy. Our Legislature has spoken in article 142 and the law must be
applied.
In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the
fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured
by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish
without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4" So statutes against sedition
have guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to agitate for
institutional changes. 5
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government
officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead
for its acceptance in "the competition of the market." However, let such
criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and
not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such
wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the
government. In the article now under examination one will find no particular
objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a
dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or
commissions are set forth. Instead the article drip with male-violence and
hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards
all public servants headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant
would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail
to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and
strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with
the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is
failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on
persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free
speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection
of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental
structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142
punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against
any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the
Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the
majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis
were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld. 6
As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites rebellious conspiracies or
riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to
provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the
writer. 7 Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir
up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce
people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds. 8
"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice Paredes of the
Court of Appeals. "The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his
"dirty government" to the point of taking his own life, is not merely a sign of
disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction
against its duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the
situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the banditry
in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks against the law
and the duly constituted authorities cannot but be interpreted by the reading
public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps
against the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President
Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus
insinuating that a state on lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very
much better than the maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed
suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas
people now in power." Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means
to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary
execution by the knife", the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed
was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the
government from the administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of
fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us. 9
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination
of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of
Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion
clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matter with
several persons in a public place uttered theses words: "Filipinos must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head" — referring to the them Governor-
General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a
judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine Reports.
That precedent is undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was penned by
Mr. Justice Malcolm probably of speech. Adopting his own words we could
say, "Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the
Philippine Islands. His official position, like the President of the United
States and other high office, under form of government, instead of affording
immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks.
But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of
free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible
with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the
laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no
question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
affirmed with costs.
CELINO VS CA
FACTS:
Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City charging petitioner with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban),1[3] and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 82942[4] (illegal possession of firearm)
Petitioner’s remedy to challenge the appellate court’s decision and resolution
was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before
October 20, 2005 or 15 days after he received a copy of the appellate
court's resolution on October 5, 20053[19]denying his motion for
reconsideration. Instead, petitioner chose to file the present petition under
Rule 65 only on December 2, 2005,4[20] a good 58 days after he received
the said resolution.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. Certiorari lies only
when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e.,
whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, could not
have been raised on appeal, no reason therefor has been advanced.
ISSUE: WON the when accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC
gun ban entitles him to
HELD:
The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession
of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
The word “committed” taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the
Constitutional presumption of innocence,5[32] necessarily implies a prior
determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful
prosecution or voluntary admission.6[33]
Petitioner’s reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan,
Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the
accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of their
commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.7[34] In the
present case, however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a
violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with
guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other
crime charged.8[35] Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.
G.R. No. 70639
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DOLLANTES, HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO
DOLLANTES, LAURO DOLLANTES, MONICO DOLLANTES,
SIDRITO LOKESIO, MERLANDO DOLLANTES, HUGO GRENGIA,
DANNY ESTEBAN AND LEONILO VILLAESTER, accused-appellants.
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XL, in Criminal Case No. 5832, convicting
the nine (9) accused, Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes,
Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia,
Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, all equally guilty of the complex
crime of "Assault upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder" and
sentencing the abovementioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally,
the sum of P30,000.00 to pay attomey's fees in the amount of P3,000.00 and
to pay the costs.
All of the accused were charged as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1983 at nighttime, in the Municipality
of Tayasan, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another with evident
premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Marcos
Gabutero, Barangay Captain of Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, an agent
of a person in authority and which fact accused had full knowledge, while the
latter was in the lawful performance of his official duty or function as
Barangay Captain or on the occasion of such function, with a bolo and
hunting knives with which the accused were then armed and provided,
thereby inflicting the following wounds in the victim, viz:
1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and half (1/2)
cm. in width, ten (10) cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the
trunk at the level of the 3rd intercostal space, 5 cm. away from the anterior
mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally and directed vertically and
slightly to the back. Ventricle and lung tissue penetrated.
2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width, eleven and a
half (11 1/2) cm. depthness, located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk,
at the level of the 2nd intercostal space about five (5) cm. away from the
anterior and midline, the wound was oriented horizontally and directed
downward and slightly to the back.
3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the left
anterior aspect of the trunk about 26 cm. below the left clavicle and four (4)
cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely.
4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width,
located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk about twenty-one (21) cm.
below the right clavicle and eight (8) cm. away from the anterior line. The
wound was oriented obliquely.
5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in length, half (1/2)
cm. in width located at the anterior aspect of the upper extremity about nine
(9) cm. above the wrist joint one and a half (1 1/2) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line and medially. The wound was oriented vertically.
6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at
the lateral aspect of the right upper extreme about five (5) cm. above the
elbow joint and five (5) cm. away from the posterior midline laterally. The
wound was oriented horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper extremity the
wound of entrance measuring about three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and
one (1) cm. in width located at the posterior aspect of the forearm above five
(5) em. below the elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the anterior mid-line
medially. The wound was oriented vertically.
8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in width located at
the lateral aspect of the left upper extremity about five (5) cm. below the
elbow joint and (5) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented horizontally.
9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width and four (4)
cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk, about seven and
a half (7 1/2) cm. above the ihac crest and twelve (12) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed downward,
slightly to the right and posteriority, perforating part of the intestine.
10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm. in width and
seven and a half (7) cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior of the trunk
about three (3) cm. above the lower angle of the scapula, and seven (7) cm.
away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and
directed downward and slightly to the left.
11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm. in width and
twelve (12) cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior aspect of the trunk
about thirteen (13) cm. below the lower angle of the scapula and six (6) cm.
away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and
directed anteriority to the left.
12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds caused the latter's
untimely death.
Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Information, Original Record, pp. 3-4)
The findings of facts of the trial court are as follows:
That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that due to the
approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in said barangay in
the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the Barangay Captain was
delivering a speech to start the dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to
the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known in the
visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as
to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay Captain
approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not to
disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of
the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm; that accused Hugo
Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was
able to get from the hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife. Immediately
thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay
Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-accused
also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at
that time was not armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny
Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other
co-accused participated in the stabbing incident. When the Barangay Captain
fell to the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in kicking the
dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead body;
that the Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts
of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead body.
According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the
body of the deceased, the victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and cardiac
tamponade due to stab wounds." (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo, p.
75).
The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of
Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero, Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the deceased,
Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho who conducted the post mortem
examination of the deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the Municipal Treasurer
of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and Pat. Jose Amis of the Integrated National
Police.
On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses: Accused:
Hugo Grengia, Leonilo Villaester, Danny Esteban, Alfredo Dollantes,
Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses: Machim Dollantes and Tacio
Fausto.After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was
convinced that all the accused in this case conspired in the commission of the
crime.
Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding all
the accused guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority
resulting in murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of all the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby finds the accused Pedro
Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico
Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesia, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny
Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a
person in authority resulting in murder, and hereby sentences the above-
mentioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Marcos Gabutero, jointly and severally, the sum of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay attorney's fees in the amount
of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 79)
From the aforementioned decision, all the accused appealed. Accused Hugo
Grengia submitted a separate brief.
The appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT
TO THE BIASED, INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DIONILO
GAROL, BONIFACIO CERO AND MARCIANA GABUTERO AND IN
NOT CONSIDERING AT LEAST THE UNCONTRADICTED
TESTIMONY OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES DOLLANTES AND
TACIO FAUSTO.
SECOND AND THIRD ERRORS
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
EXPERT PROSECUTION WITNESS DR. ROGELIO R. KHO WHICH IN
EFFECT CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION AND
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTS.
FOURTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FROM NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED HUGO GRENGIA, LEONILO
VILLAESTER alias "Laon," DANILO ESTEBAN, HAMLET
DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES AND THE TESTIMONY OF
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TACIO FAUSTO AND MCLEAN
DOLLANTES.
FIFTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF
THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ASSAULT UPON A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY RESULTING TO MURDER AND SENTENCING THEM
TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO
INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF MARCOS GABUTERO, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS,
and TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS. (Brief for Accused-
Appellant, Rollo, p. 62)
In his separate brief, accused Hugo Grengia assigns the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the admission
of accused-appellant Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the
alleged stabbing of victim Marcos Gabutero.
2. The lower court erred in not considering the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, namely: Patrolman Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogeho Kho which in
effect buttressed the theory of the defense.
3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook of
the Tayasan Integrated National Police, dated April 21, 1983, as testified to
by Patrolman Jose Amis.
4. The lower court erred in holding that conspiracy exist in perpetration of
the felony.
5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People vs. Agag (L-
64951, June 29, 1984) is applicable to the case at bar to justify the conviction
of the accused-appellants.
6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the testimony
of the defense witnesses.
7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant herein is
guilty of the crime charged.
The appeal is without merit.
The issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses.
The accused were positively identified by three (3) prosecution eye
witnesses. They were: Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero and Marciana
Gabutero, the wife of the victim. Except for the latter, the two other
witnesses Garol and Cero are not related to the victim or the accused. The
testimonies of these three (3) witnesses were subjected to a lengthy cross-
examination and were found credible and free from material contradictions
by the trial court (Rollo, p. 75).
Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw clearly what happened. He
testified that when the Barangay Captain started to deliver his speech, the
accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing a knife shouted "Who is brave here?"
(TSN, page 6, Oct. 7, 1983). The victim then approached to admonish him t
the latter stabbed the victim on the arm. Garol immediately approached the
accused Pedro Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away from the hand of
the accused. The accused Hugo Grengia also tried to grab the knife but it was
Garol who succeeded. The accused Grengia then told him "Do not try to
intervene because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, page 8, Oct. 17,
1983). Then Grengia made some signs by nodding his head and the accused
Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes rushed to and attacked the victim
followed by the other co-accused in this case who also rushed at and stabbed
the victim. He specified that accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes,
Monico Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were carrying knives while the
accused Merlando Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they stabbed the
victim one after another. He said that the accused Danny Esteban, Hugo
Grengia andLeonilo Villaester were all carrying stones which they threw at
the store of the victim's wife (TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct. 17, 1983).
This testimony was fully corroborated by another prosecution eyewitness
Bonifacio Cero who was about three (3) meters away and whose narration
tallied on all material ints with that of Dionilo Garol as to what transpired
that night. He stated further that when he saw the Barangay Captain being
stabbed he tried to approach the group but he was held by Danny Esteban
who said "do not try to interfere, you are not a party to this. We have already
gotten what we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983).
Thereafter, he ran away but Alfredo Dollantes, Pedro Dollantes and Danny
Esteban stoned him because they intended to kill him also. He also testified
that when he returned to the crime scene, he saw Hugo Grengia, Danny
Esteban and companions simultaneously kicking the dead body and shouting
"who is brave among here. "
Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy corroborated the testimonies
of Garol and Cero. She also added that Hugo Grengia wanted to be a
Barangay Captain and she happened to know that as a fact, because he told
the crowd not to long as Barangay Captain. She also testified that the accused
Leonilo Villaester splashed one glass of tuba on the face of the deceased and
that the victim had had a misunderstanding with the Dollantes on a theft case
involving Hamlet Dollantes (Rollo, pp. 68-69).
It will be noted that the above witnesses were categorical and straightforward
when they stated that they saw appellants stab the victim. They even
specified the type of weapon used by each of said appellants.
There is no possibility that they could have been mistaken in their
Identification for apart from being near the crime scene which was well
illuminated with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page 6, Oct. 19, 1983), these
witnesses are familiar with the appellants since they are all residents of the
same locality. Furthermore, there is no showing that the witnesses had any
motive to testify falsely against the appellants.
In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has held that where the scene
of the stabbing was clearly lighted and no motive was shown why
prosecution witnesses would incriminate the appellants, identification would
be given full faith and credit (People v. Escoltero, 139 SCRA 218).
The theory of the defense in this case is that it was only the accused Hamlet
Dollantes who stabbed the victim while the other accused did not participate
in the stabbing incident (Rollo, pp. 75-76).
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellants pointed out
that there are certain inconsistencies that render the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, incredible.
For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could not have een Hamlet
Dollantes stab the victim because as Garol himself stated, when said accused
rushed towards the victim, he ran away. The evidence shows however, that
Garol clearly testified that he saw au of them stab the Barrio Captain, one
after another and it was only after the Barrio Captain fell to the ground that
he ran towards the municipal hall to report the incident to the police (TSN,
page 11, Oct. 17, 1983).
Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the credibility of
Dionilo Garol was his failure to report to the police authorities the fact of
stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).
However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the victim and
the omission of the same in the narration in the report does not detract from
the established fact that the victim was stabbed several times which caused
his death.
It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store of the
victim's wife was stoned while Bonifacio Cero also testified that he was the
one being stoned.
There appears to be no inconsistency between the two testimonies. The fact
that the store of the victim's wife was stoned does not preclude the possibility
that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.
Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have seen with
precision the stabbing of the victim while he was being hugged by Danny
Esteban and he had a feeling that he would be killed by the group. Much less
could it be possiblefor accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo Villaester, Sidrito
Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes who were at the store of Severina Cadillero,
to join in stabbing the victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp. 73-74).
The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab the deceased
before he was embraced by appellant Danny Esteban who told him "do not
interfere you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have
been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly, the language is
unmistakable that in that at said point, the stabbing and the killing being
described by all the witnesses had already been accomphshed.
Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their testimonies,
the same are trivial and merely refer to minor matters which do not affect
credibility. They do not detract from the essential facts or vital details of the
crime pinpointing their criminal responsibility (Appellee's Brief, p. 16). As
held by this Court, discrepancies in minor details are to be expected from an
uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor variations
would rather show the sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of
connivance between them to make their testimonies tally in every respect
(People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423). Truth to tell, such trivial
differences constitute fail-safe reliability.
Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court erred in not giving weight
to the admission of accused Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone
perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for Accused-Appellant Hugo
Grengia, p. 7). Thus the defense argues that the accused Pedro Dollantes,
Alfredo Dollantes, Merlando Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio,
Monico Dollantes and Leonilo Villaester, did not stab the victim and were
not at the scene of the crime and that it was only accused Hamlet Dollantes
who stabbed the victim.
As found by the trial court, such claim is not supported by sufficient
evidence. On the contrary, an entry in the Police Logbook (Exhibit "D") of
the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental, shows that one
Gloria Callao, wife of the accused Lauro Dollantes, turned over to the police
two (2) hunting knives owned by the accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo
Dollantes. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, such
theory is behed by the Identification made by the prosecution witnesses and
by the number and location of the victim's wounds which are mute evidence
that several persons comn)itted the crime (People's Brief, p. 17).
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by the accused
cannot prevail over positive Identification by credible witnesses (People v.
Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so where as in the case at bar, it was not
demonstrated that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been
at the scene of said crime at the time of its commission (People v. Mercado,
97 SCRA 232).
On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes of self-defense when he
stabbed the victim is not sustained by the records. As found by the trial court,
the victim was not armed at the time of the incident, so that there was no
danger to the life and limb of the accused. The latter claims that he had to
stab the victim who boxed him and would not release his wounded hand
(Rollo, p. 76). Apart from the obvious disproportion of the means used to
repel the alleged attack, three witnesses of the prosecution testified that the
accused Hamlet Dollantes rushed towards the victim and stabbed the latter at
the back. Said testimonies were corroborated by the Post Mortem
Examination (Exhibit "A") and the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the human body
of the victim which showed a stab wound at the back. Furthermore, the
nature, character, location and extent of the wound suffered by the victim,
negates the accused's claim of self-defense. (People v. Tolentino, 54 Phil.
77). In fact, the eleven (11) wounds suffered by "he victim are indicative of
aggression (People v. Somera, 83 Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-16392,
Jan. 30, 1965).
Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution failed to prove
the existence of conspiracy. Among others, he pointed out that he was
unarmed at the time of the incident, that his name was not mentioned in the
report made by Dionilo Garol to Patrolman Barrera as to the perpetrators of
the crime; that his name was not included in the entry in the police logbook
of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that he had
no participation in the commission ofthe felony except the alleged nodding of
his head at a time when he was trying to wrest the knife from Pedro
Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia, pp. 13-
16).
While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo
Villaester did not participate in the stabbing, the lower court finds them
equally liable as principals with the other accused in this case. They were
found to be holding stones which they threw at the store owned by the victim
and his wife; they participated in kicking and dancing around the dead body
of the Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to wrest the knife
from Pedro Dollantes, he clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter
succeeded in getting the knife and was holding the hands of Pedro Dollantes,
"do not try to intervene here because you might be included in the plan."
(TSN, pp. 7-10, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same
statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do not try to interfere you are not a
party to this. We have already gotten what we have been aiming or." (TSN,
pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).
Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was delivering a speech,
Hugo Grengia was telumg people not to listen to the victim as he will not
stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to be noted that although he was a
compadre of the victim, he never tried to help the former while he was being
stabbed and after the incident, he never visited the victim's family.
Thus, the lower court found the existence of conspiracy as follows:
The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester by their
acts, aimed at the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent,
are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The conduct of
the defendants, before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly
shows that they acted in concert. (People v. Emilio Agag, L-64951, June 29,
1984, Justice Relova) There being conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty of
Murder. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo p. 77)
In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the petitioners herein
vary from those of their co-accused, there is no question that they were all
prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate against the
group..... Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done by the
participants in the felonious undertaking." (Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138
SCRA 185-186 [1985]).
Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of Dr. Rogeho
Kho that it is possible that all the stab wounds were inflicted by the same
weapon, in a desperate effort to show that only one person committed the
crime and that there is no conspiracy.
The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to he questions
propounded by the defense lawyer as to the different possibilities on how the
wounds of the victim may have been inflicted. But testifying specifically on
the case at bar, he categorically stated that actually the wounds could be
produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not necessarily
only a single bladed weapon.
Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:
Atty. Jayme:
Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim Marcos
Gabutero, is it possible Doc, that in accordance with your drawing that the
wounds inflicted was caused by a single bladed weapon, is it possible,
Doctor, that this wound was caused by a single bladed weapon? Is it possible
that this. I repeat the question, your Honor.
Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which according to you
"blunt and sharp bladed weapon which is practically single bladed weapon,
according to your physical findings there is similarly in the weapons used,
could we say practically, Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as those
incised wounds may be caused by one single-bladed weapon?
A Actually it could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different
sizes but not necessarily only a single bladed weapon.
Q According to you it was a single bladed weapon with different or several
sizes, now, what is your honest observation upon your physical findings,
what will be themaximum weapon used? I have here a zerox copy for your
own reference.
A With respect to the length of the wound there are two wounds that have
three em. in length, it could be possible that the same kind of weapon or
instrument has been used. This refers to Wounds Nos.10 and 11. By the way,
Sir, this refers to the stab wounds because the size of the incised wounds is
difficult to determine.
Atty. Jayme:
Yes, the stab wounds only.
A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 because the length is not indicated
here, so it is possible that there are 3 or 4 kinds of instrument or weapons
being used. (TSN, pp. 26- 27, December 15, 1983)
Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Kho that the
latter did not observe any contusions on the body of the deceased, obviously
to disprove that appellants danceda round and kicked the body after the
victim was slain.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "although the examining
doctor failed to find any contusion or abrasion on the cadaver of the victim,
nevertheless, such absence is not conclusive proof that appellants did not
kick the deceased. It might be possible that kicks did not cause or produce
contusions or abrasions or that they were not noticed by the doctor."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 22). Moreover, the fact of dancing and kicking
complained of, is only one of the acts showing conspiracy, without which,
conspiracy cannot be said not to have been established.
The lower court also found that treachery was present in the commission of
the crime, and that the accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico
Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio and Merlando Dollantes are as equally guilty as
principals by direct participation. These accused took turns in stabbing the
victim. In fact the victim was caught by surprise and did not have time to
defend himself.
Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying
to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he
was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of his
duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that
"As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances
within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of
his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is
murder with assault upon a person in authority."
There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on credibilitY of
witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal. (People v. Oliverio, 120
SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records, no plausible reason could
be found to disturb the findings of fact and of law of the lower court in this
case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
GELIG v. PEOPLE [July 28, 2010]
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the
purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases
throws the whole case open for review, it being the duty of the court to
correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from.[1]
Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the Decision[2] promulgated
on January 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27488 that vacated and set aside the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-10314. The RTC
Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault
with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of
slight physical injuries.
Factual Antecedents
[4]
On June 6, 1982, an Information was filed charging Lydia with Direct
Assault with Unintentional Abortion committed as follows:
That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, at
Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack,
employ force and seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public
classroom teacher of Nailon Elementary School while in the performance
of official duties and functions as such which acts consequently caused the
unintentional abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public
school teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon,
Bogo, Cebu. Lydias son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time
material to this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Lydia confronted
Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy while in
class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing
her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent assault,
Gemma suffered a contusion in her maxillary area, as shown by a medical
certificate[5] issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However,
Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two
days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the
Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have
suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate[6] was
issued.
The Defenses Version
Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from
calling her son names, so that his classmates will not follow suit. However,
Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and kicking her. She
was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of
the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion,
and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She
is likewise ordered to pay the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00)
Pesos for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA vacated the trial courts judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held
liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in
authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or
informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight
with Lydia.[8] Likewise, Lydias purpose was not to defy the authorities but to
confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son.[9]
The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for
unintentional abortion since there was no evidence that she was aware of
Gemmas pregnancy at the time of the incident.[10] However, it declared
that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court-Branch 23 of Cebu City, dated October 11, 2002 is
hereby VACATED AND SET ASIDE.A new one is entered CONVICTING
the accused-appellant for slight physical injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto
menor minimum of ten (10) days.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Issues
Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of arresto menor minimum of ten days.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information
charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion.[12]
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case
open for appellate review. We are then called upon to render such judgment
as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to
review and sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if
unassigned.[13]
The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized
under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads as follows:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the
purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority
or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the
offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands
upon a person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense
against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person
or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes
of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without
a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist
any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
[14]
occasion of such performance.
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common
form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is
assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.[15]
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the
performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork
while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their
recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry
when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a
sissy. Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead
initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded
towards the principals office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of
force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act
resulted in Gemmas fall to the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in
authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority Who shall
be deemed as such.
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).[16]
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate
court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial courts
verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct
assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the
assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by
fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her
tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She
tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly,[17] but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal
invectives. When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely
retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the
situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider
while she was going to the principals office. No fault could therefore be
attributed to Gemma.
The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of
direct assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she
employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional
abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and
pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the
proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemmas
attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to
prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove
that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17,
1981 incident.[18] It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca
since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydias assault
and Gemmas abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain
the exact effect of the assault on Gemmas abortion.
 It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for
incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July
17, 1981 incident.This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the
discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the
assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident
were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not
unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other factors.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner
Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical
injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered
finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct
assault and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year
and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

The Proper Penalty

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of direct assault, she must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The
penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00, when the offender is a public
officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority.[19] Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee since she is a teacher
in a public school. By slapping and pushing Gemma, another teacher, she
laid her hands on a person in authority.

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of

mitigating or aggravating circumstances.[20] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,[21] the petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate
term, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, and the maximum of which is that properly imposable
under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be
within the indeterminate term of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2)
years and four (4) months of arresto mayor, maximum to prision
correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. A fine of not more
than P1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in accordance with law.