ALVAREZ vs.

COMELEC Case Digest

ALVAREZ vs. COMELEC
GR No. 142527 March 01, 2001

Facts: On May 12, 1997, petitioner Arsenio Alvarez, with 590 votes, was proclaimed Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora,
Quezon City, his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election
protest in the Metropolitan Trial Court claiming irregularities in the reading and appreciation of ballots by the Board of
Election Inspectors. After a recount of the ballots in the contested precincts, the Trial Court ruled that the private respondent
won the election, garnering 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes. On appeal, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled
that private respondent won over petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, private respondent
filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.
Petitioner brought before the Supreme Court this petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc,
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of its Second Division alleging that
the COMELEC En Banc granted the respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal when the appeal was no longer
pending, thus the motion had become obsolete and unenforceable.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely acted on the Motion for
Execution pending appeal?

Held: We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a motion for reconsideration
before the Second Division. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of the
Second Division. Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the Second
Division resolved both petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal,
it did so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELEC abused
its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal. Petition is DISMISSED, and the En Banc Resolution of the
COMELEC is AFFIRMED.

United Democratic Opposition vs Commission on Elections

“Equal Protection” – Access to Media
In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the
people’s approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL – Marcos’ Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by
UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be equal
opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned
for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248
radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos
has pursuant to Res’ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection
before the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their request.
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the
considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the people on March 12,
1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party.
Under the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and
shall determine the guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of
the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the
governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV
stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with
these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense.
Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections
73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Amendment to the Constitution

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”)
to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for
the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating
the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses
that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners
contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where
the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides
in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable
issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation
are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to
pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only
of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a
delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

Law – Definition of Political Question

In September 1976, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229
providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976.
Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its “whereas” clauses that the
people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of Oct 16.
On September 27, 1976, Atty. Pablito Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence
the court cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the
authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable one. This is especially true in cases where the power
of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex
of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What
is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution,
but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending
process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the
contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority
assumed was valid or not.
This petition is however dismissed. The President, who was also the legislature, can propose amendments to the Constitution and he
was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.