* THIRD DIVISION.
390
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Spouses Dante and Leonora Cruz (petitioners) lodged a
Complaint on January 25, 2001[1] against Sun Holidays,
Inc.
_______________
[1] Records, pp. 2-6.
391
_______________
[2] TSN of September 12, 2002, pp. 2-22.
392
_______________
[3] Vide TSN of May 2, 2002, pp. 5-7; records, p. 4.
[4] Records, pp. 19-20.
[5] Id., at pp. 21-22.
393
_______________
[6] Vide Complaint, supra note 1.
[7] Records, pp. 28-35.
[8] Vide TSN of February 4, 2003, pp. 6-7.
[9] Id., at p. 8.
[10] TSN of March 4, 2003, pp. 5-6.
[11] Records, pp. 488-496.
[12] Id., at pp. 581-585.
394
_______________
[13] Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Fernanda Lampas-
Peralta; CA Rollo, pp. 135-147.
[14] Id., at pp. 190-191.
[15] Rollo, pp. 18-31.
[16] Vide Comment, id., at pp. 60-81.
395
_______________
[17] G.R. No. L-47822, December 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 612.
396
Indeed, respondent is a common carrier. Its ferry
services are so intertwined with its main business as to be
properly considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of
respondent’s ferry services in its resort operations is
underscored by its having its own Coco Beach boats. And
the tour packages it offers, which include the ferry services,
may be availed of by anyone who can afford to pay the
same. These services are thus available to the public.
That respondent does not charge a separate fee or fare
for its ferry services is of no moment. It would be
imprudent to suppose that it provides said services at a
loss. The Court is aware of the practice of beach resort
operators offering tour packages to factor the
transportation fee in arriving at the tour package price.
That guests who opt not to avail of respondent’s ferry
services pay the same amount is likewise inconsequential.
These guests may only be deemed to have overpaid.
As De Guzman instructs, Article 1732 of the Civil Code
defining “common carriers” has deliberately refrained from
making distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or
goods is the carrier’s principal business, whether it is
offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the
general public. The intent of the law is thus to not consider
such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many
other distinctions may be concocted by unscrupulous
businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in
order to avoid the legal obligations and liabilities of
common carriers.
_______________
[18] Id., at pp. 617-618.
397
_______________
[19] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1733.
[20] Id., Art. 1755.
[21] Diaz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149749, July 25, 2006, 496
SCRA 468, 472.
[22] Vide records, pp. 268-276.
[23] Vide TSN of December 13, 2001, pp. 3-19.
398
_______________
[24] Lea Mer Industries, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No.
161745, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 698, 707-708.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Records, pp. 279-280.
399
400
The first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by
applying the formula (2/3 x [80 – age at death]) adopted in
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.[31]
The second factor is computed by multiplying the life
expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the
total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of
such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses.[32] The loss is not equivalent to the
entire earnings of the deceased, but only such portion as he
would have used to support his dependents or heirs. Hence,
to be deducted from his gross earnings are the necessary
expenses supposed to be used by the deceased for his own
needs.[33]
In computing the third factor—necessary living expense,
Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja[34]
teaches that when, as in this case, there is no showing that
the living expenses constituted the smaller percentage of
the gross income, the living expenses are fixed at half of
the gross income.
Applying the above guidelines, the Court determines
Ruelito’s life expectancy as follows:
_______________
[30] Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Sugata-on, G.R. No. 163212,
March 13, 2007, 578 SCRA 221, 235.
[31] Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23,
2005, 452 SCRA 285, 294.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Magbanua v. Tabusares, Jr., G.R. No. 152134, June 4, 2004, 431
SCRA 99, 104.
[34] G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 341, 351.
401
Documentary evidence shows that Ruelito was earning a
basic monthly salary of $900[35] which, when converted to
Philippine peso applying the annual average exchange rate
of $1 = P44 in 2000,[36] amounts to P39,600. Ruelito’s net
earning capacity is thus computed as follows:
Respecting the award of moral damages, since
respondent common carrier’s breach of contract of carriage
resulted in the death of petitioners’ son, following Article
1764 vis-à-vis Article 2206 of the Civil Code, petitioners are
entitled to moral damages.
Since respondent failed to prove that it exercised the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, it is
presumed to have acted recklessly, thus warranting the
award too of exemplary damages, which are granted in
contractual obligations if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.[37]
_______________
[35] Vide records, pp. 258-259.
[36] For reference, vide Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Treasury
Department Reference Exchange Rate Bulletins at
www.bsp.gov.ph/dbank_reports/ExchangeRates.
[37] Vide Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 1, 13; 281 SCRA 1, 12
(1997).
402
_______________
[38] Vide Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, November
25, 2004, 444 SCRA 355, 370.
[39] Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
[40] G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95-97.
403
_______________
** Additional member per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
404