AC No.

99-634 June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

Facts:

1. Petitioner, in connection with his business was introduced to respondent, who agreed to
legally represent him in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for
breach of contract.
2. Respondent prepared a demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services
the petitioner paid.
3. However, the parties failed to secure settlement then respondent suggested that the
petitioner will file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted and
respondent required the amount of 25,000 as filing fee.
4. A week later the petitioner was informed by respondent that a complaint had already
been filed in court, and that he will receive a notice of its progress
5. In the months that followed, there is no such notice. That the petitioner frequently visited
his office to inquire and respondent would repeatedly tell him to just wait
6. Petitioner then decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty.
Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that
there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta.

Issue: whether or not respondent should be disciplined due to the following acts

1. his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client

2. his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee

Whether or not there is attorney client relationship

Ruling:

 Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill
complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent
alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office was for attorney's fees and
not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only
protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar
and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession.5 Members of the bar
must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.6

 Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed

between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered.
 The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.

The court disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view
to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.

despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that
respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the
lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually
prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.

 Failure to apply the filing fee

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the
receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers
must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional
capacity. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in
trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that
have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such
fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to
promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the
bounds of law.

Penalty: Suspended for a period of one year

A.C. No. 8384 April 11, 2013

EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
Complainant tiled a complaint against respondent alleging that respondent was engaged in practice
as a notary public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly commissioned by the RTC) of
Santiago City, Isabela.

This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. To support her allegations,
complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings:

a. Two documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Judge Efren M.
Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction
of the RTC of Santiago City for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008. Respondent's
name does not appear on either list;

b. Copies of ten documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent in the years
2006, 2007, and 2008; and

c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit notarized by

respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated as to respondent's seal and signature as NO
Notarial Commission was issued upon him at the time of the document's notarization."

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of respondent warrants his suspension in the practice of law

Ruling:

The duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
"Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a
public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution."

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other

lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. As
noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in
open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently,
respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.

Penalty: suspension for a period of 2 years and disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public or two years.

A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013

ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land with an eight-door apartment
constructed thereon. She personally knew respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was
her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed against her husband in 1974, and the
aforementioned property was her share in their property settlement. Complainant stated that she
also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's trusted employee who did
secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there whenever she visited respondent in
connection with her cases.

Sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she (complainant) apply for a loan from a bank to
construct townhouses on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her property be offered
as collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would work out the speedy processing and
release of the loan. Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS,
respondent lent her the sum of ₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title
was released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would handle the preparation
of documents for the loan and follow-up the same. From time to time, complainant inquired about the
application for the loan, but respondent always assured her that she was still preparing the
documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to check
on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle speedily the preparation of her
application.

Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her apartment
was already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on her property,
which she later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from
Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent about what she discovered, but
respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After verification, complainant learned that her
property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was
the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged. Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa.

Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on
the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36,
which estafa case was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed
in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The RTC held that the case
for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno, respondent herein, for
insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt, considering the absence of
the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that Anita Peña's signature therein
was forged and the transfer of the land was made through fraudulent documents.

Issue:

Whetyher or not the dismissal of the criminal case follows the dismissal of the administrative case

Whether or not respondent violated the Code of professional responsibility and the Notarial law

Ruling:

The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections
128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as
in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.30

The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers
of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.

As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the complainant,
nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her allegation that her
signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by facilitating the sale of
the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's approval. However,
complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila,
National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of
Sale was executed.

The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep a
notarial register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct
copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of
the substance thereof.39

A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy of
the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the
month next following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the
proper clerk of court.40

In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification,41 dated February 22,
1994, stating that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the
year 1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial
Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and notarized by her.
Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could not also be found in
the National Archives per the certification42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R. Ignacio for
Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public to submit her
notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of Sale that was
notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of her commission under Section 249 of
the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity
the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.44

Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for
any deceit or dishonest act, thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the
certificate of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who
admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed, the
important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale and the
validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could not be
produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the general files of
the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be considered
lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial
Report for the month of November 1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on
November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears that efforts
were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from getting
hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting verification from an expert to prove that her
alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper
RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the
Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching implications and grave
consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and
showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her
testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of
records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that she notarized the said Deed of
Sale.

For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a
member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing,
is perpetually REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll
of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting
from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.

For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the
practice of law.1

In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the
Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in
violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the
practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from
reappointment as notaries public for two years.

Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6,
2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9

In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan
wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty.
Baliga following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as
Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to
the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law
"prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the
meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."11

Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this
court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not
render advisory opinions.13

On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4,
2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.

Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's
resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission
reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of
his commission as a notary public."15According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of
Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16

Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended
Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was]
disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of
suspension]."17 The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have
ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant
Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter."18

This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation.19

In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that
the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that
respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might
appear as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.

On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as
Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the
Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside
any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. "22

Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court
require him to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted
from performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.23

The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on
Human Rights be required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga
continued to perform his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.

On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of
law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of
[his suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his
constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included
is deemed excluded."25

In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court
further ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant
Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he
was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:

Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court
resolves:

(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective
motions to lift relative to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents
have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during the entire period of their
suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;

(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on
Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from
the performance of his functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;

(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of
complainant against them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof;
...27 (Emphasis in the original)

In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to
lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that
he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice
of law.

In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he
"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These
managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional
office and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on
Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all other services and
assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional
level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and
expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit
which takes care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35

Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga
claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of
law]."36

The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the
penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty
that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission,
Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty
upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within
the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40

Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue
and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to
Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court.
Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he
was suspended from office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director.

As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director
and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a
"lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of
law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the
officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had
supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.

With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of
law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has
that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty.
Baliga be disbarred.

On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed
to resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements
for issuance of a notarial commission.

On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and
recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of
Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights.49

In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated
that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities
[as Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty.
Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice
of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be
required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in
abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission on
Human Right's filing of comment]."52

In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on
Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.

In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty
imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed
on him as Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of
[Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested
that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."56

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be
granted.

We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further
from the practice of law for six months.

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal
knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.

The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with
power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is
divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is
given the position of Attorney VI.

Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the
following powers and functions:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights]

matters;"65

b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66

c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the

absence of the legal officer or investigator;67

d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate

courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an
alternative dispute resolution";68

e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations,

orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and

f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal
officer.70

These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are
usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily
members of the bar.72Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require
the use of extensive legal knowledge.

The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such
as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."75From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5,
2006,76 he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his
position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on
Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:

WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming
his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is
without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in
the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
resolved to put into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the
suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme
Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human
Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after:
investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the
Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for
reconsideration.

Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was
also immaterial. He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of
1âw phi 1

his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.

All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted
practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of
law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.

We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite
lack.of authority to practice law.
1âw phi 1

We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007,
reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead,
the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense
will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April
13, 2007 reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays
before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney
VI of the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission
en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.

The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy
P. Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.

The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by
Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission
granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated
to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the conditions
expressly set forth by the Commission.

With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No.
5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is
clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.

This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty.
Baliga for having contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was
granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in
equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in
mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission
grants of every official and employee.

The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him
pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of
Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is
being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above
expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013
and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in the original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This
resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite
lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy
this court's orders of suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human
Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the
necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with
conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of
[the] legal profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6)
months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the
practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A.

CARONAN," Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant),
before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against
respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing that the former has the required
educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on
August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where
complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the
University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working
thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience
Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8Through the years,
complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in
Muntinlupa.9chanroble slaw

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the
family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3)
children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college degree.12 chan roble slaw

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had
enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that
respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the
University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and
take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse
consequences to him.15 chanrob leslaw

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig
City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his
job and had a family to support.17 chan roble slaw

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report
to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to
an investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer
Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his and
respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's
University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his Birth
Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's
University showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."19 Complainant later
learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case
for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal
sponsors at respondent's wedding.20 cha nrob leslaw

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or,
in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning respondent.22On the
other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call
from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he
was authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24Further, he learned that
respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25 cralawredchan robles law

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant
developed a fear for his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his
colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present
Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice
of law.28
chanro bleslaw

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He
maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case
No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap
against him, and which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No.
10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General
Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several
administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33 chanrobles law

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both
parties again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their
respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any.37 chan robles law

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner)
issued his Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming
complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all
the allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand,
complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41 chanrobles law

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his
arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is
married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.43 chanroble slaw

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of respondent
when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating
Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant
and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No.
49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making
a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.47 chan roble slaw

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan"
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted
to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he
is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely
assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of
Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo.49Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the
official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on
August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his
photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan"
under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55 chan robles law

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name,
identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" -
never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred
from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to
the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law
course, viz.:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents
a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he
had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring
for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991,
he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.56Clearly,
respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and
earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and
educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited
to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.
Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape
the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[60] (Emphasis
supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when
he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been
working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in
the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as
between him and the court.62 chan robles law

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities,
which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not
have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity
and dignity.63 chan roble slaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is

found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A.
Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice
to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPEDand STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a
lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and cralawlawlibra ry

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards
of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a
warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name
and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

[B.M. No. 1209. July 1, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE BAR MATTER NO. 1209 LAWYER'S OATH

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 1 2003.

RESOLUTION. B.M. No. 1209(In Re: Petition to Take the Bar Matter No. 1209 Lawyer's Oath, Caesar Z.
Distrito, petitioner.)

Before the court is a Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign in the Roll of Attorneys dated April 22,
2002 filed by Caesar Z. Distrito, a successful 2001 Bar Examinee.

The petitioner is a former Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay Singcang

Airport, BacolodCity.On September 18, 1999, an Information for Usurpation of Authority or Official Function
under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code[1] was filed against him which read:
cralaw

That on or about the 18th day of September, 1999, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being the President of the Bacolod City
Sangguniang Kabataan Federation, a government agency, did then and there under pretense of official
position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously preside over the
special session of the said Federation, in violation of the aforestated law.[2] cralaw

The petitioner was conditionally allowed to take the 2001 Bar Examinations[3] and passed the same.He
cralaw

could not, however, take the Lawyer's Oath nor sign in the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
above-mentioned case.

On August 2, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter[4] from a certain Mr. Benjie
cralaw

Montinola informing the said office that there were other cases filed against the petitioner which were not
duly disclosed in the latter's petition to take the bar examinations, to wit:

1.Two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22 filed sometime in 1999, docketed as B.C.I.S.
99-6735 and 99-6736, before the City Prosecutor's Office of Bacolod;

2.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on July 26, 2001, before the MTCC, Bacolod, in which an
adverse decision dated April 1, 2002 was rendered;

3.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on March 15, 2002, before MTCC, Bacolod.

Mr. Montinola also alleged in his letter that the petitioner took his oath as an Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) member, knowing fully well that he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer before the
Supreme Court nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys Mr. Montinola further averred:

The fact that CAESAR Z. DISTRITO have (sic)not disclosed the above-mentioned criminal and civil case filed
against him in his application form despite his personal knowledge of the same when he applied for the Bar
Exams sometime in 2001, is tantamount to PERJURY and that should be acted upon by your respectable
office to protect the integrity of our present lawyers who will be our future Prosecutors, Judges, Justices or
even High Ranking Cabinet or Government Officials or even President of our country.

The unethical act of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO when he took his oath as a lawyer/member before a testimonial
dinner tendered by the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter and witnessed not only by it's Officials, present
members and honored guests but by thousands of Television viewers not only in Bacolod City but the whole
of Western Visayas if not the whole country, despite also of his personal knowledge that he is not qualified
to do so for the same reason above-stated, is tantamount to IMPERSONATION that should be properly acted
upon by the said body who will be furnished a copy of this information and to also protect their integrity and
to avoid similar incident that may happen in the future for lack of proper screening.

Mr. Montinola attached to his letter copies of the complaint as well as a copy of the decision in Civil Case No.
26837.

On August 15, 2002, the OBC received another letter from a certain Ms. Christine Angelie M. Espinosa, then
SK Federation President of Bacolod City, which read:

Your Honor:

May I inquire from your good office, whether a bar passer who has not taken his oath in view of the pending
criminal case filed against him can attached (sic) to his name the nomenclature atty.?Such is the case of Mr.
Caesar Z. Distrito , SK Federation, Bacolod City Vice-President whopassed the bar last May 2002, but has
not taken his oath due to the pending criminal case lodged in MTCC branch 4, Bacolod City for Usurpation of
Power charge against him by the undersigned.

Ms. Espinosa attached a copy of an attendance sheet of a Sangguniang Panglungsod committee hearing
dated June 21, 2002 where the petitioner's name appeared to have been signed, along with the word "Atty."

On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys
alleging that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod, rendered a decision
acquitting him in Criminal Case No. 99609.[5] Attached thereto was a certified true copy of the decision in
cralaw

the said criminal case and a certificate of finality of judgment.[6] The OBC informed the petitioner of the
cralaw

above-mentioned charges and required him to comment on the same.

In his Comment dated May 12, 2003, the petitioner avers that when he filed his petition to take the 2001
bar exams, the criminal case for usurpation of authority or official function was the only pending case
against him at the time.He did not mention I.S.B.C. Case Nos. 99-6735 and 6736 for Violation of B.P. Blg.
22 in his petition because he was of the honest belief that it was no longer necessary for him to do so,
considering that the cases had long been settled and dismissed without even reaching the arraignment
stage.[7] The said criminal cases apparently stemmed from the debts of some 50 fish vendors
cralaw

at Magsungay Village.The petitioner's father, as the punong barangay, had guaranteed the same in order to
help the fishermen.But as the drawer of the two checks, the complainant filed the action against the
petitioner when the debts remained unpaid.

As regards the civil cases, the petitioner avers that the same stemmed from salary loans that he, along with
other barangay officials and employees, obtained from Fil-Global Credit and Asset Management Inc. and
SWIP Lending Corporation on January 13, 2000 and August 22, 2000, respectively, when he
was Barangay SK Chairman.The barangay treasurer regularly deducted from his salary the payment for the
said loans until such time when he completed the payment to Fil-Global on January 31, 2001 and for SWIUP
Lending on April 30, 2001.The barangay treasurer thereafter issued a certification of complete
payment.[8] When the petitioner came back to Bacolod after the bar exams, he was surprised to learn that
cralaw

their barangay officials and employees were facing cases for sum of money filed by Fil-Global and SWIP
Lending because apparently, their payments were not duly remitted.He received summons only on October
22, 2001 and April 4, 2002 from the MTCC, Bacolod City.The finance officer and the treasurer promised to
settle everything, but they failed to do so until their term expired on August 15, 2002.After the decision was
rendered by the MTCC, the petitioner paid the plaintiffs in the said cases, as evidenced by official receipt
nos. 8169[9] and 9019[10] issued by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending respectively datedMay 7, 2003.Thereafter,
cralaw cralaw

an order of satisfaction of judgment[11] was correspondingly issued by the court in civil cases 26837[12] and
cralaw cralaw

27447.[13] cralaw
Anent the IBP incident, the petitioner stated that an invitation[14] was sent to him by the IBP Negros
cralaw

Occidental Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the annual judicial excellence awarding ceremonies,
but that there was no mention of any induction ceremony.Considering the he in fact successfully passed the
bar examinations and was being recognized therefore he was inspired to attend the occasion.He admitted
that during the occasion, all those who just passed the bar exams were called for the induction of new
members, and that he was left with no choice but to join the others onstage when his name was
called.However, the petitioner did not intend to deceive or to keep the IBP in the dark, as he in fact
informed them of his status.To prove the absence of malice on his part, he did not sign any document that
night.

The petitioner also stated that after some verification as to the identity of the complainant in the Letter-
complaint dated August 22, 2002, he found out that Benjie Montinola awas a non-existing person who
cannot claim to be a "guardian of proper civi[c] responsibility" considering that he is not even a registered
voter of Bacolod City and that he could not be located in the address given, as indicated in a Certification
issued by the Commission on Elections, Bacolod City[15] and the Office of the Barangay Council of Barangay
cralaw

Singcang Airport.[16] cralaw

Regarding the use of the appellation "Atty.", The petitioner admitted writing the same in the attendance
sheet in a committee hearing of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Bacolod City.He reasoned that he was of
the notion that a bar passer can be called "Attorney," and that what is only prohibited is to practice law,
such as appearing in court and notarizing docunments without the requisite oath-taking before the Supreme
Court and signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

The petitioner averred that the complainant in this case, Ms. Matus Espinosa, had in fact executed an
affidavit of desistance[17] to attest that there was indeed no misrepresentation on his part.
cralaw

The petitioner manifested his sincere apology to the Court for any mistake he may have committed.

On May 22, 2003, the OBC made the following recommendation:

Considering that there is no more pending civil, criminal or administrative cases against herein petitioner, he
may now be admitted as a member of the Bar.

Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that Mr. CAESAR Z. DISTRITO be now allowed to take
the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.[18] cralaw

There are thus three important matters raised before this Court, the determination of which would
materially affect the fate of the present petition:

First.The petitioner's non-disclosure of a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and of two other civil cases
filed against him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the filing of his petition to take the 2001 bar
examinations.

Second.The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for new lawyers, when he
had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll of Attorneys.

Third.The petitioner's admitted use of the appellation "Atty." When he had no authority to do so as yet.

The Court sees fit to discuss each one, to serve as reminder to law students and prospective applicants to
the bar.

The petitioner's non-disclosure of a

Criminal case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and two other civil cases filed
against him, albeit already dismissed
at the time of the filing of his petition
to take the 2001 bar examinations.
The petitioner insists that he had not read any requirement in the petition to include cases that had already
been dismissed.[19] This, the Court cannot quite fathom.As stated by Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
cralaw

Confidant, Ma. Cristina B. Layusa:[20] cralaw

The petitioner's contention is quite hard to accept.In the ready-made petition form to take the Bar
Examination, the following is written clearly:

"Note: Indicate any pending or dismissed civil, criminal or administrative case against you and attach
pertinent documents:____________________________."

If petitioner had not read the notation, as what he claimed, why did he disclose his pending case for
Usurpation of authority or Official Function.Moreover, the said instruction is written in the middle of the
form, so if petitioner had not really read the same, he was not mindful of what he was doing which should
not be the case of a Bar applicant.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar, to wit:

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Whether or not the petitioner shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the Court.An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, fit
and proper to practice law.[21] The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
cralaw

granted to everyone who demands it.Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.[22] cralaw

It has been held that moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known.Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality.The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.[23]
cralaw

Admittedly, the petitioner was less than honest when he failed to disclose the two other cases for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 and the civil cases involving sums of money which were filed against him, in his petition to
take the bar examinations.He should have known that the said petitionis not to be taken lightly as it is made
under oath.The petitioner, in so doing, violated Rule 7.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[24] which requires of every applicant candor and truthfulness.Every applicant is duty bound
cralaw

to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine the applicant's moral character.[25] The petitioner should have
cralaw

realized the implication of any omission on his part, even if inadvertently made.

In the case of People v. Tuanda,[26] the Court held that "violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
cralaw

offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order," and considered the same an offense
involving moral turpitude.The erring lawyer was consequently suspended from the practice of law.

In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did not even reach the
arraignment stage is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to disclose the same as it was a material
fact which could affect his application for admission to the bar.

It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false statement in his
application is not of good moral character.[27] The concealment or withholding from the court of the fact
cralaw

that an applicant has been charged with or indicated for an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification of
the applicant to take the bar examination, or for revocation of the license to practice, if he has already been
admitted to the bar.If what the applicant concealed is a crime which does not involve moral turpitude, it is
the fact of concealment and not the commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a
lawyer.It should be noted that the application was made under oath, which he lightly took when he made
the concealment.[28] cralaw

The petitioner's attendance and

participation in an IBP testimonial
dinner for new lawyers, when he had
not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.

As to the IBP incident, the petitioner claims that he though the occasion was just a plain and simple
testimonial dinner for successful bar examinees that included an awarding ceremony for judges.It was only
later when he discovered that the program was actually a testimonial for new lawyers.[29] However, a
cralaw

perusal of the invitation[30] sent by the IBP to the petitioner reveals that there was an express mention that
cralaw

the affair was for new lawyers, to wit:

Dear Atty. Distrito:

The IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter will hold its Chapter's Judicial Award of Excellence to Outstanding
Judges and Proscutors and Testimonial Dinner for new lawyers on June 28, 2002, 7:00 P.M., at the
Ballroom-A, Business Inn, Lacson Street, Bacolod City.

In behalf of the Officers and members of the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter, I am inviting you to
attend said after being one of the new members of the Bar.Please come in formal attire.

Your presence on this occasion will be highly appreciated.

The Court can only conclude that the petitioner did not take his petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys seriously.He would have us believe that he attended an affair, believing in good
faith that it was meant for those who recently passed the bar, when the invitation he himself attached to his
petition states otherwise.The petitioner's forthrightness and candor with the Court leave much to be desired.

The petitioner's admitted use of the

Appellation "Atty." When he had no
Authority to do so as yet.

The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations may allow himself to be
called an attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has passed the required examination or has been
otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court
the corresponding oath of office.[31] The Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar
cralaw

for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records,
and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificates shall be his
authority to practice.[32] The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a Roll of Attorneys admitted to practice,
cralaw

which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate..[33]
cralaw

The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the signing in the Roll is the
last act that finally signifies membership in the bar, giving the applicant the right to call himself
"attorney".Continued membership in the IBP and regular payment of membership dues and other lawful
assessments that it may levy are conditions sine qua non to the privilege to practice law and to the retention
of his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[34] cralaw

The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect contempt of
court.[35] The Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the Lawyer's Oath for grave misconduct, such
cralaw

as calling himself and "attorney" and appearing as counsel for clients in courts even before being admitted
to the bar.[36] Although the evidence in this case does not include that the petitioner actually engaged in the
cralaw

practice of law, the fact is that he signed in an attendance sheet as "Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself
"attorney" knowing fully well that he was not yet admitted to the bar.[37]
cralaw
Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to become a member of
the bar.The petitioner must show this Court that he has satisfied the moral requirements before he can be
admitted to the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is
hereby DENIED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE

HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of
which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling
[1]

(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both
for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred
on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife
causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City,
despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is
an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and
appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed
[2]

his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases
[3]

filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor
in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose
from a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and
terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word Attorney as they were, according to
him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC
[4]

disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only
the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take
the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an
applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his
act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also
answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.[5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid
reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is,
he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he
is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use
of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take

the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes
the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in
the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. [7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling,
however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders
the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose
the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for
resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a
matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
[8]

precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also

essential for remaining in the practice of law. [9]

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the
2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not
been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused
or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite
the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether
there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The [10]

nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the
Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded
of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal
cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character
and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member
of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is
not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya, the Court
[11]

had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by
members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine
Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4 th Judicial
Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by
him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted
to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as
Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that
those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official
to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but
likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of
this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes
infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his
marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting
submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly
unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition
of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine
Sharia Bar.Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine
Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.

RANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite
moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral
integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate
who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed

the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent
could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date
but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a
pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act
as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George
Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation
of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
 On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys
until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific
assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly
accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre,
the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment
and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC
was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as
counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as
counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

 The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice
of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission
to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan
while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and
his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan
to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May
2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayordated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel
for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent
stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC
on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to
represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily
Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that:
[1]

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any
[2]

activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal

procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared
in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing
that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral
unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. [3]

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a

privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,
and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
[4]

does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission
had practiced law without a license. [5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,

Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his
[6]

oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
[8]

requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does
not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of
law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that
he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. Vice-Mayor Relox
[10]

accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. Thus, the [11]

evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a
client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791and
passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2 cralaw virtua law lib rary

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6 cralaw virt ualaw lib ra ry

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll
of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at
the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7 c ralaw virtualaw l ibra ry

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate
and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the
mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as
urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its
urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”9 cralaw virt ualaw lib rary

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required
to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll
of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
cralaw virt ualaw lib rary

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC
recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and
utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15 cralaw vi rtua law lib rary

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing
upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s
attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit
after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file
the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied: chan roble s virtua1aw 1i bra ry

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari
sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and
anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll
and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members
of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict
requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions
at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the
Energy Development Corporation.19 cralaw virtualaw l ibra ry

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from
individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,
without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”22 cralaw vi rtualaw l ibra ry

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia
legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of
fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance
record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite
of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of
the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while
it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: c hanrobles vi rt ua1aw 1ib ra ry

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of
law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the
heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are
bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him
from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing
him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of
P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of
law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll
of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the
one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act
that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by
this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of
his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact,
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A.
No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes
a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his
profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
1âw phi 1

interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of
the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents
in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of

Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good
moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-

MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the
MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After
all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended
that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-
acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206691, October 03, 2016

ATTY. RAYMUND P. PALAD, Petitioner, v. LOLIT SOLIS, SALVE V. ASIS, AL G. PEDROCHE AND
RICARDO F. LO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition to cite respondents Lolit Solis (Solis), Salve V. Asis (Asis), AI G. Pedroche
(Pedroche), and Ricardo F. Lo (La) for indirect contempt for publishing articles on the petitioner Atty.
Raymund P. Palad's suspension, which was subject of a pending administrative case.

The facts follow.

On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a
Resolution in CBD Case No. 09-2498, recommending the penalty of suspension of herein petitioner Atty.
Raymund P. Palad.1 Pal ad received a copy of the Resolution on March 8, 2013, and filed his Motion for
Reconsideration.

Petitioner averred that around 6:30 in the morning on April 23, 2013, he received a text message from his
fellow lawyer friends informing him that the latter read in an article in Filipino Star Ngayon that petitioner
was already suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.2 The article was written by respondent
Solis in her column "Take it, Take it", which was also published on the tabloid's website. An excerpt of the
article reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Dahil sa paglabag sa code of professional responsibility

ABOGADO NI KATRINA HALILI SUSPENDTDO NG ISANG TAON!

Sisikapin ng Startalk staff na kunin ang panig ni Atty. [Raymund] Palad, ang legal counsel ni Katrina Halili sa
kaso na isasampa nito laban kay Hayden Kho, Jr.

May balita kasi na nakarating sa Startalk na suspendido si Atty. Palad sa practice of law dahil lumabag siya
sa code of professional responsibility ng mga lawyer. Diumano, isang taon ang suspension ni Atty. Palad
dahil sa mga salita na binitawan niya laban sa Belo Medical Clinic. Hindi raw nag-verify si Atty. Palad tungkol
sa kaso na walang kinalaman ang klinika ni Dr. Vicki Belo.

Suki ng Startalk si Atty. Palad, Jato na noong kainitan ng kaso nina Katrina at Hayden. Karapatan niya na
magsalita at magpaliwanag para mabigyang-linaw ang isyu na kinasasangkutan niya ngayon.

Apat na taon na ang nakalilipas mula nang pumutok ang sex video scandal nina Katrina at Hayden.

Ang akala ng Iahat ay tapos na ang isyu dahil naglabas na ng dcsisyon ang korte pero hindi pa pala dahil sa
bagong isyu na nagsasangkot sa pangalan ni Atty. [Raymund] Palad.

xxxx

Pipilitin din ng Startalk staff na hingin ang panig nina Katrina at

Hayden tungkol sa alleged suspension ni Atty. Palad. xxxx

Kung totoo man na suspended si Atty. Palad, pareho na lang sila ng kapalaran ni Hayden na binawian
naman ng medical license ng Professional Regulation Commission (PRC).

x x x:3

Petitioner also alleged that respondent Lo broached the same topic in his column Funfare in The Philippine
Star on April23, 2013, thus:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

What's up?

 Could it be true that the lawyer Raymund Palad, the cotmsel of Katrina Halili (in the case she filed
against Hayden Kho who was cleared by the court), was suspended from the practice of law
because of several actions that were deemed inconsistent with the lawyers' code of professional
responsibility, including making irresponsible public statements against the Belo Medical Clinic
without verifying his reports and making public statements regarding a pending case of which
Funfare sources said that lawyer Palad has filed a motion for reconsideration which is awaiting
resolution.4

Petitioner avowed that respondents clearly violated the confidentiality rule in proceedings against attorneys
as provided by Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court when they disclosed the pending administrative case to the
public and are, likewise, liable for indirect contempt since they made comments, opinions and conclusions as
to the findings of the IBP Board of Governors regarding the administrative case against him.

In their Joint Comment, respondent Solis alleged that she has been an entertainment journalist for forty
(40) years who writes about anything that pertains to both local and international entertainment industry,
including, among others, news about local and international celebrities and personalities who are associated
with them. On the other hand, respondent Asis contended that she has been the editor ofPilipino Star
Ngayon's Showbiz section for four years. As editor, she edits the articles submitted to the entertainment
section by the entertainment columnists before they are published, but she has no control or discretion over
the topics that the columnists write.

For his part, respondent Pedroche narrated that as the Editor-in-Chief, he is in charge of the overall
preparation of the newspaper, and determines which news to be published by the order of their national
significance. However, the editors of other segments, such as showbiz, have autonomy to decide which
article to use. Meanwhile, respondent Lo averred that he has been an entertainment journalist for almost 40
years and that he writes the column Funfare in the entertainment section of the Philippine Star.

Solis and Lo further claimed that sometime in April 2013, they received information from a reliable source
that petitioner was reportedly suspended from the practice of law for supposed violation of the code of
ethics. They argued that the administrative case against petitioner is a matter of public interest because he
became a public figure by gaining national recognition and notoriety as the ardent counsel of Katrina Halili,
whose scandal with Hayden Kho made headlines a few years ago. Petitioner inevitably became an overnight
celebrity lawyer due to his extensive media exposure in defending his client. The issue with which petitioner
was associated as Halili's lawyer generated so much publicity, captured the entire nation's attention, and
even led to a Senate investigation. As such, they alleged that their writings about petitioner's suspension arc
considered qualified privileged communication, which is protected under the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press.

Meanwhile, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, in a Resolution5 dated June 28, 2013,
dismissed the libel case filed by petitioner against Solis for lack of probable cause. The element of malice is
wanting given that there were no wild imputations, distortions or defamatory comments calculated to
damage petitioner's reputation when Solis reported in her column about the alleged suspension.6Likewise,
the case against Solis, Asis and Pedroche was also dismissed. It held that it is plainly evident from a reading
of the article that it is but a mere inquiry of the alleged suspension.7 The case against Lo was also dismissed
because all fair commentaries about the status and condition of the petitioner, for having acquired the
stature of public figure, become qualified privileged communication.8 chanroble slaw

In the present petition, petitioner raises the following issues:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

RESPONDENTS VIOLATED RULE 139-B OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH DECLARES THAT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST ATTORNEY SHALL BE PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

RESPONDENT[S] VIOLATED THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ATTY. SIGFRID
FORTUN VS. FREEDOM FUND FOR FILIPINO JOURNALISTS (FFFJ), ET AL. (sic)

Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in
proceedings against lawyers, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

Before all else, contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. Contempt, in its broad sense, is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a
legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in
its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In
its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity
of a court.9 chanrobles law

Contempt of court is of two (2) kinds, namely: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so. On the other hand, indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which
is committed out of the presence of the court, which includes any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.10 chan robles law

We note that the petitioner filed a contempt charge in the nature of a criminal contempt. A criminal
contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute
or disrespect. Being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, criminal contempt is an offense
against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an
issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. 11 chan roble slaw

Records of this case revealed that the petitioner's alleged penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one year had been published by respondents.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Section 18. Confidentiality. Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the
final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

The confidential nature of the proceedings has a three-fold purpose, to wit: (i) to enable the court and the
investigator to make the investigation free from any extraneous influence or interference; (ii) to protect the
personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and
irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the publication of such charges pending their resolution; and
(iii) to deter the press from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon.12 cha nrob lesl aw

We held that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints
against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication
constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the
Court.13 chanroble slaw

Contempt is akin to a case of libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of
expression guaranteed by our Constitution. What is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered
in the other.14 As early as 1918, this Court, in the case of United States v. Cañete, 15 ruled that publications
which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech.16 Therefore, the principle of privileged communications can also be invoked in contempt charges.

It is settled that Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the
press. As long as there is a legitimate public interest, the media is not prohibited from making a fair, true,
and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. However, in the absence of a legitimate public interest
in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings during its pendency.17 chanro bleslaw

Petitioner alleged that unlike in the Fortun18 case, the media merely reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint and was done without any comment, in good faith and without malice. Petitioner alleged that he is
an ordinary private practicing lawyer who handled the Hayden Kho-Katrina Halili sex scandal which is a
private case, not imbued with legitimate public interest.

We are not persuaded. This Court has always grappled with the meaning of the term "public
intcrest."19Public interest is something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary
interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities arc affected; it does not mean anything so
narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the
matters in question.20 As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:21 cha nro bleslaw

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace
a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.22

In the case at bar, the highly-publicized controversy involving petitioner's client, who is a public figure,
roused the public's attention, as the footage was made available to anyone who has access to internet. The
case involved the issue on photo or video voyeurism23 on the internet which is considered a subject of public
interest. The public concern was focused on the event, the conduct of the personalities, and the content,
effect and significance of the conduct, and not on the mere personalities. Thus, petitioner represents a
matter of public interest.

It is noted that the then Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo "Jamby" Madrigal stressed at the start of the Senate
inquiry in 2009 that the proceeding was being conducted not only for Halili but for all women who might find
themselves being videotaped during sexual intercourse and the footage publicized - all without their
consent.24 Republic Act No. 9995, otherwise known as Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009, was
enacted into a law to stop voyeurism using the internet.25 cralaw redc hanrobles law

A person, even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, could validly be the subject of a
public comment as long as he was involved in a public issue.26 Petitioner has become a public figure because
he is representing a public concern. We explained it, thus:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

But even assuming x x x that [the person] would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow
that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a
public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a sub.iect of
public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual
is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become
involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior
anonymity or notoriety.27

As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final
decision of this Court. However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner became a matter
of public concern considering that it arose from his representation of his client on the issue of video
voyeurism on the internet. The interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement and
participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner related
to his supposed conduct and statements made before the media in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility involving the controversy.

Since petitioner has become a public figure for being involved in a public issue, and because the event itself
that led to the filing of the disciplinary case against petitioner is a matter of public interest, the media has
the right to report the disciplinary case as legitimate news. The legitimate media has a right to publish such
fact under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Respondents merely reported on the alleged
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a year against petitioner, and the supposed grounds relied
upon. It appeared that the respondents, as entertainment writers, merely acted on information they
received from their source about the petitioner who used to appear before the media in representing his
actress client. Also, there was no evidence that the respondents published the articles to influence this Court
on its action on the disciplinary case or deliberately destroy petitioner's reputation. Thus, they did not
violate the confidentiality rule in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers.

Petitioner alleged that respondents made comments, opinions and conclusions as to the findings of the IBP
Board of Governors. Petitioner also alleged that the articles are pure hearsay since they were not supposed
to have copies of the Resolution. On the other hand, respondents alleged that as entertainment journalists,
they received information from their respective sources about various incidents, events, and personalities.
They alleged that they took the information about the petitioner as the truth, and reported the same as they
were relayed to.

While substantiation of the facts supplied is an important reporting standard, still, a reporter may rely on
information given by a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story provided the reporter does
not entertain a "high degree of awareness of its probable falsity."28 chanrob leslaw

Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statement must be shown to have been written or
published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not.
"Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the author or publisher entertains serious doubt as to
the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.29 cha nrob leslaw

Aside from his bare allegation, petitioner presented no proof that respondents have their own copies of the
Resolution, or that they made their own comments, opinions and conclusions. Petitioner also failed to prove
that the publication of the articles is malicious. Likewise, there was no evidence that respondents
entertained awareness of the probable falsity of their information.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition filed by petitioner Atty. Raymund P. Palad to cite respondents Lolit Solis,
Salve V. Asis, Al G. Pedroche, and Ricardo F. Lo for indirect contempt is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

A.C. No. 10671, November 25, 2015

 JOSEPH C. CHUA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

In a verified complaint1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Joseph C. Chua (Chua) sought the disbarment of Atty. Arturo M. De Castro (Atty. De
Castro) for his capricious and continuous unethical practice of law in deliberately delaying, impeding and
obstructing the administration of justice in his strategy for the defense of his client in Civil Case No. 7939
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84.

Chua alleged that his company, Nemar Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC), filed a collection case against Dr.
Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel, Atty. De Castro.2

According to Chua, since the filing of the collection case on June 15, 2006, it took more than five (5) years
to present one witness of NCRC due to Atty. De Castro's propensity to seek postponements of agreed
hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses. Atty. De Castro's flimsy excuses would vary from simple absence
without notice, to claims of alleged ailment unbacked by any medical certificates, to claims of not being
ready despite sufficient time given to prepare, to the sending of a representative lawyer who would profess
non-knowledge of the case to seek continuance, to a plea for the postponement without providing any
reason therefore.3

Moreover, Chua averred that when the trial court required Atty. De Castro to explain why he should not be
held in contempt for such delays, he belatedly made his explanation, further contributing to the delay of the
proceedings.4

For his defense, Atty. De Castro countered that his pleas for continuance and resetting were based on valid
grounds.5 Also, he pointed out that most of the resetting were without the objection of the counsel for
NCRC, and that, certain resetting were even at the instance of the latter.6

On April 10, 2013, the CBD submitted its Report and Recommendation7 addressing the charge against Atty.
De Castro. The CBD found Atty. De Castro to have violated Canons 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he deterred the' speedy and efficient administration of justice by
deliberately employing delaying tactics in Civil Case No. 7939. The CBD recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from notice, with a warning that a similar lapse in the
future may warrant more severe sanctions.

On April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution8 adopting and approving with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD. The Board of Governors modified the penalty
meted out to respondent reducing the period of suspension from six (6) months to three (3) months. Both
Chua and Atty. De Castro filed their respective motions for reconsideration dated August 28, 20139and
August 23, 201310 but the same were denied in a Resolution11 dated May 3, 2014.

Upon review of the records of the instant case, this Court finds the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to be proper under the circumstances.

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such
lawyers['] duty."12 Rule 1.03 and Rule 10.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly states: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man's cause.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
cra lawlawlib rary

As shown by the records, Atty. De Castro violated his oath of office in his handling of the collection case
against his client. Chua was able to show that, through Atty. De Castro's atrocious maneuvers, he
successfully delayed the disposition of the case, causing injury and prejudice to NCRC.
The CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, correctly observed that Atty. De Castro violated his
responsibility to attend previously set engagements with the court, absent a truly good reason to be absent.
The Report and Recommendation in part states: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

Through manueverings [sic] obviously orchestrated by [Atty. De Castro], who has nonchalantly forgotten or
otherwise deliberately disregarded professional commitments, much of the time has been wasted with [Atty.
De Castro's] uncharacteristic reliance on postponements for reasons that may not be termed valid but ones
that really border on plain attempts to rile the other side. [Atty. De Castro's] lack of concern for the other
party, that amounted to obvious disrespect to the Court which has accommodated some requests for
resettings which may not have solid ground to be granted, does not speak well of [Atty. De Castro's]
attitude towards his lack of concern with the court's (and adverse parties/counsel's) time specially reserved
to hear the case.13 cralawlawlibra ry

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following
grounds: (i) deceit; (ii) malpractice; (iii) gross misconduct in office; (iv) grossly immoral conduct; (v)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (vi) violation of the lawyers oath; (vii) willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; and (viii) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.

Here, Atty. De Castro clearly caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the
administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. "Indeed, he
abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law."14

Undoubtedly, Atty. De Castro failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of
law and justice. Fie showed his great propensity to disregard court orders. His acts of wantonly employing
dilatory tactics show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession.

In line with jurisprudence, however, this Court held that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.15 In the
present case, this Court, after considering the circumstances and records of the case, finds that the
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months oi Atty. De Castro, as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, is sufficient to discipline him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo M. De Castro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE (3) MONTHS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of Atty. Arturo M. De Castro as a member of the Bar
and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry