Ferrer Transpersonal Evolutionary Theory PDF

This article was downloaded by: [88.8.89.
195]
On: 18 October 2014, At: 05:34
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:
1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,
London W1T 3JH, UK
World Futures: The Journal of

New Paradigm Research
Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gwof20
Beyond absolutism and

relativism in transpersonal
evolutionary theory
a
Jorge N. Ferrer
a
California Institute of Integral Studies , 9 Peter
Yorke Way, San Francisco, CA, 94109, USA Phone:
(510) 595–0408, (415) 674–5500x125 Fax: (510)
595–0408, (415) 674–5500x125 E-mail:
Published online: 04 Jun 2010.
To cite this article: Jorge N. Ferrer (1998) Beyond absolutism and relativism in
transpersonal evolutionary theory, World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm
Research, 52:3-4, 239-280
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02604027.1998.9972709
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all
the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our
platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors
make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,
completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of
the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be
independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and
Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,
demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in
relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study
purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,
reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access
and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
Downloaded by [88.8.89.195] at 05:34 18 October 2014
Beyond Absolutism and Relativism in
Transpersonal Evolutionary Theory
JORGE N. FERRER
California Institute of Integral Studies, 9 Peter Yorke Way, San Francisco,

CA 94109 USA. Tel.: (510) 595-0408, (415) 674-5500x125;
Fax: (415) 674-5555, E-mail: JorgeNF@aol.com
(Received December 10, 1997; accepted January 6, 1998)
This paper critically examines Ken Wilber's transpersonal evolutionary

theory in the context of the philosophical discourse of postmodernity. The

critique focuses on Wilber's refutation of non-absolutist and non-universal-
ist approaches to rationality, truth, and morality—such as cultural relativ-
ism, pluralism, constructivism or perspectivism—under the charges of
being epistemologically self-refuting and morally pernicious. First, it is
suggested that Wilber offers a faulty dichotomy between his absolutist-
universalist metanarrative and a self-contradictory and pernicious vulgar
relativism. Second, it is shown that Wilber's arguments for the self-refuting
and pernicious nature of other non-absolutist approaches are both fal-
lacious and distorting. Finally, the problematic consequences of absolutist
discourse for academic and cross-cultural dialogue are pinpointed. Taking
Wilber's treatment of Nagarjuna's thinking as a paradigmatic example, it is
suggested that absolutist thinking both usually leads to "bad" hermeneutics,
and potentially hinders genuine dialogue among people and traditions
holding different world views.
KEYWORDS: absolutism, relativism, evolution, transpersonal, dialogue,
Wilber
The last two decades of Western philosophical debates have been

increasingly dominated by an implacable assault on the principles
of modernity, or the so-called "fundamental Enlightenment para-
digm." Although there is not a unified postmodern theory, virtually
all postmodern thinkers have developed the following two inter-
related lines of attack against the legacy of modernity (see, e.g., Best
and Kellner, 1991; Docherty, 1993; Rosenau, 1992): (1) the rejection
of any form of absolute and universal standards of rationality, truth,
World Futures, 1998, Vol. 52, pp. 239-280 © 1998 OPA (Overseas Publishers Association) N.V.
Reprints available directly from the publisher Published by license under
Photocopying permitted by license only the Gordon and Breach Publishers imprint.
Printed in India.
239
240 JORGE N. FERRER
and value; and (2) the critique of any privileged picture, metanar-
rative or "Big Story" about human beings and their place in history
and the cosmos.1 As Lyotard (1974) put it in his often quoted
dictum, postmodernity can be characterized by an "incredulity
toward metanarratives." According to many contemporary thinkers,
metanarratives have historically not only claimed universal status,
but also functioned as legitimization devices of ethical and epistemic
judgments and practices. The absolutist character of metanarratives
has been fiercely criticized for being totalizing, imperialistic, and
logocentric. Postmodernism emerged as a reaction against these
totalizing meta-frameworks, and due to the failure of the funda-

mental Enlightenment project to find untouchable or absolute
foundations for human knowledge and morality. This lack of ulti-
mate foundations has been often portrayed as potentially leading to
a situation of utter perplexity, enervating anxiety, meaningless rela-
tivism, and even banalized nihilism (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Crook,
1991; Carr, 1992).2 If there are no transhistorical and transcultural
foundations for our knowledge and morality, the enemies of post-
modernism argue, then the only route open to us is one leading to
both a self-refuting epistemological relativism and a pernicious moral
anarchy. This is, paraphrasing Habermas (1987, p. 300), the di-
lemma of the postmodern era: How to navigate between the Scylla of
a totalitarian and unattainable absolutism and the Charybdis of a
self-contradictory and morally repugnant relativism.
Interestingly enough, this postmodern predicament finds strik-
ing parallels in the history of evolutionary philosophical thinking.
Ever since the rise of Darwinism, many of the debates on biological
and human evolution have orbited around the conflict between
defenders of an uni-linear, universal, and frequently pre-given evolu-
tionary process (Hegel, Teilhard de Chardin, etc.) and proponents
of multiple, undeterministic, and often purposeless evolutionary
pathways (Spencer, Morgan, Bergson, Monod, etc.) (Bowler, 1989).
In the same vein, the perpetual quarrels between scientists and
religious partisans of various sorts (creationists, finalists, etc.) about
the nature and purpose of evolution usually derived from similar
points of divergence (e.g., Barlow, 1995). However, it was in the
discipline of cultural anthropology where the dichotomy between
absolutist and relativism in the context of evolutionary thinking
ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 241
emerged at its best. Since the critique of the classic evolutionary

standpoint by Franz Boas and his pupils, but especially after the
publication of Peter Winch's seminal The Idea of a Social Science and
its Relation to Philosophy (1958), philosophers and anthropologists
have arduously disputed both the universality and evolutionary
superiority of the mode of rationality characteristic of the West
(absolutist/universalist thesis), and the illegitimacy of making such
transcultural comparative judgments due to the relativity and in-
commensurability existing among multiple "rationalities" and "forms
of life" (relativist/pluralist thesis) (see Wilson, 1970; Finnegan and
Horton, 1973; Hollis and Lukes, 1982). In the eyes of their respective
antagonists, of course, the universalists appeared "imperialistic"
and "ethnocentric," and the relativists look "irrational," "nihilistic,"
and "amoral." It soon became evident, however, that both extreme
positions—radical universalism and radical relativism—entailed
unbearable implications for our modern ideals of justice, democ-
racy, and equality among human beings. On the one hand, the
commitment to radical universalism traps us in the conceptual
straitjacket of dogmatic superiority and intolerance towards other's
values and ways of life, so painfully evident in the historical
justification of colonialism and imperialism. On the other hand, the
acceptance of radical relativism builds unbridgable gaps among
cultures that now "live in different worlds," not only positing a priori
obstacles to cross-cultural communication, but also preventing the
critique of any historically or culturally accepted form of life (includ-
ing organized slavery, systematic genocide, ritualistic cannibalism,
or institutionalized torture). In the light of these difficulties, it
should not be surprising that an increasing number of anthropo-
logists, philosophers, and social scientists are today intentionally
seeking a middle way between these excesses that honors their
insights while avoiding their dangers (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Tambiah,
1990; Fay, 1996). As in contemporary philosophy, then, the agenda
of modern anthropology and evolutionary philosophical thinking
is to transcend these pernicious dualisms and move beyond
absolutism and relativism.
It is in this context that I want to discuss here the most recent
work in transpersonal evolutionary theory as proposed by Ken
Wilber (1995a) in his massive Sex, Ecology, Spirituality. The Spirit of
242 JORGE N. FERRER
Evolution.3 One manner to read Wilber's (1995a) Sex, Ecology,

Spirituality (SES thereafter) is as a response to the relativist threat
seemingly inherent in the postmodern critique of modernity. In
the introduction of SES, Wilber presents this work as the first part
of a trilogy (The Kosmos Trilogy) aimed at the bold and colossal
task of identifying and systematizing the general evolutionary pat-
terns embedded in the various branches of human knowledge—the
"patterns of existence" (p. 32)—with the Maimonidean purpose of
providing us with an "orienting map of the place of men and
women in relation to Universe, Life, and Spirit" (p. ix). Specifically,
Wilber (1995a) offers his trilogy as an example of how this type of

integrative work can be done in our fragmented postmodern era.
Pushing post-modern jargon to its limits, we could say that what
Wilber is proposing is a meta-metanarrative: A privileged meta-
fràmework able to adequately situate or correct the rest of metanar-
ratives about human existence and its place in the cosmos—such as
the Christian, Darwinian, Marxist, Buddhist, Jungian, etc.4 Further-
more, as is the case with all metanarratives, this "Big Story" is not
presented as one more perspective of cosmic and human evolution,
but as an all-embracing framework possessing privileged status over
all local and rival stories. As Wilber points out, the problem with
contemporary holistic paradigms is that they are not holistic
enough, and the purpose of his Trilogy is to show the bigger picture
(in Schwartz, 1995, p. 41).
Two other intertwined objectives are pursued by Wilber in SES:
The first is to carry forward what he considers to be the true task
of postmodernity, i.e., the integration of the Big Three (We, I, and it;
or the Good, the Beautiful, and the True), whose differentiation
defined the modern period, and whose present state of dissociation
is, for Wilber, lurking behind most of the maladies besetting the
twentieth-century, such as the ecological crisis, ethnocentric imperi-
alism, or egocentric narcissism (see Wilber, 1995a, pp. 148-149;
390-394; 1996, p. 337). The second is to fight the "flatland,"
Wilber's term for the currently prevalent Western world view char-
acterized by a lack of qualitative distinctions, interiority, and spiri-
tuality. This world view must be challenged, Wilber (1996) writes,
not only because "Only by rejecting flatland can the Good and the
True and the Beautiful be integrated" (pp. 336-337), but also
in order to dispel the "aperspectival madness" (nothing is better

than anything else) which Wilber attributes to every non-absolutist
and non-universalist account of rationality, truth, and value—such
as cultural relativism, pluralism, perspectivism, multiculturalism,
constructivism, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, and contex-
tualism.5
It is not my purpose in this paper to argue against or in favor
of the specific vision of reality that Wilber presents in his book.6
My purpose is merely to show that the arguments he offers for the
rejection of non-absolutist approaches do not stand serious scrutiny,

and that certain non-absolutist positions should therefore be re-
garded as viable alternatives to his absolutist-universalist scheme
in both transpersonal theory and evolutionary thinking.7 In addi-
tion, I want to suggest what I believe are certain problematic con-
sequences of absolutist thinking for the practice of genuine and
undistorted dialogue among different peoples and traditions.
To this end, I will first elucidate the philosophical stance espoused
by Ken Wilber in SES. Second, I will claim that the arguments he pres-
ents against non-absolutist approaches have important and insur-
mountable shortcomings. On the one hand, I will argue that Wilber
offers a "faulty dichotomy" between his absolutist-universalist scheme
and a self-contradictory and pernicious vulgar relativism. On the
other hand, I will show that Wilber's arguments for the self-refuting
and pernicious nature of every non-absolutist approach are both
fallacious and distorting. In brief, I will give an account of how
non-absolutist views can be posited without falling in self-contradictory
aporias or "aperspectival madness." Finally, I will explore the poten-
tially hazardous consequences of absolutist positions for academic
dialogue and cross-cultural understanding. Taking Wilber's treatment
of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example, I
will suggest that absolutist thinking frequently hinders genuine dia-
logue between people and traditions holding different world views.
I. ABSOLUTISM IN AN AGE OF POSTMODERNISM
As mentioned above, the overall goal of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality

(SES) is to offer an orienting map of the place of men and women
244 JORGE N. FERRER
in the universe. In this section, I want to show how this map is laid
out from the absolutist position known as the perennial philosophy.
Before proceeding further, however, it may be necessary to
say some words here about my use of the term "absolutism," instead
of the more in vogue "objectivism," to refer to Wilber's position
throughout this paper. As is well known, absolutism has been a
term in disuse in Western philosophy for the last decades. Recently,
for example, Bernstein (1983) encouraged the substitution of
objectivism for absolutism in the classic dichotomy "absolutism-
relativism." Bernstein (1983) argued that, since all human knowl-
edge is today accepted to be fallible, conjectural, and approximate,

absolutism is "no longer a live option" (p. 12). Therefore, he pro-
posed to use objectivism to refer to all forms of foundationalist
philosophy standing in opposition to relativist, contextualist or
skeptical views of reason, knowledge, and value. However, although
both absolutism and objectivism have been applied in contrast to
relativist doctrines, these two terms should not be used as inter-
changeable. In short, while objectivism claims that our knowledge
of the world, even if imperfect and approximate, is warranted by the
existence of a pre-given reality that exists "out there" independently
of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity, absolutism maintains the
existence of ultimate, transcendental or eternal truths and values
embedded in human nature, the universe, or both.
The reason I am emphasizing this distinction here is because
I believe that, in the context of transpersonal theory, to use the
term objectivism is profoundly confusing and misleading for at
least the following two reasons: First, to accuse an absolutist
transpersonal theorist—such as Wilber—of being objectivist is
inaccurate because he or she may be defending the identity
between human deepest subjectivity and the ultimate nature of
objective reality. After all, this is the central claim of the perennial
philosophy, according to which: "At the highest levels, world
and self, outer reality and inner reality, coincide as the 'ground' of
all that is" (Rothberg, 1986, p. 3). Or, in Wilber's (1993b) own
words: "The core insight of the psychologia perennis is that our
'innermost' consciousness is identical to the absolute and ultimate
reality of the universe" (p. 22). Second, we should also remember that
one of the most basic tenets of transpersonal theory is precisely
that self-identity can expand to include other aspects of life and

cosmos (Grof, 1985, 1988; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993a). But then,
in transpersonal studies it is not clear how to coherently demarcate
between what is objective and what is subjective because what once
were "objects" of knowledge can become, temporarily or perma-
nently, part of an individual's "subjectivity". As I see it, this dis-
mantlement of the subject-object organization of phenomena
strongly suggests that Cartesian epistemic categories such as objec-
tivism or subjectivism do not have either explanatory descriptive
power to account for transpersonal events.

The critical issue in transpersonal epistemology, then, is not the
"objectivity" of transpersonal knowledge claims, but their ontologi-
cal and epistemic status in relation to rival proposals (e.g., does
the archetypal-astrological paradigm have epistemic privilege over
Wilber's evolutionary model? Can indigenous forms of spirituality
be legitimately subordinated to the hierarchical framework of the
perennial philosophy? Or are all these approaches different but
equally valid ways in which spirituality can be cultivated and lived?).
We will briefly return to these crucial questions at the end of this
article; here I am merely pointing out that, since the nature of
transpersonal phenomena renders objectivism meaningless, we
need to recover the term absolutism to refer to any transpersonal
theory claiming to be paradigmatic for the rest and/or to depict
"how things really are."8
1. The Perennial Philosophy
There is no doubt that the idea of a perennial philosophy

(philosophia perennis) has been differently articulated throughout
the history of Western philosophy. The search for an universal, per-
manent, and all-encompassing philosophy can be traced to the
Neoplatonism of Philo of Alexandria or the Platonic-Christian
synthesis of St. Augustine. However, it is not until the Renaissance
that we find the term "perennial philosophy" explicitly used
in philosophical circles (Loemker, 1973). More precisely, it was
Agostino Steuco (1497-1546), bishop of Kisamos and librarian of
the Vatican, who coined this term to refer to the prisca theologia or
246 JORGE N. FERRER
philosophia priscorium of Marsilio Ficino, a unifying philosophical

system based on a synthesis of Platonic principles and Christian
doctrines. Thus, the modern notion of a perennial philosophy
should be regarded as a product of the ecumenical interest of the
Neoplatonic tradition in the Renaissance (Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni
Pico della Mirándola, Nicolas de Cusa, Agostino Steuco, etc.) in
finding unity and harmony amidst the multiplicity of conflicting
world views (Schmitt, 1966).
Throughout the history of philosophy, the term "perennial phi-
losophy" (philosophia perennis) has also been used as a synonym

for Scholasticism and Thomism; as the final goal of philosophy
by Leibniz; as the regulative ideal of philosophical practice by
Jaspers; and as a world philosophy, synthesis of East and West, by
Radhakrishnan (Collins, 1962; Loemker, 1973). Common to all
these conceptions, however, is the idea that a philosophical current
exists that has endured through centuries, and that is able to
harmoniously integrate all traditions in terms of a "single Truth"
which underlies the apparent plurality of world views. According to
the defenders of the perennial philosophy, this unity in human
knowledge stems from the existence of a single ultimate reality
which can be directly accessed by the human mind under certain
special conditions.
As is well known, the idea of a perennial philosophy was popular-
ized in the twentieth century by Aldous Huxley (1945), who in his
book by the same title defined it as "the metaphysics that recognizes
a divine Reality substantial to the world of things and lives and
minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to,
or even identical with, divine Reality; the ethic that places man's
final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent
Ground of all being" (p. vii). What characterized Huxley's peren-
nialism, as well as the one of the so-called traditionalists such as
René Guenon, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy or Frithjof Schuon (see
Borella, 1995; Quinn, 1997), was the conviction that the "single
Truth" of the perennial philosophy can be found at the heart of the
mystical teachings of the world contemplative traditions. Although
with different emphases, all these authors claimed that while the
exoteric beliefs of the religious traditions may be assorted and
occasionally even incompatible, their esoteric or mystical dimension
reveals an essential unity that transcends all doctrinal pluralisms.9

And this is so, the traditionalists argued, because mystics of all ages
and places are individuals who are able to transcend the different
conceptual schemes provided by their cultures, languages, and doc-
trines, and consequently have access to a direct, unmediated appre-
hension of reality (gnosis).10
In sum, the traditionalists maintained not only the existence of a
contemplative consensus about the ultimate nature of reality, but also
the absolute truth of such a vision, i.e., that it depicts "the way things
really are" once divested from individual and cultural projections. In
its general form, then, the perennialist thesis includes two different
knowledge claims: A descriptive claim, that affirms the homogeneity
of the message of the contemplative traditions; and a normative or
epistemological claim, that maintains the absolute truth of that
message (cf., Griffiths, 1991). Although I cannot develop this point
here, it is important to note that the evaluation of these two claims
may require different testing procedures. The examination of the
former claim, for example, may involve hermeneutic comparative
analyses of the different mystical texts, as well as interviews and dia-
logues among representatives of the living traditions. In contrast, the
assessment of the latter may entail epistemological analyses of the
cognitive value of mysticism, and, in my opinion, personal involve-
ment in certain forms of spiritual inquiry (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1994).
But, what is the "single Truth" about which all contemplative tradi-
tions supposedly agree? According to the modern defenders of the
mystical version of the perennial philosophy, such as Huston Smith
(1976, 1987, 1989), Frithjof Schuon (1984), and Seyyed Hossein
Nasr (1989, 1993), the doctrinal core of the perennial phi-
losophy is the belief that Spirit, Pure Consciousness or the Universal
Mind is the fundamental essence of both human nature and the
totality of reality. In the perennialist view, that is, Spirit is the
ontologically primary foundation of the cosmos.
Briefly, the other major principles derived from this primor-
dial Truth are involutionary cosmology, hierarchical ontology and
axiology, and hierarchical epistemology (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1986;
Smith, 1976, 1989; Nasr, 1989, 1993; Wilber, 1977, 1990, 1993a;
Quinn, 1997): (1) Involutionary cosmology, or the postulate that the
physical universe is the result of a process of emanation, restriction
248 JORGE N. FERRER
or involution of Spirit. In other words, Spirit is prior to matter, and

matter has evolved from It. (2) Hierarchical ontology and axiology, or
the vision of reality as composed of different layers or levels of
being that are hierarchically organized (e.g., matter, mind and
spirit)—the so-called Great Chain of Being. In this hierarchy, the
higher levels are those closer to Spirit, and are regarded as more
real, more causally effective, and more valuable than the lower.
That is, Spirit is more real and better than mind and matter. And
(3) hierarchical epistemology, or the theory of knowledge according to
which knowledge of the higher realms of the hierarchical ontology
is more essential, reveals more about reality, and is therefore

authoritative upon knowledge of the lower ones. That is, knowledge
of Spirit (contemplation, gnosis) is more true and valuable than
knowledge of the mental and physical levels (rational and empirical
knowledge, respectively).
To sum up, the perennial vision maintains that reality is orig-
inated by, and ontologically the same as, a simultaneously imma-
nent and transcending Spirit—identical in essence to human
innermost consciousness—that constitutes the ultimate referent for
what can be regarded as real, true, and valuable.
2. Ken Wilber's Evolutionary Perennialism
Through his many works, Ken Wilber has identified himself as

a modern translator and defender of the perennial philosophy,
championing untiringly the perennial doctrines in the transpersonal
arena during the last two decades (1977, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1993a).11
His latest work is not an exception. As Wilber (1997) has recently
stressed, however, there is a fundamental difference between his
"neoperennialism" and the traditional versions of the perennial phi-
losophy. In contrast to the merely involutionary accounts of most
traditions, Wilber (1997) claims that a more adequate description
of the perennial Truth today should necessarily incorporate the
notion of evolution. As Walsh (1995) rightly pointed out, the aim of
Wilber's recent work "is to trace evolution—physical, biological,
and human—and to set it within the context of the perennial phi-
losophy" (p. 18). Following thinkers like Hegel, Aurobindo, or
Teilhard de Chardin, then, Wilber (1997) proposes an evolutionary

perennialism that holds that:
(...) there is still That One, or the timeless and absolute Spirit of
which the entire universe is but a manifestation, but that world of
manifestation is not now devolving away from Spirit, it is evolving
toward Spirit. God does not lie in our collective past, God lies in our
collective future; the Garden of Eden is tomorrow, not yesterday; the
Golden Age lies down the road, not up it. (p. 63)
What Wilber is claiming is that the involutionary cosmology of the

traditional perennial philosophy should be complemented with a
special type of teleological evolutionism. Teleological evolutionism is
the view that cosmological, phylogenetic, and ontogenetic processes
are ultimately directed towards a predetermined goal. In the classic
evolutionary perennialist view, this pre-given goal is generally
equated with Spirit itself. For traditional evolutionary perennialists
like Teilhard de Chardin or Aurobindo, that is, Spirit is not only the
beginning, but also the end-point of evolution. Spirit is both the
Alpha and the Omega of all cosmological and evolutionary pro-
cesses. It is important to note here that, in contrast to these phi-
losophers, Wilber (1995a, 1997) does not believe that this Omega
point (Spirit) towards which the evolutionary process is directed will
ever be reached in the world of time and space and form. Since
Spirit is timeless and formless, Wilber (1997) convincingly argues,
It will never be reached at any point in time, but can only be
realized "by stepping off the cycle of time and evolution altogether"
(p. 280). Still, it should be noted here that Wilber (1995a) regards
Spirit as the final cause, pull, and telos of the entire cosmic and
human evolutionary process.
It is certainly one of Wilber's great accomplishments to have given
the perennial vision higher contemporary finesse and explanatory
power than any other traditional or modern account. In my opinion,
this is due not only to the incorporation of the notion of evolu-
tion, but also to the adoption of two conceptual frameworks: One
modern, structuralism, and the other postmodern, constructivism.
Against an evolutionary background, these two frameworks allow
Wilber to accommodate, somewhat artificially I believe, both the
250 JORGE N. FERRER
plurality of human forms, and some modern epistemological

insights within the universalist vision of the perennial philosophy.
On the one hand, the adoption oí structuralism permits him to house
cultural differences within a universalist view of consciousness and
reality. For example, defending a perennialist view of spirituality,
Wilber (1995a) proposes that the diversity of experiences, symbolic
expressions, and cultural forms found in the various contemplative
traditions stems from the existence of surface structures, culturally
and historically situated manifestations of an underlying universal
sequence of deep structures which ultimately constitute one path
and one goal for human spiritual evolution: "Common deep struc-
tures with culturally situated surface structures seem to me to steer
a course between 'no similarities at all' and 'mostly or only one
common core'" (1995a, p. 604, note. 16).
Accordingly, Wilber (1995a) plots the transpersonal territory into
four types of hierarchically laddered realms or deep structures. The
psychic (or nature mysticism: the realm of OBEs, vibrations, Kun-
dalini, chakras, etc.); the subtle (or deity mysticism: the realm of
luminosity and archetypal forms, of God, etc.); the causal (or
formless mysticism: the realm of pure consciousness, emptiness,
nothingness, the Void, etc.); and, finally, the nondual (nondual
mysticism: beyond being and non-being, where "emptiness is form,
and form is emptiness," the world as expression of Spirit, etc.).
According to Wilber (1995a), these four types of mysticism "can
most definitely be found cross-culturally. Nobody is denying that
a Buddhist will interpret the luminosity as the Sambhogakaya, the
Christian will interpret it perhaps as an angel or Christ himself,
a Jungian will interpret it as an archetypal emergence, and so on"
(p. 621, note. 58). In other words, although very specific arche-
typal visions and deities (different surface structures) can be ob-
served in different traditions, all of them belong to the same level
of spiritual development, i.e., the subtle level, the realm of the
archetypal manifestations (the same deep structure). In sum, human
spirituality is ultimately universal, as constituted by an evolutionary
hierarchy of deep structures. Contextual factors only shape and
determine the situated manifestations and interpretation of these
deep structures and the level of spiritual evolution attainable in
each tradition.
On the other hand, Wilber (1995a) adds to the perennial vision

several construdivist principles inspired in Várela, Thompson, and
Rosch's (1991) enactive paradigm, such as the rejection of the
representation paradigm, the emancipation from the constraints of
a pre-given reality, or the idea of "enacted worldspaces" (intersub-
jectively shared worlds of referents that are disclosed in the process
of the mutually codetermined evolution of consciousness and the
world). Wilber should certainly be credited for having extended the
scope of the enactive paradigm from its original confinement in
the monological sensoriomotor world to dialogical mental and
translogical spiritual realms. I should point out here, however, that

Wilber's inclusion of these modern epistemological insights occurs
under the shadow of an absolutist-universalist scheme that sab-
otages the enactive paradigm. According to Wilber (1995a), al-
though the different worldspaces are not pre-given but enacted,
their unfolding follows a still pre-given evolutionary pattern gov-
erned by a spiritual telos: "The deep structures are given, but the
surface are not." (Wilber, 1996, p. 212). Of course, the unnecessary
subordination of the enactive paradigm to a uni-linear sequence of
pre-given evolutionary stages (or deep structures) betrays the very
raison d'être of this paradigm, which was not only devised to provide
a "middle way or entre-deux between the extremes of absolutism
and nihilism" (Várela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 238), but
also developed in the context of a view of "evolution by natural
drift" that is undeterministic and inimical to any pre-given evolu-
tionary path.
In sum, Wilber should be credited for having 'softened' and
actualized the perennial vision, there by allowing for much more
diversity, variety, and creative novelty than any traditional account.
However, by retaining an absolutist/universalist core in his notion
of deep structure, Wilber still runs the risk of falling prey to the
several dangers intrinsic to absolutist thinking. In the next two
sections, we will examine in more detail the nature of these pitfalls.
Here, what should be clear is that, for Wilber, underlying all apparent
contextual diversity and undeterminism, there exists a pre-given and
universal evolutionary process that determines the deep structure of
world views, social structures, and human psychospiritual develop-
ment. This evolutionary process is driven by a dynamic telos-Spirit
252 JORGE N. FERRER
that, although never reachable in the world of form, is the ultimate

origin, end, and ground of all that exists.
II. FIGHTING THE FLATLAND
In this section, I want to explore the arguments Wilber offers

throughout the entire SES against non-absolutist accounts of knowl-
edge and value. In short, I will argue that Wilber's strategy com-
prises the following two moves: (1) to create a faulty dichotomy
between his absolutist-universalist vision and a vulgar relativism;

and (2) to depict all the alternatives to his absolutist vision as both
self-refuting, i.e., they cannot be stated without falling in contradic-
tions; and pernicious, i.e., they inevitably lead to a "flatland" in
which no qualitative contrasts can consistently be made (a situation
of "aperspectival madness"). This section discusses in detail the
fallacious nature of these two moves.
1. The Fallacy of the Faulty Dichotomy
Wilber's first move against non-absolutist approaches is to create

a faulty dichotomy between his absolutist scheme and a self-
contradictory and pernicious relativism. Central to Wilber's argu-
ment is the conflation of all non-absolutist approaches into an
artificially constructed "vulgar relativism," so that the reader gets
the impression that one has to choose between either adopting
absolute/universal standards or falling into the clutches of a self-
refuting and nihilistic relativism in which no knowledge claims or
qualitative distinctions can coherently be made.
The nature of this move is more evident than ever in his
discussion of the types of constructivism. Wilber (1996) claims that,
"Faced with this discovery of'not pregiven,' a theorist can then take
one of two routes through this new and confusing postmodern
landscape, where nothing is foundational" (p. 61, his emphasis).
The first route is one leading to a self-contradictory extreme con-
structivism, which holds that all world views are arbitrary, all truth
relative, and no universal truths exist, while at once defending the
universal validity of its own approach. Wilber pinpoints, rightly I
believe, that this form of constructivism is just a form of nihilism

rooted in egocentric narcissism. The second route is a moderate
constructivism, which Wilber (1996) identifies with his own approach,
and that "simply investigates the actual history and unfolding of these
world views, not as a series of merely arbitrary flailings-around, but
rather as an evolutionary or developmental pattern, governed in part
by the currents of evolution itself (p. 63, his emphasis). As we have
seen, for Wilber, the deep structures of this evolutionary pattern are
still pre-given, that is, they follow a pre-determined sequence that
inversely recaptures the steps of involution.
The crucial flaw in this argumentation is that a non self-

contradictory constructivism does not need to be subordinated to
any pre-given evolutionary scheme—and this is, I believe, the
crux of Várela, Thompson, and Rosch's (1991) enactive paradigm.
However, Wilber's naked dichotomization renders possible only
two options: Either pre-given evolutionary world views or totally
arbitrary ones; either universalism or nihilistic "aperspectival mad-
ness;" either absolutism or self-contradictory relativism. There is
nothing new about this move. For example, in spite of the numer-
ous studies clarifying the different varieties of relativism,12 abso-
lutist philosophers—out of either ignorance or malice—have sys-
tematically employed this argument to attack any non-absolutist
account of truth and value. The purpose behind positing dichot-
omies that do not exhaust the possibilities is well known by phi-
losophers and logicians. In their classic study on fallacies, for
example, Fearnside and Holther (1959) pointed out that: "The as-
sumption that there is no middle ground is a favorite weapon of
persons desiring to force others to take sides in black-white terms
even though the problem is not simple and though its fair solution
requires an evaluation of several possibilities" (p. 30).
To conclude this section, it appears that Wilber suffers from, and
helps to spread, the philosophical affliction that Bernstein (1992)
called the "Cartesian Anxiety," that is, "the anxiety that unless we
can specify a firm foundation for our knowledge claims, unless we
can appeal to clear determinate ahistorical criteria for deciding
what is true and false, correct and incorrect, then the only alterna-
tive is to fall into the abyss of a self-refuting relativism where
'anything goes'" (p. 309).
254 JORGE N. FERRER
2. Refuting the Argument for Self-Refutation
Once the false dichotomy between absolutism and vulgar relativ-

ism is artificially constructed, the second move logically follows: A
sustained attack of the "wrong" pole under the charges of self-
refutation and "aperspectival madness." In this section, I will con-
sider the legitimacy of the charge of self-refutation with which
Wilber (1995a, 1996) attempts to dismiss all non-absolutist ap-
proaches, such as cultural relativism, constructivism, pluralism,
and other contextualist accounts of truth and morality. The next
section will deal with the second charge, that of "aperspectival

madness."
The core of Wilber's attack against non-absolutist approaches
rests in the argument for self-reflexivity or self-refutation. When
considering cultural relativism, for example, Wilber (1995a) claims
that its adherents "maintain that all diverse cultural values are
equally valid, and that no universal value judgments are possible.
But that judgment is itself a universal judgment. It claims to be
universally true that no judgments are universally true" (p. 29, his
emphasis). Therefore, he continues, "this type of obscurantism (...)
is profoundly self-contradictory" (p. 29; see also pp. 526-528,
note. 26). Wilber (1995a) applies the same line of argumentation
ad nauseum to critique non-hierarchical approaches (p. 25), plural-
ism (p. 28; p. 574, note. 26), perspectivism and post-structuralism
(p. 188), multiculturalism (pp. 199-204), constructivism (pp. 599-601,
note. 16), and deconstructivism (p. 721, note. 4).
As is well known, the charge of self-refutation is the classic
argument against relativism used by virtually all absolutist philoso-
phers even since Plato's quarrels with the Sophists.13 In its general
form, the argument runs as follows: Relativism (or constructivism,
contextualism, etc.) is self-refuting because it cannot be stated con-
sistently without becoming some form of absolutism (or objectiv-
ism, universalism, etc.). That is, to say that all views are relative
(or constructed, contextual, etc.) renders the relativist thesis either
relative itself or claiming to be an exception to its own logic. If the
relativist thesis does not have absolute and universal value, the
absolutist philosopher argues, then there is no reason to consider it
more valid than any other view. Conversely, if the relativist thesis is
claimed to have absolute value, it either contradicts itself or falls

into what Mandelbaum (1982) called the "self-excepting fallacy."
Before proceeding to show the fallacious nature of this argumen-
tation, I should add an important point here to avoid serious
misunderstandings of my position in this article. I totally agree with
Wilber, Taylor, and many others, in that a vulgar relativism main-
taining that "everything is the same as everything else, and that no
distinctions can be therefore made between what is good or bad,
right or wrong, true or false" is both blatantly self-contradictory and
morally repulsive. And it is probable that some of Wilber's targets
are guilty of these charges and well deserve the harsh reprimand
they receive at his hands. 14 Furthermore, I also agree with these
authors on the significance and inevitability of making qualitative
distinctions in human life—and, in the next section, I will be giving
a brief account of how these contrasts can be made without falling
into the extremes of absolutism and vulgar relativism.
The problem with Wilber's presentation, however, is that it forces
the reader to mistakenly believe that one can only "take one of two
routes:" Absolutism/universalism or a self-contradictory vulgar rela-
tivism. In other words, Wilber consistently omits to mention that
many alternatives to absolutism, such as certain types of pluralism,
perspectivism, pragmatism, and moderated forms of relativism and
constructivism, are not necessarily inconsistent.15 What all these
approaches have in common is not to be self-refuting, but to
challenge absolutist, universalist, and objectivist beliefs in the exis-
tence of transcultural and transhistorical standards of rationality,
truth, and morality. As Adorno (1979) already warned, to inter-
pret this denial as a self-refuting positive theory is both fallacious
and question-begging. In short, what I am suggesting here is that
the self-refuting nature of most non-absolutist approaches only emerges
when they are either believed to have absolutist purposes or judged from
standards (notions of absolute truth, rationality, etc.) only appropriate in an
absolutist domain of discourse. In other words, these approaches are
self-refuting only when they are supposed to have an absolutist
agenda, i.e., to make absolutist claims.16
The imputation of purposes alien to non-absolutist approaches is
a common strategy employed, with more or less awareness, by most
absolutist philosophers. The neo-pragmatist Rorty (1989), for
256 JORGE N. FERRER
example, after rejecting self-refuting forms of vulgar relativism

("every belief is as good as every other"), challenged the assump-
tion that philosophy is a search for the Truth, and that human
inquiry is aimed at the discovery of "underlying structures,"
"culturally invariant factors," or "biologically determined patterns."
(p. 36). And when the absolutist philosopher depicts his position as
self-contradictory, he Responded that this philosopher is "projecting
his own habits of thought upon the pragmatist when he charges with
[vulgar, self-refuting] relativism" (p. 44). Because, Rorty (1989)
argued, the absolutist philosopher "thinks that the whole point of
philosophical thought is to detach oneself from any particular com-

munity and look down at it from a more universal standpoint. When
he hears the pragmatist repudiating the desire for such a standpoint
he cannot quite believe it. He thinks that everyone, deep down
inside, must want such detachment" (p. 44, his emphasis).
The persuasiveness of the argument for the self-refuting nature
of non-absolutist approaches, then, rests on the acceptance of an
absolutist domain of discourse. However, human discourse can have
different purposes apart from arguing for the absolute truth or
falsehood of knowledge claims, viewpoints, or paradigms. For ex-
ample, when Meiland (1980) considered the claim that if rela-
tivism is only relatively true, then we have no reason for taking it
seriously, he pointed out that this statement presumes that only
that which is purely absolute or objective is worth expressing. By
bringing evidence contra universals and absolutes, relativists may
be attempting to rationally persuade the non-relativist of the rela-
tivity of all conceptual frameworks, including the relativist one. This
appears to be, for example, the path taken by Goodman (1978),
who emphasized the local (versus universal) validity of relativist
knowledge claims. Stated in this way, then, the relativist thesis,
far from being self-refuting, is rather "self-exemplifying" (Smith,
1993). Alternatively, Meiland (1980) continued, relativists may be
merely presenting their position because they have a psychological
need to express the way they see the world. Furthermore, I should
add, they may be appealing to the reasonableness, appropriateness,
and even 'truthness' of the relativist thesis without operating in the
domain of a bivalent theory of truth—according to which a state-
ment is either true or false (not-true), instead of having different
degrees of 'truthness' (Negoita, 1985). In all these cases, relativism

is not self-refuting and worth expressing. Needless to say, analogous
arguments can be made, mutatis mutandis, in defense of the rest
of non-absolutist approaches that Wilber attempts to dismiss under
the charge of self-refutation—such as pluralism, perspectivism, or
constructivism.
The idea of different domains of discourse has been further
developed by Patel (1994). In his interesting attempt to solve the
paradox of self-refutation in Nagarjuna's thinking, Patel (1994)
distinguished between two different universes of discourse: Argu-
mentative/systematic and dialogical/conversational.17 In the argu-

mentative universe of discourse, the function of statements is to assert
propositions that have a truth-falsehood value. In a dialogical uni-
verse of discourse, in contrast, propositions are not advanced as true
or false, but expressed with a different purpose, such as therapeutic,
soteriological, showing a state of affairs, or simply continuing the
philosophical conversation. According to Patel (1994), the problem
of the contradictory nature of self-referential statements—such as
Nagarjuna's famous claim that his Mulamadhyamakarikas contains no
thesis—appears only when considered in an argumentative universe
of discourse. Following Patel, one might argue that when relativists
deny the existence of absolutes, they are primarily developing an
alternative mode of dialogical discourse. However, absolutist phi-
losophers have interpreted them as positing absolutist positive
theories in an argumentative universe of discourse.
In addition, discourse (both argumentative and dialogical)
may not be necessarily the ultimate context for the discussion of
knowledge claims—and especially transpersonal ones. In this vein,
Rothberg (1994) pointed out that once the epistemological claims
of the spiritual traditions are taken seriously into account, to assume
"discourse as the universal horizon of knowledge" (p. 9, his em-
phasis) could be deeply misleading. Furthermore, Rothberg (1994)
continued, arguments for self-contradiction such as Habermas'
"performative paradox" (to question discourse is self-refuting
because it assumes discourse) are only legitimate if one presumes
the impossibility of going beyond the structures of communicative
rationality—and this assumption is precisely what most spiritual
traditions challenge! Rothberg (1994) suggested that a possible
258 JORGE N. FERRER
complementary model to discourse could be found in Kremer's

notion of "concourse" (1992a,b, 1994, 1996). In contrast to the
Habermasian-like discourse, where the different validity claims
(comprehensibility, propositional truth, truthfulness, and right-
ness) are redeemed through the suspension of action, and engage-
ment in linguistic elucidation and argumentation, Kremer coined
the term "concourse" to refer to a more holistic, embodied, and
egalitarian mode of knowledge-sharing and resolution-making in
which not only rational argumentation, but also ritual, silence,
story-telling, humor, theater, dance and other arts are taken into
consideration in the search for consensus. According to Kremer

(1994), "While it is true that we are always challenged to reflect our
resolutions in language, this does not mean that language is the
sole arbiter of truth" (p. 33). On the contrary, he added: "The
knowing of the body, the knowing of the heart, the knowing which
comes from states of shifted awareness are all valuable processes.
Even though every consensus will have to withstand the challenges
posed in verbal, rational discourse, the words of resolution will
have to withstand the challenges from all other human dimen-
sions of experience—somatic, sexual, emotional, and spiritual"
(1994, p. 33).
In sum, there are two paradigms of human communication aimed
at the resolution of validity claims: Discourse—argumentative and
dialogical—and concourse. Since the practice of dialogue incorpo-
rates extra-linguistic elements such as attention to the silences be-
tween words, to the language's rhythm, and to the timbre and tone
of voice (Böhm, 1990), I suggest that the dialogical mode of dis-
course should be considered a bridge between argumentative dis-
course and "concourse." In other words, I believe that the shift from
an argumentative to a dialogical mode of discourse in contemporary
philosophy (Bernstein, 1983) is paving the way for the recognition
of "concourse" as a necessary corrective for the limitations of
linguistic modes of rationality and resolution-making.
To conclude this section, although vulgar relativism is obviously
self-contradictory, the validity of this charge against most non-
absolutist approaches assumes an absolutist universe of argumenta-
tive discourse. However, both the existence of absolutist standards
(of reason, truth, and value), and the exclusive or privileged
legitimacy of an argumentative universe of discourse, is pre-

cisely what is denied or put into question by these approaches.
Furthermore, the contradictory problems seemingly implicit in
self-referential propositions do not necessarily emerge in either a
dialogical universe of discourse or in a model of "concourse." But
then, the argument for self-refutation against relativism is well-
founded only if relativism, the view that it is trying to discredit is
mistaken (that is, if there really exist absolute standards of reason,
knowledge, and value). Once it is revealed that the hidden premises
of the self-refutation charge against non-absolutist approaches pre-

suppose its conclusion, this reasoning becomes what logicians call a
syllogistic fallacy. This is why a non-absolutist philosopher such as
Fuchs (1992) can tranquilly point out that "The methodological
horror of relativism and its paradoxes scares and occupies only
those who still search for safe epistemic foundations" (p. 30).
3. Absolutism or "Aperspectival Madness"?
The second charge made by Wilber against the different varieties

of non-absolutism is that they lead to what he calls "aperspectival
madness," i.e., a situation in which no qualitative distinctions can
consistently be made because no perspective can be regarded as
having advantage over any other (e.g., see 1995a, pp. 721-722,
note. 4; 1996, pp. 192-193). Wilber illustrates the potentially
pernicious nature of non-absolutist stances by mentioning, for
example, that Paul de Man—an early American deconstructionist—
had been a Nazi sympathizer (1995a, p. 722, note. 4).
Again, I believe that what is lurking behind this reasoning is the
belief that the rejection of absolute standards ineluctably leads to
moral nihilism and anarchy. However, it cannot be repeated too
often that the absence of absolute or universal standards does not
mean that there are no standards at all, or that any value judgment
is arbitrary. Non-absolutists philosophers are well aware of the
dangers of falling in what Smith (1988) called the Egalitarian Fallacy,
i.e., to assert "that, unless one judgment can be said or shown to be
[objectively, absolutely] more 'valid' than another, then all judgments
must be 'equal' or 'equally valid'" (p. 98). In the same line, modern
260 JORGE N. FERRER
cultural anthropologists have warned us against this faulty reasoning.

According to Robbins (1993), for example, the flight from ethno-
centrism should not lead anthropologists into the "relativistic fallacy,"
the morally intolerable "idea that it is impossible to make moral
judgments about the beliefs and behaviors of others" (p. 9). Actually,
I do not know of any serious contemporary philosopher who holds
the view that any belief or practice should be regarded as good as any
other so I fail to discern who are the real targets of Wilber's critique
of the view that "It's all relative, so there is no better and worse, and
no stance is better than another" (Wilber, 1996, p. 193).
On occasions, Wilber (1995a) appears to accept the possibility of

relative value judgments. For example, in discussing multicultural-
ism, he states that: ".. .sliding contexts do not in any way prevent
some contexts from being still relatively better than less encompassing
contexts. Thus, that everything is relative does not mean nothing is.
better; it means some things are, indeed, relatively better than
others, all the time" (pp. 202-203, his emphasis). However, it
should be noted here that these statements are made in the context
of an absolutist-universalist framework in which what is more encom-
passing and holistic is judged to be absolutely more valuable than
what is more simple. For Wilber, that is, relatively better contexts are
necessarily more encompassing contexts. In fact, Wilber (1995a) con-
tinues his discussion on multiculturalism: "By failing to see the
definiteness of relative judgments—and thus being totally disoriented
and lost in aperspectival space—they miss the integral part, the
universal-integral part, of their own stance, and thus they all too
often regress into a riot of idiosyncratic differences that destroys the
integrity of their own position" (p. 203; his emphasis). Once again,
Wilber's inability to envision non self-refuting alternatives to univer-
salism is conspicuous: Contextual and relative value judgments are
accepted, but only when subordinated to his absolutist-universalist
scheme. Otherwise, there is no escape from self-contradictory
aporias and "aperspectival madness."
However, a world without moral absolutes or universals is not
necessarily a "flatland" in which "nothing can be said to be deeper
or higher or better in any meaningful sense" (Wilber, 1995a, p. 24).
This line of argumentation, apart from falling into the several
fallacies mentioned above, blatantly ignores the possibility of
historically embedded human values. Judgments about what is

better or worse can be legitimately made either on pragmatic/
contextual grounds such as local adequacy, applicability, etc. or
resolved in a situation of "concourse" where we not only rationally
consider abstract moral postulates, but also openly listen to the
voice of our bodies, our emotions, and our spirits (Kremer, 1992b,
1994).
For example, Rorty (1989) argued that qualitative distinctions
can be justified, not from an absolute or transhistorical standpoint,
but on the grounds of the practical advantages of a certain posi-
tion or way of being. These qualitative preferences, Rorty (1989)

stressed, are "not built into us by human nature. It is just the way
we live now!" (p. 44, his emphasis). And contra cultural solipsisms,
Bernstein (1991) pointed out that, although each tradition has its
own standards of rationality, cross-cultural qualitative judgments are
possible because we can examine both how a tradition fulfills its own
standards of rationality, and how successful it is in meeting the chal-
lenges of rival traditions. Therefore, "The rational superiority of a
tradition can be vindicated without (falsely) presupposing that there
are universally neutral, ahistorical standards of rationality. There is
not 'rationality as such'" (p. 91). A similar point has been made by
Hoy (1994) in his critique of Habermas' universalism: "To criticize
one community or set of social practices, we do not need to imagine
some ideal standpoint that is independent of any contingent con-
crete standpoint. More substantively, we may judge that community,
not from outside our own standpoint (since there is no such out-
side), but from the standpoint of other communities, or other self-
understandings, that we know to be, or to have been, viable" (p. 203).
In other words, the rejection of universal standards does not
necessarily snares us in either the idiotic endorsement of all forms
of life ("aperspectival madness") or the ethnocentric hubris and
provinciality of thinking that our standards are to be preferred to
all others. All of us are already participating in diverse planetary
communities, and this participation allows us to criticize not only
other's standards, but also our own. By stepping outside our own
particular community and looking at our context from other con-
texts, we can practice self-criticism and open ourselves to learn and
be transformed by other perspectives. In this way, ethnocentrism is
262 JORGE N. FERRER
avoided while conserving grounds for cross-cultural criticism. What

is really ethnocentric, says Hoy (1994), "is the assumption that we
have become less and less context-bound, and more and more
universal. This Whiggish view entails that others will have to become
more like us, and is thus ethnocentric" (p. 205).
The positions of these authors not only challenge Wilber's univer-
salist claims about a unique mode of rationality (based on Piaget's
"formal operational cognition") (e.g., see 1995a, p. 174), but also
his conviction that the absence of absolute standards leads inevi-
tably to a situation of "aperspectival madness." On the contrary, con-

temporary philosophers argue, the lack of absolute foundations may
lead to a pluralistic reconstruction of a philosophy embodied in
everyday practices and grounded on an open-ended dialogical
communication among human beings. Non-absolutist philosophers
simply do not find it necessary to appeal to any form of abstract
absolute or universal principles, and less to factual ones such as
Wilber's "holistic capacity," in order to make such evaluations. The
Enlightenment assumption that without absolute or universal stan-
dards, rational criticism of others and ourselves is not possible is a
myth that must be laid to rest.
Furthermore, one might even contend that nihilism is parasitic,
not upon relativism, but upon absolutism. Nihilism results from the
failure to find absolute foundations. Although I cannot adequately
defend this thesis here, I believe that the craving for absolute and
universal standards is ultimately rooted in fears of moral anarchy,
the fear that, as Dostoyevsky put it, "If God does not exist, then
everything is permitted." This tendency can be traced to Plato,
whose doctrine of the eternal and transcendental Ideas was in
part a reaction against the individualism and vulgar relativism
dominating Greek government and commerce after the rise of
democracy. However, if one is not involved in the self-defeating
enterprise of searching for absolutes, nihilism does not need to
emerge. This is why, I believe, some contemplative traditions, such
as Madhyamaka Buddhism, regarded the grasping for absolute
foundations not only as an egoic tendency contributing to exis-
tential alienation, but also as the major obstacle for spiritual lib-
eration—more about Wilber and Madhyamaka thinking in the next
section.
To conclude this section, it may be necessary to say some words

regarding Wilber's claim (1995a) about the inevitability of a hier-
archical ontology and axiology grounded in the principle of "holis-
tic capacity." In brief, Wilber (1995a) insists that reality is not
composed of things or processes, but of holons, that is, whole/parts,
"wholes that are simultaneously parts of other wholes" (p. 35), which
are thereby hierarchically organized. Wilber (1995a) offers two
different arguments for the inevitability of hierarchies. The first is
formal: The rejection of hierarchies is self-defeating because it
involves an implicit hierarchical ranking of non-hierarchies upon
hierarchies. To deny hierarchies, then, "is self-contradictory: it is a

hierarchy that denies hierarchy" (p. 25). The second argument is
descriptive or naturalistic: As in all domains of nature—the physio-
sphere (matter), the biosphere (life) and the noosphere (mind)—
wholes emerge with more and new qualitative properties than their
parts, and as these wholes cannot, by definition, be at the same level
as their parts (otherwise they will be merely another part), Wilber
(1995a) maintains that hierarchies, or "ranking of events according
to their holistic capacity" (p. 17, his emphasis), are embedded in
reality. In this hierarchical world view, he proceeds, holons (whole/
parts) with more integrative and holistic capacity are higher, deeper, and
more valuable.
As we have seen, the first argument is plainly fallacious. Assuming
an absolutist argumentative universe of discourse, it turns a nega-
tion into a positive statement, and then accuses it of being self-
contradictory. As for the second argument, I agree with Wilber that
there are different degrees of order, complexity, and organization
in the physical and biological world, and I believe that to speak
about these differences in terms of "higher" and "lower" is a
semantic option as valid as any other. However, the adequacy of
hierarchical accounts in cognitive and moral development (the
noosphere) is currently a highly controversial and debated issue—
see, e.g., Alexander and Langer (1990) for several descriptions of
non-hierarchical models of cognitive development; Flanagan (1991)
for a critique of universal stage developmental theories of moral-
ity; and Burman (1994) for an account of some of the serious
ideological problems inherent in Piaget's cognitive developmental
model.
264 JORGE N.FERRER
Finally, about the validity of grounding qualitative distinctions in

a hierarchical ontology, it must be said that it is highly problematic
to leap without further explanation from a factual level of discourse
(e.g., about what is more complex, organized and holistic) to an
axiological one (about what is more valuable). This "jump" is what
in the philosophy of ethics is known as the naturalistic fallacy,
according to which no conclusions expressed in evaluative language
(value judgments) can be legitimately drawn from premises ex-
pressed in descriptive language (factual judgments). And even in
the case that it were valid to say, as I believe it is, that "values and
facts are no longer automatically divorced" (Wilber, 1995a, p. 31),

Wilber offers no non-circular argumentation for the value judgment
that more holistic organizations must be regarded as absolutely
more valuable than simpler ones.
III. PRIVILEGED FRAMEWORKS, HERMENEUTICS, AND

DIALOGUE
One of die most critical issues in contemporary transpersonal

dieory is the existence of a privileged framework or paradigm able
to harmoniously unify the different competing theories that have
risen in the field during the last decades. Of course, most transper-
sonal thinkers believe that the frameworks they hold are either more
encompassing or epistemically privileged upon the rest. Arguably,
the condition of modern transpersonal studies can be dien character-
ized as a "batde for the ultimate framework," i.e., the search for an
all-embracing meta-framework able to bestow their advocates with a
privileged symbolic interpretation that allows them to hierarchically
subordinate the rest of transpersonal models and theories.
Whether a consensus about an ultimate framework for transper-
sonal theory, or for human knowledge in general, will ever be
reached is obviously unknown to me. For all I know, it is quite
possible that the very idea of an single, complete, and privileged
symbolic interpretation of reality is no more than mere fiction. In
any event, what is most discouraging about this situation is the
circularity of the arguments transpersonal authors generally employ
to refute or discredit dieir opponents. I believe that transpersonalists
would be wise in remembering at least two of the harshest lessons

philosophers of science learned more than twenty years ago: First,
that the persuasive power of an argument is in large part provided
by the conceptual framework within which it is made. And second,
that logically incompatible conceptual frameworks can fit the very
same evidence. Or, put in philosophical jargon, that all evidence is
in large part "theory-laden" (Hanson, Kuhn), and that all theories are
"underdetermined" by evidence (Quine). For example, Wilber's
(1995a) support of the more advanced nature of Eastern and Western
mysticism over shamanism (pp. 572-573, note. 26), his claim about
the non-spiritual nature of most Jungian arche types (pp. 247-249),

and his portrayal of a plethora of thinkers—Berman, Roszak, Tarnas,
Washburn, etc.—as retro-romantics (see pp. 670-691, note. 32;
p. 684, pp. 751-761, note. 17), only make sense and are compelling
if both the pre-trans fallacy, and his unilinear and universal evol-
utionary scheme are accepted. However, the pre-trans fallacy in its
strong form and the idea of unilinear evolution are precisely some
of the notions questioned by many transpersonal thinkers (e.g.,
Armstrong, 1984, 1985; Washburn, 1990, 1995, 1996; Hunt, 1995;
Grof, 1996; Kremer, 1996a). Needless to say, when the basic
premises of a framework are challenged, retorts assuming their
validity are blatantly question-begging.
Although I cannot go further into this discussion here, I would
like to conclude this paper by briefly pointing out certain potential
pitfalls of believing to have attained ultimate or absolute frame-
works for academic and cross-cultural dialogue. In brief, the first
danger is to ignore, dismiss as incoherent, or simply regard as false
any conflicting evidence the absolutist philosopher encounters when
confronted with other viewpoints, alien traditions or competing
paradigms. The second is to regard this evidence as partial, or, what
is even more distorting, to translate it in terms of the "master" code
of the totalizing framework.
As it should be obvious, both dangers build serious obstacles to the
practice of authentic dialogue, which requires not only the willingness
and ability to actively listen and understand others, but also the
openness to be challenged and transformed by their viewpoints.
Of course, the problem with absolutist stances in this regard is that
once one believes to have a more or less accurate picture of "how
266 JORGE N. FERRER
things really are," dialogue with people maintaining conflicting

viewpoints cannot but become an uninteresting and sterile mono-
logue. At its worst, the conflicting viewpoints are regarded as less
evolved, incoherent, or simply false. At its best, the challenges
presented are assimilated within the all-encompassing framework
defended by the absolutist philosopher. In both cases the absolutist
philosopher appears to not even listen to what other people are
saying, because all new or conflicting information is screened, pro-
cessed, and assimilated in terms of his or her own framework.
Therefore, a genuine or symmetrical encounter with the other in
which opposing viewpoints are regarded as real options is rendered

unlikely.
Considering Wilber's work in this context, several authors have
commented on the obstacles that his argumentative style of dis-
course raise for academic and philosophical dialogue (Kremer,
1996b; Rothberg, 1996; Zimmerman, 1996; McDermott, 1997), and
even pointed out that "his main adaptive strategy in relation to the
challenges has been, in Piagetian terms, that of assimilation" (Kelly
and Rothberg, 1996; their emphasis). Rather than repeating what
others have already pointed out with eloquence, I will focus here on
how some absolutist tendencies of Wilber's discourse may hinder
cross-cultural dialogue and hermeneutic understanding. To this
end, I will present Wilber's treatment of the celebrated Buddhist
philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example of the distor-
tions commonly resulting from the process of assimilating other
traditions to an absolutist metanarrative.18
The Absolutization of Emptiness (sunyata)
In short, the interpretation that Wilber offers of Madhyamaka's

thinking relies exclusively on Murti's The Central Philosophy of Bud-
dhism (1955). Wilber (1995a) justifies the selection of this source by
saying that, "although not without its difficulties and occasional
inaccuracies, is nonetheless a classic in the field" (p. 692, note. 1),
and "is generally regarded as the finest treatment of Nagarjuna in
English" (p. 630, note. 2). Then, he proceeds by equating emptiness
(sunyata) with pure Consciousness (p. 539, note. 2); with Absolute
reality (pp. 693-694, note. 1); with the Suchness of all Forms (p. 693,
note. 1); with pure Presence (p. 696, note. 1); and even suggests that,
once the Madhyamaka via negativa is relaxed, Nagarjuna's emptiness
can be metaphorically matched with the Hindu Brahman (p. 698,
note. 1). Furthermore, Wilber (1995a) adds, the Buddhist no-self
doctrine cannot be literally applied to the Absolute, because both self
and non-self "are equally manifestations of the Primordial State, self-
cognizing Emptiness and spontaneous luminosity" (p. 706, note. 1).
Several objections can be raised about Wilber's account of empti-
ness (sunyata): First, Wilber omits to mention that Murti's work
(1955), together with Stcherbatsky's writings (1962, 1968) are

unanimously regarded by modern Buddhist scholars and historians
as the "absolutist" interpretation of Nagarjuna. This absolutist
interpretation, strongly influenced by nineteenth-century German
idealism (Schelling, Hegel, Kant, etc.), emerged as a reaction to the
nihilistic readings of emptiness fruit of the first Western intellectual
encounter with Buddhism (e.g., Max Müller) (Tuck, 1990). Modern
commentators concur in that in order to establish convincing par-
allels between these traditions (Madhyamaka and German idealism),
Murti had to transform Nagarjuna's thinking into a version of
Advaita Vedanta philosophy that does not stand any serious analysis
of the textual and historical evidence (Tuck, 1990; Hayes, 1994).
As Huntington (1989) pointed out, for example, Murti's "Vedantic/
Kantian spectacles distort the Madhyamika's message in a much
more subtle and persuasive fashion than any nihilistic interpreta-
tion ever could, and for that reason have unfortunately done a great
deal to prevent us from deepening our understanding of these
texts" (p. 27). Actually, no modern scholar of Madhyamaka philos-
ophy would quote Murti's work except to point out the inadequacy
of his interpretations, or as an historical example of the projection
of Western philosophical notions on Eastern thinking (see e.g.,
Streng, 1967, p. 76, p. 148, note. 15; Huntinchon, 1989, pp. 26-30;
Tuck, 1990, pp. 47-53; Hayes, 1994, pp. 333-338).
Second, modern interpreters of Nagarjuna find any form of
absolutist account of emptiness (sunyata) completely unacceptable,
and in no way grounded on textual evidence. According to Richards
(1978), for example, "It is a mistake to subsume the Madhyamika
philosophy of Nagarjuna in Advaita Vedanta and thereby to change
268 JORGE N. FERRER
a dialectical philosophy into an ontology. Equally it would be a

mistake to translate sunyata into a transcendental absolute such
as Tathagata" (p. 259). The point here is that emptiness (sunyata)
was explicitly devised to be a via media between absolutism and
nihilism, and the reification of any of these extremes is the worst
service one can offer to Nagarjuna's intentions. It is in the middle
way, between absolutism and nihilism, where the soteriological and
transformative power of emptiness (sunyata) resides: Suffering re-
sults from the reifying tendencies of the mind towards positions and
beliefs, and liberation is attained by the avoidance of all views,
including the transformation of emptiness (sunyata) into another

theory or view of reality. In Nagarjuna's own words:
The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquish-

ing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are
said to be incorrigible. (Mulamadhyamakarihas 13: 8; in Kalupahana,
1986, p. 223)
Commenting on this passage, Candrakirti (in Sprung, 1979)

described emptiness (sunyata) as a medicine given by a doctor (the
Buddha) for the malady of dogmatically clinging to views: "in this
sense, Kasyapa, the absence of being (sunyata) is the exhaustion of
all dogmatic views. But the one for whom the absence of being itself
becomes a fixed belief, I call incurable" (Prasannapada, 249; in
Sprung, 1979, p. 151).
Finally, it is noteworthy, and I do not think accidental, that
Nagarjuna's opponents attempted to refute emptiness (sunyata)
with the same fallacious argument that Wilber uses against all
non-absolutist approaches, i.e., the argument for inconsistency due
to self-referentiality. In the Vigrahavyayartani (Averting the argu-
ments), Nagarjuna's opponents stated that:
1. If self-existence (svabhava) does not exist anywhere in any existing

thing,
Your statement, (itself) being without self-existence, is not able to dis-
card self-existence. {Vigrahavyayartani, I: 1-2; in Streng, 1967, p. 222)
Nagarjuna's response is well known: Emptiness (sunyata) cannot

be regarded as another viewpoint simply because it shows the
shortcomings of all views. To indicate the inherent contradictions of

all views is not to state another view, but simply to point out that no
viewpoint can be normative and paradigmatic for the rest.
In sum, emptiness (sunyata) is used by Nagarjuna as an antidote
to absolutist and nihilist metaphysical speculations about the ulti-
mate nature of reality. Emptiness (sunyata) is neither referring to
the ultimate or absolute nature of reality nor standing for any phil-
osophical position, dogma or view; its ultimate value is not descrip-
tive or explanatory, but pragmatic and soteriologic (cf., Barnhart,
1994; Garfield, 1994). In presenting emptiness (sunyata), then,

Nagarjuna was challenging the exclusive privilege of both argumen-
tative and absolutist universes of discourse when talking about the
nature of reality. Therefore, Nagaijuna's emptiness (sunyata) cannot
be consistently quoted to support any absolutist picture of reality,
and less one involving claims about universal "patterns of exist-
ence," "World Souls," and the like.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Going beyond absolutism and relativism is not an easy task. It

calls us to transcend many strongly engrained habits of our think-
ing and to participate in the mystery and paradox that pervade
our universe. It calls us to overcome deeply rooted fears and to
humbly encounter uncertainty and complexity. It calls us to simul-
taneously admit, against absolutism, that there is not a single True
story, and against relativism, that some stories are better than
others—and that some may be manifestly distorting and problem-
atic! Admittedly, to dwell on the razor edge of such a middle way
can be perplexing and distressing, especially when one's mind is
flirting with the hubris of absolutist metaphysics, and constrained
by both the assumptions of argumentative discourse and the
tyranny of bivalent logic. In this paper, however, I have tried to
show that many of the disconcerting tensions and aporias involved
in going beyond absolutism and relativism are more apparent than
real. More precisely, they only emerge when these attempts are
considered within an absolutist universe of argumentative discourse,
and dissolve when approached from either a dialogical discourse
270 JORGE N. FERRER
or other alternative paradigms for human communication and

resolution making.
Furthermore, I should add that even in die case that some of the
paradoxical or self-referential nature of non-absolutist approaches
would still remain in these alternative domains of communication,
diis does not necessarily mean that they should be dismissed as
self-contradictory. To be sure, to turn paradoxes into self-contradic-
tory statements is tempting, but I would argue diat the transpersonal
eye may see in this more a retreat into ways of thinking paradigmatic
of the Cartesian ego, rather than, for example, a movement towards
vision-logic (Wilber) or other forms of contemplative cognition. What

I am suggesting here is that, from a transpersonal perspective, the
movement beyond absolutism and relativism can be seen not as self-
contradictory, but as paradoxical. As paradoxical, the issues it raises
cannot be "solved" in the arena of formal (bivalent) logic or by newer,
improved, or more encompassing theoretical models. Although para-
doxes cannot be logically "solved," however, they can be transcended
in die realm of human action and experience. In my opinion, for
example, many of the paradoxes raised by non-absolutist approaches
disappear when one realizes diat, rather dian philosophical positions
to be logically defended in an argumentative domain of discourse,
they are attitudes towards life and other human beings characterized
by an openness to understand and be enriched by what is different.
As attitudes towards life radier than as philosophical positions, these
approaches can be criticized, but not refuted. And here is where the
potential transformative power of paradox truly emerges: Paradoxes
are doorways to transpersonal ways of being because, by ineluctably
(and humorously) showing the limits of rational-logical diinking, they
invite us to expand our consciousness and enter the space of trans-
rational modes of being and cognition.
In these days of rich cross-cultural exchange, the temptations of
either discarding other's viewpoints as less rational or evolved, or
assimilating them into our own categories without doing justice to
genuine differences are tremendous. Despite its many achieve-
ments, I believe that Ken Wilber fell prey in SES to both tempta-
tions, and this fall—together with his rigid dichotomizations—led
his enterprise to navigate in the tempestuous post-modern seas to
a most unfortunate shipwreck.
To conclude, I should emphasize that I am not craving for the

absolute certainty of what I have espoused here. Still, I have deep
longings. I long for the advent of philosophy as a discipline in
which thinkers will be recognized not for their discrediting rival
opinions or "beating" opponents, but for the philosophical courage
to suspend their most cherished beliefs; the ability to question their
most basic presuppositions; and, most importantly, the willingness
to see and listen to others in their "Otherness" not only with their
eyes, ears, and minds, but also with their hearts and souls. This sort
of vision, I believe, allows us not only to compassionately critique
other viewpoints when necessary, but also to be genuinely open to

be challenged and tranformed by them. These are essential aspects
of what I consider to be authentic transpersonal thinking. Only if
our commitment to 'truthfulness' and 'truth' (not to the abstract
Truth!) is greater than our attachment to our ideas, models, and
theories, can we enter competently the dialogical space. And con-
versely, whenever our attachment to our logically compelling ideas
surpasses our commitment to 'truthfulness' and 'truth', we should
realize that, captives of a blind intellectual self-slavery, we have
stopped being genuinely free transpersonal thinkers.
Notes
1. For a popular introduction to the main themes of postmodernity, see the
interesting collection of essays compiled by Anderson (1995) in his The Truth
About the Truth.
2. Although I cannot subscribe all its conclusions, the work of Carr (1992) is uniquely
valuable in offering both a taxonomy of the different varieties of nihilism
(epistemological, alethiological, ontological, ethical, and existential), and lucid
distinctions between nihilism on the one hand, and relativism, skepticism and
atheism on the other.
3. Throughout this essay, I will also be referring to Wilber's popular version of SES,
A Brief History of Everything (1996), and to its sequel The Eye of Spirit (1997).
4. In contrast to a metanarrative—e.g., Darwinism, Freudianism or Marxism—which
generally tells the story of human existence in its own terms—e.g., biological
evolutionism, psychic determinism, or social-economic historicism—without ex-
tensive reference to other branches of knowledge, a meta-metanarrative explicitly
attempts, à la Hegel, to accommodate or correct all already existent metanar-
ratives within an all-encompassing scheme about "how things really are." Notice
that meta-metanarratives also function as legitimizing both knowledge claims and
moral judgments. For example, the Basic Moral Intuition derived from Wilber's
272 JORGE N. FERRER
meta-metanarrative is "to protect and promote the greatest depth for the
greatest span" (1996, p. 334, his emphasis), and an example of moral judgment
that follows from that intuition is that if we have to choose between killing a
dozen apes or killing Al Capone, we should kill Al (1996, p. 336). After all, Wilber
(1996) adds, "There's nothing sacrosanct about being a human holon" (p. 336).
5. In a rather personal article, Wilber (1995b) stated that the ultimate purpose, the
"single and unmistakable goal of the twelve books" (p. 21) he has authored "is
not to get people involved in intellectual head trips" (p. 22). On the contrary,
he added, "That is exactly what my books are attempting to stop, as those who
have read them will readily acknowledge. The problem is that many people,
academic or otherwise, are already playing head games (....) So I have
attempted to engage these people in their own game, and to play it very fast and
hard, simply to get to this conclusion: at some point, you and I must stop this
intellectual head-tripping, and begin actual spiritual practice." (p. 20). In

passages like this, Wilber seems to be joining Nagarjuna in his crusade to stop
conceptual proliferation as a means to attain spiritual liberation. As we will see
in this paper, however, SES is not the Mulamadhyamakarikas, but in many
respects its antithesis. And the authoritative, provoking, and sometimes sarcastic
and ridiculing tone of Wilber's critiques of many contemporary thinkers is
certainly not conducive to stopping mind games, but seems to be rather calling
for heated debate and retort.
6. I do not want the following critical reading of certain trends in Wilber's thinking
to overshadow the profound appreciation I feel for his work. I want to emphasize
here that not only do I believe that the vision he presents is feasible, but also that
I find myself in agreement with an uncountable number of the issues and ideas
he brilliantly discusses in SES. I firmly believe that Ken Wilber—together with
Donald Rothberg, Michael Washburn, and a few others—is one of the few authors
truly developing the edges and giving maturity to modern transpersonal studies.
Nor do I want this paper to be taken as a postmodern critique of transpersonal
studies. On the contrary, I should make clear from the very beginning that
I consider myself a transpersonal thinker, and I am convinced that many aspects
of postmodernity can and should be critiqued from a transpersonal perspective.
However, as we will see, most sophisticated postmodern thinkers are neither
self-contradictory nor nihilistic, and to ground the transpersonal critique of
postmodernity on these charges is therefore futile and misleading. It is my belief
that the next decade will bear witness to the beginning of a very needed con-
versation between the transpersonal perspective and wider mainstream academia.
Entering such a dialogue by building "straw men" and begging the real issues at
stake is not the most auspicious presentation of transpersonal studies.
7. Although, as I will show below, Wilber's thinking is both absolutist and universal-
ist, these two doctrines should not be confused. While absolutism is always
universalist, universalism does not necessarily imply absolutism. Universalism
merely makes reference to the occurrence and incidence of a phenomenon and
does not make any judgment about its absolute rightness, goodness or truth. Like-
wise, the doctrine antithetical to universalism is not relativism but particularism.
As Gellner (1982) demonstrated, the discovery of universals is perfectly compat-
ible with a relativistic position.
8. An alternative way to depict Wilber's position is as holding both metaphysical
monism—there exists a "unique Truth" about the world—and critical monism—this
Truth is open to only "one right interpretation" that can be ascertained by the
human mind and translated into a "Theory of Everything." In contrast, more
pluralistic views, even admitting an independent unique reality, may maintain
that there can be rational disagreements about its nature, a plurality of "right"
interpretations, and that no single theory can map reality in all its complexity and
proclaim to be paradigmatic for the rest (see, e.g., Hoy and McCarthy, 1994).
9. It is probable that many of the universalist claims of the perennial philosophy
stem from an a priori commitment to an absolutist view of reality. As Perovich
(1985), a perennialist philosopher, put it: "The point [of the perennial philos-
ophers] in insisting on the identity of mystical experiences was, after all, to
bolster the claim that the most varied mystics have established contact with 'the
one ultimate truth'" (p. 75).
10. In several passages (e.g., 1995a, pp. 264-276), Wilber suggests the possibility of
validating perennialist claims on the basis of the experiential content of mystical
experiences. Although I consider this proposal highly controversial, I will not
discuss here its validity insofar as Wilber promises to deal in detail with this topic
in the third volume of the Trilogy (see p. 599, note. 15). Meanwhile, the reader
interested in pursuing this issue further can consult the works by Wilber (1990)
and Shear (1994) for different argumentations suggesting that the principles of
the perennial philosophy can find epistemic support in mystical experiences. For
the contrary view, that is, that mystical experiences offer no evidential value for
mystical metaphysics, see Smith (1987), Angel (1994), and Fenton (1994).
11. Elsewhere (Ferrer, 1997) I have critically discussed the relationship between
transpersonal theory and the perennial philosophy. Here, I would like to merely
point out that the roots of this association can be traced to the very birthplace
of the transpersonal orientation, i.e., Maslow's seminal works. Maslow's most
clear perennialist manifesto can be found in Chapter 3 of his Religions, Values,
and Peak-Experiences (1970), adequately entitled "The 'Core-Religious,' or 'Tran-
scendent,' Experience." In this essay, he wrote: "This private religious experi-
ence [the peak-experience] is shared by all great religions including the atheistic
ones like Buddhism, Taoism, Humanism, or Confucianism" (p. 28). Trans-
personal theory, that is, was born in a perennialist world. Arguably, the second
major factor for the perennialist flavor of most contemporary transpersonal
scholarship is the strong influence of Wilber's thinking in transpersonal circles
(see Davis and Wright, 1987; Walsh and Vaughan, 1994). In any event, the fact
that many perennialist claims have been usually taken for granted by most
transpersonal thinkers suggests that an exhaustive examination of the precise
relationship between transpersonal psychology and the perennial philosophy is
imperative (cf. Walsh and Vaughan, 1993b).
12. Any serious investigation of the issues raised by the different varieties of relativism
should include, at least, the anthologies by Wilson (1980), Hollis and Lukes (1982),
Krausz and Meiland (1982), Bernstein (1983), Margolis (1986), Siegel (1987),
Krausz (1989), and Harre and Krausz (1996).
13. In the Thaetheus, 170a-172c. See Burnyeat (1990) for a detailed examination of
Protagoras' self-refutation.
14. However, listen to Gadamer (1990): "That the thesis of skepticism or relativism
refutes itself to the extent that it claims to be true is an irrefutable argument.
But what does it achieve? The reflective argument that proves successful here
rebounds against the arguer, for it renders the truth value of reflection suspect.
274 JORGE N. FERRER
It is not the reality of skepticism or of truth-dissolving relativism but the truth

claim of all formal argument that is affected. Thus the formalism of such relative
argument is of specious philosophical legitimacy. In fact it tells us nothing"
(p. 344). On Gadamer and relativism, see the collection of essays edited by
Schmidt (1995). Also, on the refutation of relativism, MacIntyre (1987) wrote:
"For relativism, like skepticism, is one of these doctrines that have by now been
refuted a number of times too often. Nothing is perhaps a surer sign that a
doctrine embodies some not-to-be-neglected truth that in the course of the
history of philosophy it should have been refuted again and again. Genuinely
refutable doctrines only need to be refuted once" (p. 385).
15. Space does not allow me to discuss here the important differences among these
non-absolutist approaches, so I will refer the reader to some of the sources in
which some of these distinctions are hammered out. For distinctions between
perspectivism and relativism, see Graham (1992) and MacIntyre (1988). See
Matilal (1991) for a contrast between pluralism and vulgar relativism. Also, see
Rorty (1989) for a defense of a non self-refuting pragmatism, Rescher (1993)
for an account of a non self-refuting pluralism, and Margolis (1986, 1989),
Maclntyre (1987), and Tianji (1991) for descriptions of non self-contradictory
forms of moderated relativism.
16. For several works explicitly challenging the self-refuting nature of relativism, see
Meiland (1980), Smith (1993), Hales (1997), and Krausz (1997).
17. See also Bernstein (1983) for a lucid presentation of the shift from an argumen-
tative to a dialogical model of rationality in contemporary philosophy through
the study of the work of Rorty, Gadamer, Habermas, and Arendt. For further
contrasts between argumentative epistemology and dialogical understanding, see
Maranhão (1990).
18. Of course, the following discussion raises the perennial herneneutical issues of
the limits of the meaning and valid interpretations of a text. There are different
positions on this issue in contemporary philosophy, from the extreme that there
are no limits on the meaning and interpretation of a text, to the opposite
position holding that there is only one correct meaning and interpretation per
text. In my opinion, although the adoption of different standpoints may allow
the emergence of different meaning units potentially embedded in a text, this
does not mean that "anything goes" in the hermeneutic enterprise. To be sure,
the limits of both the potential meaning and the valid interpretations of a text
are neither pre-fixed by the author's intentions nor pre-given by the text.
Furthermore, these limits are in constant fluctuation according to shifts of
discussion in the communities of pertinent scholars working at specific historical
and cultural milieus. However, and this is of fundamental importance, these
fluctuations in valid meaning, far from being arbitrary, occur within certain
constraints (anything does not go!). And these constraints emerge from the
interaction among the author's intentions (conscious and unconscious), the text,
and the interests and situation of the relevant community of inquirers. There-
fore, although there may exist an unlimited number of valid interpretations and
meanings of a text, some interpretations go beyond the margins of potentially
valid meanings. In other words, at any given moment, certain interpretations are
more plausible than others, and some can be even blatantly absurd. For
example, I do not think that anyone will make now, or at any point in future
history, a consistent case for the gender-egalitarian nature of Freud's account of
psycho-sexual development. No, Freud was not genderly unbiased, and, as I will
show, Nagarjuna did not defend an absolutist view of ultimate reality. For a lucid
work clarifying some of these hermeneutical issues, see Gracia (1995).
Acknowledgments
This research was carried out in part thanks to the support of a

"La Caixa" Fellowship ("La Caixa" Fellowship Program, 201 North
Indiana Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47405-3601; 812-855-7072,
fax: 812-855-6271). The author would like also to thank Steve Dinan
for helpful comments on an early draft of this paper, and Alfonso
Montuori, Ph.D. for his encouragement and editorial assistance.
References
Alexander, C. N. and Langer, E., eds. 1993. Higher stages of human development.
Perspectives on adult growth. New York: Oxford University Press.
Adorno, T. 1979. Negative dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York: Seabury Press.
Anderson, W. T., ed. 1995. The truth about the truth. De-confusing re-constructing the
postmodern world. New York: A Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam Book.
Angel, L. 1994. Enlightenment East & West. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Armstrong, T. 1984. Transpersonal experience in childhood. Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology 16: 207-230.
Armstrong, T. 1985. The radiant child. Wheaton, IL: The Theosophical Publishing
House.
Barlow, C., ed. 1995. Evolution extended. Biological debates on the meaning of life.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Barnhart, M. 1994. Sunyata, textualism, and incommensurability. Philosophy East &
West 44: 647-658.
Bernstein, R. J. 1983. Beyond objectivism and relativism. Science, hermeneutics, and praxis.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Bernstein, R. J. 1991. Incommensurability and otherness revisited. In Culture and
modernity. East-West philosophical perspectives, edited by E. Deutsch. Honolulu, HI:
University of Hawaii Press.
Bernstein, R. J. 1992. Reconciliation and rupture: The challenge and threat of
otherness. In Discourse and practice, edited by F. Reynolds & D. Tracy. Albany,
NY: SUNY Press.
Best, S. and Kellner, D. 1991. Postmodern theory. Critical interrogations. New York: The
Guilford Press.
Bohm, D. 1990. On dialogue. Ojai, CA: David Bohm Seminars.
Borella, J. 1995. René Guénon and the traditionalist school. In Modern esoteric
spirituality. Vol. 21 of world spirituality: An encyclopedic history of the religious quest,
edited by A. Faivre and J. Needleman. New York: Crossroad.
276 JORGE N. FERRER
Bowler, P. J. 1989. Evolution. The history of an idea. (Revised edition). Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Burman, E. 1994. Deconstructing developmental psychology. New York: Routledge.
Burnyeat, M. F. 1990. Protagoras and self-refutation in Plato's Theaetetus. In
Epistemology. Companions to ancient thought 1, edited by S. Everson. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Carr, K. L. 1992. The banalization of nihilism. Twentieth-century responses to meaningless-
ness. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Collins, J. 1962. The problem of a perennial philosophy. In Three paths in philosophy.
Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company.
Crook, S. 1991. Modernist radicalism and its aftermath. Foundationalism and anti-
foundationalism in radical social theory. New York: Routledge.
Davies, J. and Wright, C. 1987. Content of undergraduate transpersonal psychology

courses. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 19: 173-179.
Docherty, T., ed. 1993. Postmodernism. A reader. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Fay, B. 1996. Contemporary philosophy of social science. A multicultural approach.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Fearnside, W. W. and Holther, W. B. 1959. Fallacy. The counterfeit of argument.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Fenton, J. Y. 1995. Mystical experience as a bridge for cross-cultural philosophy of
religion: A critique. In Religious pluralism and truth. Essays on cross-cultural
philosophy of religion, edited by T. Dean. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Ferrer, J. N. 1997. Teoría transpersonal y filosofía perenne: Una evaluación crítica.
[Transpersonal theory and the perennial philosophy: A critical evaluation]. In
Psicología y Conciencia, edited by M. Almendro. Barcelona: Kairos.
Finnegan, R. and Horton, R., eds. 1973. Modes of thought: Essays on thinking in western
and non-western societies. London: Faber and Faber.
Flanagan, O. 1991. The science of the mind. 2nd ed., revised and expanded. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Fuchs, S. 1992. The professional quest for truth. A social theory of science and knowledge.
Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Gadamer, H.-G. 1990. Truth and method. 2nd revised ed.. Trans. rev. by J. Weinsheimer
and D. G. Marshall. New York: Crossroad.
Garfield. 1994. Dependent arising and the emptiness of emptiness. Why did
Nagarjuna start with causation? Philosophy East & West 44: 219-250.
Gellner, E. 1982. Relativism and universals. In Rationality and relativism, edited by
M. Hollis and S. Lukes. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Goodman, N. 1978. Ways of worldmaking. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co.
Gracia, J. J. E. 1995. A theory of textuality. The logic and epistemology. Albany, NY: SUNY
Press.
Graham, A. C. 1992. Unreason within reason. Essays on the outskirts of rationality.
La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Griffiths, P. J. 1991. An apology for apologetics. A study in the logic of interreligious
dialogue. New York: Orbis Books.
Grof, S. 1985. Beyond the brain: Brith, death, and transcendence in psychotherapy. Albany,
NY: SUNY Press.
Grof, S. I988. The adventure of self-discovery. Dimensions of consciousness and new
perspectives in psychotherapy and self-discovery. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Grof, S. 1996. Ken Wilber's spectrum psychology: Observations from clinical con-
sciousness research. Revision 19 (Summer): 11-24.
Habermas, J. 1987. The philosophical discourse of modernity. Trans. Frederick Lawrence.
Boston, MA: The MIT Press.
Hales, S. D. 1997. A consistent relativism. Mind 106: 33-52.
Harre, R. and Krausz, M. 1996. Varieties of relativism. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Publishers.
Hayes, R. P. 1994. Nagarjuna's appeal. Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 299-378.
Hollis, M. and Lukes, S., eds. 1982. Rationality and relativism.Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
Hoy, D. C. 1994. The contingency of universality: Critical theory as genealogical
hermeneutics. In Critical theory, by D. C. Hoy and T. McCarthy. Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell.
Hoy, D. C. and McCarthy, T. 1994. Critical theory. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Hunt, H. T. 1995. Some developmental issues in transpersonal experience. The
Journal of Mind and Behavior 16: 115-134.
Huntington, C. W., Jr., with Wangchen, G. N. 1989. The emptiness of emptiness. An intro-
duction to early Indian Madhyamika. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.
Huxley, A. 1945. The perennial philosophy. New York: Harper and Row.
Kalupahana, D. J. 1986. Nagarjuna: The philosophy of the middle way. Albany, NY:
SUNY Press.
Kelly, S. M. and Rothberg, D. 1996. Reflections on the Revision conversation.
Revision 19 (Fall): 47-48.
Krausz, M., ed. 1989. Relativism. Interpretation and confrontation. Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Krausz, M. 1997. Relativism and beyond: A tribute to Bimal Matilal. In Relativism,
suffering and beyond. Essays in memory of Bimal K. Matilal, edited by P. Bilimoria
and J. M. Mohanty. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Krausz, M. and Meiland, J. W., eds. 1982. Relativism. Cognitive and moral. Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Kremer, J. 1992a. The Dark night of the scholar: Reflections on culture and ways of
knowing. Revision 14 (Spring): 169-178.
Kremer, J. 1992b. Whither dark night of the scholar? Further reflections on culture
and ways of knowing. ReVision 15 (Summer): 4-12.
Kremer, J. 1994. Looking for Dame Yggdrasil. Red Bluff, CA: Falkenflug Press.
Kremer, J. 1996a. The shadow of evolutionary thinking. ReVision 18 (Summer): 41-48.
Kremer, J. 1996b. Lingering shadows. ReVision 19 (Fall): 43-44.
Loemker, L. E. 1973. Perennial philosophy. In Dictionary of the history of ideas. Vol. III,
edited by P. P. Wiener. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Lyotard, J.-F. 1984. The post-modern condition: A report on knowledge. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
MacIntyre, A. 1987. Relativism, power, and philosophy. In After philosophy. End or
transformation?, edited by K. Baynes, J. Bohman, and T. McCarthy. Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press.
Maclntyre, A. 1988. Whose justice? Whose rationality? Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press.
Mandelbaum, M. 1982. Subjective, objective, and conceptual relativisms. In Relativ-
ism. Cognitive and moral, edited by M. Krausz and J. W. Meiland. Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
278 JORGE N. FERRER
Maranhão, T. 1990. Introduction. In The interpretation of dialogue, edited by

T. Maranhäo. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Margolis, J. 1986. Pragmatism without foundations. Reconciling realism and relativism.
New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.
Margolis, J. 1989. The truth about relativism. In Relativism. Interpretation and con-
frontation, edited by M. Krausz. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Maslow, A. 1970. Religions, values, and peak-experiences. New York: The Viking Press.
Matilal, B. 1991. Pluralism, relativism and interaction between cultures. In Culture
and modernity. East-West philosophical perspectives, edited by E. Deutsch. Honolulu,
HI: University of Hawaii Press.
McDermott, R. 1996. The need for philosophical and spiritual dialogue. Reflections
on Ken Wilber's Sex, ecology, spirituality. Revision 19 (Fall): 8-9.
Meiland, J. W. 1980. On the paradox of cognitive relativism. Metaphilosophy 11:

115-126.
Murti, T. R. V. 1955. The central philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen and
Unwin.
Nasr, S. H. 1989. Knowledge and the sacred. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Nasr, S. H. 1993. The need for a sacred science. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Negoita, C. V. 1985. Experts systems and fuzzy logic. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/
Cummings.
Patel, K. C. 1994. T h e paradox of negation in Nagarjuna's philosophy. Asian
Philosophy 4: 17-32.
Perovich, A. N., Jr., 1985. Mysticism and the philosophy of science. The Journal of
Religion 65: 63-82.
Quinn, W. W. 1997. The only tradition. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Rescher, N. 1993. Pluralism. Against the demand for consensus. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Richards, G. 1978. Sunyata: Objective referent or via negativa? Religious Studies 14:
251-260.
Robbins, R. H. 1993. Cultural anthropology. A problem-based approach. Itasca, IL: F. E.
Peacock Publishers.
Rorty, R. 1989. Solidarity or Objectivity? In Relativism. Interpretation and confrontation,
edited by M. Krausz. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Rosenau, P. M. 1992. Post-modernism and the social sciences. Insights, inroads and intru-
sions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rothberg, D. 1986. Philosophical foundations of transpersonal psychology: An
introduction to some basic issues. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 18: 1-34.
Rothberg, D. 1994. Spiritual inquiry. Revision 17 (Fall): 2-12.
Rothberg, D. 1996. Ken Wilber and contemporary transpersonal inquiry. An intro-
duction to the ReVision conversation. Revision 18 (Spring): 2 - 8 .
Schwartz, T. 1995. The full spectrum. Common Boundary May/June: 3 4 - 4 1 .
Schmidt, L. K., ed. 1995. The specter of relativism. Truth, dialogue, and phronesis in
philosophical hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Schmitt, C. B. 1966. Perennial philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz. Journal
of the History of Ideas 27: 505-532.
Schuon, F. 1984. The transcendent unity of religions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Shear, J. 1994. On mystical experiences as support for the perennial philosophy.
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62: 319-342.
Siegel, H. 1987. Relativism refuted: A critique of contemporary epistemological relativism.

Dordrecht: Reidel.
Smith, B. H. 1988. Contingencies of value. Alternative perspectives for critical theory.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Smith, B. H. 1993. Unloading the self-refutation charge. Common Knowledge 2: 81-95.
Smith, H. 1976. Forgotten truth: The primordial tradition. New York: Harper and Row.
Smith, H. 1987. Is there a perennial philosophy? Journal of the American Academy of
Religion 55: 553-566.
Smith, H. 1989. Beyond the postmodern mind. (Updated and revised). Wheaton, IL: T h e
Thosophical Publishing House.
Sprung, M. 1979. Lucid exposition of the middle way. The essentials chapters from the
Prasannapada of Candrakirti. Boulder, CO: Prajna Press.
Stcherbatsky, F. 1962. Buddhist logic. (2 volumes). New York: Dover.

Stcherbatsky, F. 1968. The conception of Buddhist nirvana. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Streng, F. J. 1967. Emptiness. A study in religious meaning. Nashville, NY: Abingdon
Press.
Tambiah, S. J. 1990. Magic, science, religion, and the scope of rationality. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Tianji, J. 1991. The problem of relativism. In Culture and modernity. East-West
philosophical perspectives, edited by E. Deutsch. Honolulu, HI: University of
Hawaii Press.
Tuck, A. P. 1990. Comparative philosophy and the philosophy of scholarship. On the Western
interpretation of Nagarjuna. New York: Oxford University Press.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. 1991. The embodied mind. Cognitive science
and human experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Walsh, R. 1995. The spirit of evolution. Noetic Sciences Review, Summer: 16-21, 3 8 - 4 1 .
Walsh, R. and Vaughan, F., eds. 1993a. Paths beyond ego. The transpersonal vision. Los
Angeles, CA: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Perigee.
Walsh, R. and Vaughan, F. 1993b. On transpersonal definitions. Journal of Transper-
sonal Psychology 25: 199-207.
Walsh, R. and Vaughan, F. 1994. The worldview of Ken Wilber. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology 34: 6 - 2 1 .
Washburn, M. 1990. Two patterns of transcendence. Journal of Humanistic Psychology
30: 8 4 - 8 5 .
Washburn, M. 1995. The ego and the dynamic ground. 2nd ed. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Washburn, M. 1996. The pre/trans fallacy reconsidered. Revision 19 (Summer): 2-10.
Wilber, K. 1977. The spectrum of consciousness. Wheaton, IL.: The Theosophical
Publishing House.
Wilber, K. 1980. The Atman project. Wheaton, Ill: The Theosophical Publishing
House.
Wilber, K. 1983. Up from eden. A transpersonal view of human evolution. Boulder, CO:
Shambhala.
Wilber, K. 1990. Eye to eye. The quest for the new paradigm. Expanded ed. Boston, MA:
Shambhala.
Wilber, K. 1993a. The Great Chain of Being. Journal of Humanistic Psychology 33:
52-65.
Wilber, K. 1993b. Psychologia Perennis: the spectrum of consciousness. In Paths
beyond ego. The transpersonal vision, edited by R. Walsh and F. Vaughan. Los
Angeles, CA: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Perigee.
280 JORGE N. FERRER
Wilber, K. 1995a. Sex, ecology, spirituality. The spirit of evolution. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
Wilber, K. 1995b. Mind and the heart of emptiness. Reflections on intellect and the
spiritual path. The Quest, Winter 1995.
Wilber, K. 1996. A brief history of everything. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
Wilber, K. 1997. The eye of spirit. An integral vision for a world gone slightly mad. Boston,
MA: Shambhala.
Wilson, B., ed. 1970. Rationality. New York: Harper and Row.
Winch, P. 1958. The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Zimmerman, M. E. 1996. A transpersonal diagnosis of the ecological crisis. ReVision
18 (Spring): 38-48.

Ferrer Transpersonal Evolutionary Theory PDF

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Ferrer Transpersonal Evolutionary Theory PDF

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

This article was downloaded by: [88.8.89.

World Futures: The Journal of

Beyond absolutism and

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02604027.1998.9972709

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

California Institute of Integral Studies, 9 Peter Yorke Way, San Francisco,

(Received December 10, 1997; accepted January 6, 1998)

This paper critically examines Ken Wilber's transpersonal evolutionary

theory in the context of the philosophical discourse of postmodernity. The

The last two decades of Western philosophical debates have been

totalizing meta-frameworks, and due to the failure of the funda-

emerged at its best. Since the critique of the classic evolutionary

Evolution.3 One manner to read Wilber's (1995a) Sex, Ecology,

Wilber (1995a) offers his trilogy as an example of how this type of

in order to dispel the "aperspectival madness" (nothing is better

rejection of non-absolutist approaches do not stand serious scrutiny,

I. ABSOLUTISM IN AN AGE OF POSTMODERNISM

As mentioned above, the overall goal of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality

edge is today accepted to be fallible, conjectural, and approximate,

that self-identity can expand to include other aspects of life and

power to account for transpersonal events.

1. The Perennial Philosophy

There is no doubt that the idea of a perennial philosophy

philosophia priscorium of Marsilio Ficino, a unifying philosophical

losophy" (philosophia perennis) has also been used as a synonym

reveals an essential unity that transcends all doctrinal pluralisms.9

or involution of Spirit. In other words, Spirit is prior to matter, and

is more essential, reveals more about reality, and is therefore

2. Ken Wilber's Evolutionary Perennialism

Through his many works, Ken Wilber has identified himself as

Teilhard de Chardin, then, Wilber (1997) proposes an evolutionary

What Wilber is claiming is that the involutionary cosmology of the

plurality of human forms, and some modern epistemological

On the other hand, Wilber (1995a) adds to the perennial vision

translogical spiritual realms. I should point out here, however, that

that, although never reachable in the world of form, is the ultimate

II. FIGHTING THE FLATLAND

In this section, I want to explore the arguments Wilber offers

between his absolutist-universalist vision and a vulgar relativism;

1. The Fallacy of the Faulty Dichotomy

Wilber's first move against non-absolutist approaches is to create

believe, that this form of constructivism is just a form of nihilism

The crucial flaw in this argumentation is that a non self-

2. Refuting the Argument for Self-Refutation

Once the false dichotomy between absolutism and vulgar relativ-

section will deal with the second charge, that of "aperspectival

claimed to have absolute value, it either contradicts itself or falls

example, after rejecting self-refuting forms of vulgar relativism

philosophical thought is to detach oneself from any particular com-

degrees of 'truthness' (Negoita, 1985). In all these cases, relativism

mentative/systematic and dialogical/conversational.17 In the argu-

complementary model to discourse could be found in Kremer's

consideration in the search for consensus. According to Kremer

legitimacy of an argumentative universe of discourse, is pre-

of the self-refutation charge against non-absolutist approaches pre-

3. Absolutism or "Aperspectival Madness"?

The second charge made by Wilber against the different varieties

cultural anthropologists have warned us against this faulty reasoning.

On occasions, Wilber (1995a) appears to accept the possibility of

historically embedded human values. Judgments about what is

tion or way of being. These qualitative preferences, Rorty (1989)

avoided while conserving grounds for cross-cultural criticism. What

tably to a situation of "aperspectival madness." On the contrary, con-