Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

CONRADO CASING, G.R. No. 192334

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
- versus - SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

HON. OMBUDSMAN, JAIME June 13, 2012

C. VELASCO and ANGELES DELLOVA,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari[1] filed by Conrado Casing

(petitioner), assailing the March 29, 2007 resolution[2] and the January 22, 2009
joint order[3]issued by the Ombudsman in OMB-P-C-06-0437-E. These assailed
issuances found probable cause against the petitioner for violation of Section 3,
paragraph b of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
 ANTECEDENT FACTS

The petitioner was a Traffic Enforcer and was also designated as Head of
Task Force Traffic of SB Novaliches District Center (NDC), Quezon City. The
officer-in-charge of the NDC was Mr. Tadeo Palma.[4]

Sometime in 2003, Jaime C. Velasco and Angeles Dellova (complainants)

were hired as contractual Traffic Enforcer/Field Coordinator at the NDC, with a
monthly salary of P6,000.00, under the petitioners supervision. Upon hiring, the
petitioner informed the complainants that they may obtain their salary in advance
through one Arlene Sebastian. As advised, and being in dire financial need, the
complainants obtained a two-month cash advance from Sebastian. The
complainants were surprised to learn that the amount of P2,000.00 was
automatically deducted from their advanced salary, half of which was given to the
petitioner for his effort in helping them find employment.[5]

In December 2003, the Quezon City government allocated an amount

of P2,500.00 as Pamaskong Handog for its employees. However, when the
complainants went to Ms. Fe Chua (the liaison officer at the time), they learned
that their Pamaskong Handog had already been withdrawn by Chua, who in turn
gave it to the petitioner upon the latters instruction. Despite repeated demands, the
petitioner failed to make good his promise to return the amount to the
complainants. Worse, according to the complainants, in December 2005, the
petitioner recommended to Mr. Palma not to renew the complainants contract,
resulting in the termination of their employment.[6]
 The complainants filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman,
narrating the foregoing account and charging the petitioner with malversation,
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and dishonesty.

The petitioner denied the complainants allegations, arguing that he had no

hand in releasing the complainants salary or monetary benefits. The petitioner
added that the complainants have an axe to grind against him for the unsatisfactory
performance rating he gave them, resulting in the termination of their contractual
employment.[7]

In a decision dated August 6, 2007,[8] the Ombudsman found the petitioner

administratively liable for grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the
service. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, in a resolution dated March 29, 2007, Graft Investigation
Officer Yvette Marie S. Evaristo, with the approval of Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, found probable cause against the petitioner for violation
of Section 3 (b), R.A. No. 3019, which reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxx

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,

percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. [emphasis
and italics supplied]

The Ombudsman found:

 In the present case, [the petitioner] indirectly demanded and received a
share from the salary of complainants, as a consideration for having successfully
employed the latter as traffic enforcers in the formers area of jurisdiction.
Complainants[] employment/commission as traffic enforcers is by virtue of a
contract to render service to which [the petitioner] has the capacity to intervene
through the exercise of his recommendatory powers for the hiring or employment
of the [complainants].

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in this light, let an Information for Violation of R.A.

3019, Section 3(b) be FILED against [the petitioner] with the proper
court.[9] (emphases supplied)

The petitioner moved for reconsideration[10] of this resolution but his motion
was rebuffed in this wise:

The issue in this case is more on the credibility of the complainants and
their testimony as against the denial of the [petitioner]. xxx There is no indication
that the allegations of the complainant are tainted with bad faith or motivated by
ill will against the respondent. As a matter of fact, their story is not uncommon in
the bureaucracy especially in the hiring of casual employees who do not enjoy
any security of tenure, and whose jobs depend primarily on the discretion of the
employer. As to [the petitioners statement] that he had no hand in the approval or
termination of the complainants job orders, documentary evidence showed
otherwise.[11]

Undaunted, the petitioner comes to this Court via a certiorari petition

questioning the Ombudsmans determination of probable cause.

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause for violation
of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 should be proved by clear and convincing
evidence,[12] and not by the mere say-so of the complainants that the petitioner
deducted an amount from their salary. The petitioner argues that to be charged with
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the benefit or favor must have been in
connection with a transaction with the government in which the public officer has
the legal right to intervene. In the present case, the complainants have not
presented evidence to prove that he indeed intervened in the process of hiring the
complainants, much less that he had a legal right to do so, making the
complainants allegation incredible. The absence of this element alone negates the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause.

The petitioner adds that the Ombudsman should have dismissed outright the
complaints against him for (i) being filed more than one (1) year from the
occurrence of the act complained of, citing Section 4(a), Rule III of Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 17, in relation to Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, and
(ii) failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping, citing Section 3, Rule III
of A.O. No. 17.

COMMENT[13]

The Office of the Ombudsman submits that its appreciation of the evidence and its
ratiocination in finding the existence of probable cause, while adverse to the
petitioner, are not enough to substantiate a claim of grave abuse of discretion. As
against its findings, contained in the assailed issuances, the petitioner offered
nothing but bare denial of the charges against him a factual and evidentiary matter
that must be properly ventilated in a criminal trial.

The Ombudsman implores the Court to apply its policy of non-interference with
the Ombudsmans determination (i) of the presence or absence of probable cause
and, concomitantly, (ii) of the sufficiency of the evidence before it. Citing Lazatin
v. Desierto,[14] the Ombudsman argues that the issue of the correctness of the
Ombudsmans determination of these matters is outside the province of certiorari.

THE COURTS RULING

 We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

The Courts policy of non-interference with the

Office of the Ombudsman except in a clear case
of grave abuse of discretion
The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770[15] endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory
powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and
employees.[16] Specifically, the determination of whether probable cause
exists[17] is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether a
criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not is
basically its call.[18]

As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers,[19] and
respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman
which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of
the integrity of the public service.[20]While the Ombudsmans findings as to whether
probable cause exists are generally not reviewable by this Court,[21] where there is
an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the Ombudsmans act cannot escape
judicial scrutiny under the Courts own constitutional power and duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[22]

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsmans exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner - which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law in order to
exceptionally warrant judicial intervention. The petitioner failed to show the
existence of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

Evidentiary basis of probable cause

The petitioner argues that in finding probable cause for violation of Section
3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the Ombudsman should have used the clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard as threshold.

We strongly disagree.

In line with the constitutionally-guaranteed independence of the Office of

the Ombudsman[23] and coupled with the inherent limitations in
a certiorari proceeding in reviewing the Ombudsmans discretion,[24] we have
consistently held that so long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsmans
ruling, his decision should stand.[25] In a criminal proceeding before the
Ombudsman, the Ombudsman merely determines whether probable cause
exists, i.e., whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof.[26] Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption
that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.[27] As the term itself
implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or
even moral certainty;[28] it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[29] On
this score, Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao)[30] is instructive

[A] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe
that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
 stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. [italics, underscoring and emphasis
ours.]

A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a
trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.[31]

In the present case, the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause for violation of
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 against the petitioner is supported by substantial
evidence. First, the petitioner himself recommended the non-renewal of the
complainants contractual employment;[32] and second, the petitioner is the head of
the Task Force where the complainants were previously employed. As the
Ombudsman does, we find these facts sufficient to engender a reasonable belief
that the petitioners act satisfies one of the elements[33] of the law allegedly violated,
and whose existence the petitioner strongly disputes. In turn, these facts rule out
any arbitrariness in the Ombudsmans determination of probable cause. Whether the
evidence before the Ombudsman will be sufficient to procure a conviction is a
different matter that must await the trial of the criminal case.

Outright dismissal of complaint not warranted

Lastly, the petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
complaint outright for having been filed more than one year from the occurrence of
the act or omission complained of.

Again, we disagree. Section 4 of A.O. No. 17 of the Office of the

Ombudsman reads:

PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

 Section 4. Evaluation. Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated
to determine whether the same may be:

a) Dismissed outright for any of the grounds stated under Section 20 of

Republic Act No. 6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not
mandatory and shall be discretionaryon the part of the Ombudsman or the
Deputy Ombudsman. [emphases added]

Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:

Section 20. Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if
it believes that:

xxxx

(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of. [emphases added]

A plain reading of these two provisions clearly shows that they do not apply to a
criminal case but only to an administrative case. Their invocation in the present
case is therefore misplaced. Even assuming, however, that these provisions apply
to the criminal proceedings below, the obviously permissive wording of the law
simply confers on the Ombudsman the discretion whether to conduct an investigation
of a complaint even if it was filed more than one year from the date of the act or omission
complained of.[34] The claim for an outright dismissal simply has no leg to stand on.

On the petitioners claim that the complaint should have been dismissed for
lack of a certificate against forum shopping, suffice it to state that one of the
attachments in the petition itself is the certificate against forum shopping attached
to the complaint of one of the complainants.[35]

Even if we assume the absence of the certificate, this would not warrant the
outright dismissal of the case by the Ombudsman: first, A.O. No. 17 requires the
attachment to the complaint of a certificate against forum shopping only in an
administrative case,[36] whereas the incident which gave rise to
this certiorari petition is the criminal proceeding before the Ombudsman;
and second, under the Rules of Court (which applies suppletorily to the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman[37]), the absence of a certificate against
forum shopping would not cause the automatic dismissal of the complaint without
a prior motion and hearing on the matter.[38] No such motion appears to have been
filed in the present case. In fact, the petitioners position paper before the
Ombudsman did not raise this issue. It was only after the Ombudsman issued a
resolution finding probable cause against him that the petitioner questioned the
supposed absence of a certificate against forum shopping. This
technical objection is, therefore, deemed waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court.[39]
In closing, we reiterate the rule that absent good and compelling reason, the
Ombudsmans finding of probable cause or lack thereof deserves great respect from
the Court. If it were otherwise, the Court would be inundated with innumerable
petitions ultimately aimed at seeking a review of the Ombudsmans exercise of
discretion on whether to file a case in the courts,[40] wreaking havoc to our orderly
system of government, based on the principles of separation of powers, and checks
and balances. It is only in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion that the Court
may properly supplant the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion.[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice