PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

FERNANDO SULTAN
G.R. No. 132470 April 27, 2000

FACTS:
On June 2, 1997, around 9:00 in the evening, Juditha Bautista was on her way home from visiting her cousin when she was accosted by
the accused Fernando Sultan. Fernando pointed a sharp instrument at her neck and told her that this was a hold-up. Fearing for her life,
she let him grab and bring her to his house. Through intimidation and her fear for her life, she was robbed and twice raped.

After the second rape, he told her he loved her and in her effort to release herself, she “agreed” to elope with him. Convinced, Fernando
let her go home to get her things. She then went to her cousin, Antonette and narrated everything that happened. Antonette then called
her brother SPO1 Bautista who advised Juditha to continue with the elopement so that he and his companions could stage an arrest.
This went successful and Fernando was apprehended.

On June 5, 1997, Fernando was charged with the complex crime of robbery and rape but he merely brushed this aside as simply sex
between consenting adults.

RTC: Found him guilty on the charge against him.

Contention of the accused: There is no convincing proof that he is guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE:
Whether the additional rape committed by the accused is considered as an aggravating circumstance?

HELD:
No. The record shows that the prosecution has established that he committed both robbery and rape with the intent to take personal
property of another preceding the rape.

Complaining witness Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. In the recent case of People v. Regala, the Court held that
the additional rapes committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant "anomalous situation"
wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of gravity. The Court realized that there
was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further
observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of
the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy
lies with the legislature.

Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the
Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender. Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not
considered an aggravating circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[i]n all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof . . . . 2.
[w]hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.