People v.

Aruta – 288 SCRA 626

FACTS:

On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling
Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled
a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming
from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked
“aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They
found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed
that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”.
While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder
bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity
of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant
was presented. The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs
of 1972.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

HELD:

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. The accused cannot be said to be
committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously
for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal
basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no probable cause
and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so.
The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
 People v. Cuenco – GR 128277, Nov. 16, 1998

FACTS:

Accused Ferdinand Cuenco and Florida Fajardo were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by the RTC of Cavite in violation of the Section 4 and 8 of the RA 6425 otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused – appellant appealed to the SC from the
judgment of the court a quo assailing the validity of the police officer who have given
testimony in the two criminal cases contending that the sale of the prohibited drug since
the marked money used in the purchase of the illegal drug has not been "blottered” and
claim that he was not even at home when the sale supposedly had taken place.
Accused – appellant further contend that there was no buy bust operation happened
because of the illegality of the search made in the house and insinuated a frame-up
since at that time he was at neighbor house watching two children playing spiders when
he heard the shouts of his wife so he ran towards home and when he arrived there, the
police officers were already inside the house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not warrantless searches and seizure is invalid and constitutes irregularity.

HELD:

No. The arrest of appellant has been made in the course of a buy-bust operation A buy-
bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeated been accepted to be a valid
means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law is far variant from an ordinary
arrest. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending
officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also
in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective
control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of
committing violence or of escaping.
Contrary to the contentions of the accused that there was no buy-bust operation, the
police officers had shown through their testimonies that the elements of the offense with
which he was charged were present, i.e., that the accused had sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another and that accused knew that what he had sold and delivered
was a dangerous drug. The established fact is that there was marijuana taken from the
accused FERDINAND CUENO pursuant to a buy-bust operation and the same was
tested positively as such. In fact, accused did not refute the fact that the substance
recovered from him when he was arrested was marijuana, a prohibited drug.
 People v. Doria – GR 125299, Jan. 22, 1999

FACTS:

Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information

from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities
in Mandaluyong City. They decided to entrap him via a buy-bust operation. The poseur-
buyer, PO2 Manlangit set aside 1,600 pesos as marked money for the entrapment
operation, which was then handed to Jun upon transaction. Jun returned an hour later
bringing marijuana where he and his associates subsequently arrested Jun but did not
find the marked bills on him. Jun said he left the bills to his associate “Neneth”. Jun led
the police to Neneth’s house. The police went to Neneth’s house. Standing by the door,
PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the
boxes flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic
wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by
"Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of
the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. They also found the marked bills. They arrested
Jun and Neneth and brought them to the headquarters. It was only then that the police
learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y
Catama. The trial court found them guilty.

ISSUES:

1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao, the search of the latter’s person
and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom is valid.

2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being in plain view of the police officers

HELD:

1. YES. We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not
unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by
Section5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person maybe arrested without a warrant if he

"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."

In the case, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not
only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. - However, the
warrantless arrest, search and seizure of Gaddao is invalid.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to
give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule113. She was not committing any
crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant
Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."114 In fact, she
was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of
Rule 113."Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of
Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion.” In case, there was no reasonable suspicion
especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused.

Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the
person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing
drugs as Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge,
with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom
agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. As
the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the arrest.

2. NO- The marijuana was not in plain view of the police officers and its seizure without
the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution as the
contents of the box where the marijuana was partially hidden was not readily apparent
to PO3 Manlangit, one of the arresting officers.
 People v. Sevilla – 339 SCRA 625

FACTS:

A team of police officers went to the house of the accused to enforce a warrant of
arrest. Some members of the Narcotics Command joined the team to look for
marijuana. Accused was subsequently charged with illegal possession of marijuana.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search for marijuana is illegal.

HELD:

The search is illegal. It is not a search incidental to a valid arrest since the Narcotics
Command joined the team of police officers for the specific purpose of conducting a
search.
 People v. Che Chun Ting – 328 SCRA 592

FACTS:

Standing outside Unit 122, accused handled two transparent bags of drugs to Mabel Po,
in full view of NARCOM agents. Police officers arrested the surprised man and
conducted a search of Unit 122 where they found more bags of shabu.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search of unit 122 is legal.

HELD:

The search of Unit 122 and the seizure of drugs found therein are illegal. A warrantless
search should be limited to the premises and surroundings that are under the immediate
control of the accused. Unit 122 is not even the house of the accused but that of his
girlfriend.
 People v. Valdez – 341 SCRA 85

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, 2nd judicial district
convicting the appellant of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to 14 yrs. ,8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heir s of the deceased
Egmidio Pangilinan in the sum of 1,000 pesos ,it was the theory of the defense that
Egmidio died from self-inflicted wounds and the failure of the trial court so to find it
assigned as error. In view, of this theory appears us to have been manufactured for the
occasion and regard the testimony in support thereof no false.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Silveino Valdez is exempted from a criminal responsibility from which he
was charge of the crime of homicide and penalizing him of reclusion temporal.

HELD:

The judgment is reversed. In the instant case, considering the suddenness which of the
disturbance and the startling effect upon the appellant which must have resulted from
hearing the screams of his wife calling for help and coming as he did without previous
knowledge upon an armed man named Egmidio Pangilinan engaged in a murderous
attacked in his own house in presence of his wife he assumed that he is dealing to an
insane person and in view of the imminence danger his act could be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent the aggression to render the aggressor harmless under
par.3 of article 11 RPC.

In the lath of the 1987 Philippine Constitution par.3 Sec 2 Art. 3 warrantless searches
and seizures are not applicable to the appellant because of no probable cause present
and that the 4 witnesses were not eyewitnesses and their testimonies are not confined
to circumstances pointing to the facts alone.
 People v. Johnson – 348 SCRA 526

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Leila Johnson was caught in NAIA departure area in possession of

three (3) plastic bags containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The
accused-appellant was convicted and was sentenced with reclusion perpetua for vilation
of R.A 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). Johnson claims that she was arrested and
detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her
right against unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under
custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in
fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as “the
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in]
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes
that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to
elicit information or [a] confession from him." The circumstances surrounding the arrest
of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence
the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being
accurate.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation
of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage is routinely subjected to
x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated
with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if
any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.

The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a

valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant
herein. Corollary, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her
person in flagrante delicto.
 Del Rosario v. People, GR 142295, May 31, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms).

Petitioner claims that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as the search
warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution and consequently, the evidence
seized was inadmissible. He contends that he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm
and ammunition seized in his bedroom. But the other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver
seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite
rifle, and two 2-way radios found in his daughter’s bedroom, were either planted by the
police or illegally seized, as they were not mentioned in the search warrant.

ISSUE:

W/N the search and seizure was valid?

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that the search and seizure of the .22 caliber revolver, magazine for
an Armalite rifle and two-way radios was not valid.“Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of said constitutional provision.”

The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized. Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid
search warrant.

In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a
result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner’s house. This firearm, to
emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal.
 People v. Estrada – GR 124461, June 26, 2000

FACTS:

A decision promulgated on September 25, 1998, this Court denied the petition
questioning the trial court's order which quashed the search warrant it issued and
ordered the return of the seized goods on the ground that the warrant failed to satisfy
the constitutional requirements for issuance of warrants.

Petitioner now seeks a partial reconsideration of the said decision arguing that the
seized drugs subject of the void warrant can no longer be returned because the same
are contraband goods. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioners attached annexes
purporting to show that the 52 boxes of medicines seized under the void warrant, upon
laboratory examinations, were found genuine but were illegally imported.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of goods is illegal.

HELD:

Even if the medicines were genuine if the seller has no permit from the appropriate
government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although the search
warrant was declared illegal.
 1. Searches and Seizuers “of whatever nature and for whatever sources.”

Material Distributors v. Natividad – 84 Phil 127

FACTS:

On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April 10, 1947, to
include Harry Lyons) seeking a money judgment against petitioners on three causes of
action in the total of P1, 256,229.30. On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the
production and inspection documents.

On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the production and inspection
of the original documents requested,petitioner filed a memorandum and opposition to
Sarreal's above mentioned original and supplemental motion on the ground that he
failed to show good cause and that the motion were evidently filed for the purpose of
fishing evidence.

On July 16, 1947, respondent judge, granting both motions, required petitioners to
produce the documents and annexes in question on July 24, 1947.On account of the
absence in the Philippines of Harry Lyons, petitioner moved, reserving whatever rights
they have under the Rules of Court, to postpone the inspection of the documents and
annexes in question and accordingly respondent judge postponed it to August 15, 1947.

Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders of July 16 and September 27, 1947, as
were issued by the respondent judge in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
his discretion, and prayed for the annulment or modification of the order of July 16,
1947.Petitioners contend that in filling his original and supplemental motions, Sarreal
has failed to show good cause for the issuance of the requested order. It appears,
however, in the original motion of May 27, 1947, that the books and papers therein
mentioned "constitute or contain the evidence material to the matters involved in the
above entitled case. Petitioners also contained that the order of the trial judge violated
petitioner's constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abuse his discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction when he issue the order granting both motions and required petitioners to
produce the documents and annexes in question on July 24, 1947 without search
warrant.
HELD:

No. The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil
procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and
inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the
procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge place them outside the
realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches. There is no question that, upon the
pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in question,
that they are material and important to the issues between him and petitioners, that
justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before
the trial court.

The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not

be violated, because the trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the
production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of the
constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of
communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice. After a
careful consideration of the legal question raised by petitioners, this Court has arrived at
the conclusion that the trial judge, in issuing the order of July 16, 1947, has not exceed
his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion.
 Oklahoma Press v. Waling – 327 US 186

FACTS:

The provisions of § 11(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, authorizing the Administrator
to investigate conditions and practices of employment in any industry subject to the Act,
and of § 9, incorporating the provisions of § 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
authorizing the issuance and judicial enforcement of subpoenas, were challenge by the
petitioners, contending that they violate the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures or any other provision of the Constitution.
Said law applies to business of publishing and distributing newspapers like the herein
Petitioners. Respondent conducted an investigation pursuant to the above-mentioned
law against the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Fair Labor standard Act violates the fourth amendment.

HELD:

No. The Fourth Amendment, if applicable, guards against abuse only by way of too
much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be "particularly described," if the
inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials
specified are relevant, the gist of the protection being the requirement that the
disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. There was no violation of petitioners' rights
in these cases, since both petitioners were corporations; the only records or documents
sought were corporate ones; no element of self-incrimination was presented or claimed;
all the records sought were relevant to an inquiry for the purpose of determining
whether petitioners were subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were violating it; and
such an inquiry was authorized by §11(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
 Camara v. Municipal Court – 387 US 523

FACTS:

An inspector from the Department of Health entered a home to investigate possible

violations of a City’s housing code without a warrant.The inspector was informed that
the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector
confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises because residential
use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant did not
allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant. A few weeks later the
inspector attempted again to gain access to the building but the private respondent then
again refused. A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the
Housing Code. His demurrer was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inspector may enter the building without a search warrant.

HELD:

The court ruled that the inspector cannot obtain access to the building without first
securing a search warrant because under section 2 of the Bill of Rights states that “
That right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be in violable” a mere information gathered from a person is not a reasonable
ground to enter the house of the appellant without a search warrant.The Court of
Appeals further rule that the right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be
exercised under unreasonable condition.
2. Warrantless Arrests

Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago – 162 SCRA 840

FACTS:

This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals
Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adrian Van Den Elshout, 58.
All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago
issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew
Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two
naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read
that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed
being live-in for some time now. Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls
of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising
the child prostitutes were also found.

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17
February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17
of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence,
another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to
face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted
against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative
Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37,
45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the
Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed
11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988
Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral
argument on 20 April 1988.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners
pending determination of existence of probable cause.

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.

(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.
HELD:

While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared
policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-
being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause
determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized
as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule
126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not
an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental
to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In
view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending
their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation
charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when
confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in

accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69
of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested
and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for
deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is
that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of
the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
tranquility of the people.
 People v. Aminnudin – 163 SCRA 402

FACTS:

The police agents in Iloilo City received a tip from a reliable informer that the accused,
Aminnudin, was on a vessel bound for Iloilo and is carrying with him marijuana. The
said vessel was to arrive few days after such tip. On the day of the arrival, the agents
then waited at the port for the vessel. Upon arrival of the vessel and when the suspect
disembarked, they immediately frisked him and searched his bag which contained the
marijuana. Subsequently, the Aminnudin was arrested. During the trial, the accused that
alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed and that his bag
was confiscated without a search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest is valid.

HELD:

No. Warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court not justified
unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or
had just been committed. The evidence of probable caused should be determined by a
judge and not by law-enforcement agents.
 People v. dela Cruz – 184 SCRA 416

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics regional Unit at Malilic St.,
Tondo, and Manila on May 04, 1987 to catch the pushers-dela Cruz and Beltran.
Caught in the actual selling of the ascertained marijuana, as a result of the buy-bust
operation, dela Cruz and Beltran were subsequently arrested. The 10.00php marked bill
and the foil containing marijuana were seized and even used as admissible evidence
against them.

The two accused contended that the warrantless arrest and the seizure of the marked
bill and foil containing marijuana incidental to the buy-bust operation violated their
constitutional right to reasonable search and seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure incidental to buy-bust operation were violative to
their constitutional right to reasonable search and seizure.

HELD:

The court held that the buy-bust operation was an essential form of entrapment since
the peace officer neither instigates nor induces that the accused commit to crime. The
warrantless arrest was lawful because the arrest was held when the accused were
caught committing an offense in flagrante delicto.

While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation there is a seizure of evidence from

one’s person without a search warrant, needless to state that a search warrant was not
necessary, the search being incidental to lawful arrest.
 People v. Burgos – 144 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion

(tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its
members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information
filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man
defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had
his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm,
allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated.

Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has
been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged
extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his
person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid
warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the
firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.

ISSUE:

Whether defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of
a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

HELD:

Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the
information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest with a warrant with
them—in wanton violation of Art. IV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2).

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under
the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any
“subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless
arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or actually have
been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The
test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also
finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is
no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. If an arrest without a
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made; generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful.
 Umil v. Ramos – 187 SCRA 311 (Main); MR – Oct. 3, 1991

FACTS:

This case is a result of the consolidation of separate motions filed by petitioners seeking
reconsideration of Court’s promulgated decision on October 9, 1990 where petitions
were dismissed. The Court clarified that the decision did not rule that mere suspicion
that one is a communist party or NPA member is valid ground for his arrest without
warrant.

Petitioners contend that upholding questioned arrests made without warrant, in relying
on Rules of Court Section 5, Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards fact that such arrest violated
the constitutional rights of the persons arrested.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of petitioner was valid even in the absence of a warrant.

HELD:

There is no merit in the petitioners’ contention. If arrests were made in accordance with
law, detention resulting from such arrest also is accordance with law. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court states that:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and…”

Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overwhelming the government is attained. Subversion and rebellion is perceived as a
continuing offense.
Grounds of suspicion are reasonable when suspicion is based on actual facts supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. Reasonable suspicion founded on probable cause coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Power to arrest
without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements for Sec., Rule 113 are
met. The rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities. “Probable cause”, not evidence of guilt, is the reason for warrantless
arrest. Even if persons are later acquitted, arresting officers are not liable.
 People v. Sucro – 195 SCRA 388

FACTS:

Accused appellant was arrested by police officers after gathering information that the
former was engaged in selling marijuana and placing the former under monitoring of his
activities. The police officers were able to intercept one of the buyers of the appellant
who consequently admitted that it was the latter who sold him stick of marijuana, thus
confirming his illicit business. The police officers were able to recover marijuana in the
possession of the appellant when arrested. The petitioner was charged with and
convicted of violation of Sec. 4, Art II of the Dangerous Drugs Act for having acted as a
pusher or broker in the business of selling, administration, delivery, giving away to
another and for distributing prohibited drugs.

The accused appellant appealed the decision of the trial court contending that the
alleged marijuana were taken without the required warrant of search and arrest, thus his
arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under Sec. 2, Art III of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE:

W/N the arrest without warrant of the accused- appellant lawful.

HELD:

The SC ruled in the affirmative. Sec. 5 Rule 113 of the rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule
states: Arrest without warrant, when lawful- A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person

a. When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the
basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transaction) there
existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact
selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.
 Go v. CA – 206 SCRA 138

FACST:

Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a
collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of
the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down
petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently
ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself
in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him.

Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the
prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner
has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the
rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in
his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a
preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

HELD:

Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the
offenses, which however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in
an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5,
Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the
incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner
were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not
apply. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he
neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any
crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should
have been scheduled to determine probable cause.
Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation,
necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition
granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal
case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered
released upon posting a bail bond.
 People v. Briones – 202 SCRA 708

FACTS:

In the evening of April 23, 1988, Francisco was tendering his sari-sari store. At about
11:30 p.m., accused Javier and Allied came to his store and ordered four bottles of
beer. Accused Briones arrived and was offered beer, but he declined and left. After
about 30 minutes, Javier and Allied also left the store. About 8 meters away from
Francisco’s store was the house of spouses Felicismo and Gutierrez, at the ground floor
of which was also a store. At the street near the store was a 100-electric bulb.

When all his customers had left, Francisco closed his store. Not long after, he heard the
barking of dogs from the Gutierez residence. Feeling that something untoward was
taking place, he went out of his store, and from there, he saw Briones, Javier and Allied
mauling Gutierrez who was lying prostrate on the ground. The three later dragged Mrs.
Gutierrez inside her house and closed the door.

In the morning of April 24, 1988, Francisco went to the house of Gutierrez. He found it in
disarray, with the spouses sprawled dead on the first floor. He then informed the Chief
of Police of the incident and a team of investigators proceeded to the scene of the
crime. Subsequently, the culprits were apprehended on separate occasions.

ISSUE:

W/N the warrantless arrest of the accused is valid.

HELD:

The arrest was unlawful originally but it was cured. “It is unequivocally clear that no valid
arrest was made on the accused, the arrest having been made without any warrant at
all. Neither can the appellant’s arrest qualify as a lawful arrest without a warrant under
Sec. 5 (b) Rule 113 because the police officer who effected the arrest indubitably had
no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
the crime. It is eyewitness Francisco who has such personal knowledge. In sum,
therefore, the warrantless arrest of the appellant is illegal.Nevertheless, such unavailing
technicality cannot render all the other proceedings, including the conviction of the
accused, void. It cannot deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when all the
facts on record point to their culpability.
 In this regard, the case of De Asis v. Romero finds application. Thus, “One of the most
important of these settled rules is that any objection to the procedure followed in the
matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must
be opportunely raised before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.

Immediately after their arrest, accused Briones and Javier could have objected to the
legality thereof due to the failure of the police officer to secure first a warrant for their
arrest. Not only that, without having questioned the legality of their arrest, they even
pleaded, on arraignment to the information filed against them. Accused acts constitute a
clear waiver of their right against unlawful restraint of liberty. Besides, it would be
impractical, if not ridiculous to order the court to set the appellants free then issue a
warrant for their arrest, and try them all over again when appellants themselves have
waived their right to object to such irregularity and when their conviction is truly based
on overwhelming evidence.
 People v. Mengote – 210 SCRA 174

FACTS:

On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a telephone call from an
informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila. When the surveillance team arrived therein, they
saw the accused “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen that are why they
tried to ran away because of the other lawmen, they were unable to escape. After their
arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wesson revolver was confiscated from the accused and
several days later, information for violation of PD 1866 filed against him. After trial,
Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866 and was sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal evidence. It was automatic
appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search and seizure.

HELD:

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is

inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of
Article III, Section 3 [2], of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule
based on the justification given by Justice Learned Hand that “only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will the wrong be repressed.”

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of the decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power. No pronouncement on costs.
 People v. Simon – 234 SCRA 555

FACTS:

Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988
with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or
about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea
bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration
of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were
found positive for marijuana.

Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his
rearrests following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, and Pampanga where
he was temporarily detained, he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a
pre-trial conference, 3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.

As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming

that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the
members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he had never met
before suddenly, arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was
told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a
different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to
alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature
and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the
P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from
the pocket of Pejoro.

On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay
a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.

Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower
court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his
defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of the accused was valid.

HELD:

After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, the
Court is morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the
illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of
doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place
and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the
straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and
negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is
more entitled to credence.

We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of
poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.
Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case
at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a
surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected. No
ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed
to have regularly performed their official duty. Such lack of dubious motive coupled with
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, erected as it is upon the mere
shifting sands of an alibi.
 People v. Rabang – 187 SCRA 682

FACTS:

On or about the 6th day of October 1984, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with intent to kill and
by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of HENRY
CORTEZ y MORRIS by then and there stabbing the latter at the back with a bladed
weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said HENRY CORTES y MORRIS fatal stab wound
which was the direct cause of his death.On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding the appellant
guilty of murder, attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Appellant contends basically that his identification as the culprit was “tailored-fit and
legally defective and sham” since prosecution witness Victor Boban could not be
expected to be able to register in his mind an accurate picture of what he saw or of
events which might have taken place on the early morning hours of 6 October 1984,
considering that those events were absolutely unforeseen and unexpected, and since
that was the first time he had ever seen the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest was void due to the defect in the identification of the culprit.

HELD:

No. The Court considers that appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his
arrest. An examination of the record reveals that this issue is being raised for the first
time by appellant before this Court. He had not moved for the quashing of the
information before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to his
arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty “and by participating in the trial”.
 People v. Lopez – 246 SCRA 95

FACTS:

On August 8, 1990, Evelyn Paras, Edgardo Castro and Jesus Reyes went to the
Barangay Hall at Onyx Street, San Andres, Manila to file a complaint against Mario
Lopez who reportedly rained stones on the house of Evelyn Paras. While they were at
the Barangay Hall, appellant Leonardo Lopez who is the brother of Mario Lopez
suddenly appeared behind them and in a swift and sudden motion, stabbed Jesus
Reyes at the back with the use of a knife. Jesus Reyes fled fell on the ground face
down. then appellant stabbed him at the back. After the incident, appellant went into
hiding and was not heard of or seen in the neighborhood until seven (7) months later
when Evelyn Paras saw him at his house. She called the police and the appellant was
promptly arrested.

Accused-appellant Leonardo Lopez y Mancilla, Jr. was charged with murder. On

arraignment, accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. A trial
subsequently ensued and the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ‘Murder’. The appellant contends that he was
arrested without a warrant.

ISSUE:

WON the appellant may still raise the question of being arrested without warrant even if
he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.

HELD:

Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.—finally, and it is much too late for appellant
to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was
arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment,
participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection
is deemed waived.
The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error besides, this issue is
being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant
to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
Velasco v. CA – 245 SCRA 677
 People v. Sequino – 264 SCRA 79

FACTS:

The respondent in this case was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as
charged in an information. The respondent invoke his right against warrantless arrest,
contending that the conditions stated in Article III Section 5 where a peace officer may
validly arrest a person without a warrant cannot be applied in his case because the
police’s basis in arresting him was the bio-data sheet with the respondent’s name found
at the crime scene. It cannot validate the arrest because the bio-data sheet could have
been obtained by anyone and left it at the crime scene long before or after the crime
was committed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent can invoke his right against warrantless arrest

HELD:

Yes. It was not proper for the police to arrest the respondent only on the basis of the
bio-data sheet with the respondent’s name therein which was found at the crime scene.
The arrest was illegal because not one of the conditions mentioned in Section 5, Article
III on warrantless arrest can be applied to the case. The police only had an
unreasonable suspicion when he arrested the respondent. Nevertheless, the court still
upheld the decision of the Trial Court because of the testimonies of the witnesses who
were victims themselves.
 People v. Nazareno – 260 SCRA 256

FACTS:

Respondent de la Vega, along with five others, was charged with murder. He was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing, he
escaped from detention. Prosecutors file a motion to proceed with the hearing in
absentia, invoking Sec 19, Art IV of the 1973 Constitution.

SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.

The lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was dismissed against the five
accused, while proceedings against de la Vega were held in abeyance. The lower court
denied recon of the “abeyance portion” of the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court loses jurisdiction over an accused who escapes from detention
after arraignment.

HELD:

NO. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by
his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is
accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in
this case. Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the
crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues
until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
 People v. Mahusay – 282 SCRA 80

FACTS:

On April 19, 1988, at around 6:45 o’clock p.m., six armed men barged into the Bughao
residence and introduced themselves as members of the New People’s Army. After
extinguishing the three oil lamps inside the house, they tied the arms and feet of
Troadio Bughao, his wife and house helper Esmarlita Paspos, who is the sister of
appellant Paspos. The group split in two, ransacked the cabinets, and cleaned out the
premises of every valuable item they could carry.Bughao’s daughter Maria Luisa (a.k.a.,
Marilou) was brought upstairs by three men who successively ravished her. She
recounted that when she was being violated, a flashlight was focused on her face, thus,
giving her ample illumination and enabling her to look intently at one of her
assailants. She, however, failed to identify the other two because she fainted in the
course of the ordeal she underwent.

Esmarlita Paspos, on the other hand, testified that she immediately recognized one
of the men as her brother Cristituto, the only malefactor wearing a mask, through his
movements and physical features. She likewise identified Mahusay and Mendio as the
persons who ordered her to serve food.

The following day, the incident was reported to the police. A police team from the
Integrated National Police Station of San Isidro, Leyte led by Sgt. Manuel Bughao was
promptly dispatched to Sitio Sumakab, Barangay Inangatan, Tabango, and Leyte to
arrest the suspects. The police were able to recover from them a wall clock, cash
amounting to P1, 445.00, a ring and two caliber .38 paltik revolvers. During the
investigation, appellants allegedly admitted responsibility for the crime
charged. Considering, however, that the searching inquiry was done without the
assistance of counsel, the trial court correctly disregarded the same. Appellants, on the
other hand, invoke alibi as their defense.

On April 17, 1988, Mahusay and Mendio, both drivers and residents of Navotas, Metro
Manila, alleged that they went on a trip to Medellin, Cebu to visit the former’s uncle,
Elezer Cuyaco. Three days later, or on April 20, 1988, they departed for San Isidro,
Leyte to attend a fiesta. With them on the pump boat was Galo whom Mahusay came
to know in a dance in his brief stay in Cebu. Galo was apparently instructed by his aunt
to go to San Isidro to collect a P660.00 debt from Paspos.

Arriving in San Isidro at noon of April 20th, they repaired to the house of Paspos who
served them steamed bananas. While resting and conversing with one another, four
policemen suddenly pounced upon them and brought them to the police station where
they were allegedly maltreated and illegally detained for two months. After trial on the
merits, Galo was acquitted of the crime charged while Mahusay, Paspos and Mendio
were proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a decision by the trial court.

Mahusay and Paspos filed a notice of appeal contending that the trial court erred in
ruling that their apprehension was valid and that their guilt was proved beyond
reasonable doubt because there was no warrant of arrest issued to them. Appellants
were arrested on the sole basis of Bughao’s verbal report. The arresting officers were
led to suspect that, indeed, appellants had committed a crime. Thus, the arrest was
made in violation of their fundamental right against an unjustified warrantless arrest.

ISSUE:

W/N the arrest of the accused without warrant violates their rights against an unjustified
warrantless arrest.

HELD:

The Court has ruled on several occasions that “any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. Indeed, it is too late for appellants to raise the question of their arrest. “When
appellants were arrested and a case was filed against them, they pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented their respective
evidence. Appellants are thus estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. At
the outset, appellants should have “moved for the quashal of the information before the
trial court on this ground.” Accordingly, any irregularity in their arrest was cured when
they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
 People v. Alvario – 275 SCRA 529

FACTS:

On January 29, 1993, Esterlina Quintero (Ester), a 29-year old girl, took her time off as
a housekeeper at Pasong Tirad, Makati, to look for another place of employment.
Eventually, she found a house in Bel-Air Subdivision where she was accepted by
Armando Alvario as a cook and a laundress. (Alvario was just a caretaker of the house).
Based on Ester’s testimony, Alvario would barge into her room in the maid’s quarter,
point a gun at her and rape her. Also, she testified that Alvario did not allow her to go
out of the house and to use the telephone. However, on January 28, she phoned her
sister and asked her from her. Subsequently, her sister and 4 Makati police came to the
house in Bel-Air. When Alvario and Ester opened the door, she pointed at Alvario and
say that he raped her. Then and there, Alvario was arrested.

ISSUE:

W/N the arrest of Alvario is valid

HELD:

No. The arrest of Alvario violated his constitutional right against warrantless arrests. As
required by Rules on Criminal Procedure, a person can be arrested even without a
warrant when an offense has in fact been committed and the policeman making the
arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. In this case, the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was culled
from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man
who raped her at the time of his arrest
 Larranaga v. CA – 287 SCRA 521

FACTS:

On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her
minor son, Francisco Juan Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the RTC of Cebu City as well
as the warrant of arrest issued as a consequence thereof. Petitioner as an alternative
remedy prays for the annulment of the order of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu
denying Larranagga’s motion for a regular preliminary investigation and that it be
conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the office of the State Prosecutor,
Department of Justice.

On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition praying for the

issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve her son from his alleged illegal
confinement or to grant him bail. It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP
CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue,
Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga.

Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the
warrantless arrest. The police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that
Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for
perlominary investigation. On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of
Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular preliminary
investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in support of
the complaint against his client and that he be granted a non-extendible period of twenty
(20) days from their receipt to file the defense affidavit.

The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga
should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest
investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was
warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his client’s right to a preliminary
investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Atty. Armivit’s verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city
prosecutor.

On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals
assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. However, Larranaga’s effort to stop the filing of a criminal information
against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had
filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PNP CIG authorities committed grave abuse of discretion when they
arrested, without warrant, the petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months
before.

HELD:

The Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of petitioner and to order
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation
of the petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul the order for Detention
During The Pendency of the Case issued by Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against
the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to order the immediate
release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4) to order the Presiding
Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending
the result of petitioner’s preliminary investigation.
 People v. Olivarez – GR 77865, Dec. 4, 1998

FACTS:

Involved in this case is the crime of robbery with homicide committed during the season
of yuletide. For the death of the two victims and the loss of some items, appellants were
charge with the complex crime of “robbery with double homicide”.

The Prosecution witness Cpl. Tomas Juan of the Valenzuela Police Station V testified
that in the morning of December 28, 1981, he was assigned by his station commander
to follow-up the robbery with homicide that took place at Tanada Subdivision, Gen. T.
De Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. He learned from Patrolman Bote that a regular
employee of the Cardinal Plastic Industries (where the crime was committed) had not
yet reported for work. With that information, Cpl. Juan accompanied by Pat. Rodriguez,
Acharon, and Reyes proceeded to the business establishment and were able to confirm
from the workers that appellant Danilo Arellano failed to report for work since the
commission of the crime. Melchor Salle (cousin of appellant Arellano) volunteered to
bring them to Danilo Arellano, in a factory situated in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thereat,
Melchor Salle was able to secure information from the ‘barkada’ of appellant Arellano
who turned out to be appellant Olivares, Jr. Appellant Olivares accompanied them to
Broadway, Barangay Kristong Hari, and Quezon City, where they found appellant
Arellano. After being asked about the incident that took place at the Cardinal Plastic
Industries, appellant Arellano readily admitted to the police authorities his participation
in the commission of the crime. Thereafter, appellant Arellano was invited to the police
station. On further direct examination, Cpl. Juan identified in open court the Sanyo
cassettes, the tapes and the wristwatch they recovered from the place where appellant
Arellano pointed to them. Said items were turned over to the police station.

On direct appeal to this Court, appellants, who are imprisoned, seek their acquittal on
the ground that their guilt was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Alternatively, they argued that in case their conviction is sustained, the death penalty
should not be imposed on them in the light of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

WON appellants should be acquitted on the ground that they were arrested without a
valid warrant of arrest.
HELD:

Yes. In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and; thus, no
direct evidence points to appellant’s criminal liability. The prosecution’s principal
evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who
arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when
juxtaposed with appellants’ constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of
confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot he held liable for the offense
charged despite the inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not
because they are not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are
inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.

Appellants were arrested without a valid a valid warrant of arrest and their arrest cannot
even be justified under any of the recognized exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest
mentioned in Section 6, (now Section 5) Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which prior to its amendment in 1988 provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is

about to commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When the offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.”

None of the foregoing exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest concurs herein. At the
time appellants were apprehended, two days had already lapsed after the discovery of
the crime – they were not doing nor had just done any criminal act. Neither were they
caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped from confinement. Probably aware of the
illegality of the arrest they made, the arresting officers testified that appellants were
merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however, when construed in the
light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the purpose
of conducting an interrogation. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a
warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an
investigation.
 Cadua v. CA – 312 SCRA 703

FACTS:

The penalty imposed upon the petitioner however deserves a review. At the time he
was convicted the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under PD 18666 was
reclusion temporal in its maximum period for reclusion perpetua. The trial court as
affirmed by the appellate court imposed on petitioner penalty of 12 years ,5 months and
10 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 yrs. 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. In view of enactment of RA 8294 certain provisions of a law
have been amended. Penalty for simple illegal possession of a law powered FA such as
paltik had been reduced to prision correctional in its maximum period. And fine of not
less than 15,000 pesos. Penalty imposed to the petitioner should be lowered to benefit
him as favorable to him as per Art 22 of RPC it must have retroactive effect. Pertaining
to the new laws doctrine laid down in PP vs. Martin Sison must be applied in relation to
Section 1 of Intermediated Sentence law although it is considered the said law a special
law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for illegal possession of firearms.

HELD:

Decision of CA is affirmed with modification that the petitioner is hereby sentenced to 2

years 4 months and 1 day of prison correctional medium as minimum to 5 yrs. 4 months
and 20 days prison correctional as maximum. There being no mitigating /aggravating
circumstances with 15,000 pesos fine with subsidiary imprisonment should petitioner fail
to pay.

Since the petitioner has already served more than 7 years 5 months in prison which is
non beyond the maximum principal penalty at present for his offense even if subsidiary
penalty for unpaid fine is included he is hereby ordered released.
 People v. Elamparo – 329 SCRA

FACTS:

Acting on a report by an informant, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation (of

marijuana) in Caloocan. They arrested the person who sold them the marijuana
(Spencer), but the same was able to escape. Then: “the ‘buy-bust’ team pursued
Spencer, who ran inside a bungalow-type house. Having trapped Spencer inside the
house, the police officers frisked him and recovered the marked money. The officers
also found Elamparo repacking 5 bricks of marijuana inside the house’s sala Elamparo
was then arrested and were taken to a precinct and delivered to an inquest fiscal for
further investigation.” The buy-bust operation and arrest happened on February 12,
1995 while the information was filed on February 15, 1995.

Appellant insists that he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana because he
failed to pay the police officers the amount of P15,000.00 for his release, unlike
Spencer, who paid said amount. Appellant assails the legality of his arrest inside the
house of his father for failure of the apprehending officers to secure a search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not warrantless arrest against the appellant was valid.

HELD:

The warrantless search and seizure was also lawful since it was a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. Section 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto
arrests. Here two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating the he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Thus, when appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the police
officers were not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant. The members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after him and
entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of the fleeing
criminal.
 People v. Cubcubin – 360 SCRA

FACTS:

The case is an automatic review of the decision, dated October 5, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin,
Jr. guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. Accused appellant
Cubcubin pleaded not guilty to the charge. But the trial court rejected his alibi, giving full
credence to the testimonies of a witness and the police investigators whom it found to
have motive to falsely implicate Cubcubin. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest
on August 26,1997 without a warrant, was illegal.

ISSUE:

W/N the warrantless arrest was valid.

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that Cubcubin was illegally arrested without warrant.

Rule 113, §5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
b.) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
Under Sec (b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the
offender has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.

In this case, the arresting officers had no “personal knowledge of facts”. Their
knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-
appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others.
At the time accused-appellant was arrested, he was not doing anything overtly criminal.
The alleged discovery of the gun came after his arrest. Moreover, the firearm, spent
ammunition shells and blood-stained t-shirt allegedly seized from accused-appellant
were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
 People v. Compacion – 361 SCRA 540

FACTS:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was

growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio
Sarong of the6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of
the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-
appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995.During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall
plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana
plants. Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon
and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995.

SPO4Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What
happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that
the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was
immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he
admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was
suffering from migraine the operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants.

Accused-appellant’s version of what transpired is that around one-thirty in the early

morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody
knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he
opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military,
entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the
others who entered the house as the same was light only by a kerosene lamp. One of
the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the
others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his
house and the premises.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backyard of the accused was
valid.

HELD:

NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the
house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear
either that the situation falls under any of the exceptions.
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless in advertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the following
elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was in advertently discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-
appellant's premises without the latter's consent.
 Posadas v. Ombudsman – 341 SCRA

FACTS:

Roger Posadas, then UP Diliman Chancellor, asked the Director of the NBI for
assistance in determining the persons responsible for the killing of Dennis Venturina,
Sigma Rho member, in a rumble between Sigma Rho and another fraternity on
December 8, 1994. Orlando Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI,
and his team went to UP à attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan & Raymund
Narag, members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.

On the basis of positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leonardo Lachica &
Cesar Mangrobang, Taparan and Narag were then at the UPDP Station, for a peace
talk between SJ & Sigma Rho. Posadas, Marichu Lambino (Asst. Legal Counsel),
Rosario Torres-Yu (Vice-Chancellor) & a certain Atty. Villamor (counsel of the suspects)
objected to the arrest on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with
them, the suspects not arrested as a result of the intervention but Posadas and Villamor
promised to take the suspects to the NBI office the next day.

Dizon filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor charging Posadas,
Lambino, Torres-Yu, Villamor and Col. Eduardo Bentain (Chief of Security Force of UP
Police) with violation of PD 1829 – making it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the
apprehension & prosecution of criminal offenders. Information filed stated that:
petitioners delayed the investigation and prosecution of the heinous case by harboring
an concealing suspects thus leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and
another principal suspect Joel Carlo Denosta. On motion, Office of the Special
Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case à recommendation disapproved by
Office of the Ombudsman – directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with prosecution
of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition to set aside the resolution of
the Office of the Ombudsman ordering the prosecution of petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suspicion is a probable cause to authorized the arrest without
warrant.
HELD:

No. Regardless of petitioners’ suspicion, they could not have authorized the arrest
without warrant or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide the
question of probable cause since the students were not caught in flagrante delicto.
Special Prosecutor in recommending dismissal: UP officials then present had every
right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on campus.
 People v. Buluran – 325 SCRA 476

FACTS:

Of the four suspected perpetrators of the crime, only two were arrested and tried,
namely Cielito Buluran and Leonardo Valenzuela, now the appellants. The other two,
Reynaldo Danao and Jaime Danao, remain at-large. This case of homicide started that
On May 16, 1993 in the evening, the Meyer family was celebrating the birthday of their
mother at their residence. The victim, Edilberto Meyer, Sr., brought Dominador outside
the house to cool-off because they were having an altercation with a cousin. However,
while the victim and Dominador were talking outside their residence, Reynaldo Danao
approached them and warned them not to make any trouble because the community
was celebrating its fiesta. The victim denied making any trouble and said that the matter
was a family problem. Suddenly, Reynaldo boxed the victim who also retaliated with a
fist blow. The two exchanged blows and grappled with each other. Reynaldo managed
to run away but returned after about two minutes.

Now, accompanied by his barkadas (Cielito Buluran, Leonardo Valenzuela and Jaime
Danao). Reynaldo stabbed the victim at the left side of his lower back. All the while, his
three companions were pointing and brandishing their weapons at the Meyer brothers
and the other people present in order to prevent them from interfering. Cielito poked his
knife at the Meyer brothers and stood guard to prevent other people from rendering help
to the victim. Leonardo likewise held his slingshot against the Meyer brothers and
prevented people from going near the victim by pointing his loaded slingshot at them.
Thereafter, the four barkadas fled. The victim died that same night.

On May 20, 1993, appellant Cielito Buluran and his companion were charged with the
crime of murder. The Information was later amended when Leonardo Valenzuela was
identified as one of the assailants. Upon arraignment, both accused entered pleas of not
guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented three eyewitnesses to the stabbing
incident. All were neighbors of the victim. The prosecution likewise presented PO1
Roberto C. San Miguel of Station 2, Sangang Daan, Novaliches, Quezon City, who
"invited" appellant Buluran to the precinct and Chief Inspector Florante F. Baltazar, the
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the victim. For the defense,
appellants denied any participation in the affray and testified that at the time of the
incident, they were both asleep in their respective houses,the trial court rendered
judgment, convicting appellants of murder. The appellants appealed the decision of the
trial court. They argue that their warrantless arrest and the lack of preliminary
investigation render the criminal proceedings against them illegal for violation of their
constitutional rights.
ISSUE:

WON appellants can still question the irregularity of their arrest.

HELD:

Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since
they never raised this issue before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
 People v. Rodriguez – 232 SCRA 227

FACTS:

Appellant Larry Artellero was employed as a cement mixer and helper of co-accused
Wilfredo Rodriguez, a mason in the construction of the upper floors of the Far East
Bank and Trust Company, Blumentritt Branch, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Both were charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of the bank security guard, Ramon
Matias y Ibay. The trial court found both guilty of murder. Both appealed. However,
Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for financial reasons.

The police officers arrested the accused by the evidences obtained in the possession of
the latter which were a maong pants and shirts with a blood stains and some hearsay
evidences.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest by the police officer violates sec. 2 of the Bill of
Rights.

HELD:

The court ruled in favor to the accused, it’s clearly violates section 2 of the Bill of Rights
of the constitution. By mere obtaining a suspicious evidences and some hearsay
evidences shall not be a reasonable ground by arresting without a warrant, the
warrantless arrest shall only be applicable to any person caught in the act in committing
a crime or about to commit it or an escapee from jail. In this case the accused were only
suspected and cannot be arrested without a warrant.
 People v. Acol – 232 SCRA 406

FACTS:

Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly staged a hold-up inside
a passenger jeepney on September 29, 1990 were hauled to court, not for the felonious
transportation, but for possession of the two unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered
from them which were instrumental in the commission of the robo. Of the two persons
accused, only Pio Boses interposed an appeal from the trial court's judgment inasmuch
as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from incarceration thereby abating any review of
his culpability for the misdeed.

The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were to the effect that at
around 3:45 in the morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his
jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road, the
two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan
was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange where the other passengers
were divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene
Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes
Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio
to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits.
Victim Rene Araneta who went with the responding police officers, upon seeing four
persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort
Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers
introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions but three of
them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol
and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with
bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were
identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who ganged up on the accused.

On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges leveled
against them, proffering a general denial. The court a quo was persuaded by their
general denials. With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his protestation of
innocence by claiming that the trial court below erred in admitting the prosecution
evidence consisting of exhibits "E", "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", since the
arresting officers admitted they were not armed wih a warrant of arrest, nor a search
warrant when they chased and frisked accused-appellants and proceeded to arrest
them.
ISSUE:

WON the arrest of the defendants without warrant is valid.

HELD:

With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant, the Supreme

court is of the view that the search falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113
which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest: When an offense
has in fact been committed, and the has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; Inasmuch as the police team was formed and
dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of the
information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed.
And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made
incidental thereto was valid. Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the
police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition.
III. Section 3
Exclusionary Rule
Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA – 235 SCRA 111

FACTS:

Rafael Ortañez filed a complaint for annulment of marriage against petitioner Teresita
Salcedo-Ortañez on grounds of lack of marriage license and / or psychological
incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by Rafael were three (3)
cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified
persons. The tape recordings were made and obtained when Rafael allowed his friends
from the military to wiretap his home telephone.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer of

evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private
respondent’s offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied
on 23 June 1992.From this adverse judgment; petitioner filed the present petition for
review.

ISSUE:

W/N the tapes were admissible as evidence.

HELD:

No. Rep Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication and for other purposes” expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondent’s trial court
and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversation allowed the
recording of the same, the INADMISSIBILITY of the subject tapes is mandatory.
 Zulueta v. CA – 253 SCRA 699

FACTS:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's
knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding. “The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
 Ramirez v. CA – 248 SCRA 590

FACTS:

Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcia’s office. Ramirez taped the
conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her,
using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording.
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wiretapping act,
because it was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what
the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it
using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was
dismissed because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law).

The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to

tape it without the consent of all those involved.

HELD:

First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to
secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved. The word “any”
in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be unlawful for ANY person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or
dictograph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. “The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized
by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication.” The congressional records also showed that the intent was that
permission must be sought from all parties in the conversation. “This is a complete ban
on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties,” Sen.
Tanada said during the deliberations. The provision seeks to penalize even that privy to
the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.”
 Ople v. Torres – 293 SCRA 141

FACTS:

Administrative Order 308, “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

Reference System” is sought to be invalidated. Blas F. Ople, herein petitioner, is a
member of the Senate while Ruben D. Torres is the Executive Secretary. The
respondent’s contention is that the computerized system will be facilitating convenient
transaction of business with basic services and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities. The system will properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services and social security, reducing fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations. The system will make use of biometrics, where biological or
physiological characteristics of a person are used such as retinal scan, finger-scanning,
“artificial nose” and thermo gram.

On the other hand, petitioner points out that the said administrative order impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy. Also, the said administrative order
is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said administrative order infringes the citizenry’s right to privacy thus
should be rendered unconstitutional.

HELD:

The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone”. The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen. The right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution; hence, it is the burden of the government to show that
AO 308 is justified by some compelling state interest. It is also arguable that the
broadness and vagueness and over breadth of AO 308 which if implemented will put
people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. The fear of right to privacy being
threatened is not groundless because of numerous options available to the
implementers.
There is also a potential misuse of the data to be gathered. The more frequent use of
the National ID, the more huge the data can be collected. Vast information can be
temping for the government for misuse of personal information of the user. Also, the
administrative order does not tell how data will be handled; who shall control or access
the data; under what circumstances, and; for what purpose. It is necessary to safeguard
privacy and guarantee the integrity of the information.Therefore, Administrative Order
308 is NULL and VOID and hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 People v. Marti – 193 SCRA 57

FACTS:

The appellant went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the
Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila to send four gift wrapped packages allegedly
containing books, cigars and gloves to a friend in Zurich. In the final inspection of the
appellant’s box by the proprietor of the Forwarder, he discovered that the packages
contain some dried leaves inside which emit a peculiar odor. The proprietor took several
samples and coordinated with the NBI.The NBI agents then went to the proprietor’s
office where the latter himself, opened the packages in the presence of the agents and
found out dried marijuana leaves inside the packages. The accused appellant was
charged and convicted in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended.

Accused – appellant appealed the decision of the trial court contending that the
evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
Constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizure, and of privacy of
communication, and therefor argues that the same should be inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE:

W/N the right of the appellant against unreasonable searches and seizures, and of the
privacy of communication violated.

HELD:

The SC ruled in the negative. In the absence of governmental inference, the liberties
guaranteed by the constitution cannot be invoked against the state. The Bill Of Rights
governs the relationship between the individuals and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals.

The constitution proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies
as a restraint directed against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the state to which the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
 People v. Artua – 288 SCRA 626

FACTS:

On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling
Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled
a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming
from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked
“aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They
found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items.

In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre
where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross the road an old woman
asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the
police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was
nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented. The trial court convicted
the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

HELD:

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. The accused cannot be said to be
committing a crime for she was merely crossing the street and was not acting
suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There
was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no
probable cause, and the accused was not lawfully arrested. The police had more than
24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was
illegal and inadmissible evidence.
 Gaanan v. IAC – 145 SCRA 112

FACTS:

It appears that in the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his
client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed against
Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant,
who is a lawyer to come to his office and advised him on the settlement of the direct
assault case because his regular lawyer is on a business trip. Appellant went to the said
office .When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to
the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposedconditionsforsettlement.Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions
for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement”

under R.A.4200.

HELD:

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone,

dictograph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not
be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Furthermore, it is a general rule that
penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt
as in the case at bar, on whether an extension telephone is included in the phrase
“device or arrangement”, the penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension telephone. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable
must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in R.A. No. 4200 or others of
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such
devicesorarrangements.Wherefore, the petition is granted. The petitioner is acquitted of
the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
IV. Section 4
1. Prior Restraint

Near v. Minnesota – 238 US 697

FACTS:

Mr. Near Published a newspaper in Minnesota called the Saturday Press, which
reported certain questionable conduct by the local police and officials, and hinted at a
perceived favoritism. An article claimed that the police were turning their heads to the
criminal actions of a Jewish gangster. Minnesota enacted a statue that made a
publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory matters in the print media a public
nuisance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, a law authorizing proceedings to restrain the publication of print media
operates within the bounds of the liberty of protected press.

HELD:

No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of press may be
abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not affect the requirement that the
press has immunity from previous restraints when it deals with official misconduct.
Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy,
consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such
proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as
historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional. The statute in
question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show,
before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete system
of censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the press
and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
 Freedman v. Maryland – 380 US 51

FACTS:

Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being
exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted
morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making
process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the
procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Maryland law violates the freedom of expression protected by the
First Amendment.

HELD:

The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern
that the statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The
board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions
for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established
three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of
protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film
is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a
valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time
period."
 New York Times Co. v. US – 403 US 713

FACTS:

The United States sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from
publishing contents of a confidential study about the Government’s decision making with
regards to Vietnam policy. The District Court in the New York Times case and the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in the Washington Post case held that the
Government had not met the requisite burden justifying such a prior restraint.

ISSUE:

Whether the United States met the heavy burden of showing justification for the
enforcement of such a restraint on the New York Times and Washington Post to enjoin
them from publishing contents of a classified study.

HELD:

No. Judgments of the lower courts affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming
the District Court. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The
mandates shall issue forthwith.
 Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – GR 115444, Oct. 30, 1995

FACTS:

There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Among the Petitioners
was the Philippine Press Institute which claimed that R.A.7716 violates their press
freedom and religious liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay Value
Added Tax. It is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from
the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the
press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." PPI argued that the VAT is in the nature of a
license tax.

ISSUE:

Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?

HELD:

A license tax, which unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the
press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right.
Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its
application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in
connection with the latter’s sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional.
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, ―it is one thing to impose a tax on income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a
sermon.

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or
subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
 Alexander v. US – 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441

FACTS:

The Petitioner owned 13 adult bookstores throughout Minnesota. He was convicted on

17 obscenity counts and 3 RICO violations. The obscenity convictions were based on
the sale of 4 magazines and 3 videotapes. He was sentence to 6 years in prison, fined
$100,000 and ordered to pay the cost of trial and incarceration for the obscenity counts.
In addition, he was ordered to forfeit his businesses and nearly $9 million in profits.

ISSUE:

Is the court order to shut down the adult bookstores an unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) rejected the argument
that the sentence violated Petitioner’s First Amendment constitutional rights, but
remanded for reconsideration under the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution). The items were seized as punishment not a prior restraint.

1. RICO's forfeiture provisions, as applied here, did not violate the First Amendment.

(a) The forfeiture here is a permissible criminal punishment, not a prior restraint on
speech. The distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments is solidly
grounded in this Court's cases. The term "prior restraint" describes orders forbidding
certain communications that are issued before the communications occur. See e.g.,
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357. However,
the order here imposes no legal impediment to petitioner's ability to engage in any
expressive activity; it just prevents him from financing those activities with assets
derived from his prior racketeering offenses. RICO is oblivious to the expressive or no
expressive nature of the assets forfeited.
 Petitioner's assets were forfeited because they were directly related to past
racketeering violations, and thus they differ from material seized or restrained on
suspicion of being obscene without a prior judicial obscenity determination, as occurred
in, e.g., Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127. Nor
were his assets ordered forfeited without the requisite procedural safeguards. Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 109 S.Ct. 916, 103 L.Ed.2d 34,
distinguished. His claim is also inconsistent with Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S.
697, 106 S.Ct. 3172, 92 L.Ed.2d 568, in wwhich the Court rejected a claim that the
closure of an adult bookstore under a general nuisance statute was an improper prior
restraint. His definition of prior restraint also would undermine the time-honoured
distinction between barring future speech and penalizing past speech

(b) Since the RICO statute does not criminalize constitutionally protected speech, it is
materially different from the statutes at issue in this Court's over breadth cases. Cf.,
e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569,
574-575, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 96 L.Ed.2d 500. In addition, the threat of forfeiture has
no more of a "chilling" effect on free expression than threats of a prison term or large
fine, which are constitutional under Fort Wayne Books. Nor can the forfeiture be said to
offend the First Amendment based on Arcara's analysis that criminal sanctions with
some incidental effect on First Amendment activities are subject to First Amendment
scrutiny where it was the expressive conduct that drew the legal remedy, 478 U.S., at
706-707, 106 S. Ct., at 3177. While the conduct drawing the legal rimed here may have
been expressive, "obscenity" can be regulated or actually proscribed consistent with the
Amendment,

2. The case is remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider petitioner's claim that the
forfeiture, considered atop his prison term and fine, is "excessive" within the meaning of
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court of Appeals rejected
petitioner's Eighth Amendment challenge with a statement that applies only to the
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments." The Excessive
Fines Clause limits the Government's power to extract payments as punishment for an
offense, and the in persona criminal forfeiture at issue here is clearly a form of monetary
punishment no different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a traditional "fine." The
question whether or not the forfeiture was excessive must be considered in light of the
extensive criminal activities that petitioner apparently conducted through his enormous
racketeering enterprise over a substantial period of time rather than the number of
materials actually found to be obscene.
 INC v. CA – 259 SCRA 529 (1996)

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent
Board of Review For Moving Pictures and Television that X-rated the TV Program "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of
discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of
freedom of expression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board to give
petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering petitioners to refrain from
attacking and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for
reconsideration the petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make
them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of their programs for
review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board
appealed before the CA which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the
jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In their petition for review
on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over reviewing of their TV
program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed
vested with such.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it has
acted with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the
powers vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom,
the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of
invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption.

The decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioner’s freedom of speech
and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions.
It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may
be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring
about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by
the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction
of the Board to review the petitioner’s TV program while it reversed and set aside the
decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV
program of the petitioner.
2. Subsequent Punishment

People v. Perez – 45 Phil. 599

FACTS:

Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th
Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by
electrocution. Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered
evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were
substantiated. Perez appealed for his case. Thus, instead of treason, he was convicted
of the accused rapes under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 which says “That
where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense (treason)
charged, the People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for
any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the
evidence.

All rape cases are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 14,
paragraph 2, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the right "to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was deprived of his right under Art III section 14paragraphs
2 of the Constitution.

HELD:

No. The defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if
he was innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them.
There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of
criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that designated in the complaint or
information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or
described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented
during the trial."
 Dennis v. US – 341 US 494

FACTS:

The petitioners were indicted in July 1948 for violating a provision of the Smith Act. The
1949 trial was presided over by Judge Harold Medina, Prosecutor John McGohey did
not assert that the defendants had a specific plan to violently overthrow the US
government, but rather alleged that the CPUSA's philosophy generally advocated the
violent overthrow of governments. To prove this, the prosecution proffered articles,
pamphlets and books (such as The Communist Manifesto) written by authors such
as Karl Marx and Joseph Stalin. The prosecution argued that the texts advocated
violent revolution, and that by adopting the texts as their political foundation, the
defendants were also personally guilty of advocating violent overthrow of the
government.

The ACLU was dominated by anti-communist leaders during the 1940s, and did not
enthusiastically support persons indicted under the Smith Act. However, the ACLU did
provide an amicus brief for the Foley Square defendants, endorsing a motion for
dismissal. The defense employed a three-pronged strategy: First, portraying the CPUSA
as a conventional political party, which promoted socialism by peaceful means; second,
employing the "labor defense" tactic to attack the trial as a capitalist venture which could
never provide a fair outcome to proletarian defendants; and third, using the trial as an
opportunity to publicize CPUSA policies.

The defense deliberately antagonized the judge by making a large number of objections
and motions, which led to numerous bitter engagements between the attorneys and
Judge Medina. Out of the chaos, an atmosphere of "mutual hostility" arose between the
judge and attorneys. Medina came to believe that the defense attorneys were using the
trial as an opportunity to publicize communist propaganda, and that the they deliberately
disrupted the trial using any means they could. Judge Medina attempted to maintain
order by removing defendants who were out of order. In the course of the trial, Medina
sent five of the defendants to jail for outbursts. Several times in July and August, the
judge held defense attorneys in contempt of court, and told them their punishment
would be meted out upon conclusion of the trial.

On October 14, 1949, after the defense rested their case, the judge gave the
jury instructions to guide them in reaching a verdict. After deliberating for seven and a
half hours, the jury returned guilty verdicts against all eleven defendants.

On appeal, petitioners were found guilty by the trial court and the decision was affirmed
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari,
but limited it to whether section two or three of the Smith Act violated the First
Amendment and whether the same two sections violated the First and Fifth
Amendments because of indefiniteness.

The defendant argued the cause for petitioners. Solicitor General Philip B.
Perlman and Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. With them on the
brief were U.S. Attorney General James Howard McGrath, U.S. Assistant Attorney
General McInerney, Irving H. Saypol, Robert W. Ginnane, Frank H. Gordon, Edward C.
Wallace, and Lawrence K. Bailey.

Issue:

w/n smith act is constitutional.

Held:

No. The Court rule affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, a leader of
the Communist Party in the United States. Dennis had been convicted of conspiring and
organizing for the overthrow and destruction of the United States government by force
and violence under provisions of the Smith Act. In affirming the conviction, a plurality of
the Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation of the clear and present danger
test:

In each case, courts must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the danger.
These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government. They
were not charged with overt acts of any kind designed to overthrow the Government.
They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to
overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk
and publish certain ideas at a later date. The indictment is that they conspired to
organize the Communist Party and to use speech or newspapers and other publications
in the future to teach and advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government. No matter
how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I
believe the First Amendment forbids. I would hold 3 of the Smith Act authorizing this
prior restraint unconstitutional on its face and as applied. So long as this Court
exercises the power of judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree that the First
Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on
the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere "reasonableness." Such a doctrine
waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to
Congress. The Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those "safe"
or orthodox views which rarely need its protection....

There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and
fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the
high preferred place where they belong in a free society.
 Gonzales v. COMELEC – 27 SCRA 835

FACTS:

One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain
proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the
regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in the issues
involved in the election. It wass contended that such issue cannot be properly raised
before the courts because it is a political one.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD:

Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in

this provision to indicate that the election thereinn referred to is a special, not a general
election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. The SC
also noted that if what is placed in question or if the crux of the problem is the validity of
an act then the same would be or the issue would be considered as a justifiable
question NOT a political one.

The determination of conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be

submitted to the people is concededly a matter that falls within the legislative sphere.
The petitioner merely attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress – not the
authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof is to permit Members of Congress to
run for election as delegates to the Constitutional Convention and participate in the
proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this
should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
 Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. – 137 SCRA 628

FACTS:

A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed”
on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to
sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no
hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of
the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even
promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a
new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite
the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested
parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to
pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in
matters as this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

HELD:

The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void.
The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary
requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed
before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the
following requirements:

(1) the right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) the decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to
support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and
facts and not simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know
the various issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of
Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media,
whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although
the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is
the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in
such nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the
right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public
affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to
have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have
the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media.
Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media
by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
 Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. V. Judge Capulong – 160 SCRA 865

FACTS:

Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production and
filming of the projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution”, which relates to the
non-bloody change of the government that took place at EDSA for its unlawful intrusion
upon the former’s right to privacy. Petitioner’s contends that the freedom to produce and
film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and the subject matter of the
motion picture us one of the public interest and concern and not the individual private
life of respondent senator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free
speech.

HELD:

YES. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of the
public interests. Motion pictures are medium for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. This freedom is available to both local and foreign
owned production companies even if they are commercial. There is such a thing as the
right to privacy. But this cannot be invoked to resist publication of matters of public
interest. What the right to privacy protects is the right against unwarranted intrusions
and wrongful publication of the private affairs and activities of individuals which are
outside the sphere of legitimate public concern.
 Kelley v. Johnson – 425 US 238

FACTS:

A country regulation limiting the length of country policemen’s hair held not to violate
any right guaranteed respondent policeman by the 4th amendment. Respondent sought
the protection of the 14th amendment not as an ordinary citizen but as a law
enforcement employee of the country’s a subdivision of the state and this distinction is
one of considerable significance since a state has a wider latitude and notably different
interests in imposing restrictive regulations on its employees than it does in regulating
the citizenry at large.

Choice of organization dress and equipment for law enforcement personnel is entitled to
the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as re state choices to promote other
aims within cognizance of the States police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the State can establish a genuine public nee for the specific regulation
and whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rationale connection between
the regulations based as it is on the country’s mated of organizing its police force and
promotion of safety of persons and property.

HELD:

The District Court for tar Eastern District of new York originally dismissed respondents
complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a regulation promulgated by
petitioner limiting the length or policemen’s hair .Judgment was reversed, Court of
appeals affirmed and granted certiorari.

In the light of the 1987 Philippine Constitution par 2 sec 4 of Art # the Country’s
regulation may not be described as the subsequent punishment of expression since it
falls on one of the three limits “the balancing of interests test” that it appears that the
public interests served by restrictive legislation is such a character that is outweighs the
abridgement of freedom the court will find the legislation valid since said regulation
desires to make police officers readily recognizable to the public or to foster the spirit de
corps protocol.
 Brandenburg v. Ohio – 395 US 444

FACTS:

Clarence Brandenburg, a leader of Ku Klux Klan (KKK) I rural Ohio contacted a reporter
at a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come and cover a KKK rally in
Hamilton County.

On the rally, one of the speeches given by Brandenburg made reference to the
possibility of “vengeance” against “niggers”, “Jews” and those who supported them. The
petitioner was charged with advocating violence under Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism
statute for his participation and his speech in the said rally and he was convicted in the
Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County. On his appeal, he claimed that the statute
violated his right to freedom of speech under First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Criminal Syndicalism statute violated the right to freedom of speech of
the petitioner.

HELD:

The SC reversed the decision of the lower court. It held that the government cannot
constitutionally punish abstract advocacy of force or law violation. Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism statute was overruled by Whitney vs. California and articulated a new test.
The “imminent lawless action” test- for judging was then referred to as “seditious
speech” under the First Amendment, “mere advocacy” of any doctrine including one that
assumed the necessity of violence or law violation was per se protected speech.

The three distinct elements of this test (intent, imminence, and likelihood) have distinct
precedential lineages. Judge Learned Hand was possibly the first judge to advocate the
intent standard, in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
reasoning that "[i]f one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their
interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to
cause its violation." The Brandenburg intent standard is more speech-protective than
Hand's formulation, which contained no temporal element.

The imminence element was a departure from earlier rulings. Brandenburg did not
explicitly overrule the bad tendency test, but it appears that after "Brandenburg", the test
is de facto overruled. The "Brandenburg" test effectively made the time element of the
clear and present danger test more defined and more rigorous.
 2. Speech and the Electoral Process

Sanidad v. COMELEC – 181 SCRA 529

FACTS:

Petitioner, a newspaper columnist, assails the constitutionality of Sec. 19 of the

COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 which was promulgated to govern the conduct of the
plebiscite on the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The questioned
provision prohibits columnists, commentators and or announcers to campaign for or
against the plebiscite. Petitioner argues that the said provision violates the
Constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. COMELEC on
the other hand contends that the provision is a valid implementation of the power of the
COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during the election periods as provided by
Art. IX-C, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

W/N the questioned provision is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that the assailed provision is unconstitutional as it is a form of
regulation that is tantamount to the restriction of the freedom of expression without
justifiable reason.
 National Press Club v. COMELEC – 207 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2)
individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial
office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their
right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being
curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No.
66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of
expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed bySection 11 (b) amounts
to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the COMELEC space of the newspapers and on CEMELEC time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC’s power, less than 1X, C, 4 to regulate time in broadcast
media and space in the papers violable freedom of expression.

HELD:

No. the effect of the provision is to cause “an exception to freedom of speech-and –
press clause on account of considerations more paramount for the general welfare and
public6 interest, which exemptions after all would operate only during limited periods,
that is, during the duration of the election campaign filed in the charter itself and/or by
law.
 Adiong v. COMELEC – March 31, 1992

FACTS:

Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and

stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails
said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places
like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print political
advertisements.

ISSUE:

WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.

HELD:

No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public
or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the prohibition.
 Osmena v. COMELEC – 288 SCRA 447

Facts:

The petitioners Emilio Osmena and Pablo P Garcia seek for the nullification of
the decision made by the Supreme Court in NPC v COMELEC wherein it ruled for the
validity of the Electoral Reform Laws of 1987. Said law prohibits the selling and
donating of space for campaign and any political purposes except for COMELEC.
According to them the court erred in ruling in the NPC case that the freedom of speech
was not violated for such was a valid regulation for election purposes. According to
them the ban to political advertising creates a disadvantage to the poor candidates for
they are deprived of a medium which they can afford to pay unlike the more affluent
candidates who can provide for other means than dissemination of information through
media. Instead of leveling the playing field, it worsens it.

Issue:

Whether the assailed decision is unconstitutional

Held:

The petition is DISMISSED. A number of decisions are cited by the court but it all
came down to the fact the State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as
well as campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political
advertising in the mass media skews the political process and subverts democratic self-
government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates
because of the views expressed in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the
absence of any compelling reason.
 ABS-CBN v. COMELEC – 323 SCRA 811

FACTS:

The COMELEC issued a resolution in order to stop ABS – CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey. The petitioner contends
that the resolution violates their constitutional rights which are freedom of expression
and of the press.

The private respondent contends that the reason of the issuance of the resolution in
order to protect the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots and
furthermore, to avoid confusion to the public of who are the winners on such elections.
But the petitioner further contends the purpose of exit polls conducted by them is not to
diminish the sanctity of the ballot but rather to promote a clean, honest, orderly and
credible election to be freed from fraud or fixing the result of the election.

ISSUE:

Whether the resolution of the COMELEC violates the constitutional rights of the
petitioner, which are the freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD:

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Because the Constitution provides under the
Bill of Right “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression
and of the press” The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and
political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.
It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. It means more than the right to approve
existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures,
or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any of public consequence.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued
by the Court on May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No.
98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE.
 SWS v. COMELEC – 357 SCRA 496

FACTS:

SWS is a research institution that conducts surveys while KPC publishes the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general circulation here in the Philippines. Both wanted to
conduct an election survey during the 2001 national and local elections. However a
resolution was issued by COMELEC stating that ―Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election‖.
SWS and KPC argue that such resolution is a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom
of speech. COMELEC on their part avers that such is a valid regulation in order not to
manipulate the election results.

ISSUE:

Whether Sec. 5.4 is a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech.

HELD:

The petition is GRANTED. The court rules that SEC 5.4 are invalid for some reasons.
First, it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression. Secondly, it is a direct
and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only
for a limited period, and lastly, the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
 3. Commercial Speech

Rubin v. Coors Brewing – 131 L. Ed. 2d 532

FACTS:

Section 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA or Act) prohibits beer
labels from displaying alcohol content, because of this, the federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) rejected respondent brewer's application for approval of
proposed labels that disclosed such content. Respondent filed suit for relief on the
ground that the relevant provisions of the Act violated the First Amendment's protection
of commercial speech. The Government argued that the labeling ban was necessary to
suppress the threat of "strength wars" among brewers, who, without the regulation,
would seek to compete in the marketplace based on the potency of their beer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 5(e)(2) violates the First Amendment's protection of commercial
speech.

HELD:

Yes. Here, respondent seeks to disclose only truthful, verifiable, and non-misleading
factual information concerning alcohol content. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. vs. Public Serv. Commission of N. Y., it was held that even truthful and lawful
commercial speech may be regulated provided that; (1) Government has substantial
interest to protect; (2) the regulation directly advances that interest; and (3) it is not
more extensive than is necessary to protect that interest.
Although the interest in curbing "strength wars" is sufficiently "substantial" to satisfy
Central Hudson requirement, Section 5(e)(2) fails in the second and third requirement.
The labeling ban cannot be said to advance the governmental interest in suppressing
strength wars because other provisions of the FAAA and implementing regulations
prevent §205(e)(2) from furthering that interest in a direct and material fashion.

Lastly, Section 5(e)(2) is more extensive than necessary, since available alternatives to
the labeling ban would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's protections for
commercial speech.
 Cincinnati v. Discovery Network – 123 L. Ed. 2d 99

FACTS:

Discovery Networks, Inc. provides educational and other programs to adults in

Cincinnati. It advertises these programs in magazines. Cincinnati revokes the permit
that allows Discovery to use their news racks, claiming that the City ordinance prohibits
the distribution of “commercial handbills” on public property. Cincinnati claims that these
actions further safety and aesthetic goals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a city may constitutionally ban news racks from which owners
disseminate their publications that are comprised primarily of advertising materials

HELD:

In applying the Fox test, the court finds out that the City’s ordinance does not
reasonably fit the City’s goals of safety and aesthetics. The court refuses to accept the
City’s argument that commercial speech is entitled to significantly less protection than
non-commercial speech. It also subjects the City’s proffered justification for the
ordinance-safety and aesthetics-to considerable scrutiny and ultimately finds that they
were insufficient in this case.
 City of Laduc v. Gilleo – 129 L. Ed. 2d 36

FACTS:

A City of Laduc ordinance prohibited homeowners from displaying any signs on property
except for residence identification, for sale signs and signs warning of safety hazards.
The police advised Respondent that signs such as her war protest sign were prohibited
in the Petitioner City. The City Council denied Respondent’s petition for variance. The
Respondent moved her sign to the window, so that it wouldn’t be on her property. The
Petitioner City enacted a replacement ordinance in order to expand the definition of
signs that would be prohibited in the City and also to add an explanation of the
legislative purpose of the ban on signs.

The Petitioner City enacted a replacement ordinance, which included a sweeping

definition of signs (window signs were among those prohibited) and also extended an
explanation of findings, policies, interests, that described among other things that the
signs would clutter, tarnish beauty and impair property values. The replacement
ordinance also expanded the exceptions available for commercial signs.

ISSUE:

Is the Petitioner City’s sign ordinance an unconstitutional content-based restriction on

speech?

HELD:

The ordinance is an unconstitutional abridgement of 1st Amendment constitutional

rights. The regulation treated commercial speech more favorably than non-commercial
speech and totally foreclosed a means of communication with a sweeping definition of
signs. The ordinance was more than just a time, place and manner restriction, since the
speech could not be switched to an alternate medium. Further, residents’ self-interest in
property values will probably prevent the danger of unlimited proliferation of signs. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) felt a more temperate regulation
could meet the Petitioner City’s concerns.
A time, place and manner restriction is permissible. A local government can regulate the
physical characteristics of signs that pose public problems by obstructing views,
displace alternative use and distracting motorists. In Contrast, the petitioner’s ordinance
cut off the entire medium expression through signs and therefore was not tied to the
harm could validly seek to prevent under the police power.
 4. Libel

Policarpio v. Manila Times – 5 SCRA 148

FACTS:

Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover Php150, 000 as actual damages, Php70, 000 (moral
damages), Php60, 000 (correctional/exemplary damages) and Php20,000 (attorney’s
fee) from the respondent. The Daily Mirror issue on August 11 and August 13, claimed
by petitioner as defamatory, libelous and false, have exposed her to ridicule,
jeopardized her integrity, good name and business, etc.

The Court of First Instance (CFI, now RTC) decided that the petitioner had not proven
that the respondent had acted maliciously in publishing said articles. Articles presented
the petitioner in a more unfavorable light than she actually was. An example of such
errors were the number of stencils was greater, trip expenses reimbursed were falsely
reported and the administrative complaint was filed by her subordinate and not the
Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not said articles are covered by the immunity of commercial speech.

HELD:

Newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the manner in

which a given event should be presented to the public, and that its presentation in a
sensational manner is not illegal per se. To enjoy immunity, a publication containing
degratory information must be not only true, but also fair and it must be made in good
faith, without any comments or remarks. In the case at bar, the containing information is
degratory to the petitioner. The published article presented her in a worse predicament
than that in which she was in. Said articles were not fair and true reports of the
proceedings. Also, the headlines was not only a comment or remark, but also contained
false information. The said articles are “presumed to be malicious.” The second article
rectified some major errors made in the first article which mitigates the damaged caused
by the respondent. Hence, petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent is ordered to
pay Php3,000 for moral damages and Php2,000 for attorney’s fees.
 Lopez v. CA – 34 SCRA 116

FACTS:

The petitioners herein are the publisher and editor of This Week Magazine. The
petitioners published an article on an incident in the Babuyan Islands involving one Fidel
Cruz, a sanitary inspector who allegedly hoaxed the government by fabricating an
incident of series of killings therein only for the purpose that he could be ferried back to
Manila.

In a series of publication issued by the petitioners on the incident, the photograph of the
person purporting to be Fidel Cruz was carried. Unfortunately, the pictures that were
published on both occasions were that of the private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a
business contractor from Bulacan.

As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of the
petitioners, correction was immediately published together with the picture of Fidel Cruz,
the sanitary officer. Respondent sued the petitioners and was awarded by the CFI in
Manila recovery of damages, which was affirmed on appeal by the respondent court.

ISSUE:

W/N the immediate publication of correction made by the petitioner relieves them of
their liability for libel.

HELD:

Supreme Court in ruling against the petitioners. Petitioners would make much, likewise,
of their correction, which has all the force of a retraction, as a basis from being absolved
from any pecuniary responsibility. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out
the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may and
should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52)."

The correction promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a reduction in the
damages awarded. It should be noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary
logs arising from the above publication. It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm
referred to as the tolerant attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual
practice being "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them."
 New York Times Co. c. Sullivan – 376 US 254

FACTS:

On March 29, 1960, the New York Times carried a full-page advertisement entitled,
“Heed Their Rising Voices,” which contained several paragraphs describing unfair
treatment of Alabama State College student protestors, two of which specifically
mentioned unfair treatment by the police. Respondent L.B. Sullivan was one of three
commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama. One of his main duties was the
supervision of the city police department. Although none of the statements made within
the advertisement directly named Sullivan, he argued that, as supervisor of the city
police department, he was being accused of allowing the described treatment of the
students.

It was found that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs in question
were not accurate descriptions of what had actually occurred and placed the police
department in a very unfavorable light. Additionally, all witnesses who testified stated
that they did not believe the statements in reference to the respondent. Respondent
Sullivan brought a claim of libel against four of the individuals whose names, among
others, were in the advertisement and against the New York Times for publishing the
advertisement. The trial court found for respondent and awarded him damages of
$500,000 against all defendants on the grounds that the statements in the
advertisement were libelous per se [legal injury being implied without proof of actual
damages], false, and not privileged. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed the decision. Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Can a public figure receive damages in a civil libel action, if malice is not proven?

HELD:

No. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The
Supreme Court held that petitioner was protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. As such, a public official [respondent] was prohibited from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless it could be
proven that the statement was made with actual malice.
Respondent presented no evidence to show petitioner was aware of erroneous
statements or was reckless in that regard, and therefore could not prove malice. In the
absence of malice, respondent could not recover damages.
 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. – 403 US 254

FACTS:

Respondent's radio station, which broadcast news reports every half hour, broadcasts
news stories of petitioner's arrest for possession of obscene literature and the police
seizure of "obscene books," and stories concerning petitioner's lawsuit against certain
officials alleging that the magazines he distributed were not obscene and seeking
injunctive relief from police interference with his business. These latter stories did not
mention petitioner's name, but used the terms "smut literature racket" and "girlie-book
peddlers." Following petitioner's acquittal of criminal obscenity charges, he filed this
diversity action in District Court seeking damages under Pennsylvania's libel law. The
jury found for petitioner and awarded $25,000 in general damages; and $725,000 in
punitive damages, which was reduced by the court on remittitur to $250,000. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
standard applied, and "the fact that plaintiff was not a public figure cannot be accorded
decisive significance."

ISSUE:

WON CA erred in reversing the decision of the District court

HELD:

The judgment is affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that the New York Times standard of
knowing or reckless falsity applies in a state civil libel action brought by a private
individual for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a radio news broadcast about the
individual's involvement in an event of public or general interest. MR. JUSTICE BLACK
concluded that the First Amendment protects the news media from libel judgments even
when statements are made with knowledge that they are false. MR. JUSTICE WHITE
concluded that, in the absence of actual malice as defined in New York Times,
supra, the First Amendment gives the news media a privilege to report and comment
upon the official actions of public servants in full detail, without sparing from public view
the reputation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected by any official action.
 Gerts v. Robert Wlech – 418 US 323

FACTS:

In 1968, a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson.
The state prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for murder. The Nelson family
retained the Petitioner, Gertz (Petitioner), to represent them in civil litigation against
Nuccio.In 1969, the Respondent, Robert Welch, Inc. (Respondent), publisher of
American Opinion, a monthly outlet for the views of the John Birch Society, ran an
article in which it accused the Petitioner of being the architect of a “frame-up” of Nuccio.
The article stated that the Petitioner had a criminal record and a long history of
communist affiliation. The Petitioner filed the instant case for libel and, after trial; the jury
returned a verdict in his favor in the amount of $50,000. The trial court, nevertheless,
entered Judgment N.O.V., concluding that the New York Times v. Sullivan standard
applied to any discussion of a “public issue.” The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods

about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a
constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements.

HELD:

The New York Times rule defines the level of constitutional protection appropriate to the
context of defamation of a public person. However, the state interest in compensating
injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should apply
with respect to them. The New York Times standard is inapplicable to this case and the
trial court erred in entering judgment for the Respondent. Because the jury was allowed
to impose liability without fault and was permitted to presume damages without proof of
injury, a new trial is necessary.
 Hustler v. Magazine – 485 US 46

FACTS:

ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of
Catarman, Northern Samar, with JUDGE PROCESO SIDRO of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Mondragon-San Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining
witness. According to the Information, the crime was committed when Vicario allegedly
distributed and circulated in the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in
Catarman photocopies of page 7 of the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer which contained the following article: SAMAR JUDGE WHO POCKETED BOND
CHARGED WITH GRAFT.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of merely distributing a photocopy of an article in a newspaper

reporting that graft charges had been filed against a judge named therein constitutes
libel.

HELD:

No. The elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d)
existence of malice.

The evidence on record clearly shows that the elements above enumerated have not
been satisfactorily established as to conclude that libel was committed by petitioner.
 In Re Jurado AM No. 90-5-2373, 4 LR 19 Aug’09

FACTS:

This proceeding treats of Emiliano P. Jurado, a journalist and lawyer who writes in a
newspaper of general circulation, the “Manila Standard. Jurado had been writing about
alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about
October, 1992 to March, 1993).

There were insistent and more widespread reiterations of denunciations of

incompetence and corruption in the judiciary. It was stated in Jurado’s article,“who will
judge the justices”, that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren (a total of
36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong. ETPI counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza and former Law Dean Eduardo de los Angeles, have since declared
that none of the lawyers or officers of the corporation had ever authorized the release of
the Yerkes affidavit. Mr. Vicente R. Samson, First Vice President of the PLDT, denied a
claim mentioned in a Jurado column that it was PLDT who financed the vacation of the
Justices to Hong Kong. Records of travel agencies presented the fact that no
arrangements were made indeed made by PLDT.

Atty. Veto denied report in Jurado’s column as having been “hosted (by the Equitable
Bank) at its penthouse mainly for some justices, judges, prosecutors and law
practitioners. Jurado was called to present before an Ad Hoc Committee, a fact-finding
body. Jurado was tasked to definitely and accurately determine the facts as regards the
published rumors and reports of corruption in the judiciary but despite two invitations he
failed to appear. He averred that his columns are self-explanatory and reflect his beliefs,
and there was no need to elaborate further on what he had written.Some of the articles
were supported by testimonies given to him in strict confidence, from newspaper and
police reports, as well as testimonies from various relatives of the Judiciary.

ISSUE:

WON Jurado’s exercise of freedom of expression was valid despite his refusal to
present before the Ad Hoc committee to determine the validity of the facts he presented
in his columns.
HELD:

That the utterance or publication by a person of falsehoods or half-truths, or of slanted

or distorted versions of facts—or accusations which he made no bonafide effort
previously to verify, and which he does not or disdains to prove—cannot be justified as
a legitimate exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution, and cannot be deemed an activity shielded from sanction by that
constitutional guaranty;

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional
right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of
its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be
preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of
the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an muzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is
the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot
be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse
inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties
and the

Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning
of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice.
 Vasquez v. CA – GR 118971 Sept. 15, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in

April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing
Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their
Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with Atienza
and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by
newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day,
April 22, 1986, the following excerpts of the news article appeared in the newspaper
Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, published were supposed allegations by Vasquez that
(1) “nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang makamkam ang may
14 na lote ng lupa”; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din
umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga
nakawan ng manok.

Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner
alleging that the latter’s statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P1, 000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actual malice standard in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be
applied in prosecutions for criminal libel.

HELD:

The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to be applied in
criminal prosecutions for libel. For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false,
no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. In this case, the
prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but
also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard
of whether they were false or not. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing
the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends
for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal
Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.

Libel was used as a form of harassment:

Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the charges
against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case to harass
petitioner.
It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly
offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all
impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curio user" still, his
clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper.
 Borjal v. CA – GR. 126466 Jan. 14, 1999

FACTS:

Borjal, the President of Phil Star daily, Inc., and Soliven, the publisher and chairman of
the editorial Board of Philippine star, were sued by Francisco Wenceslao for allegedly
alluding to him in the “jaywalker” column, wherein he was portrayed as an extortionist by
using the conference for the revamp of transportation laws as a means of getting money
from unwitting businessmen. Wenceslao filed a complaint with the National Press Club
for unethical conduct and with the courts for libel. The criminal case for libel was
dismissed by the assistant prosecutor, which was sustained by the DOJ and by the
office of the President. Undeterred, Wenceslao filed a civil action against borjal and
Soliven based on the libel subject of the Criminal complaints. The trial court ruled for
Wenceslao. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner acted with malice in the publication.

HELD:

No. Petitioner was moved by a sense of civic duty and Borjal and prodded by his
responsibility as a newspaperman to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a
public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge for that. To be considered malicious. The
libellous statements must be shown to have been written or published with knowledge
that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. The articles
in the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these
are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. They were based on
reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted several personal interviews
and after considering the varied documentary evidence provided him by his sources.
 Vicario v. CA – GR 124491 June 1, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of Catarman, Northern
Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mondragon-San
Roque, Northern Samar, as complaining witness. According to the Information, the
crime was committed when Vicario allegedly distributed and circulated in the vicinity of
the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page 7 of the 20
March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Private complainant Sidro alleged that petitioner's act greatly prejudiced his reputation
as a member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner Vicario on the
other hand disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, at
the same time asserting that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed a
criminal charge for graft and corruption against Judge Sidro before the Ombudsman
and an administrative complaint for dishonesty with the Supreme Court, both due to the
latter's unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner's cash bond of P1, 000.00.

After trial, the court a quo found petitioner Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced him to
pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The trial court
justified its decision by declaring that while no evidence was presented to show that
Vicario distributed copies of the news article to several persons, at least he gave one
photocopy to prosecution witness Amador Montes which amounted to publication, and
that this act was tainted with malice as it stemmed from Vicario's hatred, as evident from
the manner his testimony was delivered, towards complaining witness Sidro.

On 28 February 1996 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of merely distributing a photocopy of an article in a newspaper

reporting that graft charges had been filed against a judge named therein constitutes
libel.
HELD:

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,

real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a
discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.

The evidence on record clearly shows that the elements above enumerated have not
been satisfactorily established as to conclude that libel was committed by
petitioner. Thus, we rule in his favor. For an incongruence exists between the evidence
on one hand, and the findings of fact and of law by the trial court and the appellate court
on the other, which we must reconcile, if not rectify.

As found by the trial court, there was no evidence at all to show that petitioner was the
source of the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Indeed, for not only was the news item by itself bereft of this information, the
records also confirmed its absence.

There was nothing defamatory in the news item. This much was found by the trial court
itself, noting that the published article was merely a factual report about the filing by the
Ombudsman of the charge of corruption against the judge with the Sandiganbayan. Of
course, it does not necessarily mean that if the news article complained of is not
libelous because it is a privileged matter, he who repeats the publication is likewise free
from accountability for the re-utterance. We recognize that a person's liability for libel
does not necessarily proceed from the fact that he was the original publisher of the
discreditable act. The maker of a libelous republication or repetition, although not liable
for the results of the primary publication, is liable for the consequences of a subsequent
publication which he makes or participates in making so long as the elements of libel
are satisfied. But in every case malice must be present, something which has not been
shown in the case at bar.
 Pader v. People – 325 SCRA 117

FACTS:

On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversing with
his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner
appeared at the gate and shouted “putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya
mo!” The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was
a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections of May 8, 1995.

On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan a
complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner pleaded “not
guilty.” After due trial, on October 30, 1997 the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagac,
Bataan rendered decision convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation.

Accordingly and in view of all the foregoing, the court finds accused Rogelio Pader
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation as defined and
penalized under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the extenuating
circumstances of drunkenness hereby sentences him to an imprisonment of one (1)
month and one (1) day to one (1) year imprisonment and to indemnify the private
offended party in the amount of P 20,000.00 as moral damages, considering his social
standing and professional stature. On appeal, on March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial
Court affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation.

HELD:

The expression “putang ina mo” is a common enough utterance in the dialect that is
often employed, not really to slender but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact,
more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. We do
not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunken
Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing
anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not
necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional
gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.
 5. Obscenity

Miller v. California – 37 L. Ed. 2d 419

FACTS:

The case of Miller v. California involved a man named Marvin Miller, who was a part
owner of a business that was considered to be lewd and sexual in nature. In the year of
1972, Mr. Marvin Miller started an advertising campaign where he distributed a ton of
letters to citizens of California. The majority of these individuals never requested this
information and Mr. Miller ran into legal trouble when a mother and her child received
one of Miller’s crude advertisements. The mother and child were highly offended by Mr.
Miller’s advertisement. Shortly after receiving the publication, the mother filed a
complaint to the California police department. After reviewing the materials, the
California police department was found guilty of distributing this information which was
considered to be unsuitable for the general population. In response to the charges,
Marvin Miller appealed the arrest and the fact that his material was considered
“obscene.” In Miller v. California, Marvin Miller claimed that the arrest was a violation of
his 1st Amendment Rights, which awards him the right to speak and express him freely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the advertisement is a form of obscene material.

HELD:

No. States may regulate materials that are patently representations of sexual acts or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of genitals. Only
those materials that depict “hardcore,” patently offensive sexual conduct is exempt from
1st Amendment protection.
 Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak – 137 SCRA 717

FACTS:

Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made
and that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an action, claiming violation
of their freedom of expression.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s freedom of expression was violated.

HELD:

Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the classification
of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. The power
to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its
validity. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest. The Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting
petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only"
without deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion
grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes
showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and caressing each other like
lesbians.

Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are
within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that censorship is
presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only case where the Board of
Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil against national security or public morals or other public interest. In all
other cases, the Board can only classify.
But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and
intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to
pay anything.

On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the
test being whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us
to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found abuse of
discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for
entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse
was grave.
 Pita v. CA – 178 SCRA 362

FACTS:

Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic, and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the
publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his
appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with SC, invoking the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure.

ISSUE:

W/N the search and seizure was illegal.

HELD:

Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society
from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is
easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly
for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any
constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be
decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and
(2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant
from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized
are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.
 Barnes v. Glen Theater – 498 US 439

FACTS:

Respondents, two Indiana establishments wishing to provide totally nude dancing as

entertainment and individual dancers employed at those establishments, brought suit in
the District Court to enjoin enforcement of the state public indecency law - which
requires respondent dancers to wear pasties and a G-string - asserting that the law's
prohibition against total nudity in public places violates the First Amendment. The court
held that the nude dancing involved here was not expressive conduct. The Court of
Appeals reversed, ruling that non obscene nude dancing performed for entertainment is
protected expression, and that the statute was an improper infringement of that activity
because its purpose was to prevent the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed
by the dancers.

ISSUE:

WON the enforcement of Indiana's public indecency law to prevent totally nude dancing
does not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression.

HELD:

Yes. Nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, although only marginally so (b) Applying
the four-part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 -377 - which rejected
the contention that symbolic speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection - the
statute is justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity. The law
is clearly within the State's constitutional power. And it furthers a substantial
governmental interest in protecting societal order and morality. Public indecency
statutes reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in
public places, and this particular law follows a line of state laws, dating back to 1831,
banning public nudity.
The States' traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public
health, safety, and morals, and such a basis for legislation has been upheld. See, e.g.,
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61.

This governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since

public nudity is the evil the State seeks to prevent, whether or not it is combined with
expressive activity. The law does not proscribe nudity in these establishments because
the dancers are conveying an erotic message. To the contrary, an erotic performance
may be presented without any state interference, so long as the performers wear a
scant amount of clothing.

Finally, the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than is

essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. Since the statutory prohibition
is not a means to some greater end, but an end itself, it is without cavil that the statute
is narrowly tailored.
 FCC v Pacifica Foundation – 438 US 726

FACTS:

A radio station of respondent Pacifica Foundation (hereinafter respondent) made an

afternoon broadcast of a satiric monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," which listed and
repeated a variety of colloquial uses of "words you couldn't say on the public airwaves."
A father who heard the broadcast while driving with his young son complained to the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which, after forwarding the complaint for
comment to and receiving a response from respondent, issued a declaratory order
granting the complaint. While not imposing formal sanctions, the FCC stated that the
order would be "associated with the station's license file, and in the event subsequent
complaints are received, the Commission will then decide whether it should utilize any
of the available sanctions it has been granted by Congress." In its memorandum
opinion, the FCC stated that it intended to "clarify the standards which will be utilized in
considering" the growing number of complaints about indecent radio broadcasts, and it
advanced several reasons for treating that type of speech differently from other forms of
expression. The FCC found a power to regulate indecent broadcasting, inter alia, in 18
U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.), which forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communications." The FCC characterized the language of
the monologue as "patently offensive," though not necessarily obscene, and expressed
the opinion that it should be regulated by principles analogous to the law of nuisance
where the "law generally speaks to channeling behavior rather than actually prohibiting
it." The FCC found that certain words in the monologue depicted sexual and excretory
activities in a particularly offensive manner, noted that they were broadcast in the early
afternoon "when children are undoubtedly in the audience," and concluded that the
language as broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 1464.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner’s contention is correct.

HELD:

The FCC was warranted in concluding that indecent language within the meaning of
1464 was used in the challenged broadcast. The words "obscene, indecent, or profane"
are in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning. Though prurient
appeal is an element of "obscene," it is not an element of "indecent," which merely
refers to non-conformance with accepted standards of morality.
Contrary to respondent's argument, this Court in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 ,
has not foreclosed a reading of 1464 that authorizes a proscription of "indecent"
language that is not obscene, for the statute involved in that case, unlike 1464, focused
upon the prurient, and dealt primarily with printed matter in sealed envelopes mailed
from one individual to another, whereas 1464 deals with the content of public
broadcasts.

Of all forms of communication, broadcasting has the most limited First Amendment
protection. Among the reasons for specially treating indecent broadcasting is the
uniquely pervasive presence that medium of expression occupies in the lives of our
people. Broadcasts extend into the privacy of the home and it is impossible completely
to avoid [438 U.S. 726, 728] those that are patently offensive. Broadcasting, moreover,
is uniquely accessible to children.

The First Amendment does not prohibit all governmental regulation that depends on the
content of speech. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52. The content of
respondent's broadcast, which was "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking," is not entitled
to absolute constitutional protection in all contexts; it is therefore necessary to evaluate
the FCC's action in light of the context of that broadcast.
 Renton v. Playtime Theater – 475 US 41

FACTS:

Respondent Playtime Theatres Inc. filed a suit in the Federal District Court seeking
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, arguing that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the US Constitution were violated by a City Ordinance that prohibits
adult motion picture theatres located within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or
multiple-family dwelling, church, park or school.

The District Court ruled in favor of the City, holding that the First Amendment was not
violated. But the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the
ordinance constituted a substantial restriction on the First Amendment.

ISSUE:

W/N the assailed City Ordinance is valid.

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that the ordinance is valid as it does not ban adult theatres
altogether. The ordinance is a “content-neutral” speech regulation and is only in pursuit
of the city’s zoning interests and is not related to the suppression of free expression.
The Renton City ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
while allowing for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. A city’s interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, as in this case, must be accorded with
respect.
 Bethel School District v. Fraser – 478 US 675

FACTS:

Mathew Fraser, a senior at Bethel High School in Bethel, Washington, spoke to a

school assembly to nominate a classmate for an office in student government. His
speech was filled with sexual references and innuendos, but it contained no obscenities.
The good news is that Fraser's candidate was overwhelmingly elected. The bad news
was that Fraser was suspended from the school for three days and removed from the
list of students who were eligible to make graduation remarks. (Fraser was second in
his class at that time.) His parents appealed the school's disciplinary action. The
Washington Supreme Court agreed that his free speech rights had been violated. The
school board then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the First Amendment prevents a school district from disciplining a high
school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly.

HELD:

Stricter rule have been allowed for speech in schools because of the nature of the
community that is involved and the relationship between schools and parents.
 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier – 484 US 260

FACTS:

Respondents, former high school students who were staff members of the school's
newspaper, filed suit in Federal District Court against petitioners, the school district and
school officials, alleging that respondents' First Amendment rights were violated by the
deletion from a certain issue of the paper of two pages that included an article
describing school students' experiences with pregnancy and another article discussing
the impact of divorce on students at the school. The newspaper was written and edited
by a journalism class, as part of the school's curriculum. Pursuant to the school's
practice, the teacher in charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the school's
principal, who objected to the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although
not named, might be identified from the text, and because he believed that the article's
references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the
younger students. The principal objected to the divorce article because the page proofs
he was furnished identified by name (deleted by the teacher from the final version) a
student who complained of her father's conduct, and the principal believed that the
student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the remarks or to
consent to their publication. Believing that there was no time to make necessary
changes in the articles if the paper was to be issued before the end of the school year,
the principal directed that the pages on which they appeared be withheld from
publication even though other, unobjectionable articles were included on such pages.
The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred. The Court of
Appeals reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the first amendment rights were violated.

HELD:

Respondents' First Amendment rights were not violated. (a) First Amendment rights of
students in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings, and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment. A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech
outside the school. (b) The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum
for public expression. School facilities may be deemed to be public forums
 6. Assembly and Petition

Navarro v. Villegas – 31 SCRA 73

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to compel the herein respondent to issue a permit for peaceful
assembly which will be held at plaza Miranda. Respondent city mayor Villegas has
expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza
Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause
unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further
offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the
demonstration sought to be held in the afternoon. Petitioners argue that the city mayor
has denied or absolutely refused the permit sought by them which results to violation of
their constitutional rights to freedom of assembly.

ISSUE:

WON the right to freedom of assembly was denied to petitioners.

HELD:

No. The right to freedom of assembly is not denied; but this right is neither unlimited nor
absolute. It is not correct to say that the Mayor has refused to grant the permit applied
for; he offered an alternative, which is not unreasonable. The Mayor cannot be
compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of the applicants to
hold their assembly at a public place of their choice; another place may be designated
by the licensing authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil if no change was made.
 PBM Employees v. PBM – 51 SCRA 189

FACTS:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is a legitimate labor

union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to
be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those
in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent violates the right of the petitioners to assemble and petition
the government.

HELD:

The court ruled that the obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights
sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in
the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15
of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts
the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts
and circumstances revealed by the record.
 JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing – 125 SCRA 553

FACTS:

Petitioner retired Justice J.B.L Reyes on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally starting from the
Luneta Park (Public Park) to the gates of the United States Embassy. There was an
assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech
and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken “to ensure a peaceful march and
rally.” It turned out that the permit was denied by the respondent Mayor. Petitioner was
unaware of such denial as it was sent through an ordinary mail.

The reason of refusing the permit was due to “police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit. To be more specific, reference
was made to “persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people are expected to attend. Mayor suggested, however, that a permit may
be issued for the rally if it will be held in Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed areas
where the safety of the participants and general public may be assured. The Mayor also
posed the applicability of Ordinance No.7925 of the City of Manila prohibiting the
holding and staging of rallies or demonstration within a radius of 500 feet from any
foreign mission or chancery in this case the US Embassy. However, there was no proof
that the US Embassy was indeed 500 feet away.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the denial of permit to rally by the respondent Mayor is valid.

HELD:

Even if it can be shown that such condition existed (500 feet away), it does not follow
that the respondent could legally act the way he did. Such denial can still be challenged
as to the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna
Convention which calls for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission. But,
the denial of permit to rally in front of the US Embassy is only justified in the presence of
clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.
This is binding on the Philippines to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of
the mission against intrusion or damage and prevent any disturbance of peace or
impairment of its dignity. To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of
the generally accepted principles of international law, it should be part of the law of the
land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or
damage or disturbance of peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, there would
be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the
US Embassy - but there was none.
 Malabanan v. Ramento – 129 SCRA 359

FACTS:

Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University.

They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from
8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with
other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal
Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in
the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering
they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture.
The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally.
It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period
allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held
liable for holding an illegal assembly.

Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive
suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.
Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which
was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of
classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its
cognate right of free speech.

HELD:

Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective
if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But
with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear
and present danger of public disorder is discernible. Although disciplinary action may be
taken against the petitioners for their conduct which is one that “materially disrupts class
work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”, considering the
importance of the right of assembly and petition, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense. Hence a lighter penalty is proper.
 BAYAN v. Ermita – GR 169838, April 25, 2006

FACTS:

Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was
violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful
mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts
that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the
policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU,
et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at
the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and
forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further
allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectorial rally which KMU also co-sponsored was
scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them
from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of
them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some
of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the
policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no
rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005. Petitioners Bayan, et al.,
contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time
and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
sought. Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for
redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It
also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal.
Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard
of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague
and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and
therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even
assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing
evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day
requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public
assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy,
they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports
the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880
and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people
of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing
to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow
of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of
holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to
deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880 and that the permit is for the use of a
public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-
based regulation because it covers all rallies.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

HELD:

No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and

exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by
B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of
public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes; otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and
entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists
and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no
prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No.
880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality
of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.
V. Section 5

1. Free Exercise of Religion

Cantwell v. Connecticut – 310 US 296

FACTS:

Jesse Cantwell (Cantwell), a Jehovah’s Witnesses, was convicted on the charge of

breach of the peace for playing a phonograph record sharply critical of the Catholic
religion to persons he encountered on the street. His intent was to proselytize his
listeners. Prior to his arrest, there was no evidence that Cantwell’s deportment was
noisy or offensive. Moreover, although the message on the record was offensive, it was
only played to persons who voluntarily agreed to listen.

ISSUE:

Did the arrest and conviction of Cantwell for violating the common law offense of breach
of the peace violate his constitutional rights of free speech under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution (Constitution)?

HELD:

Yes. The lower court’s decision is reversed. A State may proscribe speech if it amounts
to a breach of the peace, which encompasses not only violent acts, but also acts and
words likely to produce violence in others. Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated
that while it is obvious that the principles of freedom of speech and religion do not
sanction incitement to riot or violence, it is equally obvious that a State may not unduly
suppress free communication of views under the guise of maintaining desirable
conditions. With these considerations in mind, we note that there was no evidence of
assaultive behavior or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no profane,
abusive, indecent remarks directed to the person of the hearer. Thus, it cannot be said
that Cantwell’s actions resulted in a breach of the peace or an incitement to a breach
thereof.
 US v. Ballard – 322 US 78

FACTS:

Respondent Guy W. Ballard, also known as Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington,
Godfre Ray King, had been selected and thereby designated by the alleged as
‘ascertained masters’ as divine messenger. He established the “I Am” Movement as
means of communicating to mankind his teachings. Guy, Edna and Donald Ballard had
the ability to heal curable and incurable diseases. They allegedly cured hundreds of
people. The respondents knew that everything was all false.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents believe in good faith that they have practiced their religion
or faith and had not used the mailing system as a tool in getting money from various
people.

HELD:

Amendment embraces two concepts: “Freedom to believe and Freedom to Act”. The
first is absolute; the second cannot be. Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of
religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. Man’s relation to God was made no
concern of the State. Case was remanded to circuit court of appeals for further
proceedings.
 American Bible Society v. City of Manila – 104 Phil. 386

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit religious missionary corporation

which in the course of its ministry, sold bibles and gospel portions of the bible. The City
of Manila compelled the plaintiff to obtain both a Mayor’s permit and a Municipal
License required of those who are engaged in business of general merchandise in
accordance with the City ordinance of Manila. Plaintiff challenged this attempt
contending that it amounted to religious censorship and restrained the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession to distribute and sale bibles and other religious
literature to the people of Philippines.

The trial court dismissed the case for lack merits, with costs against the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

W/N the freedom of exercise and enjoyment of religious profession of the plaintiff-
appellant was violated by compelling the same to obtain Mayor’s permit and Municipal
license.

HELD:

The SC in holding for the Plaintiff said that the constitutional guarantee was plaintiff’s
license. The constitutional guarantee of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression
on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which
the state has the right to prevent. In the case at bar, it is true that the price asked for the
bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same, but it cannot mean that the appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit. For this reason, the SC
believed that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance (No. 2529 as amended), cannot
be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of
its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
 Ebranilag v. Divison Superintendent – 219 SCRA 256; (MR) 251 SCRA

FACTS:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan,
Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these
students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
“Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing
that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection
against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence
of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a
system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious
significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious
belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory
laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts
school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of
citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not religious freedom has been violated.

HELD:

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspects of right to
religious worship are: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm
of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts.
The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to
public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The
expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified.
The 30 yrs. old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and
teachers who refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and
religious profession and worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from
observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such
ceremonies.

In the case at bar, the Students expelled was only standing quietly during ceremonies.
By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent
to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is exemption from flag
ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools? The expulsion of the students by
reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free education.
The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of
patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes,
civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore,
expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified.
 Wisconsin v. Yoder – 406 US 205

FACTS:

Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish
religion. Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their
children to attend public or private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to
send their children to public school after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents
were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.

ISSUE:

Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

HELD:

The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in
marked variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an
environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a
crucial period in their life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr.
Hostetler testified that the compulsory attendance could result in not only great
psychological harm to Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order
Amish church community.

The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration
of basic education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of
parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. The State’s
power is subject to a balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as
those protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State
does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a
state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under
the Free Exercise Clause.
This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in religious
beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.

The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system. Second, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society. We accept these propositions. However, the evidence
adduced shows that an additional one or two year of formal high school would do little to
serve those interests. Such education may be necessary for preparation for the modern
society in which we live, but is not for the separated agrarian community of the Amish
faith.

The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must
be protected by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has
been a highly successful social unit within our society, producing productive and law-
abiding citizens. The State also supports its position on the possibility that some
children will choose to leave the Amish community. This argument is highly speculative
on the record and the practical agricultural training and habits of industry would support
children that did choose to leave.

The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development,
designed to not only provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or
forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in compelling school attendance is
less substantial for Amish children than for children generally. The State finally argues
that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize the children’s substantive right to a
secondary education, giving due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae. On
this record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish parents are
preventing children who wish to further their education from attending school.
 Pamil v. Teleron – 86 SCRA 413

FACTS:

Father Margarito Gonzaga was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of
Alburquerque, Bohol. He was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was filed by
Fortunato Pamil, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on the
Administrative Code Provision: “In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation fr provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of
municipality.” RTC ruled in favor of Father Gonzaga because such statutory ineligibility
was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Pamil appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, an ecclesiastic is eligible to hold an elective municipal position.

HELD:

NO. The provision of the Revised Admin Code barring ecclesiastics from being elected
to public office was held constitutional. Minority of 5 members of the SC prevailed over
insufficient 7 votes of members, as the requirement to declare a law unconstitutional is
8 votes. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. “It is
not even necessary to annul the challenged Admin Code provision. It is merely declared
inoperative by virtue of the mandate of the 1935 Constitution, similarly found in the
present Charter. Nonetheless, the above view failed to obtain the necessary 8 votes
needed to give it binding force. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Sec 2175
having failed, it must be given full force & application. The ecclesiastic is free to seek
public office & place his personal merits & qualifications for public service before the
electorate who in the ultimate analysis will pass judgment upon him.
 McDaniel v. Paty – 435 US 618

FACTS:

Early in American history, laws were enacted in seven of the original states and six
other early additions to prevent clergy from holding any public office. One reason given
was that they were involved otherwise engaged in an exalted activity and hence should
not be involved in the messy world of politics. Another argument was the issue of the
separation of church and state - it was feared that should a clergy member take public
office, he (at the time, they were always male) might try to impose his religious views on
citizens. At the very least, clergy would have a conflict of interest between what their
religious oaths demanded and what the secular interests of government required. But
even early on there were those who did not agree with this - for example, James
Madison argued that such prohibitions punished a religious profession with the denial of
a basic civil right. Over time, more people were convinced with this argument and came
to believe that the separation of church and state was strong enough to protect against
any violations. Such laws were gradually eliminated until, by 1977, Tennessee was the
only one left - bringing us to this case.

McDaniel was an ordained Baptist minister who was barred from serving in Tennessee's
constitutional convention even though he had been duly elected because Tennessee
law prevented "Ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever" from
holding such publicly elected positions. McDaniel argued that this violated his First
Amendment rights.

ISSUE:

WON Petitioner’s contention is correct.

HELD:

The right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to
preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, or, in other words, to be
a minister of the type McDaniel was found to be Tennessee has encroached on
McDaniels' right to the free exercise of religion.
"To condition the availability of benefits [including access to the ballot] upon this
appellants' willingness to violate a cardinal principle of [his] religious faith [by
surrendering his religiously impelled ministry] effectively penalizes the free exercise of
[his] constitutional liberties."

The Supreme Court accepted that original exclusion of clergy from public office may
have justifiable, but that this was no longer true - thus, it argued that the fact that a
practice goes back to the colonial period is not sufficient to allow it today. This principle
is not, however, followed consistently - for example legislative chaplains were found
permissible almost entirely on the basis of their traditional place.
 Goldman v. Weinberger – 54 LW 4298

FACTS:

Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew,
and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in
Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not
be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties."

ISSUE:

Did the Air Force Regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

HELD:

The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice
Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations
are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the
need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de
corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought
by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987,
Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the
armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.
 German v. Baranganan – 135 SCRA 514

FACTS:

At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50

businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila,
for the ostensible purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the
Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing the now familiar inscribed
yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists 1 and
shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by
respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen.
Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel
was located within the Malacañang security area. Petitioners' alleged purpose in
converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the
hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and
worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not
really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government
demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the
Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive
with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the
yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of
anti-government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom to exercise religion

HELD:

The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect,
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or
choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate
the same into action.
 Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct
an anti- government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their
clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right
to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction
was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his
family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the
Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances.
 Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – 249 SCRA 628

FACTS:

These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed
in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by
removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to
others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom.

HELD:

No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax,
is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a
prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such
those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as
the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and
pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to
impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax
on him for delivering a sermon."

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or
subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
 Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos – 236 SCRA 197

FACTS:

Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as
the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1, 500.00. It is
admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, information was filed

against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the
Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense,
claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable
or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the
construction of a chapel. This was denied by the trial court, and petitioner's motion for
reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.

On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment finding accused Vicente
Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to
each pay a fine of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that the accused
be pardoned on the basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it
believed that the latter should not have been criminally liable were it not for the
existence of Presidential Decree No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to
apply in the instant case.

Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for
contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term
"religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what
the law does not include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose
would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the
Constitution.
ISSUE:

Whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest sense so
as to include a religious purpose.

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that solicitation of contributions in general, which may include
contributions for religious purposes, may be regulated by general law for the protection
of the public. The Court however, also ruled that the law in question did not prohibit
solicitation for religious purposes but only solicitation of contributions for charitable or
general purposes.

The Court reversed and set aside the decision appealed from, and petitioner Martin
Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
 Church of the Lukumi v. City of Hialeach – No. 91-948, June 11, 1993

FACTS:

Santeria is a religion that fused African religion with Roman Catholicism. It called for
animal sacrifices to keep the orishas (spirits) alive. In response to the news that a
Santeria church was to be built in the city of Hialeah, the city council held an emergency
public session in order to pass three laws outlawing any animal sacrifices in connection
with Santeria rituals. All ordinances were passed by a unanimous vote. Violations were
punishable by fines not exceeding $500.00 or imprisonment no longer than sixty days,
or both.

ISSUE:

Whether the city ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution?

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable.
The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had
to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failures of the ordinances were that they
applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the
Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve
their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances
targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny.
 Lamb’s Chapel v. School Disctrict – No.91-2024, June 7, 1993

FACTS:

New York law authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations permitting
the after-hours use of school property for 10 specified purposes, not including meetings
for religious purposes. Pursuant to this law, respondent school board (District) issued
rules and regulations allowing, inter alia, social, civic, and recreational uses of its
schools (Rule 10), but prohibiting use by any group for religious purposes (Rule 7). After
the District refused two requests by petitioners, an evangelical church and its pastor
(Church), to use school facilities for a religious-oriented film series on family values and
childrearing on the ground that the film appeared to be church-related, the Church filed
suit in the District Court, claiming that the District's actions violated, among other things,
the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause. The court granted summary
judgment to the District, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. It reasoned that the school
property, as a "limited public forum" open only for designated purposes, remained
nonpublic except for the specified purposes, and ruled that the exclusion of the Church's
film was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.

ISSUE:

W/N there was a denial of freedom of speech clause and religion.

HELD:

Yes. Denying the Church access to school premises to exhibit the film violates the
Freedom of Speech Clause and religion.

(a) There is no question that the District may legally preserve the property under its
control, and need not have permitted after-hours use for any of the uses
permitted under state law. This Court need not address the issue whether Rule
10, by opening the property to a wide variety of communicative purposes, has
opened the property for religious uses, because, even if the District has not
opened its property for such uses, Rule 7 has been unconstitutionally applied in
this case.
 (b) Access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter or speaker identity
so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. Rule 7
treats all religions and religious purposes alike does not make its application in
this case viewpoint-neutral, however, for it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint
by permitting school property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and childrearing except those dealing with the subject from a
religious standpoint. Denial on this basis is plainly invalid and that the
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker
solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible
subject.

Permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film would not have been an
establishment of religion under the three-part test. Since the film would not have been
shown during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would
have been open to the public, there would be no realistic danger that the community
would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any
benefit to religion or the Church would have been incidental. Nor is there anything in the
record to support the claim that the exclusion was justified on the ground that allowing
access to a "radical" church would lead to threats of public unrest and violence. In
addition, the Court of Appeals' judgment was not based on the justification proffered
here that the access rules' purpose is to promote the interests of the general public,
rather than sectarian or other private interests. Moreover, that there was no express
finding below that the Church's application would have been granted absent the
religious connection is beside the point for the purposes of this opinion, which is
concerned with the validity of the stated reason for denying the application, namely, that
the film appeared to be church-related.
 Estrada v. Escritor – AM P-021651 (August 4, 2003)

FACTS:

Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with
a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.
Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner. Nevertheless, he filed
the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that
they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross
and immoral conduct."

HELD:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not
been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting
the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits
such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the
respondent’s conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within
the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct
where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but
must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard
on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious
belief and practice.
 2. Non-Establishment of Religion

Aglipay v. Ruiz – 64 Phil. 201

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of

Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation
of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used
in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the
principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion
wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends
and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052,
providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance
of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

HELD:

What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious
toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated.

The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize
violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling
to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit
of the Roman Catholic Church.
The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the word
“Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the
Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to
“to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance
and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and
propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not the aim or purpose of the Government.
 Garces v. Estenzo – 104 SCRA 510

FACTS:

Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth
of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and
the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through
the selling of tickets and case donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the
caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in
his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be
made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were
implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of
the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to
return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church
funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin
case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy.
Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the
Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the
constitution was violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the freedom of religion clause in the Constitution was violated.

HELD:

No. The case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose
of favoring any religion or interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio
residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition) is not illegal.
Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made
available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and
novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their
property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to
give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were
used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and
which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions
regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of
public money or property.
 School District v. Schempp – 394 RS 203

FACTS:

The case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At the beginning of

the school day students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were
required to read at least ten verses from the township students to recite the Lord’s
Prayer. Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their
parents to the school as in a recitation of the Lord’s Prayer at open exercises at public
schools Murray and his moth professed: atheist –challenged the prayer requirement.

ISSUE:

Did the Pennsylvania Law and Abington policy requiring public school students to
participate in classroom religious exercises violate the religious freedom of students as
protected by first and fourteenth amendments?

HELD:

The Court found such violation. Required activities encroached on both the free
exercise clause and the entertainment Clause of first Amendment since the readings
and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were intended by the state to
be so. Further argued Justice Clark the ability of a parent to exercise a child from these
ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant. Since it did not prevent the schools actions
from violating the establishment clause.

In the light of the Philippine Constitution (1987) par.2 of Section 5 of Article 3 in order
that establishment of religion is allowed government aid must have a secular legislative
purpose must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and must
not require exercise entanglement with recipient institutions thus in this case state
sponsored Bible readings and prayers in public schools like Abington School district
have been invalidated for violation Non establishment of religion.
 Board of Education v. Allen – 392 US 236

FACTS:

New York’s Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to
elementary and secondary school students in private and parochial schools. The
Boards of Education contends that the law violated the Establishment and Free Clauses
of the First Amendment. A suit was filed by the board against Commissioner of
Education James Allen requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of
the statute. The trial court affirmed the petition of the board and found the statute
unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed the ruling. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not New York’s Education Law lending books to parochial schools is a
violation of non-establishment of religion.

HELD:

The statute does not violate the Establishment or the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. It satisfied the two conditions allowed by law. The express purpose of the
statute was the furtherance of educational opportunities for the young, and the law
merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school
books free of charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to
schools. Everson v. Board of Education. Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian
function, perform the task of secular education, and, on the basis of this meager record,
the Court cannot agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian school is
religious, or that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that secular
textbooks furnished to students are, in fact, instrumental in teaching religion.
 Lemon v. Kurtzman – 403 US 602

FACTS:

Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher salaries,
textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that
allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement.

ISSUE:

Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools for the
cost of teaching secular subjects?

HELD:

No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and
religion. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the
institution benefited the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship between
the government and church.The framers of the United States Constitution specifically
and purposefully prohibited the establishment of a state church because of the inherent
problems. The Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state “sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”
 Tilton v. Richardson – 403 US 672

FACTS:

The Federal Higher Education Facility Act of 1963 gave construction grants to church-
sponsored higher education institutes. The money had to be used to construct non-
religious school facilities. The act stipulated that after twenty years, the school could use
the facilities for whatever purpose they chose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Act violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

HELD:

The Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that
subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the
effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in
question had not used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the
facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The Court also
held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that
college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination, that the aid was of
"non-ideological character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state
surveillance.
 Country of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union – 57 LW 504

FACTS:

This litigation concerns the constitutionality of two recurring holiday displays located on
public property in downtown Pittsburgh. The first, a crèche depicting the Christian
Nativity scene, was placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse,
which is the "main," "most beautiful," and "most public" part of the courthouse. The
crèche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, and bore a
sign to that effect. Its manager had at its crest an angel bearing a banner proclaiming
"Gloria in Excelsis Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the Highest." The second of the
holiday displays in question was an 18-foot Chanukah menorah or candelabrum, which
was placed just outside the City-County Building next to the city's 45-foot decorated
Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor's name and
containing text declaring the city's "salute to liberty." The menorah is owned by Chabad,
a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and removed each year by the city.
Respondents, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and
seven local residents, filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin the county from
displaying the crèche and the city from displaying the menorah on the ground that the
displays violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to
state governments by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied relief,
which held that a city's inclusion of a crèche in its annual Christmas display in a private
park did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Courts Of Appeals reversed and
hold that the crèche and the menorah in the present case must be understood as an
impermissible governmental endorsement of Christianity and Judaism.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the display of the crèche is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The majority rejects the suggestion that the display of the crèche can "be justified as an
`accommodation' of religion," because it "does not remove any burden on the free
exercise of Christianity." Contrary to the assumption implicit in this analysis, however,
we have never held that government's power to accommodate and recognize religion
extends no further than the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause.
To the contrary, "[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no
means coextensive with the non-interference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.
The majority suggests that our approval of legislative prayer is to be distinguished from
these cases on the ground that legislative prayer is nonsectarian, while crèches and
menorahs are not. In the first place, of course, this purported distinction is utterly
inconsistent with the majority's belief that the Establishment Clause "mean[s] no official
preference even for religion over non religion." If year-round legislative prayer does not
express "official preference for religion over non religion," a creche or menorah display
in the context of the holiday season certainly does not "demonstrate a preference for
one particular sect or creed." Moreover, the majority chooses to ignore the Court's
opinion which applied precisely the same analysis as that I apply today: "[T]o conclude
that the primary effect of including the crèche is to advance religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause would require that we view it as more beneficial to and more an
endorsement of religion than the legislative prayers.
 Zobrest v. Catalina – No. 92-94 June 18, 1993

FACTS:

James Zobrest, a deaf student entitled to special education under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), attended a public school in the Catalina Foothills
School District in grades six through eight. For religious reasons his parents then
enrolled him in Salpointe Catholic High School and asked the district to provide him with
a sign-language interpreter for his classes. The school district refused, claiming this
would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Zobrests sued.
The district court granted summary judgment for the school district on the ground that
“the interpreter would act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of James—thereby
promoting James’ religious development at government expense.” The court of appeals
affirmed, ruling that if the district provided the interpreter, IDEA would have the primary
effect of advancing religion. The Zobrests appealed. [James has graduated from high
school; his parents seek reimbursement for the costs of the interpreter that they
employed.

ISSUE:

WON the refusal of the school district violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.

HELD:

The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Establishment Clause
does not bar a school district from providing an interpreter at a sectarian school, and
sent the case back to the trial court. The Court explained that provision of an interpreter
occurs as part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally; that
the aid is provided to pupils and their parents, rather than directly to sectarian schools;
and that a sign-language interpreter’s responsibilities are different from those of a
teacher or guidance counselor. Offering a neutral service at a sectarian school as part
of a general program that is not skewed toward religion does not violate the
Establishment Clause.
The IDEA neutrally provides benefits to disabled students without reference to religion,
and the children are the statute’s primary beneficiaries. To the extent sectarian schools
benefit from it, they are only incidental beneficiaries. Government funds are not paid to
the school, nor are they relieved of any expense they otherwise would have assumed.
The Establishment Clause is not an absolute bar to placing a public employee in a
sectarian school. What it prohibits is direct aid that brings about the direct and
substantial advancement of religious activity. Such advancement would not occur here,
because any attenuated financial benefit that parochial schools ultimately receive is
attributable to the private choices of individual parents, not to state decision making. In
addition, a sign-language interpreter does no more than accurately interpret whatever
material is presented to the class as a whole. A sign-language interpreter does not add
to or subtract from the pervasively sectarian environment that James’s parents have
chosen for his education.
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinetter & Ku Klus Klan – US No. 94-780, June 29,
1995

FACTS:

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made binding upon the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that government "shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." Capitol Square is a 10 acre, state owned plaza
surrounding the Statehouse in Columbus, Ohio. For over a century the square has been
used for public speeches, gatherings, and festivals advocating and celebrating a variety
of causes, both secular and religious. It has been the Board's policy "to allow a broad
range of speakers and other gatherings of people to conduct events on the Capitol
Square." Brief for Petitioner 3-4. Such diverse groups as homosexual rights
organizations, the Ku Klux Klan and the United Way have held rallies. The Board has
also permitted a variety of unattended displays on Capitol Square: a State sponsored
lighted tree during the Christmas season, a privately sponsored menorah during
Chanukah, a display showing the progress of a United Way fundraising campaign, and
booths and exhibits during an arts festival.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the State violated the Establishment Clause when, pursuant to a
religiously neutral state policy, it permits a private party to display an unattended
religious symbol in a traditional public forum located next to its seat of government

HELD:

The court noted, to begin with, that it is not really an "endorsement test" of any sort,
much less the "endorsement test" which appears in our more recent Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, which petitioners urge upon us. "Endorsement" connotes an
expression or demonstration of approval or support. We find it peculiar to say that
government "promotes" or "favors" a religious display by giving it the same access to a
public forum that all other displays enjoy.
And as a matter of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held that
it is no violation for government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit religion.
Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it is purely private
and occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to
all on equal terms. Those conditions are satisfied here, and therefore the State may not
bar respondents' cross from Capitol Square.
 Manosca v. CA – 252 SCRA 412

FACTS:

Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to
have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo.

It passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute
an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI,
of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted.

HELD:

Yes. Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking to be valid
must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should
be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of
lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
 Lee v. Welsman – US No. 90-1014, June 24, 1992

FACTS:

A rabbi was invited to deliver a prayer at a public school’s graduation ceremony. The
rabbi was given a copy of a pamphlet that recommended prayers at civic ceremonies be
inclusive and sensitive. The Defendant, Rachel Weisman, a student at the school,
challenged the practice of having prayers at public school graduations alleging that a
school sponsored, non-denominational prayer offered at a public school graduation
violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not including clerical members who offer prayer as part of the official school
graduation ceremony is consistent with the Religions clauses of the First Amendment of
the Constitution.

HELD:

No, the Court held that schools may not promote religious exercises either directly or
through an invited guest at graduation ceremonies.

The Court found that the Establishment Clause forbids government from coercing
people into participating in a religious activity. Forcing students to choose between
attending a graduation ceremony containing religious elements with which they disagree
or avoiding the offending practices by not attending their graduation ceremony was
inherently coercive and unlawful. The Court found that students who do attend are
exposed to subtle coercion to appear as though they approve of or are participating in
the prayer.
VI. Section 6
Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel

Marcos v. Manglapus – 177 SCRA 668

FACTS:

This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
Sec. of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family, and to enjoin the implementation of Pres. Aquino’s
decision to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines.

Petitioner contended that Pres. Aquino was without the power to impair liberty of abode
of the Marcoses because only a court may not do so within the limits prescribed by the
law, nor she has the right to impair their right to travel because no law authorized her to
do so.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pres. Aquino may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.

HELD:

Though the constitution outlines tasks of the President, this list is not defined and
exclusive. She has residual and discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution
which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.

The court held that the President did not act arbitrarily that the return of former Pres.
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. The court
furthered that the President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return
of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the
Marcos regime.
 Silverio v. CA – 195 SCRA 760

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure
order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner’s passport, based on the finding
that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the
accused has left the country without the knowledge and the permission of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

HELD:

The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been
issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction
on the right to travel. It is imposed so that the accused must make him available
whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return.

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that
criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding him amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.
 Santiago v. Vasquez – 217 SCRA 633

FACTS:

“Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction,
with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing” was directly filed by the petitioner to
the Court which rooted from Criminal Case No. 16698 filed on May 9, 1991 against the
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

An arrest warrant was then issued by the presiding justice of the Sandiganbayan, with
bail for the release of the accused fixed at Php15,000 which the petitioner paid, through
her counsel, despite her absence due to circumstances prohibiting her to appear in
court brought about by her physical injuries sustained from a car accident. The same
was accepted by the Sandiganbayan through a resolution authorizing petitioner to post
a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until
June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her
physical appearance before the said court.

However, respondent Ombudsman Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a

manifestation that the accused appeared in his office on May 20, 1991, accompanied by
her brother who represented he to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be
a physician. Acting on the manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution setting
the arraignment of the accused on May 27, 1991 and setting aside the previous
resolution.

Upon learning that the petitioner intended to flee abroad for further study, the
Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner. The petitioner
asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies,
there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel;
and that under Section 6 of the Bill of Rights, the right to travel may be impaired only
when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
may be provided by law.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to travel of the petitioner was impaired through the issuance of
the Sandiganbayan of a hold departure order against the petitioner.

HELD:

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
They can impose limits only on the basis of “national security, public safety, or public
health” and “as may be provided by law.” It should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. Holding an accused in a
criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may
be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is
the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that the criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused
holding him amendable at all time to Court Orders and processes.

Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from
the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon
such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefore since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.
Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu
propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies
therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by filing of
the requisite application for travel abroad.
 Marcos v. Sandiganbayan – 247 SCRA 127

FACTS:

The petitioner, the former first lady and widow of former Pres. Marcos, is the defendant
in several criminal cases for violations of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandiganbayan and in the regular courts. In two of those cases, the
petitioner was found guilty. However, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioner.

After the conviction in the two cases, petitioner filed series of motions for leave to travel
abroad to seek diagnostic tests and treatment in china, including US and Europe if
necessary. The petitioner alleged that the tests needed were not available in the
Philippines.

The chairman of the respondent court asked for expert opinion on coronary medicine to
the OIC of the Philippine Heart Center. The committee report consequently contains
findings which were contrary to the conclusions of petitioner’s physician. Thus the court
denied petitioner’s motions.

ISSUE:

W/N the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s request to
travel abroad for medical treatment.

HELD:

The SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not violate the right of the petitioner to travel
abroad. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was
based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the
opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. The
subject lay beyond its competence and since the grant of the request depended on the
verification of the claim that petitioner was suffering from a medical condition that was
alleged to be serious and life threatening, the respondent court, we think, followed the
only prudent course available of seeking the opinion of other specialists in the field.
Indeed, when even in their own field of expertise (law) courts are allowed to invite amici
curiae to shed light on recondite points of law, there is no reason for denying them
assistance on other subjects. Presiding Justice Letter to Philippine Heart Center is
notable in this regard for its sedulous concern for "greater need for information and
expert advice" to the end that respondent court may be able to determine "whether or
not it is necessary and urgent for petitioner to travel abroad."
VII. Section 7
Right to Information

Legaspi v. CSC – 150 SCRA 530

FACTS:

The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request

for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas
who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy
and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible that passed
the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of
the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of
the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of
Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

HELD:

The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It
has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws. It becomes apparent that when a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest
is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is
clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the
public right.
 Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC – GR 177271, May 4, 2007

FACTS:

On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of
names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the
May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the
necessary manifestations. Among these – and ostensibly subsequently accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely:
(1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA;
(6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT
ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING
PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping,
list.

Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to
be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the
Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.

Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor
and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter
dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec’s Law Department
requesting a list of those groups’ nominees. Another letter of the same tenor dated
March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the
particular urgency of the subject request.

Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner
Rosales’ requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the
front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON’T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with
the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."

On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their
own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec
formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales’ earlier plea for information
regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally
guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew
attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the and in net
effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec, "collectively
or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying … the
banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx"
Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en
banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’
names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure
request.

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees

of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free
access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and

2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the

public the names of said nominees.

HELD:

The petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly denied insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel
the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups,
sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the
same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to
the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
 Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. – 170 SCRA 256

FACTS:

Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to
be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa
who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda
Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et.
al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte,
Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro.
Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS
and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS
to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."

On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote
Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply " They are now
considering to themselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo
Valmonte, et. al. filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish
Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
the election thru the intercession note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b)
to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon
GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political
parties.
HELD:

The instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioner’s access to
documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, inspection, not incompatible with this decision,
as the GSIS may deem necessary.
 Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato – 203 SCRA 515

FACTS:

In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television

Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she
be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished
by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television
productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are banned, cut or classified
accordingly. Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she
has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB,
to gain access to the records sought to be examined. Petitioner's request was
eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of
the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting
slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely
private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips
is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access
thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may
be legally denied.

Petitioner argues that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and
other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of
examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny
any citizen seeking examination of the board's records.

ISSUE:

WON the refusal of respondent to allow petitioner to examine the records of MTRCB
violates the petitioner’s constitutional right of access to public records.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court found that respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine
the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee
as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's
constitutional right of access to public records more specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution.
As held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this
constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations
167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right there in recognized may be
asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature
are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)."
 Chavez v. PCGG – GR 130716, Dec. 9, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer) sought to prohibit and respondent PCGG
from entering, perfecting or executing an agreement with the heirs of the late President
Marcos concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines
and or abroad. Petitioner also seeks to compel respondents to make public all
negotiations and agreement between PCGG and the Heirs. The action was brought by
petitioner on account of several news reports alleging the discovery of billions of dollars
of Marcos assets deposited in various Swiss bank accounts. The news reports also
claim that there was an execution of a compromise between the PCGG and the heirs on
how to split or share these assets. Petitioner contends that such negotiations be made
public as they affect paramount public interest since it has a “debilitating effect on the
country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudiced to the national interest of the
Filipino people. Hence the people have a right to know the transactions and dealings.
Respondent contend that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim though that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is
no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and agreement.
And even if he has, PCGG may not be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the agreements have not become effective and
binding. Petitioner invokes section 7 Art III of the Constitution. Respondent answers that
the cited constitutional provision refers to completed and operative official acts.

ISSUE:

WON the court may require the respondent to disclose to the public details of any
agreement, perfected or not.

HELD:

Yes. The court rendered the agreement entered into by the heirs and the PCGG as null
and void being contrary to the constitution. PCGG, its officers and all government
functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in the
recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are to disclose to
the public the terms of the agreement, proposed and final.
The “information” and “transactions” referred to in the subject provisions of the
Constitution have no defined scope and extent. However, the following are some
recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information- there
is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets, but
where there is no need to protect such secrets, the privilege may not be invoked. (2)
Trade secrets and banking transactions-trade or industrial secrets. (3) Criminal matters.
(4) Other confidential information
 Chavez v. PEA – GR 133250, July 9, 2002

FACTS:

In 1973, the Commissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas
of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to
the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation
Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects
under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsequently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of
all scams”).

Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:

On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can
make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
 RE: Request for Radio-TV Coverage – 365 SCRA 248

FACTS:

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were
killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-
related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic
incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre" spawned charges for
57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused. Almost
a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives
of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the
academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage
of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras,
tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of
devices.

President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 addressed to Chief
Justice Renato Corona, came out "in support of those who have petitioned [this Court]
to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The President expressed "earnest
hope that [this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic
deliberation,
attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a petition
merits. Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid
miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to prohibits live radio and television coverage
of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited
and restricted as above indicated.

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of
court proceedings. They state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of
the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are
being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and
that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of
media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for
each media institution.
ISSUE:

Whether or not live broadcasting by radio and television of the court proceedings on
Maguindanao Massacre cases be allowed.

HELD:

Yes. Considering impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that

will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number
of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom? Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public
trial.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling
the abstract discussion of key constitutional precepts into the workable
context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation
thereof that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and
furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined
guidelines.

In light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court partially grants pro hac vice the request
for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.
 RE: Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage – 365 SCRA 62

FACTS:

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were
killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-
related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic
incident that came to be known as the “Maguindanao Massacre” spawned charges for
57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66,
and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et
al. Following the transfer of venue and the re-raffling of the cases, the cases are being
tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa inTaguigCity.

Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives
of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the
academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage
of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras,
tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of
devices. The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.

President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 addressed to Chief
Justice Renato Corona, came out “in support of those who have petitioned this Court to
permit television and radio broadcast of the trial.” The President expressed “earnest
hope that this Court will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic
deliberation attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such
a petition merits.” The court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of
court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live
TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel
Case and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E.
Estrada which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on
constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand
when regulation is a viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense
media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and
the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and
searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict
orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media
practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each
media institution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Live Radio-TV broadcasting of “Maguindanao Massacres” is allowed in

the exercise of the right to information

HELD:

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant’s right to due process as well as to
the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of
the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less
distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes
shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video
shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties’ right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid
miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited
and restricted as above indicated
 Senate v. Ermita – GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.

Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections,
wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloria gate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress valid and constitutional?
HELD:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must be respected.The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting
a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
 Neri v. Senate – GR 180643, March 25, 2008; MR Sept. 4, 2008

FACTS:

DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the PRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative
to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Venecia issued a statement that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of
the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to
bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to
attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered falls under
executive privilege.

HELD:

The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.The communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of

the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President.

Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
 Akbayan v. Aquino – GR 170516, July 16, 2008

FACTS:

The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the

sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new
chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).”
JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for
opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and
restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the
WTO.

The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted
by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee,
chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On
one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits
of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who
raised their very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic
waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue
concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader
national development concerns.

ISSUE:
Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted
from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine
government is justified in denying access thereto?

HELD:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of
“Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516).
The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition,
which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto?

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made
accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished
with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this,
however, the Court lengthily discussed the substantives issues, insofar as they impinge
on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of
the negotiations.

The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that
while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there
should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after
the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern
the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.”

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty
negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing
their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations
normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant
concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in
an area of greater national interest.
VIII. Section 8
Right to Association

TUCP v. NHC- 173 SCRA 33

FACTS:

Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of

Government Corporations. Its shares of stock have been 100% owned by the
Government from its incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization
with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE it was
denied.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner may hold the certification election among the workers of NHC.

HELD:

The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations w/
original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress of by special
law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.There is,
therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of
NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a
government owned and/ or controlled corp. w/o an original charter.
 SSS Employees v. CA – 175 SCRA 686

FACTS:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged
an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business
with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the
strikers are ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued
overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.

ISSUE:

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

HELD:

By reason of the nature of public employer and the peculiar character of the public
service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry
as not applying to public employees and civil service employees. The government, in
contrast to a private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service
and that accordingly such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations
could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ.
 UPCSU v. Laguesma – 286 SCRA 15

FACTS:

Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.

which filed for a certification of election on behalf of the route managers at the said
company. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides:

“Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory

employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.”

Petitioner challenges this provision asserting that it contravenes Art. III, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution which provides:“The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 245 of the Labor Code is unconstitutional.

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that it is constitutional. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject
to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the
case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from
forming or joining labor organizations. As elaborated by the Court in Bulletin Publishing
Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, “The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to
be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a
Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident
conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence
of managerial employees in Union membership”.
IX. Section 9

Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong – March 14, 2000

FACTS:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners pray for the reversal of
the Order dated July 28, 1998 issued by Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
in SCA No. 875 entitled "City of Mandaluyong v. Alberto S. Suguitan.

On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued

Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing then Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute
expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue
and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and
more particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry
of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the
expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.

Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering
to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the
city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. The case was docketed as SCA No. 875,acting upon a motion filed by the
respondent, the trial court issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take
immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000
representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the
current tax declaration of such property. On December 15, 1995, the City of
Mandaluyong assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of
possession issued by the trial court on December 14, 1995. On July 28, 1998, the court
granted the assailed order of expropriation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that essential requisites for Local Government Unit validly and legally
exercised its power of eminent domain.
HELD:

An ordinance must authorize it. Thus, a Local Government may not expropriate on the
strength of a Sanggunian Resolution alone.“In the exercise of the respondent City of
Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a "resolution" empowering the City Mayor to
initiate such expropriation proceedings and thereafter when the court has already
determine[d] with certainty the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property
expropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungosd appropriating
funds for the payment of the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the
just compensation.”
 Iron and Steel Authority v. CA – 249 SCRA 538

FACTS:

Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote
the iron and steel industry. PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years
counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA’s original term expired on October 10, 1978,
its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National
Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such steel mill
was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to
the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President
of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large
tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and
immediate occupancy of NSC.

Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational
chemical fertilizer plant, and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued
directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the
Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject
land. Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.

ISSUE:

WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of
ISA’s term.

HELD:

Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated
with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA
as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from
that of the government.
The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality
of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the Philippines. It is common
knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic
are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,
sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic.

We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The
Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of
powers and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.”

When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are
reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other
disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and
functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.

When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must
be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the
provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated
agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and
liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence
assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown
to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an
agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its
authority under PD 272.The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of
the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
properties involved.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in
the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired.
Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or
justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
 Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC – 244 SCRA 272

FACTS:

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to

provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The
Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations
of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel
print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private
personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation
cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772
does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property
of newspaper or magazine publishers.
 Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337

FACTS:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an

organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing
as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc.,
operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground
(1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2)
that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate
the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. In
the case at bar, as will presently be shown, petitioner's substantive claim is without
merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the air time taken by the COMELEC owned by the petitioner is a
violation of Sec 9 of the Bill of Rights.

HELD:

No. The court ruled that the right of a party personally attacked to reply, "Licenses to
broadcast do not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary
privilege of using them." Consequently, "a license permits broadcasting, but the license
has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his
frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to
present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which
would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves." As radio and television
broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
 Greater Balanga v. Municipality of Balanga – 239 SCRA 436

FACTS:

The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public market in
the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of Greater
Balanga Development, Corp., owned and controlled by the Camacho family. The lot
was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the name of Aurora Banzon Camacho,
which was later, subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold, others donated.
Five buyers of the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for partition and delivery of
titles.

Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of
Balanga but failed to mention the existence of the civil case for partition and delivery of
titles. The permit was granted the privilege of a “real estate dealer/privately-owned
market operator.” However, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-
88, annulling the Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that the issue as to
the ownership of the lot caused “anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the
stallholders and traders in the lot,” and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit “to
operate a public market.” The Mayor then revoked the permit through EO No. 1 s-88.

Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction or restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's permit and to curtail the
municipality's collection of market and entrance fees from the lot occupants. He alleges
that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus, there's no reason for revocation of the permit; 2)
Respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation; 3) the collection of market
fees is illegal.

On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief executive has
the power to issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was due to
the violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1)
made false statement in the application form, failing to disclose that the lot was subject
to adverse claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply for 2 separate
permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).

ISSUE:

W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

HELD:

NO. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and
any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. The authority of the
Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of its
conditions for its grant. For revocation to be justified under the Balanga Revenue Code
there must be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make a
false statement. Good faith is always presumed. In this case, the application for Mayor's
permit requires the applicant to state the “type of business, profession, occupation,
privileges applied for.” Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is only in
the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not
justified because Petitioner did not make any false statement therein.

Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for
revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two
permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that separate
fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that separate permits are actually
required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the number of
businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.

The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of the
Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a public
market on the area. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land. Of course, the SB has the duty
in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license
fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may
be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness"
among the stallholders and traders doing business on a property not owned by the
Municipality cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner.

Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right
to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue
Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of
this specific violation. Moreover, Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-
A-3, and thus cannot collect market fees, which only an owner can do.
 1. Elements of “taking”

Republic v. Vda. De Castelvi – 58 SCRA 336

FACTS:

After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the
government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. Then on May 26, 1961, the trial court rendered its decision in favor
of the respondents. On its motion for reconsideration, petitioner, the Republic, contends
that the lower court erred, among others, in holding that the “taking” of the properties
under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action. It argues that the “taking”
should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement
between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the “right and
privilege” to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease.

Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the “taking” of property under the
power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and
occupation by condemner upon the private property for more than a momentary or
limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in the
instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides
for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the
Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the
contract of lease does not grant the Republic the “right and privilege” to buy the
premises “at the value at the time of occupancy."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemner has entered
and occupied the property as lessee.

HELD:

No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959. A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of
property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of lease.
 Garcia v. CA – 102 SCRA 597

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari instituted against the Court of Appeals and the National
Power Corporation seeking a relief in the Decision of the Court of Appeals respecting
Block 19, wherein it has adjudged private respondent entitled to acquire title and
ownership over the property by paying a compensation of PO.07 per square meter be
reversed and that the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga adjudging the
private respondent to compensate herein petitioners for Block 19 in the amount of
P15.00 per square meter with interest at the legal rate from June 30, 1954 be upheld.

The record discloses that on August 8, 1969, the private respondent National Power
Corporation filed a complaint for eminent domain with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga praying that it be allowed to acquire right of way easements over the
property of petitioners consisting of two adjoining parcels of land (Lots Nos. 633 and
634) with a total area of 15.98 hectares. the said complaint alleges that the proposed
right-of-way is needed to construct the 69 KV Mexico-Balibago power line which will
encompass some 2,835 square meters of petitioner's property. On March 2, 1970, the
defendants, petitioners herein, filed an answer asking that the complaint for
expropriation be dismissed. The lower court rendered judgement ordering the plaintiff to
pay the defendants (petitioners) the amount of P 15.00 per square meter for the area
herein expropriated which totals P399, 435.00, with interest at the legal rate. Plaintiff,
private respondent National Power Corporation, appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered its decision modifying the trial court's decision ordering the plaintiff to pay to
the same defendants the amount of P14, 511.69 as the market value for Block 19
(20,439 square meters) at PO.07 per square meter with legal interest from July 1, 1957.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in fixing the amount of just compensation.

HELD:

Just compensation is the market value of the property. It should be determined at the
time of the taking. It is the price which it will command where it is offered for sale by one
who desires, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity
of having it. The market value must be determined as of the time the plaintiff takes
possession. Thus, when possession is ahead of the filing of the complaint, the date of
possession determines the market value.

Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the
uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not
merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner.
All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements
and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its value.
 City of Government v. Judge Ericta – 122 SCRA 759

FACTS:

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE

ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. The law
basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. Quezon City justified the law by invoking
police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD:

The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.

The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
 US v. Causby – 328 US 256

FACTS:

Respondents owned a dwelling and a chicken farm near a municipal airport. The safe
path of glide to one of the runways of the airport passed directly over respondents’
property at 83 feet, which was 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18
feet above the highest tree. It was used 4% of the time in taking off and 7% of the time
in landing. The Government leased the use of the airport for a term of one month
commencing June 1, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 30, 1967, or six
months after the end of the national emergency, whichever was earlier.

Various military aircraft of the United States used the airport. They frequently came so
close to respondents’ property that they barely missed the tops of trees, the noise was
startling, and the glare from their landing lights lighted the place up brightly at night. This
destroyed the use of the property as a chicken farm and caused loss of sleep,
nervousness, and fright on the part of the respondents. They sued in the Court of
Claims to recover for an alleged taking of their property and for damage to their poultry
business. The Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an easement over
respondents’ property and that the value of the property destroyed and the easement
taken was $2,000; but it made no finding as to the precise nature or duration of the
easement.

The Court of Claims granted respondents a judgment for the value of property
destroyed and damage to their property resulting from the taking of an easement over
their property by low-flying military aircraft of the US, but failed to include its findings of
fact a specific description of the nature or duration of the easement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not compensation should be granted to petitioners for the said air space
used by the Government’s airplanes.
HELD:

It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, which is the measure of the value of the
property taken. Market value fairly determined is the normal measure of the recovery.
And that value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well
as the existing use. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents
could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as
complete as if the US had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive
possession of it. We agree that, in those circumstances, there would be taking.

Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if
permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee
interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the
surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface is irrelevant. The
owner’s right to possess and exploit the land – that is to say, his beneficial ownership of
it – would be destroyed.

The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing land, an
orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some value would
remain. But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the utility of
the land and cause a diminution in its value.The air above the minimum safe altitude of
flight prescribes by the Civil Aeronautics Authority is a public highway and part of the
public domain, as declared by the US Congress in the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Flights below that altitude are not within
the navigable air space which Congress placed within the public domain, even though
they are within the path of glide approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.

We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is obvious that, if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be
erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be run. The principle is
recognized when the law gives a remedy in case overhanging structures are erected on
adjoining land. The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the grounds
as the y can occupy or use in connection with the land. The flight of airplanes, which
skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land
as a more conventional entry upon it.
 People v. Fajardo – 104 Phil 443

FACTS:

Defendants- appellants were charge with and convicted by the justice of the peace court
of Baao, Camarines Sur for violation of Municipal Ordinance prohibiting the construction
of a building that destroys the view of the public plaza without mayor’s permit.

The appellants subsequently appealed to the court of the first instance, which affirmed
the conviction and ordered the demolition of the building because it destroys the view of
the public plaza.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exercise of police power valid.

HELD:

The SC ruled in the negative. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their
own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellants’ property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern
tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort
and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the
sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
 Republic v. PLDT – 26 SCRA 620

FACTS:

Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of
the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the
Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone
System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent
contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System
can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD:

Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may
require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use
of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone
systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.
 NPC v. Jocson – 206 SCRA 520

FACTS:

The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of the parcels
of land described in the complaints for its Negros-Panay Interconnection Project,
particularly the Bacolod- Tomonton Transmission Line. Provisional values were fixed
on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit petitioner may derive.
Respondents sought a re-evaluation. Judge increased value without hearing and
directing the defendants to manifest within twenty-four (24) hours whether or not they
are accepting and withdrawing the amounts, representing the provisional values,
deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as "final and full satisfaction of the value of
their respective property (sic); " Judge declared the provisional values as the final
values and directing the release of the amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to
the defendants even if not all of them made the manifestation; and suspended the
issuance of the writ of possession until after the suspending the amounts shall have
been released to and received by defendants.

ISSUE:

WON Judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction.

HELD:

YES. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation: The first is concerned
with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this
be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and
leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits.
So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise
of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard." The
second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
Court of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the
just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the
suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
 Penn Central Transportation v. NY City 438 US 104

FACTS:

In 1968, the Petitioner entered into a 50-year lease agreement with a British company to
construct a multi-storey office building on top of the existing terminal. The plan was to
increase revenue by renting the office space. But, the application to build was denied.
The Respondent, New York City, passed a regulation that prevented the Petitioner,
Penn Central Transportation, from adding an office building structure to the top of the
Grand Central Station.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, a city place restrictions on the development of individual historic

landmarks without effecting a taking requiring just compensation.

HELD:

Yes. The restrictions do not interfere with the present use of the terminal. It still allows
Petitioner to profit from the Terminal and obtain a “reasonable return” from its
investment. This is a taking because the Respondent is asking companies like the
Petitioner to bear the cost of maintaining designated historical landmarks throughout the
City. The cost should be borne by the citizens of the city that insists these locations
remain unchanged.
 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto – 467 US 986

FACTS:

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data submitted by an applicant for
registration of a covered product (hereinafter pesticide) in evaluating the application of a
subsequent applicant, and to disclose publicly some of the submitted data. Under the
data-consideration provisions of § 3, as amended in 1978, applicants now are granted a
10-year period of exclusive use for data on new active ingredients contained in
pesticides registered after September 30, 1978, while all other data submitted after
December 31, 1969, may be cited and considered in support of another application for
15 years after the original submission if the applicant offers to compensate the original
submitter. If the parties cannot agree on the amount of compensation, either may initiate
a binding arbitration proceeding, and if an original submitter refuses to participate in
negotiations or arbitration, he forfeits his claim for compensation. Data that do not
qualify for either the 10-year period of exclusive use or the 15-year period of
compensation may be considered by EPA without limitation. Section 10, as amended in
1978, authorizes, in general, public disclosure of all health, safety, and environmental
data even though it may result in disclosure of trade secrets. Appellee, a company
headquartered in Missouri, is an inventor, producer, and seller of pesticides, and invests
substantial sums in developing active ingredients for pesticides and in producing end-
use products that combine such ingredients with inert ingredients. Appellee brought suit
in Federal District Court for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging, inter alia, that the
data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA effected a "taking" of
property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that the
data-consideration provisions violated the Amendment because they effected a taking
of property for a private, rather than a public, purpose. The District Court held that the
challenged provisions of FIFRA are unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined EPA
from implementing or enforcing those provisions.

ISSUE:

WON the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA effected a

"taking" of property without just compensation violates the Fifth Amendment.
HELD:

To the extent that appellee has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data
cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that property right is
protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Despite their intangible nature,
trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more traditional forms of property.
Moreover, this Court has found other kinds of intangible interests to be property for
purposes of the Clause. EPA's consideration or disclosure of data submitted by
appellee prior to October 22, 1972, or after September 30, 1978, does not effect a
taking, but EPA's consideration or disclosure of certain health, safety, and
environmental data constituting a trade secret under state law and submitted by
appellee between those two dates may constitute a taking under certain conditions.

A factor for consideration in determining whether a governmental action short of

acquisition or destruction of property has gone beyond proper "regulation" and an effect
a “taking” is whether the action interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations. With respect to any health, safety, and environmental data that appellee
submitted to EPA after the effective date of the 1978 FIFRA amendments (October 1,
1978), appellee could not have had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that
EPA would keep the data confidential beyond the limits prescribed in the amended
statute itself. As long as appellee is aware of the conditions under which the data are
submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest,
a voluntary submission of data in exchange for the economic advantages of a
registration can hardly be called a taking.
 2. Public Use

Sumulong v. Guerrero – 154 SCRA 461

FACTS:

On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the
expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing
the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to
be expropriated are the petitioners'' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging
the constitutionality of PD 1224.

ISSUE:

Whether “socialized housing” as defined in PD 1244 as amended for the purpose of

condemnation proceeding is public use.

HELD:

The "public use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions.

Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized
as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also
because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and, in sum, the general welfare.

This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as
amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of
expropriation. However, as previously held by this Court, the provisions of such decrees
on just compensation are unconstitutional; and in the instant case the Court finds that
the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing
immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of due process.
 Phil. Columbian Assn. v. Hon. Panis – 228 SCRA 668

FACTS:

On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch27,
Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining
order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and petitioner herein to enjoin their
ejectment from and the demolition of their houses on the premises in question. On June
28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Manila, for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject
of the ejectment proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346.

Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the
City of Manila had no power to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for
public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the
deposit of P2 million in the City of Manila representing the provisional value of the land,
was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which
was formerly a part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to expropriate the
Fabie Estate.

Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10 square
meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and distributed
the portions to the actual occupants thereof. The remaining area of 4,842.90 square
meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to
petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been occupied by private respondents.
On 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with the approval of the Mayor, passed
Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the expropriation will prosper.

HELD:

It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them.
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a
flexible concept, influenced by changing. Public use now includes the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and
housing. The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise
been complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for
hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing Authority v. Valenzuela, 159
SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and appellate
courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the issue of due process.

Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsideration
of the trial court's order, denying its motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals, in
determining whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent courts,
passed upon the very same issues raised by petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which
findings we uphold. Petitioner therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.
The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an amount not
only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact remains that petitioner,
albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore estopped from assailing the
same. It must be remembered that the valuation is merely provisional. The parties still
have the second stage in the proceedings in the proper court below to determine
specifically the amount of just compensation to be paid the landowner. WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
 Province of Camarines Sur v. CA – 222 SCRA 173

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a resolution

authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to
the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon.
Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the
complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation
offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.

For its part, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate
the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.

ISSUE:

W/N the expropriation proceeding is valid.

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that the SP resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for
public purpose or public use. Resolution No. 219, Series of 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:

"A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation
proceedings for public use or purpose.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units
must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary
expropriation proceedings.
In addition, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public
purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised...
Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.

Likewise, the Court found no merit in the contention of the San Joaquins that they will
be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property. In
previous rulings, the Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees
fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower. The
rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall
be the just compensation for their property.
 Lagcao v. Judge Labra – GR 155746, Oct. 13, 2004

FACTS:

The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot
1029 located in Cebu City. Petitioners, Crispina Lagcao, purchased Lot 1029 on
installment basis. But subsequently the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the
Province of Cebu. The province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu
to the petitioners but the court ruled in favor of the latter. After acquiring title, petitioners
tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by
squatters thus prompted petitioner to institute ejectment proceedings against the
squatters. Cebu City Mayor requested for the deferment of the demolition on the ground
that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. During the
suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant. Ordinance No. 18437
was enacted by the SP authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of
petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless
after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the
ordinance appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot.

In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 18437 is unconstitutional as it

sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters,
an endeavor contrary to the concept of “public use” contemplated in the Constitution.
They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to
petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big
source of votes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu parcel of land owned by
petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws as it would not be for public
purpose.

HELD:

Land may only be expropriated for “public purpose”. LGUs have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it when expressly authorized by the legislature.
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted
to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social problems of
the country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their
power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily
choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no
showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the city
ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No.
1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized
housing project.

Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random

expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is
certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is
depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible
benefit to the public. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character. The due process clause
cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the expropriation of a private
individual’s property.
 3. Just Compensation

City of Manila v. Estrada – 25 Phil 208

FACTS:

The parcel of land in question is situated in the City of Manila, fronting Calles Herran
and Looban and the Paco Estero. The said land was sought to be expropriated by the
City of Manila, herein petitioner, in its entirety where a market place was to be erected
under the district of Paco.Balbina Estrada y Sarmiento, minor and only heiress of
Concepcion Sarmiento (deceased) and Ariston Estrada, administrator of said parcel of
land, are the respondents to this case.

Two real estate agents testified that the land in question was worth P10 per square
meter. About thirty days prior to the hearing of the case, Enrique Brias, one of the real
estate agents, stated that he had succeeded in selling his parcel of land, situated on the
opposite side of the estrero fronting Herran, at P6 per square meter. George C. Sellner,
the other real estate agent and negotiator for Brias’ estate transaction, said that he was
familiar with real estate values in the city of Manila and that Brias’ property was of about
the same elevation as the parcel sought to be expropriated although no improvements
had been made in Brias’ property, the land being used for storage of coal. The Internal
Revenue Bureau, represented by Mr. Powell, testified that the appraisal for taxation of
the Estrada land was at P6 per square meter and prior to 1911 it had been appraised at
about P4 per square meter.

Estrada contended that the land in question was worth P25 per square meter, basing
his statement on the price obtained three years ago by the owner, a certain Clarke, of
the parcel of land on the opposite side of Calle Herran of P19.85 per square meter. He
also testified that upon learning that the property which was subject of the present
litigation was to be condemned, he offered to pay a similar real estate agent P15 per
square meter for a piece of land situated in the locality with relatively similar commercial
location.

The lower court held as a compromise that the amount of P15 per square meter is just
compensation for the entirety of the land and its improvements, as compared to P20 per
square meter reflected in the majority reports and P10 per square meter by the minority
reports, both submitted to the court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not P10 per square meter was just compensation by the petitioner in
expropriating the land in question from the respondents.

HELD:

“Compensation” means an equivalent for the value of the land (property) taken.
Anything beyond that is more and anything short of that is less than compensation. To
compensate is to render something which is equal to that taken or received. The word
“just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation;” to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,
ample. “Just compensation,” therefore, means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained.” The compensation must be just to the public as well as to the owners.

In estimating its value all the capabilities of the property, and all the uses to which it may
be applied or for which it is adapted, are to be considered, and not merely the condition
it is in at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. It is not a
question of the value of the property to the owner. Nor can the damages be enhanced
by his unwillingness to sell. On the other hand, the damages cannot be measured by
the value of the property to the party condemning it, nor by its need of the particular
property. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surrounding, its
improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in estimating its value.

Estrada’s contentions are without merit. The case of Clarke’s property was different
from the case at bar. The market value of the land taken from Clarke included not only
the value of the actual property seized but also the consequential damages to the
remainder of the said parcel of land since the land was not taken entirely for a sewer
pumping station. There were no consequential damages to Estrada’s property for the
reason that his entire holding was taken. Also, his offer to pay another real estate agent
the amount of P15 per square meter for a lot similar in commercial value was done in
bad faith. The action was done in his hopes to raise the value of the property sought to
be condemned.

In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private properties.
As a general thing, we should say that the compensation to the owner is to be estimated
by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing
business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the
immediate future.
 Manila Railroad v. Paredes – 31 Phil. 118

FACTS:

The plaintiff is a railroad corporation organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands
and has the power of eminent domain. In conformity with its charter it constructed and is
now operating a branch line from Manila to Gumaca, Province of Tayabas. .It claims
that it took possession of this strip of land with the consent of the various owners and
occupants claiming title thereto, and with the understanding that it would pay the owners
of all the lands thus taken a price to be agreed upon thereafter, or to be fixed in
condemnation proceedings; and that, not having been able to agree upon a price with
the owners of the land, it was later compelled to institute proceedings for the
condemnation of the land.

However this may be, the Railway Company, on the first day of April, 1913, instituted
expropriation proceedings looking to the condemnation of all these lands under and by
virtue of the authority conferred upon it by is charter and under the laws applicable to
such proceedings. On the fourth day of April, 1913, the Honorable Herbert Gale, the
judge then presiding in the court wherein these proceedings were pending, entered an
order granting to the Railroad Company the right of possession of all these lands, upon
the filing of a deposit in an amount certified by the provincial treasurer to be equal to the
average assessed value of all these lands, which, in the language of the order itself was
the value of the lands, "hereby provisionally ascertained and fixed." On the eleventh of
April, 1913, the Railroad Company deposited the sum of P8, 971.72, the assessed
value of the lands in question as shown by the certificate of the provincial treasurer. On
the - of April, 1913, Judge Cui, then presiding in the court wherein the proceedings were
pending, issued a formal writ, directing the sheriff of the court to put the Railroad
Company in possession of all the lands described in the applications in expropriation
proceedings filed by the Railroad .

Thereafter, the land companies to be the owners and successors in interest of the
original owners of most of the lands in question, entered their appearance as
defendants in the expropriation proceedings, and acting jointly with the various
claimants whose lands had not been acquired by them, procured the appointment of
commissioners for the valuation of these lands. On the ninth of January, 1915, the land
companies and the other claimants to these lands moved the court to increase the
amount of the deposit from P8, 971.72, the amount originally fixed, to P1, 000,000. On
the 18th of February, 1915, the respondent judge, then presiding in the court wherein
the proceedings were pending, after hearing the parties and considering the evidence
submitted at the hearing, and notwithstanding objection duly interposed on the ground
of his lack of jurisdiction to entertain the motion, issued an order directing the Railroad
Company to increase its deposit to P1, 000,000.

ISSUE:

Whether the state may prescribe a procedure by virtue of which a railway corporation
may secure the possession of the lands it seeks to condemn, pending the
condemnation proceedings.

HELD:

The Court said that “according to the weight of authority, if the constitution or statutes
do not expressly require it, actual payment or tender before taking is unnecessary, and
it will be sufficient if a certain and adequate remedy is provided by which the owner can
obtain compensation without any unreasonable delay.”

The right to enter into immediate possession of the property even before the final
ascertainment and payment of just compensation is given to any plaintiff. The pertinent
Rules of Court provision (Section 2, Rule 67) reads:

“Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right
to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he
deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionally and
promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be
held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final disposition of the court.
 Santos v. Land Bank – GR 137431, Sept. 7, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner filed before the RTC an agrarian case for the determination of just
compensation regarding his properties which were taken by the DAR under P.D. No. 27.
The trial court rendered judgment requiring the respondent Land bank to pay the
petitioner in accordance with the provision of R.A. No. 6657 ( Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) which provides that payment should be made in “cash and bond”.

The plaintiff filed a motion before the trial court that the said amount be paid in cash or
certified check, which was opposed by the respondent bank. The trial court resolved the
motion in favor of the petitioner.

However, in a motion for reconsideration, the then new presiding judge of RTC held that
the payment of just compensation must be computed in manner provided for by R.A.
No. 6657 which was upheld by the CA.

ISSUE:

W/N the payment in cash and bond as provided under R.A. No. 6657 for just
compensation in agrarian case proper.

HELD:

Yes. Compensation for land expropriation for agrarian reform is valid, even if made not
completely in cash. The Supreme Court said: "Accepting the theory that payment of the
just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money; we find further that
the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total
payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger
the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more
than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of
value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance
of the payment are 'negotiable at any time.' The other modes, which are likewise
available to be landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is
made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other
things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
 Municipality of Daet v. CA – 129 SCRA 665

FACTS:

The Municipality of Daet instituted condemnation proceedings against private

respondent on August 9, 1962 before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte for
the purpose of acquiring and subsequently converting a property owned by private
respondent as a public park, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
expropriation proceedings. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
reversing the trial court's decision. After the records of the case were remanded to the
trial court, private respondent filed a "Motion for Appointment of Commissioners to Fix
Just Compensation for the Property Sought to be taken”.

On April 15, 1969, the trial court issued twin orders: (1) fixing the provisional value of
the land at P129,99 per square meter and the value of the improvement at P30,000.00
totaling P356,040.00 and require the Municipality to deposit with the Provincial
Treasurer in cash or in security which should be payable on demand and upon deposit
being effected, the Clerk of Court was ordered to issue the necessary writ of place the
Municipality in possession of the property; and (2) appointing Atty. Ernesto de Jesus,
Provincial Assessor, as chairman; Atty. Jose V. Jamito, PNB Branch Attorney and Dr.
Mateo Aquino, a resident of the municipality, as members of the committee on
appraisal, after submission of evidence for both parties, the trial court rendered a
decision disregarding the valuation made by the commissioners and using the appraisal
of Engineer Aurelio B. Aquino in 1969 as the basis in determining the value of the land
in 1962, fixing the reasonable value of the property sought to be expropriated at
P117.00 per square meter or for a total amount of Three Hundred Seventeen Thousand
Eight Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos (P317,889.00), and the value of the improvement at
Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P36,500.00), this amount to bear interest at
the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until paid with costs against the plaintiff.

On October 18, 1972, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision sustaining the
valuation of the property in 1969, declaring the municipality to have a lawful right to
expropriate and modified the judgment of the trial court with respect to the interest that
can be recovered which should be from and after the date of actual taking.
ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in determining the value of the property in
condemnation proceedings at the time of the rendition of the judgment of the trial court
and not at the date of the filing of the complaint.

HELD:

No. The decision of the CA fixing the market value of the property to be that obtaining,
at least, as of the date of the rendition of the Judgment on Dec. 2, 1969 as prayed by
private respondent, which the court fixed a P200.00 per square meter is in conformity
with doctrinal rulings that the value should be fixed at the time of the taking of the
property because, firstly, at the time judgment was rendered, petitioner had not actually
taken possession of the property sought to be expropriated and secondly, the Court
finds the valuation determined by the CA to be just and reasonable.
 NPC v. CA – 129 SCRA 665

FACTS:

In 1961, petitioner commenced negotiations with the spouses Sadang and Lachica,
then the registered owners, for the purchase of a portion of 8,746 sq. ms. of the latter’s
parcel of land of 62,285 sq. m., situated in Bulacan, for the purpose of constructing an
access road to its Angat River Hydroelectric Project. Although the negotiations were not
yet concluded, NPC nevertheless obtained permission from said spouses to begin
construction of the access road, which it did in November 1961. Private respondent San
Diego, a realty firm, acquired the parcel of land at a public auction sale and was issued
a title.

On 1963, NPC instituted proceedings for eminent domain against the spouses Sadang
in the CFI, later amended with leave of Court, to implead SAN DIEGO. The Motion to
Amend was only granted on 1968. Trial Court appointed three Commissioners, to
receive the evidence and determine the just compensation to be paid for the property
sought to be expropriated. Trial court rendered decision Declaring to plaintiff the full and
legal right to acquire by eminent domain the absolute ownership over the portion of the
land consisting of 8,746 square meters, and authorizing the payment by plaintiff to
defendant of the amount of P31, 922.00 as full indemnity for the property at the rate of
P3.75 per square meter. Both parties appealed. CA modified said decision, declaring
that the just and reasonable compensation for the property in question is P7.00 per
square.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation for the
portion of land sought to be expropriated based on its planned convertibility into a
residential subdivision.

HELD:

Yes. It is now settled doctrine that to determine due compensation for lands
appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time it
was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government. The convertibility of
the property into a subdivision, the criterion relied upon by respondent Court, is not
controlling. It is the time of taking and not as “potential building” site that is the
determining factor.
 EPZA v. Dulay – 149 SCRA 305

FACTS:

The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San
Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without
them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation.

It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15
per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533,
the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value
declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor,
whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA
then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further
hearing the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile
in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination.
The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination
of just compensation is a judicial function.
 The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the
decreed compensation.
 Maddumba v. GSIS – 182 SCRA 281

FACTS:

GSIS conducted a public bidding of several foreclosed properties. Petitioner Domingo

B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and submitted his sealed bid in the
amount of P98, 000.00 in Philippine currency. The bid was subject to the condition that
there should be a down payment of 35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting the
proposal bond with the remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt of the notice of award
or acceptance of the bid.

Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the additional 25% in
Land Bank bonds at their face value. However, the GSIS rejected the offer, hence it was
withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash the remaining 25% down
payment “and all future installments.”

The first installment was paid by petitioner on December 3, 1981. When the second
monthly installment became due, petitioner sent a letter to the GSIS Board of Trustees
requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his Land Bank
bonds commencing in January, 1982 until the exhaustion of the said bonds.

The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on January 22, 1982,
denied petitioner’s offer and resolved to reiterate the policy that Land Bank bonds shall
be accepted as payment only at a discounted rate to yield the System 18% at maturity.

Hence, this petition for mandamus seeks to compel respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value.

ISSUE:

Whether or not GSIS can be compelled to accept the said Land Bank bonds at their
face value.

HELD:

Yes. The nature of a Land Bank bond itself fortifies the Court’s view that the respondent
may be compelled to accept those bonds at their face value.
True, the statute does not explicitly provide that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted at
their face value. There can be no question, however, that such is the intendment of the
law particularly in the absence of any provision expressly permitting discounting, as
differentiated from Republic Act No. 304, or the Back pay Law, as amended by Republic
Acts Nos. 800 and 897, which expressly allows it.

Land Bank bonds are certificates of indebtedness, approved by the Monetary Board of
the Central Bank, fully tax-exempt both as to principal and income, and bear interest at
the rate of 6% per annum redeemable at the option of the Land Bank at or before
maturity, which in no case shall exceed 25 years. They are fully negotiable and
unconditionally guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
 Berkenkotter v. CA – 216 SCRA 584

FACTS:

The petitioner, Berkenkotter & Co., refused to sell a parcel of his land for the use of the
Apolinario R. Apacible School of Fisheries (ARASOF) to Vicente Viray, president of the
said school. It is due to unresolved agreement on the price of the said land per square
meter. Expropriation proceedings were commenced against the petitioner by the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of ARASOF. Thus, instead of P50.00, as
requested by the petitioner, the land was sold at P32.00 per square meter. The
petitioner then filed its complaint questioning the under-appraisal of the subject land by
the Philippine Appraisal Committee. Later, RTC appointed a panel of commissioners to
determine the just compensation to be paid for the land. The panel submitted its report
and recommended that the property be appraised at the unit price of P85.00 per square
meter. RTC rendered judgment affirming the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
subject land upon payment to the owner of just compensation at the rate of P85.00 per
square meter. Republic objected and pointed to the three contracts of sale the petitioner
had concluded whereby it sold three tracts of land similar in topography and adjacent to
the property in question for P19.18. RTC reiterated its original recommendation.

This decision was elevated to and reversed by the Court of Appeals. The respondent
court noted that the three contracts of sale were practically disregarded by the trial
court. Accordingly, the respondent court set aside the compensation fixed by the trial
court and ordered that the subject property be paid for at the rate of P19.18 per square
meter, or a total of P204, 075.20The present petition challenges the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not right to just compensation was denied

HELD:

Compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. We
agree with the respondent court that by selling its lands in the three deed of sale
indicated as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, at the uniform rate of P19.18 per square meter, the
petitioner thereby impliedly admitted that the lands subject of the expropriation
proceeding, being of the same topography and virtually in the same location is the said
other lands, should also be valued at the same rate.
This rule of inconsistency is best expressed in the familiar saying, surely not unknown to
the petitioner, that what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and it is hereby affirmed that the just
compensation for the subject land should be computed at the rated of P19.18 per
square meter.
 Meralco v. Pineda – 206 SCRA 196

FACTS:

MERALCO filed a complaint for expropriation of the lots of the private respondents.
While the case was going on and before the appointment of the Board of
Commissioners to value the land, the private respondents filed a motion to withdraw a
portion of the deposit of MERALCO. This was granted by Judge Pineda; MERALCO
objected, contending that this cannot be done since the Board of Commissioners was
not yet constituted, and allowing such is a deprivation of its property without due
process of law. Judge Pineda maintained that he can dispense with the Board and
adopt the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or he could exercise himself the
right to decide the just compensation to be paid to the owners of the land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can order payment of just compensation before appraisal and
valuation of the property by a Board of Commissioners.

HELD:

No. Although it is true that the judge may disregard the findings of the commissioners
and substitute his own estimate of the value of the land, he may only do so for a valid
reason, e.g. where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence,
or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. But the
composition of the Board of Commissioners is mandatory. A trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of
just compensation. The lot owners must prove the value of the land by evidence. On the
other hand, MERALCO must be given an opportunity to rebut any evidence presented
by lot owners.
 NPC v. CA – 254 SCRA 577

FACTS:

In the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon "Kading", a
massive flood covered the towns near Angat Dam, causing several deaths and the loss
and destruction of houses, farms, plants, working animals and other properties of the
people residing near the Angat River. Private respondents blamed the sudden rush of
water to the reckless and imprudent opening of all the three (3) floodgates of the Angat
Dam spillway, without prior warning to the people living near or within the vicinity of the
dam. In view of these, an action for damages was filed by respondents. The trial court
ruled in favor of the latter. Likewise the Court of Appeals affirmed with said decision.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was instituted by the National Power
Corporation.

Petitioners denied private respondents' allegations and, by way of defense, contended

that they have maintained the water in the Angat Dam at a safe level and that the
opening of the spillways was done gradually and after all precautionary measures had
been taken. NPC further contended that it had always exercised the diligence of a good
father in the selection of its officials and employees and in their supervision. It also
claimed that written warnings were earlier sent to the towns concerned, and that there
was no direct causal relationship between the alleged damages suffered by the
respondents and the acts and omissions attributed to the former. That it was the
respondents who assumed the risk of residing near the Angat River, and even
assuming that respondents suffered damages, the cause was due to a fortuitous event
and such damages are of the nature and character of damnum absque injuria, hence,
respondents have no cause of action against them.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners can escape civil liability by invoking force majeure as the proximate
cause of the loss and damage.

HELD:

No. Petitioners cannot escape liability because their negligence is the proximate cause
of the loss and damage. Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable.
It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated,
as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. 7 As a
general rule, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable.

However, the principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act
must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is
found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active
intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
 Land Bank v. CA – 249 SCRA 149; (MR) 258 SCRA 404

FACTS:

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified benificiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the alledge lapses of the DAR and the Land bank
with respect to te valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657. Wherein, private respondents alleged that without complying
with the requirement of sec. 16(e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and
Land bank bonds in an accessible bank, the TCTs of private respondent were totally
cancelled and were transferred to farmer beneficiaries, based on the request of DAR
together with the certification of the Land bank. In this agrarian dispute petitioner assail
the decision of the CA which granted private respondents’ petition for certiorari and
mandamus. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied
the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of property of private respondents without prompt payment
can be considered “just”.

HELD:

No. The court reiterated the cardinal rule that within the context of the State’s inherent
Power of Eminent Domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within
a reasonable time from its taking, furthermore the Supreme Court did not abandon the
recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
 Panes v. VISCA – 264 SCRA 708

FACTS:

This is an expropriation case wherein both petitioner and respondent seemed to review
the petition of respondent court on different consolidated petitions.

On March 21, 1977 then President Marcos issued PD 1107 establishing PRCRTC
VISCA as well as authorizing said school to acquire/expropriate private agricultural
properties. VISCA filed expropriation complaint and writ of possession due to the fact
that they deposited the assessed value for areas mentioned on PD 1107 in the PNB.
Series of prayer for different petitions were filed by both parties. On March 29, 1979 trial
court issued a resolution denying the motion of VISCA on writ of possession. From then
on different petitions were filed by VISCA to include the filing of motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the case docketed as CA-G.R. No 10250-
CAR(originally CAR 1659),said motion was granted on February 20, 1980.Respondent
court found the dismissal of the expropriation case to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion due to 1.petitioner sent request to opposing counsels and to the trial court for
cancellation of hearing;2.scheduled hearing were subject of injunction;3first time VISCA
sought for postponement;4.no basis for the conclusion of the lower court. Trial court
ruled out that PD 1533 has previously established a uniform basis for the determination
of just compensation and the amount of deposit for immediate possession of property
involved in eminent domain proceedings.

ISSUE:

W/N PD No, 1107, 42 and 1533 were unconstitutional.

HELD:

Trial Court set aside orders of March 29,June 21, September 6 and October 23, 1979
thus ordered VISCA to comply all the requirements of PD 1533 in relation to PD 1107
and 42, after which proceed with trial of CAR case no 1659.Thereafter herein petitioner
seek for nullification of aforementioned order wherein trial court modified the decision of
CA insofar as it ordered respondent VISCA to comply with PD 1533,issue merits only
after payment of just compensation determined by trial court in accordance with section
2, Rule 67 of the revised rules of court.
 4. Judicial Review

De Knecht v. Bautista – 100 SCRA 660

FACTS:

The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite
Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta
Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to
make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human
Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the
new route which save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation
proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among whom
was petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De

Knecht and others similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to be
expropriated seemed arbitrarily made by the DPWH.

HELD:

The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive
judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is
so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The
factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del
Pan Streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the
residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice
between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be
remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the
people.
 Manotoc v. NHA – 150 SCRA 89

FACTS:

Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and
Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees
issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the
decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by
their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were
immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the
chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that
the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the
President through his law-making powers exercises this power, the public use and
public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become
political in nature and the courts must respect the decision.

ISSUE:

WON PD No. 1669 and PD no. 1670 are constitutional.

HELD:

The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to
the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and
directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect
immediately upon the signing of the decree.

The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by
which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or
the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the
Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court but it did not do so. Obviously, it did not deem it necessary because of
the enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any
questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In
effect, the properties, under the decrees were "automatically expropriated." This
became more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to
cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only
with copies of the decrees to support its request.
 Republic v. De Knecht – 182 SCRA 141

FACTS:

De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of
EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the
Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the
lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted
the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case
was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken despite the SC decision
until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same
properties for the same purpose. The lower court denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Is the final judgment of the court on the subject becomes the law of the case between
the parties?

HELD:

While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the
Constitution and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the
petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
appropriate court action or by legislation. When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it
was based on supervening events that occurred after the 1980 decision of the SC on
the De Knecht case was rendered. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court
to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. Moreover, the said decision
is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and
necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the
subsequent legislative fiat.
X. Section 10

Rutter v. Esteban – 93 Phil. 68

FACTS:

In August 1941, before World War 2 broke out, petitioner Royal Rutter sold to
respondent Placido Esteban two (2) parcels of land in the City of Manila.Respondent
failed to pay the 2 installments on the agreed dates – Aug. 7, 1942 and Aug. 27, 1943 –
as well as the interests that accrued thereon.

In August 1949, petitioner instituted this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover the balance due, the interest due thereon, and the attorney's fees stipulated in
the contract. Respondent admitted the averments of the complaint, but set up as a
defense the moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342. He claims that this is
a pre-war obligation contracted on August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having
filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had
suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of said Republic Act
No. 342, payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years
from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission, and this
period has not yet expired.

The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint holding that the obligation
which plaintiff (petitioner) seeks to enforce is not yet demandable under the moratorium
law. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the first time the
constitutionality of the moratorium law. Petitioner asserts that RA 342 should not be
applicable to the present case as it is unconstitutional being violative of the
constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of obligation of contracts.

ISSUE:

W/N RA 342 violates the Constitution when applied to the case at bar?

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that under the prevailing circumstances, the continued operation
and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 is unreasonable and oppressive, and should
not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and
void and without effect.
In addition, the Court also said that the true test of the constitutionality of a moratorium
statute lies in the determination of the period of suspension of the remedy. It is required
that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the
constitution.
 Del Rosario v. De los Santos – L-20589-90

FACTS:

This petition for the review of a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations represents
still another attempt to assail the validity of Section 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
1955, which empowers a tenant "to change the tenancy contract from one of share
tenancy to the leasehold tenancy and vice versa and from one crop sharing
arrangement to another of the share tenancy." Such attempts in the past on the part of
landowners were singularly unsuccessful, its validity having been consistently upheld.
Two petitions were filed by now-respondents Victorino de los Santos and Tomas de los
Santos before respondent Court of Agrarian Relations on April 28, 1961, manifesting
their desire, as tenants of herein petitioner-landowner, Ernesto del Rosario, to take
advantage of Section 14 (Change of System) and to adopt the leasehold system
provided, thus changing their previous status as tenants,a decision was rendered by the
Court of Agrarian Relations, rejecting the claim of unconstitutionality of section 14 of the
said Act as without merit and declaring the relationship between respondent tenants
and petitioner-landowner to be one of leasehold tenancy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of an existing

contract because of Section 14 of the Tenancy Act.

HELD:

No. The objection to the validity of Section 14 in this case was premised not only on the
alleged impairment of an existing obligation but likewise on the transgression to the
freedom of contract concept which is embraced in the liberty safeguarded by the due
process clause. Its validity then as a police power measure is now beyond question.

Reinforced by the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution,
the attribute of police power justifies the enactment the said Act. That public interest
would be served by governmental measures intended to aid the economically under-
privileged is apparent to all.

Obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such
power is exercised, as in this case, to preserve the security of the State and the means
adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are not arbitrary
or oppressive.The Constitution ordains the promotion of social justice and the protection
to labor, especially to working women
The purpose of this Act (Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955), according to Section 2
thereof, is 'to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants
upon the principle of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both
tenants and landlords.
 Abella v. NLRC – 152 SCRA 140

FACTS:

Herein petitioner leased a farm land in Monteverde, Negros Occidental, known as

Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten years, which was also renewable at her
option for another ten years. She extended the lease contract for another ten years.
During the existence of the lease, she employed herein private respondents Romeo
Quitco and Ricardo Dionele, Sr., who were farm worker and regular employee
respectively, and were later on promoted. Upon the expiration of the leasehold rights,
petitioner dismissed private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners
thereof, who continued the management, cultivation and operation of the farm.

The private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor
and Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with back wages.
The Labor Arbiter held a decision in favor of the private respondents with regards to the
separation pay but ruled that the dismissal was warranted by the cessation of business.

The petitioner raised the issue to the Supreme Court on certiorari. She claimed that
since her lease agreement had already expired, she is not liable for payment of
separation pay. Neither could she reinstate the private respondents in the farm as this is
a complete cessation or closure of a business operation. Also, she contends that Article
284 of the Labor Code, a provision used by the Labor Arbiter as basis in granting the
separation fee, violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations
and contracts, because when she leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona, neither she nor the
lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to workers at
the end of the lease.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 284 violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of
obligations and contracts as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:

The Court ruled that such contention is untenable. The case of Anucension v. National
Labor Union was cited as follows:
In spite of the constitutional prohibition the State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguard said
interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are existing
laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is
subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in reference
to the possible exercise of that power. Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may
be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing
that which otherwise may be prohibited.

In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract of

obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all
circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined,
has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstance.
Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for
the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted must be
legitimate, i.e. within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony
with the constitutional limitation of that power.
 Phil. Vet. Bank Employees v. Phil. Vet. Bank – 189 SCRA 14

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case dispute the power of the Central Bank to liquidate PVB
claiming that as the Bank was created by a special law, a contractual relationship now
exists between the Government and the stockholders of the Bank that cannot be
disturbed without violation of the impairment clause. The acceptance of the benefits of
that law by the petitioners had conferred a vested right on them that cannot now be
withdrawn without their consent as this would constitute a deprivation of their property
without due process of law. Assuming that such benefits could be validly revoked, this
cannot be done by the Central Bank only but by the legislature itself which conferred the
franchise on the Bank in the first place. Moreover, that Central Bank cannot exercise
any authority over the Bank because the latter is itself also a government bank. The
Central Bank has no control over these government lending institutions.

ISSUE:

Whether the Central Bank has the power to liquidate the Philippine Veterans Bank.

HELD:

R.A. No. 3518 itself, which created the Philippine Veterans Bank, provides in its Section
14 that the Bank shall be subject to the authority of the Department of Supervision and
Examination. The purpose of these provisions is to enable the Central Bank, as the
entity charged with the responsibility of maintaining the stability of the banking and
monetary systems of the country, to take the necessary steps against any banking
institution whose continued operation may cause prejudice to its depositors and
creditors, and the general public as well.

Even if it be conceded that the charter of the Rank constitutes a contract between the
Government and the stockholders of the Bank, it would not follow that the relationship
cannot be altered without violating the impairment clause. This is a too simplistic
conclusion that loses sight of the vulnerability of this "precious little clause," as it is
called, to the inherent powers of the State when the public interest demands their
exercise.
It was then held that contract may be altered validly if it involves the public interest, to
which private interests must yield as a postulate of the existing social order.

Supreme Court stressed that every contract involving the public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity, and that is its susceptibility to change whenever required by the
public interest. The police power can be validly asserted to make that change to meet
any one of the several great public needs, such as, in that case, regulation of the value
of money.