Civil Law Review Ii: Case Digest

CIVIL LAW REVIEW II
CASE DIGEST
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO A. URIBE
Submitted by
#30
Lozano, Marivic Zacarias
Wednesday 8:00-9:00PM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Obligations
A. In General
1. Definition
2. Kinds of Obligations as to basis & enforceability
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs Chuy Lu Tan
G.R. No. 202176,August 1, 2016
3. Prescription of Actions
4. Elements of Obligations
B. Sources of Civil Obligations

1. Law
2. Contracts
Techno Development & Chemical Corporation vs Viking Metal Industries,
G.R. No. 203179, July 4, 2016
3. Quasi-contracts
a. Negotiorum Gestio
b. Solutio Indebiti
c. Other Quasi-Contracts
4. Acts or omissions punished by law
5. Quasi-delicts
C. Compliance with Obligations
D. Kinds of Civil Obligations

1. As to Perfection & Extinguishment
a. Pure
b. Conditional
c. With a term or period
2. As to Plurality of Prestation
a. Conjunctive
b. Alternative
c. Facultative
3. As to rights & obligations of multiple parties
a. Joint
b. Solidary
c. Disjunctive
4. As to performance of prestation
a. Divisible
b. Indivisible
c. Joint indivisible
d. Solidary indivisible
5. As to the presence of an accessory undertaking in case of breach

a. With a Penal Clause distinguished from liquidated damages
E. Breach of Obligations
Manner of Breach
1. Fraud
2. Negligence
3. Delay
Cabanting v. BPI G.R. No. 201927, February 17, 2016
4. Any other manner of contravention

Excuses for non-performance
1. Fortuitous Event
Sps. Poon v. PSB G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

Act of creditor
Torres-Madrid Brokerage vs. FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance Corp.

G.R. No. 194121, July 11, 2016
F. Remedies for Breach of Obligations

1. Extra-judicial remedies
a. Expressly granted by law
b. Stipulated
2. Judicial remedies
a. Principal remedies
b. Subsidiary remedies
c. Ancillary remedies
NCLPI vs. LMI G.R. No. 176986, January 13, 2016
G. Modes of Extinguishment of Obligations

1. Payment or performance
Special Forms of Payment
a. Dation in Payment
b. Application of Payments
c. Payment by Cession or Assignment
d. Tender of payment and Consignation
2. Loss of the thing due or Impossibility of Performance
3. Condonation or Remission of debt
4. Confusion or Merger of Rights
5. Compensation
Kinds of Compensation
a. Legal
b. Conventional
c. Facultative
d. Judicial
6. Novation
Kinds of Novation
a. As to its nature
i. Subjective or personal
ii. Objective or real
b. As to its form
i. Express
ii. Implied
Odiamar v. Valencia G.R. NO. 213582, JUNE 28, 2016
7. Other Modes
Sps. Jonsay v. Solidbank Corp.

G.R. No. 206459, April 6, 2016
II. Contracts
A. In General
1. Definition
Auto- Contract
2. Elements of Contracts
a. Essential
b. Natural
c. Accidental
B. Fundamental Characteristics/Principles of Contracts

1. Consensuality of Contracts
Contract of Adhesion
2. Autonomy of Contract
3. Mutuality of Contracts
Acceleration Clause
Escalation Clause
4. Obligatory Force of Contracts

5. Relativity of Contracts
Privity of Contracts
Vda. de Rosales v. Dime G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016
C. Classification of Contracts
1. According to degree of dependence
a. Preparatory
b. Principal
c. Accessory
2. According to perfection
a. Consensual
b. Real
c. Formal
3. According to solemnity or form\
a. Any form
b. Special form
4. According to purpose
a. Transfer of ownership
b. Conveyance of use
c. Rendition of service
5. According to nature of obligation produced
a. Bilateral
b. Unilateral
6. According to cause
a. Onerous
b. Gratuitous or lucrative
c. Remuneratory
7. According to risk
a. Commutative
b. Aleatory
8. According to name
a. Nominate
b. Innominate
9. According to subject matter
a. Thing
b. Right
c. Services
D. Stages of Contracts
1. Negotiation
2. Perfection
3. Performance
4. Consummation
E. Essential elements of contracts

1. Consent of the contracting parties
Cognition Theory
Manifestation Theory
2. Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract

3. Cause of the obligation
4. Delivery
5. Due observance of prescribed formalities
MCIAA vs. Heirs of Ijordan G.R. No. 173140, January 11, 2016
F. Form of Contracts
1. Any form – oral
Kabisig Real Wealth Dev.’t, Inc. vs Young Corporation Builders

G.R. No. 212375, January 25, 2017
2. Special form
a. Validity
b. Enforceability
c. Greater efficacy or convenience
G. Reformation of Contracts
H. Interpretation of Contracts
I. Kinds of Contracts as to Validity
1. Valid and binding
2. Valid but defective
i) Rescissible Contracts
ii) Voidable Contracts
iii) Unenforceable Contracts
3. Void or inexistent
Tan v. Hosana G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016
Special Contracts
A. Sales
1. In General
Bonifacio Dana vs. Spouses Gregorio Serrano, G.R. No. 195072

August 1, 2016
 Kinds of Sale
Dasmarinas T. Arciana vs. Noemi L. Ingram
G.R. No. 196444, Feb. 15, 2017
Thelma Rodriguez vs Spouses Jaime Sioson, G.R. No. 199180, July 27,
2016
2. Elements
3. Obligations of Seller/Buyer
4. Remedies
5. Extinguishment of Sale
Lukban v. Optimum Development Bank

G.R. No. 205785, January 20, 2016
Cahayag v. CCC G.R. No. 168078, January 13, 2016
B. Barter or Exchange
C. Lease
1. In General
2. Elements
3. Obligations of Lessor/Lessee
4. Remedies
5. Termination of Lease
D. Loan
1. In General
2. Kinds of Loan
a. Commodatum
b. Mutuum
E. Deposit – Warehouse Receipts Law/Trust Receipts Law

1. In General
2. Kinds of Deposit
a. Judicial
b. Extra-judicial
i) Voluntary
ii) Necessary\
3. Nature/Characteristics
4. Subject Matter
5. Rights & Obligations of Depositor and Depository
6. Modes of Extinguishment
F. Aleatory Contracts – Insurance, Gambling, Life Annuity
Special Contracts: Accessory Contracts
G. Guaranty and Suretyship

1. Definition
2. Nature/Characteristics/Extent
3. Effects of Guaranty
a. Between the Guarantor and the Creditor
b. Between the Guarantor and the Debtor
c. Between Co-Guarantors
4. Modes of Extinguishment
Carodan v. China Banking Corp.

G.R. No. 210542, February 24, 2016
H. Pledge, Mortgage and Antichresis

1. In General
2. Essential Elements
3. Effects/Rights & Obligations
4. Extinguishment/Foreclosure
Special Contracts: Preparatory Contracts
(Business Associations and Relations)
I. Agency
1. In General
Teresita A. Buenaventura vs Metrpolitan Bank trust Company
G.R. No. 167082, August 3, 2016
2. Kinds, Creation & Existence

3. Obligations of the Agent/Principal
4. Modes of Extinguishment of Agency
J. Partnership
1. In General
2. Classes of Partnership and Partners
3. Creation and Duration
4. Obligations of Partners to one another
5. Property Rights of a Partner
6. Relations and Dealings with Third Persons
7. Dissolution, Winding Up and Termination
8. Limited Partnership
K. Trusts
1. In General
2. Kinds of Trusts
a. Express
b. Implied
III. Extra- Contractual Obligations

A. Law
B. Quasi-Contracts
C. Delicts
D. Quasi-Delicts
IV. Damages
A. In General
B. Kinds of Damages
1. Actual or Compensatory
2. Moral
3. Nominal
4. Temperate or Moderate
5. Liquidated
6. Exemplary or Corrective
The Orchard Golf & Country Club v. Yu

G.R. No. 191033, January 11, 2016
Spouses Romeo Pajares vs. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning
G.R. No. 212690,February 20, 2017
AC Development & Property Managers, Inc., G.R. No. 217732,
June 15, 2016
V- CIVIL REVIEW I- PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

A. Annulment-Psychological Incapacity
Rachel A. Del Rosario vs. Jose Del Rosario

G.R. No. 222541, Feb. 15, 2017
B. WILLS (Prohibition)
Jose Norberto Ang vs. The estate of Sy So

G.R. No. 182252, August 3, 2016
C. WILLS-PRETIRITION
Iris Morales vs Ana Maria Olondris et. al.

G.R. No. 198994, Feb. 3, 2016
D. PROPERTY Co-ownership
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tugegarao vs Florentino Prudencio

G.R. No. 187942, Sept. 7, 2016
E. Property-Accretion
Rex Daclison vs Eduardo Baytion

G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016
F. COMMON CARRIER
Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Spouses Arnulfo and evelyn Fuentabella

G.R. No. 188283, July 20, 2016
Transimex Co. Vs Mafre Insurance Corp.

G.R. No. 190271, Sept. 14, 2016
G. PRESCRIPTION-Doctrine of Laches
Heirs of Andres Naya vs. Orlando Naya

G.R. No. 215759, Nov. 28, 2016
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Petitioner
Vs.
Chuy Lu Tan, Mr. Romeo Tanco, Dr. Sy Se Hiong and Tan Chhu Hsiu Yen, Respondents
G.R. No. 202176, August 1, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: Peralta, J:
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Facts:Between Feb. 26, 1996 and May 1996, herein respondents Chuy Lu Tan and Romeo Tanco
obtained five loans from herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company with an
aggregate amount of P19,900,000.00. These loans are evidenced by five Promissory Notes
executed by Chuy and Tanco on various dates. As security for the loans, Choy executed a Real
Estate Mortgaged on Feb. 26, 1996 over a 1,449.70 square meter parcel of land in Quezon City
covered by TCT No. RT-53314 (288923). In a ddition to the said mortgage, herein respondents
Sy Se Hiong and Tan Chu Hsiu Yean also executed a Continuing Surety Agreement whereby
they bound themselves to be solidarily liable with Chiy and Tanco for the principal amount of
P19,900,000.00 plus interests thereon at the rate or rates stated in the obligation.
Subsquently, Chuy and Tanco failed to settle their loans despite repeated demands. Metrobank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property, howver the Metrobank contended that after
application of the bid price , there remained a deficiency of P1,641,815.00 as of Jan. 15, 2000 as
such Metrobank demanded payment and for failure to pay filed a suit for collection of sum f
money.
The RTC ruled in favor of Metrobank ordering the respondents jointly and severally the amount
of P1,641,815.00. The CA reversed th ruling of the RTC, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the penalties imposed by Petitioner is excessive?

Ruling. Yes.
The Court finds that the eighteen percent (18%) penalty charge imposed by petitioner on the
deficiency claim , computed from the time of default , as excessive and accordingly, reduces it
consideeing that petitioner was already able to recover a large portion of repondents principal
obligation. In consonance with the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to reduce
the rate of penalty charge imposed on the deficiency claim from 18% per annum to 12% per
annum.
Article 1229. The Judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance,
the penalty may also be reduced by the Courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
Techno Development & Chemical Corporation, Petitioner
Vs.
Viking Metal Industries Incorporated, Petitioner
G.R. No. 203179, July 4, 2016
Third Division
Ponente:PERALTA, J.:
Nature of the Action: Review on Certiorari UNDER Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Facts: On Sept. 23, 1993, respondent Viking Metal Industries, Incorporated (VMI) , through its
President and General Manager, Brilly Bernardez, represented to the PNOC Energy
Development Corporation its bid proposal to supply and deliver , within 160 days , various
fabricated items consisting of pipe shoes and structural supports , for the PNOC-EDC First 40
MW Mindanao-Geothermal Project (MG Project). The project was awarded to VMI for having
the lowest bid of P6,794,172.30. Pending the execution of a formal contract, VMI and PNOC-
EDC agreed that the bid document and the Notice of Award shall constitute as the binding
contract between them. In a meeting held among the representatives of PNOC-EDC, VMI and
herein petitioner Techno Development & Chemical Corporation, the parties agreed to paint the
fabricated items with Ultrazine Primer, an ant-rust primer manufactured by petitioner Techno.
Consequently, VMI began purchasing said primer from Techno, while Techno provided VMI
with technical personnel to supervise the application of the primer on the fabricated items.
Thereafter, VMI made several deliveries of the fabricated items to PNOC-EDC but on the third
week of June 1994, PNOC-EDC advised VMI of the rejection of 410 pcs of the fabricated items
due to premature rusting of the coated surfaces thereof. On July 13, 1994, the VMI and Techno
representatives met again and agreed that corrective measures on the defective painting would
have to be done. Subsequently VMI and PNOC-EDC encountered several delays and consequent
contract extensions due to defeciencies and non-conformance of the fabricated items with
PNOC-EDC’s specifications. The PNOC-EDC decreased the contract price of P6,794,172.30,
which was adjusted to P6,871,605.64 in February 1996 to P6,578,034.99.
In a letter dated April 3, 1998, VMI appealed PNOC-EDC to reconsider its demand of
P2,265,645.09 as the total collectible amount representing liquidated damages and deductions
rationating that delay was ultimately attributable to the poor and substandard primer paint of
Techno. In Sept. 30, 1999 VMI filed a case against PNOC-EDC and Techno for the
reimbursement of P550,000.00 for the alleged repairs done on the defective coating of the
fabricated items. The Techno however alleged that VMI has outstanding balance as evidenced by
Invoices and Statement of Accounts of paints deliver to them.
The RTC ruled in favour of VMI ordering PNOC-EDC to pay the balance as examination of the
evidence on record shows that the delay of the plaintiff in the performance of its obligation
cannot be solely attributed to it. It was clear that PNOC-EDC acknowledged the fact that the
delay was caused by the defendant Techno. RTC also ordered Techno to pay the P550,000.00
reimbursements and ordering both defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of
P100,000.00 for as attorney’s fees plus cost of suit. CA ruled in favour of Techno, deleting the
P550,000.00 actual damages in favour of VMI. The CA affirm the decision with modification.
Issue: Whether or not VMI is liable for the alleged unpaid obligation to Techno?
Ruling: Yes. Here, the Court finds that petitioner Techno duly proved its claims that VMI
purchased paint products there from, that the same were delivered to VMI and and that VMI
failed to fully pay the price thereof. A cursory reading of the record shows that VMI never
bothered to refute Techno’s counterclaim by contrary evidence or by any sort of denial in its
pleading before RTC and CA. Ultimately , it must be noted that if Techno’s claim was to be
denied simply by the failure of the lower courts to pass upon the same in their decisions, without
any factual or legal explanation therefor, VMI would be unjustly enriched at the expense of
Techno for failure to pay the paints received.
The award of P550,000.00 in favour of VMI was deleted and ordered the PNOC-EDC to pay the
amount of P2,230,410.10. And ordered VMI to pay P166,750.00 to Techno Development and
Chemical Corporation the unpaid purchased paints product plus interest
Vicente Cabanting and Lalaine Cabanting, Petitioners
vs.
BPI Savings Bank, INC., Respondents
G.R. No. 201927, February 17, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: PERALTA, J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:Petitioners bought on installment basis from Diamond Motors Corporation a 2002

Mitsubishi Adventure SS MT and for value received, petitioners also signed, executed and
delivered to Diamond Motors a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage. Therein, petitioners
jointly and severally obligated themselves to pay Diamond Motors the sum of P836,032.00,
payable in monthly instalments. On the day of the execution of the document, Diamond Motors,
with notice to petitioners, executed a Deed of Assignment, thereby assigning to BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc. (BPI Family) all its rights, title and interest to the Promissory Note with
Chattel Mortgage.
A Complaint was filed by BPI Family against petitioners for Replevin and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), praying that petitioners be ordered to pay the unpaid
portion of the vehicle's purchase price. BPI Family alleged that petitioners failed to pay three (3)
consecutive installments and despite written demand sent to petitioners through registered mail,
petitioners failed to comply with said demand to pay or to surrender possession of the vehicle to
BPI Family.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that they sold the subject vehicle to one Victor S. Abalos,
with the agreement that the latter shall assume the obligation to pay the remaining monthly
installments. It was then Abalos who made payments to BPI Family through his personal checks,
and BPI Family accepted the post-dated checks delivered to it by Abalos. Petitioners pointed out
that BPI Family should have sued Abalos instead of them.
The RTC ruled in favour of BPI. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of RTC.
Petitioners argue that the following stipulation should be deemed invalid as the document
executed was a contract of adhesion:
"[i]n case of my/our [petitioners'] failure to pay when due and payable, any sum which I/We x x
x or any of us may now or in the future owe to the holder of this note x x x then the entire sum
outstanding under this note shall immediately become due and payable without the necessity of
notice or demand which I/We hereby waive."
Issue:Whether the stipulation in a contract of adhesion stating that ‘failure to pay will make the
obligation due and demandable’ is an invalid stipulatin.
Ruling:No.A contract of adhesion, wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on
the other, is not strictly against the law. A contract of adhesion is as binding as ordinary
contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it
entirely. Contrary to petitioner's contention, not every contract of adhesion is an invalid
agreement.
The validity or cnforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be determined by the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the situation of the parties concerned.
Indeed, Article 24 of the New Civil Code provides that "[in] all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant
for his protection." x x x
Here, there is no proof that petitioners were disadvantaged, uneducated or utterly inexperienced
in dealing with financial institutions; thus, there is no reason for the court to step in and protect
the interest of the supposed weaker party.
SPOUSES JAIME and MATILDE POON , Petitioner
Vs
PRIME SAVINGS BANK, Respondent
G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016
First Division
Ponente: SERENO, CJ.:
Facts: Spouses Poon owned a commercial building which they used for their bakery business.
Matilde Poon and PSB executed a 10-year Contract of Lease over the building for the latter's use
as its branch office. They agreed to a fixed monthly rental of P60,000, with an advance payment
of the rentals for the first 100 months in the amount of P6,000,000. As agreed, the advance
payment was to be applied immediately, while the rentals for the remaining period of the
Contract were to be paid on a monthly basis.
Three years later, however, the BSP placed PSB under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) by virtue of BSP Monetary Board Resolution No. 22. The BSP
eventually ordered PSB's liquidation under Monetary Board Resolution No. 664. PSB vacated
the leased premises and surrendered them to petitioners. Subsequently, the PDIC issued Spouses
Poon a demand letter asking for the return of the unused advance rental amounting to P3,480,000
on the ground that the lease agreement had become inoperative, because respondent's closure
constituted force majeure. The PDIC likewise invoked the principle of rebus sic stantibus under
Article 1267 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) as alternative legal basis for demanding the
refund.
Spouses Poon, however, refused the PDIC's demand. They maintained that they were entitled to
retain the remainder of the advance rentals following their Contract.
The RTC ordered the partial rescission of the lease agreement. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the PSB may be released from its contractual obligations to petitioners on
grounds of fortuitous event under Article 1174 of the Civil Code and unforeseen event under
Article 1267 of the Civil Code?
Ruling: No. The closure of respondent's business was neither a fortuitous nor an unforeseen
event that rendered the lease agreement functus officio.
Respondent posits that it should be released from its contract with petitioners, because the
closure of its business upon the BSP' s order constituted a fortuitous event as the Court held in
Provident Savings Bank. The cited case, however, must always be read in the context of the
earlier Decision in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals. The Court ruled in that case that the
Monetary Board had acted arbitrarily and in bad faith in ordering the closure of Provident
Savings Bank. Accordingly, in the subsequent case of Provident Savings Bank it was held that
fuerza mayor had interrupted the prescriptive period to file an action for the foreclosure of the
subject mortgage.
In contrast, there is no indication or allegation that the BSP's action in this case was tainted with
arbitrariness or bad faith. Instead, its decision to place respondent under receivership and
liquidation proceedings was pursuant to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653. Moreover,
respondent was partly accountable for the closure of its banking business. It cannot be said, then,
that the closure of its business was independent of its will as in the case of Provident Savings
Bank. The legal effect is analogous to that created by contributory negligence in quasi-delict
actions.
Under this theory, the parties stipulate in light of certain prevailing conditions, and the theory can
be made to apply when these conditions cease to exist.35 The Court, however, has once
cautioned that Article 1267 is not an absolute application of the principle of rebus sic stantibus,
otherwise, it would endanger the security of contractual relations. After all, parties to a contract
are presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is only in absolutely
exceptional changes of circumstance, therefore, that equity demands assistance for the debtor.
Torres-Madrid Brokerage, Inc., Petitioner
Vs
FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance Corp. And Benjamin P. Manalastas doing business under
the name of BMT Trucking Services, Respondent
G.R. No. 194121, July 11, 2016
Second Division
Ponente: BRION, J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts: On Oct. 7, 2001, a shipment of various electronic goods from Thailand and Malaysia
arrived at the Port of Manila for Sonny Philippines, Inc. Previous to the arrival, Sony had
engaged the services of TMBI to facilitate, process, withdraw, and deliver the shipment from the
port to its warehouse in Binan, Laguna.
TMBI, did not own any delivery trucks, subcontracted the services of Benjamin Manalastas’s
company, BMT Trucking Services to transport from the port to Binan, Laguna. BMT trucks
picked up the shipment from the port at about 11:00a.m. of Oct. 7, 2000. However, BMT could
not immediately undertake the delivery because of the truck ban and the following day was a
Sunday. Thus , BMT scheduled the delivery on Oct. 9, 2000. In the early morning of Oct. 9,
2000, the four trucks of left atBMT’s garage for Laguna. However, only three trucks arrived at
Sony’s Binan warehouse. At around 12:00 noon, the truck driven by Rufo Reynaldo Lapesura
(NSF-391) was found abandoned along Diversion Road in Filinvest, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
Both the driver and the shipment were missing.
TMBI, notified Sony for the loss through a letter dated Oct. 10, 2000, it also sent a letter to BMT
demanding payment for the lost shipment. BMT refused to pay, insisting that the goods were
hijacked.
MITSUI after evaluating the claim of Sony paid the corresponding value of the lost goods. After
subrogated to Sony’s right Mitsui demanded payment from TMBI . TMBI refused to pay
Mitsui’s claim, as a result Mitsui filed a a complaint against TMBI on Nov. 6, 2001. TMBI ,
impeaded Benjamin Manalastas, the owner of BMT Trucking.
In the trial, it was revealed that BMT and TMBI have been doing business with each other since
early 80’s . It also came out that there had been a previous hijacking incident involving Sonys
cargo in 1997 but neither Sony nor its insurer filed a complaint against TMBI or BMT.
The RTC found TMBI and Benjamin Manalastas as jointly and solidarily liable to pay Mitsui
Php7,293,386.23 as actual damages, attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed and
the cost of the suit. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC and found petitioner TMBI and
Benjamin Manalastas jointly and solidarily liable to FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance Co., Inc. for
damages from the loss of transported cargo.
Issue: Whether or not the hijacking of the truck was fortuitous event?
Ruling: No. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of transporting passenger or goods or both by land , water, air, offering their services to
public. TMBI’s and BMT are available to anyone willing to pay its fees. Undeniably TMBI is a
common carrier and should be held responsible for the loss, destructtion, deterioration of goods
its transports unless it results from:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the container;
5. Order or act of competent authority.
For all other cases such as theft or robbery , a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless it can prove that it observed extra ordinary diligence. The
theft and robbery is not considered a fortuitous event or a force majeure.
Nissan Car Lease Phils., Inc., Petitioner
vs.
Lica Management, Inc. and Proton Pilipinas, Inc. Respondent
G.R. No. 176986, January 13, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: JARDELEZA, J.:
Facts:LMI is the absolute owner of a property. It entered into a contract with NCLPI for the latter
to lease the property for a term often (10) years with a monthly rental of P308,000.00 and an
annual escalation rate often percent (10%). NCLPI, with LMFs consent, allowed its subsidiary
Nissan Smartfix Corporation (NSC) to use the leased premises.
NCLPI failed to pay the monthly rent, such that its total rental arrearages amounted to
P1,741,520.85. Nissan and Lica verbally agreed to convert the arrearages into a debt to be
covered by a promissory note and twelve (12) postdated checks, each amounting to P162,541.95
as monthly payments.
While NCLPI was able to deliver the postdated checks per its verbal agreement with LMI, it
failed to sign the promissory note and pay the checks. Thus, in a letter, LMI informed NCLPI
that it was terminating their Contract of Lease due to arrears in the payment of rentals. It also
demanded that NCLPI (1) pay the amount of P2,651,570.39 for unpaid rentals and (2) vacate the
premises within five (5) days from receipt of the notice.
NCLPI replied to LMI's letter acknowledging the arrearages incurred by it under their Contract
of Lease. Claiming, however, that it has no intention of abandoning the lease and citing efforts to
negotiate a possible sublease of the property.
Later on, LMI, entered into a Contract of Lease with Proton over the subject premises. NCLPI
demanded Proton to vacate the leased premises. However, Proton refused to vacate the property
on the ground that it was occupying the property based on a lease contract with LMI. In a letter
of even date addressed to LMI, NCLPI asserted that its failure to pay rent does not automatically
result in the termination of the Contract of Lease nor does it give LMI the right to terminate the
same.23 NCLPI also informed LMI that since it was unlawfully ousted from the leased premises
and was not deriving any benefit therefrom, it decided to stop payment of the checks issued to
pay the rent.
NCLPI alleged that LMI and Proton "schemed" and "colluded" to unlawfully force NCLPI (and
its subsidiary NSC) from the premises. Since it has not abandoned its leasehold right, NCLPI
asserts that the lease contract between LMI and Proton is void for lack of a valid cause or
consideration.
The trial court ruled in favour of LMI. The CA affirmd the trial court’s decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:Whether the extrajudicial rescission of lease contract is valid.
Ruling:Yes.It is clear from the records that NCLPI committed substantial breaches of its
Contract of Lease with LMI.
It is true that NCLP1 and LMI's Contract of Lease does not contain a provision expressly
authorizing extrajudicial rescission. LMI can nevertheless rescind the contract, without prior
court approval, pursuant to Art. 1191 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1191 provides that the power to rescind is implied in reciprocal obligations, in cases
where one of the obligors should fail to comply with what is incumbent upon him. Otherwise
stated, an aggrieved party is not prevented from extrajudicially rescinding a contract to protect its
interests, even in the absence of any provision expressly providing for such right.
Nympa Odiamar, Petitioner
vs.
Linda Odiamar Valencia, Respondent
G.R. NO. 213582, June 28, 2016
First Division
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for review on certiorari.
Facts:On August 20, 2003, respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
petitioner, alleging that the latter owed her P2,100,000.00. Petitioner issued China Bank a check
for the said amount to guarantee the payment of the debt, but upon presentment, the same was
dishonored. For her part, petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it
was her deceased parents who owed respondent money.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay. The CA concurred with the
RTC that novation took place insofar as petitioner was substituted in place ·of petitioner's late
parents, considering that petitioner undertook to pay her deceased parents' debt. However, the
CA opined that there was no novation with respect to the object of the contract, following the
rule that an obligation is not novated by an instrument which expressly recognizes the old
obligation and changes only the terms of paying the same, as in this case where the parties
merely modified the terms of payment of the P2, 100,000.00.
Issue:Whether or not petitioner should be held liable to respondent for the entire debt in the
amount of P2, 100,000.00 due to novation.
Ruling:Yes. Having admitted that she obtained loans from respondent without showing that the
same had already been paid or otherwise extinguished, petitioner cannot now aver otherwise. It is
settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove
them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when it is shown that they have
been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually made, neither of
which was shown to exist in this case. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by her admission of
liability and the only material question remaining is the extent of such liability.
Based on the records of this case, respondent, for her part, admitted that petitioner's deceased
parents owed her P700,000.00 of the P2, 100,000.00 debt and that petitioner owed her Pl ,
400,000.00 only. While it is observed that petitioner had indeed admitted that she agreed to settle
her late parents' debt, which was supposedly evinced by (a) the P2,100,000.00 check she issued
therefor, and (b) several installment payments she made to respondent from December 29, 2000
to May 31, 2003, there was no allegation, much less any proof 'to show, that the estates of her
deceased parents were released from liability thereby. In S.C. Megaworld Construction and
Development Corporation v. Parada, the Court held that to constitute novation by substitution of
debtor, the former debtor must be expressly released from the obligation and the third person or
new debtor must assume the former's place in the contractual relations. Moreover, the Court
ruled that the "fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has assumed the
obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors and not novation." At its core, novation is
never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express
agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken. 46
Here, the intent to novate was not satisfactorily proven by respondent. At best, petitioner only
manifested her desire to shoulder the debt of her parents, which, as above-discussed, does not
amount to novation. Thus, the courts a quo erred in holding petitioner liable for the debts
obtained by her deceased parents on account of novation by substitution of the debtor.
Spouses Florante E. Jonsay and Luzviminda L. Jonsay and Momarco Import Co, Inc.,
Petitioners
vs.
Solidbank Corporation (now Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company), Respondent
G.R. No. 206459, April 6, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: Reyes, J.
FACTS:Momarco, controlled and owned by the Spouses Jonsay, is an importer, manufacturer

and distributor of animal health and feedmill products catering to cattle, hog and poultry
producers. On November 9, 1995, and again on April 28, 1997, Momarco obtained loans of
P40,000,000.00 and P20,000,000.00, respectively from Solidbank for which the Sps. Jonsay
executed a blanket mortgage over three parcels of land they owned in Calamba, Laguna
registered in their names containing a total of 23,733 square meters.
On November 3, 1997, the loans were consolidated under one promissory note, signed by
Florante as President of Momarco. The stipulated rate of interest was 18.75% per annum along
with an escalation clause, by which Solidbank was eventually able to unilaterally increase the
interest charges up to 30% per annum.
Momarco religiously paid the monthly interest charged by Solidbank from November 1995 until
January 1998. Claiming that business reverses brought on by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
persistent demands by Solidbank, Momarco made its last monthly interest payment in April 1998
in the amount of P1,000,000.00. Solidbank applied the said payment to Momarco’s accrued
interest for February 1998.
Solidbank proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose on the mortgage. On September 22, 1999,

Sheriff Adelio Perocho issued a certificate of sale to Solidbank, duly annotated on April 15, 1999
on the lots’ titles. The spouses filed a complaint against Solidbank, Sheriff Perocho and the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna for Annulment of the Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage, Injunction, Accounting and Damages with a Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injuction.
The RTC granted the petitioners’ application, thus suspending the consolidation of Solidbank’s
titles to the lots. The CA, in its amended decision, upheld the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, the consolidation of titles of Solidbank in the foreclosed properties.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners’ mere proposal to extinguish their loan obligations by way
of dacion en pago novate the mortgage contract.
HELD:No.
On the question of the petitioners’ failed proposal to extinguish their loan obligations by way of
dacion en pago, no bad faith can be imputed to Solidbank for refusing the offered settlement as
to render itself liable for moral and exemplary damages after opting to extrajudicially foreclose
on the mortgage. In Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Philippine National
Bank, the Court held:
Dacion en pago is a special mode of payment whereby the debtor offers another thing to the
creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding obligation. The undertaking is
really one of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor,
payment for which is to be charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential of a contract
of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. It is only
when the thing offered as an equivalent is accepted by the creditor that novation takes place,
thereby, totally extinguishing the debt.
On the first issue, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Tecnogas has no clear legal right
to an injunctive relief because its proposal to pay by way of dacion en pago did not extinguish its
obligation. Undeniably, Tecnogas’ proposal to pay by way of dacion en pago was not accepted by
PNB. Thus, the unaccepted proposal neither novates the parties’ mortgage contract nor suspends
its execution as there was no meeting of the minds between the parties on whether the loan will
be extinguished by way of dacion en pago. Necessarily, upon Tecnogas’ default in its obligations,
the foreclosure of the REM becomes a matter of right on the part of PNB, for such is the purpose
of requiring security for the loans.
JUANA VDA. DE ROJALES, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY
CELERINA ROJALES-SEVILLA, Petitioners
vs.
Marcelino Dime substituted by his, represented by Bonifacia Manibay, Respondent
G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016
Third Division
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:Juana Vda. de Rojales owned a parcel of land. Marcelino Dime alleged that petitioner
conveyed under a pacto de retro contract in favor of respondent for and in consideration of the
sum of P2,502,932.10. Petitioner reserved the right to repurchase the property for the same price
within a period of nine (9) months. Despite repeated verbal and formal demands to exercise her
right, petitioner refused to exercise her right to repurchase the subject property.
In her answer, petitioner denied the execution of the pacto de retro sale in favor of respondent
and alleged that she had not sold the subject property. She claimed that the document presented
by respondent was falsified since the fingerprint appearing therein was not hers and the signature
of the Notary Public Modesto S. Alix was not his.
It was concluded therein that the questioned thumbmark appearing on the original-duplicate copy
of the notarized pacto de retro sale and the standard right thumbmark, taken by Police Officer
Marcelo Quintin Sosing, were impressed by and belong to the same person, the petitioner.
Respondent passed away before the trial on the merits of the case ensued. Being his compulsory
heirs, respondent's estranged wife Bonifacia Dime and their children Cesario Antonio Dime and
Marcelino Dime, Jr., substituted him in the suit.
The heirs of respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the
ground that it was Rufina Villamin, respondent's common law wife, who was the source of the
fund in purchasing. They alleged that the consolidation of ownership and title to respondent
would be prejudicial to Villamin and would unjustly enrich them.
Issue:Whether Rufina Villamin substituted respondent in the personal rights and obligations in
the pacto de retro sale?
Ruling:No.We have consistently held that the parties to a contract are the real parties-in-interest
in an action upon it. The basic principle of relativity of contracts is that contracts can only bind
the parties who entered into it, and cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware
of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. Hence, one who is not a party to a
contract, and for whose benefit it was not expressly made, cannot maintain an action on it. One
cannot do so, even if the contract performed by the contracting parties would incidentally inure
to one's benefit.
As evidenced by the contract of Pacto de Retro sale, petitioner, the vendor, bound herself to sell
the subject property to respondent, the vendee, and reserved the right to repurchase the same
property for the same amount within a period of nine (9) months from March 24, 1999 to
December 24, 1999. Therefore, in an action for the consolidation of title and ownership in the
name of vendee in accordance with Article 1616 of the Civil Code, the indispensable parties are
the parties to the Pacto de Retro Sale - the vendor, the vendee, and their assigns and heirs.
Villamin, as the alleged source of the consideration, is not privy to the contract of sale between
the petitioner and the respondent. Therefore, she could not maintain an action for consolidation
of ownership and title of the subject property in her name since she was not a party to the said
contract.
.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority, Petitioner
vs
Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, , namely , Julian Cuison, FranciscaCuison ,Damastna Cuison,
Pastor Cuison, Angelina Cuison, Mansueto Cuison, Bonifacia Cuison, Basilio Cuison,
Moises Cuison, and Florencio Cuison, Respondent
G.R. No. 173140, January 11, 2016
First Division
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.:
Nature of the Action:
Facts:Julian Cuizon executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale covering the subject
lot in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of
petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Since then until the present,
MCIAA remained in material, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the subject
lot through the CAA, later renamed the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT), and is presently
known as the Air Transportation Office (ATO). The subject lot was transferred and conveyed to
MCIAA by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958.
The respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the
subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was reconstituted in the names of
the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca,
Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all
surnamed Cuison. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not
authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.
The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of the OCT prompted MCIAA to
sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, alleging in its complaint that the certificate of
title conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the
Government in 1957; that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes in the
name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal obligation
to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of a new one in its
name.
The RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of the respondents
in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian. The CA affirmed the
orders of the RTC.
Issue:Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to MCIAA
Ruling:No.The Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the subject lot were
concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of the
authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. xxx. Hence,
the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents
for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to
their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract
in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to
represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked
by the other contracting party. But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and
effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by
virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part.
Petitioners: Kabisig Real Wealth Dev., Inc. and Fernando C.
Vs.
Respondent: Young Corporation Builders
G.R. No. 212375, January 25, 2017
Second Division
Ponente: Peralta J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review
Facts: Sometimes in 2001, Kabisig Real Wealth Dev., Inc. through Fernando C. Tio contracted
the services of Young Builders Corp. To supply labor, tools, equipment and materials for the
renovation of its building in Cebu City. Young Builders then finished the work in Sept. 2001 and
billed Kabisig for P4,123,320.95. However despite numerous demands, Kabisig failed to pay. It
contended that there was no written contract was ever entered and they were not informed of the
estimated cost of the renovation. Young Builders filed an action for Collection of Sum of Money.
RTC decided in favour of Young Builders and ordered respondents Kabisig to pay P4,123,320.95
P4,123,320.95 representing the value of services rendered and materials used in renovation of
the building of Kabisig plus 12% per annum from Sept. 11, 2001 until its fully paid. Kabisig
elevated the case to CA ON June 28, 2013, the appellate Court affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not there is a contract between Young Builders and Kabisig?
Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of CA.
Kabisig’s claim as to the absence of a written contract between the parties simply does not hold
water. It is settled that once perfected, a contract is generally binding in whatever form, whether
written or oral, it may have been entered into, provided the aforementioned essential requisites
for its validity is present. Article 1356 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.
Tomas P. Tan, Petitioner
Vs.
Jose G. Hosana, Respondent
G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016
Second Division
Ponente: BRION, J.:
Facts:Jose G. Hosana married Milagros C. Hosana. During their marriage, Jose and Milagros
bought a house and lot.
Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of
sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor. The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for
the lot was P200,000.00. After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was
issued in the name of Tomas.
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages

against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City. Jose contended that while he
was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to
execute the SPA by forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros
to sell the subject property to Tomas.
Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value and alleged that the SPA
authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the title.
The RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to Tomas. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling.
Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling.
Issue:Whether Tomas can recover what he has paid in a void deed of sale?
Ruling:No.Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be
considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim.
Tomas' bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given weight
and credence.A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. 47
This rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of
a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse's written consent. 48 A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. 49 It cannot be validated either by
ratification or prescription. When, however, any of the terms of a void contract have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been
given under it.
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what has been
given is in order."52 This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states
that "every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same." Hence, the restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a
void and inexistent contract.
In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence
of the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce
satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual consideration
and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent
of both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence
of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of
sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual
consideration paid.
Bonifacio Dana, Petitioner
Vs
Spouses Gregorio Serrano and Adelaida Reyes, Respondents
G.R. No. No. 195072, August 1, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: PERALTA:J:
Nature of the Action: Petition for review on Certiorari
Facts: Respondents spouse Gregorio Serrano and Adelaida Reyes are registered owners of a
parcel of land consisting of a total area of 23,981 square meters situated in Sta Cruz, Lubao
Pampanga and covered by OCT No. 6947. Sometime in the year 1940 and 1950, the property
was still co-owned by respondents Gregorio and his siblings, Gregorio’s sisters, Marciana and
Felicidad, gave petitioner Bonifacio Danan and a certain Artemio Vitug permission to possess
400 square meters each of the total estate to build their homes thereon in exchange of one cavan
of palay every year. Thereafter Gregorio sold to Bonifacio and Artemio their respective 400
square meters for Six Thousand Pesos. While Bonifacio and Artemio was able to pay the initial
payment of P2,000.00 as agreed in the contract they were both unable to pay the balance of the
purchase price when they fell due on June 30, 1977 and June 30, 1978, nevertheless they
remained in possession of the properties.
In a complaint dated Sept. 10, 1998, the spouses Serrano, through their son and attorney-in-fact,
Arnel Francisco Serrano, instituted ejectment proceedings against Bonifacio and Artemio ,
alleging that they are merely caretakers and prayed that the properties be vacated. The complaint
was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Meanwhile in a complaint for specific
performance dated Nov. 3, 1998, Bonifacio alleged that they purchased their respective portions
of land via the Agreement Receipt Form dated June 27, 1976 and sinced then stop the rental of
one cavan of palay yearly. While they admitted failure to pay the balance of P4,000.00, they
claimed that such was due to the continuous absence of the spouses Serrano. They were shocked
when they found out that the Serrano’s obtained the title over the subject property. According to
Bonifacio and Artemio, Gregorio intentionally deceived them into signing the documents in May
1992 purportedly intended to facilitate the processing and issuance of their titles. Bonifacio and
Serrano prayed for the delivery of the proper Deed of Sale and declared the documents they
signed on May 1992 as null and void and for the award of moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Respondents spouses asserted that they are the owners of the subject properties and that the
possession of Bonifacio and Artemio are merely by tolerance and that the Agreement in Receipt
Form date June 27, 1976 are merely Contract to Sell, of which failure by the vendees to fully
price agreed thereon prevents the transfer of ownership from Vendor to Vendees.
RTC ruled in favor of Bonifacio and Artemio , ordering the Spouses Serrano to deliver the proper
Deed of Sale and to accept the balance of P4,000.00 pesos as agreed upon and pay consequent
moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Accoding to the Trial Court the acceptance of a
down payment means that the contract is no longer executory but partly executed. The CA
reversed the decision , hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the agreement is a Contract of Sale or a Contract to Sell?
Ruling: The agreement is a Contract to Sell.

As expressly stipulated therein, the parties agreed that in June 1978, upon the completion of the
full payment of the agreed price, the herein vendor will deliver to the vendee a title to the
corresponding to the lot or portion sold. Clearly the title to the property was to remain with the
Spouses Serrano , to pass only to Bonifacio and Artemio until his full payment of the purchase
price. If the Agreement is a Contract of sale, Bonifacio would not have prayed in his Complaint
that a proper Deed OF Sale together with the Corresponding Title over the subject property , be
signed, executed and delivered
RA No. 6652 is not applicable because Bonifacio was only able to pay the first P2,000.00
installment upon signing of the contract.
The petition was denied and Petitioner Bonifacio Danan is hereby ordered to pay Spouses
Serrano monthly rental in the amount of P3,000.00 with legal interest of 12% per annum.
Dasmarinias T. Arciana and Magnani T. Banta , Petitioners
vs.
Noemi L. Ingram represented Ma. Nenette L. Archinue, Respondents
G.R. No. 196444, Feb. 15, 2017
Second Division
Ponente: JARDELESA J.:
Facts: Arciana is the owner of Lot No. 3230 located at Salvacion, Sto. Domingo, Albay.
Sometimes in 2004, her attorney-in-fact, Banta entered into a contract with Ingram for the sale of
the property and represented that the lot has an area of 6,200 square meters per the tax
declaration covering it. The contract price was P1,860,000.00 with Ingram making instalments
payments for the property from May 5, 2004 to Feb. 10, 2005 total of P1,715,000.00. Banta and
Ingram thereafter executed a MOA acknowledging the previous payments and that Ingram still
had an obligation to pay the remaining balance of P145,000.00. They also separately executed
Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in Ingrams favour both described that the lot has an
area of 6,200 square meters. When the property has been surveyed thru Ingram’s effort, they
discovered that the lot has an actual area of 12,000 square meters. Banta allegedly insisted that
the difference of 5,800 square meters remains unsold. This was opposed by Ingram who claims
that she owns the whole lot by virtue of the sale.
In her complaint Ingram alleged that upon discovery of the actual area of the property, Banta
insisted on fencing the portion which she claimed to be unsold. Ingram further maintained that
she is ready to pay the balance of P145,000.00 as soon as petitioners recognize her ownership of
the whole property. The MCTC ruled in favour of Banta relying in Article 1540 of the Civil
Code : If in the case of the preceding article, there is a greater are or number in the
immovable than that stated in the contract, the vendee may accept the area included in the
contract and reject the rest. If he accepts the whole area he must pay for the same at the
contract rea. Since Ingram failed to show that she paid for the value of the excess land area,
MCTC held that she cannot claim ownership and possession of the whole property.
On Appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MCTC HOLDING THAT Article 1542 , which covers
sale of real property in lump sum, applies in this case. CA affirm the decision of the RTC , that
the sale for a lump sum and not on a per square meter basis.
Issue: Whether or not the sale is on lump sum?
Rulings: In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing
agreement: a unit contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference by way
of reference to a stated rate per unit area or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase
price for an immovable the are of which based on an estimate. There was no indication that it
was bought on a per-square-meter basis. Thus, Article 1542 of the Civil Code governs the sale,
however the Court clarified that the Rule laid down in Art. 1542 admits of an exception. “A
caveat is in order, however. The use of more or less or similar words in designating quantity
covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency”.
In a lump sum contract, a vendor is generally obligated to deliver all the land covered within the
boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in
the deed. However, in case there is conflict between the area actually covered by the boundaries,
and the estimated area stated in the contract of sale, he/she shall do so only when the excess or
deficiency between the former and the latter is reasonable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Oct. 26, 2010 Decision and
March 17, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Thelma Rodriguez joined by her husband, Petitioners
Vs
Spouses Jaime Sioson and Armi Sioson, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 199180, July 27, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: REYES, J.:
Nature of Action: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Facts: Sometimes in 1997, the Municipality of Orani, Batan purchased from Neri an area of
about 1.7 hectare of lot 398 to be used for the extension of the Municipality’s public market.
Among other things, it was agreed that upon full payment of the purchase price, Neri will
surrender the mother title to the Municipality for subdivision on the condition that Neri will
equitably share in the expense thereof. However the owner’s duplicate copies of TCT were
retained by the Municipality pending the payment of his shares in the expenses incurred for the
subdivision of Lot 398. These were placed under the custody OF Municipal Treasurer, where
they continue to remain.
Neri, however alleged that Municipal Mayor Mario Zuniga suggested that he sell Lot 398-A to
his aunt, Petitioner Thelma Rodriguez. The Municipality would then expropriate the same from
Thelma. Neri agreed to the suggestion. After agreeing the amount of P1,243,000.00 as the selling
price, Thelma issued a check to Neri that when fell due was dishonoured for insufficient funds.
Consequently it was agreed that Thelma would pay the purchase price in instalments from March
20, 1997 to Sept. 4, 1997. Thelma, however wa only able to pay P442,293.50. On Nov. 2001,
Thelma caused the annotation of an adverse claim on TCT No. T-209894 , at about the same
time, Thelma saw an announcement that a new Orani Common Terminal would be built on Lot
398-A. As she has not yet entered into any agreement regarding the utilization of the property,
Thelma filed a complaint for injunction against then incumbent Mayor Efren Pascual, Jr.
Subsequently Neri caused the cancellation of Thelma’s adverse claim and executed Deed of Sale
to respondents and subsequently TCT was issued under their names.
After Thelma learned of the second sale of Lot 398-A. She filed against the respondents for the
Declaration of the Nullity of the second sale. The respondents countered that they are innocent
purchasers for value having bought Lot 398-A at the time when Thelma’s adverse claim was
already cancelled.
RTC ruled in favour of Thelma and declared the second sale as null and void. The Ca reversed
the Decision of the RTC, THE ca FOUND THAT THE CONTRACT BETWEEN Neri and
Thelma was a mere Contract to Sell and not a Contract of Sale; hence there was no double sale
of Lot 938-A. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the transaction between Neri and Thelma is a contract of sale or a contract to
sell?
Ruling: The Contract between Neri and Thelma is a Contract to Sell. The transfer of ownership
over lot 398-A being conditioned on Thelma’s full payment of the purchase price. A review of
this case shows that CA ruled in accord with existing jurisprudence stated by the Court, the
agreement to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price shows that the
vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the purchase price. Thus, in
Roque vs Aguado, the Court ruled that since the petitioners have not paid the final instalment of
the purchase price, the condition which would have triggered the parties obligation to enter into
and therby perfect a contract of sale cannot be deemed to have been fulfilled, consequently, they
cannot validly claim ownership over the subject portion even if they had made an initial payment
and even took possession of the same.
Helen B. Lukban, Petitioner
Vs.
Optimum Development Bank, Respondent
G.R. No. 205785, January 20, 2016
Second Division
Ponente: CARPIO, J.:
Facts:The City Treasurer's Office of Marikina conducted an auction sale of tax delinquent real
properties, which included the real property of Melba T. Atienza. Helen B. Lukban was the
highest and winning bidder of the property during the public auction. She filed a petition for the
cancellation of TCT under the name of Atienza and the issuance by the Marikina Register of
Deeds of a new TCT in her favor. The trial court found that there was an entry on TCT
annotating a prior Notice of Levy in favor of Capitol Bank (now Optimum Development Bank) -
Mortgage. It was annotated more than 12 years ahead of the Notice of Levy for tax delinquency.
Optimum Bank filed a motion on the ground that its rights would be affected should the petition
be granted. Optimum Bank alleged that while it was the registered mortgagee of the property, it
was not aware that it was sold by the City Treasurer in a public auction and that Lukban was the
highest bidder. Optimum Bank manifested that it had the original duplicate title of the property in
its possession.
The trial court ruled that Lukban was able to satisfactorily prove that she acquired the property
from a public auction sale, that the one-year redemption period lapsed without Atienza
redeeming the property, and that a Final Deed of Sale was issued in her favor. The Court of
Appeals ruled that actual notice to the registered owner of the real property is a conditionsine
qua non for the validity of the auction sale. The Court of Appeals ruled that the records of the
case did not show that Atienza actually received a notice of the auction sale. According to the
Court of Appeals, such failure invalidated the auction sale and as a consequence, Lukban did not
acquire any right therefrom. However, Optimum Bank, not being the registered owner of the
property, was not entitled to the notice of sale.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
Issue:Whether Optimum Bank should have been notified of the delinquency sale because as a
person having legal interest in the property, it should have been given the right to redeem the
property.
Ruling:No.Only the registered owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer who is entitled to a
notice of delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. In this case, Atienza received
the Warrant of Levy and the Notice of Sale. Whether Atienza received the Notice of Public
Auction is a factual issue that was not raised by Optimum Bank because it is an issue that only
Atienza, being the registered owner, can raise.
Fabio Cahayag and Conrado Rivera, Petitioners
Vs
Commercial Credit Corporation, et.al., Respondent
G.R. No. 168078, January 13, 2016
First Division
Ponente: SERENO, C.J.:
Nature of the Action: Rule 45 Petitions.
Facts:Dulos Realty was the registered owner of certain residential lots. Dulos Realty obtained a
loan from respondent CCC in the amount of F300,000. To secure the loan, the realty executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over the subject properties in favor of respondent. The mortgage was duly
annotated on the certificates of title. Dulos Realty entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioners
Cahayag, Rivera and Escalona.
Dulos Realty defaulted in the payment of the mortgage loan, prompting respondent CCC to
initiate extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The auction sale was held, with respondent CCC
emerging as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale covering the properties, together with all the
buildings and improvements existing thereon, was issued in favor of CCC. The Certificate of
Sale was annotated on the corresponding titles to the properties. By virtue of the affidavit, the old
TCTs all in the name of Dulos Realty were cancelled and new TCTs were issued in the name of
respondent CCC.
Dulos Realty entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with petitioner Baldoza over the property
together with the improvements existing thereon. respondent CCC, through a Deed of Absolute
Sale, sold to respondent Qua the same subject properties which were in the name of respondent
CCC. The sale was duly annotated on the corresponding titles to the properties. Accordingly,
TCTs in the name of CCC were cancelled; and new TCTswere issued to respondent Qua.
Qua filed ejectment suits individually against petitioners Dulos Realty, Cahayag, Escalona, and
Rivera. The MTC rendered Decisions in favor of Qua. It ordered Dulos Realty, Escalona,
Cahayag, and Rivera to vacate the properties. Petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents
for the "Annulment of Sheriff's Sale.
Issue:Whether the registration of the mortgage binds the buyers under the Contracts to Sell.
Ruling:Yes.Registration of the mortgage establishes a real right or lien in favor of the

mortgagee, as provided by Articles 1312 and 2126 of the Civil Code. Corollary to the rule, the
lien has been treated as "inseparable from the property inasmuch as it is a right in rem. In other
words, it binds third persons to the mortgage.
The purpose of registration is to notify persons other than the parties to the contract that a
transaction concerning the property was entered into. Ultimately, registration, because it provides
constructive notice to the whole world, makes the certificate of title reliable, such that third
persons dealing with registered land need only look at the certificate to determine the status of
the property.
In this case, the Real Estate Mortgage over the property was registered on 3 February 1981. On
the other hand, the Contracts to Sell were all executed after the registration of the mortgage.
Consequently, petitioners Cahayag, Rivera and Escalona, were bound to the mortgage executed
between mortgagor Dulos Realty and mortgagee CCC, by virtue of its registration. Definitely,
the buyers each had constructive knowledge of the existence of the mortgage contract when they
individually executed the Contracts to Sell.
Rosalina Carodan, Petitioner
Vs.
China Banking Corporation,Respondent
G.R. No. 210542, February 24, 2016
First Division
Ponente: SERENO, C.J.:
Facts:Barbara and Rebecca, for value received, executed and delivered Promissory Note No.
TLS-98/007 to respondent bank under which they promised therein to jointly and severally pay
the amount of P2.8 million. As security for the payment of the loan, Barbara, Rebecca and
Rosalina also executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a property registered in the name of
Rosalina. Respondent alleged that a Surety Agreement in favor of China Bank as creditor was
also executed by Barbara and Rebecca as principals and Rosalina and her niece Madeline as
sureties. Through that agreement, the principals and sureties warranted the payment of the loan
obligation amounting to F2.8 million including interests, penalties, costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees.
Barbara and Rebecca failed to pay their loan obligation despite repeated demands from China
Bank. Their failure to pay prompted the bank institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
the mortgaged property. From the extrajudicial sale, it realized only PI.5 million as evidenced by
a Certificate of Sale. This amount, when applied to the total outstanding loan obligation of
PI,865,345.77, would still leave a deficiency of P365,345.77. For that reason, the bank prayed
that the court order the payment of the deficiency amount with interest at 12% per annum;
attorney's fees equal to 10% of the deficiency amount; and litigation expenses and costs of suit. 14
Issue:Whether Rosalina is liable jointly and severally with Barbara and Rebecca for the payment
of the loan?
Ruling:Yes.
In the instant case, petitioner Rosalina admitted that she was a party to these loan documents
although she vehemently insisted that she had received nothing from the proceeds of the loan. 62
Meanwhile, respondent bank offered in evidence the Promissory Note, the Real Estate Mortgage
and the Surety Agreement signed by the parties.
We find that Rosalina is liable as an accommodation mortgagor.
Apart from being an accommodation mortgagor, Rosalina is also a surety, defined under Article
2047 of the Civil Code.
When Rosalina affixed her signature to the Real Estate Mortgage as mortgagor and to the Surety
Agreement as surety which covered the loan transaction represented by the Promissory Note, she
thereby bound herself to be liable to China Bank in case the principal debtors, Barbara and
Rebecca, failed to pay. She consequently became liable to respondent bank for the payment of
the debt of Barbara and Rebecca when the latter two actually did not pay.
China Bank, on the other hand, had a right to proceed after either the principal debtors or the
surety when the debt became due. It had a right to foreclose the mortgage involving Rosalina's
property to answer for the loan.
The proceeds from the extrajudicial foreclosure, however, did not satisfy the entire obligation.
For this reason, respondent bank instituted the present Complaint against Barbara and Rebecca as
principals and Rosalina as surety.
Teresita I. Buenaventura, Petitioner
Vs
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Respondent
G.R. No. 167082, August 3, 2016
Ponente: Bersamen:J.
Nature of the Action:
Facts: On January 20, 1997 and April 17, 1997, Teresita Buenventura executed Promissory Note
Nos. 232663 and 232711, respectively each in the amount of P1,500,000.00 and payable to
Metrobank. PN No. 232663 was to mature on July 1, 1997, with interest and credit evaluation
and supervision fee of 17.532% per annum while PN no. 232711 was to mature on April 7, 1998,
with interest and CESF at the rate of 14.239% per annum. Both PNs provides for a penalty of
18% per annum on the unpaid principal from date of default until full payment of the obligation.
Despite demands, there remained unpaid on PN Nos. 232663 and 232711. Consequently
Metrobank filed an action against Buenaventura for recovery of said amounts, interests , penalty
and attorneys fees before Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 61). Appellant,
Buenaventura averred that in 1997, she received from nephew, Rene Imperial , three postdated
checks drawn against appellee (Tabaco Branch) as payments for her properties that she
rediscounted the subject checks with Appelle (Timog Branch), for which she was required to
execute the PNs to secure payment thereof., and that she is a mere guarantor and cannot be
compelled to pay unless and until the appellee shall have exhausted all the properties of Imperial.
The RTC ruled in favor of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. The CA affirm the decision of
RTC with modification .
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a mere guarantor on the Promissory Note executed with
Metrobank?
Ruling. No. The CA was correct. A contract of guaranty is one where a person, the guarantor,
Binds himself or herself to another, the creditor , to fulfill the obligation of the principaldebtor in
case of failure of the latter to do so. It cannot be presumed, but must be express and in writing to
be enforceable, especially as it is considered a special promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another. It being clear that the promissory notes were entirely silent about the
proposed guaranty in favour of Imperial, we must read the Promissory Notes literally due to the
absence of any ambiguities about their language and meaning. In other words, the petitioner
could not validly insist on the guaranty.
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., EXEQUIEL D. ROBLES,
CARLO R.H. MAGNO, CONRADO L. BENITEZ II, VICENTE R. SANTOS,
HENRY CUA LOPING, MARIZA SANTOS-TAN, TOMAS B. CLEMENTE
III, AND FRANCIS C. MONTALLANA , Petitioners
vs.
Ernesto V. Yu and Manuel Yuhico, Respondents
G.R. No. 191033, January 11, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: PERALTA, J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went to the Orchard Golf & Country Club to play a round
of golf. Due to the "no twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in the membership handbook
prohibiting groups of less than three players from teeing off on weekends and public holidays
before 1:00 p.m., respondents requested management to look for another player to join them.
Because Orchard were unable to find their third player, respondent Yu tried to convince Francis
Montallana, Orchard's assistant golf director, to allow them to play twosome, even if they had to
tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course. Montallana refused. Yu then shouted
invectives at Montallana, at which point he told respondent Yuhico that they should just tee off
anyway, regardless of what management's reaction would be. Respondents then teed off without
permission from Montallana. They were thus able to play, although they did so without securing
a tee time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a result
of respondents' actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with the board of directors.
The respondents were suspended.
With regard to the purported damages they incurred, respondents testified during the trial to
support their respective allegations. Yuhico stated that he distanced himself from his usual group
(the "Alabang Boys") and that he became the butt of jokes of fellow golfers.36 On the other hand,
Yu represented that some of his friends in the business like Freddy Lim, a certain Atty. Benjie,
and Jun Ramos started to evade or refuse to have dealings with him after his suspension.
Issue:Whteher repondents are entitled to damages?
Ruling: No. In this case, Yu acknowledged that there was an offense committed. Similarly,
Yuhico admitted that he was aware or had prior knowledge of the Club's "no twosome" policy as
contained in the Club's Membership Handbook and that they teed off without the required tee
time slip.
There is, therefore, no factual and legal basis to grant moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and costs of suit in favor of respondents. The damages suffered, if there are any, partake of
the nature of a damnum absque injuria.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be
not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many
cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the
damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,
although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may
use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause
damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's favor. Any injury or damage
occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an
individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful
means.54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum
facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria."
In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that there is fault or
negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige them to pay for the alleged damage
sustained as a result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly, membership in the Club is a
privilege. Regular members are entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of the Club, subject
to its rules and regulations. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental anguish
respondents experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon them by themselves for
deliberately and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that
respondents were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate them. Indeed,
the penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article XIV of the By-Laws is a means to
protect and preserve the interest and purposes of the Club. This being so, the suspension of
respondents does not fell under any of the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the grant of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation costs.
Spouses Romeo Pajares and Ida T. Pajares
vs
Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning represented by Archemedes G. Solis
G.R. No. 212690, February 20, 2017
First Division
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Nature of the Action : Petition for Review on Certiorari
Facts: Spouses Pajares alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with
petitioners whereby the latter acting as a dealer outlet, shall accept and receive items or
materials for laundry which are then picked up and processed by the former in its main plant or
laundry outlet; that Petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Qouta & Penalties) of said
contract which required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when on
April 30, 2012, they ceased delaer outlet operations on account of lack of personnel, that
respondents made written demands upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and
provided in the contract but the latter failed to pay and that petitioners violation constitute breach
of contract. And that the respondent pray for the defendant’s to pay consequential and incidental
damages.
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent file a Certiorari before a Court of
Appeals seeking to nullify the February 19, 2013 and April 29, 2013 RTC’s orders. It argued that
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and remanded the case to RTC which ordered to proceed with
the trial on the merits with dispatch. Petitioner sought to reconsider but were denied. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint is one with Breach of Contract or for Simple Damages?
Rulings: The Compliant is for Simple Damages. In an action for damages, the court which has
jurisdiction is determined by the total amount of damages claimed.
The Court grants the petition of the Respondents. The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil
Case No. CEB 39025 as an action for damages seeking to recover an amount below its
jurisdictional limit:
Respondents compliant denominated as one for “Breach of Contract and Damages” is neither an
action for specific performance nor a complaint for rescission of contract. In ruling that
respondent's Complaint is incapable of pecuniaiy estimation and that the RTC has jurisdiction,
the CA comported itself with the following ratiocination:
A case for breach of contract [sic] is a cause of action either for specific performance or
rescission of contract. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for
specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
without, however, determining whether, from the four corners of the Complaint, respondent
actually intended to initiate an action for specific performance or an action for rescission of
contract.
Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129 as amended by Reublic Act No. 7961, provides that where the
amount of the demand exceeds P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC.
Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Trial Court.
AC Development & Property Managers, Inc., Petitioner
Vs.
Montaire Realty and Development Corporation, Respondent
G.R. No. 217732, June 15, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: REYES, J.,:
Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari/Liquidated Damages
Facts:ADPROM and MARDC were parties to a Construction Agreement executed on April 25,
1996, whereby ADPROM, as contractor, was to contract 17 units of MARDC’s Villa Fresca
Townhomes in Bgy. Kaybagal, Tagaytay City. The total consideration for the contract is
P39,500,000.00 inclusive of labor, materials, supervisions and taxes. ADPROM was to be paid
periodically based on monthly progress billings less 10% retention. Angel Lazaro & Associates
(ALA) was hired by MARDC as the project’s construction manager.
The parties later amended their contract, reducing the number of units to 11 and total contract
price to P25,500,000.00. On May 2, 1996, ADPROM commenced with the construction of the
townhouses.
MARDC fully satisfied ADPROM’S progress Billing Nos. 1 to 8 for a total amount of
P23,169,183.43. In progress Billing No. 9, ADPROM demanded from MARDC the amount of
P1,495,345.24, however approved the amount P94,460.28 as it disputed specific amounts in the
billing, including cost additives. ADPROM refused to allow a reduction in its demanded amount.
ADPROM decided to stop for the continuous refusal of MARDC to pay the Billing No. 9.
The stoppage prompted MARDC to serve upon ADPROM on March 20, 1997 a notice of
default. After several meetings among the parties, ALA still advised MARDC to defer the
payment. The consolidated Billing No. 9 and 10 amounting to P1,778,682.06 was still greater
than the ALA’s approved amount of P1,468,348.60. On June 5, 1997, MARDC decided to
terminate the subject Construction Agreement. It demanded the ADPROM to return the alleged
overpayment amounting to P11,188,539.69 after it determined from ALA that the accomplished
work constituted only to 54.67%. An evaluation made by another firm by MARDC, TCGI
Engineers also provided that ADPROM,s work accomplishment was only at 46.98%.
Feeling aggrieved, ADPROM instituted with the CIAC for sum of money against MARDC.
CIAC ordered MARDC to pay ADPROM the amount of P4,384,987.03. MARDC filed an appeal
before CA. CA modified the decision of CIAC, and ruled MARDCs to pay the unpaid billings
and the refund of its retention. ADPROM was held liable to MARDC for liquidated damages,
award of interest on the unpaid billing was set aside. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not ADPROM is liable to MARDCs of liquidated damages?
Ruling: Yes. The CA ‘s award of liquidated damages upon MARDC was also supported by
sufficient bases. The pending conflict between the parties on the unpaid billings was not a
sufficient ground to stop the construction. Article XIII, Section 13.1 of the Construction
Agreement even provided that the parties shall attempt to settle any dispute arising from
Agreement amicably.
Rachel A. Del Rosario, Petitioner
vs.
Jose O. Del Rosario and Court of Appeals, Respondents
G.R. No.222541, Feb. 15, 2017

First Division
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts: Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old met Jose, then Seventeen (17) years old, sometimes in
Dec. 1983 in Nueva Viscaya, they become romantically involved. On 1988, Rachel went to
Hongkong to work as Domestic Helpeer and allegedly provided for Jose’s tuition fees in his
college education.They got married on Dec. 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose
City, Nueva Ecija. They were blessed a son named Wesley. In 1998, Rachel went back to
Hongkong to work and returning home for vacation every year. Through her efforts, theye were
able to acquire a house and lot.
In Sept. 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of Marriage before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
his essential marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their
marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband and father.
According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent. Jose would represent himself as single,
would flirt openly and had an extra marital affair and Rachel claimed that Jose would refuse any
chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.
Rachel presented the testimonies of her son Wesley, her sister and Dr. Neldy Tayag stated that
Jose suffered from Anti Social Personality Disorder. However, Jose denied all the allegations and
maintained that he had dutifully performed all of his marital and parental duties and obligations
to his family, provided family’s financial and emotional support and contributed to the building
and maintenance of their conjugal dwelling. He also denied the alleged-extra marital affair and
having laid hand on Rachel and their son.
The RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC holding that the totality of the evidence
Rachel presented was not enough to sustain that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the obligations of marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity?
Rulings: The petition lacks merit. The policy of the constitution is to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of
this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the Marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which provided
under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect, fidelity, and render help and support. In other words, it must be a
malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
The Court’s debies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exist
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose’s immaturity, irresponsibility or infedility
amount to psychological incapacity. It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag’s report does not
Petitioner: Jose Norberto Ang
Vs.
Respondent: The Estate of SY So
G.R. No. 182252, August 3, 2016
First Division
Ponente: SERENO, CJ.:
Nature of the Action: Petition Certiorari pursuant to Rule 45

Facts: Respondent Sy So, a Chinese citizen, was married to certain Jose Ang. Sy So maintained a
Sari Sari Store and by testimonial evidence she was then financially well-off on her own. The
couple was childless and on 1941, when a woman approached Sy So and offered a seven month
old infant for adoption, respondent immediately accepted the offer. No formal adoption papers
were processed , the child was christened as Jose Norberto Ang. The respondent subsequently
adopted three other wards, Mary Ang, tony Ang and Teresita Tan. Jose Ang died on 1943 and Sy
So maintained her store and engaged in cigarette trading.
Later , respondent Sy So acquired a property described as 682.5 square meter lot located at 10 th
Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City and another lot with an area of 1977 square meters, located
at 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City and registered under TCT No. 10425, both was
registered under the name of Jose Norberto Ang who was then three years old, in keeping with
the Chinese tradition of registering properties in the name of the eldest male son or ward.
Unknown to Sy So, Norberto Ang was able to secure a Second Owner’s Duplicate Copy of the
two lots and subsequently sold on 1971 the 11th Avenue lot. On April 5, 1974, Jose Norberto’s
counsel wrote respondent Sy So demanding a monthly payment of P500.00 as her contribution
for real estate taxes on the 10 th Avenue Lot. Later on, Counsel of Jose Norberto Ang, wrote
another letter , demanding Sy So to vacate the 10 th Avenue property and on July 25, 1989, Jose
Norberto filed an ejectment suit against respondent Sy So on the ground of non-payment of
rentals. The case was dismissed on Oct. 30, 1989 by MTC and affirm by RTC June 4, 2001.
On June 9, 1993 respondent Sy So filed with the RTC a case for transfer of Trusteeship from the
defendant Jose Norberto Ang to the new Trustee Tony Ang, with damages. Citing Norberto’s
gross ingratitude, disrespectfulness, dishonesty and breach of trust and argued that she had
bought the two parcels of land and constructed the apartment doors thereon at her own expense.
Norberto Ang argued that the land was acquired from the money given to him by his foster
father Jose Ang.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that there was no implied trust between respondent
and petitioner. The CA ruled that laches had set in as regards the 11 th Avenue but not with 10th
Avenue since respondent Sy So is in possession of the property and that the action of
reconvetyance was imprescriptible.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent can transfer the subject property to the other Trustee/Heirs?
Ruling: No. Respondent Sy So would have this Court declare that she is the true owner of the
real properties in question and that as owner, she has the right to have the land titles transferred
from the name of Jose Norberto Ang to that of Tony Ang, Sy So’s trustee –designate. However,
Sy So’s Chinese citizenship is undisputedly shown by the records, and even supported by
documentary evidence wherein Sy So is prohibited to acquire lands as it is against the
constitution. Axiomatically, the properties in question cannot be legally reconveyed to one who
had no right to own them in the first place. In sales of real estate to alien incapable of holding
title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are
deemed to have committed the constitutional violation. Being in pari delicto the courts will not
afford protection to either party. The property who could assail the sale is the Solicitor General.
Iris Morales, Petitioner
Vs
Ana Maria Olondris, Alfonso Juan Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Moreno Olondriz, Isabel Rosa
Olondriz , Francisco Javier and Maria Olondriz, Respondent
G.R. No. 198994, Feb. 3, 2016
Second Division
Ponente: BRION, J.:
Facts: Alfonso Juan Olondriz, Sr. (decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his
widow, Ana Maria Olondriz and his children: Alfonso Juan Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro MARINO
Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz , Angeo Jose Olondriz and Francisco Javier, Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the respondent heirs.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition for the partition of
the estate and the court appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz , Jr. as administrator.
However on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the
decedent left a Will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the will to be probated and his
appointment as admintratrix.
The pertinent portions of the decedent’s will reads.
1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and
administrator of my estate until its distribution in accordance herewith.xxx
2. My entire estate shall be decided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among and
between 1.) Iris Morales Olondris , my children 2.) Alfonso Juan Olondriz, Jr., 3.)
Alejandro Olondriz , 4.) Isabel Olondriz, 5.) Angelo Olondriz, and their mother ,6.) Maria
Ortegas Olondriz.
Notably the Will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz an illegitimate son of the
decedent. On Jan. 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings
because Francisco was preterited in the will.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents contending that the court will not hesitate to set
aside probate proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might become an idle
ceremony because the will is intrinsically void. The CA affirm the decision of RTC , the
decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir in the direct line.
Issue: Whether or not there was a preterition in the will of the decedent?
Ruling: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of compulsory heir from the will either because
he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc. , he is neither instituted as an heir
nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited –tacitly depriving the heir
of his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also
receive any legacies, devises or advances on his legitime. Article 854 of the Civil Code states the
legal effect of preterition:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
If the committed compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.
The petition is dismissed.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao, Petitioner
Vs
Florentino Prudencio, now deceased substituted by Her Heirs
Gr. No. 187942, Sept. 7, 2016
Third Division,
Ponente:Jardeleza, J.
Facts: Felipe Prudencio married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife Elena Antonio, he
begot five (5) children. During the marriage to Elena, they acquired a 13.0476 hectares parcel of
land located at Sitio Abbot, Barrio Imurong, Bagao, Cagayan covered by Original Title
Certificate No. 1343. When Elena died, Felipe and their children became co-owners of the
property.
Felipe then died intestate during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr.
and Leonora executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of the late Felipe with
Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora. While the Extra Judicial Partition acknowledged that the
Cagayan Lot was acquired during the marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated that Elena and
Felipe did not have any children who could inherit the property., hence Teodora and her children
are the only living heirs by operation of law, it further stated that Prudencio Jr. and Leonora
waived their rights over the Cagayan lot in favor of their mother. The title of the lot was
transferred to Teodora.
On May 16, 1972, Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and
Salvacion Divini. On August 25, 1972, Spouses Cepeda sold Cagayan lot to petitioner for
P16,500.00. Thereafter, petitioner was issued TCT No. 20084.
On Sept. 15, 1972, respondents-appelles filed a Complaint for Partition with Reconveyance
against petitioner spouses Cepeda, Teodora, Prudencio , Jr. and Leonora before the RTC. They
alleged that they are the children and grandchildren of Felipe in his first marriage. Respondents-
Appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful shares in the Estate of
Felipe and elena when the Extra-Judicial Partition declarec that Teodora as the sole owner of the
Cagayan lot.
Petitioner contended that they are an innocent purchaser for value and it is the Spouses Cepeda
who will be liable as it is stated in the Deed of Sale that the latter shall answer for any claim of
any other possible heir who might be deprived of their lawful participation in the estate of the
original registered owner. The Souses Cepeda likewise contended that they were a buyer in good
faith as they are not aware on any defect on the property because the title was clean.
RTC ruled in favor respondents-appellee and that Teodora can only sell 33,550 sq. meter of the
Cagayan lot for a person cannot give what he does not own. The CA affirm the decision of the
RTC. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the excluded heirs could recover what is rightfully theirs from persons who
are innocent purchasers for value?
Whether or not the sale between Teodora and spouses Cepeda is null and void?
Ruling: Yes.
Segura vs Segura teaches us that answer would not depend on the good faith or bad faith of the
purchaser, but rather on the fact of ownership, or no one can give what he does not have. Thus,
the good faith or bad bad faith of petitioner is immaterial. A person can only sell what he owns or
is authorized to sell, a buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can
legally transfer. Thus the CHILDREN OF Felipe in his two marriages should be included in the
Extra-Judicial Partition.
No. The Nullity of the Extra-Judicial Partition does not automatically result in the nullity of the
sale between Teodora and Spouses Cepeda, and that of two Spouses Cepeda and Petitioner.
Teodora may sell her undivided interest in the Cagayan Lot and such disposition shall affect only
pro indiviso share.When she sold the entire property to the Spouses Cepeda, the latter legally and
validly purchased only the part belonging to Teodora.Likewise, when Sposuses Cepeda sold the
entire property to the petitioner the spouses only transferred the petitioner Teodora’s pro indiviso
share.
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.The Oct. 21, 2008 Decision and May 11, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 77100 are hereby affirmed.
Rex Daclison, Petitioner
Vs.
Eduardo Baytion, Respondent
G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016
Second Division
Ponente:Mendoza,J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for Review.
Facts: On January 27, 2009, respondent Eduardo Baytion filed a complaint for Forcible Entry
and Damages with prayer for issuance of Preliminary Manadatory Injunction with Metropolitan
trial Court against petitioner Rex Daclison. In the complaint, Baytion alleged that he was a co-
owner of a parcel of land consisting of 1,500 square meters . The said property was inherited by
him and his siblings from their parents and, as agreed upon, was being administered by him.
Erected on the said property was one storey building which was divided into seven units or stalls.
One of the stalls was leased to a certain Leonida Dela Cruz who used it for business, when the
contract of lease expired, Daclison occupied the stall without prior knowledge and consent of
Baytion. Upon knowledge of unauthorized entry of Daclison,Baytion demanded that to vacate
the stall. Daclison refused to vacate despite oral and written demand.
Daclison contended that he vacated the subject stall and transferred to the filled-up and plane-
leveled property beside the property of Baytion ( a riprap erected at the creek lying beside
Baytion property) on the promise that Baytion will no longer bother as it is not part of his
property.
The MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC ruled that it is Baytion who has the
better right on the property. The CA likewise ruled that it is Baytion who has a better right.
Issue: Whether or not there was accretion on the subject property?
Ruling: No. Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced.
In Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks rivers belongs the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current waters.
In other words, the following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered:
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water, and;
3. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. The land come
about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-
made and not the exclusive result of the current from the creek adjacent to his property.
Cathay Pacific Airways, Petitioner
Vs.
Spouses Arnulfo and Evelyn Fuentabella, Respondents
G.R. No. 188283, July 20, 2016
First Division
Ponente: SERENO, CJ:
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari/Breach of Contract
Facts: Spouses Arnulfo and Evelyn Fuentabella filed a complaint against Cathay Pacific
Airways, Ltd. Respondents prayed for a total of P13,000,000.00 in damages for the alleged
besmirched reputation and honor, as well as the public embarrassment they had suffered as a
result of a series of involuntary downgrades of their trip from Manila to Sydney via Hongkong
on Oct. 25, 1993 and from Hongkong to Manila On Nov. 2, 1993. Petitioner maintained that
respondents had flown on the sections they had booked and confirmed.
RTC ruled in favour of respondents and awarded P5Million as moral damages , P1Million as
exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The CA upheld the ruling of the RTC
and reduced the Attorneys fees to P100,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not there is a breach of contract?
Ruling: Yes. In an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not
have tpo prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent; all that he has to prove is
the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier. In this case, both
the trial and appellate court s found that respondents were entitled to First Class accommodations
under the contract of carriage, and that the petitioner failed to perform its obligations.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA with modification , the award of moral damages
is excessive considering that the highest amount awarded in moral damages in P500,000.00.
Transimex Co., Petitioner
Vs.
Mafre Asian Insurance Corp.
G.R. No. 190271, Sept. 14, 2016
Ponente: Sereno, CJ:
Nature of the Action: Money Claim/Fortuitous event
Facts: On May 21, 1996, MV Meryem Ana received a shipment consisting of a 21,857 metric
tons of Prilled Urea Fertilizer from Helm Duengemittel GMBH at Odessa, Ukraine. This
shipment was covered by two separate bills of lading and consigned to Fertiphil for delivery to
two ports, one in Poro Point, San Fernando , La Union and the other in Tabaco, Alabay. Fertiphil
insured the cargo against all risks under Marine Risk Notes Nos. MN-MAR-HO-0001341 and
MN-MAR-HO-0001347 issued by respondent.
On June 20, 1996, M/V Meryem Ana arrived at Poro Point , La Union and discharged
14,339.507 metric tons of fertilizer under the first bill of lading. The ship sailed in to Tobaco,
Albay, to unload the remainder of the cargo. The fertilizer unloaded at Albay appeared to have
agross weight of 7,700 metric tons. When the fertilizer was stored at the Warehouse it was
weighed again and it was discovered that it is only 7,350.35 metric tons of fertilizer that had
been delivered. Because of the alleged shortage of 349.65 metric tons, Fertiphil filed a claim
with respondent for P1,617,527.37 which was found compensable.
After the paying the Fertiphil, respondent demanded reimbursement from the petitioner on the
basis of the right of subrogation. The petitioner contended that the lost was due to fortituitous
event therefore they are not liable. The claim was denied, prompting respondent to file case
before the RTC for the recovery of money.The Rtc ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered
petitioner to pay the claim of P1,617,527.37 for there was indeed a shortage in the cargo
delivered for which the common carrier must be held responsible. The CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether petitioner is liable for the loss or damage sustained by the cargo because of bad
weather?
Ruling: Yes, the petitioner is liable.
It must be emphasized that not all instances of bad weather may be categorized as storms or peril
of the sea within the meaning of the provisions of the Civil Code and COGSA on common
carriers. Even assuming that the inclement weather encountered by the vessel amounted to a
storm under Art. 1734 (1) of the Civil Code. There is no proof that the bad weather encountered
by MV Meryem Ana was the proximate cause and only cause of the damage to the shipment.
Second it failed to establish that it had exercised the diligence required from common carriers to
prevent loss or damage to the cargo.
The Petition is denied.

Heirs of Andres Naya, Teresita B. Naya, Norma N. Orbiso, Carmencita Fernan and Narciso
P. Naya, Petitioners
vs
Orlando P. Naya and Spouses Honesimo C. Ruiz and Gloria S. Ruiz, Respondents
G.R. No. 215759, Nov. 28, 2016
Third Division
Ponente: Jardeleza, J.:
Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title, reconveyance of ownership, damages,
and attorney’s fees against respondents involving a parcel of land at V. Rama Ave., Cebu City.
The property is denominated as Lot No. C-1 and has an area of 576 square meters more or less.
Petitioners alleged that they, together with respondent Orlando P. Naya are the legitimate and
compulsory heirs of the late spouses Andres and Gregoria Naya. In 1968, heirs of Andres
executed an extra judicial adjudication and setytlement of estate where his surviving spouse,
Gregoria held all his properties in trust in favour of the other heirs and on the condition that she
will assume all debts and pay all obligations of the estate. Gregoria, however failed to fulfill this
condition. Despite knowing all these, Orlando allegedly sold the property, under the name of his
parents to one Alfonso Uy by means of fraud and deceits. After the transferred of ownership to
Alfonso , he then sold it to Orlando who thereafter managed to have the title of the property
transferred in his name. In Sept. 1974, Orlando sold the property to Honesimo C. Ruiz. The title
was transferred on 2007 and the Pettioners alleged that only in 1974 that they learned of
anomalous transaction of Orlando and caused the annotation on the adverse claim of the
petitioner.
Petitioners alleged that Honesimo is not a buyer of good faith because he acquired the property
after the notice of the adverse claim had already been annotated on Orlando’s title.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state the cause of action and laches. The CA
denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the action is barred by laches?
Ruling. No. The RTC did not conduct a hearing to receive evidence proving that petitioners will
guilty of laches. We reiterated that the well settled rule that the elements of laches must be
proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss.

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW II

ATTY. CRISOSTOMO A. URIBE

B. Sources of Civil Obligations

C. Compliance with Obligations

D. Kinds of Civil Obligations

5. As to the presence of an accessory undertaking in case of breach

Cabanting v. BPI G.R. No. 201927, February 17, 2016

4. Any other manner of contravention

Sps. Poon v. PSB G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

Torres-Madrid Brokerage vs. FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance Corp.

F. Remedies for Breach of Obligations

NCLPI vs. LMI G.R. No. 176986, January 13, 2016

G. Modes of Extinguishment of Obligations

Odiamar v. Valencia G.R. NO. 213582, JUNE 28, 2016

Sps. Jonsay v. Solidbank Corp.

B. Fundamental Characteristics/Principles of Contracts

4. Obligatory Force of Contracts

Vda. de Rosales v. Dime G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016

E. Essential elements of contracts

2. Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract

Kabisig Real Wealth Dev.’t, Inc. vs Young Corporation Builders

Tan v. Hosana G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016

Bonifacio Dana vs. Spouses Gregorio Serrano, G.R. No. 195072

Lukban v. Optimum Development Bank

E. Deposit – Warehouse Receipts Law/Trust Receipts Law

F. Aleatory Contracts – Insurance, Gambling, Life Annuity

Special Contracts: Accessory Contracts

G. Guaranty and Suretyship

Carodan v. China Banking Corp.

H. Pledge, Mortgage and Antichresis

2. Kinds, Creation & Existence

III. Extra- Contractual Obligations

The Orchard Golf & Country Club v. Yu

V- CIVIL REVIEW I- PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Rachel A. Del Rosario vs. Jose Del Rosario

Jose Norberto Ang vs. The estate of Sy So

Iris Morales vs Ana Maria Olondris et. al.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tugegarao vs Florentino Prudencio

Rex Daclison vs Eduardo Baytion

Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Spouses Arnulfo and evelyn Fuentabella

Transimex Co. Vs Mafre Insurance Corp.

Heirs of Andres Naya vs. Orlando Naya

G.R. No. 202176, August 1, 2016

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the penalties imposed by Petitioner is excessive?

G.R. No. 203179, July 4, 2016

G.R. No. 201927, February 17, 2016

Facts:Petitioners bought on installment basis from Diamond Motors Corporation a 2002

G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari.

G.R. No. 194121, July 11, 2016

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari

G.R. No. 176986, January 13, 2016

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Issue:Whether the extrajudicial rescission of lease contract is valid.

G.R. NO. 213582, June 28, 2016

Nature of the Action: Petition for review on certiorari.

G.R. No. 206459, April 6, 2016

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS:Momarco, controlled and owned by the Spouses Jonsay, is an importer, manufacturer

Solidbank proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose on the mortgage. On September 22, 1999,

G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016

Nature of the Action: Petition for review on certiorari.