CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION

(Compare and contrast cases, indicate why the other case is justiciable and other is not)

PIMENTEL, JR. VS. AGUIRRE

336 SCRA 201
G.R. No. 132988
19 July 2000

The Court granted the petition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO)
No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent
of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and to enjoin respondents
from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments., and ordered respondents and their successors as permanently prohibited from
implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43 insofar as local government units are
concerned.

The Court held in its ruling that this case is justiciable, as that it is not premature
for adjudication. It held that the real issue of the case is whether the Constitution and the law
are contravened by the Section 4 of AO 372, and not whether the Constitution and the law and
violated by the acts implementing it.

Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from the Court’s majority decision on the
ground that, allegedly, the petition is premature such. In his Dissent, he said that Section 4 of AO
No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4 does not
conclusively show that, on its face, the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the
IRA shares of the LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the
withholding is merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its
unconstitutionally, especially in light of the reasonable presumption that administrative agencies
act in conformity with the law and the Constitution.

He further stated that, where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged
construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the
administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action
in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the
proper exercise of judicial function.

According to Justice Kapunan, petitioners have not shown that the alleged 5% IRA share
of LGUs that was temporarily withheld has not yet been released, or that the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) has refused and continues to refuse its release. In view thereof,
the Court should not decide as this case suggests an abstract proposition on constitutional issues.

In this note, the Court ruled in its decision that Justice Kapunan’s dissent is a rather novel
theory—that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question
acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the
Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated
by the acts implementing it.

In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the
legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy
that, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution,
have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends

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the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void.

Besides, the issue that the petition is premature has not been raised by the parties; hence
it is deemed waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its use against a party that has
not been given sufficient notice of its presentation, and thus has not been given the opportunity
to refute it.

When an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a co-equal of Congress,
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, settling the dispute becomes
the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

MONTESCLAROS VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

384 SCRA 269
G.R. No. 152295
9 July 2002

The Court dismissed the petition which seeks to prevent the postponement of the
Sangguniang Kabataan elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002, and which seeks to
prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK, due to utter lack of
merit.

The Court held in its ruling that this case is not justiciable, as that it is premature
for adjudication because a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law,
and thus it creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court.

In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections,
petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than
July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy
requiring judicial intervention.

Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering
the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill
is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes
no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no
constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a
proposed act of Congress.

The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. The second paragraph of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, “judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a
proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not
before.

It also ruled that, absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of

constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review
over the internal processes or procedures of Congress. Under the separation of powers, the Court
cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill
according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval
of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved
bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress.

The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that
Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does

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not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to
compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote
and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of
checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and
independent branches of government.

Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under
Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored
the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age
for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Every law passed by Congress is always
subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending
or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.

A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit, and by “real interest” is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest. Petitioners have no personal and
substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be
denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. In the instant case,
petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but
not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those
who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts
membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners
have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15,
2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the
SK elections.

The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an
appropriate action and adequately argued. This petition does not raise any constitutional issue.
At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced
the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA
No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.
To grant petitioners’ prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections
necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done.

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 Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP)
568 SCRA 402
G.R. No. 183591
14 October 2008
The Court denied respondents’ motion to dismiss, and gave due course to and granted the
main and intervening petitions.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF

Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

The petitions are ripe for adjudication on the following grounds:

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to
issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. An actual case or
controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a
proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it
is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.

Concrete acts under the MOA- AD are not necessary to render the present controversy
ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000), this Court held: x x x [B]y the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. x x x x By the same
token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes
the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example,
in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), decided in 1992, the United States Supreme
Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not
to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take
immediate action to avoid the provision’s consequences.

As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and
statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an
actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

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 For a party to have locus standi, one must allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect
other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional
question raised. When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or
is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. When the
issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the
eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that
the present petitions provide an exception to the “moot and academic” principle in view of (a) the
grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001.
Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain
similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.

The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in
view of the respondents’ action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of
the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.

The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the
local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any
branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.

Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) vs. Philippine Government

(GPH)
811 SCRA 284
November 29, 2016

The Court dismissed the consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality and
validity of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) entered into between the Government of the Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on the ground of prematurity.

Clearly, any question on the constitutionality of the CAB and the FAB, without the
implementing Bangsamoro Basic Law, is premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a
Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no actual case or controversy
that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial review over a coequal branch of
government.

The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (FAB) remain peace agreements whose provisions cannot be enforced and
given any legal effect unless the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is duly passed by Congress and
subsequently ratified in accordance with the Constitution. The CAB and the FAB cannot be
implemented without the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB are
preparatory documents that can “trigger a series of acts” that may lead to the exercise by Congress
of its power to enact an organic act for an autonomous region under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.

It is not the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) or the Framework

Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) that will establish the Bangsamoro but the Bangsamoro
Basic Law (BBL) enacted by Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in accordance with the

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Constitution. Congress must still enact a Bangsamoro Basic Law. The requirement of a
Bangsamoro Basic Law under the CAB and the FAB ensures that the pitfalls under the invalid
MOA-AD will be avoided.

The decision holds that the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) judicial review power is limited to
actual cases or controversies. The Court generally declines to issue advisory opinions or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of
judicial review to actual cases and controversies assures that the courts will not intrude into areas
specifically confined to the other branches of government.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite

legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. There must be a contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an
act, either by the Executive or Legislative, only when an actual case between opposing parties is
submitted for judicial determination.

For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then
been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court may interfere,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy
is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it.

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