ABRC2016.Pointers in Remedial Law Combined With Pointers 2015 Segregate

Magic Areas in REMEDIAL LAW
2016 Bar Examination

Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
Bar Review Director, ABRC
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred by law.

In a complaint for recovery of possession of a real property before the RTC but failed to allege the assessed value of
the property, attached a copy of a Declaration of Real Property showing that the subject property has a market value of
P51,965.00 and assessed value of P20,790.00, the RTC has jurisdiction if it is located outside of Metro Manila.
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the parties’ action or conduct, and
is, likewise, determined from the allegations in the complaint.
Generally, the court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction. (Barbosa v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 133564, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 99). There may be instances, however, when a
rigid application of this rule may result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice to a party’s substantial right. (See Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302). In Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Garcia, 227 Phil.166,
174 (1986), the Court allowed the RTC to consider, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties in
deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. In Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Heirs of
Valdez, et al., G.R. No. 171531, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 441, 449, it was held that the factual allegations in a complaint
should be considered in tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral
parts.
There is no reason to strictly apply the above-mentioned general rule, and to consider the facts contained in the
Declaration of Real Property attached to the complaint in determining whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petitioner’s
case. A mere reference to the attached document could facially resolve the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered
lengthy litigation on this point unnecessary.
Accion publiciana; assessed value determines the court with jurisdiction.

Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of
title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. (Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 130, 140).
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the
parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to
possess the property.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the
issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. (Suapo, et al. v. Sps. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 198356, April
20, 2015, Brion, J)
The RTC and MTC have jurisdiction over accion publiciana.

In view of the amendments to the Rule of Law, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is now determined by its assessed value. (See Ouano v. PGTT International Investment, 434 Phil. 28 [2002]; Hilario v.
Salvador, 497 Phil. 327 [2005]; Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla, 618 Phil. 395 [2009]; Padre v. Badillo, G.R. No. 165423,
January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 50,66). The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment
level. It is synonymous to taxable value. (Hilario v. Salvador, supra.; BF Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010,
220 SCRA 220, 229).
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, 557 phil. 650, 657 [2007], it was ruled that as things now stand, a distinction must
be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00,
if within. If the assessed value as shown by the tax declaration is P39,000.00 and attached to the complaint, the MTC of Manila
has jurisdiction even if not alleged. (Suapo, et al. v. Sps. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015, Brion, J)
Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In Russell v. Vestil, G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999, 304 SCRA 738, 744), it was ruled that in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought is resorted to. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim.” But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. (Surviving Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, et al., G.R. No. 208232, March 10,
2014).
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
1 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Remedial Law (combined with pointers 2015)segregate/EVSA/crys

money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs. (See Rusell v. Vestil,
304 SCRA 738, March 17, 1999; SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, et al. v. FRANCISCO LINDO, et al., G.R. No.
208232, March 10, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J)
Jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal.

It is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised even for the first time on appeal. In
Heirs of Julao v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014, Del Castillo, J, the SC was confronted with the issue of lack of
jurisdiction being raised in a party’s appellant’s brief. It was once again ruled that even if it was raised for the first time on
appeal is of no moment. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription,
which must be apparent from the pleading or the evidence on record. In other words, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. (Heirs of Jose Fernando v.
De Belen, G.R. No. 186366, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 556, 562). In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at any
time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint. Thus, it cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties; nor can it be cured by their
silence, acquiescence, or even express consent. (Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 512 Phil. 389, 400 [2005];
Heirs of Julao v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014).
Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

The rehabilitation case is distinct and dissimilar from the annulment of foreclosure case, in that the first case is a
special proceeding while the second is a civil action. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Strictly speaking, it is only in civil actions that one speaks of a
cause of action. A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Thus, in the
annulment of foreclosure case, the cause of action of Rombe is the act of Asiatrust in foreclosing the mortgage on Rombe’s
properties by which the latter’s right to the properties was allegedly violated.
Indeed, the two cases are different with respect to their nature, purpose, and the reliefs sought such that the
injunctive writ issued in the annulment of foreclosure case did not interfere with the rehabilitation case. The purpose of the
rehabilitation case and the reliefs prayed for by Rombe are the suspension of payments because it "foresees the impossibility
of meeting its debts when they respectively fall due," and the approval of its proposed rehabilitation plan. The and the reliefs
sought by Rombe in the annulment of foreclosure case are, among others, to annul the unilateral increase in the interest rate
and to cancel the auction of the mortgaged properties. Hence, being dissimilar as to the nature, purpose and reliefs sought, the
order granting the injunctive writ in the annulment of foreclosure case did not interfere with the order dismissing the
rehabilitation petition and lifting of the stay order issued by RTC Branch 7. (ROMBE EXIMTRADE (PHILS.), INC., et al. vs.
ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, G.R. No. 164479, February 13, 2008, Velasco J.)
Action for quieting of title is within the MTC or RTC jurisdiction depending upon its assessed value.
The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance involving friar land
belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), depending upon the assessed value of the
property.
Conformably with Sec. 19, BP 129 as amended by RA 7691, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud
on one’s title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 in
which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction. Determinative of which
regular court has jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint on the assessed value of the property and the principal
relief thereby sought. (Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 2, 2009, 603 SCRA 395; Heirs of
Reterta, et al. v. Sps. Lopez, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011, Bersamin, J).
In partition cases, assessed value determines the court with jurisdiction.

MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the
required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case. (Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, Peralta, J).
Action to enforce right to repurchase lot is beyond pecuniary estimation.

An action to enforce a right to repurchase the lot of a party formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free patent
holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act is one beyond pecuniary estimation. It is not one involving title to or
possession of real property or interest therein. The reacquisition of the lots is but an offshoot of the exercise of the right to
redeem the same. The reconveyance of the title is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase and is not the
principal main relief or remedy. The right to repurchase is provided for by the law which is five (5) years from the date of
conveyance which is deemed to be written in the contract. Thus, it is a binding prestation which the owner may seek to
enforce. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to cover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his
action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such
being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. (Surviving
Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, et al., G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014, Velasco, J).
Recovery of damages due to malicious prosecution; total amount of damages determines the jurisdiction of the court.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises
a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. If the main action is for damages, e.g.,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, they are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main
action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint, hence, the totality rule applies.

The total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the jurisdictional
amount. (Iniego v. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 394; Sante v. Hon. Claravall, et. al., G.R. No. 173915,
February 22, 2010; Mendoza v. Soriano, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639).).
When the doctrine of estoppel to question jurisdiction applies.

The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction depends on whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel.” However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard
and decided upon a given theory, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not
be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. (See also: Metromedia
Times Corp. v. Pastorin, G.R. No. 154295, July 25, 2005, 465 SCRA 320; Lozon v, NLRC, 310 Phil 1 [1995]).
RULE 2 - ACTIONS
Effect of misjoinder of causes of action.

Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the
motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with
separately. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a severance, then
there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action. In Republic of the Philippines
v. Herbieto it was ruled:
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear
and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules
of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction.
It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to
order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party,
also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties (498 Phil. 227 [2005]).
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the
causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. (Lilia Ada, et al. v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13,
2012).
Failure to state a cause of action

Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is
dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a
defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff’s
complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be
based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.
New Vista’s threshold contention that De Guzmans SPA to sell should not be considered for not having been
incorporated as part of its amended complaint is incorrect since Vitangcol duly submitted that piece of document in court in
the course of the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in considering said SPA
relative to the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. This is so because it is deemed part of the pleading. (ALICE
VITANGCOL and NORBERTO VITANGCOL V. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC., G.R. No. 176014, September 17, 2009, VELASCO,
JR., J.)
RULE 3 – Parties
Real parties in interest.

According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Supreme Court stood by its ruling in
Fortich v. Corona that farmer-beneficiaries, who are not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-interest. In
Fortich, the farmers who intervened in the case were mere recommendees. In the case at bar, members of petitioner Samahan
are mere qualified beneficiaries of CARP. The certification that CLOAs were already generated in their names, but were not
issued because of the present dispute, does not vest any right to the farmers since the fact remains that they have not yet been
approved as awardees, actually awarded lands, or granted CLOAs. (SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA NG 53 HEKTARYA v. WILFREDO
MOSQUERA, et al., G.R. No. 152430, 22 March 2007, Velasco, Jr., J).
Capacity Of mammals to sue.

A novel case was recently decided by the Supreme Court where a suit was filed by resident marine mammals, like
whales, dolphins, etc. inorder to prevent the exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tanon
Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. One of the basic questions is whether they
have the capacity to sue or otherwise known in constitutional law as locus standi.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for
maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride
on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents
proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for example, is
the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all
other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff
speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—

whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for the values which the river represents
and which are threatened with destruction.
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects
standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court
demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the
action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative.
Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, a suit was allowed to be brought in the
name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even
need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any
Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tanon Strait, E.G. Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented by
Human Beings Gloria Ramos & Rose Liza Eismia-Osorio, etc. v. Sec. Angelo Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015 &
companion cases, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Effect if person supposed to be parties in an action are not impleaded in an action.

Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in the action, the final judgment in
said case cannot bind them. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to them by simply issuing an alias writ of
execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not
bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only again a party and
not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein
and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto. (Munoz v. Atty. Yabut, et al., G.R. No. 142676; Munoz v. Sps. Chan, et al., G.R.
No. 146718, June 6, 2011, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Non-joinder or misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal. The complaint can be amended to drop or implead
a party.
Solidary co-debtor are not indispensable parties.

Manuel and Lolita obtained a loan from Boston Equity resources Inc. obligating themselves jointly and severally to
pay the amount of the obligation and her husband has already passed away, the contention that the estate of Manuel is an
indispensable party and that the claim should be against the estate of Manuel is not correct, because the obligation is solidary.
The creditor can collect the entire obligation from Lolita alone. Under the law, the creditor may proceed against anyone of the
solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to
those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully satisfied. (Art. 1216, NCC).
The creditor may opt to collect the entire amount from anyone of the solidary debtors. (Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA, et
al., G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013, Perez, J).
The estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of
Manuel and his wife is solidary. Solidary co-debtors are not indispensable parties.
The collection case can proceed and the demands of the creditor can be satisfied by respondent only, even without
impleading the state of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for
sum of money. (Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 173946, June 29, 2013, Perez, J).
Reasons why suits must be between real parties in interest.

The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or defending an action at law are: (a) to
prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to require that the actual
party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; (c) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage
litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. Indeed, considering that all civil actions must be
based on a cause of action, defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another, the former as the
defendant must be allowed to insist upon being opposed by the real party in interest so that he is protected from further suits
regarding the same claim. Under this rationale, the requirement benefits the defendant because “the defendant can insist upon
a plaintiff who will afford him a setup providing good res judicata protection if the struggle is carried through on the merits to
the end.”
The rule on real party in interest ensures, therefore, that the party with the legal right to sue brings the action, and
this interest ends when a judgment involving the nominal plaintiff will protect the defendant from a subsequent identical
action. Such a rule is intended to bring before the court the party rightfully interested in the litigation so that only real
controversies will be presented and the judgment, when entered, will be binding and conclusive and the defendant will be
saved from further harassment and vexation at the hands of other claimants to the same demand. (Stronghold Ins. Co., Inc. v.
Cuenca, G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013).
Effect of death of a party in an action that survives.

If an action survives after the death of a party, there can be substitution of the decedent by his heirs. (Sec. 16, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform the court of such
death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his
heirs in the pending action. (Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).
If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails to appear within a
specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the opposing party to procure the appointment
of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be

affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate. (Sumaljag v. Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18,
2008, 555 SCRA 53; Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010).
When there is a class suit.

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or
is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should
allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a
class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the
members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number
appearing in the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the
class and the subject matter of general or common interest. (Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 157 Phil.
551 (1974); Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 29, 2010).
Adherence to jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow parties that disagree with the decision of a judicial tribunal to annul the
same through the expedient of transferring their interests or rights involved in the case.
A transferee pendente lite stands in exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-interest, the original defendant,
and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to it. It is a proper but not an
indispensible party as it would in any event be bound by the judgment against his predecessor. This would follow even if it is
not formally included as a defendant through an amendment of the complaint. Hence, its non-inclusion of Heritage in the
proceedings is of no moment as Rule 3 of Section 19 of the ROC specifically allows the proceedings to proceed with the
original parties while binding the transferee. (HERITAGE PARK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION(HPMC) v. CIAC and ELPIDIO
UY, et al., G.R. No. 148133, October 8, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.)
RULE 4 – Venue
Where to file an action for foreclosure of a parcel of land.

The foreclosure of mortgage should be filed before the court where the property is located since it also involves the
title to or possession of real property, and therefore it is also a real action. (Chieng v. Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007,
531 SCRA 730).
However, the action may prosper if the defendant fails to object on the ground of wrong venue, in which case the
objection is deemed waived. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the
court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a
jurisdictional matter. (Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 630).
Stipulation on venue with the use of the word “shall;” effect.

If the parties intend in their contract that the place specified as the venue of all suits is exclusive, they must employ a
categorical and suitable limiting language, that they wish the venue of all actions between them to be laid only and exclusively
at a definite place, otherwise it is permissive. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the venues
mentioned in Rule 4 or fix a place for their actions different from those specified in said rule, does not suffice to characterize
the agreement as a restrictive one. There must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose
and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. Any doubt or uncertainty as to the parties’
intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a restrictive or mandatory aspect. (Unimasters Conglomeration,
Inc. vs. CA, et al., 79 SCAD 241, G.R. No. 119657, February 7, 1997).
Barangay Conciliation
Effect if one of the parties in a compromise fails or refuses to comply with the terms of a compromise.
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise
or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. (Art. 2041, NCC).
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated
or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for
rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.
(Catedrilla v. Lauron, G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013 citing Chavez v. CA, G.R. No. 159411, March 18, 2005).
Non-compliance with the judgment based on compromise at the barangay is deemed to be repudiation because it
denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof, thereby negating the very purpose for which it
was executed.
Party has the option to enforce or regard it as rescinded and insist on original claim. (Chavez v. CA, 493 Phil. 945
(2005); See: Arts. 2037 & 2041, NCC; Miguel v. Montanez, G.R. No. 191336, January 25, 2012).
RULE 6 - Counterclaims
Compulsory counterclaim, when it is.

A claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a deficiency as a
compulsory counterclaim, otherwise it would belatedly raised, hence, waived. A counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out
of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (b)
it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the
court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC,
the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. A claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price
vis-à-vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by
the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove
their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are absolutely
incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing

claims arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it
would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions
would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence. (METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
v. CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC., et al., G.R. No. 200567; June 22, 2015; VELASCO, JR., J)
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
Test of forum shopping.

The test to determine whether forum shopping exists is whether the elements of litis pendencia are present or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Res judicata means a matter or thing adjudged, judicially
acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment. Its requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the
judgment or order must be one on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties; and (4) between the first and second actions, there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action. (CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. MONDRAGON LEISURE AND RESORTS CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No.
150986, 2 March 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.)
RULE 8 – Manner of Allegations
Manner of alleging actionable document.

Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or
document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit,
which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading. (Section 7,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court).
An “actionable document” is a written instrument or document on which an action or defense is founded. It may be
pleaded in either of two ways:
(1) by setting forth the substance of such document in the pleading and attaching the document thereto as an
annex, or
(2) by setting forth said document verbatim in the pleading. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Ley
Construction & Dev. Corp., et al.. G.R. No. 185590, December 3, 2014, Leonardo-De Castro, J).
Genuineness and due execution of actionable document.

Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the
manner of denying it which must be under oath and specifically denies the instrument otherwise its genuineness and due
execution shall be admitted. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a
Reply which is all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is
based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and
due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution
of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court
in resolving the demurrer to evidence. However, admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory
notes. Casents, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.
(Casent Realty Development Corporation vs. PhilBanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007, Velasco, Jr. J).
Meaning of the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document.
By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an instrument, is meant that the party whose signature it
bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority, that at the time it was signed, it was
in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleadings of the party relying upon it, that the document was delivered and that
any formal requisites required by law, such as seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamps which it lacks are waived. The
defense of forgery or that it was unauthorized are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution. (Hibbard vs.
Ebole and Mcmillan, 32 Phil. 477; Simon vs. Canlas, G.R. No. 148273, April 19, 2006).
No knowledge sufficient to form a belief; when it is a specific denial.

The defendant’s denial of allegations for lack of knowledge as to their truth and having applied for membership with
the card company and that she never authorized anyone to get her alleged card thus, not being a member, she has no
obligation, monetary or otherwise, to the plaintiff is considered as specific denial under oath the genuineness and due
execution of actionable documents.
It is true that she denied the documents merely for “lack of knowledge” which denial, is inadequate since by their
nature she ought to know the truth of the allegations regarding those documents. But this inadequacy was cured by her
assertion that she was denying the allegations regarding those actionable documents, stating that she never applied for
membership with the card company. These reasons cannot be ignored and they form part of the answer. Hence, when she
denied the transaction for “lack of knowledge,” it was her way of saying that such transactions took place without her
knowing. Since the answer was verified, she in effect denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents
supporting them. For this reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those documents were forged. (Equitable
Cardnetwork, Inc. v. Capistrano, G.R. No. 180157, February 8, 2012).
Extent of admission of genuineness and due execution of document.

The genuineness and due execution of a document is deemed admitted if document is not denied specifically and
under oath. But the party can prove that there was no consideration.
Extent of the admission are limited to the genuineness and due execution of the actionable document, the signatures
of the notary public, witnesses as well as the figures contained therein but not liability. (Maunlad Savings & Loans Association,
Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 114942, November 27, 2000).

Defendant can present evidence of non-liability.
While the “[f]ailure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document there is an admission of
the same, it does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a party from raising the defense in his answer or reply and prove at
the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the true agreement of the parties, or
that the agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing,” (Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc., et al. v.
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 187487, June 29, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J). What are merely admitted are the
genuineness and due execution of the document, the figures contained therein, the signatures of the witness and notary
public. There can be no defense of forgery.
RULE 9 – Effect of Failure to Plead
Effect if there are defenses and objections not pleaded.

Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by prior judgment or
by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court).
An action may be dismissed on the ground of prescription even if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss.
Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties’
pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred x x x; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss,
or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the
merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is
found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the
record; either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. (PNB v. Aznar, et
al., G.R. No. 171805, May 30, 2011, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
The effect and remedies of a party in default.

When defendant is declared in default, the proper remedy is to file a motion to set aside the order of default upon a
proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a
meritorious defense. (Rule 9, Sec. 3(b).
A party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense.
He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground, that the amount of the judgment is excessive
or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law. He may not seek the reversal of the decision on the basis of evidence submitted in the appellate
court. Otherwise, his right to adduce evidence would have been returned to him. He can also file a motion for new trial or
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of judgment or special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. (Nabua, et al. v.
Lu Ym, G.R. No. 176141, December 16, 2008).
Effect if there are several defendants in an action for quieting of title some answered and others were defaulted.
Under Sec. 5(c), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action
against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answer thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. In this case, considering that the plaintiffs
stated a common cause of action against the defendants, the trial court should have tried or heard the case as against all the
defendants, the defaulted defendants included. However, the trial court received evidence ex parte only against the defaulted
defendants. The partial judgment is not only violative of the rules but also a clear negation of the defaulted defendants’ limited
rights. Whatever defense and evidence the non-defaulted defendants may present which would be applicable to the situation
of the defaulted defendants should inure to the benefit of the latter.
In this case, if the title is not nullified for the answering defendants, then, it should favorably affect the defaulting
ones. For, how could the title be valid for one set of defendants and void for another set. (Pinlac, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.
91486, January 19, 2001). See: Heirs of Mangiat v. CA; Castro v. Pena).
RULE 10 – AMENDED & SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Substantial amendment in pleadings.

Substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court, but such leave of court may be refused if it appears
to the court that the motion was made for delay. (Sec. 3, Rule 10, Rules of Court). This is a departure from the old rule which
prohibited substantial amendments.
It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice
in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally
recognized in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay to prevent circuitry of action and needless expense. (Limbauan
v. Acosta, 579 Phil. 99 [2008]).
In any case, a substantial alteration in the cause of action or defense is not a bar to amend the original complaint so
long as the amendment is no meant for delay. It is also quite absurd that the party who filed the main case would himself
resort to dilatory tactics to prolong the disposition of his case. It is undoubtedly to Aguinaldo's interest that this case be
decided with dispatch, more so that they have already been evicted from the property. (Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. v.
Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 200018, April 6, 2015, Reyes, J)
Amended complaint.
According to Sec. 2 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any
time before a responsive pleading is served. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up
defenses. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. The RTC did not err in admitting petitioner’s amended complaint,

respondents not having yet answered the original complaint when the amended complaint was filed. Irene, by force of said
Sec. 2 of Rule 10, had, as a matter of right, the option of amending her underlying reconveyance complaint. Also, the RTC
decision granting respondents’ motion to dismiss has not yet attained finality at the time Irene filed her amended complaint.
However, the filing of the amended complaint does not cure the defect in venue. The action is a personal action.
According the Sec. 2 Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the
residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. Irene is the real party in interest since
she is the beneficiary so entitled to the avails of the present suit. Not one of her co-plaintiffs can be considered principal
parties because they are mere representative of Irene. The co-plaintiffs may be residents of Batac, but Irene is the principal
party. She is not a resident of Batac, therefore the venue is improperly laid. (Irene Marcos-Araneta, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 154096 August 22, 2008, Velasco, Jr., J.)
Amendment of pleading to conform to evidence.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court allows the amendment of a pleading to conform to or authorize presentation
of evidence. This provision envisions two scenarios, when evidence is introduced in an issue not alleged in the pleadings and
no objection was interjected; and when evidence is offered on an issue not alleged in the pleadings but this time an objection
was raised. When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been
raised in the pleadings. On the other hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be admitted where its admission will
not prejudice him.
Thus, while defendant admitted in her Answer that she still owed petitioners P200,000, defendant later submitted an
evidence to show that she already paid the whole amount of her unpaid obligation. When the receipt of payment was formally
offered as evidence, petitioners did not manifest their objection to the admissibility of said document on the ground that
payment was not an issue. Since there was an implied consent on the part of petitioners to try the issue of payment, even if no
motion was filed and no amendment of the pleading has been ordered, the RTC cannot be faulted for admitting defendant’s
testimonial and documentary evidence to prove payment. (Sps. Dela Cruz v. Ana Marie Concepcion( G.R. No. 172825, October
11, 2012).
RULE 13 – SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, ETC.
Service by registered mail is complete; requisites.

The general rule is that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt thereof by the addressee. The
exception is where the addressee does not claim his mail within 5 days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, in
which case, the service takes effect upon the expiration of such period.
Inasmuch as the exception only refers to constructive and not actual service, such exception must be applied upon
conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. (Johnson and Johnson [Phils.] Inc. vs. CA,
201 SCRA 768). Not only is it required that notice of the registered mail be sent but that it should be delivered to and received
by the addressee. (Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz, et al., 160 SCRA 361). Notably, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is not applicable. It is incumbent upon a party who relies on constructive service to prove that the first notice was
sent and delivered to the addressee. (Sps. Jose and Evangeline Aguilar, et al. vs. CA, et al., 109 SCAD 108, G.R. No. 120972, July
19, 1999, citing Barrameda vs. Castillo, 78 SCRA 1; Jesus G. Santos vs. CA, et al., 98 SCAD 132, G.R. No. 128061, September 3,
1998).
Service through courier not allowed.

Filing or service of a copy of a pleading to petitioners by courier service cannot be trivialized. Service and filing of
pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not that mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus
motion to an address or area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and
resent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then,
however, the 15-day period had expired hence, the trial court therefore acted regularly in denying PDB’s notice of appeal.
(Palillo, et al. v. Planters Dev. Bank, G.R. No. 193650, October 8, 2014, Del Castillo, J).
Preference of personal service.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a
pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is
done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practice: (1) serving or filing pleadings
by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive
pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered containing the pleading of or
other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming
it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service
whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if
the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was
not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for
Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable.” (City of Dumaguete v. PPA, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011).
Rule not absolute.

Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and
resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the
light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or
filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to
why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall
likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of
the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (City of Dumaguete v. PPA, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011,
Leonardo-de Castro, J).

RULE 14 - SUMMONS
How court acquires jurisdiction over defendant.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance
in court and their submission to its authority. (Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, G.R. No.182729, September 29,
2010, 631 SCRA 596, 612, citing Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007, 522
SCRA 617, 622; Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corp., G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013, Peralta, J).
Substituted service of summons.

The following are the requirements for substituted service of summons to be valid: (1) Impossibility of prompt
personal service; (2) Specific details in the return; and (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and
discretion residing at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular
place of business.
There is no valid substituted service of summons if there is no return showing impossibility of personal service
specifying the details done to serve it personally. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the
substituted service was made not at petitioner’s house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is
detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made
Defendant did not voluntarily appear before the court, because the pleadings filed by petitioner were filed solely for
special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over her person and that of her
three children. (CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al., , G.R. No. 170122 October 12, 2009 J. Velasco).
Voluntary appearance.
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.”
(Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, 606 Phil. 615 [2009])
RULE 16 – MOTION TO DISMISS
When court can dismiss an action motu proprio.

The Rules of Court allows courts to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds – (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and prescription – provided that the ground for
dismissal is appasrent from the pleading or the evidence on record.” Such a dismissal may be ordered even on appeal. (Sec. 1,
Rule 9, Rules of Court; Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas, G.R. No. 157852, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 444, 451; RCBC v.
Hilario, et al., G.R. No. 160446, September 19, 2012, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Rule in ruling a MTD on the ground of failure to state a cause of actions.

Settled is the rule that in a Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, the issue is passed upon on
the basis of the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true. The court does not inquire into the truth of the
allegations and declare them to be false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the plaintiff.
Only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered, and the court cannot take cognizance of external facts or
hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. The test for determining whether a complaint states or does not state a
cause of action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in
the complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint. (St. Mary of the Woods School Inc., et al. v.
Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, et al., G.R. Nos. 174290, 176116, January 20, 2009).
What hypothetical admission of facts comprehend.

While the facts alleged in the complaint are hypothetically admitted for purposes of the motion, it must,
nevertheless, be remembered that the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in
the complaint as well as to inferences fairly deductible therefrom. Verily, the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the
sufficiency of the complaint does not hypothetically admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice of to be not
true, nor does the rule of hypothetical admission apply to legally impossible facts, or to facts inadmissible in evidence, or to
facts that appear to be unfounded by record or document included in the pleadings. (Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No.
159691, February 17, 2014).
Allegation of prior recourse to compromise in a complaint between immediate members of family is waivable.
The ground for motion to dismiss that the complaint must alleged a condition precedent is waived if it is not alleged.
In this case, the complaint did not allege a prior recourse to compromise.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action. (P.L. Uy Realty
Corporation v. ALS Management and Development Corp., G.R. No. 166462, 24 October 2012, 684 SCRA 453, 464-465).
Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, 422 Phil. 222, 230 [2001]).
That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss
emanating from the law that no suit between members from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the

verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground
for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss
based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9
stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are,
as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia ; res
judicata; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but
had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived. (Heirs of Dr. Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, et
al., G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014).
Tests in pendency of another action; more appropriate action test.

In the 1956 case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, the Court deviated from the "priority-in-time rule" and applied the "more
appropriate action test" and the "anticipatory test."
The "more appropriate action test" considers the real issue raised by the pleadings and the ultimate objective
of the parties; the more appropriate action is the one where the real issues raised can be fully and completely settled.
InTeodoro, the lessee filed an action for declaratory relief to fix the period of the lease, but the lessor moved for its dismissal
because he had subsequently filed an action for ejectment against the lessee. The unlawful detainer suit was the more
appropriate action to resolve the real issue between the parties - whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue
occupying the land under the terms of the lease contract; this was the subject matter of the second suit for unlawful detainer,
and was also the main or principal purpose of the first suit for declaratory relief.
Anticipatory test.
In the "anticipatory test," the bona fides or good faith of the parties is the critical element. If the first suit is filed
merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal, then the first suit should
be dismissed. In Teodoro, that the first action, declaratory relief, was filed by the lessee to anticipate the filing of the second
action, unlawful detainer, considering the lessor’s letter informing the lessee that the lease contract had expired.
Application of more appropriate test & anticipatory test.

In University Physician Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the "more appropriate action test" and "anticipatory test" were
both applied. In this case, the new owner of an apartment sent a demand letter to the lessee to vacate the leased apartment
unit. When the lessee filed an action for damages and injunction against the new owner, the new owner moved for the
dismissal of the action for damages on account of the action for ejectment it had also filed. The ejectment suit is the more
appropriate action to resolve the issue of whether the lessee had the right to occupy the apartment unit, where the question of
possession is likewise the primary issue for resolution. The lessee, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the premises, was
aware that an ejectment case against her was forthcoming; the lessee’s filing of the complaint for damages and injunction was
but a canny and preemptive maneuver intended to block the new owner’s action for ejectment.
RULE 17 – DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
Effect if plaintiff serves notice of dismissal.

A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer
or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon
the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same
claim. (Sec. 1, Rule 17, Rules of Court).
Under the above-cited rule, this confirmation is the only qualification imposed on the right of a party to dismiss the
action before the adverse party files an answer. (O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty
and Development Corporation, 520 Phil. 318 [2006]). In this case, the dismissal of the action therefore became effective upon
that confirmation by the RTC despite the subsequent filing of the motions for partial reconsideration. (Hontiveros-Baraquel, et
al. v. Toll Regulatory Board, et al., G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015).
Dismissal with prejudice.

Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for
partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494
of the Civil Code. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of
the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the
promulgation of procedural rules. Substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. This further finds support in Art.
496 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, the Court held that Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it
is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice. In the case at bar, since the co-ownership is still subsisting 30-70
in favor of respondent spouses Candelario, there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the partition
of the property through counterclaim. (VILMA QUINTOS, et al. v. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, et al., G.R. No. 210252, June 25, 2014,
Velasco, J).
Effect if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time.
The case can be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Under the Rules, if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiffs fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by
the court. (Rule 17, Sec. 3, Rules of Court; Phil. Charter Insurance Corp. v. Explore Maritime Co., Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 175409,
September 7, 2011, Leonardo-de Castro, J).

Unqualified dismissal is dismissal with prejudice; cannot be refilled; adjudication on the merits requirements.
If a case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but the order did not state the reasons for the dismissal, the dismissal
is patent on its face. If it simply states its conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion,
but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based it is not valid. Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. It is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a
dismissal with prejudice. “Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or
without prejudice are held to be with prejudice.” As a prejudicial dismissal, dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment
on the merits so that can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for
failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The dismissal order clearly violated this rule for its failure to
disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is
able to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a
scheduled trial date? Had it failed to take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable
length of time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the trial court? The December 16, 2003
dismissal order does not say. (Shimizu Phils. Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, et al. (G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012).
Dismissal of main action; counterclaim can be decided independently.

As the rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso
jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided
that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant its outright
dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including
the grant of any relief thereunder, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court’s authority to proceed with the
disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own,
raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and evidentiary support. (Dio, et
al. v. Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc., G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014, Perez, J).
RULE 25 & 26 – Interrogatories to Parties & Request for Admission
Written interrogatories must be served upon a party so he may be called as adverse party to the witness stand.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides that unless
thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain
order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the
adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to
the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring. (Sps. Afulugencia v. Metrobank,
et al., G.R. No. 185145, February 5, 2014).
Effect if a party refuses to obey order of production and inspection of documents.

If a party refuses to obey the order of production and inspection of documents, he can even be cited in contempt.
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 212, it was said that to ensure that
availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party
who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default
against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established
in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose
designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. (Capitol Hills Golf &
Country Club, Inc., et al. v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014).
Request for Admission; effect if there is no answer.

Considering that respondents have already stated in their MTD and answer that petitioners failed to file any written
claim for tax refund or credit. Their failure to file a reply to the same is not an admission of the veracity and truth of the
requested fact.
Under Rule 26, Secs. 1 & 2, of the Rules of Court, once a party serves a request for admission regarding the truth of
any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen (15) days within
which to file a sworn statement answering the same. Should the latter fail to file and serve such answer, each of the matters of
which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. (See Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156605, August 28, 2007,
531 SCRA 385, 399; Manzano v. Despabiladeras, G.R. No. 148786, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 123, 134; Motor Service Co.,
Inc. v. Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., 96 Phil. 688, 691-692 [1955]).
The exception to this rule is when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already controverted
the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have
already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or
deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or
even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. (Limos v. Odones, G.R. No. 186979, August
11, 2010, 628 SCRA 288). The rationale behind this exception had been discussed in the case of CIR v. Manila Mining
Corporation, G.R. No. 153204, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 571, citing Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. CA, 334 Phil. 77
[1997]; Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp., et al. v. Ms. Liberty Toledo, et al., G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013).

RULE 33 – DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court and granted; accused has the right to present evidence.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. (Salazar v. People, 458 Phil. 504 (2003). This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on
the civil aspect of the case. (Salazar v. People; Dayap vs. Sendiong).
RULE 34 – JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Judgment on the pleadings; when proper.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a
specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission of the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.
In Mongao v. Pryce Properties Corporation, 504 Phil. 472 (2005), it was likewise held that where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not comply with the
requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of
the adverse party’s pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if it omits to deal with
them at all." (See also: Asian Construction & Dev. Corp. v. Sannaedle Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 181676, June 11, 2014, Peralta, J).
RULE 35 – SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Nature of summary judgment.

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.
When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain
immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the
case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary
judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue” is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished
from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to
be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party
presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine. (Ferrer v. Sps. Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 165300,
April 23, 2010).
RULE 37 - MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Neypes principle reiterated; reasons for the rule; retroactive.

In Go v. Sunbanum, et al., G.R. No. 168240, February 9, 2011, Del Castillo, J, the Neypes principle was once again given
retroactive effect. Justifying the same, the SC ruled that when a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the
furtherance of the administration of justice, it shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity
delights in equality.
In Neypes it was held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the
order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC. It was said:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and
Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The Neypes principles applies to criminal cases. (Yu v. Judge Tatad, February 9, 2011; Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No.
188239, January 25, 2012).
RULE 38 – Relief from Judgment
Double period under Rule 38 is jurisdictional.

A petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time if filed beyond the periods provided for by Rule 38.
However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from the date of finality of the trial
court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after
petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-
month period. Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states a petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such

proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. (Spouses
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 557 Phil. 241, 248 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, First Division]). A petition for relief from judgment filed
beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to
the public policy of immutability of final judgments. (Madarang v. Sps. Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014, Leonen, J).
RULE 39 – EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
Judgment on ownership carries with it possession.

As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of
execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated and may not vary the terms of the
judgment it seeks to enforce, nor it may go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel
of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision,
it appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership. (Baluyot v. Guiao,
373 Phil. 1013 (1999). Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party
has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. In the present case,
the court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to
possess the land independently of his claim of ownership. (De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, et al., G.R. No. 181970; PEA, et
al. v. Hon. Alaras, et al., G.R. No. 182678, August 3, 2010, Peralta, J).
Discretionary execution; stay of same.

The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment where supervening events bring about a material change in
the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution
because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances. However, the reason put forward by respondents is insufficient to
merit a stay execution. Nowhere in the compromise agreement is it stated that the obligation to pay is conditioned upon a
party's receipt of the payment due from its projects with other companies. A party cannot renege on his obligation under the
agreement by claiming an inability to pay. It would be an anathema to the orderly administration of justice if such an easy
excuse is entertained to abrogate a final decision based on a compromise agreement. Neither is there any supervening event
which materially and substantially altered the situation of the parties such that execution would be unjust and inequitable.
The compromise agreement has the force of law between the parties unless it is void, there is a vice of consent, or there is
forgery, or if the terms are so palpably unconscionable. (HERNAN C. DALIDA v. SPOUSES ELISEO NAGUIT AND ALICIA
NAGUIT, G.R. No. 170083, June 29, 2007, Velasco, Jr., J).
Discretionary Execution
PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties. PPA is a government instrumentality charged with
carrying out governmental functions through the management, supervision, control and regulation of major ports of the
country. It is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication pursuant to PD 505. Ergo, they are
exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal. Funds of PPA partake of government funds,
and such may not be garnished absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished
and its properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the
trial court likewise cannot grant discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established
jurisprudence that government properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. (SPOUSES CURATA v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.).
Execution pending appeal; financial situation, a good reason.

The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final judgment may be
executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules), the existence of “good reasons” for the immediate
execution of a judgment is an indispensable requirement as this is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ
of execution pending appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution, lest judgment
becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing party’s chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are altogether
nullified. The “good reason” yardstick imports a superior circumstance demanding urgency that will outweigh injury or
damage to the adverse party and one such “good reason” that has been held to justify discretionary execution is the
imminent danger of insolvency of the defeated party.
Defendant was under a state of rehabilitation and had ceased business operations. President and General Manager
had permanently left the country with his family. These constitute such superior circumstances that demand urgency in the
execution because respondents now run the risk of its non-satisfaction by the time the appeal is decided with finality. The
rehabilitation receiver had manifested before the rehabilitation court the futility of rehabilitating NSSC because of the latter’s
insincerity in the implementation of the rehabilitation process. Clearly, respondents’ diminishing chances of recovery
from the favorable Decision is a good reason to justify immediate execution; hence, it would be improper to set aside
the order granting execution pending appeal. (Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corp. v. Universal Motors, et al., G.R.
189358, October 8, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J).
Rule 39, Sec. 10 sets the procedure for execution of judgment for specific acts.
As a general rule, the writ of execution to must conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of
execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the
judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
Nonetheless, a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (DHL Philippines Corp. United Rank and File Asso.-Federation of Free
Workers v. Buklod ng Manggagawa DHL Philippines Corp., 478 Phil. 842, 853; Jaban v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 896, 904;
370 SCRA 221, 228 (2001). Thus, in Perez v. Evite, 111 Phil. 564 (1961), where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed

in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land was considered included in the decision where the defeated party’s
claim to possession was based solely on his claim of ownership. (See also Baluyut v. Guiao, 373 Phil. 1013 (1999); Tumibay, et
al. v. Sps. Soro, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010).
Requirements if a judgment is a special judgment.

When a judgment requires the performance of any act other than the payment of money or a special judgment, or the
sale or delivery of real or personal property, a certified true copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution
and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required
thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
(Sec. 11).
5-year period to execute; 10-year to revive a judgment

An action upon a judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. (Aart. 1144,
NCC). Furthermore, the law provides that once a judgment becomes final and executor, the prevailing party fails to have the
decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten years from the time the judgment becomes final.
When the complaint for revival of judgment was filed, it had already been eleven (11) years from the finality of the
judgment he sought to revive. Clearly, the statute of limitations had set in. (Villeza v. German Management & Services, Inc., et
al., G.R. No. 182937, August 8, 2010). It was the fault of the plaintiff, that he asked for suspension of the execution of the
judgment. Being the prevailing party, he should be more interested in the execution of the judgment. That is why the Rules
provide for a period to execute to prevent the prevailing party from sleeping on his right to execute the same.
Res Judicata; Requisites; donation declared void action to quiet title will not prosper anymore.
After the final and executory judgment declaring the donation void, the donee cannot filed an action for quieting of
title against the donor, because of the principle of res judicata. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, such
material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the parties. When a right or fact has been juridically tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, judgment of the court as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with him. Thus, petitioners can no longer
question donor’s ownership over the land in the suit for quieting of title. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
(Tan v. CA, 415 Phil. 675 (2001); Sps. Noceda v. Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010).
Terceria is the remedy if a third party’s property is levied upon to satisfy liability of another.
The remedy of a person whose property is levied upon to satisfy a money judgment against another is terceria. The
reason behind such right is that it is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon
to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies
provided for under the Rules of Court. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to
the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate action" to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession
over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied
properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. (Gagoomal v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813,
18 January 2012, 663 SCRA 444, 454-455; Villasi v. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014).
Res judicata; distinctions between bar by prior judgment from conclusiveness of judgment.
Res judicata has two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c).
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second
case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Where there is identity of
parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, there is conclusiveness of judgment.
The first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined, not as to matters
merely involved therein. (RCBC v. Royal Cargo Corp., G.R. No. 179756, October 2, 2009).
Revival of judgment; nature.

An action for revival of judgment is a totally separate and distinct case from the original case. In Saligumba v.
Palanog, 593 Phil. 420 [2008], it was said:
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon
motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment
debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a
new and independent action, different and distinct from either the recovery of property case or the
reconstitution case [in this case, the original action for partition], wherein the cause of action is the
decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. (Clidoro, et al. v. Jalmanzar, et al., G.R. No. 176598, July 9, 2014, Peralta, J).
Effect if parties are different.

There may be instances where the parties in the original case and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment
would not be exactly the same. The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the complaint for revival of judgment are
different from the names of the parties in the original case would not necessarily mean that they are not the real parties-in-
interest. What is important is that, as provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Definitely, as the prevailing
parties in the previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case for revival of judgment would be benefited by the
enforcement of the decision in the partition case. (Clidoro, et al. v. Jalmanzar, et al., G.R. No. 176598, July 9, 2014, Peralta, J).

Nature of identity under the principle of res judicata.
Only substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of res judicata. The addition or elimination of some
parties does not alter the situation. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a
party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. (Heirs of Faustina
Adalid v. Court of Appeals, 498 Phil. 75, 87 [2005]).
APPEAL
Petition for review on certiorari v. special civil action for certiorari.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order “unless the accused will thereby be placed
in double jeopardy.” The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting
the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for
review. A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. (Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014).
The period under Rule 45 is 15 days; under Rule 65, 60 days. The issue in Rule 45 is pure question of law; the issue in
Rule 65 is jurisdiction.
The writ of execution may be appealed in certain cases.

The following are the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed: 1) the writ of execution varies the
judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is
sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to
the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is
issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without
authority.
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to
the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error
or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus. The instant case falls under one of the
exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that
would make execution inequitable or unjust. We find that Danilo’s situation merits a relaxation of the rules since special
circumstances are involved that is to determine if his allegation were true would allow a final resolution of the case. The writ
of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification of
judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties
the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before issuing
the writ of execution in the instant case. (DANILO L. PAREL v. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO, G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011,
Velasco, J)
Well-settled is that the sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court
strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not.
Under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made immediately executory to
avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a)
perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. (ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T.
PALLANAN A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.)
Neypes principle does not apply to administrative cases.

It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.
In Panolino v. Tajala, G.R. No. 183616, June 29, 2010, the Court was confronted with a similar issue of whether the
“fresh period rule” applies to an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary, an
appeal which is administrative in nature. It was held that the “fresh period rule” only covers judicial proceedings under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the “fresh period rule” shall apply to Rule 40
(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43
(appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders & Dev.
Corp., Inc., et al. v. Maria Cristina Banya, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015)
Modes of appeal from RTC to CA, etc.

In a case decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is taken by
filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to
the Court of Appeals is by a petition for review under Rule 42.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction from further proceeding has been issued against the public respondent. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is, without a doubt, an original action.

Since the decision of the RTC in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was rendered in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, appeal from the said RTC decision to the Court of Appeals should have been made by filing a notice of appeal, not
a petition for review under Rule 42.
However, in numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice. Dismissal of the appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. It is better to excuse a
technical lapse rather than dispose of a case on technicality, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. In the present case, a dismissal on technicality would only mean
a new round of litigation between the same parties for the same cause of action, over the same subject matter. Thus,
notwithstanding petitioner’s wrong mode of appeal, the Court of Appeals should not have so easily dismissed the petition. (BF
Citiland Corp. v. Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010).
Review of final judgments or final orders of the Ombudsman
In administrative disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMB’s decision should be taken to the CA under Rule 43, unless
the decision is not appealable owing to the penalty imposed.
The nature of the case before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) determines the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party and with which court it should be filed. In administrative disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMB’s
decision should be taken to the CA under Rule 43, unless the decision is not appealable owing to the penalty imposed.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after due
investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and meted the corresponding penalty. Recourse
to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of appeal. Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders
of quasi-judicial agencies. (FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR, et al. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 197307, February
26, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J)
RULE 57 - ATTACHMENT
Discharge of attachment; meaning of the words “deposit” and “amount.”

Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash
deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of
depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious.
In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante, it was held that one of the ways to secure the
discharge of an attachment is for the party whose property has been attached or a person appearing on his behalf, to post a
counterbond or make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.
While it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation
thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment under Section 5 is
required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the
property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57.
Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the word
"amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money. (Luzon Dev. Bank, et al. v. Erlinda Krishman, G.R.
No. 203530, April 13, 2015, Peralta, J)
Facts to prove in Rule 57.

For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the applicant must sufficiently show
the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought.
The Court ruled that the Republic has sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating the commission of fraud
committed by the respondents as a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The main
supporting proving document of the Republic was unqualifiedly admitted in evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It is incongruous,
therefore, for the Sandiganbayan to deny the writ of preliminary attachment when the pieces of evidence on record which it
used and based its findings and conclusions in denying the demurrer to evidence were the same ones which demonstrate the
propriety of the writ of preliminary attachment. The denial of the prayed writ, thus, evidently constitutes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTATE OF ALFONSO LIM, SR., et al., G.R. No.
164800, July 22, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J)
RULE 58 - INJUNCTION
The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be
protected.
A court does not ordinarily issue injunction to prevent foreclosure of a mortgage.
The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be
protected, the writ being the strong arm of equity, an extraordinary peremptory remedy which can be availed of only upon the
existence of well-defined circumstances.
In this case, contrary to what the RTC ruled, there was no urgent necessity to issue the writ to protect the rights and
interest of petitioners as owners. First, they could participate in the foreclosure sale and get their property back
unencumbered by the payment of the obligations that they acknowledged in the first place. Second, a foreclosure sale does not
ipso facto pass title to the winning bidder over the mortgaged property. Petitioners continue to own the mortgaged property
sold in an auction sale until the expiration of the redemption period. Third, petitioners have one year from the auction sale to
redeem the mortgaged property. The one-year redemption period is another grace period accorded petitioners to pay the
outstanding debt, which would be converted to the proceeds of the forced sale pursuant to the requisites under Sec. 6 of
Republic Act No. 3135, as amended, for the redemption of a property sold in an extrajudicial sale, also in accordance with Sec.
78 of the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1828. It is only upon the expiration of the redemption
period, without the judgment debtors having made use of their right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold become
consolidated in the purchaser or winning bidder. (ST. JAMES COLLEGE OF PARAÑAQUE, et al. v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, G.R.
No. 179441 August 9, 2010 VELASCO, JR., J)

Petition for injunction to prevent the foreclosure does not lie.
The right of PNB to extrajudicially foreclose on the real estate mortgage in the event of PTEI’s default is provided
under various contracts of the parties. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness.
In view of PTEI’s failure to settle its outstanding obligations upon demand, it was proper for PNB to exercise its right to
foreclosure on the mortgaged properties. It then became incumbent on PTEI and BAGCCI, when they filed the complaint and
sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to establish that they have a clear and unmistakable right which
requires immediate protection during the pendency of the action, otherwise injunction would not lie.
Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and promissory notes that the mortgagee
is authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to
foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper. (Palm Tree Estates, Inc., et al.
v. PNB, G.R. No. 159370, October 3, 2012, Leonardo-de Castro).
Injunction is not available if contract has already expired.

A petitioner for an injunctive relief has no more legal rights under the service contract which already
expired. Therefore, it has not met the first vital requisite that it must have material and substantial rights to be protected by
the courts. (Manila International Airport Authority v. Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc., G.R. Nos. 146184-85, 161117 and
167827, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 269, 288-289). An injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract,
or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. (Go v. Villanueva, Jr., G.R. No. 154623, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA
126, 133-134, citing Republic v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 117733, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 736, 749). Verily, petitioner
cannot lay claim to an actual, clear and positive right based on an expired service contract.
Moreover, well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that no court can compel a party to agree to a contract through the
instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction. (See Manila International Airport Authority v. Olongapo Maintenance
Services, Inc., supra note 33 at 289; Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 139275-76 and
140949, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 125, 139; and National Food Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 115121-
25, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 470, 479). A contract can be renewed, revived or extended only by mutual consent of the
parties. (Thunder Security & Investigation Agency, etc. v. NFA, et al., G.R. No. 182042, July 27, 2011).
Remedies available in favor of a defendant against a writ of attachment.

(1) The defendant can move to discharge by making a cash deposit or giving a counter - bond to secure the payment of
the judgment (Sec. 12);
(2) The defendant may move to quash the attachment because it may have been improperly or irregularly issued or that
it has no basis. (Sec. 13).
(3) If attachment is based on fraud, the remedy is to file a counterbond. (Metro, Inc., et al. v. Lara’s Gifts & Decors Inc., et
al., G.R. No. 171741, November 11, 2009)
RULE 63 – DECLARATORY RELIEF
Petition for declaratory relief is within the RTC’s jurisdiction. SC has no jurisdiction; exception.
Well-settled is the rule that a petition for declaratory relief must be filed with the Regional Trial Court as a rule as
there are issues of facts to be resolved.
The Constitution as the subject matter; and the validity and construction of Section 8(1), Article VIII as the issue
raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution
process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed.
It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding
the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved, but also to the sanctity of the
Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. The SC could have dismissed the petition but due to the
transcendental importance of the issue involved, it took cognizance of the case as an exception. (Francisco Chaves v. Judicial &
Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012).
RULE 65 – CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION & MANDAMUS
Review of judgments and final orders or resolution of the Comelec and COA
Application of Rule 65 under Rule 64
The Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of constitutional commissions, the
COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only
relates to those rendered in the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case of the COMELEC,
this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole
judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices.
Consequently, Rule 64, which complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7, should likewise be
read in the same sense—that of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and orders rendered by the COMELEC in the
exercise of its administrative functions. In such instances, a Rule 65 petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.
The instant petition revolves around the issue on whether or not Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate in the
bidding process for the COMELEC's procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers. The case does not stem from an
election controversy involving the election, qualification, or the returns of an elective office. Hence, Rule 64 is not the proper
remedy. (LEO Y. QUERUBIN, et al. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, et al., G.R. No. 218787, December 08, 2015,
Velasco, J.)
Petition for mandamus may not be issued to compel the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a full-
pledged graduating cadet.

Suffice it to say that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom;
therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide. (University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No.
110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 356). The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission
officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing
the words of Garcia, the SC said that there are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion
appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld’s terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a
privilege rather than a right. He cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.
(Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929 [1975]).
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. (University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan,
supra note 64, at 361-362). For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there
should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated. (Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual
Help College of Rizal, Inc., G.R. No. 103142, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 591, 597; Cudia, etc. v. The Superintendent of the
PMA, et al., G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015, Peralta, J).
RULE 70 – Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Nature of ejectment proceedings.

Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right to possession of property. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises or possession de facto. The issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be assailed in
an action expressly instituted for that purpose. (Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November
29, 2009, 605 SCRA 315). Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, specifically states that a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack, and that it cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Ejectment; 2 kinds.
An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding designed to
provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. (Barrientos v.
Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 165, 170). The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or
material possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de
jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the
case. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but only
to determine the question of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of
possession. (Pengson v. Ocampo, Jr., G.R. No. 13 1968, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 420, 425).The adjudication of ownership in
that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the
property. (Fe U. Quijano v. Amante, G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014, Bersamin, J).
Court may issue an order enjoining the execution of the judgment considering the change in the nature of the title of the
lessor during the subsistence of the lease.
It is true that Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that “the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against
the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.” However,
it was ruled in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 363, that on appeal the appellate
court may stay the said writ should circumstances require. x x x even if the RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are
immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. (Amagan v. Marayag, 383 Phil 486 [2000] and Vda. De
Legaspi v. Avendano, 169 SCRA 138 [1977]).
In City of Naga v. Asuncion, 557 SCRA 528 (2008), that when exigencies in the case warrant it, the appellate court may
stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC in an action for ejectment if there are circumstances necessitating such action. An
example of such exceptional circumstance can be seen in Laurel v. Abalos, 140 Phil 532 (1969). Therein, a defendant was
ordered by the trial court to vacate the premises of the disputed property and return possession thereof to the plaintiffs, but
while the ejectment case was on appeal, a judgment was promulgated in a separate case where the sale of the property to said
plaintiffs was declared null and void, making the plaintiffs’ right to possess the disputed property inconclusive. The Court
ruled in said case that:
Where the supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material
change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no
compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court
may stay immediate execution of the judgment. (La Campana Dev. Corp. v. Ledesma, et. al., G.R. No. 154152,
August 25, 2010, Peralta, J).
Title not issue in an action for forcible entry.

Title is never an issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who had prior physical possession.
The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behoves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, it was stressed that ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at
issue in an action for recovery of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal
possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. The same
is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a
ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
The only question that the court must resolve in ejectment proceedings is – who is entitled to the physical possession
of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to
the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to
be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of
property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favour prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to
remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to
settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession. (Munoz v. Yabut, et al., G.R. No. 142676; Munoz v. Sps. Chan, et al.,
G.R. No. 146718, June 16, 2011, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Possession by tolerance; rental to be reckoned from withdrawal of tolerance.

As a rule, if there is possession of a property by tolerance, no rentals are paid. In fact, no contract exists between the
parties. But if the tolerance is withdrawn, is the possessor liable to pay rentals from the time possession started, or are the
rentals to be paid only after tolerance is withdrawn. In Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. v. Tormil Realty & Dev. Corp., G.R. No.
176341, July 7, 2014, Del Castillo, J, it was ruled that such compensation should not be reckoned from the time the lessee
began to occupy the same, but from the time of the demand to vacate.
Possession de facto cannot be affected by pendency of action involving ownership.

Possession de facto cannot be affected by the pendency of the annulment case where the ownership of the property is
being contested. (Soco v. CA, 131 Phil. 753 (1996)). It is a well-settled jurisprudence that suits involving ownership may not
be successfully pleaded in abatement of the enforcement of the final decision in an ejectment suit. If the rule were otherwise,
ejectment cases could easily be frustrated through the simple expedient of filing an action contesting the ownership over the
property subject of the controversy. This would render nugatory the underlying philosophy of the summary remedy of
ejectment which is to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves
entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their
claims. (Samonte v. Century Savings Bank, G.R. No. 176413, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 478).
Unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction; boundary dispute is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
An ejectment case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the
complaint. But if the allegations do not make out a case for unlawful detainer, but an action reinvindicatoria, the case should
be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. A boundary dispute must be
resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary
dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful
detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the
expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s
possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of
possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which
between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. (Manalang v. Bacani, G.R. No. 156995, January 12,
2015)
Contempt
With regard to Erlinda’s authorship of the On the Edge of Heaven, she is found guilty of indirect contempt. Indirect
contempt is a deliberate act to bring the court or judge into disrepute. Her statements pose a different threat to the Courts
repute. Statements such as “Was justice sold?” and “How can the highest court of our land be a party to the break up of my
family and, disregarding the Family Code”, when taken together went beyond the permissible bounds of fair criticism. While
most of her statements were in the form of questions instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the same: they
constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the highest tribunal of the land. Litigants, no matter how aggrieved or dissatisfied they may be of court’s decision,
do not have the unbridled freedom in expressing their frustration or grievance in any manner they want. (ERLINDA I.
BILDNER, et al. v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, et al., G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
The modes of settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

They are:
1. Extrajudicial settlement (Rule 74, Sec. 1) where the heirs may, without intervention of the court, settle the estate
subject to the conditions that:
a. He left no will;
b. He left no debts;
c. The heirs are all of age or even if there are minors, there may be appointment of a guardian.
The document has to be registered with the ROD to bind third persons.
2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. There is a judicial intervention; the estate does not exceed P10,000.00
3. Judicial settlement through letters of administration or letters testamentary. (Rules 73; 75-90, Rules of Court).
In the second, a petition for settlement of the estate is filed. In the third, a petition for the probate of the will of the
decedent is filed since the probate is mandatory and that a will shall not pass any right until it shall have been
admitted to probate.
4. Self-adjudication of the estate by a sole heir. He merely executes an affidavit and registers with the ROD. (See:
Rebusquillo v. Gualvez)
Where estate of a deceased person settled.

The estate shall be settled in the court where the deceased was residing at the time of his death if he was a resident of
the Philippines. If he was a resident of another country, it should be settled in the court of any place where he had an estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement shall exercise it to the exclusion of all other courts. However, the place of
settlement is not a question of jurisdiction but a question of venue. (Jao v. CA; San Luis v. San Luis; Nitcher v. Nitcher).

Remedies of an aggrieved party after extrajudicial settlement of estate.
An aggrieved party may avail of the following remedies:
He may file an action for reconveyance within a period of 10 years from the issuance of the title as it is based on
constructive trust (Art. 1144, NCC; Marquez v. CA, 300 SCRA 653 [1998]). However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the
property, said action, if based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the property/land has not been transferred to a buyer in
good faith and for value. (Heirs of Saludares v. CA, 420 SCRA 54).
Will of a foreigner executed abroad can be probated in the Phils.; no need for prior probate abroad.
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate,
may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. (In Re: Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011).
Extent of the power of the probate court.

The authority of the probate court is limited to the ascertainment of the extrinsic validity of the will, the soundness of
mind of the testator, whether the will was executed freely. It cannot determine the intrinsic validity of the will except if
preterition is apparent because it would be useless to declare the will extrinsically valid and yet, intrinsically void as there
would be waste of time of the parties and the court. It cannot likewise determine the validity and nature of contracts as the
same shall be decided in an appropriate proceeding before a court of general jurisdiction. The reason for the above is because
a probate court has limited jurisdiction. (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449). However, if the parties agree, the court may
determine the ownership of properties. (See: Vizconde v. CA)
Even if a will has been admitted to probate abroad, there is need to submit it to probate in the Phils., because the
judgment is not a law in the Philippines. It has to be proven as a fact according to the rules of evidence. The ancillary
administrator of the estate has the duty to introduce in evidence the law of the State of the decedent. (Ancheta v. Guersey-
Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139866, June 8, 2006). When the will is allowed it shall have the same effect as if originally proved and
allowed in the Philippines. (Rule 77, Sec. 3).
Declaration of heirship must be in the intestate or testate proceedings; exception.

As a rule the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action.
However, recourse to administration proceedings to determine who the heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and
compelling reason for such recourse. (Pereira v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81147, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 154; Intestate
Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1953)). Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring
administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. (Heirs of
Magdaleno Ypon v. Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 778; Republic v. Mangotara, G. R. No.
170375, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 360; Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA
70, 80-81; Fidel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168263, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 186, 194; Rebusquillo v. Sps. Gualvez, et al., G.R.
No. 204029, June 4, 2014).
Order of preference in the appointment of administrator of an estate.

In the appointment of administrator the order of preference is”
a. The surviving spouse or next of kin;
b. Person requested by surviving spouse or next of kin;
c. Principal creditors;
d. Other person selected by the court.
The best interest of the estate shall always be considered in the appointment of administrator. In case of conflict
between the surviving spouse and the next of kin, the court shall apply the greater interest rule such that things being equal,
like when the two are competent, willing and can post a bond, the one with greater interest shall be appointed. (Santos v.
Angeles).
Appointment of special administrator; matter of discretion.

The appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court. The statutory provisions as to the
prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, and the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed. While
the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised
with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that
the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. Given this duty on the
part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving
the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. (DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS v. MARGARITA AVILA LORETO, et al., G.R. No.
193161, August 22, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J)
During the pendency of an intestate proceeding, the will of the decedent was produced.
The will must be submitted to probate but the intestate proceeding shall not be dismissed. The two cases shall be
consolidated. The rule is based on the principle that the probate of a will is mandatory and that it will not pass any right until
the will shall have been admitted to probate. Furthermore, there is preference of testacy over intestacy especially so that the
will of the decedent is his voice even after his death.

Statute of Non-Claims; The claims against the estate.
The claims against the estate are all money claims consisting of:
a. Claims for money arising from contract, express or implied;
b. Funeral expenses;
c. Expenses for the last sickness of the decedent;
d. Judgment based on money. (Evangelista v. Proveda, 38 SCRA 378).
Only money claims may be filed. Claims for damage and recovery of properties must be filed against the executor or
administrator. (Rule 87, Sec. 1; Hilado v. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009). This is so because they are claims that survive the
death of the deceased.
Remedies of an heir entitled to a share but not given.

He can demand his share through a proper motion in the same testate or intestate proceedings. Or, he may file a
motion to reopen if it had been closed. He should not file an independent action which could be tried by another court which
might reverse a decision of the probate court that has already become final and executory. (Guilas v. Judge of CFI of
Pampanga).
As a rule, no execution shall issue in a probate proceedings; the rule is not absolute.
As a rule, the probate court does not issue a writ of execution because all claims shall be paid as ordered by the court
in the process of liquidation of the estate where the executor or administrator does in the performance of his duties. The rule
is not however absolute.
The probate court may only issue execution (a) to satisfy debts of the estate out of the contributive shares of
devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent’s assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of
partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 3,
Rule 142) and (d) where the executor or administrator has possession of share to be delivered and refuses to transfer the
possession to persons entitled. (Sec. 1, Rule 90, Heirs of the Late Fran v. Salas, G.R. No. 53546, June 25, 1992, 210 SCRA 303).
Remedies of creditor if debtor dies.

The bank may exercise any of the following options:
a. It may file a claim against the estate;
b. It may foreclose the mortgage judicially;
c. It may extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, but it has no right to ask for deficiency from the estate.
The remedies are not cumulative. They are not alternative. The exercise of one excludes the other remedies. (Heirs of
the Late Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013).
RULE 76 – ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership.

If an action was instituted by heirs against their brother, who is also an heir, and their mother, who is the
administrator of the estate the probate court can determine the issue of ownership. In Coca v. Borromeo (171 Phil. 246
[1978]), the Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass upon the issue of title, precisely because the only interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the proceeding.
While it is true that a probate court’s determination of ownership over properties which may form part of the estate
is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and strangers
thereto.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (171 Phil. 385 [1963]), the Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether
a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court.
(Romero, et al. v. CA, et al., (G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012).
RULE 86 – CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under Rule 86, Sec. 5.
A claim for necessary expenses by a possessor of a parcel of land is a kind of quasi-contract, hence, it should be filed
in the estate proceedings.
A claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v.
O’Brien, it was explained that the term “implied contracts,” as used in our remedial law, originated from the common law
where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-
contract is included in the concept “implied contracts” as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased
arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Absolute Management Corp., G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013, Brion, J).
RULE 102 – HABEAS CORPUS
Writ of habeas corpus; when available.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over
a minor. (Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 101, 111). The general rule is that parents should
have custody over the minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such
children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they
carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled. (In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus of Minor Shang Ko Vingson Yu, Sherly Vingson v. Jovy Cabcaban, UDK 14817, January 13, 2014).

Nature of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petition for habeas corpus; appeal period.
The 48-hour period of appeal is the more appropriate remedy. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the
adequacy of such remedy in that no necessary time will be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the
writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application. (OSG v. De Castro, 529 SCRA 157 [2007]; Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 67569; Go v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167570; Hon.
Fernandez, et al. v. Go, et al., G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009).
Writ of Habeas Corpus at NCJR.

The National Capital Judicial Region consists of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and
the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa,
and Valenzuela. In view thereof, it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a
family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the National Capital
Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon
City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule. (Rules on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC) MA. HAZELINA A.
TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA v. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, G.R. No. 210636, July 28,
2014, Velasco, J)
Tender age presumption; not conclusive.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in
all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling
evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly
incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s
custody.
Thus, the sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch was awarded to the mother, Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch. (AGNES
GAMBOA-HIRSCH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007 VELASCO, JR. J)
RULE 67 – EXPROPRIATION
Motion to dismiss may not be filed in an expropriation case.

The rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended
by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates that any
objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer. (Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R.
No. 136349, January 23, 2006).
When expropriating authority may be granted the writ of possession in expropriation.

The deposit of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property is not sufficient to grant writ of
possession. Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may
issue. Such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost
urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized. It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of
deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure
projects. (Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166249, December 19, 2005).
RULE 108 – CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
Petition for change of name; adversarial proceedings; who should be impleaded.

Where a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy, paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. Section 3 of Rule 108 requires that the civil registrar and all
parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries must be
impleaded. Non-impleading of a party who may have been inadvertently left out may be notified through publication. (Rep. V.
Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011)
Correction of entries involving first names should be filed with the Local Civil Registrar.
The first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048. Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register
can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order.
Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172 provides that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month
in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in
the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned cityor municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

If correction is clerical, it is summary in nature; if it affects civil status, citizenship, it is substantial.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia, 225 Phil. 408 [1986], the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with
the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding." (Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 58 [2004]). An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered. (Rep. v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 9, 2014, Peralta, J).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Elements of jurisdiction in criminal cases.

The elements of jurisdiction in criminal case are the following:
1. Penalty attached;
The jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the penalty imposable, and not by the penalty ultimately
imposed. (People v. Lagon, G.R. No. 45815, May 18, 1990). If the penalty does not exceed 6 years, it is within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. If more than 6 years, it is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The additional penalty for habitual delinquency is not considered in determining which court shall have jurisdiction
over a criminal case because such delinquency is not a crime. (El Publo de Filipinas v. San Juan, 69 Phil. 3347 [1940];
B129).
2. Nature of the offense charged;
Crimes committed by public officers fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if the grade is 27 & above.
Below 27, the MTC or RTC has jurisdiction.
3. Territorial jurisdiction over place of crime commission.
In criminal cases, venue is a question of jurisdiction. However, SC may order the transfer of the venue of trial of
criminal cases in order to attain the aims of justice.
The absence of any of these elements may be challenged by an accused at any stage of the proceedings in the court
below or on appeal. Failing to comply with anyone of them, the resulting judgment of conviction is null and void.
Venue, a question of jurisdiction in criminal cases; exception.

Under the law, venue is a question of jurisdiction in criminal cases, hence, as a rule, the complaint should be filed in
Manila. Such rule is founded on public policy so as not to unduly prejudice the parties. But under RA 8042, the law provides
that a victim of illegal recruitment has the option to file the case in his place of residence or in the place where the crime was
committed. This is an exception to the rule that venue is a question of jurisdiction in criminal cases. The law is intended to
protect the interest of victims of illegal recruitment. (Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas v. Salac, G.R. No. 152642, November 12, 2012).
When a private individual within the jurisdiction of the SB.

The SB has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal actions involving a person notwithstanding that he is private
individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates and close associates. (Disini v. SB, G.R. Nos. 174764-65, September 11, 2013).
Jurisdiction in libel cases.

Neither the MTC nor SB have jurisdiction over the libel suit because under the law, libel cases are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC (Art. 360, RPC). The nature of the offense, the penalty provided for by law and the grade to which A
belongs do not determine the court that has jurisdiction. This is especially so that it is the law that confers jurisdiction over a
subject matter. Since the law confers jurisdiction upon the RTC. The MTC and SB have no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(People v. City Court of QC; People v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 154474; Photokina Marketing Corp. v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 154473,
April 24, 2009).
How jurisdiction over the person of the accused acquired.

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused in acquired either by his/her arrest or voluntary appearance in court. The
voluntary appearance of the accused is accomplished either by his: 1) pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction, 2) appearing for arraignment, entering trial), or 3)
by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accuse, as a rule, the
same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender. This is so because the accused cannot repudiate the power of the court and at the same time invoke it.
Meaning of the phrase “in relation to their Office” involving crimes committed by public officials and employees.
It means that the offense need not be connected with official duties. It is enough that it is in relation to office. A public
official and employee commits a crime “in relation to their office” if the offense was intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetuated while he is in the performance of his official function. Mere allegation in the Information that the
offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. What is controlling is the specific
factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official
duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public
office.
RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
Allegation of age, relationship between the offender and the offended in rape cases.

The accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape if the information does not allege the age, and the relationship of
the victim and the alleged rapist. Rape is qualified and punished with death when committed by the victim’s parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law
spouse of the victim’s parent. However, an accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the information alleges the
circumstances of the victim’s over 12 years but under 18 years of age and her relationship with him. The reason is that such
circumstances alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they are special qualifying circumstances.
As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be specifically alleged in the information and
proven beyond reasonable doubt during the trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed (People v. Bayya, 384 Pil.
519 (2000); People v. Maglente, 366 Phil. 221 (1999); People v. Ilao, 357 Phil. 656 [1998]; People v. Arcillas, G.R. No. 181491,
July 30, 2012).
The offender being a common-law husband of the victim’s mother at the time of the commission of the rape, even if
established during the trial, could not be appreciated because the information did not specifically allege it as a qualifying
circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him (People v. Negosa,
G.R. Nos. 142856-57, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 539).
Reason for need to allege qualifying circumstances.

The need to allege qualifying circumstances to justify finding of qualified rape and the imposition of death penalty
was stressed in several cases. The additional attendant circumstances introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353 should be considered
as special qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and if not pleaded as such, could only be
appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
Without allegation of relationship in cases of statutory rape, proof alone of relationship, unless specifically alleged in
the information, would not warrant imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and
her relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance which should both be alleged and proved with certainty
in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. In this case, complainant never said she was below eighteen (18)
years of age when she was allegedly raped by her father on any of the dates stated in the complaint.
Although a husband is subject to punishment by death (now reclusion perpetua) in case he commits rape against his
wife’s daughter, the penalty cannot be imposed because the relationship alleged in the information is different from that
actually proven. Only the penalty for simple rape shall be imposed.
No duplicity of information.
If an employee of a corporation received purchase price of several lots from several buyers but misappropriated the
amounts and the corporation and the buyers sue him for estafa separately there is violation of the rule against duplicity of
information.
There is no duplicity in a charge for estafa committed by the accused for misappropriation of the purchase price of
several lots owned by a corporation, which was fraudulently received by the accused from several lot buyers on the pretext
that she was authorized to do so and which she misapplied to her personal use, instead of remitting the money to the owner
corporation. The crime of estafa committed against the corporation and those committed against the lot buyers are definitely
separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided
by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated on different occasions, and caused injury to different parties.
Sufficiency of allegations in the information; mere allegation of hazing is not sufficient.

If the indictment in a hazing case merely stated that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim, a Motion to Quash should be granted because the ultimate facts alleged did not constitute the crime of hazing. The
indictment merely stated that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that
the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial
ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term (U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910) (cited in Consigna
v. People, G.R. Nos. 175750-51, 2 April 2014; People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, 18 January 2012, 663 SCRA 272; Matrido v.
People, 613 Phil. 203 (2009); Batulanon v. People, 533 Phil. 336 (2006); Andaya v. People, supra note 28; Burgos v. SB, 459
Phil. 794 [2003]; People v. Banihit. 393 Phil. 465 [2000]; Oca v. Jimenez, 115 Phil. 420 [1962]) – in this case, hazing – is
insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia, both “the designation of
the offense given by the statute” and “the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.” The Special
Prosecutor’s belated argument that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a
prerequisite for continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure this defect
in the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of
accomplice to hazing. (People v. Bayabos, et al., G.R. No. 171222; People v. Aris, et al., G.R. No. 174786, February 18, 2015,
Sereno, J).
Duplicitous information; nature; effect if no MTQ.

As a rule, there should be only one offense alleged in one information as duplicity of offenses in one information is
not allowed by the Rules. However, the requirement is a mere procedural rule not jurisdictional, such that if the accused as in
this case, did not object to the duplicity of the information, he can be convicted of as many offenses as may be proven during
the trial. (Peoplee v. Dacay, G.R. No. 86939, August 1, 1993, 225 SCRA 1).
Rules in the amendment of a complaint or information.

A Complaint or Information may be amended, in form or substance, without leave of court at any time before the
accused enters his/her plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the Complaint or Information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original Complaint or Information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, in accordance with
Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused should not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Prescription of offense.
The applicable law on prescription in case of BP Blg. 22 is Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,” as amended. Appositely,
the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, G.R. No. L-22465, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 694, the Court ruled that
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v.
Court of Appeals, et. al., 207 Phil. 471 (1983), when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends
the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. (People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012),
Novel case on liability of school, etc. in Hazing cases.

The cases of People v. Bayabos, et al., G.R. No. 171222; and People v. Aris, et al., G.R. No. 174786, February 18, 2015,
Sereno, J, present novel questions on the extent of the liability of school and school authorities under RA 8049 or the Anti-
Hazing Law.
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established: (1) a person is placed
in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts
were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial
ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the
infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an
organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the
accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing
in spite of actual knowledge thereof.
The contention that PMMA should not be considered an organization is not correct. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the
breadth of the term organization, includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training
corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP.
Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-owned educational
institution established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is
included in the term organization within the meaning of the law.
RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
Civil liability despite acquittal.

The accused’s acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt
does not include the extinguishment of his civil liability for the dishonored checks. Despite acquittal, the accused may still be
adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability
of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which
the accused was acquitted. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 515 SCRA 502 (2007)). In a number of similar cases, it was
held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil damages. (Bax v. People, G.R. No.
149858, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 284; Domangsang v. CA, G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000, 347 SCRA 75; Alfarez v.
People, et al., G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011).
Extinction of penal action; effect on civil liability.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court). In case the judgment is of acquittal, it
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. (Sec. 2, Rule 120, Rules of Court; Domingo v. Colina, G.R. No. 173330, June 17, 2013, Peralta,
J).
Effect of his death on his civil liability.

The death of the accused extinguished his civil liability arising from the crime charged as a felony, as well as his
criminal liability. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as accused, the

civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case. (People v. Amistoso, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
No independent civil action under BP 22.

There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is
clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Even if not yet in effect when the civil case was filed, are nonetheless applicable. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or
arise from, procedural laws. (Cheng v. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155). Any new rules may validly be made to
apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules
of procedure, (Aldeguer v. Hoskyu, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil. 197), except that in criminal cases, the changes
do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time
of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution. (Heirs of Simon v. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011).
Two(2) elements of prejudicial question.

Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are expressly stated in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the
other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear
not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If
the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action
based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,”
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. (Sabandal v. Tongco, G.R. No. 124498, October 5,
2001, 366 SCRA 567, 571-572).
Action for nullity of marriage is not prejudicial to a case of frustrated parricide.

An action for annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no
effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. (Joselito Pimentel v. Maria Chrystine Pimentel, et al., G.R.
No. 172060, September 13, 2010).
RULE 112 – Preliminary Investigation
Effect if accused was granted immunity from prosecution but charged in the information.
The filing of the criminal action against an accused in court does not prevent the Ombudsman from exercising the
power that the Congress has granted him. Section 17 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman may grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence
may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under
its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity
granted shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from
demotion or removal from office.
The authority enables the Ombudsman to carry out his constitutional mandate to ensure accountability in the public
service. (Quarto v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 580). It gives the Ombudsman wide latitude in using
an accused discharged from the information to increase the chances of conviction of the other accused and attain a higher
prosecutorial goal. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 783). Immunity statutes seek to
provide a balance between the state’s interests and the individual’s right against self-incrimination. To secure his testimony
without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from prosecution.
In such case, both interests and rights are satisfied. (People v. The Hon. SB, et al., G.R. No. 185729-32, June 26, 2013).
Validity of the creation of the Joint Panel of the COMELEC and DOJ in conducting preliminary investigation on the
electoral sabotage filed against them.
The Constitution does not vest on the COMELEC exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws. Under the present law, the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now
exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. (RA 9369, Sec. 43).
The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of “concurrent jurisdiction” authorized by the
amendatory law. (Arroyo v. DOJ, et al., G.R. No. 199082, and Abalos v. De Lima, et al., G.R. No. 199085; Arroyo v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 199118, July 23, 2013, Peralta, J).
Probable cause can be determined based on hearsay evidence.

Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such

investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because
substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the
application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in
determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt. (Sen. Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 21140-41, January 21, 2015, Carpio, J).
RULE 113 – ARREST
Arrest Without Warrant, When Lawful

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust
operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police
authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not
necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a
trait of good police work. When time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the
instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the dangerous drugs, the policemen
need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they undertook the buy-bust operation.”
The warrantless search was also valid. Under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113, a person may be arrested without a warrant if
he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.” (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO
MANLANGIT y TRESBALLES, G.R. No. 189806, January 12, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J)
Determination of probable cause by the judge before issuance of warrant of arrest.

While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the prosecutor, the
trial court may, in the protection of one’s fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the
evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
While the information filed by the prosecutor may be valid, a judge still has the discretion to make her own finding of
whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the
accused for arraignment and trial.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase “upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce” allows a determination of
probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to
“immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause.”
In People v. Hon. Yadao, G.R. Nos. 162144-154, November 13, 2012, 685 SCRA 264, it was said:
“Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
(2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s
first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause against the respondents.
It is also settled that “once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.” (Leviste v. Alameda, G.R.
No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 575, 598, citing Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114046, October 24, 1994, 237
SCRA 685; Mendoza vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, Leonen, J).
Judge to proceed with caution.

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases
due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that
the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other
hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice
may be served.
Meaning of personal knowledge of commission of crime; does not include person’s reputation or past criminal citations.
Previous criminal records of an accused are sufficient to cause his arrest within the meaning of personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that accused committed an offense. Such concept must be strictly construed. (People v. Tudtud, 458
Phil. 752 [2003]).
A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. “Personal knowledge” of the
arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret “personal knowledge” as referring to a
person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority
and power of police
officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering
nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
An accused’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be
dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of

criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5. “Probable cause” has been
understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. (People v. Chua Ho
San @Tsay Ho San, 367 Phil. 703, 717 [1999]). Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case. (People v. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013).
RULE 114 – BAIL
Application for bail where the accused is charged with a crime punishableby reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;
indispensable requirements.
Where the accused is charged with a capital offense which, under the law at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by death or reclusion perpetua, and the accused files an application for bail, give reasonable notice of the hearing to
the prosecutor or require him to submit his/her recommendation. The petition for bail must be filed before the court where
the case is pending since bail is a matter of discretion. (Borniaga v. Hon. Tamino). There must be a hearing. Evidence of guilt
must be strong. Prosecution must be given full opportunity to present evidence. The Court may not grant bail simply for the
refusal of the prosecutor to adduce evidence in opposition to the application for bail, but may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of the State’s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of the bail.
Minor is charged with murder; bail a matter of right.

If a minor is charged with the crime of murder, bail is a matter of right because he is entitled to a reduction of the
penalty by one degree. If he is charged under a special law, bail is not a matter of right because he is not entitled to the
benefits of Art. 68, RPC where the penalty is reduced to one degree. He has to file a petition for bail and prove that the
evidence of guilt is not strong. (People v. Mangusan, April 14, 1991; Bravo v. Borja, 134 SCRA 466).
Bail granted due to humanitarian reasons.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of
the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his
life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The
People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461 [October 2, 1946].
Granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and
better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of
his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. (Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
and People, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, Bersamin, J).
No need to wait for termination of trial.

To mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can
be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is entitle the accuse to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be
circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject
of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.
In Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, it was observed that to allow bail on the basis of the
penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also
evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the
judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. Such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail, which is to
entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending trial. The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest
of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of
due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. (Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, G.R. No.
156822, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 467, 478; Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17;
Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, Bersamin, J).
No constructive bail.
Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet
charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. In the case at bar, The
accused did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the RTC. Despite the absence of any written
application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to The accused. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in
Sec. 17 of Rule 114.
As regards the insistence of the Judge that such may be considered as constructive bail, there is no such species of
bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the rights of another. (GAUDENCIO B. PANTILO III v. JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262, February 9,
2011, Velasco, Jr., J)
RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Effect if a case of rape, the court ordered the accused to present evidence ahead of the prosecution.
It violated the right of the accused to be presumed innocent and the right to due process. In fact, it violated the order
of presentation of evidence. The accused has the right to take the witness stand and that right carries with it the right not to
take the witness stand. (Alejandro vs. Pepito, 92 SCRA). Under the Rules of Court, however, where the accused admitted his
guilt but interposed the defense of justifying and exempting circumstances, the order of trial would be reversed. (Rule 119,
Rules of Court).

Allegations in the information controlling; caption, no.
No less that the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be
alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the
information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
“[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the complaint or
information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused
cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or
necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is
put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried
would be an unauthorized denial of that right.” (Canaran v. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 1, 2015, Mendoza, J).
Test to determine when offenses necessarily included.

Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in
the information filed against him. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted stage. In this case,
although the evidence presented during the trial proved the crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted
Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not
charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the allegations against him, as he so protests. (Canaran v. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 1, 2015, Mendoza, J).
Right against self-incrimination not applicable to juridical persons.

The right against self-incrimination is not applicable to juridical persons. In Baseco vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27,
1987, it was said that an individual may refuse to answer questions incriminating him unless there is an immunity statute
granted to him. This does not apply to a corporation vested with privileges, or franchises, for it may not refuse to show its
hands when charged with abuse of its privileges. In fact, an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce its records in its
possession, upon plea of self-incrimination, either of himself or the company.
Double jeopardy will attach if accused is prosecuted for same offense.

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy
only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds
where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s due process rights.
The petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to
evidence, without requiring the presentation of additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant traceable to the
special prosecutor’s conduct. The special prosecutor’s conduct allegedly also violated the State’s due process rights. In this
case, the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the
special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other evidence could be
secured. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 153304-05 (665 SCRA 89), February 7, 2012).
RULE 116 - ARRAIGNMENT
Duties of a court if an accused pleads guilty to a grave offense.

(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of
guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence inhis behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death (now reclusion perpetua), for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The
primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he
might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the
meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. (People v. Ernas, 455 Phil. 829 [2003]). Moreover, the requirement of
taking further evidence would aid the Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.
(People v. Pastor, 428 Phil. 976 [2002]; People v. Gambao, et al., G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013).
Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his/her plea and (b) require the prosecution to prove his/her
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. It should allow the accused to present evidence on his/her behalf. In People v.
Alicando, G.R. No. 1117587, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 293, the Supreme Court held that a conviction in capital offense
cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the
precise degree of his/her culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Note: This is especially so if there are aggravating
circumstances which are not admitted when accused pleads guilty. (People v. Commendador)
Searching questions in case of re-arraignment.

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the
Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was “not guilty,” the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to “guilty.” (G.R. No. L-135053, March 6, 2002, 378 SCRA 389; People v. Chua, 366
SCRA 283 (2001)). The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death

penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have
misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. (People v. Galvez; People v. Magat, 332 SCRA 517
(2000); People v. Khaddafy Janjalani, et al., G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011).
Requirement of conduct of searching questions not satisfied if it was counsel who explained the consequences of plea.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused. In People v. Alborida, the Court found that there was
still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the
penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. (G.R. No.
136382, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA 495).
The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the
significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea. (People v. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 (1990)). This requirement is
stringent and mandatory. (People v. Galvez, 378 SCRA 389 (2002); People v. Khaddafy Janjalani, et al., G.R. No. 188314,
January 10, 2011).
PRE-TRIAL & TRIAL
Admission by counsel at pre-trial.

The admission of counsel in a criminal case in open court that accused had remorse of conscience and would admit
the crime charged pleading for mercy and compassion by the trial court is not binding upon the accused. It cannot be used
against him as it has not been signed by him. Admission by an attorney is limited to matters of judicial procedure. An
admission that operates as a waiver, surrender and obstruction of the clients cause is beyond the scope of the attorney’s
implied authority. (People v. Hermanes, G.R. No. 139416, March 12, 2002, 397 SCRA 117; People v. Maceda, 73 SCRA 679).
Only admission relative to procedural matters are binding upon the accused.
Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit.
If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as
extended by Section 6 of this Rule, the Information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his
right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving the motion, but the prosecution shall have the burden of
going forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under Section 3 of this Rule. The dismissal shall be subject
to the rules on double jeopardy. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right
to dismiss under this Section. (See: Perez; Nacionales; Tatad; Binay).
RULE 117 - MOTION TO QUASH
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”?
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “series”?
Who committed those acts?
The SC ruled that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars.
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50 million by means of
a combination or series of overt acts. Under these terms, it is not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten
wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a
combination or series of overts acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories
listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example, misappropriation, malversation and raids on
the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)]. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil.
290, 351 [2001]).
The prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in alleging the criminal overt acts allegedly
committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph uncertain to the point of ambiguity for
purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for his defense.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.” Hence, even if the
accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if
this resulted from a single criminal act. This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the congressional
deliberations.
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the various overt acts
that constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are material facts that should not only be alleged, but
must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that the accused would know what he is specifically charged with and why he
stands charged, so that he could properly defend himself against the charges. (Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People,
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, Bersamin, J)
Basic purpose of Bill of Particulars.

The purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are indefinite, vague, or are
conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of
which he stands accused. Verily, an accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete
or are unclear to him.

Matter of defense cannot be grounds for motion to quash; present them at the trial.
An information cannot be quashed if the ground relied upon is a matter of defense. The issue on the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is,
therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an
offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by
way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which
may be raised only during the presentation of evidence. (Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010).
Requisites of the 1 year; 2 year bar rule.

In open court, the accused moved to dismiss provisionally a criminal case considering that complainant had not
shown any interest to prosecute the complaint the contention that the dismissal became permanent one year after the
issuance of the order of dismissal is not correct. He is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph
thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the
offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the
motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case. (People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317, 370-371 (2003), as cited in Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229
(2009)). In this case, it is apparent that there was no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing
thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule
15 of the Rules. The importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained
in People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317 (2003)).
When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process. (Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014, Peralta, J).
RULE 119 - TRIAL
Once court granted demurrer to evidence, appeal from the order would put the accused in double jeopardy.
Well-settled is the rule that if accused is acquitted on a demurrer to evidence, the State cannot appeal, otherwise the
accused would be put to double jeopardy. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy (People v. SB, G.R. No.
164185, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 449). Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on
errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not
attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (People v. SB, 491
SCRA 185 [2006]), and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s due process rights (People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444,
September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 207). If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void; as
a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will
not lie in such a case (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688).
A review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction (People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 1288587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393). Mere allegations of grave abuse
of discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient (Marcelo B.
Gananden, Oscar B. Mina, Jose M. Bautista and Ernesto H. Narcisco, Jr. v. Honorable Office of the Ombudsman and Robert K.
Humiwat, G.R. Nos. 169359-61, June 1, 2011; People v. SB, et al. (G.R. Nos. 153304-05, February 7, 2012).
Demurrer to evidence without leave of court; accused waives right to present evidence if denied; includes civil liability.
When accused filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, the whole case was submitted for judgment on the
basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At
that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect. (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No.
165496, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 502; Alferez v. People, et al., G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011).
Effects if an accused is discharged to become a State Witness

1. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the evidence during the trial. If the
court denies the motion to discharge of the accused as state witness, his/her sworn statement shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
2. Discharge of accused operates as an acquittal and a bar to further prosecution for the same offense, unless the
accused fails or refuses to testify against his/her co-accused in accordance with his/her sworn statement constituting
the basis of his/her discharge.
2.1. Failure to testify refers exclusively to defendant’s will or fault.
2.2. Where an accused who turns State witness on a promise of immunity, but later retracts and fails to keep his/her
part of the agreement, his/her confession of his/her participation in the commission of the crime is admissible as
evidence against him/her.
3. Erroneous or improper discharge of state witness does not affect the competency and quality of the testimony of the
discharged defendant.
If he refuses to testify or recants – he can be charged. The affidavit/admissions are admissible against him. If motion
to discharged denied – affidavit not admissible in evidence.
RULE 120 - JUDGMENT
Effect if accused fails to appear at promulgation; warrant of arrest; mere notice of appeal is not considered as
surrender.

The accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
under the Rules of Court against the judgment—(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b)
an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in
order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment. If the trial
court finds that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused shall be allowed to avail of the said remedies within 15
days from notice or order finding his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of
conviction.
Accuseds’ mere filing of notice of appeal through their new counsel, therein only explaining their absence during the
promulgation of judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender. The term “surrender” under Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court contemplates an act whereby a convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of notice of appeal cannot suffice as a physical
and voluntary submission of petitioners to the RTC’s jurisdiction. It is only upon petitioners’ valid surrender, and only after
proper motion, that they can avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent compliance with these requirements, their notices of
appeal, the initiatory step to appeal from their conviction, were properly denied due course. (Villena, et al. v. People, et al., G.R.
No. 184091, January 31, 2011; Salvador v. Chua, G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015).
Variance between offense proved and charged.

An accused may be convicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No.
9165 when he was charged with illegal dispensation, delivery, transportation, distribution or acting as broker of dangerous
drugs under Article II, Section 5 of the same statute.
Rule Rule 120, Section 4 of the Rules of Court governs situations where there is a variance between the crime
charged and the crime proved. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The same ruling may also be applied to the other acts penalized under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 because for the accused to be able to trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit, or transport any dangerous drug, he must necessarily be in possession of said drugs. (People v.
Maongco, et al., G.R. No. 196966, October 23, 2013, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
State cannot appeal from an order granting demurrer to evidence; double jeopardy.
The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused as it is equivalent to an
acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove that the court’s action is attended with grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated.
The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The following are the recognized
exceptions thereto: (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law; (Galman v. SB, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)) and (ii) when
the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by
granting the accused’ demurrer to evidence. (People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668; People v. SB,
et al., G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010).
Accused can avail of probation even if he appealed; when.

As a rule, if an accused appealed from the judgment of conviction, he is disqualified from availing of the benefit of
probation. The rule is not absolute as when the judgment of conviction imposed a severe penalty that disqualified him from
availing of the benefits of probation, but such judgment would be annulled because of an erroneous judgment. The accused
did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal
and probation. The contention that the appeal would dilute Francisco v. CA, where if an accused appeals, he is disqualified
from applying for probation is not correct. This is so because the ruling that would allow him to avail of probation is the
court’s greatly diminished penalty imposed upon him on appeal. The rule in Francisco remains that those who will appeal
from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
(Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258; People v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 154954, & companion cases, December 1, 2014).
Rationale for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. The Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that
the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny an accused the right to apply for probation
when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to
probation? (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258; People v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 154954, & companion cases, December 1, 2014).
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
Ground for new trial must really exist.

In granting a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence presented must be in
actual existence and unknown to the party even if a judgment had been rendered before. This should be the case because
otherwise, how could it be discovered evidence when it did not in fact exist previously during trial?
In this case, petitioner presented as a ground for its motion the testimony of an employee, who stated in an affidavit
that his liability to the creditor had been cut down to a mere PhP 21,981.71. However, it is obvious that the same affidavit
cannot be executed, much less produced, during the trial since the payments were made after judgment or after the fact.
Hence, the same could hardly be classified as newly discovered evidence. (FRANCISCO L. BAYLOSIS, SR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 152119, August 14, 2007, VELASCO, JR., J)

EVIDENCE
Judicial Notice and Judicial Admissions
The essence of the crime penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the accused’s lack of license or permit to
carry or possess the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to
prove that petitioner had no license or permit to possess the seized contraband as shown by a certification that he had no
license.
The contents, authenticity, and import of the above certification were admitted during the hearing by petitioner,
thereby dispensing with the testimony of the issuing officer, SPO1 Regis. Under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, "[A]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made." Clearly, petitioner cannot take a contrary or different position considering that he has made an express
admission of the Certification, which does not require proof and cannot be contradicted because there is no previous evidence
that the admission was made through palpable mistake. After admitting it, he cannot now assail that said certification has not
been properly identified. Besides, he has had several occasions to present proof that he was licensed to possess firearms. Yet,
even in this late stage he has not. (CAYETANO CAPANGPANGAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 150251, November
23, 2007, Velasco. Jr., J)
Dead man’s statute; the reason for its inadmissibility.

Under the Dead Man’s Statute Rule, “if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted
and unexplained account of the transaction.” (Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125861, September 9, 1998, 295 SCRA 247,
258). Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with the petitioners
cannot be used as evidence against the respondent as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same.
Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a case,
or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (Garcia v. Vda. De Caparas, G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013,
Del Castillo, J).
Mental retardate can testify.

While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental retardate may be difficult to determine, still, it can be
ascertained by deducing from the manner she testifies in court as to the surrounding facts of the crime committed. For as long
as her testimony is straightforward, candid and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, and her
demeanor is consistent with one who has been a victim of rape, bolsters her credibility with the verity born out of human
nature and experience, thus, must be given full faith and credit.
Moreover, mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the
court. (People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 188855, December 8, 2010).
Witness is a child; cannot be sole reason for disqualification.

As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such
awareness, experience, or observation to others can be witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or
social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as
listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest
in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualifications.
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of Child Witness
(A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption,
the burden of substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child. (People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015, Bersamin, J)
Extrajudicial confession before a “Bantay Bayan” is not admissible in evidence; reason.

The prosecution’s contention that the confession before the bantay bayan is admissible since they are not police
officers is not quite correct, because there was a violation of his constitutional rights under custodial investigation or the
Miranda warnings. In People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 294, the confession before the
barangay chairman together with object seized were inadmissible in evidence. In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 432 Phil.
471 (2002), it was held that “bantay bayan” is “a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community, which is an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.”
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local
government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, the specific
scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry that is made by them has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights. (People v. Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010).
Admissibility of dying declaration; reason.

Dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. . While the victim was not able to testify in court,
his statement is considered admissible under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the declaration of
a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, it must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization
by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence – not so much the rapid eventuation of death – is at hand. This may
be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent’s wounds,
or other relevant circumstances.” (People v. Santos, 337 Phil. 334 (1997)).
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who knows of his impending death would make
a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. (People v. Lamasan, 451 Phil. 308 (2003)). It is hard to
fathom that the victim, very weak as he was and with his body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon
every remaining strength he had just to lie about his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
(People v. Tabarnero, et al., G.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010; People v. Palanas, G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015, Perlas-
Bernabe, J).
Res gestae.
If after the rape and killing of a young girl, the accused admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that he was the
one who committed the crime such admission is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Accused’s statements infront
of the barangay officials are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence (Rule 130, Sec.
4), a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. All these requisites are present in this case. He had just been through a startling and
gruesome occurrence, victim’s death. His admission was made while he was still under the influence of said startling
occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the influence of
alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking spree. His confession concerned the rape and killing of the victim. His
spontaneous statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or law enforcers, are not covered by the
constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him. (People v. Tirso
Sace, G.R. NO. 178063, April 5, 2010).
Independently relevant evidence; exception to the hearsay rule.

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, the hearsay rule does not apply where only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. (People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. 178301,
August 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 693). In the case at bar, the testimony of the police officer as regards the conversations between
the informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it established that said information led the police officers to
prepare for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The conversation between the informant and the accused-appellant was
not necessary to prove the attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to sell was already clear from accused-appellant’s
actuations which were all within the personal knowledge of police officer and testified to by him. (People v. Coronado, G.R. No.
186141, April 11, 2012).
Text messages admissible in evidence.

The text messages are admissible applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC,
Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002). Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of
those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages
and was competent to testify on them. (People v. Enojas, et al., G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014).
Offer of Evidence
Offer of evidence; purposes.

The Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. A formal
offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object
to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court. Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The formal offer of one’s
evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. (HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG et al. v.
SPOUSES LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, et al., G.R. No. 155483, 27 April 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.)
When objection to a document made.

Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The identification
of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party
presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when
it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an
exhibit.
If no timely objection was ever made, the evidence not objected to became property of the case, and all the parties to
the case are considered amenable to any favourable or unfavourable effects resulting from the evidence. (Interpacific Transit,
Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385, June 6, 1990; Sps. Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary District of the Phil. Islands of Protestant
Episcopal Church in the USA, et al., G.R. No. 171209, June 27, 2012, Leonardo-de Castro, J).
Proof of private document.

Documents acknowledged before a notary public, except last wills and testaments, are public documents. (Sec. 5, Rule
132). Since the subject REM was not properly notarized, its public character does not hold. It is subject to the requirement of
proof for private documents under Section 20, Rule 132, which provides before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
“When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.” (Dycoco v.
Grafilo, et al., G.R. No. 184843, July 30, 2010).
Doctrine of equipoise.
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused. If inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction. (People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 633 [1999]; Amanquiton v. People, G.R.
No. 186080, August 14, 2009).
Handwriting experts.
Handwriting experts, while useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwritings or signatures.
(Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court).
Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court allows the reception of the opinion of a witness, like Judge Laviña, for
which proper basis is given, as evidence regarding a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity. (Progressive Trade
Services Ent. V. Antonio, G.R. No. 179502, September 18, 2009).
Requisites of judicial notice.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed
to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety.
Best Evidence Rule

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for
its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In this case, the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino
that the original contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but
to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. Furthermore, MCMP’s failure to present the copy of the contract
and even explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.” (MCMP CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION v. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J)
When secondary evidence may be presented.

A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed,
but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations
must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence. Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above
exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on
ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to
produce them. Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other
words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as
secondary evidence have been met. (EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESOT v. BF CORPORATION, G.R. No. 145842, 145873
June 27, 2008 Velasco, Jr., J)
Parol evidence forbids the addition or contradiction of the terms of the instrument.
Parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or
other evidence purporting to show that, “at or before” the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms
were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was
agreed upon not prior to but “subsequent to” the written agreement. The validity of the written agreement is not the matter
which is being put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal agreement was agreed
upon by the parties after the execution of the written agreement which substantially modified their earlier written agreement.
(Raymundo, et al. v. Lunaria, et al., G.R. No. 171036, October 17, 2008).
Exception to the general rule.

This however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the four (4) items
enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, “a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the agreement.” Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading such that it falls under the exception is not
limited to the party initiating an action. In Philippine National Railways v. Court of First Instance of Albay, the Court noted that
“if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the complaint does not express the true
agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties.” Moreover, as with all
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party’s failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may
then be entertained.

Parol evidence must be relevant.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to be introduced points
to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to “induce belief in the existence” of
the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to introduced parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the
four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second,
that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Photocopy of document admitted.

In Caraan v. Court of Appeals, wherein the SC accepted in evidence a mere photocopy of the document since it was not
objected to despute non-presentation of the original.
No objection was raised by counsel for petitioners in their written opposition/comment to private respondents' offer
of evidence regarding the fact that what was marked and submitted to the court was the photocopy. In Blas vs. Angeles-
Hutalla, the Court held thus:
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the
time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Bystanders’ account of a rumble incident admissible as part of the res gestae.

As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, x x x." (RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 130, Sec. 36). All other kinds of testimony are
hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the general rule, and
one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the startling occurrence, they are,
in fact, admissible as evidence given in res gestae. (People v. Feliciano, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, Leonen, J).
Recantation of witness.
As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has
invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant
witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would
later on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. An affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. In the present case, private complainant lost the
right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case had already reached and must
therefore continue to be heard by the court a quo. (People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Salazar, G.R. No. 181900, October 20,
2010, Velasco, JR, J)
Essence of physician-patient privileged communication.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would
blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the
history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and
provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that
had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
(Josielene Lara Chan v. Johnny Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013).
Hospital records covered by physician-patient privilege.

To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician
ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence
that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
When is an offer of compromise admissible or not admissible against the offeror.

In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in
evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. (Sec. 27).
Effect of a plea for forgiveness in a criminal case.

A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed something wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease, to feel resentment against on account of
wrong committed. (People vs. De Guzman, 77 SCAD 39, G.R. No. 117217, December 2, 1996).
Nature of an interview of the accused with the media about the commission of a crime and the guidelines on its
admission in evidence
Interview by media men does not form part of custodial investigation, however, because of the inherent danger in the
use of television as a medium for admitting one’s guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent
that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all
probability, the police with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced
extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television.

Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and imperil our criminal justice system. (People
vs. Edino, G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001).
Rules on the admissibility of hearsay evidence.

When the statement is presented for the purpose of proving the truth of the facts asserted therein, it is hearsay and
inadmissible. But when the statement is presented to prove something else, without reference to its truth, it is not hearsay
and hence, admissible. Such statement is non-assertive of the truth like:
a. to prove that the statement was made;
b. to show the feelings or state of mind of the defendant, like his mental condition, motive, fear, apprehension, good
or bad faith. (People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d. 553).
Nature of the Vallejo standards in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence.
The Vallejo standard refers to jurisprudential norms considered by the court in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence.
In People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002, 382 SCRA 192, it was held that in assessing the probative value of
DNA evidence, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.
One-Day Examination of Witness Rule.

The One-Day Examination of Witness Rule abbreviates court proceedings by having a witness fully examined in only
one day during trial.
Par. 5(i) of Supreme Court A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC requires that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day only.
This rule shall be strictly adhered to subject to the court’s discretion during trial on whether or not to extend the direct
and/or cross-examination for justifiable reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his
formal offer of evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose
his objection thereto. Thereafter, the judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the judge
has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132.
Doctrine of adoptive admission.

Under the doctrine of adoptive admission, a third party’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or
espousing it.
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat
the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. This was applied in Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, April 3, 2001, 356 SCRA 108, where it was held:
“In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces
withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had
to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of “dignified exit or resignation.”
Petition did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioner’s
silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.”
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
Circumstantial evidence.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite
circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
controvert the evidence of the prosecution. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO PABOL, G.R. No. 187084 October 12,
2009 J. Velasco)
In this case, the prosecution has successfully established the following circumstances and facts that, when taken
together, very well constitute evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) appellant having met AAA on the latter’s
way to school and hitting her on the face; (2) the positive identification of appellant as the person she met while she was on
her way to school; (3) appellant then hugging AAA from behind, sitting her on his lap and striking her breast with a piece of
stone; (4) AAA shouting for help and appellant covering her mouth; (5) appellant hitting AAA until she lost consciousness and
then dragging her body to the side of the road; (6) AAA waking up two hours later to discover that her ears had been sliced,
her blouse opened, and her underwear stained with her own blood; (7) AAA feeling pain in her private part after the incident;
and (8) AAA sustaining hymenal laceration. Given the foregoing circumstances, there is no other conclusion that we can make
with moral certainty other than that appellant raped the victim.
Chain of custody, in relation to Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and
photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-
appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some
flexibility when a proviso added that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.” The same provision clearly states as well, that it must
still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been
preserved.
Here, accused-appellant does not question the unbroken chain of evidence. His only contention is that the buy-bust
team did not inventory and photograph the specimen on site and in the presence of accused-appellant or his counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. However, as ruled by the Court in
Rosialda, as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21

of RA 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. The chain of custody in the instant case
was not broken as established by the facts proved during trial. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO MANLANGIT y
TRESBALLES , G.R. No. 189806, January 12, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J)
Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 need not be followed as an exact science. Non-
compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODANTE DE LEON y
DELA ROSA, G.R. No. 186471 January 25, 2010, Velasco, Jr., J)
When there is a need to present confidential informant.

The basic rule is that, there is no need to present the confidential informant in court. The rationale behind the rule is
to protect him. The rule is not absolute, the SC said in People v. Andaya, G.R. No. 18370, October 13, 2014, Bersamin, J, because
in this case, the poseur buyers and the confidential informant were one and the same. Ordinarily, the poseur buyer is a police
officer or lawman, and the informant is different. There is a need to present the poseur buyer.
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the State's case against
the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-arranged signal from the confidential
informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his non-presentation must be credibly explained and the transaction established by
other ways in order to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not
themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other,
that bears the burden of proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. 13 This responsibility imposed
on the State accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until
and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence. (People v.
Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 207).
WRIT OF AMPARO
Writ of amparo may not issue if there is property-related.

Granting that the intrusion occurred into a property, it was merely a violation of property rights. The writ of amparo
does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature.
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it
is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. x x x. (Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768).
The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. “Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less
than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.” (Rubrico v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 233; Sps. Pador v. Arcayan, et al., G.R. No. 183460, March
12, 2013).
Effect of the filing of a criminal case on the Amparo Petition.

If the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action can more
adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a
curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal
case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained
his liberty. (Lozada, Jr., et al. v. Arroyo, et al., G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012).
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Writ of habeas data; concept.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparo in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.”As such, it
is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of respondents.
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. (Rhonda Ave S. Vivares, etal. V. St. Theresa’s Colleges, et al., G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014,
Velasco, J).

WRIT OF KALIKASAN
Writ of continuing mandamus.

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently
based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, which provides that
continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied. (Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555;
Macario Dolot v. Hon. Paje, et al., G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013, Reyes, J).
Nature of a Writ of Kalikasan.

A remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, private individual or entity, involving environmental damages of such magnitude
as to prejudice the life, health and property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. (Rule 7, Sec. 1; Boracay
Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555; Macario Dolot v. Hon. Paje, et al., G.R. No.
199199, August 27, 2013, Reyes, J).
A party filing a petition for a writ of kalikasan need not be a person directly affected by the environmental disaster.
The condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect
some or all of the condominium unit owners or users. As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with
the unit owners and residents of West Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case. The other organizations in
the case at bar are also considered real parties-in-interest. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of
a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be
directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation. (WEST TOWER
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, ET. AL. V. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015,
VELASCO, JR., J)
CHILD AS WITNESS
Rules for the application of live-link testimony.

The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of the child be taken in a
room outside the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link television.
Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the prosecutor or counsel and
shall defer to the judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of applying for an order. In case the guardian
ad litem is convinced that the decision of the prosecutor or counsel not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma,
he himself may apply for the order.
The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the trial date, unless the court finds on the
record that the need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable. (Sec. 25)
Concept of the rape-shield rule.

The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:
(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim. (Sec. 30)
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Picture images as electronic documents; admissible.

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official
ballots themselves. in Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Court held that “the picture images of
the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof as the functional equivalent
of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.”
(Maliksi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013).
That the two documents – the official ballot and its picture image -- are considered “original documents” simply
means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not
considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to
the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the
rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or
best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that
the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised. (Maliksi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013).
DNA
Blood testing; requisite before taking.

As a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can

determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for
blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. (Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011).
BILL OF PARTICULARS
Nature of buy-bust operation.

Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation has long been held as a
legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in
the act of commission of an offense. A buy-bust operation can be carried out after a long period of planning. The period of
planning for such operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake such operation. It is unavailing
then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the objective of the operation was to
apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or private person. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO3 SANGKI ARA Y
MIRASOL et al., G.R. No. 185011, December 23, 2009, Velasco, Jr., J)
Good Luck to All 2016 Bar Examinees
We Are Praying for Your Success
God Bless
From: ABRC Family

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Magic Areas in REMEDIAL LAW

2016 Bar Examination

Jurisdiction is conferred by law.

Accion publiciana; assessed value determines the court with jurisdiction.

The RTC and MTC have jurisdiction over accion publiciana.

Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.

1 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Remedial Law (combined with pointers 2015)segregate/EVSA/crys

Jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal.

Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

In partition cases, assessed value determines the court with jurisdiction.

Action to enforce right to repurchase lot is beyond pecuniary estimation.

2 |ABRC2016.Pointers in Remedial Law (combined with pointers 2015)segregate/EVSA/crys

When the doctrine of estoppel to question jurisdiction applies.

Effect of misjoinder of causes of action.

Failure to state a cause of action

Real parties in interest.

Capacity Of mammals to sue.

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Effect if person supposed to be parties in an action are not impleaded in an action.

Solidary co-debtor are not indispensable parties.

Reasons why suits must be between real parties in interest.

Effect of death of a party in an action that survives.

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When there is a class suit.

Where to file an action for foreclosure of a parcel of land.

Stipulation on venue with the use of the word “shall;” effect.

Compulsory counterclaim, when it is.

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Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping

Test of forum shopping.

RULE 8 – Manner of Allegations

Manner of alleging actionable document.

Genuineness and due execution of actionable document.

No knowledge sufficient to form a belief; when it is a specific denial.

Extent of admission of genuineness and due execution of document.

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RULE 9 – Effect of Failure to Plead

Effect if there are defenses and objections not pleaded.

The effect and remedies of a party in default.

RULE 10 – AMENDED & SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Substantial amendment in pleadings.

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Amendment of pleading to conform to evidence.

RULE 13 – SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, ETC.

Service by registered mail is complete; requisites.

Service through courier not allowed.

Preference of personal service.

Rule not absolute.

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How court acquires jurisdiction over defendant.

Substituted service of summons.

RULE 16 – MOTION TO DISMISS

When court can dismiss an action motu proprio.

Rule in ruling a MTD on the ground of failure to state a cause of actions.

What hypothetical admission of facts comprehend.

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Tests in pendency of another action; more appropriate action test.

Application of more appropriate test & anticipatory test.

RULE 17 – DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

Effect if plaintiff serves notice of dismissal.

Dismissal with prejudice.

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Dismissal of main action; counterclaim can be decided independently.

RULE 25 & 26 – Interrogatories to Parties & Request for Admission