The effect of multiple internal representations on context-rich instruction

Nathaniel Lasrya兲
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
and Department of Physics, John Abbott College, Montreal, Canada H9X 3L9
Mark W. Aulls
Department of Educational and Counseling Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada H3A 1Y2
共Received 12 May 2006; accepted 16 August 2007兲
We discuss n-coding, a theoretical model of multiple internal mental representations. The n-coding
construct is developed from a review of cognitive and imaging data that demonstrates the
independence of information processed along different modalities such as verbal, visual, kinesthetic,
logico-mathematic, and social modalities. A study testing the effectiveness of the n-coding construct
in classrooms is presented. Four sections differing in the level of n-coding opportunities were
compared. Besides a traditional-instruction section used as a control group, each of the remaining
three sections were given context-rich problems, which differed by the level of n-coding
opportunities designed into their laboratory environment. To measure the effectiveness of the
construct, problem-solving skills were assessed as conceptual learning using the force concept
inventory. We also developed several new measures that take students’ confidence in concepts into
account. Our results show that the n-coding construct is useful in designing context-rich
environments and can be used to increase learning gains in problem solving, conceptual knowledge,
and concept confidence. Specifically, when using props in designing context-rich problems, we
find n-coding to be a useful construct in guiding which additional dimensions need to be attended
to. © 2007 American Association of Physics Teachers.
关DOI: 10.1119/1.2785190兴

I. INTRODUCTION
In his Nobel lecture, Richard Feynman stated: “Perhaps a
thing is simple if you can describe it fully in several different
ways without immediately knowing that you are describing
the same thing.”1 The converse may also be true because the
ability to represent an object or phenomenon in multiple
ways may simplify one’s understanding of it. Several studies
have addressed the importance of multiple representations in
learning physics.2,3 However, previous studies have defined
representations primarily as external representations such as
mathematical, diagrammatic, or graphical representations.2
The present paper shifts the focus to internal mental repre-
sentations to provide insights into optimizing student learn-
ing and potentially explain the effectiveness of external rep-
resentations. Just as multiple external representations can
enhance problem solving,4 previous cognitive studies have
shown that the construction of multiple mental representa-
tions can also enhance problem-solving abilities.5 Multiple
mental representations complete each other, resulting in a
more authentic portrayal of a problem than any single source
of unimodal information.6
The first part of our paper surveys the cognitive literature
to build a coherent model of internal representations that is
sufficiently simple to be used in classrooms. The second part
presents a classroom study of the effectiveness of the pro-
posed model of internal representations. To achieve a com-
prehensive picture of effectiveness, we develop new mea-
sures of learning in physics. By shifting the focus away from
a Boolean view of students’ conceptual states 共that is, away
from a perception that “they either get it or they don’t”兲,
these new measures acknowledge the complexity of stu-
dents’ conceptions by taking into account affective factors
such as students’ confidence in concepts. The third part of
this paper will discuss our findings, their limitations, and
provide recommendations for maximizing physics learning.
II. FROM ENCODING TO N-CODING
The mind is currently conceived as a set of specialized
information processors that are spatially independent but
functionally interrelated.7 The classical neuroscience text-
book by Nobel laureate Eric Kandel and coauthors8 states
that the “idea that different regions 关of the brain兴 are special-
ized for different functions is now accepted as one of the
cornerstones of modern brain science.” Local brain areas
have different processing functions and although spatially
independent, these processors interact9 with each other, a
collaboration of separate entities that Minsky has poetically
called the Society of Mind.10 Cognitive scientist and Nobel
laureate Herbert Simon had argued that this type of modular
design of the mind is a special case of modular, hierarchical
design of all complex systems.11
The process by which information is taken from the exter-
nal environment and “coded” for the mind is called encod-
ing. Encoding can take place in several modes. Consider for
instance dual-coding theory. This model12 attempts to give
equal weight to verbal and visual processing. The reasoning
behind dual-coding theory is that both the visual and the
auditory system can be activated independently although the
two systems are interconnected 共Fig. 1兲. In the neuro-
cognitive literature these independent systems are referred to
as the auditory or phonological loop and the visuospatial
sketchpad.13 This independence can be easily demonstrated
by asking subjects to perform two simultaneous tasks. If both
tasks are auditory 共or both visual兲, an interference occurs
prohibiting their simultaneous completion. When one is vi-
sual and the other auditory, simultaneous tasks can be per-
formed. It has been suggested that the connectedness of both

1030 Am. J. Phys. 75 共11兲, November 2007 http://aapt.org/ajp © 2007 American Association of Physics Teachers 1030

Fig. 1. Dual-coding theory: Information from the sensory system is selec-
tively channeled to verbal or nonverbal processing units. The encoding and
representation of words 共logogens兲 thus differs from the encoding and rep-
resentation of images 共imagens兲. Reproduced with consent from TIP data-
base 共http://tip.psychology.org/paivio.html兲.
systems allows individuals to cue from one system to the
other, which facilitates interpreting the environment.14 The
inference is that because there are two distinct ways of en-
coding and representing information in our mind, the use of
both representations allows parallel processing to occur thus
reducing computational time.
Evidence of specialized processing—such as verbal or vi-
sual processing—is abundant. Through studies of injured pa-
tients, it has been known for over a century that the process-
ing of language is located in what are now called Broca and
Wernicke’s areas in the brain. In the past 15 years, the use of
neural imagery has revealed an increasingly clear picture of
localized processing. The impact of current advances in im-
aging has been likened to Ramon y Cajal’s first observation
of an individual nerve cell.15 Imaging data of localized pro-
cessing shows that visual and auditory words activate 共a
largely left sided兲 set of areas of the anterior and posterior
cortex and the cerebellum, while simple arithmetical tasks
activate left and right occipital and parietal areas.16 There is
now also information on spatial tasks,17 on understanding of
the minds of others18 and of oneself,19 and even on the pro-
cessing of musical tasks.20 Encoding information from the
environment is a parallel process: One part of the brain does
not wait in sequence to start processing if another part is
activated; more than one part can be activated at once. Thus,
current imaging studies suggest that multiple forms of en-
coding can take place. In a similar way that dual-coding
theory urged us to consider two encoding modes, these im-
aging findings encourage us to reconsider encoding as
n-coding. The term n-coding is coined here to emphasize
that ‘n’ is no longer two 共as in dual-coding兲 but the number
of identifiable encoding dimensions, which may increase
with further imaging studies 共see Fig. 2兲.
N-coding modes need not be strictly perceptual. For in-
stance, imaging data on understanding the minds of others18
supports cognitive “theories of mind” positing the existence
of an internal “mind-reading system.”21 This modality can be
seen as rooted both in genetic and environmental settings as
illustrated by its normal developmental trajectory in
children22 and its dysfunction in children with autistic
1031 Am. J. Phys., Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007
Fig. 2. Auditory processing areas contrasted in darker gray 共blue online兲;
Visual processing areas contrasted in lighter gray 共orange online兲. Image by
Stephen Smith, University of Oxford Functional MRI of the Brain Center,
Copyright 2000–2001. Reproduced with author’s consent.
disorders.21 However, encoding information about the mind
of others is done somewhat independently from its related
visual perceptual process. Autistic individuals can recognize
people without being able to tell their emotional state, some-
thing that autistic professor of animal studies Temple Gran-
din has likened to being as an anthropologist on Mars,23
constantly trying to figure out how different behaviors trans-
late into emotional states. In a nutshell, the possibility to
n-code is the ability to represent information mentally along
multiple dimensions, for example, verbal, visual, logico-
mathematical, kinesthetic, or social.
From a cognitive perspective, in everyday settings the rep-
resentational modes of a problem are not sequential, for ex-
ample, auditory then visual. Multimodal inputs are physi-
cally integrated and simultaneously encoded. N-coding can
be related to the everyday characteristic of information in-
puts as being multimodal, concomitant, and physically inte-
grated. Lifelike multiple representations are less of a cogni-
tive load by virtue of being physically linked. Multiple
representations may also be a key feature that differentiates
experts from novices. In a study of chemistry experts and
novices Kozma and Russel24 showed that experts not only
organize larger chunks of knowledge, which had been well
described in the literature,25 but that these chunks are orga-
nized across different representational modes. How can these
findings be applied to instruction?
III. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
It is necessary to err on the side of caution when going
from a “descriptive learning theory” to a “prescriptive in-
structional theory.”26 It would be ill advised to take imaging
findings and make explicit conclusions and recommenda-
tions as to what instructional environments should be like.
Current educational trends, such as “brain-based” learning,
have been severely critiqued27 for inferring one-to-one rela-
tions between fundamental research findings and instruc-
tional practices. Before jumping into tentative applications,
we are reminded of the wise comments of a founder of
American psychology, William James:28 “You make a great,
a very great mistake if you think that psychology, being a
science of the mind’s laws, is something from which you can
deduce definite programmes and schemes and methods of
instruction for immediate schoolroom use.”
Although we must be wary of translating neuroscience
N. Lasry and M. W. Aulls 1031
findings directly into educational practice, it would be un-
conscionable not to use neuroscience findings as a guide for
empirically driven educational development.
To implement n-coding in the classroom, we must avoid
unimodal tasks 共for example, text only兲 and design activities
that require students to represent the information along dif-
ferent modalities. Designing n-coding tasks goes beyond re-
placing text-based activities by hands-on activities. Tasks
should require student representations that are verbal 共putting
ideas into words兲, visual 共being able to depict a situation or
problem兲, logico-mathematic 共ability to make inferences and
deductions in context兲, kinesthetic 共for example, extracting
information through manipulations or measurements兲, and
social 共collaborate with others and share expertise兲. Having
all of these modalities at once is not always feasible. To give
an example of such activities, we present in the following a
classroom experiment where students in different sections
were assigned to activities based on context-rich problems
consistent with the cooperative-group problem-solving
共CGPS兲 approach29 but that varied in n-coding opportunities.
The CGPS approach was chosen because of its demonstrated
effectiveness30 and because it constitutes an exemplary inter-
active engagement approach using context-rich problems.
The classroom experiment attempted to test whether increas-
ing n-coding opportunities in the context of cooperative-
group problem solving has even more beneficial effects on
learning.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF TREATMENT CONDITIONS
Students enrolled in an algebra-based mechanics course in
a Canadian two-year community college were given homo-
morphic CGPS problems. The classroom study consisted of
four sections that differed by the level of n-coding intrinsic
to the environment and the problem structure. To obtain a
better picture of the difference between these treatment sec-
tions we briefly describe one CGPS activity and its imple-
mentation in the different groups. The problem was based on
a popular television show, CSI: Crime Scene Investigators,
and put students in the shoes of a detective trying to solve a
murder. The objective of this problem was to help students
better acquire and synthesize notions of two-dimensional ki-
nematics. The first section, the high n-coding group
共nCodHi兲, incorporated multiple representations in the prob-
lem presentation and required n-coding in the problem solu-
tion as well. In this section the text problems were accom-
panied by rich visuo-spatial presentations. Besides diagrams,
an actual scene reconstitution included an outline of a victim
taped on the floor and chalk dust emulating gun powder dis-
tribution so as to locate the initial horizontal position of the
gun. Kinesthetic data was also available such as a block of
wood in which a stray bullet and an actual 9 mm slug was
found. 共The slug graciously provided by the police technol-
ogy program of the college.兲 Students were then given a
table of muzzle speeds 共that is, the initial speed of the bullet
as it exits the gun兲 for various calibers. Once extracted from
the block of wood it had supposedly been shot in, the slug’s
angle of entry was to be measured 共a 9 + mm hole was
drilled at 5° from horizontal, and the slug was inserted prior
to lab兲. Using all the information available, students had to
collaboratively determine the variable they were ultimately
seeking. In this case, the initial vertical position of the bullet
was to be found so as to find the approximate shoulder height
of the shooter to later identify him from a line-up.
1032 Am. J. Phys., Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007
Table I. Schema of various treatment sections.
Control 共TI兲 nCodLo nCodMed nCodHi
Cooperative-group N Y Y Y
problem solving.
n-coding/multiple N N Y Y
representation required
for task solution.
n-coding in task N N N Y
presentation and task
solution.
The second group, labelled medium n-coding group
共nCodMed兲, did not include emulated environments that re-
quired elaborate setups. Problems were presented in text for-
mat. However, the solution of these problems required stu-
dents to inquire about the objects of the emulated
environment and make some measurements. Thus, the sec-
ond group was presented neither with an emulated environ-
ment nor with physical props. To solve the problem students
had to enquire about the props. For instance, the actual 9 mm
slug was not presented but was available on student request
and its measurement was essential to the problem solution
共without the information that it was a 9 mm slug, student
could not know for instance the initial speed of the bullet兲.
Thus, although the same problem was given and similar
measurements had to be done in both groups, only one group
had the props presented with the problem while the other had
to enquire about them. The laboratory problems for the two
first groups were designed to use measurement instruments
that were familiar to students 共everyday tools such as a bath-
room scale or a measuring tape, and stop watches兲.
The third group, labelled low n-coding group 共nCodLo兲,
had conventional CGPS context-rich problems presented in
text format without transforming the environment. This
group had fewer opportunities for multiple representations as
none of the props were available, and all data encodable
along visual or tactile dimensions was presented in text form.
For instance, the problem stated: “a 9 mm slug was recov-
ered from the scene.” Given the caliber of the bullet, the
students could determine its muzzle speed from a table. As in
the other two groups, all the information was not available in
the initial problem description. However, students could not
measure the missing information from various props.
The control group was comprised of traditional instruction
共TI兲 laboratories, that is, highly structured “cookbook”
labs,31 which assessed the same learning outcomes 共for ex-
ample, two-dimensional kinematics兲. All the groups 共treat-
ments and control兲 had the same instructor 共NL兲 so as to
minimize interinstructor differences and macrodifferences in
classroom culture. All three treatment groups required stu-
dents to collaboratively solve problems in groups of three or
four. Students in the control section were assigned to groups
of two. Table I summarizes the presence or absence of char-
acteristics for the groups.
V. MEASURES
Physics understanding is traditionally measured by proce-
dural problem solving. In this study, these skills were as-
sessed using the local physics department’s comprehensive
final examination. This exam was constructed by a commit-
N. Lasry and M. W. Aulls 1032
tee of physics professors and was approved unanimously by
all those teaching the course 共10–12 instructors兲. The exam
score was also consistent as each instructor marked a single
exam question for the entire cohort 共not just for his or her
students兲. This procedure insured that no group had either an
exam of differing difficulty or a corrector of different gener-
osity. The correctors of the exam questions were unaware of
which students belonged to which treatment condition.
Students may know how to solve physics problems with-
out having a complete conceptual understanding of the phys-
ics involved.32 Therefore, conceptual understanding was also
measured. Students were assessed the first and last week of
the semester with the force concept inventory 共FCI兲.33,34
Hake’s normalized gain30 g was used as a gauge of the rela-
tive effectiveness of different approaches. The normalized
gain is defined as the ratio of the increase in correct answers
after instruction to the maximal possible increase:
冉 冊
PostT − PreT
g= . 共1兲
maxT − PreT
Note that the symbol T in Eq. 共1兲 refers to the test score 共in
this case the FCI score兲 and maxT to the maximal achievable
grade on the test. Furthermore, PreT and PostT refer to the
test scores when administrated at the beginning and end of
the semester, respectively. The normalized gain may be cal-
culated for each student and the average student gain g can
be found.
Students’ conceptual models are loosely organized35 as
can be seen when instances of a concept are correctly ex-
pressed in one context and not in a somewhat different
context.36 Because students’ conceptions seem not to fit in
true-false categories,37 a new measurement is proposed com-
bining levels of confidence to FCI questions. In his Peer
Instruction approach, Mazur has shown how students’ confi-
dence levels for in-class concept tests vary at different test
times.38 It is interesting to assess students’ confidence for
each FCI item at the beginning and the end of a semester.
The level of confidence expressed allows us to infer how
strongly a conception is held. Associating a level of confi-
dence on a five-point Likert scale 共0 = guessing, 1 = not sure,
2 = pretty sure, 3 = confident, 4 = very confident兲 with each an-
swer gives a better representation of students’ conceptual
state than the true-false view. The procedure of assessing
confidences for FCI items yields three measures.
A. Average level of confidence
This measure represents an individual’s overall confidence
in answering conceptual physics questions. This level of con-
fidence can be compared for both test times to determine the
effect of treatment conditions on students’ overall confidence
regarding physics concepts. This comparison could reveal
interesting information, particularly if an increase in confi-
dence were to be found in some sections more than others.
On the other hand, students may be less confident, which
may occur if the new knowledge acquired is under construc-
tion and not fully “compiled.”39 Preinstruction and postin-
struction average confidence levels can also be used to com-
pute a normalized average confidence gain.
B. Confidence level for right/wrong answers
This measure isolates the reported confidence for right or
wrong answers and can be contrasted at both test times. For
1033 Am. J. Phys., Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007
instance, are students significantly more confident of correct
answers at the end of the semester? Also, are students more
confident in their right than wrong answers before/after in-
struction? Here again, confidence gains can be normalized.
C. Weighted FCI score
Assuming that a five-point Likert scale can be treated as a
continuum 共which is implicitly done when researchers per-
form t-tests on Likert scale data, for instance兲, we can asso-
ciate a numerical value to each level of confidence and use
this value as a factor in determining a weighted FCI score.
We attribute 1 point for a correct answer and −1 point for an
incorrect answer. Levels of confidence are values corre-
sponding to the student entry: 0 on the scale indicating
“guessing” and 4 indicating “very confident.” A student en-
tering a correct answer with maximum confidence obtains 4
points 共1 ⫻ 4兲, and a student entering a wrong answer with
maximum confidence receives −4 points 共−1 ⫻ 4兲. Students
that are not at all sure of an answer 共confidence level 0兲 such
as students that are guessing, receive 0 points regardless of
whether the answer is right or wrong. The 2-point true-false
representation of students conceptions can now be mapped
on a 9-point pseudo-continuum: from highly confident in a
misconception 共−4兲 to highly confident in a correct concep-
tion 共+4兲. The resulting total weighted scores for the 30 FCI
items therefore vary between −120 and 120. The differences
in weighted FCI score across all groups can then be com-
pared between both testing occasions. Here again, weighted
FCI gains can be normalized by replacing T in Eq. 共1兲 by the
weighted FCI score 共wFCI兲 yielding
冉 冊
Post wFCI − Pre wFCI
wg = . 共2兲
120 − Pre wFCI
These measures may address some of the concerns raised
by the interpretation of FCI scores.40 For instance, a student
guessing a right answer would not attribute high confidence
to an item. Therefore, a portion of false positives 共students
guessing a right answer兲 would become identifiable. Further-
more, these measure are more comprehensive as they assess
cognitive changes 共conceptual change兲 and affective changes
共confidence change兲 in physics learning thus addressing two
of the three fundamental components of the mental trilogy:
cognition, conation, that is, motivation, and affect.41
Possibly the most important use of wFCI is as a diagnostic
tool. Indeed, compiling confidence data across an item 共in-
stead of across a student兲 before instruction, it is possible to
identify strong group misconceptions 共high confidences for
wrong answer兲. For instance, if preinstruction results show
that the class average wFCI for a given item is highly posi-
tive 共closer to +4兲, the instructor can decide to briefly over-
view the concept and reallocate the time allotted to teaching
it. If the preinstruction results show that the class average
wFCI for a given item is highly negative 共closer to −4兲 in-
structors would be alerted to a misconception strongly held
by many students and could devote more time to addressing
these misconceptions. Concrete examples of wFCI uses will
be presented elsewhere as they do not fit within the objec-
tives of the current study. Using the proposed measures, the
central research question is “Does instruction using n-coding
opportunities provide better learning gains?”
N. Lasry and M. W. Aulls 1033
 Table II. Group differences in dependent learning variables. Learning gains increase as n-coding increases.
nCodHi 共n=14兲 nCodMed 共n = 14兲
FCI g 0.46± 0.06
wFCI g 0.33± 0.08
RConf g 0.21± 0.1
Exam 83.6± 2.5
共Avg±
StdErr兲
VI. SAMPLE
Participants consisted of a cohort of 84 students following
first semester algebra-based physics, pseudo-randomly as-
signed by the registrar to four different laboratory sections
following distinct instructional formats 共nCodHi, n = 20;
nCodMed, n = 20; N-CodLo, n = 24; Cont: n = 20兲. Instruction
for all four sections took place in the same conventional
physics laboratory with seating for 24 students. Of the initial
84 students pretested, 61 were also posttested 共nCodHi, n
= 14; nCodMed, n = 14; nCodLo, n = 18; Cont, n = 15兲. This
attrition is due in part to the loss of first semester students
due to program changes, as well as decreases in attendance
in the week prior to final examinations. Because all groups
were of similar size and each lost five to six students be-
tween the first and last administration of the FCI, the absence
of 共usually weaker兲 students the last week of the semester
should not work to the advantage of any particular group.
The pre- and post-FCI scores, related confidence levels, and
final exam scores were collected for these 61 participants.
VII. ANALYSIS
Using a multivariate analysis of variance 共MANOVA兲, the
treatment condition was chosen as the independent variable
and the FCI, wFCI, right answer confidence 共RConf兲 and the
final exam grade 共Exam兲 were taken as the multiple depen-
dent variables. These four variables were chosen because
each gives some information the others do not. For instance,
problem-solving aptitude is a measure of learning. However,
students may learn how to solve problems algorithmically
without full conceptual understanding.32 The FCI therefore
adds a contribution by measuring conceptual learning. Be-
cause answers on the FCI are either right or wrong and stu-
dents’ conceptions seem not to fit in Boolean categories,37 a
confidence weighted FCI was developed to create a richer
scale. Finally, because a robust use of a conceptual model
entails a good confidence in correct concepts, the right an-
swer confidence gain was also sought to complete the pic-
ture. A MANOVA is an appropriate statistical measure here
because it seeks differences between groups by adding the
contributions from each dependent variable 共dependent vari-
ables must be linearly independent of one another兲. Thus,
differences under one specific variable such as the FCI may
not be significant between groups—particularly with small
sample sizes such as those in this study—but the combined
effect of the different variables may result in significant dif-
ferences.
Three planned group comparisons seek differences be-
tween n-coding CGPS 共nCodHi&Med兲 and conventional
CGPS 共nCodLo兲; high versus medium n-coding groups; and
all CGPS groups versus control group. The rationale behind
1034 Am. J. Phys., Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007
nCodLo 共n = 18兲 Control 共n=15兲
0.42± 0.06 0.32± 0.05 0.18± 0.07
0.32± 0.07 0.20± 0.04 0.14± 0.05
0.22± 0.15 0.09± 0.11 0.03± 0.12
77.1± 3.1 63.3± 4.1 69.9± 2.8
these comparisons follows from our theoretical model. We
hypothesized that increasing n-coding should entail in-
creased learning gains. Because the high and medium
n-coding groups are CGPS groups that were modified by
additional n-coding opportunities, the first comparison seeks
differences between these n-coding transformed CGPS
groups and conventional CGPS groups. The additional ad-
vantage of combining both the high and medium n-coding
groups is to increase 共double兲 the small number of students
in the sample and provide more ability to find differences
between the groups should they exist. We compared the high
versus medium n-coding groups to see whether adding
n-coding to the presentation increases learning gains signifi-
cantly. Finally, we grouped all three CGPS active engage-
ment groups to see whether the differences expected in con-
ceptual learning also yield confidence gains and confidence
weighted FCI gains.
VIII. RESULTS
The average value per group for each of the four measured
dependent variables is presented in Table II.
These results show that the high n-coding group outper-
forms every other group; the exception being a marginal dif-
ference between the medium n-coding and high n-coding
groups on right answer confidence gains. These results also
show that medium n-coding outperformed the conventional
CGPS and Control sections for each variable. The conven-
tional CGPS group did better than the Control section on all
measures aside from the final exam grade. Thus it seems that
the greater the n-coding, the greater the learning gains. The
remaining question is “Are these differences statistically sig-
nificant or are they due to chance?”
In comparing the difference in these dependent variables
between groups using a MANOVA, the hypothesis of “no
overall treatment effect” between groups was significantly
rejected 共p = 0.009兲. Because the MANOVA shows that the
groups differ significantly in outcome, the question remains
which groups differ? The differences in the MANOVA for
the three planned comparisons between groups are presented
in Table III.
Table III. MANOVA planned comparison. Higher n-coding CGPS groups
differ statistically from classical CGPS. All CGPS together statistically dif-
fer from control.
p
nCodMed vs nCodHi 0.740
nCodHi&Med vs nCodLo 0.003
nCodHi&Med&Lo vs Cont 0.0497
N. Lasry and M. W. Aulls 1034
Table IV. IE versus TI groups under each dependent variable. Learning
differences previously found between IE and TI are found to extend to
student concept-confidence gains. Also, traditional problem solving 共exam兲
is not affected by IE method.
nCodHi&Med&Lo
vs Cont
ANOVA: FCI g p = 0.004
ANOVA: wFCI g p = 0.001
ANOVA: Exam p = 0.217
ANOVA: RConf g p = 0.0618
MANOVA p = 0.0497
These data shows that the two n-coding CGPS groups
共nCodMed and nCodHi兲 differed statistically from the con-
ventional CGPS approach 共p = 0.003兲. However, the two
n-coding CGPS groups 共nCodMed and nCodHi兲 did not dif-
fer statistically from each other 共p = 0.74兲, although both in
combination did significantly differ 共p = 0.003兲 from the con-
ventional CGPS 共nCodLo兲 group. All the CGPS groups were
significantly different from the TI control group 共p
= 0.0497兲. The differences between the interactive engage-
ment 共IE兲 and TI groups under the four dependent measures
are presented in Table IV.
These results show that besides the expected differences in
FCI normalized gains 共p = 0.004兲, significant differences
were also found in the weighted FCI scores 共p = 0.001兲, and a
tendency in right answer confidence 共p = 0.0618兲 is also ob-
served. Furthermore, IE groups performed as well 共or more
precisely, nonsignificantly better兲 than TI groups in tradi-
tional problem solving. Therefore, the previously reported
difference between IE and TI did not reside in FCI gains
alone as previously reported,30 but extended to our new con-
fidence related measures as well. Furthermore, although non-
traditional pedagogies may be thought to hinder traditional
problem solving skills, IE students performed 共nonsignifi-
cantly兲 better than TI students in the final examination.
IX. DISCUSSION
We set out to measure the effect of adding multiple repre-
sentations in a cooperative-group problem-solving environ-
ment. Our results show that increases in representational mo-
dalities resulted in increases in conceptual learning and
confidence measures, a finding we attribute to the increase in
n-coding required from students. We therefore find that
n-coding is an effective construct in understanding how to
enhance conceptual change.
The second significant difference found was between all
CGPS groups and the traditional control section 共p
= 0.0497兲. These findings replicate meta-analytic differences
found between TI and IE.30 However, the meta-analytic find-
ing reported primarily normalized FCI gain differences.
Here, this difference extends to confidence weighted FCI
gains and right answer confidence. This result suggests that
affective gains in confidence accompany the cognitive gains
made by students in nontraditional instruction. Although
more emphasis was given to concepts, students in all CGPS
groups did not differ from the control group 共p = 0.217兲 in
traditional problem solving. Taken together, these findings
confirm that IE methods are significantly better than TI
1035 Am. J. Phys., Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007
methods in fostering learning, and that this enhancement
goes beyond changes in Boolean conceptual states as mea-
sured by FCI scores.
No significant difference was found between the high and
medium n-coding groups. Recall that the difference between
the two n-coding CGPS groups 共nCodMed and nCodHi兲 was
that although both required activation of multimodal input
共verbal, visual, logico-mathematical, kinesthetic, and social兲
for problem solution, only one 共nCodHi兲 also had all these
multimodal stimuli in its presentation 共see Table I兲. It was
expected that as the n-coding opportunities increase, the out-
come gains should also increase. The remaining question is
why did the two n-coding groups not differ from one an-
other?
To better understand why no difference exists, the previ-
ous question can be reformulated as: “Why doesn’t the intro-
duction of multiple representations in the problem presenta-
tion contribute significantly?” Constructivism may hold the
answer to this question. Essentially, constructivism holds that
students construct new knowledge from existent knowledge.
As well put by Resnick and Hall42 constructivism “confirms
Piaget’s claim that people must construct their understand-
ing; they do not simply register what the world shows or tells
them, as a camera or a tape recorder does. To “know” some-
thing, indeed even to memorize effectively, people must
build a mental representation that imposes order and coher-
ence on experience and information. Learning is interpretive
and inferential; it involves active processes of reasoning and
a kind of ‘talking back’ to the world—not just taking it as it
comes.”
Having multimodal information necessary for task
completion allows students to construct multiple representa-
tions along modalities that are not usually activated, and use
these representations to “talk back to the world.”42 However,
giving multiple representations to students in the problem
presentation may contribute only minimally in constructing
their own representation. The effectiveness of “handing out”
representations in the problem presentation runs counter to
the notion that students ought to construct their own repre-
sentation.
The advantage of this negative result is that the implemen-
tation of n-coding strategies need not be as laborious as pre-
viously thought. Implementing emulated lifelike environ-
ments is not straight forward. Entire classroom settings need
to be reorganized and physical props need to be placed in
meaningful arrangements. The results of this study show that
the processing of information 共n-coding tasks兲 is more im-
portant than simulating a lifelike environment. From a prag-
matic instructional perspective, this reduces to being con-
scious of a variety of props and settings that make abstract
problems lifelike and meaningful. Many teachers do use
props. This study puts an emphasis on the nature of lifelike
learning by specifying which additional dimensions 共for ex-
ample, verbal, visual, logico-mathematical, kinesthetic, so-
cial兲 need to be attended to when using props in designing
ill-structured instructional problems.
X. LIMITATIONS
The results of this study and their generalizabiltiy are af-
fected by several limitations. Because the sample sizes of
these groups were relatively small, replications of this study
would be needed to further validate the results. As an aside,
small sample sizes also have notable advantages. Small
N. Lasry and M. W. Aulls 1035
sample sizes lead to low statistical power, that is, they are
unlikely to detect effects because the between-group differ-
ences sought are drowned in the within-group fluctuations
共like a too low signal-to-noise ratio兲. Yet, if a statistically
significant result 共p ⬍ 0.05兲 is found with small sample sizes,
we must infer that the effect size 共or signal兲 is very large.
Conversely, a major limitation of very large sample-size
studies is that most variables turn out to be statistically sig-
nificant even when their effect-sizes are minute.
A second limitation of this study resides in its design com-
prised of three treatment sections and one control group. All
groups were taught by the same instructor 共NL兲. This con-
figuration was chosen in order to minimize interinstructor
differences. However, acting as one’s own control can also
be seen as a limitation. Much time and effort was invested in
creating a range of meaningful activities. The instructor and
primary investigator’s enthusiasm during the treatment sec-
tions probably cannot be compared to his involvement in the
“cookbook” control section. On the other hand, involving a
different instructor would have been a limitation at least as
severe. Variables in educational research contexts are ex-
tremely difficult to isolate, and this concern is but one ex-
ample of why research in education is “not rocket science,
it’s much harder.”43 A mitigating factor, however, is the dis-
tance instructors have in CGPS approaches. As a student-
centered activity, it can be argued that the real involvement
in the CGPS sections was that of a “guide on the side,”
leaving learners to construct knowledge and negotiate mean-
ing between themselves rather than that of a “sage on the
stage” who directs and controls each step of the instructional
process.
A third limitation of this study is that it takes as a starting
assumption that guided inquiry is a culturally and socially
acceptable instructional strategy. In cultures where instruc-
tion is expected to be formal and didactic to be effective,
such as in Singapore,44 such active engagement approaches
may not succeed. Cultural expectation of formal and didactic
learning is also inherent in western college settings, particu-
larly as students advance in their program. Indeed, the suc-
cess of this study is not unrelated to the fact that the partici-
pating students were mostly first semester students unaware
of standard college instructional formats. Had these students
been finishing students who had been accustomed to formal
and didactic college teaching, they might have been less
likely to embrace the CGPS formats because they place dif-
ferent constraints on students. Because student involvement
is a central part of any interactive engagement method, this
issue may limit the application of these findings to introduc-
tory courses.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
Information presented to problem solvers in the everyday
world comes in different forms. To solve an everyday prob-
lem we usually obtain information by looking, listening,
touching, and interacting with people. It is reasonable to be-
lieve that problem solving can be optimized by allowing
multiple modes of information to be represented and pro-
cessed in parallel. We have shown that adding multiple in-
ternal representations, labeled n-coding, is an effective strat-
egy to enhance learning. To assess this effectiveness, we
developed new measures and made use of students’ confi-
dence in concepts to better portray their knowledge states.
Thus, beyond finding cognitive differences measured by FCI
1036 Am. J. Phys., Vol. 75, No. 11, November 2007
conceptual gains, we also found affective differences to be
associated with the change of confidence students had in
concepts. The implication is twofold. First, a richer non-
Boolean picture of students’ conceptions can be derived us-
ing confidence weighted FCI scores and other confidence
measures such as the change in average confidence or the
change in confidence for specifically right or wrong answers.
Second, using these measures, our model of internal mental
representations, n-coding, has a positive effect on learning
both at the cognitive and affective levels. Teachers wanting
to enhance the learning of their students may opt for using
ill-structured context-rich problems29 where the information
in a laboratory environment can be represented in multiple
ways and where the data measured from various everyday
objects serve to solve the problem.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Michael Witmann, Richard Hake, and
an unknown reviewer for the constructive feedback that has
helped to improve the quality of this manuscript.
a兲
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. Electronic mail:
lasry@seas.harvard.edu
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