G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990
Luz Farms vs Hon. Sec. of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform
Ponente: Paras
Facts:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and
poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of CARP. Luz Farms
petitions CARP to be declared unconstitutional together
with a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining the
order. The Court resolved to deny the petition.
Later, after a motion for reconsideration, the Court
granted the motion regarding the injunction and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
Luz Farm: Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to
crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in
this undertaking and represents no more than five
percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial
livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many
owners of residential lands all over the country who use
available space in their residence for commercial
livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing
arrangements," whereby processing corporations and
other commercial livestock and poultry raisers.
DAR: livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the
term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise
under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that
Webster's International Dictionary, "Agriculture — the
art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and
harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding,
breeding and management of livestock, tillage,
husbandry, farming.
Issue: Constitutionality of CARP, insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry, swine in its
coverage.
Ruling:
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of
the Government.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in
accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and
void for being unconstitutional and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent.
G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.
LUZ FARMS v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the
Philippines. It includes the raising of livestock, poultry,
and swine in its coverage. In 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated the IRR of Secs. 11, 13,
and 39 of the said law.
Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business, allegedly stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of certain sections of RA
6657, of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under RA 6657, and of the
IRR of Section 11. It prays that the aforesaid statutes be
declared unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law should include the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage.
Held:
No. It was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include the livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the agrarian reform program
of the government. The intention of the Committee was
to limit the application of the word “agriculture”. Thus,
Section II of RA 6657 which includes “private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine raising” in the definition of
“commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the
aforesaid agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
G.R. No. 100091. October 22, 1992.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY v. THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD
Facts:
On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao
Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be
used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a
project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels
of land were leased to its faculty members and
employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will
assist faculty members and employee groups through
the extension of technical know-how, training and other
kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service
fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly
provided that there will be no tenancy relationship
between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by
the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for
declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its
resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the
segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution
under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the
basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet
the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually,
directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.
Issue:
Whether or not the Central Mindanao University land is
covered by CARP.
Held:
No, the land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best
position to resolve and answer the question of when
and what lands are found necessary for its use. The
Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of
exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The
Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for
the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively
exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out
its present educational program with its present
student population and academic faculty" overlooked
the very significant factor of growth of the university in
the years to come.
DAR represented by Secretary Jose Mari Ponce vs.
Delia Sutton, et. al.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in
Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding.
Pursuant to the agrarian reform program at the time,
they made a voluntary offer to sell their holding to DAR
to avail of the incentives in 1987.
In 1988, a new law, CARL, took effect, which included
farms used for raising livestock under its coverage. In
light of the Luz Farms ruling, the Suttons filed a formal
request to withdraw their VOS as their land was outside
the coverage of CARL. The DAR ignored their request.
In 1993 the DAR issued AO 9-1993, which provides that
only lands used for raising livestock, poultry and swine
are outside the coverage of CARL. And in 1995, the DAR
ordered a part of the Suttons’ landholdings to be
segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of the assailed AO
HELD: Unconstitutional.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers
legislative in nature, i.e.,the power to make rules and
regulations. They have been granted by Congress with
the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated
rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern
governance due to the increasing complexity and
variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and
effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review
They may be properly challenged before the courts to
ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no
grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed
by the administrative body concerned.
To be valid, administrative rules and regulations must
be issued by authority of a law andmust not contravene
the provisions of the Constitution. Nor can it be used to
enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond
the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations.
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different
from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment
in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine
have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands
and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR
argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking
to address the reports it has received that some
unscrupulous landowners have been converting their
agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their
coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither
merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable
scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the
issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this
case. Respondents’ family acquired their landholdings
as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of
breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as
the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner
DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no
evidence on record that respondents have just recently
engaged in or converted to the business of breeding
cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead
one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its
coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL
prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-
agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the
CARL. There has been no change of business interest in
the case of respondents.
Gelos vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86186.
May 8, 1992
Topic: Definition of Agricultural Tenancy
Facts:
The Private Respondent owned the subject land of
25,000 square meters in Laguna. The Landowner then
entered in to a contract with the petitioner and
employed him to be laborer on the land with the wage
of 5.00 peso a day.
The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation
and then went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and asked
the court to fix the agricultural lease rental of the land
and his request was granted.
The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal
detainer against the petitioner that was that was
dismissed by the Ministry of Agrarian reform for the
existence of Tenancy relations between the parties. The
Private respondents appealed to the office of the
President alleging that there was no tenancy relation
between the parties.
The RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and assailed
that there was a tenancy relation between the parties.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?
Held:
No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to
be tenant but a mere employee of the private
respondent as showed in the contract. The petitioner
was paid for specific kind of work. The court stressed
many cases that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also
a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in
this case, their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important."
It should also be considered that a tenant is defined
under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a person who himself
and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying
to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.
Therefore the court laid down the requisites for the
tenancy relationship to exist:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and
6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a
tenant. It is clear that it is not a tenancy relationship
that exists between the parties, what they have is
employee-employer relationship.
G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint against
EusebioPangilinan claiming she is the owner of a
169,507 sq. m. fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula,
Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental
was entered between them. Defendant was notified
that the contract would be terminated, but upon
request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint
claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should
properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations,
there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by
plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his
answer that the land was originally verbally leased to
him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as
the defendant wanted, subject to the condition that he
would convert the major portion into a fishpond and
that which was already a fishpond be improved at his
expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano
Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease.
Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue leasing
as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to
attend to it personally.
The trial court rendered a decision stating that the the
lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil
Code. No tenancy relationship exists between the
plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act
No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide this case. Motion for Reconsideration by the
defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the relationship of plaintiff and
defendant was that of a civil lease and not a leasehold
tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
HELD:
There are important differences between a leasehold
tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold tenancy is
limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may
be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to
personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land,
whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may
be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that
governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil
Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special
laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the
Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. The land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. The land is susceptible of cultivation by a single
person together with members of his immediate farm
household;
3. Theremust be cultivated by the tenant either
personally or with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household;
4. The land belongs to another; and
5. The use of the land by the tenant is for a
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce
or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is
a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which
refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions
fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use
thereof. The mere fact that a person works an
agricultural land does not necessarily make him a
leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of Republic
Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless
the other requisites as above enumerated are complied
with.
The court doesn’t want to decide on the second
requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third requisite,
the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he
ceased to work the fishpond personally because he
became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the
members of appellant's immediate farm household
work the land. Only the members of the family of the
tenant and such other persons, whether related to the
tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support
and who usually help him to operate the farm
enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm
household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant
and his immediate family to work the land. A person, in
order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with
the aid available from his immediate farm household
cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not
actually work the land cannot be considered tenants;
and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered
as having abandoned the land as tenant within the
meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199,
and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of
one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a
quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad
Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a
leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence,
this case was not within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823,
appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.
G.R. No. L-20700. February 27, 1969.
FIDEL TEODORO, Petitioner, v. FELIX MACARAEG
Facts:
Macaraeg alleged that he is leasehold tenant of
Teodoro cultivating a farm holding situated in the
municipality of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four
(4) hectares devoted to rice culture, and that he has
worked said land “as a tenant for the last seven years”;
that on March 2, 1961 he received a letter from
Teodoro and his wife advising him that the aforesaid
landholding will be given to another tenant, on the
pretext that he (Macaraeg) “is contracting be a tenant
of another in said landholding”; that forthwith, Teodoro
placed a new tenant, Jose Niegos, in the disputed land;
that subsequently, Niegos repeatedly forbade him from
working on said riceland; that in order to avoid trouble,
he refrained from forcibly entering the landholding, but
with the advent of the planting season, it became
imperative that the agrarian court order his
reinstatement and restrain Teodoro and Niegos from
committing further acts of dispossession.
In his answer with counterclaim dated June 19, 1961,
Teodoro categorically denied that Macaraeg was his
tenant, claiming that “ever since he became the owner
of around 39 hectares of Riceland in Kalisitan, Talugtug,
Nueva Ecija, he had always leased all of it under civil
lease and he had never given any portion of it under
tenancy.” He further alleged that after the expiration of
his lease contract with Macaraeg in January 1961, his
wife twice notified Macaraeg to renew his contract for
the then incoming agricultural year 1961-62, but the
latter “verbally told Mrs. Teodoro that he was no longer
interested to work on the land and he was giving it up
as he had left the place already.” Teodoro also claims
that it was only after Macaraeg had abandoned the
farmland that he decided to lease it to Niegos.
Teodoro contends that the language and tenor of the
contract clearly manifest the intention of the parties to
enter into an ordinary civil lease contract, not a
leasehold tenancy agreement as alleged by Macaraeg
and sustained by the agrarian court.
Issue:
Whether or not the “Contract of Lease” was in effect a
leasehold tenancy agreement making Macaraeg a
tenant of Teodoro.
Held:
The principal elements of a lease-hold tenancy contract
or relation are: (1) The object of the contract or the
relationship is an agricultural land which is leased or
rented for the purpose of agricultural production; (2)
The size of the landholding must be such that it is
susceptible of personal cultivation by a single person
with assistance from the members of his immediate
farm household; (3) The tenant-lessee must actually
and personally till, cultivate or operate said land, solely
or with the aid of labor from his immediate farm
household; and (4) The landlord-lessor, who is either
the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land,
leases the same to the tenant-lessee for a price certain
or ascertainable either in an amount of money or
produce.
Reverting to the controverted “Contract of Lease”,
Supreme Court held that it indubitably contains the
forgoing essential elements of a leasehold tenancy
agreement. The landholding in dispute 24 is
unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to
agricultural production. The land is definitely
susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an
area of only four and a half (4-1/2) hectares.
Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed
landholding and he delivered the possession thereof to
Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid
in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold
tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision that the
rental be accounted in terms of produce – 9 cavans per
hectare – is an unmistakably earmark, considering the
other stipulations, that the parties did actually enter
into a leasehold tenancy relation.
Further, a contract where the parties fixed and limited
the duration of their lease contract to only one
agricultural year, does not remove the relationship
which they created from the purview of leasehold
tenancy, considering the general import of their
agreement which irreversibly leads to and clearly
justifies tenancy coverage. In the language of law, the
“expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the
parties … does not of itself extinguish the relationship”.
The Court agrees with Teodoro that as a landholder he
has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract
covering his property. What the Court wants to indelibly
impress, however, is that once a landowner enters into
a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to
agricultural production and said landholding is
susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely
or with help of labor coming from his immediate farm
household, then such contract is of the very essence of
a leasehold agreement, and perforce comes under the
direct coverage of the tenancy laws.
Anent the charge of abandonment, it is also pertinent
to note that four days after Macaraeg received a letter
from Teodoro and his wife advising him that the
landholding in question will be given to another tenant,
he lost no time in inquiring from the Tenancy Mediation
Commission at Cabanatuan City about his rights as a
leasehold tenant. It would appear therefore that
Macaraeg’s immediate reaction to his landlord’s design
to dispossess him negates the act of abandonment
imputed to him.
The Court modifies the award of damages in so far as
the earnings of the herein respondent during the period
of his dispossession shall not be deducted from the
award of damages.
G.R. No. 85611. April 6, 1990.
VICTORIANO ZAMORAS v. ROQUE SU, JR
Facts:
Victoriano Zamoras, was hired Roque Su, Jr., as overseer
of his coconut land in Dapitan. He was made to
supervise the coconut plantation and the sale of copra.
He was paid a salary plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the
sales of the copra. Another one-third of the proceeds
went to the tenants and the other third to Su.
Sometime in 1981, Su entered into a loan with a certain
Anito and authorized her to harvest coconuts from his
property while his loan was outstanding. Zamoras was
then laid-off temporarily until Su could obtain a loan
from the Development Bank of the Philippines with
which to pay Anita. He was no longer allowed to work
as overseer of the plantation and without his
knowledge and consent, Anita, harvested the coconuts
without giving him his one-third share of the copra
sales. Zamoras filed a complaint against Su, and Anita
for illegal termination and breach of contract with
damages with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
Ministry of Labor and Employment in Zamboanga City.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that
Zamoras, as overseer of the respondent's plantation,
was a regular employee whose services were necessary
and desirable to the usual trade or business of his
employer and was thus illegally dismissed. Upon appeal
to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was
reversed. It held that the relationship between the
parties was that of a landlord-tenant, hence, jurisdiction
over the case rests with the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Issue:
Whether or not Zamoras is an employee of Su, Jr. and
thus jurisdiction of the case is with the NLRC.
Held:
Under Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199, a tenant is "a
person who by himself, or with the aid available from
within his immediate household, cultivates the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter’s
consent for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder or for a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system" (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107
SCRA 276). Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the
physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by
another for the purpose of production through the
labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which
the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or
to pay a price certain or ascertainable, whether in
produce or in money, or both" (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199; 50
O.G. 4655-56; Miguel Carag v. CA, Et Al., 151 SCRA 44).
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2)
the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is
consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation
by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests
between landlord and tenant (Antonio Castro v. CA and
De la Cruz, G.R. L-34613, January 26, 1989; Tiongson v.
CA, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero v. CA, 142 SCRA 138).
The element of personal cultivation of the land, or with
the aid of his farm household, essential in establishing a
landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee relationship, is absent
in the relationship between Su and Zamoras (Co v. IAC,
162 SCRA 390; Graza v. CA, 163 SCRA 39), for Zamoras
did not cultivate any part of Su’s plantation either by
himself or with the help of his household.
The following circumstances are indicative of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties.
1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of
the coconut plantation. 2. His duties were specified by
Su. 3. Su controlled and supervised the performance of
his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras should sell
the copra produced from the plantation. 4. Su paid
Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of
the copra sales every two months as compensation for
managing the plantation.
G.R. No. 98028. January 27, 1992.
GREGORIO CASTILLO v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On July 18, 1985, a complaint for injunction was filed by
private respondent Alberto Ignacio against petitioner
Gregorio Castillo. It is alleged in the complaint that the
respondent is the agricultural tenant of the petitioner in
the latter’s parcel of land consisting of 9,920 square
meters with fruit-bearing trees situated in Cut-cut,
Pulilan, Bulacan; that sometime in April 1985, the
petitioner requested the respondent to allow him to
construct a resthouse in said land, and as a token of
goodwill, the respondent agreed, which agreement is
embodied in a "Kasunduan" between them; that in
violation of said agreement, the petitioner started to
cut fruit-bearing trees on the land in question and filled
with adobe stones the area devoted by the private
respondent to the planting of vegetables.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the
private respondent is not his agricultural tenant; that
respondent Alberto Ignacio is merely a "magsisiga"
(smudger) of the landholding in question; that he did
not ask permission from the private respondent to
construct a rest house on subject land, since as owner
thereof, he had the right to do so; that he was merely
exercising his right of ownership when he cut certain
trees in the subject premises; that when the barangay
captain failed to settle the conflict and the matter was
referred to the MAR-BALA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform-
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance) Office in Malolos,
Bulacan, Atty. Benjamin Yambao of the MAR (Ministry
of Agrarian Reform) prepared the "Kasunduan"
attached to the respondent’s complaint, but when he
(petitioner) said that he had some misgivings about
some words therein, Atty. Yambao assured him that he
need not worry because the respondent could not be a
"kasamang magsasaka" of his mango land because
there is nothing to cultivate or till in said land, but he
still corrected the last part of par. 4 of said "Kasunduan"
by making it read "sa kanilang matiwasay na
kaugnayan" before signing the same.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a relationship between plaintiff-
appellant and defendant-appellee over the mango land
in question as one of agricultural tenancy.
Held:
As held in the case of Qua v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA
236 [1991]), the essential requisites of tenancy
relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the
purpose is agricultural production; (4) there is
consideration which consists of sharing the harvest; (5)
there is consent to the tenant to work on the land and
(6) there is personal cultivation by him.
Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of
Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA 247 [1988]), that the fact of
sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Well-settled is the rule that all the
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of
one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant
a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure
tenant. This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.
G.R. No. 85041. August 5, 1993.
GRACIANO BERNAS, Petitioner v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Natividad Bito-on Deita is the owner of parcels of land
in Capiz and out of liberality, he entrusted the lots by
way of “dugo” to her brother, Benigno, so that he could
use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of financing his
children’s schooling in Manila. Prior to April 1978, these
agricultural lots had been leased by Anselmo Billones
but following the latter’s death and consequent
termination of the lease, petitioner Bernas took over
and worked on the land. Benigno and Bernas worked
out a production-sharing arrangement whereby the first
provided for all the expenses and the second worked
the land, and after harvest, the two deducted said
expenses and divided the balance of the harvest
between the two of them. The owner Natividad, played
no part in this arrangement as she was not privy to the
same.
In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister
Natividad, as all his children had by then finished their
schooling. When Natividad and her husband sought to
take over possession of the lots, Bernas refused to
relinquish, claiming that he was an agricultural
leasehold lessee instituted on the land, by Benigno and,
as such, he is entitled to security of tenure under the
law.
Issue:
Whether or not the agricultural leasehold established
by Benigno in favor of Bernas, petitioner herein, is
binding upon the owner of the land, herein private
respondent.
Held:
Yes. Republic Act No. 3844 is the governing statute in
the petition at bar and from the pertinent provisions of
the said Act; Benigno is the legal possessor of the land.
There is no dispute, as it is admitted by the parties in
this case, that Benigno was granted possession of the
property in question by reason of the liberality of his
sister, Natividad. In short, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL
POSSESSOR of the property and, as such, he had the
authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural
leasehold relation with Bernas.
In turn, having been instituted by Benigno as an
agricultural leasehold lessee, Bernas is vested by law
with the rights accruing thereto, including the right to
continue working the landholding until such lease is
legally extinguished, and the right to be protected in his
tenure i.e., not to be ejected from the land, save for the
causes provided by law, and as appropriately
determined by the courts.
G.R. No. 70736. March 16, 1987.
BONIFACIO L. HILARIO v. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
Facts:
Salvador Baltazar, herein private respondent, filed a
verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations
in Bulacan alleging that since 1955, he had been in
continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of
land with an area about 2 hectares which was
previously owned by one Socorro Vda de Balagtas; that
on or about December of 1980, and thereafter, the
spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist from
entering and cultivating a portion of the aforesaid land
with an area of 4,000 square meters and otherwise
committed acts in violation of his security of tenure;
that the Hilarios were contemplating the putting up of a
fence around the portion of land and that unless
restrained by the court, they would continue to do so to
his great irreparable injury.
Baltazar claims that he became a tenant of Balagtas on
the latter’s landholding by virtue of a “Kasunduan” and
after Balagtas’ death, he allegedly gave the share
pertaining to the landowner to her daughter Corazon. It
was only in December 1980 that he came to know that
a portion of the 2-heactare land or 4, 000 square meters
is already owned by the Hilarios.
On the other hand, the petitioners aver that they
acquired the landholding of 4, 000 square meters from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) after it had been
foreclosed by virtue if a deed of sale executed between
Hialrio and the PNB. The former owner Corazon,
testified among others, that she declared the property
for classification purposes as “bakuran” and had no
knowledge that there were other things planted in it
except bananas and pomelos.
On November 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR) in determining whether or not respondent
Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the
land in question is not an agricultural landholding but
plain “bakuran”, hence, Baltazar is not a tenant of the
land. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
lower court for further proceedings on the ground that
the findings of the CAR were not supported by
substantial evidence. The CAR found that there was no
tenancy relationship existing between Baltazr and the
former owner Corazon. Again respondent Baltazar
appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which reversed the decision of the CAR. The IAC
declared that the plaintiff-appellant is a leasehold
tenant entitled to security of tenure on the land in
question. Consequently, spouses Hilarios filed this
instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar is a tenant of the
landholding in question.
Held:
No. After a careful consideration of the records of the
case, the Court finds no valid reason to deviate from the
findings of the CAR. We note the CAR’s finding: Tenancy
relationship is indivisible. The two-hectare land subject
of the plaintiff’s alleged contract with Socorro Balagtas
having been parceled into seven (7) and the possession
thereof relinquished/surrendered in 1965 results in the
termination of plaintiff’s tenancy relationship with the
previous owner/landholder. Such being the case, he
cannot now claim that the landholding in question
consisting of 4, 000 square meters, more or less, is
being cultivated by him under the old contract. The
owner thereof Corazon Pengson has no tenancy
relationship with him (plaintiff).
From the foregoing, it is clear that Corazon Pengson did
not give her consent to Baltazar to work on her land
consisting of only 1, 740 square meters. The Court
agrees with the CAR when it said: The law accords the
landholder the right to initially choose his tenant to
work on his land. For this reason, tenancy relationship
can only be created with the consent of the true and
lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the
land by the usurper cannot confer upon him any legal
right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the
protection of the security of tenure of the Law.
G.R. No. 88113. October 23, 1992.
SPOUSES TITUS L. ENDAYA v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego
owned a piece of agricultural land consisting of 20,200
square meters situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar,
Batangas, devoted to rice and corn. As far back as 1934,
private respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land
as a tenant of the Spouses respondent Fideli has been
cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San
Diego under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. This
fact, petitioners do not dispute. On January 6, 1980, the
Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners for the
sum of P26,000.00. The sale was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer Certificate
of Title was duly issued on January 7, 1981. Private
respondent continued to farm the land although
petitioners claim that private respondent was told
immediately after the sale to vacate the land. Due to
petitioners’ persistent demand for private respondent
to vacate the land, private respondent filed in April
1985 a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas praying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the agricultural leasehold relationship
between original owner and Pedro Fideli was already
terminated.
Held:
No, R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839
(1971), which is the relevant law governing the events
at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the
Philippines from 1971 and established the agricultural
leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the
said law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure by
providing the following: "The agricultural leasehold
relation once established shall confer upon the
agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the
landholding until such leasehold relation is
extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be
ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for
causes herein provided." The fact that the landowner
entered into a civil lease contract over the subject
landholding and gave the lessee the authority to
oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this
case, is not among the causes provided by law for the
extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation.
On the contrary, Section 10 of the law provides: Sec. 10.
Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by
Expiration of Period, etc. — the agricultural leasehold
relation under this code shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. In case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or
transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over
which agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change
of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession,
such as lease, will not terminate the right of the
agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by
making such rights enforceable against the transferee
or the landowner's successor in interest.
G.R. No. 78214. December 5, 1988.
YOLANDA CABALLES v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which
consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20 meters x 3
meters), is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area
of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay,
Cebu. This was acquired by the spouses Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses,
private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his
house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a
monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes.
The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a
portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof
would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. Later in
1979, after the property was sold, the new owners,
Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, asked Abajon to vacate
the premises, but Abajon refused to leave.
DAR conducted investigation and concluded that Abajon
was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the former owner,
thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844. MAR ruled that the
new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy,
notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by
Abajon was small.
Issue:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship existed between
the petitioner and the private respondent.
Whether or not private respondent Abajon can invoke
RA 3844.
Held:
Supreme Court held that private respondent cannot
avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844. RA 3844, as
amended, defines an economic family-size farm as “an
area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor and
capital resources of the farm family and will produce an
income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living
to meet a farm family’s needs for food, clothing,
shelter, and education with possible allowance for
payment of yearly installments on the land, and
reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in
income.”
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule
portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot.
Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote,
and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely,
planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square
meter piece of land cannot produce an income
sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet
the farm family’s basic needs. The private respondent
himself admitted that he did not depend on the
products of the land because it was too small, and that
he took on carpentry jobs on the side.
Further, SC ruled that the private respondent is not a
tenant of the petitioner. The essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship are: (1) The parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural
land; (3) There is consent; (4) The purpose is agricultural
production; (5) There is personal cultivation; and (6)
There is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must
concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The absence of one does not make
an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof,
or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a 22 person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is
he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. Therefore,
the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a
landowner to accept some of the produce of his land
from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This,
however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer
a tent thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60,
or even 500, square meters and located in an urban
area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial
zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant
of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the
primary purpose of agricultural production. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private
respondent’s status is more of a caretaker who was
allowed by the owner out of benevolence or
compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden
of some sort as its southwestern side rather than a
tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being
absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private
respondent was never a tenant of the former owner,
Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as
amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private
respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
G.R. No. 126425 August 12, 1998
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners
of a 4.9774 hectare land in Davao del Sur. Policarpio,
the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of
said land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio
executed a leasehold contract which stipulates a sharing
arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978, Gavino
sold two (2) ha of the land, including the land tenanted
by Policarpio, to spouses Mancera. As a result of the
sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They then filed
an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the
Manceras. The Manceras, on the other hand, countered
that spouses Nisnisan have no cause of action because
they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
Issue:
Whether or not the tenant deemed to have voluntarily
surrendered subject landholding.
Held:
Other than their bare allegations, private respondents
failed to present any evidence to show that petitioners-
spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily after
the private respondents purchased the subject
property. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for
reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-
spouses against private respondents before the CAR
militates against the private respondents' claim that
petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their
landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural
leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's
intention to surrender the landholding cannot be
presumed, much less determined by mere implication.