International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt
from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been
or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as
members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and
the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached
the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane
conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office
or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section
18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and
duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same
working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-
hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These
benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former
from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

GSIS vs Montercarlos

Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal
protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS
denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.

There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard. There is
also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness in marriage
before the employee’s death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is
3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the
pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive
survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension.
The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose intended.
Biraogo vs Phil Truth Com

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form
such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant
or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong
as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is
governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason
in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the
very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

Jesus Garcia vs Hon Ray Drilon

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order
against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should
not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning
the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the
validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not
raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the
law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause
of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family
as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time
so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it
may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing
mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court
shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

People vs Peralta, et al.

On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs
inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.

In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue
of final judgments.

They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation and
treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed
“Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the
same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?

(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime?

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically
provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of a
common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or
implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in
order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.

Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission
of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that
there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all
the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared
for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going from one
brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation and
lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six
accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison
by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum
period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe penalty
imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the crime.

Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them
shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA

Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of Dagupan
City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta brought the
suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of
arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary investigation.
According to petitioner’s counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of
arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty.
The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints
filed.

Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and waived the
preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination
conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner
to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond.
Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation. According
to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary
investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and
bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”.
Petition for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.

BAGCAL v. VILLARAZA

 This case stemmed from a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus by herein petitioner Jose
BAGCAL in Oct 1982, who alleged that he was illegally arrested and detained

 The Court issued said Writ returnable to the Executive Judge of the CFI Cagayan de Oro (Judge Rosete)
for proper hearing on the petition for release

 The FACTS are as follows: BAGCAL was arrested on Feb 28, 1982, by the Philippine Constabulary. The
arrest was without warrant. He has been detained at Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, since his arrest
to the present

 On Aug 6, the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an “information” for murder against petitioner Bagcal
with the MTC of Cagayan de Oro presided by herein respondent Judge Rolando VILLARAZA

 Said “information” was accompanied by the several affidavits from different persons. However, said
affidavits were not subscribed before Judge VILLARAZA who did not ask the affiants to ratify their oaths
nor did he ask them searching questions

 Also, the “information” submitted before the MTC has no certification by the City Fiscal that he had
conducted a preliminary investigation

 Indeed, if preliminary investigation was duly conducted, the information should have been filed in the
CFI (not MTC) which had jurisdiction to try the case on its merits

 From the forgoing, it is quite obvious that the information was filed with Judge VILLARAZA so that he
would conduct the preliminary examination and thereafter issue a warrant of arrest

 Ultimately, Judge VILLARAZA issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioner BAGCAL

 As a result of the issuance of said warrant of arrest, taken together with BAGCAL’s actuations in
response thereto, Executive Judge Rosete (tasked to hear BAGCAL’s petition for release pursuant to the
writ of habeas corpus previously issued) was constrained to rule that BAGCAL should remain in custody
pending hearing and resolution for bail

 BAGCAL now questions the legality of such warrant under the attendant circumstances, raising the
same as the sole issue of this petition –
WON issuance of warrant of arrest cured the illegality of his previous warrantless arrest meriting his
immediate release from detention

NO! At the outset, it must be stressed that herein respondent Judge VILLARAZA should not have issued
the subject warrant of arrest to begin with. Judge Rosete and BAGCAL are in agreement, and now, the
Court as well, on this point. As provided in the records, it was never refuted that Judge VILLARAZA did not
“personally” examine the witnesses of the prosecution before issuing the questioned warrant of arrest.
This is a glaring mark of the irregularity in Judge VILLARAZA’s actuations. But does this mean that, under
the attendant circumstances, BAGCAL should be released?  NO. The above discussion notwithstanding,
the denial of BAGCAL’s petition for release is hereby UPHELD. As provided in Judge Rosete’s decision in
the petition for release (pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued), although the warrant of arrest was
irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured when petitioner submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in support thereof, and filing a
motion for reconsideration when his application was denied6 DISPOSITIVE:  Judge Rosete’s decision is
affirmed with modification that the hearing for bail be heard by him, the Executive Judge of CDO RTC and
not by Judge VILLARAZA of the CDO MTC. If evidence of guilt is strong, the petition for bail should be
denied, otherwise, the same must be granted.

People vs Dural

At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of them (prosecution witnesses Rener
Ramos and Dennis Santos) were at the Macaneneng Street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City as they were
supposed to go a (sic) "tupadahan" however, they were not able to arrive at the tupadahan because while
on their way or from a distance of twelve (12) arms-length they heard successive gunfires (sic) so they run
(sic) and hid themselves in a concrete fence near a store; from the place they were hiding or from a
distance of ten (10) arms-length they saw three (3) men each of them armed with .45 (sic) pistol, firing
upon at (sic) the two Capcom soldiers on board a Capcom mobile car which was then on a full stop
although its engine was still running; two of the gunmen positioned themselves beside each of the side of
the mobile car while the third gunman whom they identified as accused Rolando Dural otherwise known
as Ronnie Javelon (Dural for brevity) claimed the hood of the mobile car and positioned himself in front of
the car; after the two Capcom soldiers were immobilized, the gunman standing near the driver's seat
opened the left front door of the car and got the .45 (sic) service pistol and armalite of the Capcom
soldiers; thereafter, the three gunmen left; during the shooting incident they also noticed the presence of
two persons, one was inside an owner jeep while the other one whom they identified as accused
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. (Itucal for brevity) was standing near the scene of the incident with one of his arm (sic)
raised while one of his hand (sic) was holding a .45 caliber pistol; immediately after the three (gunmen)
who fired at the Capcom soldiers left; (sic) the man who was riding on the owner jeep told accused Itucal
that he was leaving and instructed Itucal to take care of everything; witness Dennis Santos even quoted
the very word (sic) of the man on board the owner jeep Pare, bahala ka na diyan; after that, the accused
Itucal walked away; two days after the incident or on February 3, 1988 eyewitnesses Ramos and Santos
voluntarily went at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City to narrate what they
have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought them at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Bicutan
then at (sic) Camp Panopio Hospital; at the said hospital, they saw one of the three gunmen (referring to
accused Dural) who shot the two Capcom soldiers; then they went back at (sic) Bicutan headquarters
where they gave their respective statements

WON there was direct assault upon an agent in authority?

Yes, There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the two (2) other gunmen knew that the
victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mangligot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary
detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims,
who were agents of persons in authority, were in the performance of official duty as peace officers and
law enforcers. For having assaulted and killed the said victims, in conspiracy with the other two (2)
gunmen, appellant Dural also committed direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon an agent
of a person in authority. Pursuant then to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious crime which is murder, should be imposed. The maximum of the penalty
prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is death penalty, 34 the proper
imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua.

The prosecution has failed to successfully discharge that burden in this case, leaving this Court
unconvinced, due to reasonable doubt, of the guilt of Itucal

SC ruling: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) is
concerned, the Decision of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. C-
30112, subject to the above modification of the death penalty.

(2) ACQUITTING, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR.; and

(3) Ordering accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) to pay one-half (1/2)
of the costs.

IMELDA O. COJUANGCO et al. v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.

While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, one of
which is where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the
decision.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed before the Sandiganbayan a "Complaint for Reconveyance,
Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses which
have been invested in the Philippine Long Distance Telecommunication Corporation (PLDT). Ramon and
Imelda Cojuangco (Spouses Cojuangco) were subsequently impleaded. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the
complaint with respect to the recovery of the PLDT shares. The Republic appealed to the Supreme Court,
and the same issued a favorable ruling.

The Republic thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,
praying for the cancellation of the shares of stock registered in the name of Prime Holdings and the
annotation of the change of ownership on PTIC‘s Stock and Transfer Book. The Republic further prayed
for the issuance of an order for PTIC to account for all cash and stock dividends declared by PLDT in favor
of PTIC from 1986 up to the present including compounded interests. The Sandiganbayan granted the
same, except its prayer for accounting of dividends.

The Republic moved for reconsideration with respect to the denial of accounting of dividends, which the
Sandiganbayan granted. The Cojuangcos protested, alleging that the SC‘s decision did not include in its
dispositive portion the grant of dividends and interests accruing to the shares adjudicated in favor of the
Republic.

Whether or not the Republic is entitled to the dividends and interests accruing to the shares despite its
non-inclusion in the dispositive portion of the decision

The Cojuangcos insist on a literal reading of the dispositive portion of the SC‘s Decision, excluding the
dividends, interests, and earnings accruing to the shares of stock from being accounted for and remitted.

The SC, in directing the reconveyance to the Republic of the 111,415 shares of PLDT stock owned by PTIC
in the name of Prime Holdings, declared the Republic as the owner of said shares and, necessarily, the
dividends and interests accruing thereto.

Ownership is a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected
to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. Its traditional
elements or attributes include jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that it produces.

Contrary to the Cojuangcos‘ contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that
becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the
opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a
decision must find support from the decision‘s ratio decidendi; and (b) where extensive and explicit
discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision.

In the Decision, although the inclusion of the dividends, interests, and earnings of the 111,415 PTIC
shares as belonging to the Republic was not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Court‘s Decision,
it is clear from its body that what was being adjudicated in favor of the Republic was the whole block of
shares and the fruits thereof, said shares having been found to be part of the Marcoses‘ illgotten wealth,
and therefore, public money.
On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the
information for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranagga
alias Paco, filed in the RTC[1] of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a consequence
thereof. Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order[2] of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranagga's motion for a regular preliminary investigation and that it be
conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the office of the State Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On
October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus to relieve her son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.

It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary Arts
located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga.
Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The,
police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his
lawyer on September 17, 1997 for perlominary investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of
the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular preliminary
investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in support of the complaint
against his client and that he be granted a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt to
file the defense affidavit. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga
should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit
was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of
his client's right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armivit's verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city
prosecutor.

On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals assailing the actuations
of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.[3] However,
Larranaga's effort to stop the filing of a criminal information against him failed. It turned out that on
September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging
Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On
September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the RTC
of Cebu City to prevent petitioner's arrest. The move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on
the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC
of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranaga's
counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997
the Court of Appeals' dismissed Larranaga's petitions, hence, the case at bar.

On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated comment on the petition
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997, we temporarily restrained the
presiding judge of Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from
becoming moot.
On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and motion in lieu of
Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that "x x x it is within petitioner's constitutional
and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a mere inquest be
conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations against him". He asked that "x
x x the petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation." He
further recommended that "x x x during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from detention."

Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary investigation. Section
7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner's inquest investigation. Said section clearly provides
that "when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court, the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person."

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested". For one, the petitioner was not arrested
on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead be
presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For
another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a
crime committed some two (2) months before. So we held in Go vs. Court of Appeals, viz:[4]

"Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless 'arrest' or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of the Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's 'arrest' took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The 'arresting' officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the 'arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
'when (the shooting had) in fact just been committed' within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the 'arresting' officers had any personal knowledge' of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute 'personal
knowledge.'

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that section 7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. x x x When the police filed
a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court
for the killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous
supposition that section 7 of the Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This
was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have
been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation."

It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of
Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital offense kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest and incarceration as in all probability he
would not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus,
petitioner's counsel was fart from being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that
he be furnished copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non-extendible
period of twenty (20) days to submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his motion "x x x prevented
petitioner from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors
and security guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify that:

"- during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his classmates were all in their
school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July 16 and 17, 1997, petitioner and his classmates took
their mid-term exams;

- following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at petitioner's Quezon City apartment
until about 9 o' clock in the evening, and then repaired to a Quezon City restaurant at Katipunan Avenue
where they stayed on until 3 o'clock in the morning of July 17; they even had pictures taken of their party;

- indeed petitioner's July 16 examination papers and that of a classmates are ready for submission as
evidence, along with petitioner's grades for the term's end in September 1997;

- two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember seeing petitioner at their
Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;

- petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until term's end in September
1997;

- petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment since June 1997, particularly
including July 16 and 17;

- petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No. PR833, as shown by his
plane ticket and boarding pass".
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense case should
have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon,[5] we emphasized that "attuned to
the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead,
Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is
to be fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 'the right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right.' A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of petitioner and to order
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation of the petitioner
in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul the order for Detention During The Pendency of the Case
issued by Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304;
(3) to order the immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4) to order the
Presiding Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and
trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending the result of petitioner's preliminary
investigation.

Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin

Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a
search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner
at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her
activities as usurer.” The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda.

On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary,
went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the
petitioner’s bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and
confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board
and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate
criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.

The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases
and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the
petitioner.

Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to
be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.

In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not
decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law.

Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against
petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without
basis.

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in 1950 to train and
produce competent marine officers. It offers a two-year course in Marine Engineering (A.M.E.) and a four-
year course in Marine Transportation (B.S.M.T.). In 1978 it established a branch in Talon, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila. But we are here concerned only with the main school in Manila. For several times prior to 1985
respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved petitioner's requests for
renewal permit/recognition. However, on 11 March 1986 the DECS issued petitioner a renewal permit for
SY 1985-1986. Later, petitioner applied for a summer permit for 1986 which the DECS favorably indorsed
to the Minister of Education in consideration of the graduating students for summer. Thereafter the
application was returned to Director Modesta Boquiren of the DECS for evaluation and decision pursuant
to the authority delegated to the Regions under Department Order No. 22, series of 1975. Director
Boquiren issued petitioner the summer permit for 1986 based on the previously stated humanitarian
reason but subject to the condition that petitioner should not enroll students for the first semester of SY
1986-1987 until a permit therefor was granted and that the enrollment list for the summer term be
submitted immediately. Despite lack of permit, petitioner continued to enroll students and offer courses
in Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation for SY 1987-1988. This prompted the DECS through
Director Hernando Dizon to write petitioner on 4 August 1988 directing it not to operate without permit
and inviting its attention to the provisions of the Private School Law 1 as reiterated in the Education Act of
1982 2 which prohibits operation of unauthorized schools/courses. Subsequent inspection of petitioner's
premises by the Bureau of Higher Education-DECS Technical Panel for Maritime Education (TPME) found
petitioner deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order No. III, series of
1987, which refers to the policies and standards for Maritime Education Plan. In a letter dated 11 July
1989 the DECS through Secretary Quisumbing informed petitioner that it had received reports that
petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered phased out effective SY
1989-1990 per letter of Director Rosas dated 25 May 1989; called petitioner's attention to the provision
of Sec. 1, Rule 1, Part V, of the Implementing Rules of the Education Act of 1982 which makes it
punishable and subject to penalties the operation of a school through the conduct or offering of
Educational Programs or Courses of Studies/Training, without prior government authorization and/or in
violation of any of the terms and conditions of said permit or recognition; directed that in accordance
with the phase-out order, petitioner's Manila campus is allowed to operate only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th
years of the authorized maritime programs which shall be gradually phased out; and, required petitioner
to comment on the reported unauthorized enrollment. In its letter to the DECS dated 26 July 1989,
petitioner moved for reconsideration stating that the finding that it had not complied with the minimum
requirements was due to the following: that as early as 21 June 1989 it filed a letter requesting
reconsideration of the letter dated 25 May 1989 of Director Rosas; that since there was no reply it
believed that the 25 May 1989 order was 1 reconsidered sub-silencio and that petitioner was allowed to
enroll 1st year students for SY 1989- 1990; and, that it had undertaken improvements in all of its facilities
in compliance with DECS requirements. In this regard, it requested another inspection of its premises.
Accordingly, in a letter dated 25 September 1989 the DECS through Secretary Quisumbing ordered
petitioner to discontinue its Maritime program in the Manila campus effective school year 1990-1991 and
suggested that efforts be made towards the development of PMMS, Las Piñas, which has a great
potential of being a good Maritime School. Subsequently, petitioner moved to reconsider the phase-out
order in its letter of 21 May 1990. Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed the matter to respondent
Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal the DECS thru Secretary Cariño issued a
Closure Order dated 27 August 1991. In a Letter dated 24 August 1992 petitioner sought reconsideration
of the 27 August 1991 Closure Order and at the same time requested that special orders be issued to its
graduates for SY 1991-1992. On 10 November 1992 the Office of the President through respondent
Executive Secretary Edelmiro Amante rendered a Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for another ocular inspection
and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities. Thus the motion was denied in the Resolution dated 12
January 1993 through respondent Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona. Petitioner assailed both
resolutions of the Office of the President before respondent Court of Appeals by way of certiorari. It
alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional requirement of due process because the
basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure orders was not sufficiently disclosed. Furthermore, its
letters dated 2 and 3 October 1992 which presented incontrovertible proof that it had introduced
substantial improvements on its facilities for the past two and a half years while its appeal was pending
were not taken into account, thereby gravely abusing its discretion.

Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering phase-out and closure
of petitioner PMMS?

NO. The Office of the President properly ignored (in the sense that it did not find worthy of consideration)
the alleged supervening events, i.e., substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities during
the pendency of the case before said Office because the improvements should have been undertaken
starting 1986. Moreover, the phase-out and closure orders were based not only on petitioner's
deficiencies as a maritime institute but also on its continued operation without the requisite
authorization from the DECS and acceptance of freshman students in blatant violation of the latter's
orders and/or persistent warnings not to do so. Verily, there are sufficient grounds to uphold the phase-
out and closure orders of the DECS which were issued conformably with Sec. 28 of the Education Act of
1982. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of
fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. In the case at bench, it is
not the function of this Court nor any other court for that matter — . . . to review the decisions and
orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and
standards required for permission to 2 operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no
Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is
obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence to do so. There being no grave abuse
of discretion committed by respondents representing the Office of the President in issuing the
Resolutions of 10 November 1992 and 12 January 1993, respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the resolutions in question. WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The questioned Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1993, as well as its Resolution of 26 November 1993, is AFFIRMED.

VILLAR VS TIP

Petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression against the respondents, in their refusal to admit
the said petitioners at the Technological Institute of the Philippines. However, reference was made to
some of the petitioners' school records. Petitioners Rufino Salcon Jr., Romeo Guilatco, Venecio Villar,
Inocencio Recitis had failed in one or two of their subjectsin 1983-1985. However, petitioner Noverto
Baretto had five failing grades in the first semester in the first school year, six failing grades in the second
semester of 1984-1985. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon Jr. had three failing grades, one passing grade and
one subject dropped in the first semester of school year 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had
five failing grade with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 school year. Petitioners
Barreto, de Leon Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades.

SPECIAL CIVIC ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the TIP Board.

Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of the
respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their being barred from
enrollment.

NO, as is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of
peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment
and which `is not limited, much less denied, except on a showing * * * of clear and present danger of
substantive evil that the state has the right to prevent.' They do not, to borrow from the opinion of
Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, `shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners Venecio Villar, Inocencio F. Recitis, Rufino G.
Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by respondents in violation of their
constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted to such petitioners to enjoin respondents
from the acts of surveillance, black listing, suspension and refusal to allow them to enroll in the coming
academic year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is dismissed as to Noverto Barreto, Edgrado de Leon
Jr. and Regloben Laxamana. No costs.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic
Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from
requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987.
The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959"
defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section
5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those
issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which
shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by
any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record
of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical
school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to
inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirementsthat may be deemed admissible.”
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as
an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT,
an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission
into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The
cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every
year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admissionrequirements as presently
called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility
for admission into the medical colleges.

Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985
are constitutional.

Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order
— of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety
and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there
is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of
the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process
of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain,
and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in ourprofessional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We
believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end,
it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a
total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it
being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated
to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.

GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the
ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under
the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive.
the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

PRC vs. De Guzman

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They
passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine
(Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful
examinees in the medical licensure examination.Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of
the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima Collegein the two most difficult subjects in the
medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were
unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in
OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also
observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and
no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other
schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for
Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure
Examination.For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the
[1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to
the test questions.”The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with
"immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne
examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial court’s
judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors to take the
physician’s oath and to register them as physicians without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary
action which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by
law and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.

Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 known as The Medical Act of 1959 a valid exercise of police
power.

Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But
like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific
or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among thosewho would practice
medicine.It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or
oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority
to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not,
however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.