1. M+W Zander Philippines Inc. vs. Trinidad M.

Enriquez
Facts:
On January 2002, M+W Zander relieved its General Manager, Mr. Stiegeren, and in his place
appointed Mr. Wiltschek. The appointment of Wiltschek as the Acting General Manager was announced
in a meeting held on January 31, 2002. On the same day, a Letter of Appeal was signed by 29 employees
of M+W Zander, opposing the appointment of Wiltschek. A day after the Letter of Appeal was released,
a number of employees did not report to work.
Petitioner allege that after the announcement of Wiltschek as the new General Manager,
respondent actively solicited signatures for a letter opposing the appointment of Wiltschek and claimed
that Enriquez used her influence and moral ascendancy to coerce several employees into signing the
letter of appeal. Upon discovering respondent Enriquez participation in drafting and in circulating the
Letter of Appeal, as well as in the alleged work stoppage that occurred a day after the release of the
Letter, M+W Zander sent a Notice] to respondent Enriquez, requiring her to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her for willful breach of trust and using her authority and/or influence as
Administration Manager over her subordinates to stage a no work day on February 1, 2002.
On March 1, 2002, a Notice of Termination was received by respondent informing her that her
services as Administration Manager and Executive Assistant to the General Manager of M+W Zander
are terminated effective the same day. On the same day of her receipt of the Notice of Termination,
respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Office of the NLRC.

Issue:
Whether respondent was illegally dismissed by petitioners

Held:
Yes, Respondent was illegally dismissed. Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code allows an employer
to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence. Certain guidelines must be
observed for the employer to terminate an employee for loss of trust and confidence.
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that the employee
concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence. There are two classes of positions of
trust: managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file employees.
In the case at bar, respondent was employed as the Administration Manager and the Executive
Assistant General Manager of M+W Zander. Though respondents’ position is designated as the
Administration Manager, it does not automatically mean that she occupies a position of trust and
confidence. It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs that determines whether
he or she occupies a position of trust and confidence.
 The second requisite of terminating an employee for loss of trust and confidence is that there
must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. To be a valid cause for dismissal, the
loss of confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
We find that it was not established that respondent used her authority to influence her subordinates to
stage a no work day; and assuming that she performed this act as alleged by petitioners, it does not
satisfy the jurisprudential requirements for valid termination due to loss of trust and confidence.
Loss of trust and confidence stems from a breach of trust founded on a dishonest, deceitful or
fraudulent act. In the case at bar, respondent did not commit any act which was dishonest or deceitful.
She did not use her authority as the Administration Manager to misappropriate company property nor
did she abuse the trust reposed in her by petitioners with respect to her responsibility to implement
company rules. The most that can be attributed to respondent is that she influenced a single subordinate,
without exerting any force or making any threats, not to report to work. This does not constitute
dishonest or deceitful conduct which would justify the conclusion of loss of trust and confidence.

3. Alilem Credit Corporation, Inc. vs. Salvador M. Bandiola

Facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner as bookkeeper. Petitioner's Board of Directors (the
Board) received a letter from a certain Napoleon Gao-ay (Napoleon) reporting the alleged immoral
conduct and unbecoming behavior of respondent by having an illicit relationship with Napoleon sister,
Thelma G. Palma (Thelma). This prompted the Board to conduct a preliminary investigation. During the
preliminary investigation, the Board received evidence of respondent alleged extramarital affair.
Respondent, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He, instead, claimed that the
accusation was a result of the insecurity felt by some members of the cooperative and of the Board
because of his growing popularity owing to his exemplary record as an employee. Thelma executed an
affidavit likewise denying the allegations of extra-marital affair.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1997, the Board received a petition from about fifty members of the
cooperative asking the relief of respondent due to his illicit affair with Thelma.
In its Summary Investigation Report, the Ad Hoc Committee of petitioner concluded that
respondent was involved in an extra-marital affair with Thelma. On July 10, 1997, the Chairman of the
Board sent a letter to respondent informing him of the existence of a prima facie case against him for
"illicit marital affair, an act that brings discredit to the cooperative organization and a cause for
termination per AMPC (Alilem Multi-Purpose Cooperative) Personnel Policy. Respondent was directed
to appear and be present at the AMPC office for a hearing. He was likewise advised of his right to be
assisted by counsel.
On the day of the hearing, respondent requested for postponement on the ground that his lawyer
was not available. The request was, however, denied and the hearing proceeded as scheduled.
 In a Memorandum dated July 16, 1997, respondent was informed of Board Resolution No. 05,
series of 1997 embodying the Board decision to terminate his services as bookkeeper of petitioner,
effective July 31, 1997, without any compensation or benefit except the unpaid balance of his regular
salary for services actually rendered.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioner before the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed respondent complaint for lack of merit. The
LA concluded that respondent had been or might still be carrying on an affair with a married woman.
The LA found it unforgiving in the case of a married employee who sleeps with or has illicit relations
with another married person for in such case, the employee sullies not only the reputation of his spouse
and his family but the reputation as well of the spouse of his paramour and the latter family. As opposed
to respondent claim that the accusation is a mere fabrication of some of the directors or cooperative
members who were allegedly envious of his growing popularity, the LA gave more credence to the
testimonies of petitioner witnesses who were relatives of Thelma and who had no motive to falsely
testify because their family reputation was likewise at a risk of being tarnished. The LA, thus, found
respondent to have been validly dismissed from employment for violation of the cooperative Personnel
Policy. The LA also found no violation of respondent right to due process as he was given ample
opportunity to defend himself from the accusation against him.
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the LA decision. The NLRC found petitioner Personnel Policy to
be of questionable existence and validity because it was unnumbered. It held that even assuming that
respondent had an extra-marital affair with a married woman, the latter is not his fellow worker in
petitioner business establishment. It, thus, concluded that respondent dismissal was not founded on any
of the just causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, but it failed to obtain a favorable decision. Petitioner
now comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari insisting on the validity of
respondent dismissal from employment.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner illegally dismissed respondent

Held:
The Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside. It is undisputed that respondent was
dismissed from employment for engaging in extramarital affairs, a ground for termination of
employment stated in petitioner Personnel Policy. This basis of termination was made known to
respondent as early as the first communication made by petitioner. In its June 20, 1997 letter, petitioner
directed respondent to explain in writing or personal confrontation why he should not be terminated for
violation of Section 4.1.4 of the Personnel Policy. Respondent merely denied the accusation against him
and did not question the basis of such termination. When the LA was called upon to decide the illegal
dismissal case, it ruled in favor of petitioner and upheld the basis of such dismissal which is the cited
Personnel Policy. The NLRC, however, refused to recognize the existence and validity of petitioner
Personnel Policy on which the ground for termination was embodied.
The existence of the Personnel Policy containing provisions on the grounds for termination of
employees was not questioned by respondent. In his position paper, respondent only assailed the
effectivity of the policy, as for him as it was amended on the same date as the letter-complaints against
him. In other words, he claimed that the policy was amended in order to include therein the ground for
his termination to make sure that he is removed from his position.
Contrary to respondent claim, with the amendment of the Personnel Policy, petitioner did not
create a new ground for the termination of employment to make sure that respondent is removed from
his position. The ground under the old policy is similar to that provided for in the new policy. The
enumeration containing the specific act of "illicit marital affairs" is not an additional ground, but an
example of an act that brings discredit to the cooperative. It is merely an interpretation of what petitioner
considers as such. It is, thus, clear from the foregoing that engaging in extra-marital affairs is a ground
for termination of employment not only under the new but even under the old Personnel Policy of
petitioner. The effectivity of the policy as to respondent cannot, therefore, be questioned.
To be sure, an employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment. It may make reasonable
rules and regulations for the government of its employees which become part of the contract of
employment provided they are made known to the employee. In the event of a violation, an employee
may be validly terminated from employment on the ground that an employer cannot rationally be
expected to retain the employment of a person whose lack of morals, respect and loyalty to his
employer, regard for his employer rules and application of the dignity and responsibility, has so plainly
and completely been bared.
Applying now the above-discussed ground for termination, we now determine whether
respondent was properly dismissed from employment. In other words, did petitioner adequately prove
that respondent indeed engaged in extra-marital affairs, an act which petitioner considers as would bring
discredit to the cooperative?
We answer in the affirmative. The employer evidence consists of sworn statements of either
relatives or friends of Thelma and respondent. They either had direct personal knowledge of the illicit
relationship or revealed circumstances indicating the existence of such relationship.
There is also no reason to doubt the statement of Melanie Gao-ay, the wife of Napoleon, who
witnessed the embarrassing "encounter", to borrow the term she used, between [respondent] and Thelma
in her own boarding house.
While respondent act of engaging in extra--marital affairs may be considered personal to him and
does not directly affect the performance of his assigned task as bookkeeper, aside from the fact that the
act was specifically provided for by petitioner Personnel Policy as one of the grounds for termination of
employment, said act raised concerns to petitioner as the Board received numerous complaints and
petitions from the cooperative members themselves asking for the removal of respondent because of his
immoral conduct.
The next question is whether procedural due process was observed in the termination of
respondent services. "Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, the employer must
furnish him two written notices: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his side; and (b) a
written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination."The employer must inform the
employee of the charges against him and to hear his defenses. A full adversarial proceeding is not
necessary as the parties may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers,
memorandum or oral argument.
In this case, respondent was adequately afforded the opportunity to defend himself and explain
the accusation against him. Upon receipt of the complaint, petitioner conducted a preliminary
investigation and even created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the matter. Respondent was directed
to explain either in writing or by a personal confrontation with the Board why he should not be
terminated for engaging in illicit affair. Not only did petitioner give him the opportunity but respondent
in fact informed petitioner that he opted to present his side orally and did so as promised when he
specifically denied such allegations. Moreover, respondent was also allowed to peruse the investigation
report prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee and was advised that he was entitled to assistance of counsel.
After which, hearing was conducted. It was only after thorough investigation and proper notice and
hearing to respondent that petitioner decided whether to dismiss the former or not. The decision to
terminate respondent from employment was embodied in Board Resolution No. 05, series of 1997 a
copy of which was furnished respondent. With this resolution, respondent was adequately notified of
petitioner decision to remove him from his position. Respondent cannot now claim that his right to due
process was infringed upon.

4. R.B. Michael Press and Annalene Reyes Escobia vs. Nicasio C. Galit,
Facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator,
whose work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Mondays to Saturdays, and he was paid PhP230
a day. During his employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times, totaling to 6,117 minutes, and
was absent without leave for a total of nine and a half days.
On February 22, 1999, respondent was ordered to render overtime service in order to comply
with a job order deadline, but he refused to do so. The following day, respondent reported for work but
petitioner Escobia told him not to work, and to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he
returned, a copy of an Office Memorandum was served on him, as follows:
To: Mr. Nicasio Galit
From: Annalene Reyes-Escobia
Re: WARNING FOR DISMISSAL; NOTICE OF HEARING
This warning for dismissal is being issued for the following offenses:
(1) Habitual and excessive tardiness
(2) Committing acts of discourtesy, disrespect in addressing superiors
(3) Failure to work overtime after having been instructed to do so
(4) Insubordination — willfully disobeying, defying or disregarding company authority
The offenses you've committed are just causes for termination of employment as provided by the
Labor Code. You were given verbal warnings before, but there had been no improvement on your
conduct.
Further investigation of this matter is required, therefore, you are summoned to a hearing at 4:00
p.m. today. The hearing will determine your employment status with this company.
(SGD) Annalene Reyes-Escobia
Manager

On February 24, 1999, respondent was terminated from employment. The employer, through
petitioner Escobia, gave him his two-day salary and a termination letter averring that Galit was
dismissed due to the following offenses: (1) habitual and excessive tardiness; (2) commission of
discourteous acts and disrespectful conduct when addressing superiors; (3) failure to render overtime
work despite instruction to do so; and (4) insubordination, that is, willful disobedience of, defiance to, or
disregard of company authority. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
money claims before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondent, and whether
due process was observed in the dismissal process
(2) Whether or not the respondent is entitled to backwages and other benefits despite his refusal
to be reinstated

Held:
Respondent's tardiness cannot be considered condoned by petitioners. Habitual tardiness is a
form of neglect of duty. Lack of initiative, diligence, and discipline to come to work on time everyday
exhibit the employee's deportment towards work. Habitual and excessive tardiness is inimical to the
general productivity and business of the employer. This is especially true when the tardiness and/or
absenteeism occurred frequently and repeatedly within an extensive period of time.
The mere fact that the numerous infractions of respondent have not been immediately subjected
to sanctions cannot be interpreted as condonation of the offenses or waiver of the company to enforce
company rules. A waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal
right or privilege. It has been ruled that "a waiver to be valid and effective must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him." Hence, the management prerogative to discipline employees and impose
punishment is a legal right which cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived.
Thus it is incumbent upon the employee to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate
condonation or waiver on the part of management to forego the exercise of its right to impose sanctions
for breach of company rules.
In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce any evidence to show waiver or condonation on the
part of petitioners.
Insubordination or Willful Disobedience
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur: (1)
the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
In the present case, there is no question that petitioners' order for respondent to render overtime
service to meet a production deadline complies with the second requisite. Art. 89 of the Labor Code
empowers the employer to legally compel his employees to perform overtime work against their will to
prevent serious loss or damage:
Art. 89. Emergency Overtime Work
Any employee may be required by the employer to perform overtime work in any of the
following cases:
(c) When there is urgent work to be performed on machines, installations, or equipment, in order
to avoid serious loss or damage to the employer or some other cause of similar nature;
In the present case, petitioners' business is a printing press whose production schedule is
sometimes flexible and varying. It is only reasonable that workers are sometimes asked to render
overtime work in order to meet production deadlines.
The issue now is, whether respondent's refusal or failure to render overtime work was willful;
that is, whether such refusal or failure was characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. In Lakpue
Drug Inc. v. Belga, willfulness was described as "characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental
attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination." The fact that respondent
refused to provide overtime work despite his knowledge that there is a production deadline that needs to
be met, and that without him, the offset machine operator, no further printing can be had, shows his
wrongful and perverse mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness.
After a re-examination of the facts, we rule that respondent unjustifiably refused to render
overtime work despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael
Press shows that he was a difficult employee. His refusal to render overtime work was the final straw
that broke the camel's back, and, with his gross and habitual tardiness and absences, would merit
dismissal from service.
Due Process: Twin Notice and Hearing Requirement
On the issue of due process, petitioners claim that they had afforded respondent due process.
Petitioners maintain that they had observed due process when they gave respondent two notices and that
they had even scheduled a hearing where he could have had explained his side and defended himself.
We are not persuaded. We held in Agabon v. NLRC:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must
give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the
employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is
sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of
the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and
284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written
notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before his
employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a
second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is being terminated. Not to be
taken lightly of course is the hearing or opportunity for the employee to defend himself personally or by
counsel of his choice.
A scrutiny of the disciplinary process undertaken by petitioners leads us to conclude that they
only paid lip service to the due process requirements.
The undue haste in effecting respondent's termination shows that the termination process was a
mere simulation — the required notices were given, a hearing was even scheduled and held, but
respondent was not really given a real opportunity to defend himself; and it seems that petitioners had
already decided to dismiss respondent from service, even before the first notice had been given.
Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain to see that there was merely a general
description of the claimed offenses of respondent. The hearing was immediately set in the afternoon of
February 23, 1999 — the day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was not given any
opportunity at all to consult a union official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense.
5. PLDT vs. Amparo Balbastro and NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner hired the private respondent as telephone operator. She was dismissed due to her three-
straight unauthorized leave because of her unconfirmed sick leave. While some of her absences were
confirmed by medical certificates, some portions were not confirmed which led to her dismissal. She
then filed for illegal dismissal against the company. Petitioner presented three medical doctors who did
not confirm private respondent’s leave of absence.

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent was validly dismissed

Held:
Yes. Her patent abuse of her sick leave privileges is detrimental to petitioner’s business since her
job as telephone operator is a vital part to many transactions all over the country and abroad.
Moreover, the court ruled that it should not be compelled to retain such employee who has been
shown to be a gross liability to its employer. The law, in protecting the rights of the employees,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.

6. The Orchard Gold and Country Club vs. Amelia R. Francisco

Facts:
Amelia R. Francisco was employed as Club Accountant, to head the Club’s General Accounting
Division and the four divisions under it. Each of these four divisions has its own Supervisor and
Assistant Supervisor. As General Accounting Division head, respondent reports directly to the Club’s
Financial Comptroller, Jose Ernilo P. Famy. Famy directed Francisco to draft a letter to SGV & Co., the
Club’s external auditor, inquiring about the accounting treatment that should be accorded property that
will be sold or donated to the Club. Francisco failed to prepare the letter, even after Famy’s repeated
verbal and written reminders. Famy issued a memorandum requiring Francisco’s written explanation,
under pain of an insubordination charge, relative to her failure to prepare the letter. Instead of complying
with the memorandum, Francisco went to the Club’s General Manager, Tomas B. Clemente III, and
personally explained to the latter that due to the alleged heavy volume of work that needed her attention,
she was unable to draft the letter. Francisco did not submit the required written explanation. For this
reason, Famy issued a memorandum suspending Francisco without pay for a period of 15 days.
Francisco wrote to the Club’s General and Administrative Manager, Ma. Irma Corazon A. Nuevo,
questioning Famy’s act of charging, investigating, and suspending her without coursing the same
through the Club’s Personnel Department. A day after Francisco’s period of suspension expired, Famy
issued separate memoranda to Francisco and Clemente informing them of Francisco’s transfer, without
diminution in salary and benefits, to the Club’s Cost Accounting Section while the investigation on
Famy’s alleged illegal activities is pending.
In another memorandum Famy sought an investigation into Francisco’s alleged insubordination,
this time for her alleged unauthorized change of day-off despite disapproval of her leave/offset
application therefor Francisco was required to explain these charges. Francisco filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal against the Club, she continued to report for work.
Francisco again received a memorandum from Nuevo, duly noted and approved by Clemente,
this time placing her on forced leave with pay for 30 days, after which, Francisco reported back to work.
This time she was handed a memorandum informing her that, due to strained relations between her and
Famy and the pending evaluation of her betrayal of company trust charge, she has been permanently
transferred, without diminution of benefits, to the Club’s Cost Accounting Section, Francisco protested
her permanent transfer.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Francisco’s complaint for lack of merit. Francisco appealed the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC, which took a contrary view contending that strained relationship
is not a valid ground for termination of employment under the Labor Code. The CA sustained the NLRC
ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not Francisco’s transfer to the position of cost controller was without valid basis and
that it amounted to a demotion in rank

Held:
Yes. The Court shares the CA’s observation that when Francisco was placed on forced leave and
transferred to the Cost Accounting Section, not once was Francisco given the opportunity to contest
these company actions taken against her. It has also not escaped our attention that just when one penalty
has been served by Francisco, another would instantaneously take its place. And all these happened even
while the supposed case against her, the alleged charge of "betrayal of company trust", was still pending
and remained unresolved. In fact, one of the memoranda was served even at Francisco’s residence.
Not even the claim that her relations with her superiors have been strained could justify
Francisco’s transfer to Cost Accounting Section. Indeed, it appears that her charge was never resolved.
And if Famy, Nuevo and Clemente truly believed that their relations with Francisco have been strained,
then it puzzles the Court why, despite her transfer, she continues to remain under Famy’s direct
supervision. Such is the tenor of the memoranda relative to her temporary and subsequently, permanent,
transfer to the Cost Accounting Section.
 Francisco’s July temporary transfer and her permanent transfer to Cost Accounting Section must
be invalidated. For one, there was no valid reason to temporarily transfer Francisco to Cost Accounting
Section. She had already served her penalty for her failure to draft the SGV letter, through the 15-day
suspension period which she just completed. Secondly, the transfer was not even rooted in any new
infraction she is accused of committing. There was thus an absolute lack of basis for her temporary
transfer.
As for her permanent transfer, the same is null and void for lack of just cause. Also, the transfer
is a penalty imposed on a charge that has not yet been resolved.
Definitely, to punish one for an offense that has not been proved is truly unfair; this is
deprivation without due process. Finally, the Court sees no necessity for Francisco’s transfer; on the
contrary, such transfer is outweighed by the need to secure her office and documents from Famy’s
possible intervention on account of the complaint she filed against him.
"An employer is free to manage and regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all
phases of employment, which includes hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and
manner of work, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers,
and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. While the law recognizes and safeguards this right of an
employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives, such right should not be abused and
used as a tool of oppression against labor. The company’s prerogatives must be exercised in good faith
and with due regard to the rights of labor. A priori, they are not absolute prerogatives but are subject to
legal limits, collective bargaining agreements and the general principles of fair play and justice. The
power to dismiss an employee is a recognized prerogative that is inherent in the employer’s right to
freely manage and regulate his business. Such right, however, is subject to regulation by the State,
basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. Thus, the dismissal of employees must be made
within the parameters of the law and pursuant to the basic tenets of equity, justice and fair play. It must
not be done arbitrarily and without just cause.

7. Functional, Inc. vs. Samuel C. Granfil

Facts:
Sometime in 1992, Sammy Granfil was hired as key operator by Functional, Inc. (FI), a corp.
engaged in the business of sale and rental of photocopying machines. As Key Operator, Granfil was
tasked to operate the photocopying machine rented by the National Bookstore (NBS) at its SM
Megamall Branch.
30 July 2002: Granfil attended to a customer by the name of Cosme Cavaldeja (Cavaldeja) who,
together with his wife, asked to have their flyers photocopied.
 Bonnel Dechavez, the security guard assigned at said establishment, saw Cavaldeja handing
money to Granfil after the transaction was finished. Dechavez submitted an incident report to NBS
Branch Manager Lucy Genegaban to wit:
“I checked one customer and asked if he already paid for his xeroxed items and he said “yes.”
Upon asking for a receipt, he pointed to Sammy the Xerox operator to whom he gave payment, instead
of paying to the cashier. Sammy came and it was only then that he brought the customer to the counter
09 for payment of the amount of the Xeroxed items is P250”
3 September 2002:Granfil filed a complaint against FI, its President, Romeo Bautista (Bautista),
its Marketing Manager, Freddie Tenorio (Tenorio), its Office Supervisor, Julius Ballesteros
(Ballesteros), and its Area Supervisor, Joel Dizon (Dizon), for illegal dismissal, unpaid 13th month pay,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. He alleged that the money which Dechavez saw him
receive from Cavaldeja was a P200 tip; that payment for the materials was, however, already paid per
batch by Cavaldeja’s wife who, by that time, had already left the premises; and, that rather than listening
to his explanation and simply verifying the meter of the photocopy machine as well as the paper allotted
to it, Dechavez submitted his incident report
Granfil further asseverated that, with said incident report having been telefaxed to FI’s head
office, he was asked to report thereat in the morning of 31 July 2002; that instead of allowing him to
explain, however, Ballesteros peremptorily ordered his termination from employment; that wishing to
explain his side, he sought out Dizon who merely ignored and tersely advised him, “Magpahinga ka na
lang”; that refused entry when he tried to report for work on 1 August 2002, he subsequently sought out
Cavaldeja whose corroboration of his version of the incident also fell on deaf ears
Granfil that he was going to be transferred to a different assignment, without demotion in rank
or diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges; that required to report to FI’s main office to
act as emergency reliever to other Key Operators while waiting for his new assignment, Granfil
misconstrued his transfer as a punishment for his guilt and refused to heed said directive which was
within the management’s prerogative to issue; that an employee’s right to security of tenure does not
give him such vested right to his position as would deprive his employer of its prerogative to change his
assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful; and, that aside from being guilty of
insubordination, Granfil clearly abandoned his employment rather than illegally dismissed.
LA rendered a decision discounting Granfil’s illegal dismissal in view of his failure to prove with
substantial evidence overt acts of termination on the part of FI.
NLRC affirmed the LA, but the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC, holding: FI failed to
prove Granfil’s abandonment.

Issue:
Whether or not Granfil was illegally dismissed
Held:
Yes. In illegal dismissal cases the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that the
employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause. The employer’s case succeeds or fails
on the strength of its evidence and not the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping with
the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in case of doubt in the
evidence presented by them
The quantum of proof is substantial evidence which is understood as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable
minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Failure of the employer to discharge the foregoing onus
would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.
FI adduced no evidence to prove Granfil’s supposed abandonment beyond submitting copies of
NBS’ 31 July 2002 request for said employee’s transfer and its 1 August 2002 written acquiescence
thereto. While these documents may have buttressed the claim that Granfil was indeed recalled from his
assignment, however, we find that the CA correctly discounted their probative value insofar as FI’s
theory of abandonment is concerned.
Being a matter of intention, abandonment cannot be inferred or presumed from equivocal acts.
As a just and valid ground for dismissal, it requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment, without any intention of returning. Two elements must concur: (1) failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. The burden of proving abandonment is once again upon the employer
who, whether pleading the same as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a mere defense,
additionally has the legal duty to observe due process. Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to
report to work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.
Bautista, Tenorio, Ballesteros and Dizon did not even execute sworn statements to refute the
overt acts of dismissal imputed against them, the record is wholly bereft of any showing that FI required
Granfil to report to its main office or, for that matter, to explain his supposed unauthorized absences.
In vigorously pursuing his action against FI before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA,
Granfil clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment.

8. CBC vs. Fermin

Facts:
Wilson B. Fermin (Fermin) was a forklift operator at Cosmos. He was accused of stealing the
cellphone of his fellow employee. Fermin was then given a Show Cause Memorandum, requiring him to
explain why the cellphone was found inside his locker. In compliance therewith, he submitted an
affidavit the following day, explaining that he only hid the phone as a practical joke and had every
intention of returning it to Braga. After conducting an investigation, COSMOS found Fermin guilty of
stealing Braga’s phone in violation of company rules and regulations. Consequently, on 2 October 2003,
the company terminated Fermin from employment after 27 years of service. Fermin filed a Complaint
for Illegal Dismissal.
Labor Arbiter dismissed for lack of merit on the ground that the act of taking a fellow
employee’s cellphone amounted to gross misconduct. NLRC affirmed but CA reversed the rulings of the
LA and the NLRC and awarded him his full retirement benefitsIt must be noted that in the case at bar,
all the lower tribunals were in agreement that Fermin’s act of taking Braga’s cellphone amounted to
theft.

Issue:
Whether the imposition of the penalty of dismissal was appropriate

Held:
Yes. Theft committed against a co-employee is considered as a case analogous to serious
misconduct, for which the penalty of dismissal from service may be meted out to the erring employee by
virtue of Article 282 of the Labor Code Misconduct involves “the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment.”
For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be; (1) of grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant, and (2) connected with the work of the
employee.
Nonetheless, Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are
susceptible of comparison to another in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly
dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282, the cause must involve a voluntary
and/or willful act or omission of the employee. A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary
and/or willful act or omission attesting to an employee’s moral depravity. Theft committed by an
employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause
analogous to serious misconduct.
9. Armando G. Yrasuegui vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
Facts:
This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL. He had problems meeting the
required weight standards for cabin and crew. He was advised to go on leave without pay several times
to address his weight concerns, to no avail. PAL had him grounded until such time he satisfactorily
complies with the weight standards and he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.
On November 5, 1992, petitioner weighed 205 lbs, way beyond his ideal weight of 166 lbs. On
June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of
almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately
The Labor Arbiter ruled that he was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter held that the weight
standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner.[15] However, the weight
standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties.[16] Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to other positions
where his weight would not be a negative factor. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, with
modifications.
The CA, however, reversed the ruling. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of
PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s position. The failure to adhere to the
weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed

Held:
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
The standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the employer; they were the prescribed
weights that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s
position.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is
hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially
meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these
standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the
faults for which an employee can be dismissed
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Being overweight
impedes mobility in times of emergencies where seconds are precious.
Petitioner was not, therefore, illegally dismissed. He is entitled to a separation pay, including his
regular allowances.

10. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing telegraph and
communication services thru its branches all over the country. It employed various employees, and came
up with a Relocation and Restructuring Program. On August 11, 1997, private respondents received
separate letters from the petitioner, giving them the option to choose the branch to which they could be
transferred. Private respondents rejected the petitioner’s offer. Petitioner sent letters to the private
respondents requiring them to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them for their refusal to be transferred. In their respective private respondents explained that the
transfers imposed by the management would cause enormous difficulties on the individual
complainants. Petitioner considered the private respondents refusal as insubordination and willful
disobedience to a lawful order; hence, the private respondents were dismissed from work. They
forthwith filed their respective complaints against the petitioner before the NLRC. Subsequently, the
private respondents bargaining agent filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice for and in behalf of the private respondents, before the arbitration branch of the
NLRC. After the parties filed their respective pleadings, LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, the private respondents appealed to the NLRC. NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of
LA. Petitioner filed a petition before the CA assailing the resolution of the NLRC.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the private respondents were legally terminated for just and authorized cause
for willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Petitioner after affording them due process of law
and thus not entitled to reinstatement.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner acted in good faith in implementing its relocating and
restructuring program which resulted in the termination of the private respondents.
Held:
(1) No. There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a
promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse. Hence, the exercise
by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination, or willful
disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. As such, there was no valid cause for the private
respondents’ dismissal.
(2) No. As the questioned dismissal is not based on any of the just or valid grounds under Article
282 of the Labor Code, the NLRC correctly ordered the private respondents reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and the payment of backwages from the time of their dismissal up to their actual
reinstatement.

11. Bienvenido R. Batongbacal vs. Associated Bank and NLRC

Facts:
Petitioner Bienvenido R. Batongbacal, a lawyer who was admitted to the Bar in 1952,
began his banking career in 1961 as manager of the Second Rizal Development Bank and from then on
he had worked to several banking institutions and the last being the Associated Bank as assistant
vice-president. On March 15,1983, because of the bank’s financial loses and reverses, the bank's board
of directors met and approved a resolution stating that, the new management be given the necessary
flexibility in streamlining the operations of the Bank and for the purpose it is hereby resolved that
the Bank officers at the Head Office and the Branches with corporate rank of Manager and
higher be required, as they hereby are required to submit immediately to the President their
courtesy resignations. But petitioner did not submit his courtesy resignation. But nevertheless,
he received a letter accepting his resignation. He asked for reconsideration of his
termination/resignation but it was denied so he filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor ordering the respondent bank to reinstate petitioner and to pay salary
differentials. But NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed for courtesy resignation not really of his own

Held:
Yes. The Court held, while it may be said that the private respondent's call for courtesy
resignations was prompted by its determination to survive, we cannot lend legality to the manner by
which it pursued its goal. By directing its employees to submit letters of courtesy resignation, the
bank in effect forced upon its employees an act which they themselves should voluntarily do. It
should be emphasized that resignation per se means voluntary relinquishment of a position or office.
Adding the word “courtesy” did not change the essence of resignation. That courtesy resignations were
utilized in government reorganization did not give private respondent the right to use it as well in its
own reorganization and rehabilitation plan. There is no guarantee that all employers will not use it to rid
themselves arbitrarily of employees they do not like, in the guise of “streamlining” its organization. On
the other hand, employees would be unduly exposed to outright termination of employment which is
anathema to the constitutional mandate of security of tenure. Petitioner’s dismissal was effected through
a letter “accepting” his resignation. Private respondent rationalizes that this was done, even if
petitioner did not actually submit such letter, so as not to jeopardize his chances of future
employment. But it is also clear from its pleadings that private respondent terminated petitioner's
employment for insubordination in view of his failure to comply with the order to submit his letter of
courtesy resignation. We hold, however, that insubordination may not be imputed to one who refused
to follow an unlawful order. Private respondent asserts that petitioner's refusal to submit his letter
of courtesy resignation was "sufficient reason to distrust him." Loss of confidence as a ground
for dismissal must be supported by satisfactory evidence. Even with respect to managerial
employees who, under Policy Instructions No. 8, may be dismissed for lack of confidence, loss of
trust must be substantiated and clearly proven. The record fails to show any valid reasons for
terminating the employment of petitioner. There are no proofs of malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by petitioner which jeopardized private respondent's interest. The latter's allegations
that petitioner was "purged" because he sabotaged the bank and that he "contributed, directly or
indirectly" to its downfall are mere subjective conclusions unsubstantiated by hard facts. To clothe with
legality petitioner's dismissal for his failure to submit his letter of courtesy resignation is to add a ground
for termination of employment to the provisions of the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the National Labor Relations Commission for
determination of the factual issues of whether petitioner, as assistant vice-president of the respondent
bank, is a managerial employee and whether he is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages.

12. School of Holy Spirit of Quezon City vs. Corazon P. Taguiam

Facts:
Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of petitioner school. After
obtaining permission from the principal, they were allowed to use the school swimming pool for their
year-end activity. With this, respondent Taguiam distributed the parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to the
students. The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother personally
brought her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit, Taguiam concluded that the mother
allowed her to join. Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to
swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked
out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately, while respondent was
away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent
rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. The petitioner
school conducted a clarificatory hearing to which respondent attended and submitted her Affidavit of
Explanation. A month later, petitioner school dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust
and confidence was valid

Held:
Yes. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground
for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated
failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. The SC
concluded that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Mae’s
permit form was unsigned.
Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae’s
mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and
swimsuit. Second, it was respondent’s responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all
activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that
proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their
activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be
impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.
Notably, respondent’s negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable
resultant damage, however, the SC agreed that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. Indeed, the
sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the
dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child

13. Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. vs. Virginia E. Pacia

Facts:
Respondent Virginia E. Pacia (Pacia) was hired by Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. (LREI). At the
time of her dismissal, she was the assistant manager and officer-in-charge of LREI's Accounting
Department under the Finance Administrative Division. LREI's acting general manager, Sumulong,
ordered Pacia to prepare a check amounting to P150,000.00, an order which she was slow to follow.
Pacia eventually complied with the order, nevertheless. Pacia was ordered to prepare another check, this
time amounting to P175,000.00. She was again slow to comply, but eventually the order was complied
with. To explain her refusal to immediately follow the directive, Pacia reasoned out that the funds in
LREIs account were not sufficient to cover the amounts to be indicated in the checks. Thereafter Pacia
received a notice of termination stating, among others, that she was being dismissed because of her
willful disobedience and their loss of trust and confidence in her.
Pacia then filed a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice due to Harassment, Constructive
Dismissal, Moral and Exemplary Damages against LREI and Sumulong. Subsequently, Pacia filed an
Amended Complaint to include the charges of illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries. The Labor
Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision finding that the dismissal of Pacia was for a just and valid cause but
ordering payment of what was due her. On appeal, the NLRC in its decision reversed the LA's Decision
and found LREI and Sumulong guilty of illegal dismissal. The case was elevated to the CA. The CA
held that LREI and Sumulong failed to establish with substantial evidence that the dismissal of Pacia
was for a just cause. It found that Pacia’s initial reluctance to obey the orders of her superiors was for a
good reason - to shield the company from liability in the event that the checks would be dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.

Issue:
Whether or not Pacia’s termination was justified under the circumstances

Held:
The petition has no merit (Just causes for termination). At the outset, it must be emphasized that
the issues raised in this petition are questions of fact which are not proper subjects of an appeal by
certiorari. A disharmony between the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC, however, opens the door
to a review by this Court. Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Moreover, when the findings of the NLRC contradict those
of the LA, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and
re-examine the questioned findings.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for which an employer may terminate
the services of an employee, to wit:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The offense of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of two (2) requisites:
(1) The employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is characterized by a wrongful
and perverse attitude; and (2) The order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
The Court finds nothing unlawful in the directive of Sumulong to prepare checks in payment of
LREI's obligations. The availability or unavailability of sufficient funds to cover the check is immaterial
in the physical preparation of the checks. Pacia’s initial reluctance to prepare the checks, however,
which was seemingly an act of disrespect and defiance, was for honest and well intentioned reasons.
Protecting LREI and Sumulong from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law was foremost in her
mind. It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate defiance of company
authority. The Court takes into consideration that Pacia, despite her initial reluctance, eventually did
prepare the checks on the same day she was tasked to do it. Pacias apprehension was justified when the
check was dishonored. This clearly affirms her assertion that she was just being cautious and
circumspect for the company's sake. Thus, her actuation should not be construed as improper conduct.

14. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt vs. Hon. Voluntary Arbitrator Buenaventura C.
Magsalin
Facts:
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the dismissal was valid. However, due to humanitarian
considerations, it ordered financial assistance. Petitioner assailed the decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator before the CA in a petition for certiorari which was dismissed outright for being the wrong
remedy. The CA explained that Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that the proper mode of appeal from judgments, final orders or resolution of voluntary
arbitrators is through a Petition for Review which should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of notice of judgment, order or resolution of the voluntary arbitrator. Considering that petitioner
intended the petition to be a Petition for Certiorari, the Court hereby resolves to dismiss the petition
outright for being an improper mode of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper remedy for assailing the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator is a petition
for certiorari

Held:
No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA via petition for review
under Rule 43. Hence, upon receipt of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary
period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this case
to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard
such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not
to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they
help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in
the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance
by the parties of the procedural rules.

15. Quirico Lopez vs. Alturas Group of Companies

Facts:
Quirico Lopez (petitioner) was hired by respondent Alturas Group of Companies in 1997 as
truck driver. Ten years later or sometime in November 2007, he was dismissed after he was allegedly
caught by respondent’s security guard in the act of attempting to smuggle out of the company premises
60 kilos of scrap iron worth P840 aboard respondents’ Isuzu Cargo Aluminum Van with Plate Number
PHP 271 that was then assigned to him. When questioned, petitioner allegedly admitted to the security
guard that he was taking out the scrap iron consisting of lift springs out of which he would make axes.
Petitioner, in compliance with the Show Cause Notice dated December 5, 2007 issued by
respondent company’s Human Resource Department Manager, denied the allegations by a handwritten
explanation written in the Visayan dialect.
Finding petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory, respondent company terminated his employment
by Notice of Termination effective December 14, 2007 on the grounds of loss of trust and confidence,
and of violation of company rules and regulations. In issuing the Notice, respondent company also took
into account the result of an investigation showing that petitioner had been smuggling out its cartons
which he had sold, in conspiracy with one Maritess Alaba, for his own benefit to thus prompt it to file a
criminal case for Qualified Theft against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol. It had in
fact earlier filed another criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner arising from the theft of the
scrap iron.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was not afforded procedural due process

Held:
This Court has held that there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted,
where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the
denial of the opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side when he was informed of the charge
against him and required to submit his written explanation with which he complied.
The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an employee with ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative or counsel in ways
other than a formal hearing. The employee can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges
against him, adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against him through a wide array of methods,
verbal or written.
After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the employee may
submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter, memorandum, affidavit or position
paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and
daily time records) and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his
explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He may also ask the
employer to provide him copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also
include a request that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal
hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes
or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment pre-termination
procedure.
The right to counsel and the assistance of one in investigations involving termination cases is
neither indispensable nor mandatory, except when the employee himself requests for one or that he
manifests that he wants a formal hearing on the charges against him.
16. Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. NLRC
Facts:
An investigating committee chaired by Leslie W. Espino formally charged Quijano as Manager-
ASAD in connection with the processing and payment of commission claims to Goldair Pty. Ltd.
wherein PAL overpaid commissions to the latter. Pending further investigation, the Espino Committee
placed Quijano under preventive suspension and at the same time required her to submit her answer to
the charges.
Another Administrative charge involving the same Goldair anomaly was filed, this time
including Committee Chairman Leslie W. Espino and Committee Member Romeo R. Ines and several
others, for "gross incompetence and inefficiency, negligence, imprudence, mismanagement, dereliction
of duty, failure to observe and/or implement administrative and executive policies, and related acts or
omissions." Pending the result of investigation by another committee chaired by Judge Martin S.
Ocampo, the PAL Board of Directors suspended respondents. The Ocampo Committee having submitted
its findings to the PAL Board of Directors, the latter considered respondents resigned from the service
effective immediately, for loss of confidence and for acts inimical to the interest of the company.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Board, Quijano filed the instant case
against PAL for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed private
respondent’s complaint. Undeterred, private respondent filed an appeal before the NLRC which
rendered the assailed Decision vacated and set aside. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
this was denied by the NLRC.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is illegally dismissed

Held:
At the onset, it should be noted that the parties do not dispute the validity of private respondent’s
dismissal from employment for loss of confidence and acts inimical to the interest of the employer. The
assailed September 29, 1995 Decision of the NLRC was emphatic in declaring that it was "not prepared
to rule as illegal the preventive suspension and eventual dismissal from the service of [private
respondent]" and rightfully so because the last position that private respondent held, Manager-ASAD
(Agents Services Accounting Division), undeniably qualifies as a position of trust and confidence.
Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised from the fact that
an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where a person is
entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of
the employer’s property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must
be "work-related" such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the
employer.
As a general rule, employers are allowed wider latitude of discretion in terminating the
employment of managerial personnel or those who, while not of similar rank, perform functions which
by their nature require the employer’s full trust and confidence. This must be distinguished from the
case of ordinary rank and file employees, whose termination on the basis of these same grounds requires
a higher proof of involvement in the events in question; mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations
by the employer will not suffice.
The language of Article 279 of the Labor Code is pregnant with the implication that a legally
dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay, to wit:
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
However, in exceptional cases, this Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed
employee as an act of "social justice" or based on "equity." In both instances, it is required that the
dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the
employee or would involve moral turpitude. This equitable and humanitarian principle was first
discussed by the Court in the landmark case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) v.
National Labor Relations Commission.
Serious misconduct as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee is defined simply as
improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error
of judgment. To be serious within the meaning and intendment of the law, the misconduct must be of
such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. However serious such
misconduct, it must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employees work to constitute just cause for
his separation. The act complained of must be related to the performance of the employees duties such
as would show him to be unfit to continue working for the employer. On the other hand, moral turpitude
has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
In the case at bar, the transgressions imputed to private respondent have never been firmly
established as deliberate and willful acts clearly directed at making petitioner lose millions of pesos. At
the very most, they can only be characterized as unintentional, albeit major, lapses in professional
judgment. Likewise, the same cannot be described as morally reprehensible actions. Thus, private
respondent may be granted separation pay on the ground of equity which this Court had defined as
"justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It
is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds no
room for application where there is law."

17. Philippine National Bank vs. Dan Padao

Facts:
On August 21, 1981, Padao was hired by PNB as a clerk at its Dipolog City Branch. He was later
designated as a credit investigator in an acting capacity on November 9, 1993. He was ultimately
promoted to the position of Loan and Credit Officer IV.
In 1994, PNB became embroiled in a scandal involving "behest loans" as anomalous loans were
being granted by its officers. In line with this, Padao was administratively charged with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The case against Padao was
grounded on his having allegedly presented a deceptively positive status of the business, credit
standing/rating and financial capability of 13 loan applicants. After due investigation, PNB found Padao
guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed from the bank. Padao appealed to
the banks Board of Directors. Velasco, Padao’s colleague, was also held guilty of the offenses charged,
and was similarly meted the penalty of dismissal. Her motion for reconsideration, however, was later
granted by the bank, and she was reinstated.

Issues:
(1) Whether the position of a credit investigator is one imbued with the trust and confidence of
the employer
(2) Whether the act of falsifying the credit and appraisal reports and that of affixing ones
signature in a false report by another is one and the same degree of misconduct which warrants the same
penalty

Held:
While it is an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a
measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest, the law sets the valid grounds for
termination as well as the proper procedure to be followed when terminating the services of an
employee.
Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the services
of an employee except for a just or authorized cause. Such just causes for which an employer may
terminate an employee are enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code: (a) serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate family member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e)
Other causes analogous to the foregoing. Further, due process requires that employers follow the
procedure set by the Labor Code. Under Art. 277, workers may be dismissed only for a just cause and
enjoy the right of due process which includes notice and the ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
his or her side.
In this case, Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article
282 (b) of the Labor Code. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties,
while habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending on
the circumstances. Padao was accused of having presented a fraudulently positive evaluation of the
business, credit standing/rating and financial capability 13 loan applicants.
The role that a credit investigator plays in the conduct of a bank’s business cannot be
overestimated. The amount of loans to be extended by a bank depends upon the report of the credit
investigator on the collateral being offered. If a loan is not fairly secured, the bank is at the mercy of the
borrower who may just opt to have the collateral foreclosed. If the scheme is repeated a hundredfold, it
may lead to the collapse of the bank.
Padao's repeated failure to discharge his duties as a credit investigator of the bank amounted to
gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. He not only failed to
perform what he was employed to do, but also did so repetitively and habitually, causing millions of
pesos in damage to PNB. Thus, PNB acted within the bounds of the law by meting out the penalty of
dismissal, which it deemed appropriate given the circumstances.
The CA was correct in stating that when the violation of company policy or breach of company
rules and regulations is tolerated by management, it cannot serve as a basis for termination. Such ruling,
however, does not apply here. The principle only applies when the breach or violation is one which
neither amounts to nor involves fraud or illegal activities. In such a case, one cannot evade liability or
culpability based on obedience to the corporate chain of command.
Padao, in affixing his signature on the fraudulent reports, attested to the falsehoods contained
therein. Moreover, by doing so, he repeatedly failed to perform his duties as a credit investigator.
18. Hospital Management Services, Inc. – Medical Center Manila vs. Hospital Management
Services, Inc.
Facts:
Respondent De Castro was a staff nurse at Medical Center Manila. Calixijan, HRD Officer of
Medical Center Manila issued a notice of termination upon respondent De Castro for alleged (1)
negligence to follow company policy on what to do with patient Rufina Causaren who fell from a
hospital bed; (2) failure to record and refer the incident to the physician-on-duty allowing a significant
lapse of time before reporting the incident; (3) deliberately instructing the staff to follow her version of
the incident in order to cover up the lapse; and (4) negligence and carelessness in carrying out her duty
as staff nurse-on-duty when the incident happened.
Respondent De Castro, with the assistance of Medical Center Manila Employees Association-
AFW, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners with prayer for reinstatement and
payment of full backwages without loss of seniority rights, P20,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00
exemplary damages, and 10% of the total monetary award as attorney's fees.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent De Castro, stating that although De Castro
committed the act complained of, being her first offense, the penalty to be meted should not be dismissal
from service, but merely 7 to 14 days suspension as the same was classified as a less serious offense
under the Employee's Handbook.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, stating that respondent De Castro lacked
diligence and prudence in carrying out her duty when, instead of personally checking on the condition of
patient Causaren after she fell from the bed, she merely sent ward-clerk orientee Guillergan to do the
same in her behalf and for influencing her staff to conceal the incident. The CA reversed the NLRC's
ruling and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's ruling.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the illegal dismissal of respondent De Castro

Held:
The petition is unmeritorious. Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may
terminate an employment for gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. The CA ruled
that per the Employees Handbook of petitioner hospital, respondent De Castros infraction is classified as
a less serious offense for "commission of negligent acts during working time" as set forth in
subparagraph 11, paragraph 3 (B) of Chapter XI[10] thereof. Petitioners anchor respondent De Castros
termination of employment on the ground of serious misconduct for failure to personally attend to
patient Causaren who fell from the bed as she was trying to reach for the bedpan. Based on her
evaluation of the situation, respondent De Castro saw no necessity to record in the chart of patient
Causaren the fact that she fell from the bed as the patient did not suffer any injury and her vital signs
were normal. She surmised that the incident was not of a magnitude that would require medical
intervention as even the patient and her niece did not press charges against her by reason of the subject
incident.
Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to
perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of
negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised in a similar situation. The Court emphasizes that the nature of the business
of a hospital requires a higher degree of caution and exacting standard of diligence in patient
management and health care as what is involved are lives of patients who seek urgent medical
assistance. An act or omission that falls short of the required degree of care and diligence amounts to
serious misconduct which constitutes a sufficient ground for dismissal.
However, in some cases, the Court had ruled that sanctioning an erring employee with
suspension would suffice as the extreme penalty of dismissal would be too harsh. Considering that this
was the first offense of respondent De Castro in her nine (9) years of employment with petitioner
hospital as a staff nurse without any previous derogatory record and, further, as her lapse was not
characterized by any wrongful motive or deceitful conduct, the Court deems it appropriate that, instead
of the harsh penalty of dismissal, she would be suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay,
inclusive of the suspension for a period of 14 days which she had earlier served. Thereafter, petitioner
hospital should reinstate respondent Edna R. De Castro to her former position without loss of seniority
rights, full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, or their monetary equivalent,
computed from the expiration of her suspension of six (6) months up to the time of actual reinstatement.

19. Sampaguita Auto Transport Corporation vs. NLRC

Facts:
Sampaguita Auto Transport Corporation was charged with illegal dismissal for allegedly firing
Sagad when he was, as he claimed, hired as a regular employee, not as a probationary employee as the
company claimed. Allegedly, sometime around September, an evaluator boarded Sagad’s bus. The
evaluator described Sagad’s manner of driving as "reckless driver, nakikipaggitgitan, nakikipaghabulan,
nagsasakay sa gitna ng kalsada, sumusubsob ang pasahero." Sagad claimed that he could not have been
driving as reported because his pregnant wife and one of his children were with him on the bus. He
admitted though that at one time, he chased a bus to serve warning on its driver not to block his bus
when he was overtaking. He also admitted that once in a while, he sped up to make up for lost time in
making trips. The company further alleged it conducted an evaluation of Sagad’s performance. It
requested conductors who had worked with Sagad to comment on his work. Conductors revealed that
Sagad proposed that they cheat on the company by way of an unreported early bus trip. Dispatcher E.
Castillo likewise submitted a negative report and even recommended the termination of Sagad’s
employment. The company also cited Sagad’s involvement in a hit-and-run accident. Allegedly, Sagad
did not report the accident to the company. Upon conclusion of the evaluation, the company terminated
Sagad’s employment for his failure to qualify as a regular employee.

Issues:
(1) Whether Sampaguita Auto Transport Corp. illegally dismissed Sagad;
(2) Whether he is entitled to backwages and separation pay, totaling P604,050.00 after working
with the company for barely five months.

Held:
(1) No. The SC ruled that Sagad was not dismissed without basis. During his brief employment
with the company, he exhibited the tendency to speed up when he finds the need for it, very obviously in
violation of traffic rules, regulations and company policy. Instead of negating the evaluator’s
observations, his admissions make them credible. Also, the SC finds no evidence that Hemoroz and
Lucero had an ax to grind against Sagad so that they would lie about their impression of him as a bus
driver. Significantly, their statements validate Castillo’s own observation that he heard talks of Sagad’s
orders to the conductors for them to cheat on the company. The scheme, contrary to Sagad’s
explanation, can only be committed with the cooperation, or even at the behest, of the driver, as the
proposed scheme is for the bus to make unscheduled, but unreported, early trips.
The company cites Sagad’s involvement in a hit-and-run incident. The Traffic Accident
Investigation Report 45 is evidence to such incident. The report was corroborated by the sworn
statements of driver of the Elf truck, UFF-597, the second party in the incident, and the driver of the
White Honda City, the first party in the vehicular accident. Also, the CA misappreciated the law when it
declared that the grounds relied upon by the company in terminating Sagad’s employment are not
among those enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code as just causes for employee dismissals.
Article 282 of the Code provides:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of hisemployer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
 The irregularities or infractions committed by Sagad in connection with his work as a bus driver
constitute a serious misconduct or, at the very least, conduct analogous to serious misconduct, under the
above-cited Article 282 of the Labor Code. To be sure, his tendency to speed up during his trips, his
reckless driving, his picking up passengers in the middle of the road, his racing with other buses and his
jostling for vantage positions do not speak well of him as a bus driver. Under the circumstances, Sagad
has become a liability rather than an asset to his employer, more so when we consider that he attempted
to cheat on the company or could have, in fact, defrauded the company during his brief tenure as a bus
driver. This calls to mind Castillo’s report on the low revenue of Sagad’s bus, an observation which is
validated by the company’s Daily Operation Reports from June to October 2006.
All told, we find substantial evidence supporting Sagad’s removal as a bus driver. Through his
reckless driving and his schemes to defraud the company, Sagad committed serious misconduct and
breach of the trust and confidence of his employer, which, without doubt, are just causes for his
separation from the service. It is well to stress, at this point, an earlier pronouncement of the Court "that
justiceis in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established factsand
applicable law and doctrine."
(2) No. Even as we find a just cause for Sagad’s dismissal, we agree with the CA that the
company failed to comply with the two-notice rule. It failed to serve notice of: (1) the particular acts for
which Sagad was being dismissed on November 5, 2006and (2) his actual dismissal. Consistent with our
ruling in Agabon v. NLRC, 52 we hold that the violation of Sagad's right to procedural due process
entitles him to an indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Considering the circumstances in the
present case, we deem it appropriate to award Sagad P30,000.00.

20. Caltex vs. Hermie G. Agad

Facts:
Petitioner Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) employed respondent Hermie G. Agad (Agad) as
Depot Superintendent-A on a probationary basis for six months and eventually, become a regular
employee. For the next eleven years, Agad held several supervisory position such as what he held before
his termination as Bulk Depot Superintendent. After serving 2 years in Leyte he is about to transfer to
Batangas. Said transfer requires him also to take with him his belongings, therefore, allegedly sought the
services of Alfredo Delda for the construction of crates. Allegedly respondent paid Delda, evidenced by
an Official receipt amounting to Php. 15,500.00 which was later-on denied by Delda. Said amount was
reimbursed by respondent to CALTEX.
On another audit report by the company auditor, they declared that 190 pieces of 11kg. LPG
cylinders from the depot were allegedly withdrawn from scrap and sold without proper documentation
and authorization from the higher management by the respondent. Respondent was eventually
terminated after several investigations and hearings conducted by the petitioner on the grounds of
serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.

Issue:
Whether Caltex legally terminated the respondent on just causes of serious misconduct and
willful violation of company rules and regulations; and willful breach of trust and confidence as
provided in article 282

Held:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, considering the findings of NLRC and CA, Even if
Agad did not commit the alleged charge of fictitious reimbursement of crating expense, he was found to
have acted without authority, a serious infraction amounting to theft of company property, in the
withdrawal and sale of the 190 pieces of LPG cylinders owned by the company. Caltex, as the employer,
has discharged the burden of proof necessary in terminating the services of Agad, who was ascertained
to have blatantly abused his position and authority. Thus, Agads dismissal from employment based on
(1) acts tantamount to serious misconduct or willful violation of company rules and regulations; and (2)
willful breach of trust and confidence as Depot Superintendent was lawful and valid under the
circumstances as mandated by Article 282 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code.
Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error
in judgment. To be serious, the misconduct must be of such grave and aggravated character.
Further, Agads conduct constitutes willful breach of the trust reposed in him, another just cause
for termination of employment recognized under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. Loss of trust and
confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that the employee
concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence. The employee must be invested with
confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, care and protection of the employers
property and funds.
As a superintendent, Agad occupied a position tasked to perform key and sensitive functions
which necessarily involved the custody and protection of Caltex’s properties. Consequently, Agad
comes within the purview of the trust and confidence rule.
21. Technol Eight Philippines Corporation vs. NLRC
Facts:
The petitioner Technol Eight Philippines Corporation (Technol), located at 127 East Main
Avenue, Laguna Technopark, Bin, Laguna, manufactures metal parts and motor vehicle components. It
hired the respondent Dennis Amular in March 1998 and assigned him to Technol’s Shearing Line,
together with Clarence P. Ducay. Rafael Mendoza was the lines team leader.
On April 16, 2002 at about 5:30 p.m., Mendoza went to the Surf City Internet Cafin Balibago,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. As Mendoza was leaving the establishment, he was confronted by Amular and
Ducay who engaged him in a heated argument regarding their work in the shearing line, particularly
Mendoza’s report to Avelino S. De Leon, Jr., Technol’s Production Control and Delivery (PCD)
assistant supervisor, about Amular’s and Ducay’s questionable behavior at work. The heated argument
resulted in a fistfight that required the intervention of the barangay tanods in the area.
Upon learning of the incident, Technol’s management sent to Amular and Ducay a notice of
preventive suspension/notice of discharge advising them that their fistfight with Mendoza violated
Section 1-k of Technol’s Human Resource Department (HRD) Manual. The two were given forty-eight
(48) hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for the incident. They
were placed under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days, thereafter, Amular received a notice
informing him that Technol management will conduct an administrative hearing. He was also given two
(2) days to respond in writing to the statements attached to and supporting the notice. A day before the
hearing, Amular filed a complaint for illegal suspension/constructive dismissal with a prayer for
separation pay, backwages and several money claims, against Technol. Amular failed to attend the
administrative hearing. Technol sent him a notice of dismissal.
The Executive Labor Arbiter found Amular’s preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal
were illegal. With respect to Amular’s dismissal, the Arbiter held that Technol failed to afford him
procedural due process since he was not able to present his side because he had filed a case before the
NLRC at the time he was called to a hearing; Technol also failed to substantiate its allegations against
Amular; the fistfight occurred around 200 to 300 meters away from the work area and it happened after
office hours. Arbiter Reyes awarded Amular separation pay (since he did not want to be reinstated),
backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and attorneys fees in the total amount of
P158,987.70.
Technol appealed to the NLRC. It NLRC affirmed the labor arbiters ruling. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the latter’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed
Held:
Court of Appeals decision is overruled. Technol insists that it had to order Amulars dismissal in
order to uphold the integrity of the company rules and to avoid the erosion of discipline among its
employees. Also, it disputes the CAs conclusion that the fact that Amulars liability should be mitigated
because the fight "was nipped in the bud." It submits that Mendoza had already sustained grave injuries
when the mauling was stopped.
Amular undoubtedly committed misconduct or exhibited improper behavior that constituted a
valid cause for his dismissal under the law and jurisprudential standards. The circumstances of his
misdeed, to our mind, rendered him unfit to continue working for Technol; guilt is not diminished by his
claim that Technol’s management called the three of them to a meeting, and asked them to explain their
sides and settle their differences, which they did. Mendoza significantly denied the alleged settlement,
maintaining that while they were summoned by De Leon after the incident, he could not shake hands
and settle with Amular and Ducay since they did not even apologize or ask forgiveness for what they
did. We do not find Mendoza’s denial of Amular’s claim unusual as Mendoza would not have stood his
ground in this case if a settlement had previously been reached. That a meeting had taken place does not
appear disputed, but a settlement cannot be inferred simply because a meeting took place.
Neither do we believe that Amular was discriminated against because he was not the only one
preventively suspended. These notices informed them that they were being preventively suspended for
30 days from May 19, 2002 to June 17, 2002 for Ducay, and May 21, 2002 for Amular. Thus, Amular
was not illegally dismissed; he was dismissed for cause.
What we see in the records belie Amular’s claim of denial of procedural due process. He chose
not to present his side at the administrative hearing. In fact, he avoided the investigation into the charges
against him by filing his illegal dismissal complaint ahead of the scheduled investigation. Under these
facts, he was given the opportunity to be heard and he cannot now come to us protesting that he was
denied this opportunity. To belabor a point the Court has repeatedly made in employee dismissal cases,
the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard; it is the denial of this opportunity that
constitutes violation of due process of law. Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v.
Solid Development Corporation, G.R. No. 165995, August 14, 2007.

22. Jonathan I. Sang-an, vs. Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc.
Facts:
Jonathan was the Assistant Operation Manager of respondent Equator Knights Detective and
Security Agency, Inc. (Equator). He was tasked, among others, with the duty of assisting in the
operations of the security services. He was also in charge of safekeeping Equators firearms.
 On April 21, 2001, Equator discovered that two firearms were missing from its inventory. The
investigation revealed that it was Jonathan who might have been responsible for the loss. On April 24,
2001, Jonathan was temporarily suspended from work pending further investigation.
On May 8, 2001, while Jonathan was under suspension, a security guard from Equator was
apprehended by policemen for violating the Commission on Elections gun ban rule. The security guard
stated in his affidavit that the unlicensed firearm had been issued to him by Jonathan.
On May 24, 2001, Jonathan filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension with prayer
for reinstatement. In his position paper, however, he treated his case as one for illegal dismissal and
alleged that he had been denied due process when he was dismissed. Equator, on the other hand, argued
that Jonathans dismissal was for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
The LA dismissed the complaint holding that no illegal dismissal took place as Jonathans
services were terminated pursuant to a just cause. The LA found that Jonathan was dismissed due to the
two infractions he committed: (1) the loss of Equators firearms under Jonathans watch, and (2) issuance
of an unlicensed firearm to Equators security guard. Jonathan appealed to the NLRC, contending that no
charge had been laid against him; there was no hearing or investigation of any kind; and he was not
given any chance or opportunity to defend himself.
The NLRC sustained the findings of the LA. However, it held that Equators letter informing him
of his temporary suspension until further notice did not satisfy the requirements of due process for a
valid dismissal. Thus, the NLRC modified the LAs decision and ordered Equator to pay Jonathan
backwages from April 24, 2001 until the date of the NLRCs decision. Equator moved for
reconsideration but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting the filing of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The CA reinstated the LAs decision dismissing Jonathans
complaint. Jonathan filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied.Hence, this petition.
Jonathan contends that when Equator filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, it failed to post a cash or surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. Without
complying with this condition, the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed outright. Also,
Jonathan contends that the CAs findings of fact are contrary to the findings of fact by the NLRC.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the posting of a cash or surety bond is required for the filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA?
(2) Whether or not Jonathan was validly dismissed?

Held:
The petition is partly meritorious. The requirement of a cash or surety bond as provided under
Article 223 of the Labor Code only applies to appeals from the orders of the LA to the NLRC. It does
not apply to special civil actions such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In
fact, nowhere under Rule 65 does it state that a bond is required for the filing of the petition.
A petition for certiorari is an original and independent action and is not part of the proceedings
that resulted in the judgment or order assailed before the CA. It deals with the issue of jurisdiction, and
may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court or tribunal prior to an appeal from the
judgment, or to a final judgment where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy
provided by law or by the rules.
In order to validly dismiss an employee, it is fundamental that the employer observe both
substantive and procedural due process the termination of employment must be based on a just or
authorized cause and the dismissal can only be effected, after due notice and hearing. The Court finds
that Equator complied with the substantive requirements of due process when Jonathan committed the
two offenses.
Article 282(A) of the Labor Code provides that an employee may be dismissed on the ground of
serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work. Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct; it is the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the
meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivia or
unimportant. It is also important that the misconduct be in connection with the employee's work to
constitute just cause for his separation.
By losing two firearms and issuing an unlicensed firearm, Jonathan committed serious
misconduct. He did not merely violate a company policy; he violated the law itself, Presidential Decree
No. 1866, and placed Equator and its employees at risk of being made legally liable. Thus, Equator had
a valid reason that warranted Jonathan’s dismissal from employment as Assistant Operation Manager.
However, the Court finds that Equator failed to observe the proper procedure in terminating Jonathans
services.
Jurisprudence has expounded on the guarantee of due process, requiring the employer to furnish
the employee with two written notices before termination of employment can be effected: a first written
notice that informs the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is
sought, and a second written notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him. In considering whether the charge in the first notice is sufficient to warrant dismissal under the
second notice, the employer must afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard.
A review of the records shows that Jonathan was not furnished with any written notice that
informed him of the acts he committed justifying his dismissal from employment. The notice of
suspension given to Jonathan only pertained to the first offense. With respect to his second offense,
Jonathan was never given any notice that allowed him to air his side and to avail of the guaranteed
opportunity to be heard. That Equator brought the second offense before the LA does not serve as notice
because by then, Jonathan had already been dismissed.
 In order to validly dismiss an employee, the observance of both substantive and procedural due
process by the employer is a condition sine qua non. Procedural due process requires that the employee
be given a notice of the charge against him, an ample opportunity to be heard, and a notice of
termination.
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
dismissal of the petitioner is valid. Consequently, Equator Knights Detective and Security Agency, Inc.
is ordered to pay petitioner Jonathan I. Sang-an P130, 000.00 as nominal damages for its non-
compliance with procedural due process.

23. Exodus International Construction vs. Guillermo Biscocho

Facts:
Petitioner Exodus International Construction Corporation (Exodus) is a duly licensed labor
contractor for the painting of residential houses, condominium units and commercial buildings.
In the furtherance of its business, Exodus hired respondents as painters on different dates.
Guillermo, Fernando, Ferdinand, and Miguel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and night-shift differential pay.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision exonerating petitioners from the charge of illegal
dismissal as respondents chose not to report for work. However, she allowed the claims for holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. The Decision was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA.
They opined that in a situation where the employer has complete control over the records and could thus
easily rebut any monetary claims against it but opted not to lift any finger, the burden is on the employer
and not on the complainants.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of respondents to their former positions and affirming the award granted by the lower
tribunals

Held:
The petition is partly meritorious. In illegal dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employees
to first establish the fact of their dismissal before the burden is shifted to the employer to prove that the
dismissal was legal. Here, there was no evidence that respondents were dismissed nor were they
prevented from returning to their work. It was only respondents’ unsubstantiated conclusion that they
were dismissed.
 Clearly therefore, there was no dismissal, much less illegal, and there was also no abandonment
of job to speak of. The Labor Arbiter is therefore correct in ordering that respondents be reinstated but
without any backwages.
However, petitioners are of the position that the reinstatement of respondents to their former
positions, which were no longer existing, is impossible, highly unfair and unjust. Petitioners are
misguided. They forgot that there are two types of employees in the construction industry. The first is
referred to as project employees or those employed in connection with a particular construction project
or phase thereof and such employment is coterminous with each project or phase of the project to which
they are assigned. The second is known as non-project employees or those employed without reference
to any particular construction project or phase of a project. The second category is where respondents
are classified.

25. Supreme Court Decision on Engaging in Extramarital Affairs as Ground for Termination of
Employees
Extramarital Affairs in the Workplace, a Ground for Termination?
To fall in love with your officemate or co-worker is something beyond question of your
employer, your superior, or even your colleagues as it is none of their business. But to have an illicit
affair within your workplace, that’s another story. It is really hard to dodge that arrow of that naughty
kid. If you got hit by cupid but for the wrong person, in the wrong place and on the wrong time, and you
think your “you and me against the world” love story might be a telenovela adaptation in the future
honoring otherwise your unfaithfulness to your spouse, then you might want to think again. Is it really
worth it risking your personal life, your career, your reputation and most especially, your family?
Having an illicit affair with your co-employee is considered an act of immorality. It is true that
this is a matter beyond the control of the company and the theory behind is that the employer should
never pry on the private affairs of its employees.
However, in some instances, if the illicit relationship is also one of a superior-subordinate
relationship in that workplace, then the management might interfere even in the absence of a company
policy regarding the matter due to possible conflict of interest that might arise to the nature of the
business of such company or at least to the department or group where they both belong. But up to what
extent can the employer validly do so in protecting its own interest and without violating the due process
clause of our labor laws? Is such immoral act also a valid ground for termination of the employee?
The Labor Code provides the valid grounds for termination. Article 282[1] provides for the just
causes while Article 283[2] for authorized causes. However, in the enumerations provided for by the
law, immorality is not one of those. If so, can the employer, if it so desires and to its best interest, validly
terminate the services of the employee having an extra-marital affair with his or her co-employee?
 While the structure of the Labor Code appears to be generally in favor of labor, this does not
mean that the employer is devoid of its own prerogatives one of which is the power to terminate the
services of an employee for violation of a company policy which the latter agreed upon during the
signing of the employment contract. Typically, if there is “immorality clause” in the employment
contract, company policy, rules or regulations or company code of conduct which provides for
termination of an employee by reason of immorality, then an employee may be terminated if found
guilty for such ground. However, such kind of immorality must be of a gross in character and not merely
simple immorality. Furthermore, at this stage where the employee is in the risk of losing his or her job,
the employer must observe due process. That is, giving the defendant employee the opportunity to
explain his or her side and to defend him or herself. As we all know, adherence to the company policy is
not always absolute. A humanitarian consideration from the employer is still possible depending on the
circumstances attending the issue. As the Supreme Court once said in a case[3], to constitute immorality,
the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of
prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law.
In some companies, immorality is a ground for disciplinary action but not necessarily
termination. The penalty also varies on a case to case basis depending on the specific immoral act
committed as prohibited by the company policy. In addition, there are companies that consider only
work-related acts of immorality as a ground for termination or disciplinary action for the reason that
such act renders the employee morally unfit to discharge his duties and responsibilities or makes him
undeserving to the position he currently holds where a great degree of integrity and ethical values are
expected of him.
Thus, an employee, no matter how valuable he or she is to the company, can be terminated by his
or her employer for acts of immorality regardless of whether or not the same is work-related insofar as
gross violation of the company policy or company’s code of conduct is concerned.

Dismissal of an employee for engaging in an extra-marital affair was held valid by the Supreme
Court
In this case, the respondent was dismissed from his employment as a bookkeeper of petitioner
cooperative for engaging in extra-marital affairs, which is a ground for termination of employment
stated in petitioner cooperative’s Personnel Policy. The Supreme Court said that while respondent’s act
of engaging in extra-marital affairs may be considered personal to him and does not directly affect the
performance of his assigned task as bookkeeper, aside from the fact that the act was specifically
provided for by petitioner’s Personnel Policy as one of the grounds for termination of employment, said
act raised concerns to petitioner as the Board received numerous complaints and petitions from the
cooperative members themselves asking for the removal of respondent because of his immoral conduct.
Other repercussions of the marital infidelity
While acts of immorality regardless of whether work-related or not, are of no concern to some
companies, the impact of such immoral act such as public humiliation, shame, criticism or being the
subject of office gossip might be considered as a punishment in itself. Nonetheless, if the illicit affair is
being tolerated in the workplace, the embarrassment is lessened to some extent, if not totally erased from
the prying eyes of their colleagues. Besides, even if they eventually become free from everybody’s
castigation, they still remain fugitives of their own conscience.
With respect to penal consequences, this usually comes in when the aggrieved spouse, aside from
seeking termination from employment of his or her philandering partner and/or the paramour, also files a
criminal case against them for adultery or concubinage. This is also apart from the damages that the
offended spouse may claim.
While criminal prosecution for the said crimes may be challenging for the aggrieved spouse who
also seeks termination from employment of these cheater employees, he or she is lucky enough if they
are convicted for the said crimes for they are as good as terminated because of the imprisonment they
will have to serve.
It is to be noted however, that the judgment in a criminal case has no binding or conclusive effect
in a labor case. Conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not indispensable to warrant an
employee’s dismissal. Thus, in a situation where there is a criminal case for adultery or concubinage and
a complaint for illegal dismissal, the judgment in the criminal case regardless of whether it is acquittal or
conviction, cannot be relied upon by the labor arbiter in rendering his decision because he is duty bound
to make his own findings of facts after the presentation and due consideration of all the pertinent
circumstances and evidence of the case.

Summary
Extra-marital relationship between co-employees is not uncommon. It exists in every workplace
and the truth is, even their colleagues or superiors tolerate the same. A company usually does not
discourage any romantic relationship between office staff. But neither it tolerates any illicit one as the
same is viewed as reflective of the company’s image and reputation especially by the judging public.
Immorality in the workplace is like a leech that devours on the esprit de corps among the
employees. Employees who were already consumed by such are no different from company thieves. The
latter steal the company resources while the former steal the company morale.
“Marriage should be honored by all, and the marriage bed kept pure, for God will judge the
adulterer and all the sexually immoral.”(Hebrew 13:4)
Endnotes:
Article 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causes:
(1) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (2) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee
of his duties; (3) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative; (4) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives;
and (5) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving
a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before
the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his
one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case
of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
Chua-Qua vs. Clave, G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990
Alilem Credit Cooperative, Inc. vs. Bandiola, G.R. No. 173489, February 25, 2013
The Revised Penal Code
Article 333. Who are guilty of adultery. – Adultery is committed by any married woman who
shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of
her knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. If the
person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being abandoned without justification by the
offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding paragraph
shall be imposed.
Article 334. Concubinage. – Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or
shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prisioncorreccional in its minimum and
medium periods. The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
 Article 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. The adulterer and the
concubine in the case provided for in Articles 333 and 334 may also be sentenced, in the same
proceeding or in a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for damages caused to the offended spouse.
Refer also to Reference No. 2 in the legal opinion of Atty. Allen Liberato regarding the liability
for damages of the mistress under the Civil Code.

26. Jose S. Santos vs. NLRC, Hagonoy Institute Inc.

Facts:
Petitioner is a married man and is employed as a teacher by private respondent Hagonoy Institute
Inc. from June 30 1980 until his dismissal on June 1, 1991 and Mrs. Arlene T. Martin, also a teacher
employed at Hagonoy Institute, fell inlove and has an affair. Private respondent, upon hearing of
circulating rumors among faculty and school officials, of the illicit relationship of petitioner and Mrs.
Martin advised the latter to take a leave of absence, Mrs. Martin ignored such notice and was henceforth
prevented from entering the campus of private respondent, effectively dismissing her from work. Private
respondent set-up a committee to investigate the veracity of the rumor, after two weeks of investigation,
the illicit relationship of petitioner and Mrs. Martinwas confirmed. Petitioner was charged
administratively for immorality and asked to present his side, on May 1991, petitioner was dismissed
effective June 1, 1991. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch III, San Fernando Pampanga and petitioner’s complain was dismissed but awarded
financial assistance of Php 13,750. On appeal the NLRC affirmed the decision of labor arbiter.

Issue:
Whether or not the illicit relationship between the petitioner and Mrs. Martin may be considered
immoral as to constitute a cause for termination under Art 282 of the Labor Code

Held:
Court reiterates that to constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must occur: (a) it must be for
any offense expressed in Art.282 of the Labor Code, (b) employee must be accorded due process, that is,
the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself. Art. 282 of the Labor Code lists the following just
cause to terminate an employee: (1) serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by employee of lawful
order of the employer or his representative in connection with his work, (2) gross habitual neglect by
employee of his duties, (3) fraud and wilful breach, (4) commission of a crime or offense of the person
of his employer or his family or his authorized representative, (5) other causes analogous to the
foregoing. In addition, Section 94, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, paragraph E, list
disgraceful or immoral conduct as ground for termination. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Art. 68 of
the Family Code enjoins the husband and wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. “As teachers, one stands in loco parentis to his students and must
therefore act with high standard of integrity and honesty. It is settled therefore that at teacher who
engages in extra marital affair, when both are married, amounts to gross immorality justifying
termination from employment. The petition was dismissed, the NLRC decision is affirmed with
modification, deleting financial assistance.

27. Permex Inc. vs. NLRC and Emmanuel Filoteo

Facts:
Petitioner, Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation (hereinafter Permex), is a company
engaged in the business of canning tuna and sardines, both for export and domestic consumption. Its
office and factory are both located in Zamboanga City. They terminated the private respondent due to
alleged flagrantly and deliberately violating company rules and regulations. More specifically, he was
dismissed allegedly for falsifying his daily time record.
Private respondent averred together with the pertinent facts found by the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC that Permex initially hired Emmanuel Filoteo on October 1, 1990, as a mechanic. Eventually,
Filoteo was promoted to water treatment operator, a position he held until his termination on August 29,
1994. As water treatment operator, Filoteo did not have a fixed working schedule. His hours of work
were dependent upon the company's shifting production schedules. Ncmmis
On July 31, 1994, Filoteo was scheduled for the night shift from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. the
following day. That night he reported for work together with his co-workers, Felix Pelayo and Manuel
Manzan. They logged in at the main gate and guardhouse of the petitioner's factory. Filoteo entered his
time-in at 8:45 p.m. and since he was scheduled to work until 7:00 a.m. the next day, he wrote 7:00 a.m.
in his scheduled time-out. This practice of indicating the time out at the moment they time in, was
customarily done by most workers for convenience and practicality since at the end of their work shift,
they were often tired and in a hurry to catch the available service vehicle for their trip home, so they
often forgot to log out. There were times also when the Log Book was brought to the Office of the
Personnel Manager and they could not enter their time out. The company had tolerated the practice.
On the evening of July 31,1994, at around 9:20 p.m., Filoteo, together with Pelayo, went to see
the Assistant Production Manager to inquire if "butchering" of fish would be done that evening so they
could start operating the boiler. They were advised to wait from 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. for
confirmation. Scncm
At or about 10:00 p.m., Filoteo and Pelayo went back to the Assistant Production Manager's
office. There they were informed that there would be no "butchering" of tuna that night. Filoteo then
sought permission to go home, which was granted. Filoteo then hurriedly got his things and dashed off
to the exit gate to catch the service jeep provided by Permex.
 The next day, August 1, 1994, Filoteo reported for work as usual. He then remembered that he
had to make a re-entry in his daily time record for the previous day. He proceeded to the Office of the
Personnel Manager to retime his DTR entry. Later, he received a memorandum from the Assistant
Personnel Officer asking him to explain, in writing, the entry he made in his DTR. Filoteo complied and
submitted his written explanation that same evening. On August 8, 1994, Filoteo was suspended
indefinitely. His explanation was found unsatisfactory. He was dismissed from employment on August
23, 1994.
The dismissal arose from Filoteo's alleged violation of Article 2 of the company rules and
regulations. The offense charged was entering in his DTR that he had worked from 8:45 p.m. of July 31,
1994 to 7:00 a.m. of August 1, 1994, when in fact he had worked only up to 10:00 p.m.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent was illegally terminated from his work

Held:
The court ruled in affirmative, the two-fold requirements for a valid dismissal were not satisfied
by the petitioners. It is clear that the alleged false entry in private respondent's DTR was actually the
result of having logged his scheduled time-out in advance on July 31, 1994. But it appears that when he
timed in, he had no idea that his work schedule (night shift) would be cancelled. When it was confirmed
at 10:00 p.m. that there was no "butchering" of tuna to be done, those who reported for work were
allowed to go home, including private respondent. In fact, Filoteo even obtained permission to leave
from the Assistant Production Manager.
Considering the factory practice which management tolerated, we are persuaded that Filoteo, in
his rush to catch the service vehicle, merely forgot to correct his initial time-out entry. Nothing is shown
to prove he deliberately falsified his daily time record to deceive the company. The NLRC found that
even management's own evidence reflected that a certain Felix Pelayo, a co-worker of private
respondent, was also allowed to go home that night and like private respondent logged in advance 7:00
a.m. as his time-out. This supports Filoteo's claim that it was common practice among night-shift
workers to log in their usual time-out in advance in the daily time record.
Moreover, as early as Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Victory Employees and Laborers
Association, 85 Phil. 166 (1949), we ruled that, where a violation of company policy or breach of
company rules and regulations was found to have been tolerated by management, then the same could
not serve as a basis for termination.
28. R.B. Michael Press and Annalene Reyes Escobia vs. Nicasio C. Galit
Facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B. Michael Press as an offset machine operator,
whose work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Mondays to Saturdays. During his employment,
Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times, totaling to 6,117 minutes, and was absent without leave for a
total of nine and a half days. He was ordered to render overtime service in order to comply with a job
order deadline, but he refused to do so. The following day,, respondent reported for work but petitioner
Escobia told him not to work, and to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. A copy of an Office
Memorandum was served on him which contained his alleged offenses. He was later on terminated.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the
NLRC, the NLRC ruled that he was illegally dismissed. Petitioners appealed before the NLRC, the
latter denied it.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA upheld the decision of the NLRC
and ruled that the time frame in which respondent was afforded procedural due process is dubitable; he
could not have been afforded ample opportunity to explain his side and to adduce evidence on his
behalf. Thus, they filed a petition before the SC.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondent
(2) Whether or not due process was observed in the dismissal process

Held:
(1) Yes. Habitual tardiness is a form of neglect of duty. Lack of initiative, diligence and
discipline to come to work on time everyday exhibit the employee’s deportment towards work. Habitual
and excessive tardiness is inimical to the general productivity and business of the employer. This is
especially true when the tardiness and/or absenteeism occurred frequently and repeatedly within an
extensive period of time.
Insubordination or Willful Disobedience
Respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime work despite a valid order to do so. The
totality of his offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that he was a difficult employee. His
refusal to render overtime work was the final straw that broke the camel’s back, and, with his gross and
habitual tardiness and absences, would merit dismissal from service.
(2) No. Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before
his employment could be terminated: (a) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (b) a
second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is being terminated. Not to be
taken lightly of course is the hearing or opportunity for the employee to defend himself personally or by
counsel of his choice.
Jurisprudence provides the procedure relating to the twin notice and hearing requirement, thus:
(a) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to
submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the
Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable
them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5)
calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses
they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are
violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
(b) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (i) explain and clarify their defenses
to the charge against them; (ii) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (iii) rebut the evidence
presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given
the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their
choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to
an amicable settlement.
(c) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (i) all circumstances involving the charge
against the employees have been considered; and (ii) grounds have been established to justify the
severance of their employment.
A scrutiny of the disciplinary process undertaken by petitioners concludes that they only paid lip
service to the due process requirements.
The undue haste in effecting respondent’s termination shows that the termination process was a
mere simulation--the required notices were given, a hearing was even scheduled and held, but
respondent was not really given a real opportunity to defend himself; and it seems that petitioners had
already decided to dismiss respondent from service, even before the first notice had been given.
Anent the written notice of charges and hearing, it is plain to see that there was merely a general
description of the claimed offenses of respondent. The hearing was immediately set in the afternoon—
the day respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was not given any opportunity at all to consult
a union official or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense. Regarding the afternoon hearing, it can
be inferred that respondent, without any lawyer or friend to counsel him, was not given any chance at all
to adduce evidence in his defense.
 Further, in the notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified respondent’s dismissal by citing
his admission of the offenses charged. It did not specify the details surrounding the offenses and the
specific company rule or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was grounded.
In view of the infirmities in the proceedings, the termination of respondent was railroaded in
serious breach of his right to due process.

29. Renato S. Gatbonton vs. NLRC, MAPUA Institute of Technology and Jose Calderon
Facts:
Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of
Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Sometime in November 1998, a civil engineering
student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system,
sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the complaint,
respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day
preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed that petitioner’s continued
stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as the students’
learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to “prepare himself for the investigation and will
prevent his influences to other members of the community.” Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a
complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties
entered into a compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the
rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 7877 or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard the
previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the charges against
petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules and regulations, as well as
the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the administrative case against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension of petitioner was valid

Held:
The SC held that preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the
company’s property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the
employee. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued
employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-
workers. However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee’s
preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive
suspension.
R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to “promulgate rules and
regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through
their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual
harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.” Petitioner’s preventive suspension was
based on respondent MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations
provides:
Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any member of the
educational community may be placed immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong
and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution or poses a risk or danger
to the life or property of the other members of the educational community. However, the same is still not
effective since it was still to be published as ruled in Tañada vs. Tuvera:
…all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
The SC agreed that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application.[14] In fact,
the Mapua Rules itself explicitly required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in
Section 3, Rule IV (Administrative Provisions), which states that “These Rules and Regulations to
implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication
by the Committee.” Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive suspension on January
11, 1999, the Mapua Rules were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal
basis.
 Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable, the Court finds that there is no
sufficient basis to justify his preventive suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed
under preventive suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of the following circumstances:
(a) If the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the
continued stay of the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal
operations of the institution; or
(b) The accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members of the
educational community.
In petitioner’s case, there is no indication that petitioner’s preventive suspension may be based
on the foregoing circumstances. Committee Resolution No. 1 passed by the Committee on Decorum and
Investigation states the reasons for petitioner’s preventive suspension.
Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the school
head is morally convinced that petitioner’s continued stay during the period of investigation constitutes a
distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life
or property of the other members of the educational community.
Even under the Labor Code, petitioner’s preventive suspension finds no valid justification. As
provided in Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:
Sec. 8. Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive
suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the employer or
of his co-workers.
As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows that respondent MIT imposed the
preventive suspension on petitioner as his continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or
property of the employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his preventive suspension is not justified.
Consequently, the payment of wages during his 30-day preventive suspension, i.e., from January 11,
1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.