People v Serrano
MURDER – Whether or not Defendants are liable for murder
FACTS:
- there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-
a) Plaintiff-Appellee’s Arguments (Pp. - Win)
- Filed a criminal case for murder against Defendants for the death of Pablo Navarro
-Trial court rendered a decision convicting Defendants
b) Defendant-Appellant’s Arguments (Serrano, Cadiang, Yumul, and Cenzon -
Lost)
-Denied the charges through alibis
-Appealed to SC the decision of the trial court
ISSUE:
-Whether or not Defendants are liable for murder
RULING:
Conclusion:
- Defendants are liable for murder. They are sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Pablo Navarro in the sum of
P6,000.00 and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. The appeal is dismissed
Rule:
-
Application:
- In this case, The weak defense of alibi put up by the appellants to disprove complicity
in the murder of Pablo Navarro cannot overcome the clear and positive testimony of
Anastacio Reyes that they were at the house of Eulogio Serrano in the evening of 16
October 1950 when the latter told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and
there kill him; and that they were together on 17, 18 and 19 October waiting for Pablo
Navarro in the town of Bacolor to lure him to barrio Dolores, and on 20 October when
they finally succeeded in luring him to barrio Dolores where they killed him. It is
difficult to believe that a man who had made up his mind to kill another would bring
along with him other persons who know nothing about the plan just to witness the
commission of the crime. If they were not in the know, as they contend, they also
would have been done away with right then and there, in the same way Simplicio
Manguerra, who was not to be killed, had been done away with, to prevent him from
reporting to the authorities or from testifying against them in Court; or they also would
have been sent away upon arriving at barrio
- The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may
be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by
evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that
the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as
conspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in
convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The
contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration,"1 applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration,
but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial,2 where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices
or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from
a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly
examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.3
Conclusion:
- Thus, Defendants are liable for murder. They are sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Pablo Navarro in the sum of
P6,000.00 and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. The appeal is dismissed
Tamargo vs. Awingan
G.R. No. 177727; January 19, 2010
Facts:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003.
The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron
surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told
him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda
and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. Columna was
arrested.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his
participation as “look out” during the shooting and implicated Romulo Awingan as the
gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda,
Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey,
Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo)
filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating
prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter
wherein the latter disowned the contents of his earlier affidavit and narrated how he
had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. Licerio also submitted
an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the
statements in his handwritten letter. The investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory
hearing so that Columna could clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited
letter. During the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and
voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the charges.
In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however, Columna said
that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the
clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. The RTC judge
denied the motion to withdraw the informations and held that based on the March 8,
2004 affidavit which Columna affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was
probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision.
Tamargo appealed. Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of the
Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna.
Awingan and the Antiporda’s, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial
confession was inadmissible against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against Awingan and the
Antipordas
Held:
Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible
as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on
res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is
considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator
under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators
provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the
extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the
common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators
without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other
piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession
could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as
evidence against them.
People v Bokingo
FACTS:
For review is the Amended Decision dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, Bokingo and Col guilty as
conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. D
An Information was filed against Bokingo and Col, charging them of the crime
of murder wherein they “conspired together armed with a claw hammer and
with intent to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his
head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said
NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death.”
During the preliminary investigation. Bokingco admitted that he conspired with
Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because
they got "fed up" with Pasion. On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea
while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the
crime charged.
The trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder, there being the two aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and abuse of confidence to be considered against both accused and the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo
only, sentencing them to Death.
The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court however lowering
the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 7659.
ISSUES:
Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator
based on Bakingo’s admission that Col is a co-consiprator
HELD:
No. Col is hereby ACQUITTED beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before
us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit
an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred
from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of
conspiracy.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had
already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not
coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-
up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the
common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not
find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. It was
during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s
plan to kill Pasion. Bokingco’s confession was admittedly taken without the
assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value
and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide.
Alpuerto v Pastor
Eladio Alpuerto and Jose Perez Pastor are both claiming title to three pa rcels
of land formerly owned by Juan Llenos, with Alpuerto as party in possession
under a contract of s ale with pacto de retro, and Pastor as purchaser at a
public sale under an execution directed against Llenos.
Alpuerto claimed that, by virtue of a contract of sale with right to repurchase,
he acquired title to the land for a consideration of P2,500, as paid, with the
right to repurchase fixed for a period of two years. Said document was
acknowledged before a notary public.
Pastor, however, claimed that the transaction by which Alpuerto claims to have
acquired title was simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance
was effected for the purpose of defrauding Pastor as creditor of Llenos.
Pastor asked the court to declare him as the true owner of the property and to
order Alpuerto to surrender possession to him.
Issue: Who is entitled to the property?
Held: Article 1225 declares that a private document legally recognized shall
have, with regard to those who signed it and their privies, the same force as a
public instrument.
The term legally recognized must be taken to mean recognized, or
acknowledged by the person or persons, executing or emitting the document,
in this case, the vendor Juan Llenos and the vendee, Alpuerto. The act of legal
recognition occurred when the ddocument was signed by the parties and
delivered in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who were called upon to
bear witness to the transaction.
The term privies, meanwhile, denotes the idea of succession, not only by right
of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular
title, derived from acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an
assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it will be privies. In short, he who
by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the
juridical relation and executed the private document and appears to be
substituting him in his personal rights and obligations is a privy.
Here, Pastor, the purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed
against Llenos, must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the
execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound by the instrument which
conveyed the property to Alpuerto, and this from the date of the execution of
that instrument as a private document.

However, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto was
one in fraud of creditors; hence, the deed must be annulled and the property
delivered to Pastor.
Doctrine: a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to
those who signed it and their privies, the same force as a public instrument.
The term privies denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship
and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived
from acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit,
and one subrogated to it will be privies.
City of Manila v Del Rosario
FACTS.
 The City of Manila filed an action to recover possession of 2 lots (located in
calles Clavel and Barcelona) in the City of Tondo which are occupied by
Jacinto del Rosario since Feb 23, 1893.
 At the hearing the City of Manila introduced documentary and oral evidence.
 ORAL EVIDENCE
o John Wilson testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the
land belonged to the city
o Eduardo Timoteo testified that Calles Clavel and Barcelona was
formerly a part of plaza divisoria which belonged to the Central
Government (not the city) and that he did not know to whom it belongs.
o Juan Villegas testified that the land in question was formerly included in
the Gran Divisoria and that all land included in it belonged to the city.
o Sotera Roco testified that a certain Lorenzo del Rosario paid 100 pesos
to her brother for the purpose of instituting a possessory information as
to the property abutting on Calle Clavel.
o Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the
ownership of the land. They simply testified as o the authenticity of
some of the documentary evidence presented by the City of Manila.
1. Petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the Mayor of Manila on
Sept 26, 1891\
2. Letter written by Lorezo del Rosario to the Municipal Board of Manila
on Oct 9 1901.
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE(apart from the 2 mentioned above)
  Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired ownership
o Map (this was not however presented at the SC and only in the CFI.)
o 2 public instruments which show that Jacinto del Rosario was in
possession of the land under a good title and with the status of an
owner.
 Lorenzo del Rosario admitted the authenticity of both documents which
contain an offer to the City of Manila to purchase the land on Calle
Clavel. He also admitted that he signed the first document under the
misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been
subsequently informed by the city officials that the land does not belong to
Manila but to Cipria Roco. He also said that he signed the second document
because the President of the Municipal Board advised him to do so in order
to avoid litigation.
o His testimony was not contradicted.
 The court ruled in favour of the City of Manila and awarded $2,500 damages.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the City of Manila is entitled to the ownership and possession of
the land – NO
 Evidence introduced does not prove Manila’s claim of title to the land in
question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses nor the documentary
evidence introduced show that the city of Manila is the owner of the land or
that it has a right to its possession. Some of the documents introduced, as
well as the two public instruments referred to as having been executed in
1900, tended to support the contentions of the defendant rather than those
of the plaintiff.
 Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant's
possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901,
and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows
that the defendant had been in the adverse possession of the land.
o A possessory information recorded in the property register is prima
facie evidence of the fact that the person who instituted the proceedings
holds the property as owner; and the presumption, under article 448 of
the Civil Code, is that his title is good unless the contrary is shown.
COURT COMMENTS ON ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED: (Written below is
what’s relevant to our topic – i.e. documentary evidence concerning the letter
petition containing offer to purchase)
 An offer of compromise is not admissible in evidence.
of the land. The second document was signed after he had transferred the
land to Jacinto del Rosario.
o Hence, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in
the documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant,
 because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one
derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act, or
omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence
against the former only when made while the latter holds the title."
DECISION.
Decision is REVERSED.
NOTES.
COURT COMMENTS ON OTHER EVIDENCE
Wilson’s testimony – did not know of his own knowledge
Timoteo’s testimony - referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon
the streets referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the
complaint, they are building lots.
Villegas testimony – merely hearsay, they only consisted of what he had learned
from some of the oldest residents in the City. His testimony was presented for the
purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land
drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under the Civil Code
Procedure. However, such testimony does not constitute “common reputation”
Sotera Roco’s testimony – hearsay. Assuming admissible it still can’t be inferred
from her testimony that Manila is the real owner of the land.
TAN SIOK KUAN and PUTECHING, Petitioners
vs.
FELICISIMO "BOY" HO, RODOLFO C. RETURTA, VICENTE M. SALAS, and LOLITA
MALONZO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175085
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA dismissing for lack
of merit the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners.
FACTS: The case stems from seven separate complaints for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching against defendants Avelino Bombita
(Bombita), Felix Gagarin (Gagarin), Bernardo Napolitano (Napolitano), Felicisimo
"Boy" Ho (Ho), Rodolfo Returta (Returta), Vicente Salas (Salas), and Lolita Malonzo
(Malonzo) wherein petitioners claim that they are the owners of a parcel of land
located at Apollo Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and that they have
been leasing portions of said property to the defendants since 1972.
On February 7, 2003 they notified defendants in writing of their failure to pay rentals
which defendants allegedly ignored warranting the filing of the complaints for
unlawful detainer.
For their part, Bombita, Gagarin, and Napolitano (defendants) argued that the
lease agreements they have executed with petitioners are void ab initio,
petitioners being Chinese nationals who are not entitled to own real property
in the Philippines. Moreover, they claimed to have been in possession of the
subject premises since 1968 or some 35 years ago, thus plaintiffs action
cannot be one for ejectment or unlawful detainer, but accion publiciana which
must be filed before the RTC
Defendants claim that have been in possession of the subject premises for 35 to 37
years without any rentals being paid to any landlord or his agents, and that there are
no existing lease contracts between respondents and petitioners. Moreover, they
contend that petitioner’s cause of action cannot be one for ejectment or unlawful
detainer, but accion publiciana.
After trial, the MeTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of petitioners holding that there is
implied admission to the existence of lease contracts. Thus, defendants cannot deny
the consequent lessor-lessee relationship. Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed the MeTC
and the subject premises were turned over to petitioners through the issued a Writ
of Execution. Defendants then timely filed their appeal before the CA, questioning
the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the consolidated cases and the finding of a lessor-
lessee relationship between petitioners and respondents in violation of the principle
of res inter alias acta.
After evaluating the merits of the case, the CA reversed the RTC, although upholding
the jurisdiction of the MeTC. The CA agreed with respondents that petitioners have
materially failed to prove their right to eject respondents on the strength of being
lessors. CA also sustained respondents' invocation of the principle of res inter alias
acta.
ISSUES: Whether or not the consolidated decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City had become final and executory for failure of respondents to file their
joint motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the decision.
Whether or not the tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondents was
properly established.

RULING: As to the first issue, a close review of the records shows that the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed. Respondents merely committed an
error in the date of receipt stipulated in their pleading.
As to the second issue, the Court sustains that a lessor-lessee relationship between
the parties was not properly established. As observed by the CA, except for
petitioners' bare claims, they have not shown any evidence of a lease between them
and respondents, be it express or implied. There was no mention of how and when
the alleged contract of lease started, there was no proof of prior payment of rentals
or any prior demand for such payment considering petitioners' allegation that
respondents failed to pay rentals since 1997 and that the case was instituted only in
2003.
Moreover, there is merit in respondents' invocation of the principle of res inter alias
acta or that principle which states that "the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided, among
which are: (1) admission by third party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3)
admission by conspirator, and (4) admission by privies." Petitioners failed to establish
that the defendants' alleged implied admission of a lessor-lessee relationship falls
under the exceptions to the principle of res inter alias acta as to make such admission
binding upon respondents.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed rulings, the Court resolves to
DENY the present petition. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 29, 2006 and the
Resolution dated October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and
the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching
against respondents Felicisimo "Boy" Ho, Rodolfo Returta, Vicente Salas, and Lolita
Malonzo are DISMISSED.
PEOPLE v. WONG CHUEN MING 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
Facts:
On 7 September 1991, at about 1:00 p.m., Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight
PR 301 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in
Pasay City, Metro Manila. Among the many passengers who arrived on board said
flight were Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing Cheung ,Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan
Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and
Lim Nyuk Sun.
Their respective passports showed that Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing
Cheung are the only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group while the rest are all
Malaysian nationals. Their passports also revealed that all Malaysians (except Lim
Chan Fatt) originally came from Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and Hongkong
before proceeding to Manila. Upon the other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing
Cheung, as well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly came from Hongkong to Manila.
Wong Chuen Ming, et. al. arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by
Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Au Wing Cheung, an employee of Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide. After passing through and obtaining
clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage
claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same in
one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at the time was manned by
customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed to Gomez the tour group's
passenger's manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports. Danilo Gomez
instructed the tour group to place their baggages on the examiner's table for
inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective baggages while they
wait for their turn to be examined. Chin Kong Song's baggage was first to be examined
by Gomez.
Gomez put his hand inside the baggage and in the course of the inspection,
he found 3 brown colored boxes similar in size to powdered milk boxes underneath
the clothes. The boxes were marked Alpen Cereals and as he found nothing wrong
with them, Gomez returned them inside the baggage and allowed Chin Kong Song to
go. Following the same procedure, Gomez next examined the baggage of Wong
Chuen Ming. Gomez again found and pulled out 2 boxes of Alpen Cereals from said
baggage and like in the previous inspection, he found nothing wrong with them and
allowed Wong Chuen Ming to go. The third baggage to be examined belonged to Lim
Nyuk Sun. When Gomez pulled out another 3 boxes of Alpen Cereals from said
baggage, he became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter.
Inside the box was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed,
Gomez immediately called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty
Collector Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to his discovery.
Upon learning about the boxes containing the white crystalline substance,
Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio (Chief of the Collection Division and Acting Duty Collector of
the Customs Office at the NAIA) immediately ordered the tour group to get their
baggages and proceed to the district collector's office. Chin Kong Song and Wong
Chuen Ming, who were previously cleared by Gomez, were also brought inside
together with the rest of the group. Inside the collector's office, Gomez continued to
examine the baggages of the other members of the tour group. He allegedly found
that each baggage contained 1, 2 or 3 boxes similar to those previously found in the
baggages of Chin Kong Song, Wong Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of 30
boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance were allegedly
recovered from the baggages of the 11 accused.
As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he
bundled said boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them over to
Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio called out the names of
accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign on the
masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective
baggages. Also present at this time were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents
of the Bureau of Customs and several news reporters. A few minutes later, District
Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and then NBI Deputy
Director Mariano Mison.
Shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, Capt. Rustico
Francisco, Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Philippine National Police Narcotics
Command Detachment at the NAIA, conducted a field test on a sample of the white
crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was indeed "shabu." Capt.
Francisco immediately informed the 11 accused that they were under arrest.
Thereafter, all accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside
a big box, were brought to Camp Crame. At Camp Crame, accused were asked to
identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified them, they were
again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside
the boxes bearing their signatures.
The examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white
crystalline substance recovered from accused was "shabu." The total weight of
"shabu" recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms. 11 separate criminal informations
were filed against all of the accused individually. The counsel of Au Wing Cheung
earlier filed a petition for reinvestigation and deferment of his arraignment but the
same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit. At their respective arraignments,
all accused with the assistance of their counsels, includin Au Wing Cheung pleaded
not guilty to the charge. The trial court conducted a joint and/or consolidated trial of
all the cases upon motion by the prosecution considering that the State had common
testimonial and documentary evidence against all accused.
On 29 November 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109 of Pasay City,
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III
of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972; and sentenced each to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00.
Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung appealed.
Issue:
Whether the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic
bags containing "shabu", are admissible in evidence.
Held:
The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on
the plastic bags containing "shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of
the records reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights
during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were
not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and
to counsel and any statement they might make could be used against them, when
they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they
were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already taken in
custody at Camp Crame.
By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic
bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere
possession of "shabu" is punished by law. These signatures of accused are
tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by
the Bill of Rights (Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore,
inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of
their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are
foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because
the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to
all persons, both aliens and citizens.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
1) This case for Robbery with Homicide against: (1) Ramiro Alegre, (2) Mario
Comayas (3) Jesus Medalla arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y
Maravilla, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom.
According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual
strangulation.
2) On July, 1966: Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City,
Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken
from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen
pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery
of Adlina Sajo.
a) 1st statement: This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the
police authorities of Tacloban City. In this statement, Melecio Cudillan
implicated a
b) 2nd statement: In his second statement, he narrated in detail the
participation in the commission of the crime of Ramiro Alegre, Jesus
Medalla and Mario Comayas
3) An Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special
Counsel of Pasay City. The pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and detention prisoner Hernando Carillo; and principally
and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan.
a) The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the
effect that when he was investigating Melecio Cudillan, the latter
pointed to accused as his companions in the commission of the
crime. According to him, said appellants “just stared at him
(Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing.” (According to the trial court,
had the appellants “really been innocent, they should have
protested vigorously and not merely kept their silence.”)
b) Additionally, Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City
jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him that they
took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of
the deceased
4) Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the
extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence
against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged “silence” of
appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as “his
companions” in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan is competent
proof (No)
(2) WON silence is tacit admission (No)
HELD:
It was error for the trial court to draw from appellants’ silence while under
police custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio
Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly
admitted their guilt.
We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial
confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the
remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment
of conviction.
1) The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan cannot be used as
evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre
and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of “res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet,” there being no independent evidence of conspiracy.
As a general rule, the extra-judicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against
his coaccused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned.3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and
circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of
such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the
crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their
implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported
verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
2) The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of
appellants while under police custody, in the face of statements of Melecio
Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the
crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their
participation therein.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning
his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him,4 and
that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also been held
that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as
evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in
custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of
silence would be illusory.
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or
his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially
when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications
or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation
in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from
his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the
right of an accused against self-incrimination. The right or privilege of a person
accused of a crime against selfincrimination is a fundamental right. It is a
personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably.
The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to
silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this
categorical mandate: “Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution
protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for
such silence
PEOPLE v MAQUEDA
British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his
house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was
badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two
household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former
houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan
and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the
house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused
asked them for directions.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken
to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3
Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he
signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet
Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion
to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering
to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he
is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the
robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.
Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the
Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence.
Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was
in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he
was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against
himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already
facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent
and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not
to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And
yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed
in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to
such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a
warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise
of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to
that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information
but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation
for the commission of an offense."
Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-
judicial admission is inadmissible as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and
Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon
only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the
truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as
hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor
Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with
Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other
admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore
admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been
made by the SC:
Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. YIP WAI MING
G.R. NO. 120959, NOVEMBER 14, 1996
Facts:
Accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals,
came to Manila on vacation on July 10, 1993. The two were engaged to be married.
Hardly a day had passed when Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and strangled to
death in their hotel room. On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, Yip Wai Ming, was
touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the
hotel room allegedly because she had a headache and was not feeling well enough to
do the sights.
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was
insured with the Insurance Company of New Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hongkong,
with appellant as the beneficiary. The premium paid for the insurance was more than
the monthly salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter in Hongkong. The Trial
Court concluded that this was one of the motives for the commission of the crime.
Issue:
What is the liability of the insurance company?
Ruling:
The trial court, in arriving at its conclusions, took the various facts presented by the
prosecution, tied them up together like parts of a jig-saw puzzle, and came up with a
complete picture of circumstantial evidence depicting not only the commission of the
crime itself but also the motive behind it.
Our review of the record, however, discloses that certain key elements, without which
the picture of the crime would be faulty and unsound, are not based on reliable
evidence. They appear to be mere surmises and assumptions rather than hard facts or
well-grounded conclusions.
A key element in the web of circumstantial evidence is motive which the prosecution
tried to establish. Accused-appellant and Lam Po Chun were engaged to be married.
They had toured China and Macao together. They were living together in one
apartment. They were registered with the Hongkong Marriage Registry in May 1993.
Marriage date was set for August 29, 1993. This date was only a month and a half
away from the date of death of Lam Po Chun. In the absence of direct evidence
indubitably showing that accused-appellant was the perpetrator of the killing, motive
becomes important. The theory developed by the prosecution was not only of a cold-
blooded crime but a well-planned one, including its timing up to the half hour. It is not
the kind of crime that a man would commit against his wife-to-be unless a strong
motive for it existed.
The trial court would have been justified in finding that there was evident
premeditation of murder if the story is proved that Lam Po Chun insured herself for
the amounts of US $498,750.00 and US $249,375.00 naming accused-appellant as the
beneficiary.
There is, however, no evidence that the victim secured an insurance policy for a big
amount in US dollars and indicated accused-appellant as the beneficiary. The
prosecution presented Exhibit "X", a mere xerox copy of a document captioned
"Proposal for Life Insurance" as proof the alleged insurance. It is not a certified copy,
nor was the original first identified.
The authenticity of the document has thus not been duly established. Exhibit "X" was
secured in Hongkong when Lam Chi Keung, the brother of the victim, learned that his
sister was murdered in Manila. It is not shown how and from whom the information
about any alleged insurance having been secured came. There is no signature
indicating that the victim herself applied for the insurance. There is no marking in
Exhibit "X" of any entry which purports to be the victim's signature. There is a
signature of Apple Lam which is most unusual for an insurance application because
the victim's name is Lam Po Chun. To be sure nobody insures himself or herself under
a nickname. The entries in the form are in block letters uniformly written by one hand.
Below the printed name "Lam Po Chun" are Chinese characters which presumably are
the Chinese translation of her name. Nobody was presented to identify the author of
the "block" handwriting. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court made any
comparisons, such as the signature of Lam Po Chun on her passport (Exh. "C"), with
her purported signature or any other entry in the form.
It needs not much emphasis to say that an application form does not prove that
insurance was secured. Anybody can get an application form for insurance, fill it up
at home before filing it with the insurance company. In fact, the very first sentence of
the form states that it merely "forms the basis of a contract between you and NZI Life."
There was no contract yet.
There is evidence in the record that the family of Lam Po Chun did not like her
relationship with accused-appellant. After all the trouble that her brother went through
to gather evidence to pin down accused-appellant, the fact that all he could come up
with is an unsigned insurance application form shows there was no insurance money
forthcoming for accused-appellant if Lam Po Chun died. There is no proof that the
insurance company approved the proposal, no proof that any premium payments were
made, and no proof from the record of exhibits as to the date it was accomplished. It
appearing that no insurance was issued to Lam Po Chun with accused-appellant as the
beneficiary, the motive capitalized upon by the trial court vanishes. Thus, the picture
changes to one of the alleged perpetrator killing his fiancee under cold-blooded
circumstances for nothing.
There are other suspicious circumstances about the insurance angle. Lam Po Chun was
working for the National insurance Company. Why then should she insure her life with
the New Zealand Insurance Company? Lam's monthly salary was only HK $5,000.00.
The premiums for the insurance were HK $5,400.00 or US $702.00 per month. Why
should Lam insure herself with the monthly premiums exceeding her monthly salary?
And why should any insurance company approve insurance, the premiums of which
the supposed insured obviously con not afford to pay, in the absence of any showing
that somebody else is paying for said premiums. It is not even indicated whether or
not there are rules in Hongkong allowing a big amount of insurance to be secured
where the beneficiary is not a spouse, a parent, a sibling, a child, or other close relative.
Accused-appellant points out an apparent lapse of the trial court related to the matter
of insurance. At page 33 of the decision, the trial court stated:
Indeed, Yip Wai Ming testified that he met Andy Kwong in a restaurant in
Hongkong and told Yip and Lam Po Chun should be married and there
must be an insurance for her life . . .
The source of the above finding is stated by the court as "tsn hearing Sept. 22, 1992."
But accused-appellant Yip Wai Ming did not testify on September 22, 1992. The entire
112 pages of the testimony on that date came from SP02 Yanquiling. The next hearing
was on September 29, 1993. All the 100 pages of the testimony on that date came from
Yanquiling. The next hearing on October 13, 1993 resulted in 105 pages of testimony,
also from Yanquiling. This Court is at a complete loss as to the reason of the trial court
sourcing its statement to accused-appellant's alleged testimony.
Lam Po Chun must have been unbelievably trusting or stupid to follow the alleged
advice of Andy Kwong. It is usually the man who insures himself with the wife or
future wife or beneficiary instead of the other way around. Why should Lam Po Chun,
with her relatively small salary which is not even enough to pay for the monthly
premiums, insure herself for such a big amount. This is another reason why doubts
arise as to the truth of the insurance angle.
PEOPLE v ENCIPIDO
G.R. No. 70091 December 29, 1986
Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO, CHARLITO MANATAD, JESUS RUBIO,
RUDY LUMARDA, JOSE CABAGERAN, EDDIE DE LA PEÑ;A, CRIS
RAMIREZ, and JESUS or JOHN DOE, accused, BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO,
CHARLITO MANATAD, and EDDIE DE LA PEÑ;A accused-appellants.
Doctrine: Interlocking confession: constitute an exception to the general rule
that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only
against the declarants thereof.
Facts:
1. March 30, 1982 - Jose Lacumbes (deceased) was found killed by his wife
and children near the hut in their farm in Sitio Capacohan in Barangay Mabini
in the Municipality of Tubajon, Surigao del Norte
2. February 2, 1983 - criminal charge of Murder was filed with the RTC.
* The following eight (8) persons: (1) Brigido ENCIPIDO (2) Charlito
MANATAD, (3) Eddie DE LA PENA (hereinafter referred to as appelants), (4)
Jesus Rubio, (5) Rudy Lumarda, (6) Jose CABAGERAN (7) Cris Ramirez, and
(8) Jesus or John Doe were charged for the death.. Only fly appellants were
tried, the other five accused having remained at large
3. Witnesses presented:
A. Felicisimo Alciso
- saw that the DECEASED was being tied and subjected to fist blows.
There were three persons who mauled the DECEASED, while others
stayed at a distance. Then, somebody struck the DECEASED with
the butt of a gun causing the latter to fall to the ground
- ENCIPIDO was behind the DECEASED, while MANATAD and DE
LA PEÑA were on the sides. On orders of ENCIPIDO also known as
"Commander Tanga," DE LA PEÑA, also called "Agosto de la Pena
struck the Deceased's neck with a bolo
B. Armando Bagacay
- testimony turned out to be hearsay
- confided to him that accused would cut Lacumbes' neck for making
Lumarda sick and for being responsible for all the witchcraft in the
community. Subsequently, witness Bagacay heard of the death of
Lacumbes at the hands of the rebels.
C. Jorge Ortega, INP Station Commander of Loreto, Agusan del
Norte
- ENCIPIDO and DE LA PEÑA disclosed to the Station Commander
that they were the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED, killed a
certain Benny and one Balaba, and who were responsible for all the
killings in Dinagat Island
D. Mariano Espina, the Municipal Mayor of Loreto
- evening of that same day of May 1, 1982, Station Commander Jorge
Ortega informed him that Commander Tanga" and his men wanted
to pay him a courtesy call. They arrived at about 8:00 in the evening
at his house
- "Commander Tanga" then confided to the Mayor his mission to
cooperate with his administration as they had heard that he was a
good Mayor. He also informed the Mayor that he had been a member
of the NPA since he was 13 years old; that he had already killed many
people, including the DECEASED, so that the latter could no longer
harm other people with his witchcraft. For his part, DE LA PEÑA
brought out a sharp-pointed knife and tried to test its sharpness,
admitted having cut the neck of the DECEASED, and even showed
the latter's ear, dried by that time
E. DE LA PEÑA
- testified in open Court that, although he belonged to the group of
"Commander Tanga," the latter, MANATAD and a third individual
merely forced him to join, threatening to kill him if he refused; that he
was with the group from March 28, 1982; that he was present on
March 30, 1982 when "Commander Tanga" and MANATAD killed the
DECEASED but that he was merely standing by; that the duo were
the first ones apprehended, and after them he was also arrested by
the CHDF.
F. ENCIPIDO and MANATAD
- denied having killed the victim and interposed the defense of alibi
> Encipido - denied having admitted to the Station
Commander and to the Municipal Mayor his Identi ty as
"Commander Tanga" or that he had killed the DECEASED
and other persons
> Manatad: also denied all imputations against him, stating
that he only came to know ENCIPIDO in jail; that he did not
know the DECEASED nor who killed him that during the
whole day
4. Trial Court – appellants found guilty of murder; sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and damages; MR denied.
* The penalty imposed by the Trial Court being reclusion perpetual the appeal
was indorsed to the SC
Issue: WON appellants guilty of crime charged.
Held: YES - The oral confessions indicating complicity in the commission of
the crime with which they are charged are admissible in evidence against the
declarants ENCIPIDO and DE LA PEÑA pursuant to Sections 22 and 29 of the
Rules of Court. It is the fact that admissions were made by appellants and
against their own interest which gives them their evidentiary value.
It is also to be noted that appellants' extra-judicial confessions were
independently made without collusion, are Identical with each other in
their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore,
also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused
implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in
the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative
evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and
circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves
participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are
what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an
exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions
are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.
People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001]
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16
October 1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward
Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and
stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who
was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to
stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from
his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his
escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared
and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the 2 assailants fled
in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding,
sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor. He
was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he
could receive medical attention. On 18 October 1991, an information for
the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry
Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both
accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991
an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its
reinstatement upon their apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry
Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo and
Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. The
Antipolo Police immediately took him into temporary custody. Early in
the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police
Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the
Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. On
their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station
where Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the
interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing
to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin,
after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister
Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them
money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where
they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they
separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward
to give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the
ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin
disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that
it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted
that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of
the Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified
by Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to
indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages.
Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarin’s confession
is admissible as evidence
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of
newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation
as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed
been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a
medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon
in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme
caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all
probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial
confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be
detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our
criminal justice system. It is not suggested that videotaped confessions
given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to
draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp
judgments in determining whether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel then to
lower courts: "we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession
always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined
and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult
and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones.
We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO
FACTS:
On or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila,the said accused,
with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential
house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden
materials, by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable
lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house
and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof
a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some
seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by
reason and on the occasion of the said fire resulted to the death of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their four (4)
children whom sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of
their death immediately thereafter.
Brgy. Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended Edna and they
immediately brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the
Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr.
and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-
appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon
inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
EDNA’s bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Brgy.
Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents
outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employer’s house on fire
because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that
she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to
just ride a broomstick in going home.
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators
headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro
Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated
and then detained. When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro
Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to
ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latter’s detention cell why she did
the burning of her employer’s house and accused-appellant EDNA
replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked
permission to go home to her province and narrated how she did the
burning of her employer’s house.When interviewed by Carmelita
Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant EDNA
while under detention was heard by SFO4 Danilo Talusan as having
admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how she
accomplished it. SFO4 Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same
confession, this time at his home, while watching the television
program “True Crime” hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN
Network.
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de
oficio, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial
ensued. However, she was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Due
to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly
elevated to this Court for automatic review. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N the court erred in allowing and giving credence to the hearsay
evidence and uncounselled admissions allegedly given by the
accused.
HELD:
We have held that the provision of Art. Section 12 (1) and (3) applies
to the stage of custodial investigation – when the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on
a particular person as a suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has
also been extended to situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the
extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following
requirements: (1)it must be voluntary;(2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel;(3) it must be
express; and(4) it must be in writing.
The barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officers for
purpose of applying by Article III, Section 12. When accused-appellant
was brought to the barangay hall in, she was already a suspect,
actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well
as killed the whole family of Separa. She was, therefore, already under
custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section
12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or
applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the “interrogation” made
by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-
appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence
of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given
to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found
by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as
such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
However, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do
not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that
the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not
apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally
admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case
at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one
of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in
the Separas’ house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting
said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in
evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional
guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely
governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the
State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another private individual –
as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita
Mendoza undoubtedly are.[44] Here, there is no evidence on record to
show that said witness was acting under police authority, so
appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial
confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, is hereby
AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA
MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be imposed and
the amount of damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO
LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
Principle: The extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without
a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Short digest:
FACTS: L was accused of the crime of qualified rape against his own
daughter, 13 years old. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was B, a
bantay bayan in the barangay. B invited L to the police station and L admitted
to him that he raped his daughter because he was unable to control himself.
L contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel
admissible in evidence?
RULING: No.
The specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay
bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar
as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession of appellant,
which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
However, SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the
appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession
but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt."

Long digest:
FACTS:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter.
Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone at home while his father
was having drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother decided to
leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother every time he
gets drunk. Her only brother also went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants
and slid inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and
underwear. Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for help. He
proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with
his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victim’s brother arrived and saw her crying.
Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out late. The two decided
to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s house, victim
recounted to her brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to
their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance of Moises Boy
Banting. Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.
He was invited to the police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted
to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he was unable to control
himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal,
the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s extrajudicial confession without counsel
admissible in evidence?
HELD: Negative.
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in
the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit
to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by
Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as evidence,
it does not warrant the acquittal of the accused. The appellant’s conviction is
upheld because of the strong evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ladiana vs. People,
FACTS: The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the
Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban
Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is
primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking
advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why
the latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously placed
to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto
Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the
safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco
San Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping
him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, attacked and shot
Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his
head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the
death of Francisco San Juan.
Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking
him. “Kaya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako
sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin;
sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking
pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis
ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan”
ISSUE: whether he acted in self-defense is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of sufficient
which eventually led to the latter’s death -- but denies having done it and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable
with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate
Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an petitioner’s penalty.
admission, it is admissible in evidence against him. Petition is DENIED
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or
by showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish
that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular,
not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance
of the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any
rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving
them unrebutted. Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim,
petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that
the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor. Petitioner should have
relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. Petitioner
argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of
self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument
deserves scant consideration. Therefore, petitioner can no longer
invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime
charged. As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been
established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his
admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the
Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and
the Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from
the fact of death.

The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary

surrender made by petitioner are statements made by two (2)
prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people
that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that
he was not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station,
he surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any
finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the
killing.

We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police
headquarters merely to report the shooting incident did not evince any
desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be