Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs Garcia239 SCRA 538 (1994)
101279 August 6, 1992
Facts:
The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the
constitutionality andvalidity of a memorandum which, among
others, authorize provincial bus and jeepneyoperators to
increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares
without applicationtherefore with the LTFRB, and without
hearing and approval thereof by said agency.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of notice and hearing and the
delegation of authorityin the increase or decrease of
transportation fares to provincial bus and jeepneyoperators is
illegal?
Held:
Under Section 16 (c) of the Public Service Act, as amended,
the legislaturedelegated to the defunct Public Service
Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services.
LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested
with thesame under Executive Order 202.The authority given
by the LTFRB to the bus operators to set fares over and above
theauthorized existing fare is illegal and invalid, as it is
tantamount to undue delegation of legislative authority. Under
the maxim potestas delegate non delegari potest
– Labor Code grantsthe Labor Secretary the power to restrict
“whathas been delegated cannot be delegated.”
The policy allowing provincial bus operators to change and
increase their fares wouldresult not only to a chaotic situation
but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leavethe riding
public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase
fares, everyhour, every day, every month or every year,
whenever it pleases them or whenever theydeem it necessary
to do so. Furthermore, under the Section 16 (a) of Public
Service Act, there must be proper notice and hearing in
the fixing of rates, to arrive at a just andreasonable rate
acceptable to both the public utility and the public.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres
G.R. No.
Griño-Aquino, J.
FACTS:
As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by
Filipino housemaidsemployed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary
Ruben Torres issued Department Order No.16, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agenciesof Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The
DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business
of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA
Administrator alsoissued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series
of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic
workers for Hong Kong.PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul
the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circularsand to prohibit their
implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with
graveabuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said
circulars;t h a t t h e a s s a i l e d D O L E a n d P O E A c i r c
u l a r s a r e c o n t r a r y t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , a r e un
reasonable, unfair and oppressive; and that the requirements
of publication and filing withthe Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.
HELD:
The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the
and regulate recruitment and placement
activities.I t r e a d s : “ T h e S e c r e t a r y o f L a b o r s h a l l h a
v e t h e p o w e r t o r e s t r i c t a n d r e g u l a t e t h e recruitm
ent and placement activities of all agencies within the
c o v e r a g e o f t h i s t i t l e [Regulation of Recruitment and Plac
ement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issueorders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and
implement theprovisions of this title.” On the other hand, the
scope of the regulatory authority of thePOEA, which was
created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the
functions of theOverseas Employment Development Board, the
National Seamen Board, and the overseasemployment functions of
the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging
fora m o n g t h e f u n c t i o n s i n h e r i t e d b y t h e
P O E A f r o m t h e d e f u n c t B u r e a u o f E m p l o y m e n t Services
was the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or
licensingsystem to regulate private sector participation in
the recruitment and placement of
workers,locally and overseas; it assumed
from the defunct Overseas Employment DevelopmentBoard
the power and duty to recruit and place workers for overseas
employment of Filipinocontract workers on a government
to government arrangement and in such other sectors aspolicy may
dictate; and from the National Seamen Board, the POEA
took over to regulateand supervise the activities of agents
or representatives of shipping companies in the hiringof seamen for
overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of
employment forcontract seamen workers and secure compliance
therewith.Said administrative issuances merely restricted the scope
or area of PASEI’s businessoperations by excluding therefrom
recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers forHong
Kong till after the establishment of the “mechanisms” that will enhance
the protectionof Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong.
In fine, other than the recruitment anddeployment of Filipino
domestic helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class
of Filipino workers either for Hong Kong and other countries
and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries. Said
administrative issuances, are intended to curtail, if not
toe n d , r a m p a n t v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e r u l e a g a i n s t e x c e s s i v
e c o l l e c t i o n s o f p l a c e m e n t a n d documentation fees, travel
fees
and other charges committed by private employmentagencie
s recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hong Kong.
They are
reasonable,v a l i d a n d j u s t i f i e d u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l w
e l f a r e c l a u s e o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , s i n c e t h e recruit
ment and deployment business, as it is conducted today,
is affected with publicinterest.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for
lack of powerpublication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register. As announced in
Tañada vs. Tuvera
,“All statutes
, including those of local application and private laws, shall
bepublished as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days afterpublication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by
the legislature.C o v e r e d b y t h i s r u l e a r e p r e s i d e n t i a l
d e c r e e s a n d e x e c u t i v e o r d e r s promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever thesame are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferredby
the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also
be publishedif their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a
validdelegation.I n t e r p r e t a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s a n d t h o s e m e r
e l y i n t e r n a l i n n a t u r e , t h a t i s , regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and the public,
needn o t b e p u b l i s h e d . N e i t h e r i s p u b l i c a t i o n r e q u i r e d
of the so-
c a l l e d l e t t e r o f instructions issued by the administrative su
periors concerning the rules orguidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of theirduties.”
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement
for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the
COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition
published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing
parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December
18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising
the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is
an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed;
and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by
people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such
initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as
proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment
of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition
when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals
to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on
the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in
the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative
and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the
respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18
December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
US VS ANG TANG HO
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act
No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes
the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in
regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the
Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of
rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was
way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in
violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and
was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed
the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of power to
the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations,
the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative,
which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As
to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix
the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner
power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in
use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated,
and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch
of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors
or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.
YNOT VS IAC
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A
which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces
but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was
caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then
charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due
process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The
lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down
the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due
process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of
the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos
are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found
that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B.
Ponce (OIC) vs. Delia T.Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T.
SuttonG.R. No. 162070 (October 19, 2005)
FACTS:Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian
reform program of the government, respondentsmade a voluntary offer to sell
(VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certainincentives
under the law. a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also
known as theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took
effect. It included in its coveragefarms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision in the caseof Luz Farms v.
Secretary of DAR this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and
poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence,
we declared asunconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as
they included livestock farms in thecoverage of agrarian reform. Thus,
respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request towithdraw their
VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and
thusexempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O.
No. 9, series of1993 which provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising oflivestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988
shall be excluded from the coverage of theCARL. The DAR Secretary issued
an Order partially granting the application of respondents forexemption from
the coverage of CARL but applying the retention limits outlined in the
DARA.O. No. 9. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that
their entire landholdingshould be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to
cattle-raising and appealing that the DARA.O. No. 9 be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993
which prescribes amaximum retention for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising is constitutional?
HELD:The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage ofagrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for
their ownership is invalid as itcontravenes the Constitution.
.
The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swineand poultry-
raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
“agriculture”or “agricultural activity.”
 The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop ortree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural activity. DAR has no power to
regulatelivestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from
the coverage of agrarianreform. It has exceeded its power in issuing
the assailed A.O. The assailed A.O. of petitionerDAR was properly stricken
down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarianreform
beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution
Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority
Facts:
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic
Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions
laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public
streets. Even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations was
not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for
reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and
executor.
Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said
decision transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent
complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of driver’s licenses
and removal of license plate numbers.
On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
authorizing itself “to detach license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.”
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter
which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict
with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several
complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance.
Issue:
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1998 are valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government
acting only as agents of the national legislature?
Held:
No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11,
Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-
enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and
confiscating driver’s licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal
corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be
valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent
with public policy.
In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under
consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to
existing law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or
the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA
to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to
legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They
are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case
at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna228 SCRA 329, Dec. 10,
1993Facts:
P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of said
law, “allemployers are required to pay all their employees receiving basic
salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the
employment, and such should be paid onDecember 24 of every year.” The
Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 containedprovisions defining
“13-month pay” and “basic salary” and the employers exempted
fromgiving it and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and R
egulationsImplementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister
Ople which inter alia set items of compensation not included in the
computation of 13-month pay. (overtime pay, earnings
andother remunerations which are not part of basic salary shall not be inclu
ded in thecomputation of 13-month pay). Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated
on August 13, 1985 M.O.No. 28, containing a single provision that modifies
P.D. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P1,000.00 a month. More than a
year later, Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the13-month pay
law was promulgated by the then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon, among
otherthings, defined particularly what remunerative items were and were no
t included in theconcept of 13-month pay, and specifically dealt with
employees who are paid a fixed orguaranteed wage plus commission or
commissions were included in the computation of 13thmonth
pay)A routine inspection was conducted in the premises of petitioner. Findin
g thatpetitioner had not been including the commissions earned by its
medical representatives inthe computation of their 1-month pay, a Notice of
Inspection Result was served on petitionerto effect restitution or correction
of “the underpayment of 13-month pay for the years, 1986 to1988 of
Medical representatives. Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting
the Noticeof Inspection Results,
and expressing the view that the commission paid to its medicalrepresentati
ves are not to be included in the computation of the 13-moth pay since the
lawand its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or BASIC salary
and therefore exclude allremunerations which are not part of the REGULAR
salary. Regional Dir. Luna Piezas issued anorder for the payment of
underpaid 13-month pay for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. Amotion for
reconsideration was filed and the then Acting labor Secretary Dionisio de la
Sernaaffirmed the order with modification that the sales commission earned
of medicalrepresentatives before August 13, 1989 (effectivity date of MO 28
and its implementingguidelines) shall be excluded in the computation of the
13-month pay.Similar routine inspection was conducted in the premises of
Phil. Fuji Xerox where itwas found there was underpayment of 13th month
pay since commissions were not included.In their almost identically-worded
petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel,
attributegrave abuse of discretion to respondent labor officialsHon. Dionisio
dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano.
ISSUE:
Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-
month pay
HELD:
NO. Contrary to respondent’s contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal,
supersede orabrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of
MO No. 28, it merely “modified”Section 1 of the decree by removing the P
1,000.00 salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Monthpay as envisioned,
defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and
whileentitlement to said benefit was no longer limited to employees
receiving a monthly basicsalary of not more than P 1,000.00 said benefit
was, and still is, to be computed on the basicsalary of the employee-recipient
as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given tothe term “basic
salary” was defined in PD 851 applies equally to “basic salary” under M.O.
No.28. The term “basic salary” is to be understood in its common, generally
accepted meaning,i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive
of such additional payments asbonuses and overtime. In remunerative
schemes consists of a fixed or guaranteed wage pluscommission, the fixed or
guaranteed wage is patently the “basic salary” for this is what
theemployee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for
extra effortsexerted in consummating sales of other related transactions.
They are, as such, additionalpay, which the SC has made clear do not from
part of the “basic salary.”Moreover, the Supreme Court said that, including
commissions in the computation of the
13thmonth pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guideli
nes on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the
concept of "basic salary" asdefined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that
implementing rules cannot add to or detractfrom the provisions of the law it
is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adoptedunder
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisionsof the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot wide
n its scope. Anadministrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME
INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION,
petitioners,vs.
BF HOMES, INC.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
F a c t s : United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI)
is the sole representative of all homeowners of BF Homes
while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) ist h e o w n e r -
d e v e l o p e r o f t h e s u b d i v i s i o n . Due to financial difficulties,
BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for 10 years under Atty.
Orendain for 10 years.Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over
management of respondent BFHI. Preliminary to the rehabilitation,
Atty. Orendain entered into anagreement with the two major
homeowners' associations, the BF Parañaque Homeowners
Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BFHomeowners
Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative
homeowners' association and the setting up of an integratedsecurity
program that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and
from the subdivision. Subsequently, this tripartite agreement
wasreduced into a memorandum of agreement, and was
amended.Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was
created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC),
6And recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners'
association inside the subdivision.Respondent BFHI, through its
receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and
operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and astrip of open space
respectively.The first receiver was relieved and a new committee of
receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's board of directors was
appointed.
9Based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the newly appointed
committee of receivers sent a letter to the different homeowners'
association in thesubdivision informing them that as a basic
requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be
responsible for the security of thesubdivision in order to centralize it
and abate the continuing proliferation of squatters. On the same day,
petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC apetition for
Mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI
alleging that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their
securityagreement with the previous receiver.The HIGC issued ex
parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking over the
clubhouse, securing all entry and exit points, impeding orpreventing
the execution and sale of properties and otherwise repudiating or
invalidating any contract or agreement or petitioner with the
BFHI.Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the
HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibitionfor the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case.
14 The HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner
UBFHAI's application for preliminary injunction, until such time that
respondentBFHI's application for prohibition with the appellate court
has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the
temporary restrainingorder had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties
to maintain the status quo15
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition
for prohibition. Motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was
denied.Hence this petition.
Issues: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the
case as provided for in s
ec1(b) rule II of HIGC’s rules of procedure.
R u l i n g : HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case.Originally,
administrative supervision was vested by law with the SEC but
pursuant to PD902-A, this function was delegated to the HIGC. As
statedin PD92-
A, HIGC was given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide homeowner’s disputes arising out of the followin
g intra-corporate relations: 1. Between and among members
of the association; 2.Between any and/or all of them and the
association of which theyare member; and 3.In so far as it
concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity,
between the association and the state.
When HIGCadopte
d its revised rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners’
disputes, it added the phrase “
between the association and the
state/general public or other entity.”
The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it
promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear
attempt to undulyexpand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-
A.The inclusion of the phrase
GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY
is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do . The rule-making power of a
publicadministrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it
may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the
Constitution orto enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceedings tocarry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and
it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements
or to embrace mattersnot covered by the statute."
26
If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.Moreover, where the
legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers
and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out anexpress
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,
which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-
granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making
power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate. "Astatutory grant of powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and
reasonable execution.
Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)
Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional
Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately
proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and
November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly
situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the
ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the
enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower
court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.
105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent
PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
petition was granted.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches.
They relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs.
Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere
with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that
the reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not
interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law.
Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling
was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place
he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the next
course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of
the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our
jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be
reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its
resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a
commendable purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the
licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee
cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference or the like or
receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is more obvious in
that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes
on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are
lawful.
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the
academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the
conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable
their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and methods of
instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with
corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out
their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged
leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least
minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the
source of such leakages and stop it right there.
The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET ASIDE.
TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay
CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954
FACTS:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US
dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but
failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official
Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265
sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is
needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding
penalties.
HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule,
circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty
for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based
on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the
people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including
its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit
the appellant, with costs de oficio.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24,
1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as
an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.
The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is
like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade
is drawn.
PEOPLE v MACEREN
79 SCRA 450AQUINO; October 18, 1977
FACTS-
Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or
poisonous substance" infishing.- The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of theCommissioner of
Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62
O.G. 1224),prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.- Jose
Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosariowere charged with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that theyengaged in
electro fishing.- Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court
dismissed the case. CFI affirmed. The lower court held that electro
fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an
obnoxious orpoisonous substance as contemplated in section II of the
Fisheries Law. The lower court furtherheld that, since the law does not
clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicialdepartments
cannot consider it unlawful.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded
his authority in issuingFisheries Administrative Order No. 84
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceeding tocarry into effect the law as it his been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending orexpanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute
Reasoning
The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissionerof Fisheries
are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to
punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been
easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.Nowhere in the said law is
electro fishing specifically punished.Administrative agents are clothed
with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for
the multifarious and complexsituations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulationshould be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it
should conform to thestandards that the law prescribes
Disposition
Decision affirmed

G.R. No. L-9876US VS. PANLILIO
Doctrine:
The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued
pursuant to a statute havethe force of law but are not penal in nature and a
violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless the statute
expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS: In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused, Panlilio
having been exposed to the dangerousand contagious disease known
as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-
authorizedagent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a
corral in the barrio of Masamat, Pampanga;that, on said place,
Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to
do, and whilethe quarantine against said carabaos was still in force,
permitted and ordered said carabaos to betaken from the corral in
which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to
another;that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants
and agents took the said carabaos from thesaid corral and drove them
from one place to another for the purpose of working them.The
accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to
the quarantining of animals sufferingfrom dangerous communicable
or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40
withsubsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs of trial. The accused contendsthat the facts alleged in the
information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of
Act No. 1760
ISSUE:Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order
of the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD:NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or madeunlawful, nor is there
provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of
Act No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions
of the Act shall, upon conviction, bepunished. However, the only
sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them
as unlawfulare Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any
of them. A violation of the orders of theBureau of Agriculture, as
authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act.
Theorders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be
said to have the force of law, arestatutes and particularly not penal
statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offenseunless the
statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and
penalizes it. Nowhere inAct No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is suchviolation
punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art.
581, par 2 of the PenalCode which punishes any person who violates
regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemicdisease among
animals
PEOPLE VS SANTOS
On June 18, 1930, the provincial fiscal of Cavite filed against the accused
-appellee Augusta A. Santos an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Augusta A. Santos of
violation of section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No.
2 and penalized by section 29 thereof committed as follows:
That on or about April 29, 1935, within 1,500 yards north of
Cavalry Point, Corregidor Island, Province of Cavite, P.I., the said
accused Augusta A. Santos, the registered owner of two fishing
motor boats Malabon IIand Malabon III, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally have his said boats, manned
and operated by his fishermen, fish, loiter and anchor without
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
within three (3) kilometers from the shore line of the Island of
Corregidor over which the naval and military authorities of the
United States exercise jurisdiction.
Contrary to law.
Cavite, Cavite, June 18, 1935.
Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, provides as follows:
28. Prohibited fishing areas. — No boats licensed in accordance
with the provisions of Act No. 4003 and this order to catch,
collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from
Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3
kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over
which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military authorities of
the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La
Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached
 rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of
the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on
the south side of said entrance: Provided, That boats not subject
to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the
areas mentioned above only upon receiving written permission
therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military
or naval authorities concerned.
A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under
section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.
The above quoted provisions of Administrative, Order No. 2 were issued
by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, now
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of the authority vested
in him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 which reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Instructions, orders, rules and regulations. — The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall from time to
time issue such instructions, orders, rules and regulations
consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry
into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of
proceedings arising under such provisions.
The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with
having ordered his fishermen to manage and operate the motor
launches Malabon II and Malabon Ill registered in his name and to fish,
loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of
Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military
authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce.
These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28
above quoted, which reads as follows:
Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003
and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above (within
3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over
which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
the United States, particularly Corregidor) only upon receiving
written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon
recommendation of the military and naval authorities of
concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to
license from fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands
and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military
authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and
naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003,
is to issue from time to time such instructions, orders, rules, and
regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper to
carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings
arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as
stated, contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above
quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the
conditional clause in question supplies a defect of the law, extending it.
This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not
been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the
then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National
Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not
only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power
which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and
void and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs. Provincial Board
of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U.S. vs.
Barrias, 11 Phil., 327).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that
the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2. issued
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and
without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power
conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a
legislative power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him.
Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto
A. Santos is charged do not constitute a crime or a violation of some
criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, the information filed
against him is dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Perez v LPG Refillers (2006)
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading, hoarding,
overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, andunderfilling of petroleum
products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum
products and ofunderfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.
The law sets a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000 as
penalties.
The Department of Energy issued Circular No. 2000-06-010 to
implement the law.
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the
DOE to set aside the Circular for beingcontrary to law but to no avail,
hence they filed an action before the RTC to nullify the circular.
RTC granted the petition and nullified the Circular on the ground
that it introduced new offenses not included inthe statute.
o Moreover, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each
violation, there is a possibility that theP50,000 maximum penalty
might be exceeded.
o The Circular has a range of P1,000-5,000/cylinder for first offenses
and a range of P5,000-10k/cylinderfor third offenses. For retails
outlets, the max penalty is 20k.
oAside from the monetary fines, some offenses also include the
recommendation the closure of thebusiness to the proper LGU.
Meanwhile, petitioner Sec. Perez of the DOE argues that DOE is
empowered by the ff.provisions to penalize theacts it enumerated in
the circular:
oBP Blg. 33, as amended:
“SEC. 3
-A.
Rules and Regulations; Administrative sanctions for violation thereof.
– which the otherwise come intothe possession of the Department and
The Bureau of EnergyUtilization shall issue such rules and
regulations as are necessary to carry into effect the provisions of
thisAct, subject to the approval of the Minister of Energy, after
consultation with the affected industrysectors. Said rules and
regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its
publication in two(2) newspapers of general circulation.
“The Bureau of Energy Utilization is empowered to impose i
n an administrative proceeding, after duenotice and hearing, upon any
person who violates any provision of such rules and regulations, a fine
of notmore than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or to suspend or
remove the license or permit of a hauler,marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-
dealer or retail outlet:
Provided,
That hearing in any administrative proceedingsmay be waived by
respondent.
Provided, Further,
That during the pendency of such administrativeproceeding, the
Bureau may suspend the business operations of such hauler,
marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retailer or retail outlet operator
when the suspension is consistent with public interest.
…
xxxx
“The administrative sanction that may be imposed shall be without
prejud
ice to the filing of a criminal
action as the case may warrant.”
o
§23 of RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998):
Section 23.
I m p l em e nt i ng R u le s a nd R eg u l at i o ns
. –The DOE, in coordination with the Board, the DENR,DFA,
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Health
(DOH), DOF, DTI, NationalEconomic and Development Authority
(NEDA) and TLRC, shall formulate and issue the
necessaryimplementing rules and regulations within sixty (60)
days after the effectivity of this Act.
o §5(g) and §21 of RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992):
(g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system of
providing incentives and penalties, for the judicious and efficient use
of energy in all energy-consuming sectors of the economy;xxxSubject
to existing rules and regulations, the funds and monies collected or
its bureaus from fees, surcharges, fines, and penalties which
theDepartment and its bureaus may impose and collect under this Act
ISSUES + RULING:
WoN the Circular is valid/legal.
YES.
For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the
following must concur:
othe violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime
by the delegating statute itself; and
othe penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself
As for the
first requirement:
o BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes by which the
said criminal acts may be perpetrated,namely: no price display board,
no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings,
noauthorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no
serial number, no distinguishing color,no embossed identifying
markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG
cylinders, andunauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
o The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the
modes contemplated by the law andserve the purpose of curbing
pernicious practices of LPG dealers.

As for the
second requirement:
o The statute provides a minimum and maximum amount as
penalties.
oThe maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an
amount within the range allowed bylaw. While the circular is silent as
to the max penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers, such does
notamount to violation of the statutory maximum limit.
oThe mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder
basis does not in itself run counter tothe law since all that B.P. Blg. 33
prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.

The law was intended to provide the DOE with increased

administrative and penal measures with which toeffectively curtail
rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving
petroleum products, whichare inimical to public interest.
DISPOSITION:
Petition granted.