Development of computer-based analytical tool for assessing physical protection

system
Alim Mardhi and Phongphaeth Pengvanich

Citation: AIP Conference Proceedings 1704, 020008 (2016); doi: 10.1063/1.4940066

View online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4940066
View Table of Contents: http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/proceeding/aipcp/1704?ver=pdfcov
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 Development of Computer-Based Analytical Tool for
Assessing Physical Protection System
Alim Mardhi1, 2, a) and Phongphaeth Pengvanich2, b)
1
National Nuclear Energy Agency Indonesia, (BATAN),
PUSPIPTEK area, Building 80, Serpong, Tangerang Selatan, Banten, Indonesia.
2
Chulalongkorn University, Faculty of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Department,
254 Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok Thailand. 10330.
a)
Corresponding author: alim_m@batan.go.id
b)
ppengvan@gmail.com

Abstract. Assessment of physical protection system effectiveness is the priority for ensuring the optimum protection
caused by unlawful acts against a nuclear facility, such as unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and sabotage of the
facility itself. Since an assessment based on real exercise scenarios is costly and time-consuming, the computer-based
analytical tool can offer the solution for approaching the likelihood threat scenario. There are several currently available
tools that can be used instantly such as EASI and SAPE, however for our research purpose it is more suitable to have the
tool that can be customized and enhanced further. In this work, we have developed a computer–based analytical tool by
utilizing the network methodological approach for modelling the adversary paths. The inputs are multi-elements in
security used for evaluate the effectiveness of the system’s detection, delay, and response. The tool has capability to
analyze the most critical path and quantify the probability of effectiveness of the system as performance measure.

Keywords: Physical Protection System, Analytical Tool, Network, Adversary Path Analysis.

INTRODUCTION
One of the objectives of physical protection system is reducing the probability of successful malicious act to
theft or sabotage in facility. Nevertheless, the weakest point of likelihood that an adversary may use to infiltrate into
the system would be using the most vulnerable part as of the system. The worst path may be found during the
evaluation process after all of the possible adversary paths have been assessed. If there are some changes in the
system design to upgrade the inventory or external factor, such as new threat has been described, the physical
protection system should be reassessed.
Since an assessment based on the real exercise scenarios is costly and time-consuming, the computer-based
analytical tool plays important role in carrying out some routine analysis in the evaluation process. It also has the
capability to solve the complexity of the problem of physical protection system and represent the result
quantitatively based on mathematical approach. So far, there are several available computer-based analytical tools
that can be used instantly such as Estimation of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) which was developed by
the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) [1] and Systematic Analysis of Protection Effectiveness (SAPE) [2] which is
developed by Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control. However, for the research purposes, it is
more suitable to have a tool that can be customized and enhanced further.
The theory and calculation behind the analytical tool is more essential in approaching the likelihood scenario.
The graph theory is already well known for many decades to solve the problem of finding the most vulnerable
network connection in a communication system and manage the shortest distance for a salesman travelling.
Previous study has reported that this methodology can be used for optimization of the physical protection system

Advancing Nuclear Science and Engineering for Sustainable Nuclear Energy Infrastructure
AIP Conf. Proc. 1704, 020008-1–020008-5; doi: 10.1063/1.4940066
© 2016 AIP Publishing LLC 978-0-7354-1351-1/$30.00

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 under uncertainty condition. Ihis study has introduced the development of network method with the capability of
combining adversary path analysis for physical protection system and evaluation of effectiveness [3]. The current
available analytical tool such as SAPE from Korea, has also been reported using the network methodology by using
A star algorithm behind the analytical process for finding the lowest number of probability of interruption in
adversary path analysis [2].
This paper focused on developing the computer-based analytical tool for assessing physical protection system.
The network methodological approach was used for modelling the adversary path analysis. The study consists of
three sections. In section one, creating the graph as representation of facility layout and input all of parameters of
physical protection system into the graph, is described. Finding the path of adversary is covered in this section.
Section two evaluates the effectiveness of the physical protection system by taking into account the probability of
detection, probability of timely detection, estimating the delay time and response force time and obtaining
probability of neutralization. Section three describes the feasibility study for this analytical tool.

CREATE GRAPH
The general form of the graph G is represented as G = (V, E) which consists of a set of node V ={1, 2, . . . , n}
and set of edge E ={(i, j)},(i, j)∈ E are connected [4]. The graph can be represented as an adjacency matrix A For
analysis purpose. The elements aij are called weights. The elements of aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E represent the unweighted
graphs, aij > 0 if (i, j) ∈ E for weighted graphs and in both cases aij = 0 if (i, j) ̸∈ E. A sequence of nodes P =
(S,2,3…,n-1,T) is called a path, S is starting node and T is end node or target. For adversary path analysis, the node
represents the base point or physical locations and the edge represents the action of how the adversary infiltrates the
facility from one base point to another location. The end node represents the objective target of infiltration. The
adversary mission is a success when he or she has reached this node. An adjacency matrix represents the connection
among elements in a facility. The measure of physical protection system such as probability of detection, probability
of timely detection, delay time and response time are represented by the weights value stored in the edge. These
weights of graph should be input after the graph or adjacency matrix has been created. The placement of weight in
the edge depends on facility description and scenario of adversary attack.
There are many types of graph model for visualizing the network. The basic one is by drawing points as nodes
and line between points as an edge. One of the types of graph that is suitable for design and analysis structure is the
grid model that visualized the nodes and edges in square box. The grid model can be adjusted and scaled, practice to
represent the real model, accommodate the more flexible flow of data between nodes by undirected edges property.

FIGURE 1. Graph visualization,

Finding Paths
Adversary path analysis is one of the methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. The key point is how
to find and analyze the probable path that can be used by the intruder. Many algorithms based on graph theory have
been developed for solving the path analysis problem. One of the algorithms for finding the number of shortest path
algorithm is created by Yen. He used the standard algorithm Dijkstra to find the shortest path and placed in the result

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 [5]. The input of this algorithm is matrix adjacency of graph and the output is the rank list of all the existing paths in
the system. This algorithm is very useful for analytical process of adversary path analysis since every single path is
obtained from the output of this algorithm and, later this algorithm also determines the most vulnerable path in the
system by ranking the probability of effectiveness from the result of path analysis in each path. The flowchart of
this analytical tool is shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2. Flowchart of Analytical Tool for Assessed The Physical Protection System,

MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM

In this section, we discuss about how to measure the performance of the system. In network analysis, the whole
system is comprised of the combination of small part connections. It is necessary to analyse every single part to
obtain accurate analysis of the whole system. There are four basic equations that have developed by Hester for
calculating physical protection system parameters in one path k. In this paper. all of these equations are used for
computation analytical purposes.
The performance of the physical protection system is measured by the probability of system effectiveness (PE),
which is based on the system-level metrics to indicate whether the system is in good performance or not. The higher
value of PE indicates that the system has better performance than the lower ones. PE in path k depends on three
input of physical protection system parameters, i.e. probability of detection (PD), probability of timely detection
(PTD) and probability of neutralization (PN) as shown in Equation 1. This parameters are assessed in every edges (i)
in path k. Xik is a binary variable to indicate whether the adversary walk through this path or not.
𝑛
𝑃𝐸𝑘 = ∑ [PDik PTDk/Dik PNk/TDk ] xik (1)
𝑖=0

𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑘 = [1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑜 ) ∏𝑙 𝜖 𝑆(1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑙𝑖 𝑌𝑙𝑖 ) ] ∏𝑖−1

𝑗=1(1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑘 ) (2)

𝑃𝑇𝐷𝑘 = 1 − ∏𝑛𝑗=1(1 − 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝑗𝑘/𝐷𝑖 ) (3)

where,
𝑗
𝑔𝑗𝑘 = 𝑇𝐺𝑗𝑘 – [∑𝑚=𝑖+1 𝑇𝑚 + ∑𝑙 𝜖 𝑆 𝑇𝑙 𝑦𝑙𝑚𝑘 ] + 𝜃 ∑𝑖𝑚=𝑖[𝑇𝑚 + ∑𝑙 𝜀 𝑆 𝑇𝑙 𝑦𝑙𝑚𝑘 ]……… (4)

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 Probability of detection of an action of adversary (PDi) in edge i is measured by the cumulative probability of
detection (PDl) of several sensors that has installed (yli) between one to another physical area to detect the movement
of adversary. This probability is normalized by the probability of adversary not to be detected in previous action
(PDj). PDo is inherent probability of detection caused by movement of adversary, for example the sound when the
door is opened. Probability of timely detection in path k (PTDk) is complement of probability of detection (PD) in
path k and can be calculated by using equation 3. Since product of 1-PTDjk/Di is equal to PDik, for analytical
calculation, equation 2 and 3 can be solved together in one calculation. Probability of timely detection in current
action also takes into account the probability of next action in adversary path.
The limit state of adversary timeline is represented by gjk. If gjk < 0 indicates the adversary has been defeated by
response force. If gjk > 0 indicates the adversary is still on the way or the mission objective success. If gjk = 0
indicates the limit between two condition above. If the adversary is detected when begin the task, ɵ is 1 then if the
adversary is detected at the end of task, ɵ is 0. Tm is time for adversary to travel in one action. Tl is delay time of
element which is installed to delay the adversary movement.
Probability of neutralization (PN) is the probability that the response force can neutralize the adversary. PN can
be estimated or calculated based on the expert judgments, force on force exercise or game simulation. Due to the
complexity of analytical calculation, the probability of neutralization in this paper is obtained from the available
analysis tool developed by Garcia.

FEASIBILITY STUDY
This analytical tool was implemented in computer program MATLAB. For feasibility study, one of examples
problem from EASI program is applied to this program. The problem is shown in Table 1 and the result from
analytical tool is given in Table 2.

TABLE.1. Example of Timely Detection Baseline

Action Minimum Time (Second) PND(PD) PI
Penetrate Fence 6 1.0 (0.0) 0
Penetrate Outer Door 84 0.9 (0.1) 0.1
Penetrate Wall 120 0.7 (0.3) 0.37
Penetrate Inner Door 84 0.1 (0.9) 0.93
Destroy Pump 30 1.0 (0.0) 0.93
Response Force Time 90

TABLE. 2. Result From Analystical Tool

Action Edge List PDk PTDk = PI gjk
Penetrate Fence 1 2 0 0 0
Penetrate Outer Door 2 3 0.100 0.100 0
Penetrate Wall 3 4 0.270 0.343 -144
Penetrate Inner Door 4 5 0.567 0.715 -144
Destroy Pump 5 6 0 0.715 -24

The example problem is type of single path. It has six nodes and five edges. The starting node from node number
1 and target in node number 6. There is bias 0.027 between probability of interruption in sample and from analytical
tool. This is reasonable since the probability of detection used in analytical tool should be normalized from the
probability of adversary not to be detected in previous action. The visualization of graph is shown in Figure 3.

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 FIGURE 3. Graph for Comparative Study Problem

CONCLUSION
The computer-based analytical tool has been developed for the research in evaluation of physical protection
system effectiveness. This tool has the capability to model the adversary path analysis scenario both in single path or
multiple paths and calculate the probability of effectiveness of the system.
The method used in this tool is network methodological approach. The advantage of this method is the
availability of tool to expand more since the graph theory is widely used in many applications in real life. The
challenge is to find analogous problem and solution close to the problem in physical protection system evaluation.
Finding the shortest k path algorithm plays important role for adversary path analysis. This algorithm can sort the
entire path in the system and placed in the list. The path list is useful for doing analytical solution to find the most
vulnerable path in the system.
The most important thing in the process of developing the analytical tool is to find the data for verifying the
results. For current solution, to verify the results of this analytical tool is by comparative study with available tools
or manual check by hand the truth of algorithm behind the calculations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research is part of thesis research in study of Master of Science in Nuclear Technology, Nuclear
Engineering Department, Chulalongkorn University.
This program is funding by European Commission, European Union.

REFERENCES
1. M. L. Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Sandia National Laboratory, Boston, USA, pp 251-267 (2001).
2. S.J Sung, W.K Sung, et al., “Development of a Vulnerability Assessment Code for a Physical Protection
System: Systematic Analysis of Physical Protection Effectiveness (SAPE)” in Journal Nuclear Engineering
Technology, Vol.41 No.5, (June 2009).
3. Patrick .T Hester, Facility Protection Optimization Under Uncertainty. Thesis Dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, Tennese, USA (2007).
4. R. Ahuja, Magnati,T and J. Orlin. Network Flows, Theory, Algorithms, and Application, Prentice Hall, New
Jersey (1993).
5. D.Eppstein, “Finding the k Shortest Paths” in 35th IEEE Symposium. Foundation of Computer and Science,.
Santa Fe, pp.154-165 (1994).

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