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SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO 2014 REMEDIAL LAW BAR EXAM I.

I. Ludong, Balatong, and Labong were charged with murder. After trial, the
court announced that the case was considered submitted for decision.
Subsequently, the Clerk of Court issued the notices of promulgation of
judgment which were duly received. On promulgation day, Ludong and his
lawyer appeared. The lawyers of Balatong and Labong appeared but without
their clients and failed to satisfactorily explain their absence when queried by
the court. Thus, the judge ordered the Clerk of Court to proceed with the
reading of the judgment convicting all the accused. With respect to Balatong
and Labong, the judge ordered that the judgment be entered in the criminal
docket and copies be furnished their lawyers. The lawyers of Ludong, Balatong,
and Labong filed within the reglementary period a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. The court favorably granted the motion of Ludong
downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide but denied the motion as
regards Balatong and Labong. (4%) (A) Was the court correct in taking
cognizance of the Joint Motion for Reconsideration? (B) Can Balatong and
Labong appeal their conviction in case Ludong accepts his conviction for
homicide?

ANSWERS:

(A)

No, the court was not correct in taking cognizance of the Joint Motion
for Reconsideration insofar as Balatong and Labong were concerned.

Under Section 6 Rule 120, if the judgment was for conviction and the failure of
the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies
available under the Rules of Court and the court shall order his arrest. The
accused may regain the remedies only if he surrenders and files a motion for
leave to avail of the remedies under the Rules of Court.

Here the failure of Balatong and Labong to appear was without justifiable
cause as even their lawyers were not aware of the reason for their absence.
Hence they lost their remedies under the Rules. Since Balatong and Labong
did not surrender and file a motion for leave to avail of remedies, it was
incorrect for the trial court to take cognizance of the joint motion for
reconsideration insofar as Balatong and Labong were concerned. The trial
court should instead have ordered their arrest. (People v. De Grano, 5 June
2009, Peralta, J.).
On the other hand, it was correct for the trial court to take cognizance of the
joint motion for reconsideration insofar as Ludong was concerned since he and
his lawyer were present during the promulgation.

(B)

No, Balatong and Labong cannot appeal their conviction in case


Ludong accepts his conviction for homicide.

Since Balatong and Labong failed to appear during the promulgation of


the conviction without justifiable cause, they lost the remedies under the Rules
of Court including the remedy of an appeal.

II.

McJolly is a trouble-maker of sorts, always getting into brushes with the law.
In one incident, he drove his Humvee recklessly, hitting a pedicab which sent
its driver and passengers in different directions. The pedicab driver died, while
two (2) of the passengers suffered slight physical injuries. Two (2) Informations
were then filed against McJolly. One, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property, and two, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries. The latter case was scheduled for arraignment
earlier, on which occasion McJolly immediately pleaded guilty. He was meted
out the penalty of public censure. A month later, the case for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was also set for arraignment. Instead of
pleading, McJollyinterposed the defense of double jeopardy. Resolve. (4%)

ANSWER:

The defense of double jeopardy is meritorious and the second


information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide should be quashed
on the ground of double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court has held that reckless imprudence is a single


crime and that its consequences on persons and property are material only to
determine the penalty.
Here there was only one act and crime of reckless imprudence. The
death, the physical injuries, and the damage to the tricycle are only
consequences of the same reckless act of McJolly. Hence there was double
jeopardy when a second information arising from the same reckless act was
brought against the accused. (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 17 November 2010).

III.

While passing by a dark uninhabited part of their barangay, PO2 Asintado


observed shadows and heard screams from a distance. PO2 Asintado hid
himself behind the bushes and saw a man beating a woman whom he
recognized as his neighbor, Kulasa. When Kulasa was already in agony, the
man stabbed her and she fell on the ground. The man hurriedly left thereafter.
PO2 Asintado immediately went to Kulasa’s rescue. Kulasa, who was then in a
state of hysteria, kept mentioning to PO2 Asintado “Si Rene, gusto akong
patayin! Sinaksak niya ako!” When PO2 Asintado was about to carry her,
Kulasa refused and said “Kaya ko. Mababaw lang to. Habulin mo si Rene.” The
following day, Rene learned of Kulasa’s death and, bothered by his conscience,
surrendered to the authorities with his counsel. As his surrender was
broadcasted all over media, Rene opted to release his statement to the press
which goes:

“I believe that I am entitled to the presumption of innocence until my guilt is


proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although I admit that I performed acts that
may take one’s life away, I hope and pray that justice will be served the right
way. God bless us all. (Sgd.) Rene”

The trial court convicted Rene of homicide on the basis of PO2 Asintado’s
testimony, Kulasa’s statements, and Rene’s statement to the press. On appeal,
Rene raises the following errors:

1. The trial court erred in giving weight to PO2 Asintado’s testimony, as the
latter did not have any personal knowledge of the facts in issue, and violated
Rene’s right to due process when it considered Kulasa’s statements despite
lack of opportunity for her cross-examination. 2. The trial court erred in
holding that Rene’s statement to the press was a confession which, standing
alone, would be sufficient to warrant conviction. Resolve. (4%)

ANSWER:
Rene’s appeal is denied for lack of merit.

1.

The contention that the trial court erred in giving weight to PO2
Asintado’s testimony since he did not have personal knowledge of the facts in
issue is without merit. The contention in effect challenges Kulasa’s statement
for being hearsay.

Under the Rules of Evidence, a statement made immediately


subsequent to a startling occurrence is excepted from the hearsay rule as part
of the res gestae.

Here Kulasa’s statement was made immediately subsequent to a


starling occurrence, that is, her stabbing by Rene, and was made in a state of
hysteria, showing that she was under the influence of the startling occurrence.
Hence testimony regarding the statement is excepted from the hearsay rule.

Since Kulasa’s statement is an exception to the hearsay rule, Rene


cannot complain that his right to due process was violated when the trial court
considered Kulasa’s statement despite lack of opportunity to cross-examine
her.

There should be no serious question about the admissibility against an


accused of hearsay where this hearsay falls under an exception to the hearsay
rule, especially here where the declarant is dead and thus unavailable to
testify. (ANTONIO R. BAUTISTA, BASIC EVIDENCE 214-215 [2004 ed.]). In
U.S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530 (1909), the Supreme Court upheld dying declarations
as an exception to the confrontation clause since “such declarations have
always been regarded as an exception to the general rule regarding hearsay
evidence.”

2.

The argument that the trial court erred in holding that Rene’s
statement to the press was a confession which, standing alone, would be
sufficient to warrant conviction is meritorious. Firstly, Rene’s
statement is not a confession but an admission. A confession is one wherein a
person acknowledges his guilt of a crime, which Rene did not do. Secondly,
even assuming it is a confession, standing alone it would not be sufficient to
warrant conviction since it is an extrajudicial confession which is not sufficient
ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (S3
R133).

Nonetheless this was a harmless error since the admission of Rene


was corroborated by the testimony of PO2 Asintado on Kulasa’s statement.

IV.

An order of the court requiring a retroactive re-dating of an order, judgment or


document filing be entered or recorded in a judgment is: (1%) (A) pro hac vice
(B) non pro tunc (C) confession relicta verificatione (D) nolle prosequi

ANSWER:

(B) (Note: Should be “nunc pro tunc.”).

V.

Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into a lease contract with Tenant,
a resident of Marikina City, over a residential house in Las Piñas City. The
lease contract provided, among others, for a monthly rental of P25,000.00, plus
ten percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-payment on its due date.
Subsequently, Landlord migrated to the United States of America (USA) but
granted in favor of his sister Maria, a special power of attorney to manage the
property and file and defend suits over the property rented out to Tenant.
Tenant failed to pay the rentals due for five (5) months. Maria asks your legal
advice on how she can expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals
plus interests due. (6%)

(A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria? (B) Where is the
proper venue of the judicial remedy which you recommended? (C) If Maria
insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you reckon the one
(1)-year period within which to file the action?

ANSWERS:

(A)
The judicial remedy that I would recommend to Maria is to file a
collection suit for the P125,000 rentals in arrears and the P12,500 interest
due. The remedy would be expeditious since it would be governed by the Rules
on Summary Procedure as the amount of the demand, excluding interest, does
not exceed P200,000. (B)

The proper venue of the collection suit would be in Marikina City,


where Tenant resides.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, venue in personal actions is with


the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, at the plaintiff’s election.

Since the Plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, venue may be laid
only in Marikina City where the defendant Tenant resides.

(C)

If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, the one-year


period within which to file the action shall be reckoned from the expiration of
5days from notice of the last demand to pay and vacate. (Cruz v. Atencio, 28
February 1959; Sy Oh v. Garcia, 30 June 1969).

VI.

As a rule, courts may not grant an application for provisional remedy without
complying with the requirements of notice and hearing. These requirements,
however, may be dispensed with in an application for: (1%)

(A) writ of preliminary injunction (B) writ for preliminary attachment (C) an
order granting support pendente lite (D) a writ of replevin

ANSWER:

(B)

VII.
Co Batong, a Taipan, filed a civil action for damages with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Parañaque City against Jose Penduko, a news reporter of the
Philippine Times, a newspaper of general circulation printed and published in
Parañaque City. The complaint alleged, among others, that Jose Penduko wrote
malicious and defamatory imputations against Co Batong; that Co Batong’s
business address is in Makati City; and that the libelous article was first
printed and published in Parañaque City. The complaint prayed that Jose
Penduko be held

liable to pay P200,000.00, as moral damages; P150,000.00, as exemplary


damages; and P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees.

Jose Penduko filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

1. The RTC is without jurisdiction because under the Totality Rule, the claim
for damages in the amount of P350,000.00 fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City. 2. The
venue is improperly laid because what the complaint alleged is Co Batong’s
business address and not his residence address.

Are the grounds invoked in the Motion to Dismiss proper? (4%)

ANSWER:

No, the grounds invoked in the motion to dismiss improper. 1. The


invocation of the Totality Rule is misplaced. Under Art. 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, jurisdiction over a civil action for damages in case of libel is with
the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. (Nocum v. Tan, 23
September 2005). The said provision does not mention any jurisdictional
amount over such action; hence the Totality Rule is inapplicable. 2.
The ground that the complaint mentioned the complainant’s office address
rather than his residence is of no moment since the complaint also stated that
the libelous article was printed and first published in Paranaque City. Under
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, venue in a civil action for libel also lies
in the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.

VIII.
Johnny, a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (USA) but
formerly a Filipino citizen, executed a notarial will in accordance with the laws
of the State of California, USA. Johnny, at the time of his death, was survived
by his niece Anastacia, an American citizen residing at the condominium unit
of Johnny located at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City; a younger brother, Bartolome,
who manages Johnny’s fish pond in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and a younger
sister, Christina, who manages Johnny’s rental condominium units in Makati
City. Johnny’s entire estate which he inherited from his parents is valued at
P200 million. Johnny appointed Anastacia as executrix of his will. (4%)

(A) Can Johnny’s notarial will be probated before the proper court in the
Philippines? (B) Is Anastacia qualified to be the executrix of Johnny’s notarial
will?

ANSWERS:

(A)

Yes, the formal validity of a will is governed also by the national law of the
decedent. (Article 817, Civil Code). A will proved and allowed in a foreign
country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and
recorded by the proper Regional Trial Court in the Philippines. (S1 R77). (B)

Yes, assuming that Anastacia is of legal age, she is qualified to be an executor


although an alien because she is a resident of the Philippines. (S1 R78).

IX.

Bayani, an overseas worker based in Dubai, issued in favor of Agente, a


special power of attorney to sell his house and lot. Agente was able to sell the
property but failed to remit the proceeds to Bayani, as agreed upon. On his
return to the Philippines, Bayani, by way of a demand letter duly received by
Agente, sought to recover the amount due him. Agente failed to return the
amount as he had used it for the construction of his own house. Thus, Bayani
filed an action against Agente for sum of money with damages. Bayani
subsequently filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment duly supported by an affidavit. The court granted the ex-parte
motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon Bayani’s posting of
the required bond. Bayani prayed that the court’s sheriff be deputized to serve
and implement the writ of attachment. On November 19, 2013, the Sheriff
served upon Agente the writ of attachment and levied on the latter’s house and
lot. On November 20, 2013, the Sheriff served on Agente summons and a copy
of the complaint. On November 22, 2013, Agente filed an Answer with Motion
to Discharge the Writ of Attachment alleging that at the time the writ of
preliminary attachment was issued, he has not been served with summons
and, therefore, it was improperly issued. (4%) (A) Is Agente correct? (B) Was the
writ of preliminary attachment properly executed?

ANSWERS:

(A)

No, Agente is not correct.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a writ of attachment may issue even before
service of summons upon the defendant. (S2 R57).

(B)

No, the writ of preliminary attachment not properly executed.

Under S5 R57, no levy on preliminary attachment shall be enforced unless


there is prior or simultaneous service of the summons and the accompanying
papers. (S5 R The Supreme Court has held that subsequent service of
summons will not cure the irregularity that attended the enforcement of the
writ (Onate v. Abrogar, 23 February 1995).

Here the sheriff levied upon the house and lot prior to the service of the
summons and the complaint upon Agente. Hence the writ of preliminary
attachment was not properly executed. The subsequent service of summons
and the complaint did not cure the irregularity in the enforcement of the writ.

X.

Prince Chong entered into a lease contract with King Kong over a commercial
building where the former conducted his hardware business. The lease
contract stipulated, among others, a monthly rental of P50,000.00 for a four
(4)-year period commencing on January 1, 2010. On January 1, 2013, Prince
Chong died. Kin Il Chong was appointed administrator of the estate of Prince
Chong, but the former failed to pay the rentals for the months of January to
June 2013 despite King Kong’s written demands. Thus, on July 1, 2013, King
Kong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for rescission of
contract with damages and payment of accrued rentals as of June 30, 2013.
(4%) (A) Can Kin Il Chong move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the RTC is without jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.00?
(B) If the rentals accrued during the lifetime of Prince Chong, and King Kong
also filed the complaint for sum of money during that time, will the action be
dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the pendency of the case?

ANSWERS:

(A)

No, Kin II Chong cannot move to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the RTC is without jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only
P300,000.

Under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Here the action is for rescission which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.


The P300,000 accrued rentals is only incidental to the main purpose of the
action which is to rescind the lease contract.

(B)

No, the action will not be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death
during the pendency of the case.

Under S20 R3, when the action is on a contractual money claim and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment, the action shall not be dismissed
but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.

Here the action is on a contractual money claim, that is, a claim for rentals
based on a lease contract. Hence it shall be allowed to continue until final
judgment. (S20 R3, S5 R86).
XI.

A search warrant was issued for the purpose of looking for unlicensed firearms
in the house of Ass-asin, a notorious gun for hire. When the police served the
warrant, they also sought the assistance of barangay tanods who were
assigned to look at other portions of the premises around the house. In a nipa
hut thirty (30) meters away from the house of Ass-asin, a barangay tanod came
upon a kilo of marijuana that was wrapped in newsprint. He took it and this
was later used by the authorities to charge Ass-asin with illegal possession of
marijuana. Ass-asin objected to the introduction of such evidence claiming that
it was illegally seized. Is the objection of Assasin valid? (4%)

ANSWER:

Yes, the objection of Ass-asin is valid.

Under the Constitution, the right of the people against unlawful search
is inviolable except in cases where a valid search warrant was issued or in
exceptional cases where the law provides for a warrantless search. (Sec. 2, Art.
III, Constitution). Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, items seized
by virtue of an unlawful search are inadmissible in evidence. (Sec. 3[2], Art. III,
Constitution).

Here the the seizure of the marijuana was illegal since it was not
pursuant to a search warrant. The search warrant was for the search and
seizure of unlicensed firearms not marijuana. Nor would the exception
regarding items seized under plain view apply. The marijuana was wrapped in
newsprint and clearly not in plain sight. Hence the marijuana may not be
introduced in evidence over Ass-asin’s objection.

XII.

Mary Jane met Shiela May at the recruitment agency where they both applied
for overseas employment. They exchanged pleasantries, including details of
their personal circumstances. Fortunately, Mary Jane was deployed to work as
front desk receptionist at a hotel in Abu Dhabi where she met Sultan
Ahmedwho proposed marriage, to which she readily accepted. Unfortunately for
Shiela May, she was not deployed to work abroad, and this made her envious
of Mary Jane. Mary Jane returned to the Philippines to prepare for her
wedding. She secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage. It turned out from the NSO records that Mary Jane had
previously contracted marriage with John Starr, a British citizen, which she
never did. The purported marriage between Mary Jane and John Starr
contained all the required pertinent details on Mary Jane. Mary Jane later on
learned that Shiela May is the best friend of John Starr. As a lawyer, Mary
Jane seeks your advice on her predicament. What legal remedy will you avail to
enable Mary Jane to contract marriage with Sultan Ahmed? (4%)

ANSWER:

The legal remedy I would avail to enable Mary Jane to contract


marriage with Sultan Ahmed is to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
entries in the marriage contract between John Starr and Mary Jane,
particularly the portion and entries thereon relating to the wife.

Rule 108 may be availed of to cancel erroneous or invalid entries in the


Civil Registry. Here the entry of Mary Jane as the wife of John Starr is clearly

erroneous and invalid as she never contracted marriage with anybody, much
less John Starr. There is no need to file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage since there was no marriage to speak of in the first place, the
marriage contract being a sham contract. (Republic v. Olaybar, 10 February
2014, Peralta, J.).

XIII.

A foreign dog trained to sniff dangerous drugs from packages, was hired by
FDP Corporation, a door to door forwarder company, to sniff packages in their
depot at the international airport. In one of the routinary inspections of
packages waiting to be sent to the United States of America (USA), the dog sat
beside one of the packages, a signal that the package contained dangerous
drugs. Thereafter, the guards opened the package and found two (2) kilograms
of cocaine. The owner of the package was arrested and charges were filed
against him. During the trial, the prosecution, through the trainer who was
present during the incident and an expert in this kind of field, testified that the
dog was highly trained to sniff packages to determine if the contents were
dangerous drugs and the sniffing technique of these highly trained dogs was
accepted worldwide and had been successful in dangerous drugs operations.
The prosecution moved to admit this evidence to justify the opening of the
package. The accused objected on the grounds that: (i) the guards had no
personal knowledge of the contents of the package before it was opened; (ii) the
testimony of the trainer of the dog is hearsay; and (iii) the accused could not
cross-examine the dog. Decide. (4%)

ANSWER:

The accused’s objections are overruled.

The objection that the guards had no personal knowledge of the


contents of the package before it was opened is misplaced. The one testifying
is the trainer not the guards and he had personal knowledge of the
circumstances since he was present during the incident. Besides there is no
rule of evidence that one cannot testify about the contents of a package if he
did not have prior personal knowledge of its contents before opening it.

The objection that the testimony of the trainer of the dog is hearsay is
not valid. Hearsay is an out-of-court declaration made by a person which is
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

Here what is involved is a dog who is not a person who can make an
outof-court declaration. (Lempert & Saltzburg, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 370-371 [1982]). A dog is not treated as a declarant or witness
who can be cross-examined. (People v. Centolella, 305 N.Y.S.2d 279). Hence
testimony that the dog sat beside the package is not testimony about an out-of-
court declaration and thus not hearsay.

The objection that the accused could not cross-examine the dog is
without merit. Under the Constitution, the accused’s right of confrontation
refers to witnesses. As previously discussed, a dog is not a witness who can be
cross-examined.

Note: It is urged that utmost liberality be exercised in grading this


number. The answer is not found in Philippine law and jurisprudence and
even in commentaries by writers on evidence.
XIV.

When a Municipal Trial Court (MTC), pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction,


renders an adverse judgment in an application for land registration, the
aggrieved party’s remedy is: (1%) (A) ordinary appeal to the Regional Trial Court
(B) petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court (C) ordinary appeal to
the Court of Appeals (D) petition for review to the Court of Appeals

ANSWER:

(C) (See Sec. 34, B.P. Blg. 129)

XV.

The Ombudsman, after conducting the requisite preliminary investigation,


found probable cause to charge Gov. Matigas in conspiracy with Carpintero, a
private individual, for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). Before the information could be
filed with the Sandiganbayan, Gov. Matigas was killed in an ambush. This,
notwithstanding, an information was filed against Gov. Matigas and
Carpintero. At the Sandiganbayan, Carpintero through counsel, filed a Motion
to Quash the Information, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, arguing

that with the death of Gov. Matigas, there is no public officer charged in the
information. Is the motion to quash legally tenable? (4%)

ANSWER:

No, the motion to quash is not legally tenable.

In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the death of the
public officer did not mean that the allegation of conspiracy between the public
officer and the private person can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
the public officer was his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the
crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and
the private person. Hence the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
offense charged. (People v. Go, 25 March 2014, Peralta, J.)

XVI.

Plaintif filed a complaint denominated as accion publiciana, against defendant.


In his answer, defendant alleged that he had no interest over the land in
question, except as lessee of Z. Plaintif subsequently filed an affidavit of Z, the
lessor of defendant, stating that Z had sold to plaintif all his rights and
interests in the property as shown by a deed of transfer attached to the
affidavit. Thus, plaintif may ask the court to render: (1%) (A) summary
judgment (B) judgment on the pleadings (C) partial judgment (D) judgment by
default

ANSWER:

(A) (S1 & 3, R35)

XVII.

A was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a crime of plunder, a non-


bailable offense, where the court had already issued a warrant for his arrest.
Without A being arrested, his lawyer filed a Motion to Quash Arrest Warrant
and to Fix Bail, arguing that the allegations in the information did not charge
the crime of plunder but a crime of malversation, a bailable offense. The court

denied the motion on the ground that it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused and that the accused should be under the custody of
the court since the crime charged was nonbailable. The accused’s lawyer
counter-argued that the court can rule on the motion even if the accused was
at-large because it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
According to said lawyer, there was no need for the accused to be under the
custody of the court because what was filed was a Motion to Quash Arrest and
to Fix Bail, not a Petition for Bail. (A) If you are the Sandiganbayan, how will
you rule on the motion? (3%) (B) If the Sandiganbayan denies the motion, what
judicial remedy should the accused undertake? (2%)
ANSWERS:

(A)

If I were the Sandiganbayan, I would deny the Motion to Quash Arrest


Warrant and to Fix Bail.

The motion to quash warrant of arrest may be considered since only


jurisdiction over the person not custody of the law is required. Jurisdiction
over the person of A was obtained by his voluntary appearance made through
the filing of the motion seeking affirmative relief. (See Miranda v. Tuliao, 31
March 2006).

Nonetheless I would still deny the motion to quash arrest warrant.


The ground that the offense charged is malversation not plunder is not a valid
ground to quash the arrest warrant. A should simply file an application for
bail and contend that he is entitled thereto as a matter of right.

The motion to fix amount of bail, which is in effect an application for


bail cannot be granted unless the accused is in custody of the law. (Miranda v.
Tuliao, 31 March 2006). Here A was not in custody of the law but still at large.
Hence the motion to fix the amount of bail should be denied.

(B)

If the Sandiganbayan denies the motion, the judicial remedy that the
accused should undertake is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Supreme Court. Certiorari is available to challenge interlocutory orders
rendered with grave abuse of discretion since appeal is unavailable.

Here the order denying the Motion to Quash Arrest Warrant and to Fix
Bail is interlocutory since it does not completely dispose of the case. Hence
certiorari is available. A should aver that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in denying his
motion.

XVIII.

A was charged with murder in the lower court. His Petition for Bail was denied
after a summary hearing on the ground that the prosecution had established a
strong evidence of guilt. No Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the
denial of the Petition for Bail. During the reception of the evidence of the
accused, the accused reiterated his petition for bail on the ground that the
witnesses so far presented by the accused had shown that no qualifying
aggravating circumstance attended the killing. The court denied the petition on
the grounds that it had already ruled that: (i) the evidence of guilt is strong; (ii)
the resolution for the Petition for Bail is solely based on the evidence presented
by the prosecution; and (iii) no Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the
denial of the Petition for Bail. (6%) (A) If you are the Judge, how will you resolve
the incident? (B) Suppose the accused is convicted of the crime of homicide and
the accused filed a Notice of Appeal, is he entitled to bail?

ANSWERS:

(A)

If I were the judge, I will grant the Petition for Bail if the evidence does
not show any qualifying aggravating circumstance. In such a case the offense
would be only homicide which is bailable.

(i) The ground that the court had already ruled that the evidence of guilt is
strong is improper. An order denying an application for bail is interlocutory
and remains at the control of the court until final judgment. Hence the court is
not bound by its earlier ruling and may reconsider the same if the evidence or
law warrants the same.

(ii) The ground that the resolution for the Petition for Bail is solely based on
the evidence presented by the prosecution is improper. While S8 R114 provides
that the prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence of guilt
is strong, it should not be taken to mean that the resolution of the bail
application is based solely on the prosecution evidence. At the hearing for the
bail

application, both the prosecution and the accused must be given reasonable
opportunity to prove or to disprove, respectively, that the evidence of guilt is
strong. (Santos v. Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56).

(iii) The ground that no motion for reconsideration was filed from the order
denying the petition for bail is improper. As previously discussed, an order
denying bail is merely interlocutory. Hence the failure to move for
reconsideration thereof during the trial will not render the order final and
conclusive.

(B)
No, after conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. (S5
R114).

XIX.

A vicarious admission is considered an exception to the hearsay rule. It,


however, does not cover: (1%) (A) admission by a conspirator (B) admission by a
privy (C) judicial admission (D) adoptive admission

(C) Note: a vicarious admission is an extrajudicial admission. Hence C is not


covered by the rule regarding vicarious admissions.

XX.

Tom Wallis filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of his marriage with Debi Wallis on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. Before filing the petition, Tom Wallis had told Debi
Wallis that he wanted the annulment of their marriage because he was already
fed up with her irrational and eccentric behaviour. However, in the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the correct residential address of Debi Wallis
was deliberately not alleged and instead, the residential address of their
married son was stated. Summons was served by substituted service at the
address stated in the petition. For failure to file an answer, Debi Wallis was
declared in default and Tom Wallis presented evidence ex-parte. The RTC
rendered judgment declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity

of Debi Wallis. Three (3) years after the RTC judgment was rendered, Debi
Wallis got hold of a copy thereof and wanted to have the RTC judgment
reversed and set aside. If you are the lawyer of Debi Wallis, what judicial
remedy or remedies will you take? Discuss and specify the ground or grounds
for said remedy or remedies. (5%)

ANSWER:
If I were the lawyer of Debi Wallis, the judicial remedy I would take is to file
with the Court of Appeals an action for annulment of the RTC judgment under
Rule 47. An action for annulment of judgment may be resorted to since the
remedies of appeal and petition for relief are no longer available through no
fault of Debi Wallis. (S1 R47).

The ground for annulment of judgment would be lack of jurisdiction.


Lack of jurisdiction also covers lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant since the judgment would be void. (1 FLORENZ D. REGALADO,
REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 558 [7th rev. ed., 3rd printing]).

Here the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Debi
since there was no valid substituted service of summons. Substituted service
of summons should have been made at Debi’s residence. (S7 R14). Hence the
judgment of the RTC was void. Since the judgment is void, the petition for
annulment thereof is imprescriptible. (S3 R47).

Furthermore, default judgments are not allowed in declaration of


nullity of marriage. (S3[e] R9). Hence the trial court’s rendition of a default
judgment was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

XXI.

Goodfeather Corporation, through its President, Al Pakino, filed with the


Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for specific performance against Robert
White. Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, Robert White filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of the appropriate board
resolution from the Board of Directors of Goodfeather Corporation to show the
authority of Al Pakino to represent the corporation and file the complaint in its
behalf. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the
dismissal of the complaint. Al Pakino filed a motion for reconsideration which
the RTC denied. As nothing more could be done by Al Pakino before the RTC,
he filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals

(CA). Robert White moved for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the
same involved purely a question of law and should have been filed with the
Supreme Court (SC). However, Al Pakino claimed that the appeal involved
mixed questions of fact and law because there must be a factual determination
if, indeed, Al Pakino was duly authorized by Goodfeather Corporation to file the
complaint. Whose position is correct? Explain. (4%)

ANSWER:

Robert White’s position is correct. In a case involving similar facts, the


Supreme Court held that the issue of whether or not the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the person who filed the
complaint in behalf of the plaintiff corporation was not authorized to do so is a
legal issue, reviewable only by the Supreme Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. (Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, 26 November 2004).

(Note: An alternative answer would be that the appeal raises a factual


question of whether or not Al Pakino was indeed authorized to file the
complaint in behalf of Goodfeather Corporation. A reading of Tamondong
would show that the appellant only raised a legal question of whether it was
proper to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action but did not
raise a factual issue as to whether the filer was in fact authorized by the
corporation.).

XXII.

Which of the following decisions may be appealed directly to the Supreme


Court (SC)? (Assume that the issues to be raised on appeal involve purely
questions of law) (1%) (A) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. (B) Decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. (C) Decision of the Civil Service
Commission. (D) Decision of the Office of the President.

ANSWER:

(B) Note: In an appeal from RTC judgment in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, the appeal should be to the CA even if the questions are only legal.
Hence A should be excluded. (S2[c] R42).

XXIII.
Mr. Humpty filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms.
Dumpty for damages. The RTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision
granting the complaint and ordering Ms. Dumpty to pay damages to Mr.
Humpty. Ms. Dumpty timely filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA),
questioning the RTC decision. Meanwhile, the RTC granted Mr. Humpty’s
motion for execution pending appeal. Upon receipt of the RTC’s order granting
execution pending appeal, Ms. Dumpty filed with the CA another case, this
time a special civil action for certiorari assailing said RTC order. Is there a
violation of the rule against forum shopping considering that two (2) actions
emanating from the same case with the RTC were filed by Ms. Dumpty with the
CA? Explain. (4%)

ANSWER:

No, there is no violation of the rule against forum shopping.

Forum shopping applies where two or more initiatory pleadings were filed by
the same party. This is discernible from the use of the phrase “commenced
any action or filed any claim” in S5 R7.

Here the first case involves the filing by Ms. Dumpty of a notice of appeal
which is not an initiatory pleading. Hence there is no forum shopping.

XXIV.

Solomon and Faith got married in 2005. In 2010, Solomon contracted a


second marriage with Hope. When Faith found out about the second marriage
of Solomon and Hope, she filed a criminal case for bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila sometime in 2011. Meanwhile, Solomon filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage with Faith in 2012, while
the case for bigamy before the RTC of Manila is ongoing. Subsequently,
Solomon filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the bigamy case on the
ground of prejudicial question. He asserts that the proceedings in the criminal
case should be suspended because if his first marriage with Faith will be
declared null and void, it will have the effect of exculpating him from the crime
of bigamy. Decide. (4%)
ANSWER:

Motion to suspend proceedings denied.

Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prejudicial question arises if there


has been a previously filed civil action. Here the civil action was filed after the
criminal action. Hence no prejudicial question will arise.

Moreover the Supreme Court has held that a pending case for declaration of
nullity of marriage does not raise a prejudicial question to a charge of bigamy
since a person who contracts a second marriage without first awaiting a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage has already committed
bigamy. (People v. Odtuhan, 17 July 2013, Peralta, J.).

XXV.

Mr. Boaz filed an action for ejectment against Mr. Jachin before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Mr. Jachin actively participated in every stage
of the proceedings knowing fully well that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over
the action. In his mind, Mr. Jachin was thinking that if the MeTC rendered
judgment against him, he could always raise the issue on the jurisdiction of the
MeTC. After trial, the MeTC rendered judgment against Mr. Jachin. What is the
remedy of Mr. Jachin? (1%) (A) File an appeal (B) File an action for nullification
of judgment (C) File a motion for reconsideration (D) File a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65

ANSWER:

(A) See S8 R40. R47 is not available since appeal is still available. Not C since
a prohibited pleading.

XXVI.
Parole evidence is an: (1%) (A) agreement not included in the document (B) oral
agreement not included in the document (C) agreement included in the
document (D) oral agreement included in the document

ANSWER:

(A) Note: It is suggested that either A or B be considered as correct. Strictly


speaking parol evidence does not have to be an agreement; it is simply any

evidence, whether written or oral, which is not contained in a written


agreement subject of a case and which seeks to modify, alter, or explain the
terms of the written agreement.

XXVII.

Mr. Avenger filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms.
Bright for annulment of deed of sale and other documents. Ms. Bright filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. Mr.
Avenger filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. State and discuss the
appropriate remedy/remedies under each of the following situations: (6%) (A) If
the RTC grants Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and dismisses the complaint on
the ground of lack of cause of action, what will be the remedy/remedies of Mr.
Avenger? (B) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss, what will be her
remedy/remedies? (C) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss and,
further proceedings, including trial on the merits, are conducted until the RTC
renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, what will be the remedy/remedies of
Ms. Bright?

ANSWERS:

(A)

If the RTC grants Ms. Brights’s motion to dismiss, the remedies of Mr.
Avenger are: (a) File a motion for reconsideration under Rule 37. (b) Re-file the
complaint. The dismissal does not bar the re-filing of the case (S5 R16). (c)
Appeal from the order of dismissal. The dismissal order is a final order as it
completely disposes of the case; hence it is appealable. (d) File an amended
complaint as a matter of right curing the defect of lack of cause of action before
the dismissal order becomes final. This is because a motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading; hence Mr. Avenger can amend the complaint as a matter
of right. (S2 R10).

(B)

If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to dismiss, her remedies are: (a)
File a motion for reconsideration. (b) Proceed to trial and if she loses, appeal
and assign the failure to dismiss as a reversible error.

(c) File a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus if the denial of the
order to dismiss is made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction.

(C)

If the RTC renders a decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, Ms. Bright’s


remedies are: (a) File a motion for reconsideration or new trial under Rule 37.
(b) File an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41. (c) File an appeal to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45 if the appeal will raise only questions of law.
(d) File a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. (e) File an action for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack
of jurisdiction.

XXVIII.

A was adopted by B and C when A was only a toddler. Later on in life, A filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, as he wanted to reassume the surname of his
natural parents because the surname of his adoptive parents sounded offensive
and was seriously affecting his business and social life. The adoptive parents
gave their consent to the petition for change of name. May A file a petition for
change of name? If the RTC grants the petition for change of name, what, if
any, will be the effect on the respective relations of A with his adoptive parents
and with his natural parents? Discuss. (4%)

ANSWER:

Yes, A may file a petition for change of name. Changing name on the ground
that it is offensive and seriously affects the petitioner’s business and social life
is a valid ground especially where the adoptive parents had given their consent.
The grant of the petition will not change A’s relations with his adoptive
and natural parents. The Supreme Court has held that change of name under
Rule 103 affects only the name and not the status of the petitioner. (Republic
v. CA, 21 May 1992).

XXIX.

Estrella was the registered owner of a huge parcel of land located in a remote
part of their barrio in Benguet. However, when she visited the property after
she took a long vacation abroad, she was surprised to see that her childhood
friend, John, had established a vacation house on her property. Both Estrella
and John were residents of the same barangay. To recover possession, Estrella
filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), alleging
that she is the true owner of the land as evidenced by her certificate of title and
tax declaration which showed the assessed value of the property as
P21,000.00. On the other hand, John refuted Estrella’s claim of ownership and
submitted in evidence a Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Estrella. After
the filing of John’s answer, the MTC observed that the real issue was one of
ownership and not of possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
full-blown trial was conducted as if the case was originally filed with it. The
RTC reasoned that based on the assessed value of the property, it was the
court of proper jurisdiction. Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment declaring
John as the owner of the land and, hence, entitled to the possession thereof.
(4%) (A) Was the MTC correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction? Why or why not? (B) Was the RTC correct in ruling that based on
the assessed value of the property, the case was within its original jurisdiction
and, hence, it may conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed case as if it was
originally filed with it? Why or why not?

ANSWERS: (A) No, the MTC was not correct in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that an allegation of
ownership as a defense in the answer will not oust the MTC of jurisdiction in
an ejectment case. (Subano v. Vallecer, 24 March 1959). What determines
subject-matter jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and not those in
the answer. Furthermore, the MTC is empowered under S16 R70 to resolve the
issue of ownership, albeit for the purpose only of resolving the issue of
possession.

(B)

No the RTC was not correct in ruling that the case was within its
original jurisdiction and that hence it may conduct a full-blown trial of the
appealed case as if it were originally filed with it.

Under S8 R40, if an appeal is taken from an MTC order dismissing a


case for lack of jurisdiction without a trial on the merits, the RTC on appeal
may affirm the dismissal order and if it has jurisdiction thereover, try the case
on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it.

Here the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case since it is an
ejectment suit cognizable exclusively by the MTC. The assessed value of the
land is irrelevant for the purpose of determining jurisdiction in ejectment suits
and would not oust the MTC of jurisdiction in the same manner as allegations
of ownership would not oust the MTC of jurisdiction.

The RTC should have reversed the dismissal order and remanded the
case to the MTC for further proceedings. (S8 R40).

Note: Utmost liberality should be given to the examinee on this


question as it does not appear to be within the coverage of the remedial law
examination per the bar examination syllabus given by the Supreme Court.

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2015 REMEDIAL LAW BAR EXAMINATION

I. Lender extended to Borrower a P100,000.00 loan covered by a promissory


note. Later, Borrower obtained another P100,000.00 loan again covered by a
promissory note. Still later, Borrower obtained a P300,000.00 loan secured by
a real estate mortgage on his land valued at P500,000.00. Borrower defaulted
on his payments when the loans matured. Despite demand to pay the
P500,000.00 loan, Borrower refused to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule,
filed against Borrower with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a
collection suit for P500,000.00. a.) Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule
and the rule on joinder of causes of action? (2%)

At the trial, Borrower's lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully


elicited an admission from the latter that the two promissory notes have been
paid. Thereafter, Borrower's lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that as proven only P300,000.00 was the amount due to Lender and
which claim is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court. He further argued that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. b.) Should the court dismiss the
case? (3%)

ANSWERS:

a) Yes Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of
causes of action. Under the rule on joinder of causes of action, a party
may in one pleading assert as many causes of action as he may have against
an opposing party. Under the totality rule, where the claims in all the causes
of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction. Here the causes of action by Lender are
all against borrower and all the claims are principally for recovery of money.
Hence the aggregate amount claimed, which is P500,000 shall be the test of
jurisdiction and thus it is the RTC of Manila which has jurisdiction.
Although the rules on joinder of causes of action state that the joinder shall not
include special civil actions, the remedy resorted to with respect to the third
loan was not foreclosure but collection. Hence joinder of causes of action
would still be proper.

b) No, the court should not dismiss the case. The Supreme
Court has held that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the amount of
the claim alleged in the complaint and not the

amount substantiated during the trial. (Dionisio v Sioson Puerto, 31 October


1974). Here the amount claimed was P500,000. Even if the claim
substantiated during the trial was only P300,000 that is not determinative of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Hence the argument that lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time is misplaced since in the first
place the RTC has jurisdiction.

II. Circe filed with the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of real estate
mortgage against siblings Scylla and Charybdis, co-owners of the property and
cosignatories to the mortgage deed. The siblings permanently reside in Athens,
Greece. Circe tipped off Sheriff Pluto that Scylla is on a balikbayan trip and is
billeted at the Century Plaza Hotel in Pasay City. Sheriff Pluto went to the hotel
and personally served Scylla the summons, but the latter refused to receive
summons for Charybdis as she was not authorized to do so. Sheriff Pluto
requested Scylla for the email address and fax number of Charybdis which the
latter readily gave. Sheriff Pluto, in his return of the summons, stated that
"Summons for Scylla was served personally as shown by her signature on the
receiving copy of the summons. Summons on Charybdis was served pursuant
to the amendment of Rule 14 by facsimile transmittal of the summons and
complaint on defendant's fax number as evidenced by transmission verification
report automatically generated by the fax machine indicating that it was
received by the fax number to which it was sent on the date and time indicated
therein." Circe, sixty (60) days after her receipt of Sheriff Pluto's return, filed a
Motion to Declare Charybdis in default as Charybdis did not file any responsive
pleading. a.) Should the court declare Charybdis in default? (2%) Scylla
seasonably filed her answer setting forth therein as a defense that Charybdis
had paid the mortgage debt. b.) On the premise that Charybdis was properly
declared in default, what is the effect of Scylla's answer to the complaint? (2%)
ANSWERS:

a) No, the court should not declare Charybdis in default. Under the Rules of
Court, the amendment of Rule 14 allowing service of summons by facsimile
transmittal refers only to service of summons upon a foreign private juridical
entity under Section 12 of Rule 14, not to a non-resident defendant under
Section 15 of Rule 14. Service of summons by facsimile cannot be effected
under Section 15 unless leave of court was obtained specifically permitting
service by facsimile transmittal. Here the defendant is not a foreign private
juridical entity but a nonresident defendant and no leave of court was obtained
to serve summons by facsimile.

Hence there was no valid service of summons and thus the court could not
declare Charybdis in default.

b) The effect of Scylla’s answer to the complaint is that the court shall try the
case against both Scylla and Charybdis upon the answer filed by Scylla.
Under Section 3(c) of Rule 9, when a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon
the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
Here there was a common cause of action against Scylla and Charybdis since
both were co-signatories to the mortgage deed. Hence the court should
not render judgment by default against Charybdis but should proceed to try
the case upon the answer filed and the evidence presented by Scylla. III. Juliet
invoking the provisions of the Rule on Violence Against Women and their
Children filed with the RTC designated as a Family Court a petition for
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Romeo.
The Family Court issued a 30-day TPO against Romeo. A day before the
expiration of the TPO, Juliet filed a motion for extension. Romeo in his
opposition raised, among others, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262 (The
VAWC Law) arguing that the law authorizing the issuance of a TPO violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the 1987 Constitution. The Family
Court judge, in granting the motion for extension of the TPO, declined to rule
on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262. The Family Court judge reasoned that
Family Courts are without jurisdiction to pass upon constitutional issues,
being a special court of limited jurisdiction and R.A. No. 8369, the law creating
the Family Courts, does not provide for such jurisdiction. Is the Family Court
judge correct when he declined to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9262? (3%)

ANSWER: No, the Family Court judge was not correct when he declined
to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262. The Supreme Court has
held that despite its designation as a Family Court, a Regional Trial Court
remains possessed of authority as a court of general jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute. (Garcia v. Drilon, 25 June 2013)

IV. Strauss filed a complaint against Wagner for cancellation of title. Wagner
moved to dismiss the complaint because Grieg, to whom he mortgaged the
property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not impleaded as defendant. a.)
Should the complaint be dismissed? (3%) b.) If the case should proceed to trial
without Grieg being impleaded as a party to the case, what is his remedy to
protect his interest? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the complaint should not be dismissed.

The Supreme Court has held that non-joinder of an indispensable party


is not a ground of a motion to dismiss. (Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508).
Here although Grieg, the registered mortgagee, is an indispensable party
(Metrobank v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 813 [2001]), his non-joinder does not warrant
the dismissal of the complaint.

b) The remedy of Grieg is to file a motion for leave to intervene. Under


Rule 19, a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation may
intervene in the action. Here Grieg is a mortgagee and such fact was
annotated in the title. Hence he has a legal interest in the title subject-
matter of the litigation and may thus intervene in the case. V. Ernie filed a
petition for guardianship over the person and properties of his father, Ernesto.
Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, Ernesto filed an opposition to the
petition. Ernie, before the hearing of the petition, filed a motion to order
Ernesto to submit himself for mental and physical examination which the court
granted. After Ernie's lawyer completed the presentation of evidence in support
of the petition and the court's ruling on the formal offer of evidence, Ernesto's
lawyer filed a demurrer to evidence. Ernie's lawyer objected on the ground that
a demurrer to evidence is not proper in a special proceeding. a.) Was Ernie's
counsel's objection proper? (2%) b.) If Ernesto defies the court's order directing
him to submit to physical and mental examinations, can the court order his
arrest? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, Ernie’s counsel’s objection was not proper. Under the


Rule on Special Proceedings, in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions, shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
special proceedings. Here there are no special provisions on demurrer to
evidence in the rules on guardianship. Hence the provisions on demurrer to
evidence in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings. Such
application is practicable since it would be a waste of time to continue hearing
the case if upon the facts and the law, guardianship would not be proper.
b) No, the court cannot order Ernesto’s arrest. Under Section 3(d) of Rule 29, a
court cannot direct the arrest of a party for disobeying an order to submit to a
physical or mental examination. The court may impose other penalties such
as rendering judgment by default or issuing an order that the physical or
mental condition of the disobedient party

shall be taken as established in accordance with the claim of the party


obtaining the order. VI. A law was passed declaring Mt. Karbungko as a
protected area since it was a major watershed. The protected area covered a
portion located in Municipality A of the Province I and a portion located in the
City of Z of Province II. Maingat is the leader of Samahan ng Tagapag-ingat ng
Karbungko (STK), a people's organization. He learned that a portion of the
mountain located in the City of Z of Province II was extremely damaged when it
was bulldozed and leveled to the ground, and several trees and plants were cut
down and burned by workers of World Pleasure Resorts, Inc. (WPRI) for the
construction of a hotel and golf course. Upon inquiry with the project site
engineer if they had a permit for the project, Maingat was shown a copy of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the DENR-EMB,
Regional Director (RD-DENR-EMB). Immediately, Maingat and STK filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus against RD-DENR-
EMB and WPRI with the RTC of Province I, a designated environmental court,
as the RD-DENR-EMB negligently issued the ECC to WPRI. On scrutiny of the
petition, the court determined that the area where the alleged actionable
neglect or omission subject of the petition took place in the City of Z of Province
II, and therefore cognizable by the RTC of Province II. Thus, the court
dismissed outright the petition for lack of jurisdiction. a.) Was the court
correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition? (3%) Assuming that the court
did not dismiss the petition, the RD-DENR-EMB in his Comment moved to
dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to appeal the issuance
of the ECC and to exhaust administrative remedies provided in the DENR
Rules and Regulations. b.) Should the court dismiss the petition? (3%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the court was not correct in motu proprio dismissing the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. In a case involving similar facts, the
Supreme Court held that the requirement that the petition be filed in the area
where the actionable neglect or omission took place relates to venue and not to
subject-matter jurisdiction. Since what is involved is improper venue and not
subject-matter jurisdiction, it was wrong for the court to dismiss outright the
petition since venue may be waived. (Dolot v. Paje, 27 August 2013).

b) No, the court should not dismiss the petition. The Supreme Court has held
that in environmental cases, the defense of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies by appealing the ECC issuance would apply only if the defect in the
issuance of the ECC does not have any causal relation to the environmental
damage. Here the issuance of the ECC has a direct causal relation to the
environmental damage since it permitted the bulldozing of a portion of the

mountain and the cutting down and buring of several trees and plants. (See
Paje v. Casiño, 3 February 2015). VII. Plaintiff sued defendant for collection of
P1 million based on the latter's promissory note. The complaint alleges, among
others: 1) Defendant borrowed P1 million from plaintiff as evidenced by a duly
executed promissory note; 2) The promissory note reads: "Makati, Philippines
Dec. 30, 2014

For value received from plaintiff, defendant promises to pay plaintiff P1


million, twelve (12) months from the above indicated date without necessity of
demand.

Signed Defendant"
A copy of the promissory note is attached as Annex "A." Defendant, in his
verified answer, alleged among others: 1) Defendant specifically denies the
allegation in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint, the truth being defendant
did not execute any promissory note in favor of plaintiff, or 2) Defendant has
paid the P1 million claimed in the promissory note (Annex "A" of the Complaint)
as evidenced by an "Acknowledgment Receipt" duly executed by plaintiff on
January 30, 2015 in Manila with his spouse signing as witness. A copy of the
"Acknowledgment Receipt" is attached as Annex "1" hereof.

Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
defendant's answer failed to tender an issue as the allegations therein on his
defenses are sham for being inconsistent; hence, no defense at all. Defendant
filed an opposition claiming his answer tendered an issue. a.) Is judgment on
the pleadings proper? (3%) Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on
the ground that there are no longer any triable genuine issues of facts. b.)
Should the court grant defendant's motion for summary judgment? (3%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, judgment on the pleadings is not proper.

Under Section 2 of Rule 8, a party may set forth two or more statements of a
defense alternatively or hypothetically. The Supreme Court has held that
inconsistent defenses may be pleaded alternatively or hypothetically provided
that each defense is consistent with itself. (Baclayon v. Court of Appeals, 26
February 1990). Hence Plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s answer
failed to tender an issue as his defenses are sham for being inconsistent is
without merit.

b) Yes, the court should grant Defendant’s motion for summary


judgment. Under Section 2 of Rule 35, a defendant may at any time,
move with supporting admissions for a summary judgment in his favor.
Here the Plaintiff had impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the acknowledgment receipt, which was the basis of Defendant’s defense, by
failing to specifically deny it under oath. Hence the Defendant may move
for a summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff had admitted that
Defendant had already paid the P1 million obligation.

VIII. Aldrin entered into a contract to sell with Neil over a parcel of land. The
contract stipulated a P500,000.00 down payment upon signing and the
balance payable in twelve (12) monthly installments of P100,000.00. Aldrin
paid the down payment and had paid three (3) monthly installments when he
found out that Neil had sold the same property to Yuri for P1.5 million paid in
cash. Aldrin sued Neil for specific performance with damages with the RTC.
Yuri, with leave of court, filed an answer-in-intervention as he had already
obtained a TCT in his name. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering
Aldrin to pay all the installments due, the cancellation of Yuri's title, and Neil
to execute a deed of sale in favor of Aldrin. When the judgment became final
and executory, Aldrin paid Neil all the installments but the latter refused to
execute the deed of sale in favor of the former. Aldrin filed a "Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution" with proper notice of hearing. The petition
alleged, among others, that the decision had become final and executory and
he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of execution as a matter of right. Neil
filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it lacked the required
certification against forum shopping. a.) Should the court grant Neil's Motion
to Dismiss? (3%) Despite the issuance of the writ of execution directing Neil to
execute the deed of sale in favor of Aldrin, the former obstinately refused to
execute the deed. b.) What is Aldrin's remedy? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the court should not grant Neil’s Motion to Dismiss.

Under Section 5 of Rule 7, a certification against forum shopping is


required only for initiatory pleadings or petitions. Here the “Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,” although erroneously denominated as a
petition is actually a motion for issuance of a writ of execution under Rule 39.
Hence the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of a certification against
forum shopping should be denied. b) Aldrin’s remedy is to file a
motion for judgment for specific act under Section 10(a) of Rule 39.
Under Section 10(a) of Rule 39, if a judgment directs a party to execute a
conveyance of land and the party fails to comply, the court may direct the act
to be done at the disobedient party’s cost by some other person appointed by
the court or the court may by an order divest the title of the party and vest it in
the movant or other person. IX. Hades, an American citizen, through a dating
website, got acquainted with Persephone, a Filipina. Hades came to the
Philippines and proceeded to Baguio City where Persephone resides. Hades and
Persephone contracted marriage, solemnized by the Metropolitan Trial Court
judge of Makati City. After the wedding, Hades flew back to California, United
States of America, to wind up his business affairs. On his return to the
Philippines, Hades discovered that Persephone had an illicit affair with Phanes.
Immediately, Hades returned to the United States and was able to obtain a
valid divorce decree from the Superior Court of the County of San Mateo,
California, a court of competent jurisdiction against Persephone. Hades desires
to marry Hestia, also a Filipina, whom he met at Baccus Grill in Pasay City. a.)
As Hades' lawyer, what petition should you file in order that your client can
avoid prosecution for bigamy if he desires to marry Hestia? (2%) b.) In what
court should you file the petition? (1 %) c.) What is the essential requisite that
you must comply with for the purpose of establishing jurisdictional facts before
the court can hear the petition? (3%)

ANSWERS:

a) As Hade’s lawyer, I would file a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage


under Rule 108 with prayer for recognition of foreign divorce judgment. In a
case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce
decree must first be recognized before it can be given effect. The Supreme
Court stated that the recognition may be prayed for in the petition for
cancellation of the marriage entry under Rule 108. (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628
SCRA 266).

b) I would file the petition in the regional trial court of Makati City,
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Section 1 of Rule 108).

c) For the Rule 108 petition, the jurisdictional facts are the following:

1. Joinder of the local civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by petition. 2. Notice of the order of hearing
to the persons named in the petition. 3. Publication of the order of hearing in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

X. An information for murder was filed against Rapido. The RTC judge, after
personally evaluating the prosecutor's resolution, documents and parties'
affidavits submitted by the prosecutor, found probable cause and issued a
warrant of arrest. Rapido's lawyer examined the rollo of the case and found
that it only contained the copy of the information, the submissions of the
prosecutor and a copy of the warrant of arrest. Immediately, Rapido's counsel
filed a motion to quash the arrest warrant for being void, citing as grounds: a.)
The judge before issuing the warrant did not personally conduct a searching
examination of the prosecution witnesses in violation of his client's
constitutionally-mandated rights; b.) There was no prior order finding probable
cause before the judge issued the arrest warrant. May the warrant of arrest be
quashed on the grounds cited by Rapido' s counsel? State your reason for each
ground. (4%)

ANSWER:

No, the warrant of arrest may not be quashed on the grounds cited by Rapido’s
counsel. a) The Supreme Court has held in Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
(1988) that Section 2 of Art. III of the Constitution does not mandatorily require
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The judge
may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted
by the regarding the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof issue
a warrant of arrest. b) There is no requirement of a prior order by the judge
finding probable cause. The SC has held that the judge may rely upon the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor provided that he personally evaluates
the same and the affidavits and supporting documents, which he did. (People
v. Grey, 26 July 2010).

XI. The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge with plunder the
provincial governor, vice governor, treasurer, budget officer, and accountant.
An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against the
provincial officials except for the treasurer who was granted immunity when he
agreed to cooperate with the Ombudsman in the prosecution of the case.
Immediately, the governor filed with the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari
against the Ombudsman claiming there was grave abuse of discretion in
excluding the treasurer from the Information. a.) Was the remedy taken by the
governor correct? (2%) b.) Will the writ of mandamus lie to compel the
Ombudsman to include the

treasurer in the Information? (3%) c.) Can the Special Prosecutor move for the
discharge of the budget officer to corroborate the testimony of the treasurer in
the course of presenting its evidence? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the remedy taken by the governor was not correct. The SC has held
that the proper remedy from the Ombudsman’s orders or resolutions in
criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme
Court. (Quarto v OMB, 5 Oct 2011; Cortes v. OMB, 10 June 2013). Here
the petition for certiorari was filed not with the Supreme Court but the
Sandiganbayan. Hence the remedy taken was not correct.

b) No, the writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the Ombudsman to include
the Treasurer in the information. The Supreme Court has held that
mandamus will lie only if the exclusion of a person from the information was
arbitrary. Here the exclusion was not arbitrary but based on Sec. 17 of RA
6770 which empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity to witnesses. (Id.).

c) No, the Special Prosecutor cannot move for the discharge of the
budget officer to corroborate the testimony of the treasurer. Under
Section 17 of Rule 119, a requirement for discharge is that there is no other
direct evidence available for the prosecution of the offense and that there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested. Here since the budget officer’s testimony is merely corroborative,
there is no absolute necessity for it. Necessity is not there when the testimony
would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.
(Jimenez v People, 17 September 2014). Hence the Special Prosecutor cannot
move for the discharge of the budget officer. XII. Paz was awakened by a
commotion coming from a condo unit next to hers. Alarmed, she called up the
nearby police station. PO 1 Remus and P02 Romulus proceeded to the condo
unit identified by Paz. PO 1 Remus knocked at the door and when a man
opened the door, POI Remus and his companions introduced themselves as
police officers. The man readily identified himself as Oasis Jung and gestured
to them to come in. Inside, the police officers saw a young lady with her nose
bleeding and face swollen. Asked by P02 Romulus what happened, the lady
responded that she was beaten up by Oasis Jung. The police officers arrested
Oasis Jung and brought him and the young lady back to the police station. PO
1 Remus took the young lady's statement who identified herself as AA. She
narrated that she is a sixteen-year-old high school student; that previous

to the incident, she had sexual intercourse with Oasis Jung at least five times
on different occasions and she was paid P5,000.00 each time and it was the
first time that Oasis Jung physically hurt her. P02 Romulus detained Oasis
Jung at the station's jail. After the inquest proceeding, the public prosecutor
filed an information for Violation of R.A. No. 9262 (The VAWC Law) for physical
violence and five separate informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Child
Abuse Law). Oasis Jung's lawyer filed a motion to be admitted to bail but the
court issued an order that approval of his bail bond shall be made only after
his arraignment. a.) Did the court properly impose that bail condition? (3%)
Before arraignment, Oasis Jung's lawyer moved to quash the other four
separate informations for violation of the child abuse law invoking the single
larceny rule. b.) Should the motion to quash be granted? (2%) c.) After his
release from detention on bail, can Oasis Jung still question the validity of his
arrest? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, the court did not properly impose the condition that the approval of the
bail bond shall be made only after the arraignment.

In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise
the accused may be hindered from filing a motion to quash since his
arraignment would necessarily be deferred pending the resolution of the motion
to quash. This would amount to a substantial dilution of his right to file a
motion to quash. (Lavides v. Court of Appeals, 1 February 2000).

b) No, the motion to quash should not be granted. In a case involving


similar facts, the Supreme Court held that each act of sexual intercourse with
a minor is a separate and distinct offense under R.A. No. 7610. Hence
the single larceny or single offense rule is not applicable. (Id.).

c) Yes, Oasis Jung can still question the validity of his arrest after his release
from detention on bail. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest provided that he does so before entering his plea. (Sec. 26, Rule 114).
XIII. Jaime was convicted for murder by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
in a decision promulgated on September 30, 2015. On October 5, 2015, Jaime
filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground that errors of law and irregularities
prejudicial to his rights were committed during his trial. On October 7, 2015,
the private prosecutor, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, filed an
Opposition to Jaime's motion. On October 9, 2015, the court granted Jaime's
motion. On October 12, 2015, the public prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration. The

court issued an Order dated October 16, 2015 denying the public prosecutor's
motion for reconsideration. The public prosecutor received his copy of the order
of denial on October 20, 2015 while the private prosecutor received his copy on
October 26, 2015. a.) What is the remedy available to the prosecution from the
court's order granting Jaime's motion for new trial? (3%) b.) In what court and
within what period should a remedy be availed of? (1%) c.) Who should pursue
the remedy? (2%)
ANSWERS:

a) The remedy available to the prosecution from the court's order


granting Jaime's motion for new trial is a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65. Under Section 1(b) of Rule 41, no appeal may be taken
from an interlocutory order and the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action as provided in Rule 65. Here the order granting the
motion for new trial is an interlocutory order since it does not completely
dispose of the case but still leaves something to be done, that is, conducting
the new trial. Hence the available remedy is the special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65. b) The special civil action for certiorari should
be filed with the Court of Appeals. It should be filed within 60 days from
receipt by the public prosecutor of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 65. The 60-day period should
be reckoned from the receipt by the public prosecutor who has the direction
and control of the prosecution pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 110.

c) The remedy should be pursued by the Office of the Solicitor


General.

Under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code, the authority to represent the government in criminal
cases before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court is vested solely in the
Office of the Solicitor General. (Cario v. De Castro, 30 April 2008).

XIV. Pedro was charged with theft for stealing Juan's cellphone worth
P10,000.00. Prosecutor Marilag at the pre-trial submitted the judicial affidavit
of Juan attaching the receipt for the purchase of the cellphone to prove civil
liability. She also submitted the judicial affidavit of Mario, an eyewitness who
narrated therein how Pedro stole Juan's cellphone. At the trial, Pedro's lawyer
objected to the prosecution's use of judicial affidavits of her witnesses
considering the imposable penalty on the offense with which his client was
charged. a.) Is Pedro's lawyer correct in objecting to the judicial affidavit of
Mario? (2%)

b.) Is Pedro's lawyer correct in objecting to the judicial affidavit of Juan?

(2%)

At the conclusion of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, Prosecutor


Marilag orally offered the receipt attached to Juan's judicial affidavit, which the
court admitted over the objection of Pedro's lawyer. After Pedro's presentation
of his evidence, the court rendered judgment finding him guilty as charged and
holding him civilly liable for P20,000.00. Pedro's lawyer seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the court erred in
awarding the civil liability on the basis of Juan's judicial affidavit, a
documentary evidence which Prosecutor Marilag failed to orally offer. c.) Is the
motion for reconsideration meritorious? (2%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, Pedro’s lawyer is not correct in objecting to the judicial affidavit


of Mario. The Judicial Affidavit Rule applies to criminal actions where
the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years. Here
the penalty for theft of property not exceeding P12,000 does not exceed 6 years.
Hence the Judicial Affidavit Rule applies.

b) No, Pedro's lawyer is not correct in objecting to the judicial affidavit


of Juan. The Judicial Affidavit Rule applies with respect to the civil
aspect of the criminal actions, whatever the penalties involved are. Here
the purpose of introducing the judicial affidavit of Juan was to prove his civil
liability.

c) No, the motion for reconsideration is not meritorious.

A judicial affidavit is not a documentary evidence but is testimonial


evidence. It is simply a witness’s testimony reduced to writing in affidavit form.
This is shown by Section 6 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule which states that the
offer of testimony in judicial affidavit shall be made at the start of the
presentation of the witness. Hence the motion for reconsideration on
the ground that Juan’s judicial affidavit was a documentary evidence which
was not orally offered is without merit. XV. Water Builders, a construction
company based in Makati City, entered into a construction agreement with
Super Powers, Inc., an energy company based in Manila, for the construction of
a mini hydro electric plant. Water Builders failed to complete the project within
the stipulated duration. Super Powers cancelled the contract. Water Builders
filed a request for arbitration with the Construction

Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). After due proceedings, CIAC rendered


judgment in favor of Super Powers, Inc. ordering Water Builders to pay the
former P 10 million, the full amount of the down payment paid, and P2 million
by way of liquidated damages. Dissatisfied with the CIAC's judgment, Water
Builders, pursuant to the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR Rules) filed with the RTC of Pasay City a petition to vacate the
arbitral award. Super Powers, Inc., in its opposition, moved to dismiss the
petition, invoking the ADR Rules, on the ground of improper venue as neither
of the parties were doing business in Pasay City. Should Water Builders'
petition be dismissed? (3%) ANSWER:

Yes Water Builders’ petition should be dismissed. Under Rule


11.3 of the Special ADR Rules, the petition for vacation of a domestic arbitral
award may be filed with the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the
place in which one of the parties is doing business, where any of the parties
reside or where arbitration proceedings were conducted. Here neither of
the parties were doing business in Pasay City nor was there a showing that
arbitration proceedings were conducted in Pasay City. XVI. AA, a twelve-year-
old girl, while walking alone met BB, a teenage boy who befriended her. Later,
BB brought AA to a nearby shanty where he raped her. The Information for
rape filed against BB states: "On or about October 30, 2015, in the City of S.P.
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor,
fifteen (15) years old with lewd design and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had
sexual intercourse with AA, a minor, twelve (12) years old against the latter's
will and consent." At the trial, the prosecutor called to the witness stand AA as
his first witness and manifested that he be allowed to ask leading questions in
conducting his direct examination pursuant to the Rule on the Examination of
a Child Witness. BB's counsel objected on the ground that the prosecutor has
not conducted a competency examination on the witness, a requirement before
the rule cited can be applied in the case. a.) Is BB's counsel correct? (3%) In
order to obviate the counsel's argument on the competency of AA as
prosecution witness, the judge motu proprio conducted his voir dire
examination on AA. b.) Was the action taken by the judge proper? (2%) After
the prosecution had rested its case, BB' s counsel filed with leave a demurrer
to evidence, seeking the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
prosecutor failed to present any evidence on BB' s minority as alleged in the
Information. c.) Should the court grant the demurrer? (3%)

ANSWERS:

a) No, BB’s counsel is not correct. Under the Rules on


Examination of a Child Witness, there is no requirement that a competency
examination of the child witness be conducted before leading questions may be
asked of her. A competency examination may be conducted by the court (not
the prosecutor) only if substantial doubt exists as to the child’s competency to
testify. (Section 6, RECW). Here there is no showing of any substantial
doubt as to the competency of AA to testify. Hence BB’s counsel is not correct.

b) No, the action taken by the judge was improper. Under the
Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, a competency examination may be
conducted by the court only if substantial doubt exists as to the child’s
competency to testify. (Section 6, RECW). Here the judge’s voir dire is in
effect a competency examination. However there is no showing of any
substantial doubt as to the competency of AA to testify. Hence the judge’s
action was improper.

c) No the court may not grant the demurrer. Under the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, a demurrer to evidence may be granted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. Here even assuming that minority was not
proved, BB may still be convicted of rape since minority is not an element of
rape. XVII. Hercules was walking near a police station when a police officer
signaled for him to approach. As soon as Hercules came near, the police officer
frisked him but the latter found no contraband. The police officer told Hercules
to get inside the police station. Inside the police station, Hercules asked the
police officer, "Sir, may problema po ba?" Instead of replying, the police officer
locked up Hercules inside the police station jail. a.) What is the remedy
available to Hercules to secure his immediate release from detention? (2%) b.) If
Hercules filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for warrantless search, as
counsel for the police officer, what defense will you raise for the dismissal of
the complaint? (3%) c.) If Hercules opts to file a civil action against the police
officer, will he have a cause of action? (3%)

ANSWERS:

a) The remedy available to Hercules to secure his immediate release


from detention is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Under Rule 102,
the writ of habeas corpus is available in cases of illegal detention. Section 5 of
Rule 102 provides that a court or judge authorized to grant the writ must,
when the petition therefor is presented and it appears that

the writ ought to issue, grant the same forthwith, and immediately thereupon
the clerk of court shall issue the writ or in case of emergency, the judge may
issue the writ under his own hand and may depute any officer or person to
serve it. The court or judge before whom the writ is returned must immediately
proceed to hear and examine the return. (Section 12, Rule 102). b) I will
raise the defense that the warrantless search was authorized as a “stop and
frisk.” “Stop and frisk” is the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons and contraband whenever
he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal
activity may be afoot. (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1).

c) Yes Hercules will have a cause of action. Under Article 32(4)


of the Civil Code, any public officer who violates the right of a person to
freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention shall be liable to the latter for
damages. The action to recover damages is an independent civil action.
Here Hercules was illegally detained as there was no probable cause to arrest
him without warrant.

XVIII. The residents of Mt. Ahohoy, headed by Masigasig, formed a


nongovernmental organization - Alyansa Laban sa Minahan sa Ahohoy (ALMA)
to protest the mining operations of Oro Negro Mining in the mountain. ALMA
members picketed daily at the entrance of the mining site blocking the ingress
and egress of trucks and equipment of Oro Negro, hampering its operations.
Masigasig had an altercation with Mapusok arising from the complaint of the
mining engineer of Oro Negro that one of their trucks was destroyed by ALMA
members. Mapusok is the leader of the Association of Peace Keepers of Ahohoy
(APKA), a civilian volunteer organization serving as auxiliary force of the local
police to maintain peace and order in the area. Subsequently, Masigasig
disappeared. Mayumi, the wife of Masigasig, and the members of ALMA
searched for Masigasig, but all their efforts proved futile. Mapagmatyag, a
member of ALMA, learned from Maingay, a member of APKA, during their binge
drinking that Masigasig was abducted by other members of APKA, on order of
Mapusok. Mayumi and ALMA sought the assistance of the local police to
search for Masigasig, but they refused to extend their cooperation.
Immediately, Mayumi filed with the RTC, a petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo against Mapusok and APKA. ALMA also filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo with the Court of Appeals against Mapusok and
APKA. Respondents Mapusok and APKA, in their Return filed with the RTC,
raised among their defenses that they are not agents of the State; hence,
cannot be impleaded as respondents in an amparo petition. a.) Is their defense
tenable? (3%)

Respondents Mapusok and APKA, in their Return filed with the Court of
Appeals, raised as their defense that the petition should be dismissed on the
ground that ALMA cannot file the petition because of the earlier petition filed
by Mayumi with the RTC. b.) Are respondents correct in raising their defense?
(3%) c.) Mayumi later filed separate criminal and civil actions against Mapusok.
How will the cases affect the amparo petition she earlier filed? (1 %) ANSWERS:

a) No, the defense of Mapusok and APKA that they are not agents of
the State and hence cannot be impleaded as respondents in an amparo petition
is not tenable. The writ of amparo is available in cases where the
enforced or involuntary disappearance of a persons is with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State. (See Sec. 3[g] of R.A. No. 9851 and
Navia v. Pardico, 19 June 2012, e.b.). Here Mapusok and APKA may be
considered as acting with the support or at least the acquiescence of the State
since APKA serves as an auxiliary force of the police and the police refused to
assist in the search for Masigasig. b) Yes respondents are correct in
raising their defense. Under Section 2(c) of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, the filing of a petition by an authorized party on behalf of the
aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order in Section
2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Here the petition for writ of
amparo had earlier been filed by the spouse of the aggrieved party Masigasig.
Thus it suspends the right of all others, including ALMA, to file the petition.

c) The amparo petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.


(Section 23, Rule on the Writ of Amparo).

Suggested Answers To 2016 Remedial Law Bar Exam:

State at least five (5) civil cases that fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs). (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The following civil cases fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTCs:

1. Actions where the demand or the value of the property in controversy


exceeds P300,000, or, in Metro Manila, P400,000, exclusive of damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, interests, and costs.
2. Real actions where the assessed value of the real property involved
exceeds P20,000, or in Metro Manila, P50,000.
3. Actions whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
4. Probate cases where the gross value of the estate exceeds P300,000, or
in Metro Manila, P400,000.
5. Actions not falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of any other court,
tribunal, body, or person, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
II

[a] Briefly explain the procedure on "Interrogatories to Parties" under Rule 25


and state the effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. (2.5%)

[b] Briefly explain the procedure on "Admission by Adverse Party" under Rule
26 and the effect of failure to file and serve the request. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)

The procedure on “Interrogatories to Parties” under Rule 25 is briefly explained


as follows:

1. A party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from an adverse


party shall file and serve upon the latter written interrogatories to be answered
by the latter.
2. The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be
signed and sworn to by the person making them. The interrogatories shall be
answered within 15 days from service thereof. The answers may be used for
the same purposes provided for in Section 4 of Rule 23 on depositions.
3. Objections to any interrogatories may be made within 10 days after
service thereof.

The effect of the failure to serve written interrogatories is that unless allowed
by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party
not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse
party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

(b)

The procedure on “Admission by Adverse Party” under Rule 25 is briefly


explained as follows:
1. At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant document or the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact.
2. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within the period designated in the request, which shall not
be less than 15 days after service thereof, the party to whom the request is
directed files and serves upon the requesting party a sworn statement either
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting
forth in detail why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matter.
3. Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court
within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement.

The effect of the failure to file and serve request for admission is that, unless
allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a
party who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the adverse party of
material and relevant facts at issue which are, or ought to be, within the
personal knowledge of the latter, shall not be allowed to present evidence on
such facts.

III

What are the contents of a judicial affidavit? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The contents of a judicial affidavit are as follows:

(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the
witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the
examination of the witness and the place where the examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully
conscious that he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability
for false testimony or perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers,
consecutively numbered, that:
1. Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts
upon which he testifies;
2. Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case
presents; and
3. Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish
their authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or
an officer who is authorized by law to administer the same.

IV

Eduardo, a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila a complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy Bank (Galaxy), and the consequent·
foreclosure and auction sale of his mortgaged Makati property. Galaxy filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue alleging that the complaint
should be filed with the RTC of Makati since the complaint involves the
ownership and possession of Eduardo's lot. Resolve the motion with reasons.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue should be granted.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the venue of real actions shall be with the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property involved
is situated. An action for annulment of mortgage is a real action if there has
already been a foreclosure sale. (See Chua v. Total Office Products and
Services, 30 September 2005).

Here there was already a foreclosure sale. Hence the action for annulment of
mortgage is a real action which should have been filed in Makati where the real
property is situated.
V

[a] What is the "most important witness" rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines
of Pretrial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures? Explain. (2.5%)
[b] What is the "one day examination of witness" rule pursuant to the said 2004
Guidelines? Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a)
The “most important witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial
and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that the judge shall,
during the pretrial conference, determine the most important witnesses to be
heard and limit the number of witnesses.

(b)
The “one-day examination of a witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines
of Pretrial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that a witness
has to be fully examined in one day only, subject to the court’s discretion to
extend the direct and/or cross-examination for justifiable reasons.

VI

Pedro and Juan are residents of Barangay Ifurug, Municipality of Dupac,


Mountain Province. Pedro owes Juan the amount of P50,000.00. Due to
nonpayment, Juan brought his complaint to the Council of Elders of said
barangay which implements the bodong justice system. Both appeared before
the council where they verbally agreed that Pedro will pay in installments on
specific due dates. Pedro reneged on his promise. Juan filed a complaint for
sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Pedro filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the case did not pass through the barangay
conciliation under R.A. No. 7160 and that the RTC, not the MTC, has
jurisdiction. In his opposition, Juan argued that the intervention of the Council
of Elders is substantial compliance with the requirement of R.A. No. 7160 and
the claim of P50,000.00 is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. As MTC
judge, rule on the motion and explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As MTC judge, I would deny the motion to dismiss.


Under the Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, a motion to dismiss on
whatever ground is a prohibited motion.
Here the complaint falls under the coverage of the Rules of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases since the claim for sum of money did not exceed
P100,000. Hence the motion to dismiss filed by Pedro is a prohibited motion
and should thus be denied. [Note: Threshold amount was subsequently
increased to P200,000]

VII

Spouses Marlon and Edith have three (3) children ages 15, 12 and 7, who are
studying at public schools. They have a combined gross monthly income of
P30,000.00 and they stay in an apartment in Manila with a monthly rent of
P5,000.00. The monthly minimum wage per employee in Metro Manila does not
exceed P13,000.00. They do not own any real property. The spouses want to
collect a loan of P25,000.00 from Jojo but do not have the money to pay the
filing fees.
[a] Would the spouses qualify as indigent litigants under Section 19, Rule 141
on Legal Fees? (2.5%)
[b] If the spouses do not qualify under Rule 141, what other remedy can they
avail of under the rules to exempt them from paying the filing fees? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
No, the spouses would not qualify as indigent litigants under Section 19, Rule
141 since their combined gross monthly income of P30,000 exceeds P26,000,
the amount double the monthly minimum wage.

(b)
The other remedy the spouses can avail of under the rules to exempt them
from paying the filing fees is to apply for exemption pursuant to the “indigency
test” under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court if they can prove that they
have “no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for [themselves] and their family.” (Sps. Algura v. City of Naga, 30
October 2006).

VIII

Juan sued Roberto for specific performance. Roberto knew that Juan was going
to file the case so he went out of town and temporarily stayed in another city to
avoid service of summons. Juan engaged the services of Sheriff Matinik to
serve the summons but when the latter went to the residence of Roberto, he
was told by the caretaker thereof that his employer no longer resides at the
house. The caretaker is a high school graduate and is the godson of Roberto.
Believing the caretaker's story to be true, Sheriff Matinik left a copy of the
summons and complaint with the caretaker. Was there a valid substituted
service of summons? Discuss the requirements for a valid service of summons.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, there was a valid service of summons.


In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that there was a valid
substituted service of summons since the defendant was engaged in deception
to thwart the orderly administration of justice.
Here the defendant was also engaged in deception since he temporarily stayed
in another city to avoid service of summons and his caretaker falsely said he no
longer resides in the house. (Sagana v. Francisco, 2 Oct 2009).

The requirements for a valid substituted service of summons are:

1. The defendant, for justifiable reasons, cannot be personally served with


summons within a reasonable time.
2. Copies of the summons shall be left at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the
copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. [Note: The call should be read as referring only to a
valid substituted service of summons; otherwise the answer would be
kilometric as there are several ways to serve summons under Rule 14]

IX

[a] Is the buyer in the auction sale arising from an extra-judicial foreclosure
entitled to a writ of possession even before the expiration of the redemption
period? If so, what is the action to be taken? (1%)
[b] After the period of redemption has lapsed and the title to the lot is
consolidated in the name of the auction buyer, is he entitled to the writ of
possession as a matter of right? If so, what is the action to be taken? (2%)
[c] Suppose that after the title to the lot has been consolidated in the name of
the auction buyer, said buyer sold the lot to a third party without first getting a
writ of possession. Can the transferee exercise the right of the auction buyer
and claim that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession
in his favor? Briefly explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the buyer in such auction sale is entitled
to a writ of possession even before the expiration of the redemption period. The
action to be taken is to file an ex parte petition for a writ of possession with the
RTC furnishing a bond to the debtor. Upon approval of the bond, the buyer
would be entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession.

Also under Section 47 of the General Banking Law, the purchaser at a judicial
or extrajudicial foreclosure sale where the mortgagee is a bank shall have the
right to enter and take possession of the property immediately after the date of
the confirmation of the auction sale.

(b)
Yes, the buyer is entitled to the writ of possession as a matter of right. After
consolidation of ownership, a writ of possession will issue as a matter of
course, without the filing and approval of a bond. The action to be taken is to
file an ex parte petition for issuance of writ of possession with the RTC
pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135. (Navarra v. CA, 204 SCRA 850).

(c)
Yes. The Supreme Court has held that a transferee of the purchaser or
winning bidder may file an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The reason is that the transferee steps into the shoes of the
purchaser and acquires whatever rights the transferor had. (Laureno v.
Bormaheco, 404 Phil. 80).

Hannibal, Donna, Florence and Joel, concerned residents of Laguna de Bay,


filed a complaint for mandamus against the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
Department of Public Work and Highways, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Department of Agriculture, Department of Budget, and Philippine
National Police before the RTC of Laguna alleging that the continued neglect of
defendants in performing their duties has resulted in serious deterioration of
the water quality of the lake and the degradation of the marine life in the lake.
The plaintiffs prayed that said government agencies be ordered to clean up
Laguna de Bay and restore its water quality to Class C waters as prescribed by
Presidential Decree No. 1152, otherwise known as the Philippine Environment
Code. Defendants raise the defense that the cleanup of the lake is not a
ministerial function and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to perform
the same. The RTC of Laguna rendered a decision declaring that it is the duty
of the agencies to clean up Laguna de Bay and issued a permanent writ of
mandamus ordering said agencies to perform their duties prescribed by law
relating to the cleanup of Laguna de Bay.
[a] Is the RTC correct in issuing the writ of mandamus? Explain. (2.5%)
[b] What is the writ of continuing mandamus? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, the RTC is correct. In MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 18
December 2008, the SC held that the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay
can be compelled by mandamus. The ruling in MMDA may be applied by
analogy to the clean up of the Laguna de Bay.
While the term issued by the RTC of Laguna is a permanent writ of mandamus,
this should be considered only as a semantic error and that what the RTC
really intended to issue is a writ of continuing mandamus. There is no such
thing as a permanent writ of mandamus since the writ shall cease to be
effective once the judgment is fully satisfied.

(b)
The writ of continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government
or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment
which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

XI

Miguel filed a Complaint for damages against Jose, who denied liability and
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In
an Order received by Jose on January 5, 2015, the trial court denied the
Motion to Dismiss. On February 4, 2015, Jose sought reconsideration of that
Order through a Motion for Reconsideration. Miguel opposed the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time. Jose countered that
the 15-day rule under Section 1 of Rule 52 does not apply where the Order
sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order that does not attain finality.
Is Jose correct? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Jose is correct.


The 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration under Section 1 of Rule
52 refers to a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution or
order.
Here what is involved is an order denying a motion to dismiss, which is not a
final order as it does not terminate the case. The order is simply an
interlocutory order which may be reconsidered by the trial court at any time
during the pendency of the case. [See Rasdas v. Estenor, 13 Dec 2005]. It
should also be noted that Miguel did not file a motion to declare Jose in
default.

XII

Tailors Toto, Nelson and Yenyen filed a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 from an adverse decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on the complaint for illegal dismissal against Empire Textile
Corporation. They were terminated on the ground that they failed to meet the
prescribed production quota at least four (4) times. The NLRC decision was
assailed in a special civil action under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals
(CA). In the verification and certification against forum shopping, only Toto
signed the verification and certification, while Atty. Arman signed for Nelson.
Empire filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of defective verification and
certification. Decide with reasons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The motion to dismiss on the ground of defective verification should be


denied. The Supreme Court has held that a lawyer may verify a pleading in
behalf of the client. Moreover a verification is merely a formal and not a
jurisdictional requirement. The court should not dismiss the case but merely
require the party concerned to rectify the defect.
The motion to dismiss on the ground of defective certification against forum-
shopping should likewise be denied. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only
one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies
with the Rule. (Jacinto v. Gumaru, 2 June 2014).
Here the Petitioners have a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action, that is, their illegal dismissal by Empire Textile Corporation for failure
to meet production quotas.

XIII

The officers of "Ang Kapaligiran ay Alagaan, Inc." engaged your services to file
an action against ABC Mining Corporation which is engaged in mining
operations in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. ABC used highly toxic chemicals in
extracting gold. ABC's toxic mine tailings were accidentally released from its
storage dams and were discharged into the rivers of said town. The mine
tailings found their way to Calancan Bay and allegedly to the waters of nearby
Romblon and Quezon. The damage to the crops and loss of earnings were
estimated at P1 Billion. Damage to the environment is estimated at P1 Billion.
As lawyer for the organization, you are requested to explain the advantages
derived from a petition for writ of kalikasan before the Supreme Court over a
complaint for damages before the RTC of Marinduque or vice-versa. What
action will you recommend? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I will recommend the filing of a Petition for the issuance of a Writ of


Kalikasan. The following are the advantages of such a petition over a civil
complaint for damages.
Firstly there will be no issue regarding the legal standing or legal capacity of
the Ang Kapaligiran ay Alagaan Inc.” (AKAI)to file the action. Section 1, Rule 7
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC) provides that the
writ of Kalikasan is available to a people’s organization, non-governmental
organization, or any public interest group. On the other hand, the legal
capacity of AKAI to file an action for damages in behalf of its members may be
questioned since a corporation has a personality separate from that of its
members.

Secondly, the petitioner in a petition for writ of kalikasan is exempt from the
payment of docket fees unlike in a civil complaint for damages.

Thirdly in a petition for writ of kalikasan, the petitioners may avail of the
precautionary principle in environmental cases which provides that when
human activities may lead to threats of serious and irreversible damage to the
environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, action shall be taken
to avoid or diminish that threat. In effect, the precautionary principle shifts
the burden of evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer harm and onto
those desiring to change the status quo. In a civil complaint for damages, the
burden of proof to show damages is on the plaintiff.

Finally, the judgment is a writ of kalikasan case is immediately executory


unlike in a civil complaint for damages.

The advantage of the civil complaint for damages is that the court may award
damages to the Petitioners for the injury suffered which is not the case in a
petition for writ of kalikasan. At any rate a person who avails of the Writ of
Kalikasan may also file a separate suit for the recovery of damages.

XIV

Pedro, the principal witness in a criminal case, testified and completed his
testimony on direct examination in 2015. Due to several postponements by the
accused, grounded on his recurring illness, which were all granted by the
judge, the cross-examination of Pedro was finally set on October 15, 2016.
Before the said date, Pedro died. The accused moved to expunge Pedro's
testimony on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation and the right
to cross-examine the witness. The prosecution opposed the motion and asked
that Pedro's testimony on direct examination be admitted as evidence. Is the
motion meritorious? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the motion to expunge Pedro’s testimony on the ground that it violates the
accused’s right to confront the witness is not meritorious.
The Supreme Court has held that where the delay in cross-examining the
witness was imputable to the accused, he could not be heard to complain if the
witness becomes unavailable through no fault of the party presenting the
witness and hence the witness’s direct examination should not be stricken
out.
Here the delay in cross-examining Pedro was imputable to the motions for
postponement filed by the accused and the death of Pedro was not the fault of
the prosecution.

XV
Chika sued Gringo, a Venezuelan, for a sum of money. The Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (MeTC) rendered a decision ordering Gringo to pay Chika
P50,000.00 plus legal interest. During its pendency of the appeal before the
RTC, Gringo died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis. Atty. Perfecto, counsel of
Gringo, filed a manifestation attaching the death certificate of Gringo and
informing the RTC that he cannot substitute the heirs since Gringo did not
disclose any information on his family. As counsel for Chika, what remedy can
you recommend to your client so the case can move forward and she can
eventually recover her money? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The remedy I can recommend to my client Chika is to file a petition for


settlement of the estate of Gringo and for the appointment of an
administrator. Chika as a creditor is an interested person who can file the
petition for settlement of Gringo’s estate. Once the administrator is appointed,
I will move that the administrator be substituted as the defendant. I will also
file my claim against Gringo as a contingent claim in the probate proceedings
pursuant to Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

XVI

Under Section 5, Rule 113 a warrantless arrest is allowed when an offense has
just been committed and the peace officer has probable cause to believe, based
on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has committed it. A policeman approaches you for advice and asks
you how he will execute a warrantless arrest against a murderer who escaped
after killing a person. The policeman arrived two (2) hours after the killing and
a certain Max was allegedly the killer per information given by a witness. He
asks you to clarify the following:
[a] How long after the commission of the crime can he still execute the
warrantless arrest? (2.5%)
[b] What does "personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" mean? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
The arrest must be made within 24 hours after the commission of the
crime. Where the arrest took place a day after the commission of the crime, it
cannot be said that an offense has just been committed. (People v. Del Rosario,
305 SCRA 740).

(b)
"Personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested committed it" means personal knowledge not of the commission of the
crime itself but of facts and circumstances which would lead to the conclusion
that the person to be arrested has probably committed the crime. Such
personal knowledge arises from reasonably worthy information in the arresting
person’s possession coupled with his own observation and fair inferences
therefrom that the person arrested has probably committed the
offense. (Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337).

XVII

The information against Roger Alindogan for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code avers:

"That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of February 1, 2010 at Barangay


Matalaba, Imus, Cavite and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, through force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
sexual abuse on his daughter, Rose Domingo, a minor of 11 years old, either by
raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, against her will and
consent to her damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."

The accused wants to have the case dismissed because he believes that the
charge is confusing and the information is defective. What ground or grounds
can he raise in moving for the quashal of the information? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The grounds which the accused can raise in moving for the quashal of the
information are the following:

1. THE INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE. The


information charges two offenses, that is, rape and sexual abuse. Worse, the
charges are stated in the alternative, making it unclear to the accused as to
what offense exactly he is being charged with.
2. THE INFORMATION DOES NOT CONFORM SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE
REQUIRED FORM. The information merely states that the accused committed
acts of lasciviousness upon the victim without specifying what those acts of
lasciviousness were.

XVIII

John filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Anne on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
obtained a copy of the confidential psychiatric evaluation report on his wife
from the secretary of the psychiatrist. Can he testify on the said report without
offending the rule on privileged communication? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, John can testify on the psychiatric report without offending the rule on
privileged communication.
In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that there is no
violation of physician-patient privilege since the one testifying is not the
psychiatrist. The privilege bars only the physician, not other persons. (Krohn
v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 146).
There is no violation of marital communication privilege since the report is not
a confidential communication between spouses.
There is also no violation of the marital disqualification rule since the case
involves an exception, that is, a civil case by one spouse against the other.

XIX

Tristan filed a suit with the RTC of Pasay against Arthur King and/or Estate of
Arthur King for reconveyance of a lot declared in the name of Arthur King
under TCT No. 1234. The complaint alleged that "on account Arthur King's
residence abroad up to the present and the uncertainty of whether he is still
alive or dead, he or his estate may be served with summons by publication."
Summons was published and nobody filed any responsive pleading within sixty
(60) days therefrom. Upon motion, defendants were declared in default and
judgment was rendered declaring Tristan as legal owner and ordering
defendants to reconvey said lot to Tristan.
Jojo, the court-designated administrator of Arthur King's estate, filed a petition
for annulment of judgment before the CA praying that the decision in favor of
Tristan be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction. He claims that the
action filed by Tristan is an action in personam and that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over defendants Arthur King and/or his estate. On the
other hand, Tristan claims that the suit is an action in rem or at least an
action quasi in rem. Is the RTC judge correct in ordering service of summons
by publication? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the RTC judge is correct in ordering service of summons by publication.

Under S15 R14, extraterritorial service, which includes service by


publication, may be availed of in actions the subject of which is property within
the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest or in
which the relief demanded consists in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein.
Here the action for reconveyance has for its subject a real property in
the Philippines in the defendant’s name and in which the relief sought is to
annul the defendant’s title and vest it in the plaintiff.
While Jojo is correct is saying that the action for reconveyance is in
personam (Republic v. CA, 315 SCRA 600, 606), the test of whether an action
is covered by S15 R14 is not its technical characterization as in rem or quasi in
rem but whether it is among those mentioned in S15 R14. (See Baltazar v.
Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 354, 363).

XX

Royal Bank (Royal) filed a complaint for a sum of money against Ervin and
Jude before the RTC of Manila. The initiatory pleading averred that on
February 14, 2010, Ervin obtained a loan from Royal in the amount of Pl
Million, as evidenced by Promissory Note No. 007 (PN) signed by Ervin. Jude
signed a Surety Agreement binding herself as surety for the loan. Royal made a
final demand on February 14, 2015 for Ervin and Jude (defendants) to pay, but
the latter failed to pay. Royal prayed that defendants Ervin and Jude be
ordered to pay the amount of P1 Million plus interests.
In their answer, Ervin admitted that he obtained the loan from Royal and
signed the PN. Jude also admitted that she signed the Surety Agreement.
Defendants pointed out that the PN did not provide the due date for payment,
and that the loan has not yet matured as the maturity date was left blank to be
agreed upon by the parties at a later date. Defendants filed a Motion for a
Judgment on the Pleadings on the ground that there is no genuine issue
presented by the parties' submissions. Royal opposed the motion on the
ground that the PN' s maturity is an issue that must be threshed out during
trial.

[a] Resolve the motion with reasons. (2.5%)


[b] Distinguish "Summary Judgment" and "Judgment on the Pleadings." (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a)
The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should be denied.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
may be filed only by the plaintiff or the claimant.
Here it was the Defendants, not the Plaintiff Royal Bank, which filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Hence the motion should be denied.

(b)
A summary judgment is distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings as
follows:
1. A summary judgment is proper even if there is a remaining issue as to
the amount of damages, while a judgment on the pleadings is proper if it
appears that there is no genuine issue between the parties.
2. A summary judgment is based not only on the pleadings but also upon
affidavits, depositions, and admissions showing that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue, while a judgment on the pleadings is
based exclusively upon the pleadings without the presentation of any evidence.
3. A motion for summary judgment requires 10-day notice (S3 R35), while
a motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to a 3-day notice rule (S4
R15).
4. A summary judgment may be prayed for by a defending party (S2 R35),
while a judgment on the pleadings may be prayed for only by a plaintiff or
claimant.
SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO 2017 REMEDIAL LAW BAR EXAMINATION
QUESTIONS
I.

What trial court outside Metro Manila has exclusive original


jurisdiction over the following cases? Explain briefly your answers.

(a) An action filed on November 13, 2017 to recover the possession of


an apartment unit being occupied by the defendant by mere tolerance of the
plaintiff, after the former ignored the last demand to vacate that was duly
served upon and received by him on July 6,2016.

(b) A complaint in which the principal relief sought is the enforcement


of a seller's contractual right to repurchase a lot with an assessed value of
P15,000.00.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)

It would be either the MTC or the RTC depending upon the assessed
value of the apartment unit.

Under B.P. Blg. 129, jurisdiction over real actions is vested in the MTC
if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P20,000 and
in the RTC if such assessed value exceeds P20,000. The action to recover
possession can no longer be one for unlawful detainer since it was brought
beyond one year from the last demand to vacate.
(b)
Exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the MTC.

The Supreme Court has held that where the ultimate relief sought by
an action is the assertion of title to real property, the action is a real one and
not one incapable of pecuniary estimation. [Brgy. Piapi v. Talip, 7 Sep 2005]
Here the ultimate relief sought by the complaint is the assertion of title
since the seller seeks to exercise his right to repurchase. Hence the action is a
real one and jurisdiction is vested in the MTC since the assessed value does
not exceed P20,000.

Alternative Answer:

(b)

Exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the Regional Trial Court.

The Supreme Court has held that an action to enforce the right of
redemption is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129. [Heirs
of Bautista v. Lindo, 10 March 2014]

II.

Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific
performance praying for the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract
of sale. Unknown to the parties, the case was inadvertently raffled to an RTC
designated as a special commercial court. Later, the RTC rendered judgment
adverse to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a regular RTC,
approaches you and wants you to file a petition to have the judgment annulled
for lack of jurisdiction.

What advice would you give to Era? Explain your answer. (4%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The advice I would give to Era is that the petition for annulment of
judgment on lack of jurisdiction will not prosper.
The Supreme Court has held that a special commercial court is still a
court of general jurisdiction and can hear and try a non-commercial case.
[Concorde Condominium Inc. v. Baculio, 17 Feb 2016, Peralta, J.].

Hence the special commercial court had jurisdiction to try and decide
the action for specific performance and to render a judgment therein.

Ill.

Answer the following briefly:

(a) What elements should concur for circumstantial evidence to be


sufficient for conviction?

(b) When is bail a matter of judicial discretion?

(c) Give at least two instances when a peace officer or a private person
may make a valid warrantless arrest.

(d) What is a tender of excluded evidence?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)

The following elements should concur for circumstantial evidence to be


sufficient for conviction:

a) There is more than one circumstance.

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [S4 R133]

(b)

Bail is a matter of judicial discretion:

(1) Before conviction by the RTC of an offense punishable by death,


reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

(2) After conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,


reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. [S4 & 5 R114]

(c)

The following are the instances when a peace officer or a private person
may make a valid warrantless arrest:

(1) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is


actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(2) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (jpp); and
(3) When the person to be arrested is an escaped prisoner. [S5 R113]

(d)

Tender of excluded evidence is the remedy of a party when the evidence


he has offered is excluded by the court.

If documentary or object evidence is excluded by the court, the offeror


may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other
personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony. (S40 R132).
IV.

Give brief answers to the following:

(a) What is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts?

(b) What is the Harmless Error Rule in relation to appeals?

(c) When does a public prosecutor conduct an inquest instead of a


preliminary investigation?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS

(a)

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts provides that where there is a


concurrence of jurisdiction by courts over an action or proceeding, there is an
ordained sequence of recourse to such courts beginning from the lowest to the
highest. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction should
be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. [Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143797, 4 May 2006]

(b)

The harmless error rule in relation to appeals provides that the


appellate court should not reverse a judgment as a result of any error or defect
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. [See S6 R51;
Bersamin, Appeal & Review in the Philippines 362]

(c)
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the public prosecutor conducts
an inquest instead of a preliminary investigation when a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation. [S6 R112]

V.

After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Evan returned to the
Philippines to retire in Manila, the place of his birth and childhood. Ten years
before his retirement, he bought for cash in his name a house and lot in
Malate, Manila. Six months after his return, he learned that his house and lot
were the subject of foreclosure proceedings commenced by ABC Bank on the
basis of a promissory note and a deed of real estate mortgage he had allegedly
executed in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier.

Knowing that he was not in the country at the time the promissory note
and deed of mortgage were supposedly executed, Evan forthwith initiated a
complaint in the RTC of Manila praying that the subject documents be declared
null and void.

ABC Bank filed.a motion to dismiss Evan's complaint on the ground of


improper venue on the basis of a stipulation in both documents designating
Quezon City as the exclusive venue in the event of litigation between the
parties arising out of the loan and mortgage.

Should the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted? Explain your


answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank should not be granted.

In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that a party is
not bound by a venue stipulation where he directly assails on the ground of
forgery the validity of the contracts containing the venue stipulation. The
reason is that such a party cannot be expected to comply with the venue
stipulation since his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition
of the validity of the contracts he assails. [Briones v. Cash Asia Credit Corp., 14
January 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.]

VI.

Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a


large tract of land located in Oriental Mindoro. She impleaded her two brothers
John and Adrian as defendants but did not implead Leica and Agatha, her two
sisters who were permanent residents of Australia.

Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without


impleading all indispensable parties, John and Adrian moved to dismiss the
complaint.

Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your
answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the trial court has a reason to deny the motion to dismiss.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, non-joinder of parties, even


indispensable ones, is not a ground of a motion to dismiss. [S11 R3; Vesagas v.
CA, 371 SCRA 508 (2001)]

VII.

Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from


executing a promissory note in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of
real estate mortgage over her house and lot as security for her obligation. The
loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence, Merchant Bank filed an action
against Elise to foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month after, and while the
foreclosure suit was pending, Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover the
principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based on the same promissory note
previously executed by the latter.

In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the


ground of splitting of a single cause of action, Merchant Bank argued that the
ground relied upon by Elise was devoid of any legal basis considering that the
two actions were based on separate contracts, namely, the contract of loan
evidenced by the promissory note, and the deed of real estate mortgage.

Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, there is a splitting of a single cause of action.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a splitting of a single cause


of action if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action. [S4 R2]. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. [S2 R2].

Here, both suits, the foreclosure and the collection suit, arose from the
same cause of action, that is, the non-payment by Elise of her P3 million loan
from Merchant Bank. The fact that the two actions were based on separate
contracts is irrelevant, what matters is that both actions arose from the same
cause of action.

VIII.

A.

Laura was the lessee of an apartment unit owned by Louie. When the
lease expired, Laura refused to vacate the property. Her refusal prompted Louie
to file an action for unlawful detainer against Laura who failed to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period.

Louie then filed a motion to declare Laura in default. Should the


motion be granted? Explain your answer.

B.

Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to


collect P350,000.00, an amount representing the unpaid balance on the price
of the car Yana had bought from Agatha. Realizing a jurisdictional error in
filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal before she
was served with the answer of Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming the
dismissal.

Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based
on the same cause of action this time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for
reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have the complaint dismissed
without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of the
answer of Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC.

A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same
MeTC.

May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s


third complaint? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(A)

No, a Motion to declare the defendant in default is a prohibited motion


in ejectment cases pursuant to S13.8 R70.

(B)
No, Yana may not successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar
Agatha’s third complaint

Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an


adjudication upon the merits provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same
claim. [S1 R17]

Here the first dismissal by the plaintiff was not in a competent court as
the RTC in Makati City did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action
seeking to recover P350,000. Hence Agatha’s third complaint is not barred by
the Two-Dismissal Rule.

IX.

Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of P750,000.00


against Salvador in the RTC in Quezon City for the latter's alleged breach of
their contract of services. Salvador promptly filed his answer, and included a
counterclaim for P250,000.00 arising from the allegedly baseless and malicious
claims of Abraham that compelled him to litigate and to engage the services of
counsel, and thus caused him to suffer mental anguish.

Noting that the amount of the counterclaim was below the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC, Abraham filed a motion to dismiss vis-a-vis the
counterclaim on that ground.

Should the counterclaim of Salvador be dismissed? Explain your


answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the counterclaim of Salvador should not be dismissed on the


ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In an original action before the RTC, the RTC has jurisdiction over a
compulsory counterclaim regardless of its amount. [See S7 R6]

Here Salvador’s counterclaim for damages arising from the alleged


malicious and baseless claims of Abraham is a compulsory counterclaim as it
arises from Abraham’s complaint. Hence the RTC has jurisdiction over
Salvador’s counterclaim even if it did not exceed the jurisdictional amount of
P400,000.

X.

On the basis of an alleged promissory note executed by Harold in favor


of Ramon, the latter filed a complaint for P950,000.00 against the former in the
RTC of Davao City. In an unverified answer, Harold specifically denied the
genuineness of the promissory note.

During the trial, Harold sought to offer the testimonies of the following:
(1) the testimony of an NBI handwriting expert to prove the forgery of his
signature; and (2) the testimony of a credible witness to prove that if ever
Harold had executed the note in favor of Ramon, the same was not supported
by a consideration.

May Ramon validly object to the proposed testimonies? Give a brief


explanation of your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) Ramon may validly object to the proposed testimony of an NBI


handwriting expert to prove forgery.

Under S8 R8, the genuineness and due execution of an actionable


document is deemed admitted by the adverse party if he fails to specifically
deny such genuineness and due execution.
Here the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, which
is an actionable document, was impliedly admitted by Harold when he failed to
deny the same under oath, his answer being unverified. Hence Harold is
precluded from setting up the defense of forgery and thus Ramon may object to
the proposed testimony seeking to prove forgery.

2) Ramon may not validly object to the proposed testimony showing


that the note was not supported by a consideration.

The Supreme Court has held that an implied admission under S8 R8


does not preclude the adverse party from introducing evidence that the
actionable document was not supported by a consideration. The reason is that
such evidence is not inconsistent with the implied admission of genuineness
and due execution. [Acabal v. Acabal, 31 March 2005]

The fact that the defense of lack of consideration is inconsistent with


Harold’s defense of forgery is also not objectionable.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may set forth two or more
statements of defense alternatively or hypothetically. [S2 R8]

XI.

A.

Teddy filed against Buboy an action for rescission of a contract for the
sale of a commercial lot. After having been told by the wife of Buboy that her
husband was out of town and would not be back until after a couple of days,
the sheriff requested the wife to just receive the summons in behalf of her
husband. The wife acceded to the request, received the summons and a copy of
the complaint, and signed for the same.

(a) Was there a valid service of summons upon Buboy? Explain your
answer briefly.
(b) If Buboy files a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the twin
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over his person and prescription of the cause of
action, may he be deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court? Explain your answer briefly. (3%)

B.

What is the mode of appeal applicable to the following cases, and what
issues may be raised before the reviewing court/tribunal?

(a) The decision or final order of the National Labor Relations


Commission.

(b) The judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A.

(a)

No, there was no valid service of summons upon Buboy.

The Supreme Court has held that in order that there will be valid
substituted service of summons, the sheriff must have exerted diligent efforts
to effect personal service of summons within a reasonable time.

Here there were no such diligent efforts on the part of the sheriff since
he effected substituted service on his very first try. Hence there was no valid
service of summons upon Buboy.
(b)

No, Buboy may not be deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to


the jurisdiction of the court.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss


of other grounds aside from lack of personal jurisdiction shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. [S20 R14]

B.

(a)

There is no mode of appeal from a decision or final order of the NLRC,


since such decision or final order is final and executory pursuant to the Labor
Code. [Art. 223].

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. [St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, 295
SCRA 494]. Such special civil action may raise questions both of fact and
law. [Aggabao v. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400].

(b)

The mode of appeal applicable to judgments or final orders of the RTC


in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is a petition for review under R42.
The petition may raise questions both of fact and law. [S2 R42]

XII.

A.
Judgment was rendered against defendant Jaypee in an action for
unlawful detainer. The judgment ordered Jaypee to vacate and to pay
attorney's fees in favor of Bart, the plaintiff.

To prevent the immediate execution of the judgment, would you advise


the posting of a supersedeas bond as counsel for Jaypee?

Explain your answer briefly.

B.

A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on September 20, 2017


by the RTC against defendant Jeff enjoining him from entering the land of
Regan, the plaintiff.

On October 9, 2017, upon application of Regan, the trial court,


allegedly in the interest of justice, extended the TRO for another 20 days based
on the same ground for which the TRO was issued.

On October 15, 2017, Jeff entered the land subject of the TRO.

May Jeff be liable for contempt of court? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)

No, as counsel for Jaypee I would not advise the posting of a


supersedeas bond.

Under the R70, a supersedeas bond is necessary to prevent immediate


execution only if the judgment awarded rents, damages, and costs.
Here the judgment only ordered Jaypee to vacate and to pay attorney’s
fees. A supersedeas bond is not required to cover attorney’s fees. [Once v.
Gonzalez, 31 March 1977]. Hence the posting of a supersedeas bond is not
required.

(B)

No, Jeff may not be liable for contempt.

Under the Rule on Preliminary Injunction, a TRO is effective only for a


period of 20 days from service on the person sought to be enjoined. It is
deemed automatically vacated if the application for preliminary injunction is
denied or not resolved within the said period and no court shall have the
authority to extend or renew the TRO on the same ground for which it was
issued. [S5 R58]

Here the extension of the TRO by the RTC was invalid since it was for
the same ground for which the TRO was issued. Hence the TRO was deemed
automatically vacated and thus Jeff may not be liable for contempt for ignoring
it.

XIII.

Police officers arrested Mr. Druggie in a buy-bust operation and


confiscated from him 10 sachets of shabu and several marked genuine peso
bills worth P5,000.00 used as the buy-bust money during the buy-bust
operation.

At the trial of Mr. Druggie for violation of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug Act of 2002), the Prosecution offered in evidence, among
others, photocopies of the confiscated marked genuine peso bills. The
photocopies were offered to prove that Mr. Druggie had engaged at the time of
his arrest in the illegal selling of dangerous drugs.
Invoking the Best Evidence Rule, Atty. Maya Bang, the defense counsel,
objected to the admissibility of the photocopies of the confiscated marked
genuine peso bills.

Should the trial judge sustain the objection of the defense counsel?
Briefly explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the trial judge should not sustain the objection that invokes the
best evidence rule.

The Supreme Court has held that the best evidence rule applies only to
documentary evidence, not to object or testimonial evidence.

Here the marked money is object not documentary evidence since it is


being offered to prove not its contents but its existence and use in the buy-bust
operation. [People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990)]

XIV.

Immediately before he died of gunshot wounds to his chest, Venancio


told the attending physician, in a very feeble voice, that it was Arnulfo, his co-
worker, who had shot him. Venancio added that it was also Arnulfo who had
shot Vicente, the man whose cadaver was lying on the bed beside him.

In the prosecution of Arnulfo for the criminal killing of Venancio and


Vicente, are all the statements of Venancio admissible as dying
declarations? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, not all the statements of Venancio are admissible as dying
declarations.

Under the Rules on Evidence, a dying declaration is admissible as an


exception to the hearsay rule provided that such declaration relates to the
cause of the declarant’s death.

Venancio’s statement that it was Arnulfo who shot him is admissible as


a dying declaration. The same related to Venancio’s own demise. It may be
inferred that Venancio had consciousness of his impending death since he
suffered gunshot wounds to his chest which would necessarily be mortal
wounds.

However, Venancio’s statement that it was Arnulfo who shot Vicente is


not admissible as a dying declaration since it did not relate to the cause of the
declarant’s death but to the death of another person.

XV.

In an attempt to discredit and impeach a Prosecution witness in a


homicide case, the defense counsel called to the stand a person who had been
the boyhood friend and next-door neighbor of the Prosecution witness for 30
years. One question that the defense counsel asked of the impeaching witness
was: "Can you tell this Honorable Court about the general reputation of the
prosecution witness in your community for aggressiveness and
violent tendencies?"

Would you, as the trial prosecutor, interpose your objection to the


question of the defense counsel? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, I as the trial prosecutor, would interpose my objection to defense


counsel’s question on the ground of improper impeachment.
Under the Law on Evidence, an adverse party’s witness may be properly
impeached by reputation evidence provided that it is to the effect that the
witness’s general reputation for honesty, truth, or integrity was bad. [S11
R132] The reputation must only be on character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness. [Cordial v. People, 166 SCRA 17]

Here the evidence is not on the Prosecution witness’s general


reputation for honesty, truth, or integrity but on his aggressive and violent
tendencies. The evidence had nothing to do with the witness’s character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness. Hence the impeachment was improper.

XVI.

Engr. Magna Nakaw, the District Engineer of the DPWH in the Province
of Walang Progreso, and Mr. Pork Chop, a private contractor, were both
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) under a conspiracy theory.

While the charges were undergoing investigation in the Office of the


Ombudsman, Engr. Magna Nakaw passed away. Mr. Pork Chop immediately
filed a motion to terminate the investigation and to dismiss the charges against
him, arguing that because he was charged in conspiracy with the deceased,
there was no longer a conspiracy to speak of and, consequently, any legal
ground to hold him for trial had been extinguished.

Rule on the motion to terminate filed by Mr. Pork Chop, with brief
reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Mr. Pork Chop’s motion to terminate the investigation before the Office
of the Ombudsman is denied.

In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the death
of a co-conspirator, even if he was the lone public officer, did not mean that the
allegation of conspiracy to violate the Anti-Graft Law could no longer be proved
or that the alleged conspiracy was already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of a co-conspirator was his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. [People v. Go, 25 March
2014, Peralta, J.]

XVII.

Juancho entered a plea of guilty when he was arraigned under an


information for homicide. To determine the penalty to be imposed, the trial
court allowed Juancho to present evidence proving any mitigating
circumstance in his favor. Juancho was able to establish complete self-defense.

Convinced by the evidence adduced by Juancho, the trial court


rendered a verdict of acquittal.

May the Prosecution assail the acquittal without infringing the


constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy in favor of Juancho? Explain
your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the Prosecution may assail the acquittal without infringing upon
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a requirement for a first


jeopardy to attach is that there must have been a valid plea by the
accused. Said rules also provide that when the accused pleads guilty but
presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea
of guilty shall be entered for him.

Here Juancho’s plea of guilty was deemed withdrawn when he


presented exculpatory evidence to the effect that he acted in self-
defense. Hence his plea of guilty was deemed withdrawn and a plea of guilty
should have been entered for him by the court, which however was not done.

Since there was no standing plea, a first jeopardy did not attach and
thus the Prosecution may assail the acquittal without infringing upon
Juancho’s right against double jeopardy. [People v. Balisacan, 31 August 1966]

XVIII.

Tomas was criminally charged with serious physical injuries allegedly


committed against Darvin. During the pendency of the criminal case, Darvin
filed a separate civil action for damages based on the injuries he had
sustained.

Tomas filed a motion to dismiss the separate civil action on the ground
of litis pendentia, pointing out that when the criminal action was filed against
him, the civil action to recover the civil liability from the offense charged was
also deemed instituted. He insisted that the basis of the separate civil action
was the very same act that gave rise to the criminal action.

Rule on Tomas' motion to dismiss, with brief reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Tomas’s motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia should be


denied.

In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely


separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action (Art.
33, Civil Code; S3 R111) and hence may not be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia.
XIX.

Boy Maton, a neighborhood tough guy, was arrested by a police officer


on suspicion that he was keeping prohibited drugs in his clutch bag. When Boy
Maton was searched immediately after the arrest, the officer found and
recovered 10 sachets of shabu neatly tucked in the inner linings of the clutch
bag. At the time of his arrest, Boy Maton was watching a basketball game being
played in the town plaza, and he was cheering for his favorite team. He was
subsequently charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and he
entered a plea of not guilty when he was arraigned.

During the trial, Boy Maton moved for the dismissal of the information
on the ground that the facts revealed that he had been illegally arrested. He
further moved for the suppression of the evidence confiscated from him as
being the consequence of the illegal arrest, hence, the fruit of the poisonous
tree.

The trial court, in denying the motions of Boy Maton, explained that at
the time the motions were filed Boy Maton had already waived the right to raise
the issue of the legality of the arrest. The trial court observed that, pursuant to
the Rules of Court, Boy Maton, as the accused, should have assailed the
validity of the arrest before entering his plea to the information. Hence, the trial
court opined that any adverse consequence of the alleged illegal arrest had also
been equally waived.

Comment on the ruling of the trial court. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The ruling of the court denying the motion for dismissal of the
information on the ground of illegal arrest is proper.

Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused’s failure to file a


motion to quash before plea is a waiver of the objection to lack of personal
jurisdiction or of the objection to an illegal arrest. [S9 R117]
Here Boy Maton entered a plea without filing a motion to quash on the
ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. Hence he is deemed to have waived the
ground of illegal arrest which is subsumed under lack of personal jurisdiction.

However, the ruling denying the motion to suppress evidence is not


correct.

The Supreme Court has held that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless


arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. [People v. Racho, 3 Aug 2010]. A waiver of
an illegal arrest is not a waiver of an illegal search. [Villanueva v. People, 17
Nov 2014, Sereno, C.J.] The Constitution provides that evidence seized in
violation of the right against illegal search is inadmissible in evidence.

Hence the evidence seized was by virtue of an illegal search since the
arrest was illegal. Hence such evidence may be suppressed.