G.R. No.

96859 October 15, 1991

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L.
SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.

Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and
privileges pertaining thereto.

On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of
the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:

The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on Elections which states that the
Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the
regional elections in Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an administrative act,
did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of the Election Code,
Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso
factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and
Phrases as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of
candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives; and,
therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed
his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was
taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for
such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.

In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House
of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were
occupied by other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from exercising his rights and
privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.

Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains
that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present
Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds
by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides
that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon
of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the other
hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;

b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,

d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional
provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it
were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of
a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so.
On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present
Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called
"administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an
interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims
that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is
decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the
negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:

A.

IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

B.

COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY
PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still
operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary
renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not included in
the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of
shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a
penalty of disqualification to hold public office.

Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as
he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which
did not involve any encroachment on judicial powers.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:

Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly
elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:

Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than
the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:

Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or within ten days after his
proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided
 shall be considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless his failure is for a cause
or causes beyond his control.

The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:

Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. — Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay
officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.

It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to be
considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and
Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion,
thus:

MR. PALMARES:

In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the provision seems to be
different — I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.

Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing or changing these
provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to
change it? What could possibly be the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?

MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people
must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another
office. However, because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not
assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of
the people. They have already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor or
for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they do not comply with that latter mandate, but still
preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest mandate must be
the one that will be given due course. ...

Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:

MR. GARCIA (M.M.):

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on constitutional grounds. We did not
propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for
office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resignednot because of abuse of facilities of power or the
use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public
officers. Now, this was not in the 1935 Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1— Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
and shall remain accountable to the people.

Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only means that all elective
public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that:
'Members of the Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of
barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a
Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be
allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because
his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was
mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he
has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of
elective public officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the
Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.
 Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files
the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other
than the one he was elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of
abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another
position which he feels he could be of better service.

As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila because the basis of this Section
62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the
entire 6-year term for which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers
not only to the community which voted him to office, but primarily because under this commentary on accountability of
public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And
that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers
holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be considered ipso factoresigned from their office
upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy."

It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In
fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to
discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve
out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it
clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that
all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term"
with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but
the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond
the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change
the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure
of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of
the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs.
Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others.
Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely
conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the
events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds
provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.

The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation,
a constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative
enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only
those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as
inhibiting the power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule
of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.

Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the
situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:

MR. MAAMBONG:
 Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary renunciation' does not only appear in
Section 3; it appears in Section 6.

MR. DAVIDE:

Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG:

It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary
renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE:

Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any given time
on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG:

Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and resignation?

MR. DAVIDE:

It is more general, more embracing.

That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt,
concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of
Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:

MR. RONO:

My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is that in one case the person is
intending to run for an office which is different from his own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the
legal significance, an intention to relinquish his office.

MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes ...

MR. RONO:

And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.

MR. TOLENTINO:

Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office which he is only intending to
leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.

MR. RONO:

Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with the conclusion that the
intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention.
It's not just an intention; it's already there.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that
"forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only
the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
 ... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into
account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable,
since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. ...

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position
being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of
voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no
statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative
powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg.
881. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy
for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which
have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As
such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions
which public policy may dictate on his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an invalid
statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in
Congress.

The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically palatable,
and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing
the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political
respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.

It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or
removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the
President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary
measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this
reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.

The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
 A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);

B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);

C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);

D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)

The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the
present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)

I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They are
exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of
a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution.
Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office.
Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter
which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary
action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.

The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180,
the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code — does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the
petitioner.

It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer
to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and
municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.

It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period to
exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current
position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the constitution.

Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In other words, did the Speaker and the
House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the Constitution?

From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of
candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of
a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary
renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true
that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local
government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He
has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can
state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to
him the privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the
respondents.

In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in
favor of representation.

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the
House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second
Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere
'administrative act' of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.

And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and not by
mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds
for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He
wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the
Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to
continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of
Congressman Dimaporo.

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

# Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an invalid
statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in
Congress.

The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may appear logical, politically palatable,
and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing
the erosion of fundamental concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in political
respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.

It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or administrative act to the causes for disqualification or
removal of constitutional officers. Neither can Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the
President and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the Constitution are not mere diciplinary
measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this
reason that the court should ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.

The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:

A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);

B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);

C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);

D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)

The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang Pambansa promulgated long before the
present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX, Section 67 provides:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)

I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the Constitution are not exclusive. They are
exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death, being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of
a ship does not justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those found in the Constitution.
Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation. So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. Conviction of a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office.
Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to expel him from Congress is a matter
which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case and controversy. My point is — Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary
action add to the causes for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 — namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665, Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180,
the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code — does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the
petitioner.

It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the filing of a certificate of candidacy refer
to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and
municipal officials. It has no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.

It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or Congress in the pre-martial law period to
exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current
position. It was also a recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the constitution.

Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In other words, did the Speaker and the
House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary renunciation" as found in the Constitution?

From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty long years, the filing of a certificate of
candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of
a statute by the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing and equate it with voluntary
renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true
that intentions may be deduced from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for a local
government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He
has been engaged in politics even before some of his present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can
state that he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit that we should not deny to
him the privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary renunciation" and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the
respondents.

In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in
favor of representation.

As aptly stated by the petitioner:

We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere right of the petitioner to sit in the
House of Representatives, but more important, we are dealing with the political right of the people of the Second
Legislative District of Lanao del Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere
'administrative act' of the respondents.

Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against disenfranchisement.

And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both substantive and procedural, and not by
mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act' of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)

The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not empower the legislature to add to the grounds
for dismissing its members. When Congressman Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He
wanted to serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken claim according to the
Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to
continue serving his people. I fail to see how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of
Congressman Dimaporo.

For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim
Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and
Presiding Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. 154683 November 12, 2002

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

-----------------------------

G.R. Nos. 155083-84 November 12, 2002

MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari1 seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC" for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

The Antecedents

On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was
convened to initiate the recall2 of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on
June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim
chair of the PRA.

On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates
and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the
Recall Resolution.

On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the
Recall Resolution.

On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc3 promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates' petition. The COMELEC gave
due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain
prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002
or a period of 10 days.

On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.

On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC,
docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August
30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. ("Ollave" for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify
Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging
substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from
running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post." Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC's First Division 4 dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-
539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall election from September
7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.

On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and Gilo. The
COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

G.R. No. 154512

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following
circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the
PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the
members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution
was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public's
constitutional right to information.

G.R. No. 154683

Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall
election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from
holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to
campaign.

In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it
fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15
days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.

Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an additional 15 days from
September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.

G.R. Nos. 155083-84

Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-
492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.

Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor in the recall election
despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective local officials.

In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall
election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post aP20,000 bond.

On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those
sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.

In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and
Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.

Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office
to give effect to the will of the electorate.

On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates' motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.

The Issues

The issues for resolution of the Court are:

 1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution
and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.

2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September
24, 2002.

In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days
has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for the
campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.

First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.

Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence
of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found that –

"On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent
notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice
are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition and
marked as Annex "G" of Volumes II and III of the Petition.

Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were attached to the
Petition and marked as Annex "H". The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the convening of the
PRA.

Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print
and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG officials].

xxx

The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a 'thorough and careful verification
of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution.' She
likewise certified 'that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their
signatures.'

The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, 'upon proper review, all
documents submitted are found in order.'

The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:

'This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA was validly
constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates.'

x x x ."

This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the
findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,5 which also dealt with alleged defective service of notice to PRA members, we
ruled that –

"Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same is
therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb
the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive
upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same."

In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact are patently erroneous.

Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA
members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant
consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all
de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local
Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and
counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall
Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and
authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the
official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in
Socrates' claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.

Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in
scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.

Second Issue: Hagedorn's qualification to run for mayor

in the recall election of September 24, 2002.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:

"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:

"Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected."

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than
three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states
that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from
being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there would be no
further election after three terms, or whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms. This is clear from the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

"THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. ROMULO:6 We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these are Alternative No. I
where there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate reelection after
three successive terms."7

The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local officials:

"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of
Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no
immediate reelection after three successive terms)."8

The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting for the term limits of Senators 9 and
Representatives of the House.10

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the
same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently
show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other
subsequent election.

If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the three-term limit, then Senators
should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit. The constitutional provision
on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:

"No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."11

In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is instructive:

"GASCON:12 I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a
period of time before he can run again?

DAVIDE:13 That is correct.

GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How long will that period of rest
be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?

DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the
expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular member of
the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand.

GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least."14 (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years15 following his completion of two terms. The
framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election,
during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend "the period of rest" of an elective official
who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive
term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.

Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as
mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001
elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from
running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.16 Socrates ran and won as
mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period,
Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of
his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's new
recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One
cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because
factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive
character of Hagedorn's service as mayor.

In Lonzanida v. Comelec,17 the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner:

"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The clear intent of the framers of
the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in
the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear
intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity
of service.

In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,18 a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a portion of a
term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two consecutive full
terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall
election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga ran
again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talaga's disqualification on the
ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as mayor.

Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talaga's recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was deemed to have
already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that the
period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Talaga's recall
term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two years
during which time Tagarao was the mayor.

We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term
from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the
nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being stitched together as
a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case is the time of
the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened
after the first three consecutive terms. In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.

In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall election. Talaga's recall term did
not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have been
disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who
wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the
recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the
rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective official's terms in office.

In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to
run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term
constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001,
despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or
successive terms of office which historically and factually are not.

Worse, to make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to
choose their leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the
leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As
this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:

"Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization
of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms
or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following
the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose' as a result
of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions 'recognizing people's
power.'"19 (Emphasis supplied)

A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in
recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-
term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:

"SUAREZ:20 For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion
of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually
the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on
disqualification, Madam President?

DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term
plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House."21

Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a recall
election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years
comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in
itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.

In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:

1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30,
2001;

2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which
time he was a private citizen;

3. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a
fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and

4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of
September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., in the result.
Mendoza, J., in the result, without to the filing of separate opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.
Corona, J., no part - prior consultation.
Azcuna, J., joins the separate opinion of C.J. Davide.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

I concur with the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in G.R. No. 154512 and G.R. No. 154683. The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) committed no grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution. Dismissal then of G.R. No.
154512 is inevitable. This notwithstanding, I still hold on to my dissenting view in G.R. No. 111511 (Garcia, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., 227
SCRA 100, 121 [1993]) that the provision on the preparatory recall assembly in Section 70 of the Local Government Code of 1991 is
unconstitutional.

Our issuance of the Resolution of 3 September 2002 in G.R. No. 154683 enjoining the COMELEC from implementing its Resolution No.
5673 insofar as it fixed the recall election on 7 September 2002, and the subsequent Resolution of the COMELEC giving the candidates an
additional campaign period of fifteen days from 7 September 2002 rendered moot and academic the principal issue in G.R. No. 154683. The
dismissal of the petition therein is also in order.

However, I regret I cannot concur with the argument and conclusion relative to G.R. Nos. 155083-84. I respectfully submit that private
respondent Edward S. Hagedorn is disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election in
question.

Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution expressly provides:

SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an Interruption In the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Paragraph (b), Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) restates this constitutional restriction, thus: SEC. 43.
Term of office. –
 …(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.

Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution was not found in the Report of the Committee on Local Governments of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986. It was introduced at the plenary session by Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Commenting thereon in his
book entitled "The Intent of 1986 Constitution Writers" (1995 ed., p. 699), Commissioner Joaquin Bernas states:

This provision was not found among the Committee's proposals but came as an amendment proposed by Commissioner Davide.
It was readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved.

Section 8 sets the duration of a term at three years, and prohibits elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms.

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article XVIII (The Transitory Provision) of the Constitution, and Executive Order
No. 270, as amended by R.A. No. 6636, the first local election, that is, the election for the first term under the Constitution for
elective local officials, was on 18 January 1988. By express provision of Section 5 of R.A. No. 6636, in relation to Section 2 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution, that term expired at noon of 30 June 1992. The second election, i.e., the election for the second
term of elective local officials which expired at noon of 30 June 1995, for elective local officials, was on the second Monday of May
1992 pursuant to R.A. No. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms). The
third election, i.e., for the third term which expired at noon of 30 June 1998, was on the second Monday of May 1995, pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166. The fourth election, or for the fourth term which expired at noon of 30 June 2001, was on the second
Monday of May 1998. The fifth election, i.e., for the fifth term which would expire at noon of 30 June 2004, was on the second
Monday of May 2001.Conformably with Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160, a local
official elected in the first local election of 18 January 1988 may be reelected in the synchronized elections in May 1992 and in
May 1995. He could not seek another reelection in the May 1998 election because that would have been his fourth term. Similarly,
a local official who was elected in the May 1992 election could be reelected in the May 1995 and May 1998 elections.

Private respondent Hagedorn was first elected as City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the May 1992 election. He was reelected in the May
1995 and May 1998 elections. His third term, by virtue of his election in the May 1998 election, expired on 30 June 2001. Therefore, he was
constitutionally and statutorily barred from seeking reelection In the May 2001 election, which would have been his fourth term.

The term of office covered by the May 2001 election is up to 30 June 2004. Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of
R.A. No. 7160 are clear in what is prohibited, which is the fourth term. Nothing can be clearer from the wordings thereof: "the term of office of
elective local officials ... shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more that three consecutive terms." In short, an elective local
official who has served three consecutive terms, like Hagedorn, is disqualified from seeking re-election for the succeeding fourth term. The
provision bars the holding of four consecutive terms.

The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree when it
rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in
the May 2001 election. It forgets that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the period from 30
June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent confusion between term and election, the root cause of which is
the attempt to distinguish "voluntary renunciation" of office from "involuntary severance" from office and the term of office to which it relates.

Let me first discuss the matter of whether the Constitutional Commission did approve the rule of "no Immediate reelection after three
consecutive terms." In support of its affirmative conclusion the ponencia quotes the Manifestation of Commissioner Romulo as entered in the
Journal of the Constitutional Commission, thus:

MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of
Representatives and local officials, namely: a) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no
immediate reelection after three successive terms).

This is inaccurate. What actually happened was that the issue was originally for elective national and local officials. However, the
Commission decided to consider first the term of the members of Congress; and to defer the discussion on the term of elective local officials
until the Commission would consider the report of the Committee on Local Governments. On this point I quote the pertinent portions of
Volume Two, pages 238-245 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission of its proceedings on 25 July 1986:

THE PRESIDENT. Maybe it will be of help we Just remind ourselves that what we have before us now is the report of the
Committee on the Legislative. Therefore, maybe we should confine ourselves first to what is covered by the report which is the
term of office of the Senators and the Representatives.And with respect to the local officials, let us await the report of the
Committee on Local Governments as to its recommendation on this matter.

MR. RODRIGO. As a matter of fact, I will go further than that, it is my belief, as regards local officials, that we should leave this
matter to the legislative.
 THE PRESIDENT. So what is the pleasure now of the Acting Floor Leader or of the Chairman of the Committee on the
Legislative?

MR. RODRIGO. I wonder if the two proponents, Madam President, will agree that we first talk about the term of office of the
Representatives because we are now discussing the legislative department.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I will agree really that this matter should relate only to the term of office of the Representatives.

THE PRESIDENT. But are we agreed on these two proposals - the one of Commissioner Garcia where there is no further election
after a total of three terms and the other where there is no Immediate reelection after three successive terms?

MR. OPLE. Madam President, originally if I remember right, the Commission decided to consider the synchronization of elections.
And from that original commitment, we proceeded to fix the terms and decided related questions within the context of
synchronization. Are we now abandoning the original task of synchronization which could only be fully settled in terms of
delimitations on the proposed terms of the President and the Vice-President, the Members of Congress and the local officials, or
do we want to postpone the synchronization task to a later time after we hear from the Committee on Local Governments and the
other concerned committees?

THE PRESIDENT. What does the Acting Floor Leader say to this particular question of Commissioner Ople?

MR. ROMULO. In a way, Madam President, we have settled the synchronization task, because we have decided on the officials'
absolute terms. All we are really talking about now is whether or not they are eligible for reelection, and I think those are separable
issues.

MR. OPLE. If they are separable, and we have already settled the synchronization task, then I think that is something to be
thankful about. But considering the immediate business at hand, is it the wish of the Acting Floor Leader that the election of the
local officials should be eliminated from the consideration of those two choices?

MR. ROMULO. Yes. I think the sense of the body now is to limit this choice to the Members of the House of Representatives.

MR. OPLE. And do the manifestations of both Commissioners Garcia and Monsod still stand after the elimination of the election of
the local officials?

MR. ROMULO. Yes, I think so.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, as worded, It is a personal disqualification.

MR. ROMULO. We are now ready to vote, Madam President.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

THE PRESIDENT. We are now ready to vote by ballot. Let us distribute the ballots. Anyway the voting would take only about 10
minutes.

The session is suspended.

It was 3:40 p.m.

At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed, and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION
 At 3:50 p.m., the session was resumed.

THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.

MR. GASCON. Madam President, may I have a clarification before we count the ballots. The voting now is just for
Representatives. We are not speaking of the term of office of the Senators yet. Is that correct?

THE PRESIDENT. The term of office of the Senators was disposed of this morning.

This voting now is only for Representatives.

MR. GASCON. I think the Issue of whether the Senators could run again for election after their two consecutive terms or 12 years
after a lapse of a period of time has not yet been finalized.

THE PRESIDENT. I beg the Commissioner's pardon.

MR. GASCON. Is this voting just for Congressmen?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

The Secretary-General will now please proceed to count the votes.

COUNTING OF BALLOTS

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.

Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//

Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/

THE PRESIDENT. The results show 17 votes for Alternative No. 1 and 26 votes for Alternative No. 2; Alternative No. 2 is
approved.

What does the Acting Floor Leader say?

MR. ROMULO. Alternative No. 2 has won, Madam President. It seems there are some doubts as to the term of office of the
Senators, so I propose that we similarly vote on that to end any doubt. It was my understanding this morning that when we voted
for the term of office of the Senators, they would not be perpetually disqualified.

THE PRESIDENT. From the transcripts, it appears here that with respect to Senators, 22 votes went to Scheme No. II; that is,
with one reelection. This is already a majority. So, does the Acting Floor Leader propose that we vote again?

MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not that will be perpetual, Madam President, or after resting for six years they can run
again. That is the question that is not answered. I am talking of the Senators.

THE PRESIDENT. This morning, Scheme No. I, without reelection, has 3 votes; Scheme No. II, with one reelection - 22 votes;
Scheme No. III, no limit on reelection - 17 votes.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. May we first clarify this from the Secretary-General?

MR. ROMULO. The question is whether or not in voting for the term of six years with one reelection, the Senator is perpetually
disqualified, so that is a similar question to what we had posed with regard to the House of Representatives.

THE PRESIDENT. In other words, after serving with one reelection, whether or not he is perpetually disqualified after serving 12
years?
 MR. ROMULO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. Or, if after one reelection, he is perpetually disqualified or he can hibernate - the very word used - for six years
and then run again for reelection but not consecutive, not immediate. In other words, he is entitled to one immediate reelection.

REV. RIGOS. Another point, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. And then, after that, if there is a gap, when he is not a Senator, then he can run for the same office.

REV. RIGOS. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Rigos is recognized.

REV. RIGOS. In relation to that, if he will be allowed to run again as Senator after a period of hibernation, we have to clarify how
long that should be. It could be three years, because in the proposed scheme, every three years we can elect the Senators.

MR. RODRIGO. Yes, Madam President, it can be three years.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

THE PRESIDENT. I will suspend the session again so as to allow the parties to compare with the Acting Floor Leader so that we
will know what we are going to vote on.

The session is suspended

It was 3:58 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 4:05 p.m., the session was resumed.

THE PRESIDENT. The session is resumed.

The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. ROMULO. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the question of the Senators, and the schemes are as follows:
The first scheme is, no further election after two terms; the - second scheme is, no immediate reelection after two successive
terms.

Madam President, inasmuch as the principles applicable here are the same as those for the House of Representatives, I move
that we go directly to the voting and forego any further discussions.

THE PRESIDENT. Please distribute the ballots for this particular item for Senators.

Are we ready now?

The Secretary-General will please count the ballots.

COUNTING OF BALLOTS

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. We have 43 ballots here, Madam President. We shall now begin to count.

THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:

Scheme No. I - /////-/////-//

Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/////-//

THE PRESIDENT. The results show 12 votes for Scheme No. I and 32 votes for Scheme No. II; Scheme No. II approved.

All the results will be considered by the Committee on the Legislative in preparation of their report.

So can we leave this matter now?

The corresponding proposal on the three-term limit for elective local officials without immediate reelection was taken up by the
Constitutional Commission much later or specifically on 16 August 1986. On this point, the pertinent portions of Vol. Three, pages
406-408, Record of the Constitutional Commission, read as follows:

MR. RAMA. Madam President, I ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Madam President.

After Section 4, I propose to Insert a new section to be denominated later as Section 5. It provides as follows: THE
TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL BE
DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND NO SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN
THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME
SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL
TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. This is in accordance with the mandate of the Commission when we voted on
the terms of officials up to local officials, excluding the term of barangay officials which was a very specific exception.

MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office of barangay officials as provided
for?

MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.

MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. We accept the amendment. The Committee accepts the amendment.

THE PRESIDENT. May we have the reaction of the Committee?

MR. NOLLEDO. The Committee accepts the amendment, as amended, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment?

MR. OPLE. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Ople is recognized.'

MR. OPLE. May we ask the Committee to read the proposed amendment now.

MR. NOLLEDO. May we ask Commissioner Davide to read the new section.

MR. DAVIDE. THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS, EXCEPT BARANGAY OFFICIALS, WHICH SHALL
BE DETERMINED BY LAW, SHALL BE THREE YEARS AND N SUCH OFFICIAL SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE
 CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS
ELECTED.

THE PRESIDENT. Then let us vote first on the Davide amendment.

Is there any objection to this new section proposed by Commissioner Davide which has been read to the body? (Silence) The
Chair hears none; the proposed section is approved.

I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on the issue of "no immediate reelection" after three consecutive terms
for members of Congress clearly indicated that the "no immediate reelection" after the 3-term limit would equally apply to the
elective local officials. This accounted for the immediate acceptance by the Committee on Local Governments of the
aforementioned Amendment of Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. These debates
clearly showed the Intent of the Commission that the ban against an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms applies to
thefourth term, i.e., the term immediately following the three consecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election for such
fourth term. For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to restfor the entire immediately succeeding
fourth term. On the next fifth term he can run again to start a new series of three consecutive terms. We quote these pertinent
portions of the debates, recorded in Volume Two, pages 232-233 of the Record of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the following are the various alternatives:Scheme No. I is without reelection; Scheme No. II is
with one reelection; and Scheme No. III is reelection without limit. This is for 'the Senators.

At this juncture, pieces of paper were distributed and the Commissioners wrote down their votes.

THE PRESIDENT. The Chair asks the Chairman, Commissioner Davide, to please consolidate the results of the voting for
President and Vice-President.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we are ready. THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed.

COUNTING OF BALLOTS

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:

Scheme No. I - ///

Scheme No. II - /////-/////-/////-/////-//

Scheme No. Ill - /////-/////-/////-//

THE PRESIDENT. The results show 3 votes for Scheme No. I; 22 votes for Scheme No. II; and 17 votes for Scheme No. III;
Scheme No. II is approved.

MR. ROMULO. Madam President, the next position is for the House of Representatives, the Congressmen. I would assume we
can use the same choices. Does any one want any variation?

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. For the record, I would like to ask Commissioner Romulo some questions.

MR. ROMULO. Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. Scheme No. II says "the Vice-President - with one reelection."

THE PRESIDENT. No, that is for Senators.'

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.

 THE PRESIDENT. Yes, Commissioner Guenon is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. May I suggest one more scheme - with two reelections for the Members of the House of Representatives?

THE PRESIDENT. So, we shall distribute ballots again.

MR. ROMULO. While the ballots are being distributed, may I read the following four propositions for Congressmen: '

Scheme No. I, without reelection.

Scheme No. II, with one reelection.

Scheme No. III, with two reelections.

Scheme No. IV, no limit on reelection. I

MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.

MR. DE LOS REYES. The term of the Members of the House of Representatives will be three years, according to the first voting;
the term of the Senators, if they are entitled to one reelection, will be 12 years. So, in order for a Member of the House of
Representatives to have also 12 years, he must be entitled to three reelections. I propose another scheme with three reelections
to make it equal.

MR. RODRIGO. Will the Gentleman maintain the number there and add that as No. V. I filled up my ballot already and if I erase,
this might be disqualified as a marked ballot.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo may change his ballot.

MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro Is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. The situation stated by Commissioner de los Reyes is apparently covered by Scheme No. II which we agreed
upon earlier. The situation will not happen, because both the Senators and the Congressmen will have five (5) years on the first
election. So, the possibility that the Senators will have a longer term than the Congressmen is remote.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, it occurred to us that the three alternatives are not really mutually exclusive. Can we have only
these three: without reelection, with reelection and with unlimited reelection? We are asking here for plurality only, Madam
President. Can we eliminate?

THE PRESIDENT. In other words, we shall have the same schemes as those for Senators; without reelection, with one reelection
and unlimited reelection.

REV. RIGOS. Madam President, besides we have already submitted our ballots.

MR. MONSOD. I withdraw my proposal, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I would suggest that the two schemes with the highest votes be voted upon to get the key
majority. For example, if the schemes with two reelections and no limit to election get the highest number of votes, then we vote
again to get the key majority.

THE PRESIDENT. We will do that. Are all the votes in?

COUNTING OF BALLOTS
 THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have 43 ballots.

THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary-General will please proceed. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, reading:

Scheme No. I - 0

Scheme No. II - //

Scheme No. III - /////-/////-/////-/////-/

Scheme No. IV - /////-/////-////

Scheme No. V - /////-/

THE PRESIDENT. The results show no vote for Scheme No. I; 2 votes for Scheme No. II; 21 votes for Scheme No. III; 14 votes
for Scheme No. IV; and 6 votes for Scheme No. V; Scheme No. III is approved.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO.. I would like to ask a question for clarification.

THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.

MR. RODRIGO. If the Members of the Lower House can have two reelections, does this mean two immediate reelections, or a
term of nine consecutive years? Let us say that a Member of the Lower House has been reelected twice; that means he will serve
for nine years. Can he let three years elapse and then run again?

THE PRESIDENT. We will ask the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative to answer the question.

MR. DAVIDE. That is correct, Madam President, because two reelections mean two successive reelections. So he cannot serve
beyond nine consecutive years.

MR. RODRIGO. Consecutively?

MR. DAVIDE. Consecutively.

MR. RODRIGO. But after nine years he can let one …

MR. DAVIDE. He can rest. He can hibernate for three years.

MR. RODRIGO. And run again.

MR. DAVIDE. He can run again.

MR. RODRIGO. And again have nine years as a maximum.

MR. DAVIDE. I do not know if that is also the thinking of Commissioner Garcia who is the main proponent of this proposal on two
reelections. I would seek the opinion of Commissioner Garcia for the record. (underscoring supplied for emphasis.)

The dichotomy made in the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the office" as used in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and "involuntary severance from office" is unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion in the
ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking now of
Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered "involuntary severance from office" because there was nothing to be severed; he was not a holder of an
office either in a de jure or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is,
definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance. Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the
continuity of a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in
the ponencia, page 17, is not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one that took place
during any of the three terms; hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no
such involuntary severance took place during any of his three terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.

More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 is one
that takes place at any time during either the first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause
of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected." The purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for
the purpose of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the three-
term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a mockery of it by the simple
act of resigning. Thus, applying it in the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from
seeking reelection in the May 2001 election.

Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that case Talaga did
not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn,
as earlier stated, fully served three successive terms.

Neither can we allow Hagedorn to take refuge under the exchange between Commissioner Suarez and Commissioner Davide found on page
592, Vol. II of the Record of the Constitutional Commission and quoted on pages 19-20 of the ponencia:

SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So,
half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that
the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?

DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of "term" And if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.

On the contrary, it is clear from the views of Commissioners Suarez and Davide that the term of office of one who is elected in a special
election is considered one term for purposes of determining the three consecutive terms.

A declaration that Hagedorn is qualified to seek reelection in a recall election to remove the Mayor who was elected for a term for which
Hagedorn was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified to be reelected to or, to hold Is to subvert the rationale of the three-consecutive-
term rule and make a mockery of it. Worse, it abets destructive endless partisan politics and unsound governance. An elective local official
who is disqualified to seek a fourth term because of the three-term limit but obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first year of the
fourth term campaigning for the recall of the incumbent in the second year of said term. This would' not be a problem If the disqualified official
has a solid following and a strong political machinery. Interestingly, in this case, as stated on page 3 of the ponencia, the President of the
Association of Barangay Captains of Puerto Princesa City is oneMark David M. Hagedorn and he was designated by the Preparatory Recall
Assembly as interim Chairman.

I therefore vote to grant the petition in G.R. Nos. 155083-84, to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC holding private respondent Edward
Hagedorn a qualified candidate for the position of Mayor of Puerto Princesa City in the recall election, and to declare him DISQUALIFIED
from seeking reelection for a fourth term or from being a candidate for Mayor in the recall election in question.

CONCURRING OPINION

PUNO, J.:

The correctness of the decision so ably written by Mr. Justice Carpio speaks for itself. Nonetheless, the complex constitutional dimensions of
the issue for resolution compels this humble concurring opinion. The issue is whether private respondent Hagedorn is disqualified from
running in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City and from serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004
mayoralty term considering that he has thrice been consecutively elected and has served three full terms as Puerto Princesa City mayor from
1992-1998. In illuminating the gray interstices of this election case, prudence dictates that ". . . where the sovereignty of the people is at
stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct."1

Private respondent Hagedorn was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in 1992, 1995 and 1998 and served three full terms. In
the May 14, 2001 national and local elections, he ran for governor for the Province of Palawan and lost. Petitioner-intervenor Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor of Puerto Princesa City.

On July 2, 2002, three hundred twelve (312) out of five hundred twenty-eight (528) members of the Barangay Officials of Puerto Princesa
City convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of Mayor Socrates. On August 21, 2002, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing a calendar of activities for the recall election. Two days after, Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in said election.
On August 27, 2002, petitioners Adovo and Gilo sought for Hagedorn's immediate disqualification on the ground that he had served three
consecutive full terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa City immediately prior to the recall election and was thus proscribed by the Constitution
from running in said election. On August 30, 2002, petitioner Ollave, Sr. intervened to disqualify Hagedorn on the same ground.

The recall election was set on September 24, 2002. On September 20, 2002, public respondent COMELEC's First Division denied the
petitions for Hagedorn's disqualification. The following day, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. filed a motion for reconsideration imploring
the COMELEC en banc to reverse the September 20 resolution. On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution of
the First Division holding Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

On September 24, 2002, petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave, Sr. sought recourse in this Court with a Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. On the same date, Mayor Socrates filed a petition-in-
intervention to nullify the September 23 resolution of the COMELEC.

The petitions before us raise the following issues:

"I.

THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS NOT DISQUALIFIED
FROM RUNNING FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY IN THE SCHEDULED RECALL ELECTION, THE
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM FOR
LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS NOTWITHSTANDING.

II.

THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO DIVIDE A SINGLE TERM
OF OFFICE INTO TWO.

III.

THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE INTENT AND PURPOSE FOR
HOLDING THE SCHEDULED RECALL ELECTIONS FOR THE POSITION OF MAYOR OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BAR AGAINST A FOURTH CONSECUTIVE TERM.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS NOT
DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING IN THE UPCOMING RECALL ELECTIONS AS HIS INELIGIBILITY IS NOT APPARENT UNDER
SECTIONS 65 AND 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, SECTIONS 39 AND 40 OF RA 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE), AND
RULES 23 AND 25 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.

V.

THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAGEDORN IS
QUALIFIED TO RUN IN THE RECALL ELECTION EVEN IF HE STANDS DISQUALIFIED FROM SERVING UNDER A FOURTH
CONSECUTIVE TERM AS SUCH IS ALLEGEDLY NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE INSTANT DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS.

VI.

THE HONORABLE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED A DEFECTIVE AND CLEARLY VOID
RESOLUTION."2

The foregoing issues may be reduced to the singular issue of whether or not private respondent Hagedorn is disqualified from running in the
September 24, 2002 recall election and serving as mayor of Puerto Princesa City considering that he has been thrice consecutively elected
and has served three full terms in that position from 1992 to 2001.

I find the petitions devoid of merit.

Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides:

"Sec. 8: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This constitutional provision is restated in the Local Government Code of 1991, to wit:

"Sec. 43. Term of Office. -. . . (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected."

We have not interpreted Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution in the recall election context of the cases at bar. It is imperative to distill the intent
of the framers of the Constitution and the people who ratified it.3 Mere reliance on the surface meaning of the words of the above provision,
however, will not suffice to capture this elusive intent. Thus, we turn to the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) as an extrinsic aid to interpretation.4 The Record of the Constitutional Commission shows that Art. X. Sec. 8 was readily accepted
by the Commissioners without much discussion;5 nonetheless, their debates on setting the term limit for Representatives show that the
rationale for the limit applies to both Representatives and elective local officials. We quote at length the relevant portions of the debates, to
wit:

"MR. GARCIA. I would like to advocate the proposition that no further election for local and legislative officials be allowed after a
total of three terms or nine years. I have four reasons why I would like to advocate this proposal, which are as follows: (1) to
prevent monopoly of political power; (2) to broaden the choice of the people; (3) so that no one is indispensable in running the
affairs of the country; (4) to create a reserve of statesmen both in the national and local levels. May I explain briefly these four
reasons.

First: To prevent monopoly of political power - Our history has shown that prolonged stay in public office can lead to the
creation of entrenched preserves of political dynasties. In this regard, I would also like to advocate that immediate
members of the families of public officials be barred from occupying the same position being vacated.

Second: To broaden the choice of the people - Although individuals have the right to present themselves for public
office, our times demand that we create structures that will enable more aspirants to offer to serve and to provide the
people a broader choice so that more and more people can be enlisted to the cause of public service, not just limited
only to those who may have the reason or the advantage due to their position.

Third: No one is indispensable in running the affairs of the country – After the official's more than a decade or nearly a
decade of occupying the same public office, I think we should try to encourage a more team-oriented consensual
approach to governance favored by a proposal that will limit public servants to occupy the same office for three terms.
And this would also favor not relying on personalities no matter how heroic, some of whom, in fact, are now in our
midst.

Lastly, the fact that we will not reelect people after three terms would also favor the creation of a reserve of statesmen
both in the national and local levels.

Turnovers in public office after nine years will ensure that new ideas and new approaches will be welcome. Public office will no
longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition. At the same time, we will create a reserve of statesmen, both in the national
and local levels, since we will not deprive the community of the wealth of experience and advice that could come from those who
have served for nine years in public office.

Finally, the concept of public service, if political dynasty symbolized by prolonged stay in particular public offices is barred will
have fuller meaning. It will not be limited only to those who directly hold public office, but also to consultative bodies organized by
the people, among whom could be counted those who have served in public office with accomplishment and distinction, for public
service must no longer be limited only to public office.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in this draft Constitution, we
are recognizing people power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And
yet at the same time, we are prescreening candidates among whom they will choose. We are saying that this 48-member
Constitutional Commission has decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running for the
same position.

The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are very skilled and good at
legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent and
with integrity. They get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we provide for Congressmen. And at 34
years old we put them to pasture.

Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here only of congressional or
senatorial seats. We want to broaden the people's choice but we are making a prejudgment today because we exclude
a certain number of people. We are, in effect, putting an additional qualification for office - that the officials must not
have served a total of more than a number of years in their lifetime.
 Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but the future
participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may only be in some areas, but we are saying that they are going
to be barred from running for the same position.

Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of his skills and competence,
in intellectual combat, in concern and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is going to be barred from the same
kind of public service.

I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous decision with respect to many of our
countrymen in the future who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the service of their country.

If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will perpetuate them, then let us give them this
rest period of three years or whatever it is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their fathers or mothers or relatives
of the second degree should not run. But let us not bar them for life after serving the public for a number of years.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE. . . . The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification
on those who have served their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional
Commission. I would be very wary about the Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who
will already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in
establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a gap on
consecutive service - in the case of the President, six years; in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the
Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list and
sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the
Committee on Local Governments. The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result
of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a
proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to
transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on
the continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials. But were we now (to) decide to put these prospective servants of the
people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking
away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of
choice.

I think the veterans of the Senate and of the House of Representatives here will say that simply getting nominated on a party ticket
is a very poor assurance that the people will return them to the Senate or to the House of Representatives. There are many
casualties along the way of those who want to return to their office, and it is the people's decision that matters. They judge
whether or not a Soc Rodrigo, a Sumulong, a Padilla, an Alonto and a Rosales, after a first and second term, should go back to
the Senate. That is a prerogative of the people that we should not take away from them -the right to judge those who have served.
In any case, we already take away from the people the freedom to vote for the third termers because we say that a Senator, say,
Mr. Rodrigo, is only good for twelve years. But if he wants to be like Cincinnatus, if he is called back by his people to serve again,
let us say for a period of six years – which Commissioner Davide called a period of hibernation which is spent at his fishpond in
Bulacan, Bulacan - because there is a new situation in the country that fairly impels the people to summon him back, like
Cincinnatus in the past, then there will no longer be any Cincinnatus.

That is not perhaps a very important point, but I think we already have succeeded in striking a balance of policies, so that the
structures, about which Commissioner Garcia expressed a very legitimate concern, could henceforth develop to redistribute
opportunities, both in terms of political and economic power, to the great majority of the people, because very soon, we will also
discuss the multiparty system. We have unshackled the Philippine politics from the two-party system, which really was the most
critical support for the perpetuation of political dynasties in the Philippines. That is quite a victory, but at the same time, let us not
despise the role of political parties. The strength of democracy will depend a lot on how strong our democratic parties are, and a
splintering of all these parties so that we fall back on, let us say, nontraditional parties entirely will mean a great loss to the vitality
and resiliency of our democracy...

xxx xxx xxx

BISHOP BACANI. . . . I think when we voted on the provision that the illiterate be allowed to vote and when we proposed in this
Constitutional Commission for initiative as a way also of empowering our people to engage in the legislative exercise, we are
really presupposing the political maturity of our people. Why is it that that political maturity seems now to be denied by asking that
we should put a constitutional bar to a further election of any Representative after a term of three years? Why should we not leave
that to the premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption
only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may
aspire to serve longer?

xxx xxx xxx

MR. GARCIA. I would like to answer Commissioner Bacani. We put a constitutional bar to reelection of any Representative
basically because of the undue advantage of the incumbent. It is not because of lack of trust in the people. We realize from history
 that Mexico fought a revolution simply because of the issue of reelection. No reeleccion, sufragio universal. Basically, it is because
of the undue advantage of the incumbent that he accumulates power, money, party machine or patronage. As regards what
Commissioner Aquino has said, politics is not won by ideals alone; it is won by solid organizing work by organizations that have
the capacity to do so; and normally the incumbent has all the advantages. . .

xxx xxx xxx

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. Madam President, we have here 43 ballots cast. We will now start the counting.

Alternative No. 1 - no further election after a total of three terms: /////-/////-/////-//

Alternative No. 2 - no immediate reelection after three successive terms: /////-/////-/////-/////-/////-/"6 (emphasis supplied)

In several cases, this Court was guided by the proceedings of the ConCom in construing Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution in
relation to Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Different from the issue presented by the cases at bar, however,
the question in those cases was what constitutes a "term" for purposes of counting the three consecutive terms allowed under Art.
X, Sec. 8. It is apropos to revisit these cases to aid us in extracting the intent behind said Constitutional provision and properly
apply it to the unique case of private respondent Hagedorn.

The maiden case was Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco7 which involved the 1998 mayoralty election in
Pateros. In 1989, private respondent Capco became mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. In
1992, he was elected mayor for a term ending in 1995. In 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending in
June 1998. In March 1998, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1998 mayoralty election of Pateros. Petitioner Borja,
Jr., another candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the ground that by June 30, 1998, Capco would have already
served as mayor for three consecutive terms and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term. The COMELEC en banc
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor, thus Borja, Jr. sought recourse in this Court. In dismissing the petition, we considered
the historical background of Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, viz:

"…a consideration of the historical background of Article X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same
position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term (2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 236-243 [Session of July 25, 1986] . . .). Monsod warned against 'prescreening candidates [from] whom the people
will choose' as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions
'recognizing people's power.'

xxx xxx xxx

Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service
of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea
of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
(emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations:

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election,
he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?

Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term
expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of
the office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected."
Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have
completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

xxx xxx xxx

...the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not
concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation before the end of
the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. . .

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the
purpose of applying Art. X, § 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had
he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only
to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a
bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a
good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service
of the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.

To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is
not unduly curtailed."8 (emphasis supplied)

We reiterated the Borja ruling in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, et al.9 which involved the election for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. Prior to the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioner Romeo Lonzanida served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. In the May 1995 elections, he ran for mayor, was proclaimed winner, and assumed office. His proclamation was, however,
contested by his opponent Juan Alvez in an election protest filed before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales which rendered a decision
declaring a failure of elections. Upon appeal of the decision to the COMELEC, Alvez was declared the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. In
February 1998, the COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, and Alvez served the remainder of the term.

Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998 election for mayor of San Antonio. His opponent Eufemio Muli filed with the
COMELEC a petition to disqualify Lonzanida on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms in the same office and was
thus prohibited from running in the upcoming election. On May 13, 1998, Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. COMELEC ruled that Lonzanida
was disqualified as his assumption to office in 1995, although he was unseated before the expiration of the term, was considered one full
term for purposes of counting the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

On appeal to this Court, we ruled, viz:

"It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to
the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner.
He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the
COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected
to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of voluntary
relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that
petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as a winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation...

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995- 1998
because he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May
1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit."10 (emphasis supplied)

Finally, in the recent case of Adormeo v. COMELEC, et al.,11 we ruled that a mayor who assumed office via a recall election and served the
unexpired portion of the mayoralty term is not considered to have served a full term for purposes of applying the three term limit. In this case,
therein private respondent Ramon Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992 and served the full term. In 1995, he was reelected and again
served the full term. In 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. About two years later, a recall election was held where Talaga, Jr. ran against
Tagarao. He (Talaga, Jr.) won and served the remainder of Tagarao's term.

In view of the upcoming May 2001 mayoralty election, Talaga, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy. On March 2, 2001, therein petitioner
Adormeo sought the cancellation of Talaga, Jr.'s certificate of candidacy and/or his disqualification on the ground that he had been thrice
elected and had served three consecutive terms as city mayor. Talaga, Jr., however, was declared qualified for the position of city mayor.
Adormeo thus sought recourse before this Court.
Citing the Borja and Lonzanida rulings, we ruled that Talaga, Jr. was not disqualified as the two conditions for disqualification, namely (1) the
elective official concerned was elected for three consecutive terms in the same post and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms,
were not met. We did not consider Talaga, Jr.'s service of the unexpired portion of Tagarao's term as service of a full term for purposes of the
three term limit. We also ruled that he did not serve for three consecutive terms as there was a break in his service when he lost to Tagarao
in the 1998 elections. We held, viz:

"COMELEC's ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years, he was a
private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Patently untenable is petitioner's contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article
X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. (footnote omitted) To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that 'if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term
of another, that unexpired (term), no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.'

As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local
government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. (Rollo, pp. 83-84)"12 (emphasis supplied)

The deliberations of the ConCom and the ruling case law of Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo show that there are two principal reasons for the
three term limit for elective local officials: (1) to prevent political dynasties perpetuated by the undue advantage of the incumbent and (2) to
broaden the choice of the people by allowing candidates other than the incumbent to serve the people. Likewise evident in the deliberations
is the effort to balance between two interests, namely, the prevention of political dynasties and broadening the choice of the people on the
one hand, and respecting the freedom of choice and voice of the people, on the other; thus, the calibration between perpetual disqualification
after three consecutive terms as proposed by Commissioner Garcia, and setting a limit on immediate reelection and providing for a
hibernation period.

In all three cases - Borja, Lonzanida and Adormeo - we ruled that the "term" referred to in the three term limit is service of a full term of three
years for elective local officials. This ruling furthers the intent of the ConCom to prevent political dynasties as it is the service of consecutive
full terms that makes service continuous and which opens the gates to political dynasties limiting the people's choice of leaders. In the words
Of Commissioner Ople, ". . . we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials
from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate those powers and
perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that
is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or unbroken service of all of these officials. (emphasis supplied)" Thus, ConCom set
the limit on consecutive full terms to no more than three. Otherwise stated, it is a fourth consecutive full term that is prohibited.

In the cases at bar, however, private respondent Hagedorn will not serve a prohibited fourth consecutive full term as he will be serving only
the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term. Similar to Talaga, Jr. in the Adormeo case, Hagedorn's service as mayor will not be
continuous from the third to a fourth consecutive full term as it was broken when Socrates was elected in the 2001 regular mayoralty election
and served for one year. In the same vein that Talaga, Jr. was elected into office by recall election and his service of the unexpired portion of
the incumbent's term was not considered a consecutive full term for purposes of applying the three term limit, Hagedorn's service of the
unexpired portion of Socrates' term should not also be counted as a prohibited fourth consecutive full term. It should not make a difference
whether the recall election came after the second consecutive full term as in the Adormeo case or after the third consecutive term as in the
cases at bar because the intent to create a hiatus in service is satisfied in both instances.

Even a textual analysis of Art. X, Sec. 8 will yield the interpretation that what is prohibited is the service of a fourth consecutive full term.
Petitioners are correct in foisting the view that "term" is a fixed and definite period of time prescribed by law or the Constitution during which
the public officer may claim to hold the office as a right. It is a fixed and definite period of time to hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy
its privileges and emoluments until the expiration of the period.13 In ascertaining what "term" means for elective local officials, the Constitution
itself provides in Art. X, Sec. 8 that it means a fixed, definite, and full period of three years, viz: "Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ..." Although one or more persons may discharge
the duties of the office during this fixed three-year period, the term is not divided into smaller terms by the number of incumbents who may fill
the office. It is one and indivisible, and term follows term in successive cycles of three years each. If the incumbent or the one elected to the
office fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, thereby creating a permanent vacancy,14 the term would remain unbroken
until the recurring election for the office.15

The provisions on voluntary renunciation under Art. X, Sec. 8 and other articles of the Constitution bolster the interpretation that for purposes
of applying the three term limit, service of a full term of three years is contemplated, viz:

"Art. X, Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected."

"Art. VI, Sec. 4. . . . No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. . . . No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. VII, Sec. 4. . . . No Vice-President shall serve more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected." (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides in Sec. 43(b), viz:

"Sec. 43(b) . . . No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected." (emphasis supplied)

Likewise, because "term" is understood to be a fixed, definite, and full period, the Constitution, in Art. Vi, Sec. 9, uses the qualifier "unexpired
term" to refer to only a portion of a term, viz:

"Art. VI, Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in
the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired
term." (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 uses the phrase "unexpired term" to mean the remainder of the term, viz:

"Sec. 44(d). The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of his predecessors. . ." (emphasis supplied)

Thus, when Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution states that "...no such (local elective) official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms,"
it consistently means that it allows service of a maximum of three consecutive full terms and prohibits service of a minimum fourth
consecutive full term.

In putting a cap on the number of consecutive full terms an elective local official can serve, the ConCom sought to curb the undue advantage
of the incumbent over other aspirants, which advantage makes it easier to found a political dynasty. At the time of the September 24, 2002
recall election, however, Hagedorn was not the incumbent favored with this feared "undue advantage of the incumbent." On the contrary, he
ran against the incumbent Mayor Socrates who alone could be the subject of recall election and who, by law, was automatically a candidate
in the election.16 Hagedorn did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election of Puerto Princesa City which Socrates won, precisely because
he was aware of the three term limit.

It is my respectful submission that the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 proscribe a local official who has been thrice
consecutively elected in regular elections and has served three full terms in the same position, from running in the regular election
succeeding his third consecutive term. It is this situation that is prohibited because it makes possible service of more than three consecutive
and continuous full terms, i.e., service of a fourth consecutive full term. We cannot overstress that it is this continuousness that the ConCom
feared would open the gates to the two evils sought to be avoided: the incumbent's use of his undue advantage to put up a political dynasty
and limiting the people's choice of leaders. It is in this context of regular elections that our obiter dictum in the Lonzanida case, which
petitioners harp on, should be understood. In that case, we opined that "[a]s finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local
government official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may
again run for the same office."17 Indeed, insofar as regular local elections are concerned, which were the elections involved in that case, there
should be a hiatus of at least one full term of three years.

On the other hand, in the case of a local official who assumes office through a recall election - whether after his first, second, or third
consecutive term- there is a break in his service caused by the election of the incumbent who was recalled. Even in the case of a local official
who initially assumes office via recall election, then wins the two succeeding regular elections and serves two full terms in the same post, he
is not prohibited from seeking another reelection and serving another full term. This is so because his service of the remainder of the
incumbent's term via recall election is not, in reality and in law, a full term continuing on to his three succeeding full terms. Local officials who
assume office via recall election serve only the unexpired portion of the incumbent's term and this service is not counted as a full term,
despite the Constitutional mandate that the term of office of elective local officials is three years. Such is the design because Art. XVIII, Secs.
2 and 5 of the Constitution also prescribe synchronization of regular national and local elections beginning on the second Monday of May
1992,18 which is accomplished if the local official who assumes office through recall election serves only the incumbent's unexpired term.

It is only in the case of Representatives (and Senators) that "if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired term will be considered one term for purposes of computing the number of successive terms allowed."19 The election herein
contemplated is a special election thus this Constitutional intent does not apply to a recall election which involves only elective local officials.
The Record bear this out, viz:

"MR. SUAREZ. . . May we ask a clarificatory question regarding the interpretation of the provisions in Sections 3 and 6 in relation
to Section 9 regarding the disqualification on the part of the Senator to run for two consecutive terms, and in the case of the
Members of the House of Representatives, for three consecutive terms. For example, a special election is called for a Senator,
and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired
 portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, because we speak of "term" and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of
that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two terms for the Members of the Lower House."20

As we ruled in the Adormeo case, service of an unexpired term is considered service of a full term only with respect to Representatives (and
Senators) because unlike local government officials, Representatives cannot be recalled. It is continuous prolonged stay in office that breeds
political dynasties. Understandably therefore, insofar as Representatives who cannot be recalled are concerned, service of an unexpired
term is strictly counted as service of a full term because the purpose of the ConCom was to limit the right to run and be elected in
Congress.21

In allowing Hagedorn to participate in the September 24 recall election, we are not unmindful of the intent of the ConCom to broaden the
people's choice of leaders. The three term limit was adopted to allow the electorate to choose from other candidates in the regular election
succeeding the incumbent's third consecutive term. This is clear in the Commissioners' alternatives for voting on the term limit for
Representatives and the outcome of their voting where 17 voted for "no further election after a total of three terms" and 26 voted for "no
immediate reelection after three successive terms." A reelection is immediate if a local official wins in the election succeeding the third
consecutive term.22 This is not the case with Hagedorn who did not run in the 2001 regular mayoralty election and left that political arena to
other contenders, thereby upholding the intent of the ConCom to broaden the choice of the electorate.

The intent of the ConCom to create a hiatus in the service of elective local officials after three consecutive full terms cannot be undermined
through abuse of the power of recall. The Local Government Code of 1991 provides limitations on recall in Section 74, viz:

"Section 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for
loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election." (emphasis supplied)

Thus, an elective local official cannot perpetually hold on to his office through the mechanism of recall as at the very least, there will be a
hiatus of one year after an unbroken service of three terms. He could not simply create, in the words of Commissioner Monsod, "structures
that will perpetuate him (them)" in power with the assurance that they will not be exposed because after serving three consecutive full terms,
he will certainly be replaced. Within the one-year period under Sec. 74, his successor could discover and begin to dismantle these
manipulative structures. This one year period also provides a reasonable basis for the electorate to judge the performance of the incumbent
successor, thus obviating fear of political maneuvering through initiation of recall proceedings by a Preparatory Recall Assembly dominated
by minions of the previous local official.23 In Claudio v. COMELEC, et al.,24 we held, viz:

"In the Bower case (in re Bower 41 I11. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252 [1968]) cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC (269 SCRA 245, 256
[1997]), it was held that 'The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for recall
election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate
the soundness of his policies and decisions.'"25

If, after one year in office, the incumbent proves himself to be worthy of his position, then his constituents will confirm this should a recall
election be called, as in the case of Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City. If, on the other hand, the incumbent turns out to be an
ineffective leader, there is no reason why the electorate should not be allowed to make a Cincinnatus of their past leader.

The imagined fear of abuse of the power of recall does not suffice to disqualify private respondent Hagedorn and should not prevail over the
resounding voice of the people of Puerto Princesa City. They have spoken and there is no mistaking that Hagedorn is their overwhelming
choice. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' position and allow an overly literal reading of the law to mute the electorate's cry and curtail
their freedom to choose their leaders. This freedom was as much a concern of the ConCom as was the prevention of political dynasties and
broadening the choice of the people. This Court has not just once admonished against a too literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of the authors. 26

In sum, private respondent Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002 recall election as the disqualification under
Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution applies to the regular mayoralty election succeeding the third consecutive term served. Nor is he precluded
from serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term as this is not service of a prohibited fourth consecutive full term.

I vote to deny the petition, giving due consideration to the tenet of representative democracy that the people should be allowed to choose
whom they wish to govern them.27 In the end, ". . . more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for
'sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.'"28
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.

The Case

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-
005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001
elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005.

The Facts

Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated
then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of
Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
(Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to
fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.
Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. [1] Resolution No. 84 further
provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13 th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.[2]
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del
Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators.
Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the
thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who
was appointed Vice-President.[3] Respondents Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked
12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as voters and taxpayers, filed the
instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC
from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13 th highest number of votes as the winner in the
special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No.
01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to
notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
6645 (R.A. No. 6645);[4] (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881;[5] and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters InformationSheet the candidates
seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph
4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646).[6] Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELEC
canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that
there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats,
irrespective of term.[7]
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be
distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim, petitioners cite
the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill
the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents
during their tenures in the Senate.[8] Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the
votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates
running under the special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections. [9]
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
 Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-
006 declaring official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators
took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended petition
impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which
they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution
No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated by
Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the
mootness of the petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the
nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for
lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case
because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13 th placer in the 14 May 2001 senatorial
elections.

The Issues

The following are the issues presented for resolution:

(1) Procedurally

(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;

(b) whether the petition is moot; and

(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.

(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14
May 2001.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction

A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his
office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded.[10] Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the
members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners are
questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various
prayers are, namely: (1) a declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on
14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul
Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special
election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain requirements
pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to determine Honasans right
in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer for the annulment of Honasans proclamation and,
ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.

On the Mootness of the Petition

COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent confirmation
on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and
01-006 moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing an act
threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[11] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. [12] However, as an exception to the rule
on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. [13] Thus,
in Alunan III v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections for
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election
had already taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the order sought to be annulled
is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections, the
mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question
of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELECs failure to comply with
requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however,
may not be decided before the date of the election.

On Petitioners Standing

Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners
do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal
injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. [15] The requirement of standing,
which necessarily sharpens the presentation of issues,[16] relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle
only actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show
that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.[18]
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a
generalized grievance. This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters,
if not all the voters, who voted in that election.[19] Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that
the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was]
x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that
there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper
purpose.[20]
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due
course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. [21] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora,[22] we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The
IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the
Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented too general an interest. We
held:

[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from
this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty
to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This
is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.

Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of
legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised
in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied)

We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise
important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise
again.

Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term

Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law, thus:

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)

To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in pertinent parts:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one
(1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a
special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the
existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office
or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:

Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill
the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in
case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in
case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
 Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular
elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they
contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions [24] or even in its press releases[25] did COMELEC state
that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections
on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate
receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements
in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001
and accordingly rendered Honasans proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the
question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a call for such election and for lack of notice as to the
office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated
below, the Court answers in the negative.

COMELECs Failure to Give Notice

of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election

The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the
legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the elections validity. [26] In a
general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged
to administer the election.[27]
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a
vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and
operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by
the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. [28] This is because the right
and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority [29] and
the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. [30]
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some
authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of
notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. [31]
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the
special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in
February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure
to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the House
of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the
vacancy should take place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to the
discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time
provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended, for COMELEC to call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90
days after the occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELECs failure to so call
and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh
impossible for the voters in the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the special election and
the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.

No Proof that COMELECs

Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special
election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed
that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. [32]
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two matters. First, that
COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the
regular elections scheduled on the same date.Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor
proved that COMELECs failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election
took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted
in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May
2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that the voters had
actual notice of the special election, the office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would
determine the winner. Such actual notice could come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of
R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the campaign.[33]
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by the
instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that
COMELECs omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the
special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is impossible to distinguish
what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the
voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise.[34]
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorates will and let the results of the election stand,
despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections. [35] This is but to acknowledge the
purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours, which is:

to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials
or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and
unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the
election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their
government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule
would make the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself.[36] (Emphasis in the
original)

Separate Documentation and Canvassing

not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,

Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial
election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass
separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory
under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC fix the date of the election, if necessary, and state, among
others, the office or offices to be voted for. Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of
certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to
support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate
documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of Resolution No.
84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad) made no mention of the manner by which the seat
vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator
Roco), the Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates
needless expenditures and the voters further inconvenience, thus:

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 [later converted to
Resolution No. 84].

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read
only the title and text of the resolution.

T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled

RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO
SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM

WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire
on June 30, 2004;

WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-
President of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority vote of all the members of both House of
Congress, voting separately;

WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on February 9, 2001;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members of the House of
Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday and every three years
thereafter; Now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and
calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the
regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD

Senator

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader, Chairman of the Committee on
Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]

Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As a
matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special election was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.

In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth
senator because at that time there were only eight to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.

Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24 candidates and the first 12
were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a three-year term.

My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate with the 13th largest number of votes
going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there going to be an election for a position of senator for the unexpired term
of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the Commission on Elections. But
personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate obtaining the 13th largest number of votes be declared as elected
to fill up the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is it not the case that the
vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do
not know if we can No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a resolution of this
Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by
the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.

It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to fill up would be that reserved for
Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a manner.

xxxx

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the simultaneous
elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the special election for this purpose. So we just nominate 13 and it is good for
our colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less
disfranchisement.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special election, maybe, we satisfy the
requirement of the law.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming elections that will be held simultaneously as a
special election under this law as we understand it.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr. President.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that there will be anyone
running specifically

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will be running with specific groups.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other amendment, I move for the
adoption of this resolution.

xxxx

ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934

If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.[37]

Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the special election
within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No.
84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in adopting means
to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so
adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. [38] COMELECs decision to abandon the means
it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method embodied in
Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should
COMELEC, in subsequent special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November
1951 and 8 November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is no
reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the
case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute
gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.[39]

A Word to COMELEC
 The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information
regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances
attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELECs failure to so call and give notice did not
invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future
elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the
conduct of regular elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949

JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.

Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Tañada for respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.

RESOLUTION

In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.

Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain the principal grounds for the denial.

The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:

In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare quested that his right to speak on the next session day,
February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed
with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the
petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally
ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted
by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and
conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.

Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto who was
confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senator were present.

Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion,
obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from
delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by
Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.

Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver
his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator
Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak
without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously
shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.

At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo
Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in
pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who
moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.

Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again
moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.

Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator David,
Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate
President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.

Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the
petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session
in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session which suggestion was
carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who
was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read
aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad
introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.

Senator Cuenco took the oath.

The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate.

By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and
oust respondent.

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial points:

a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

c. Should the petition be granted?

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance
of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori
we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators
want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a
resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens.
And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial
deliberations.

The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators have
constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently
one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves into another Senate.
The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the same one Philippines Senate.

It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes it advisable, more than ever, to
adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.

The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session
validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice
Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has
no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub-questions.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the
morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution
that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority required
by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because
the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun
and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of
the Senate of twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House:
does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.],
p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice
Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the
absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the
same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may
participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most,
eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.

Separate Opinions

MORAN, C.J., concurring:

I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case.1 The present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of
the Court.

Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-interference by the courts with the Senate because the legal capacity of his group of
twelve senators to acts as a senate is being challenged by petitioner on the groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel.
Werts vs. Rogers et al., Atl. 726; 23 L. R. A., 352). If this group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under the Constitution, then its
proceedings should be free from interference. But if it is not possessed of a valid quorum, then its proceedings should be voided.

The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate cannot be considered a political question the determination of
which devolves exclusively upon the Senate. That issue involves a constitutional question which cannot be validly decided either by the
Cuenco group or by the Avelino group separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the Avelino has decidedly less. And for obvious
reasons, the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the members of the Avelino group, possibly to avoid trouble, do not attend the
sessions presided by the respondent believing as they do that the latter was illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco group
believing itself as possessing the constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any semblance of admission to the contrary, does not find it
convenient to compel the attendance of any senator of the Avelino group. Then the question arises--who will decide the conflict between the
two groups? This anomalous situation will continue while the conflict remains unsettled, and the conflict will remain unsettled while this Court
refuses to intervene. In the meantime the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other measures which may be passed by the Cuenco group
will be open to doubt because of an alleged lack of quorum in the body which authored them. This doubt may extend, in diverse forms, to the
House of Representative and to the other agencies of the government such as the Auditor General's Office. Thus, a general situation of
uncertainty, pregnant with grave dangers, is developing into confusion and chaos with severe harm to the nation. This situation may, to a
large extent, be stopped and constitutional processes may be restored in the Senate if only this Court, as the guardian of the Constitutional,
were to pronounce the final word on the constitutional mandate governing the existing conflict between the two groups. And, in my opinion,
under the present circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to meet challenge of the situation which demands the utmost of
judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As hereinbefore stated, the present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the
intervention of this Court.

As to the legality of respondent's election as acting President of the Senate,2I firmly believe that although petitioner's adjournment of the
session of February 21, 1949, was illegality cannot be countered with another illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected as
acting President of the Senate was illegal because when Senator Mabanag raised the question of a quorum and the roll was called, only
twelve senators were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four senators, and therefore, the quorum must be thirteen. The authorities
on the matter are clear.

The constitution of our state ordains that a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum. the house of representative consist of
125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a majority or quorum are present, the house can do business; not otherwise.
A quorum possessed all the powers of the whole body, a majority of which quorum must, of course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan.,
155; 32 P., 470, 476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)

Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house shall constitute aquorum to do
business, is, for the purpose of the Assembly, not less than the majority of the whole number of which the house may be
composed. Vacancies from death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion of
Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)

The general rule is that a quorum is a majority of all the members and a majority of this majority may legislate and do the work of
the whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23 S. E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)
 . . . a majority of each House is necessary to transact business, and a minority cannot transact business, this view being in
keeping with the provision of the Constitution permitting a smaller number than a quorumto adjourn from day to day merely.
(Earp vs. Riley, 40 OKL., 340; p. 164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL., 323; 138 P. 158.)

The Constitution provides that "a majority of each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do business." In other words, when a
majority are present the House is in a position to do business. Its capacity to transact business is then established, created by the
mere presence of a majority, and depend upon the disposition or assent or action of any single member or faction of the majority
present. All that the Constitution required is the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present, the power of the
House arises. (U. S. vs.Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed. 321, 325.)

If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all the agents are assembled, or if all have been duly notified, and the
minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a majority of those present may act,provided those present constitute a majority
of the whole number. In other words, in such case, a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and a majority of
the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum, the power of the minority to act is, in general,
considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th ed., sec. 283.)3

Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more extensive opinion, if necessary, I believe that respondent Mariano J. Cuenco has not been
legally elected as acting President of the Senate. It is true that respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate President because he
represent the majority of the members now present in Manila, and, at any new session with a quorum, upon the present senatorial alignment,
he will be elected to said office. But precisely he is now the master of the situation, he must win his victory in accordance with the
Constitution. It is absolutely essential in the adolescent life of our Republic to insist, strictly and uncompromisingly, on thedemocratic
principles consecrated in our Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the future of our political life as a republican form of
government under the sovereignty of a Constitution from being a mockery.

The situation now in this Court is this — there are four members who believe that there was no quorum in respondent's election as against
four other member who believe that there was such quorum. Two members declined to render their opinion on the matter because of their
refusal to assume jurisdiction. And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus, the question of whether or not respondent has been
legally elected is, to say the least, doubtful in this Court under the present conditions. This doubt, which taint the validity of all the laws,
resolutions and other measures that the Cuenco group has passed and may pass in the future, can easily be dispelled by them by convening
a session wherein thirteen senators are present and by reiterating therein all that has been previously done by them. This is a suggestion
coming from a humble citizen who is watching with a happy heart the movement of this gallant group of prominent leaders campaigning for a
clean and honest government in this dear country of ours.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the parties is entitled to hold the position of President of the Senate is in
issue.

There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time the controversial incidents took place, petitioner Jose Avelino was
rightful occupant of the position. the litigation has arisen because of the opposing contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to respondent's
election as acting President of the Senate, on February 21, 1949.

Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a resolution was passed declaring the position of President of the Senate vacant and
electing respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of the Senate were illegal because, at the time, the session for said day has
been properly adjourned, and the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall had no right to convene in a rump session, and said
rump session lacked quorum, while respondent contents that the session which was opened by petitioner had not been legally adjournment,
the Senators who remained in the session hall had only continued the same session, and there was quorum when the position of the
President of the Senate was declared vacant and when respondent was elected as acting President of Senate, to fill the vacate position.

Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his petition, is to the effect that on Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time petitioner opened the
session in the Senate session hall, there were twenty two Senators present who answered the roll call; Vicente J. Francisco. Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin,
Melencio Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia,
Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag, and the petitioner Jose Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding session was
being read the crowd of more than 1,000 people who entered the Senate hall to witness the session, became unruly, the repeated efforts of
petitioner as well as the sergeant-at-arms and other peace officers to maintain peace and order notwithstanding. Fights and commotions
ensued and several shots were fired among the audience. The Senator who spoke could not be heard because the spectators would either
shout to drown their voices or would demeans that some other Senator should take the floor and be recognized by petitioner. Pandemonium
reigned and it was impossible for the Senate to proceed with its deliberations free from undue pressure and without grave danger to its
integrity as a body and to the personal safety of the members thereof. Senator Pablo Angeles David moved for adjournment until Thursday,
February 24, 1949. There being no objection, petitioner adjourned the session until February 24, 1949. Thereupon petitioner and nine other
Senator namely, Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Sulipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres,
Enriquez Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin left the session hall. Senator Melencio Arranz, President Pro-Tempore of Senate, went
up the rostrum and, assuming the presidency of the chamber, convinced the remaining twelve Senators into a rump session, in which a
resolution was passed declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and electing respondent as President of the Senate.
Thereupon respondent pretended to assume the office of president of the Senate and continues to pretend to assume said office.
Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or illegally exercising the office of the President of the Senate: 1.
Petitioner had adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment having been properly moved and, without objection, favorably acted
upon; 2. Petitioner had full power to adjourn the session even without motion under chapter II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the Rules of the
Senate; 3 The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no other session could be called in the Senate on the same day; 4 The
President Pr-tempore had no authority to assume the presidency except in the cases specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the
Senate, and none of the conditions therein mentioned obtained at the time in question; and 5. The twelve Senators that convened in the
rump session did not constitute a quorum to do business under the Constitution and the rule of the Senate, being less than one-half plus one
of the twenty four members of the Senate.

Respondent's version of the events as follows:

(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada announced and reserved in open session of the Senate that on
Monday, February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour privilege, it was known that formal charges would be filed against the then
Senate President, petitioner in this case, on said date. Hours before the opening of the session on Monday, February 21, 1949, Senators
Lorenzo M. Tañada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office of the secretary of the Senates a resolution in which serious charges were
preferred against the herein petitioner. A certified copy of said resolution, marked as Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an integral part
hereof:

(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time
for the session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M.;

(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a
copy of the resolution submitted by Senator Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully
said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and Tirona;

(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requested of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that the session be opened, the petitioner
finally called the meeting to order;

(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate, moved that the roll call be dispensed with as it was evident that with
the presence of all the 22 senator who could discharges their functions, there could be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed
said motion, evidently in pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of petitioner and his followers to make use of all sorts of dilatory
tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech on the charges filed against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively
showed the presence of the following 22 Senators; Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad,
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo
Mabanag and Jose Avelino;

(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minute, but this motion was likewise opposed by
senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy;

(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly took the floor to claim his right to
deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the charges against petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually ignored him; and
when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would
being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the antics of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously and
vociferously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order! Out of order! Out of order! . . .," everything the latter would ask the petitioner to
recognized the right of Senator Tañada to speak.

(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by prearrangement, but the police officers present were
able to maintain order. No shots were fired among the audience, as alleged in the petition. It was at about this same time that Senator Pablo
Angeles David, one of petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of the session, evidently again, in
pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to prevent Senator Tañada from speaking;

(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who
moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote;

(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again
moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote;

(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked out of the session hall.

(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators David, Tirona, Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and Clarin followed the petitioner out of the
session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in sub-paragraph (e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by
petitioner, whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore, took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he asked that it be made of record — as it was in so made — that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate;

(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session, which suggestion was
carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair.

(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried unanimously, Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary, as the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session;

(p) Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech, Which took more than hours,
on the charges against the petitioner contained in the Resolution, attacked hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration
and approval ofsaid Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion, after having firstread aloud the complete text of said Resolution, and
thereafter the same was unanimously approved;

(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yield edit to him, Senator Sanidad
introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate," a copy of which is herewith attacked and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "2".
Put a vote, the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved, respondent having abstained from voting;

(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting President of the Senate, immediately took his oath of Office in open session, before
Senate President Pro-Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since then, has been discharging the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives
appertaining to said office;

(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly appears that the petitioner had only nine senators in his favor and twelve, decidedly against
him, which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there was no opposition to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;

(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the allegedadjournment, it was evidently and manifestly the purpose of the
petitioner to deprive Senator Tañada of his right to take the floor and to speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner
resorted to all means to deprive the Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on Senate Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and that when
the petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator who were present in the said session was ready to approved said resolution, the
petitioner abandoned the session;

(u) The minute of the session held on February 21, Exhibit 1949, a copy of which is hereto attacked and made an integral part hereof as
Exhibit "3", show that the petitioner illegally abandoned the Chair while the Senate was in session and that the respondent has been duly
elected Acting Senate President in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment was objected to and not submitted to a vote and, therefore, could
not have been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had the power to adjourn the session even without motion; that the session presided
over, first by petitioner and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been threatened or intimidated by anybody, and after
petitioner abandoned the session continued peacefully until its adjournment at 4:40 P.M.; that there was only one session held on said date;
that petitioner's abandonment of the Chair in the face of an impending ouster therefrom constituted a temporaryincapacity entitling the
Senate President Pro-tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the absence of Senator Tomas Confessor, whowas in
the U. S. and of Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill and confined in the Lourdes Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators
constitutes a quorum; that, despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February 24, 1949, convinced that he did not count with
the majority of the Senators and not wanting to be investigated by the specialinvestigation committee regarding the grave charges preferred
against him, the petitioner deliberately did not appear at the session hall on said date.

Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; (b) No cause of action as there are only
nine Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against twelve Senators or who have madepatent their loss of confidence in him by
voting in favor of his out ouster; and (c) The object of the action is to make the supreme Court a mere tool of a minority group of ten Senators
to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the twelve other members of the Senate, to entrench petitionerin power.

In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respondent contends that the present case is not justiciable, because it involves a purely
political question, the determination of which by the Senate is binding and conclusiveupon the court (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192) respondent has been recognized as acting President of the Senate by the President of the Philippines and
said recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts (Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil., 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366); the
Senate is the only body that can determine from time to time who shall be its President and petitioner's only recourse lies in said body; and
this Court's action in entertaining the petition would constitute an invasion and an encroachment upon the powers, rights and prerogatives
solely and exclusively appertaining to Congress, of which the Senate is a branch.

Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real events, this Court authorized the reception of evidence. Before passing to consider
and to weigh said evidence so as to determine the true events, it is only logical that we should first pass upon the question of jurisdiction
raised by respondent.
In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respondent alleges, as first ground, that the present controversy is not justiciable in nature,
involving, as it does, a purely political question, the determination of which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is binding and
conclusive on the courts.

The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs question. It assumes as premises that the question has been determined by the
Senate, when the two opposing parties claim that each one of them represents the will of the Senate, and if the controversy should be
allowed to remainunsettled, it would be impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, and who really represent the Senate.

The question raised in the petition, although political in nature, are justiciable because they involve the enforcement of legal precepts, such
as the provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the Senate. Thepower and authority to decided such questions of law form part of the
jurisdiction, not only expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by express prohibition of the Constitution, it cannot be
divested.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various court, but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of
its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of the court
may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts in —

(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or regulations is in question.

(2) All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.

(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.

(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.

Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot be decided without decided also what is the truth on the controversial facts, by the
very natureof things, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reached the settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.

Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by the President of the Philippines as acting President of the Senate and that executive
recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts. The contention is erroneous. The actions of the President of the Philippines cannot
deprive the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If the Congress of the Philippines, in which the Legislature
power is vested, cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to decide questions of law, much less canthe president of the
Philippines, on whom is vested the Executive power, which in the philosophical and political hierarchy is of subordinate category to the of the
Legislative power, do so. The power to enact laws is higher than the power to execute them.

The third argument of argument of respondent, although based on truth, has nothing to do with the legal questions raised in this case. It is
true that the Senate is the only body that can determine from time who is and shall be its President, but when the legal questions are raised
in a litigation likein the present case, the proper court has the function, the province and the responsibility to decide them. To shirk that
responsibility is to commit a dereliction of official duty.

Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is invade and encroach upon the powers, rights and prerogatives solely and
exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of which the Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to
thelegality of the adjournment declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ousters, as a result of the resolution declaring vacant the position of
President of the Senate, or respondent's election as acting President of the Senate, and as to whether or not the twelve Senators who
remained in the session hall could continue holding session and if they constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which courts of justice
have jurisdiction and the SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.

From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, at the time the resolution of confidence in favor of petitioner,
introduced by the Senator Lopez, was being put to vote, Senator Tañada voted,Senator Tañada voted in the negative, alleging as ground
damaging facts, supported by several checks, highly detrimental to the personal and officialhonesty of petitioner. At the same time, Senator
Tañada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to be held on Monday, February 21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and
of delivering during the so-called privilege hour a speech in support of said charges.

On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of the ordinary daily session, Senator Tañada and Sanidad registered with the Secretary
of the Senate a resolution for the appointment of a Committee of three, composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with
instructed to proceed immediately to investigate the serious charges against petitioner embodiedin the document.

Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the respondent's answer, is as follow:

RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE
AVELINO.
WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high government officials of the Philippines Government and leaders of
the Liberal Partyheld at Malacañang palace on January 15, 1949, delivered a speech,wherein he advocated the protection, or, at
least, tolerance, of graft and corruption in the government, and placed the interest of grafters and corrupt officials as supreme and
above the welfare of the people, doctrine under which it is impossible for an honest and clean governmentto exist;

WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was given wide publicity by the press, especially the Chronicle
Publication in their issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as follows:

The senate President defenses the abuses perpetrated by Liberal Party men. He called the investigations of the surplus property
commission irregularities and the immigration quota scadal as acts of injustice he describe the probe as "criminal" and "odious."
He flayed the National Bureau of Investigation agents for persecuting Liberal party leaders.

"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we all go to hell. It is better to be in hell because in that place are no investigations,
no secretary of justice, no secretary of interior to go after us."

Avelino, who is the present President of the Liberal party, ensured the President for his actuations which, he claimed, were mainly
responsible for the division of the party into two hostile camps.

Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he could not "permit", the abuse of the party in power, because why should we be
saints when in reality we are not?

He stressed that the present investigation being conducted by President Quirino on the surplus property scandal and the
immigration quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the Liberal Party in the eyes of the people, and is a desecration to the
memory of the late President Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against the Liberal Party", Avelino said.

Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those who are in power in the government, Avelino maintained that the
Liberal Party men are entitled to more considerations and should be given allowance to use the power and privilege. If they abuse
their power as all humans are prone to do, they will be given a certain measure of tolerance, Avelino said, adding, "What are we in
power for?"

Avelino cited the surplus property investigations as an attempt to besmear the memory of Presidential Roxas. As a result of these
investigations, the members of Congress are subjected to unjust and embarrassing questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is
worse is the fact that these senators and representatives are being pilloried in public without formal charges filed against them.
(Manila Chronicle issue of Jan. 16, 1949).

At last Saturday night's caucus Senate President Avelino for two hours lectured to President Quirino on Liberal Party
discipline. At the same time he demanded "tolerance" on the part of the Chief Executive by the party in power.

The investigations were conducted on vague charges, Avelino claimed. Nothing specific has teen filed against atop
Liberal Party man. And yet National Bureau of Investigation agents have persecuted top leader of the LiberalParty.
That is not justice. That is injustice. . . . It isodious. . . . It is criminal.

Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr. President? If you cannot permit abuses, you must at
leasttolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in
realitywe are not? We are not angels. And besides when we die we all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go to hell
wherethere are no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of Interior to go after us.

When Jesus died on the Cross. He made a distinction between a good crook and the bad crooks. We can prepare to
be good crooks.

Avelino related the story of St. Francis of Assisi. Athief sought sanctuary in St. Francis' convent. When thesoldiers
came to the convent and ordered St. Francis to produce the wanted thief, St. Francis told the soldiers that thehunted
man had gone the other way.

Avelino then pointed out that even a saint had condoned the sins of a thief.

xxx xxx xxx

The investigation ordered by President Quirino, Avelino said, was a desecration of the memory of the late President
Roxas. The probe has lowered, instead of enhanced, the prestige of the Liberal Party and its leader in the eyes of the
public.

If the present administration fails, it is Roxas and not Quirino that suffers by it, because Quirino's administration is only
a continuation of Roxas, Avelino said.
 Avelino compared all political parties to business corporations, of which all members are stockholders. Every year the
Liberal Party makes an accounting of its loss profit. The Liberal Party, he said, has practically no dividends at all. It has
lost even its original capital. Then he mentionedthe appointments to the government of Nacionalistas like: Lino
Castillejo,as governor of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Nicanor Carag, consulto Madrid; and Vicente
Formoso, General Manager of the National Tabacco Corporation."(Manila Chronicle issue of January 18, 1949.).

WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said speech in the Manila Chronicle issue of January 16, 1949, the Senate President,
in a letter to the said news report was a "maliciously distorted presentation of my remarks at that caucus, under a tendentious
headlines", and threatened that "unless the proper redness is given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to take the necessary
steps to protect my reputation and good name";

WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only refuse to retract or make the rectification demanded by the Senate President, but
on the contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949, challenged him to take his threatened action, stating that "in order to est
abolished the truth, we are inviting the Senate President to file a libel suit against the Chronicle" and further repeated the
publication of their reports on the Senate President speech in the same issue of January 18, 1949 as quoted above;

WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable length of time that has elapsed, the Senate President has not carried out his
threat of filing action against the Chronicle Publication, thereby confirming, in effect, his doctrine of tolerance of graft and
corruption;

WHEREAS, in open and public session of the Senate on February 18, 1949, there were exhibited photostatic copies of four
checks totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have come into the possession and control of the Senate President, after he had
assumed his office;

WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check, which is Manager's Check No. M5375 of the National City Bank of the National City
Bank of New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in favor of the Senate President in the amount of P312,500.00, was indorsed
by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the Philippine National Bank on October
26, 1946;

WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks, which is Manager's Check No. 49706 of the Nederlands Indische Handelsbank,
drawn on October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate President in the amount of P196,905.60, was indorsedby him to his son, Mr.
Jose Avelino, Jr., who cashed it October 22, 1946;

WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37262 of the Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, drawn on
October 23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a Chinese concern, in favor of "cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was
indorsed by the Senate President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving Account No. 63436 with
the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;

WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37268 of the Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, drawn by
the aforementioned Chinese concern, Chiung Liu Ching Long and Co., Ltd., in the amount of P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate
President, was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the Philippines
National Bank on October 26, 1946;

WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned, the one for P196,905.60 was cashed by the Senate President's son, Jose
Avelino, Jr., on October 22, 1946; while of the three other checks totalling P370,000.00 which was deposited by the Senate
President's wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in her saving and current accounts with the Philippines National Bank on October 26,
1946, P325,000.00 were withdraw by her on same day;

WHEREAS, in the course of the speech delivered by the Senate President on the floor of the Senate on February 18, 1946, in an
attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he refused to be interpolated on the same, and his explanation lacked such details and
definiteness that it left many doubts unsettled;

WHEREAS, in the case of the check for P312,500.00 the Senate President explanation that the same represented proceeds from
the sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is directly contradicted by the source of the same, Ching Ban Yek, who declared
under oath before the Horilleno Investigating Committee that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been loaned byhim to the Senate
President, who repaid the same within ten days;

WHEREAS, it appears that during the period from December 29, 1945 to April 30, 1948, deposits totalling P803,865.45 were
made in the current account of the Senate President's wife Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in the Philippine National Bank, of which
amount P6,204.86 were deposited before his election to office and the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after his election;

WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate President do not bear explanation madein his speech of February 18, 1949 to the effect
that he and his wife had made substantial amounts in commercial transaction in shoes and liquor;
 WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18, 1949, the Senate President said that "en politica todo vale", and that inasmuch as
the Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it was right for the Liberals to commit frauds in the electionsto even up with frauds
committed by the opposition;

WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18, 1949 delivered by the SEnate President justified the commission of electoral frauds,
which justification is a direct attack on the sovereignty of the people and may be a cause of unrest or resolution;

WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments which passes upon all Presidential
appointment, including thoseto the judiciary, has abused the prerogatives of his office by seeking in several instances to interfere
with and influence some judge in decidingcase pending before, thereby imperilling the independence of the judiciaryand
jeopardizing the impartial administration of justice;

WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of the people and of the membersof the Senate demand a through, impartial and
immediate investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,

1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they are hereby appointed

2 Committee of three (3) members of this Senate, to be com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David and Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to investigate the charges mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of witnesses
6 and the production of books of account, documents, and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities and the services of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may deem necessary, with in
9 structions to render its report and recommendations to the
10 Senate on or before Friday, February 25, 1949.

Adopted, February 21, 1949.

Although a sufficient number of Senators to constitute quorum were already present in said morning at and before 10:00 o'clock, the
schedule time for the daily session to begin, the session was not then opened, because petitioner failed to appear in the hall until about
11:35, the time petitioner ascended the rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to order, he asked for a copy of the resolution
introduced by the Senators Tañada and Sanidad and, after reading it slowly, he called to his side Senators Angeles David and Tirona and
conferred with them.

Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that thesession be opened, that petitioner called the meeting to order
shortly before 12:00 o'clock noon.

Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Senator Tirona opposed the motion and the roll call showed the presence of the
following twenty two Senators: Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun,
Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo
Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Manag and Jose
Avelino.

Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be dispersed with, but the motion was again opposed by Senator Tirona
whose opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the reading of the minutes proceeded.

Senator Tañada repeated took the floor to floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the charges against
petitioner,pursuant to the announcement he made in the session of February 18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the reading
of the minutes. he wasignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that he would order the arrestof any Senator who speak without having
been previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad requested the Chair to recognized the right of Senator Tañada to speak, and every time
he would make the request, Senator Tirona would oppose him upon the ground that the requests were out of order.

Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery. Shout were heard from individuals of the audience, where two fist fight
took place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard from outside. Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for
adjournment of the session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the same time, moved thatthe motion be submitted to vote.
Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the motion to adjourn, banged the gavel and declared the session adjourned until next Thursday,
February 24, 1949, and, thereupon, left the session hall followed by the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria
Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him.
Twelve SEnator, respondent and his eleven supporters, remained in the session hall. Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the SEnate,
ascended the rostrum,and called those Senators present to order. Senator Mabanag raised the question of quorum and the question
of quorum and the President Pro-tempore ordered a roll call, to which all the twelve Senators remaining in the sessionhall answered.

The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those presentproceeded to continue transacting business. Senator Cabili
took an made it of record that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-
tempore and those remainingmembers of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senator Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session and the suggestion was carried unanimously and
respondent took the Chair.
Senator Tañada delivered his privilege speech, which took two hours on the charge against petitioner contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit
"1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval of said resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The motion was
seconded by Senator Sanidad, and the resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent yielded the Chair to the President Pro-tempore
and Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit "2", which read as follows:

RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND DESIGNATING THE HONORABLE
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE.

Resolved by the Senate in session assembled, That a quorum exists; that the Honorable Jose Avelino, President of the Senate
having abandoned the chair, his position is hereby declared vacant; and that, the Honorable Mariano JesusCuenco of Cebu,
designated Acting President of the SEnate, until further orders from this Body.

Adopted, February 21, 1949.

The resolutions unanimously approved, with respondent abstaining from voting. Pursuant to said resolution, respondent took his oath of
office inopen session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz and has started, since then,to discharge the duties, rights and privileges of
acting President of theSenate.

The above recital of facts is based on our findings on the evidence on record. From the said facts we believe the following conclusions are
unavoidable.

1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.

2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him had walked out from the session hall, the Senate could not continue holding session
and transact business for lack of quorum.

In the following discussion we will express the reasons in support of the above conclusions.

ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT

A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is under debate and, with certain restriction, it has the highest privilege
under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even questions of privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to
adjourn may be made after the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered and before the roll call has begun, before reading of the journal. The motion is
not debatable and, after the motion is made, neither another motion nor an appeal may intervene before the taking of the vote.

The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single individual, without
usurpation of the collective prerogatives. It is too tremendous a power to be wieldedby a single individual. The functions of the Senate and its
opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without jeopardizing the high purposes for which
a legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social order. Single-handedindividual discretion on the matter may not mean
anything other than placing the legislative chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.

There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the
body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu proprio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and
experience in thiscountry and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a
provision.

Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of Senator Angeles David to said effect was properly made and met
with no objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it was right for petitioner to declare the adjournment, because the absence of
anyobjection, provided the motion was properly made and the other Senators after having been properly apprised of the motion, did not
object to it, was an evidence of an implied consent of all the members. The evidence, however, fails to support petitioner's claim.

We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in consonance with truth. We are of opinion that the motion to adjourn was
actually objected to. Senator Tañada was bent on delivering a speech he had ready onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by
himself and by Senator Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long before the session was opened. The formulation of said charges
had been announced days before,since the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, when he showed photostatic copies of some checks as
basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In said Friday session respondent's group suffered defeat on the approval of the resolution of
confidence fathered by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable that respondent's group of Senators, believing themselves to constitute the
majority, did not want to waste any time to give a showing of said majority and must have decided to depose petitioner as soon as possible to
wrestfrom him the Senate leadership that upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.

As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would give them the control of the Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to
dispense with the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and had been requesting that Senator Tañada be recognized to take the floor.
Senator Tañada himself made attempts to deliver his speech.
Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to adopt a blocking strategyto obstruct the process that would give due course to the
investigationof the serious charges made in resolution No. 68, Exhibit 1, and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.

This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of petitioner and his supporters at the session hall and petitioner's procrastination in
opening the session, by taking all his time in reading first the Tañada and Sanidad resolution, formulating charges against him, and
conferring with Senators Angeles David and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the Senate before Senator's Cuenco and
Sanidad began urging that the session beopened.

Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he could adjourn the session under the rules of the Senate, is not well
taken. There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving petitioner such authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate
President to take measures to stop disorder, but that power does not include the one to adjourn.

The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of the petitioner and his supporters from the session
hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against petitioner and of his
impedingouster, by the decisive votes of respondent's group of Senators.

The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.

QUORUM

There is no controversy that at the session in question there were present in the session hall only twelve Senators, those composing
respondent's group, and this fact had been ascertained by the roll call ordered by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator Mabanag had
raised the question of quorum.

The Constitution provides:

A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Sub-
sec. 2 Article VI.)

The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words "each
House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of Congress.

The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-
four. Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.

We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's counsel, premised on the fact that the above constitutional provision
does not use the words "of the members" and the theory of the amicus curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the
majority of the members who can be reached by coercive processes. There is, however, nothing in said arguments that can validly change
the natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of the Constitution. "Majority of each House" can mean only majority of the members
of each House, and the number of said members cannot be reduced upon any artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the context of
the Constitution itself or by the sound processes of reason.

For all the foregoing, we conclude that:

1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case, notwithstanding their political nature and implications, are
justiciable and within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the Supreme Court, which cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the
Constitution. Should there be analogous controversy between two claimants to the position of the President of the Philippines, according to
the Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for respondent, the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because it
would raise a constitutional question. Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent was elected
acting President of the Senate, is a question that call for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and specific provision
of the Constitution. Should the two absent Senators comeand attend the session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the
Senate will be kept at a stand still, because of the deadlock resulting from twelve Senators, each group supporting petitioner's and
respondent's opposing claims to the position of President of the Senate. Admitting that pressure of public opinion may not break the impasse,
it hasbeen suggested from respondent's side that it may invite revolution. Between the two alternatives, jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
revolution, there is only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance with the Constitution, which is complete enough to offer
orderly remedies for any wrong committed within the framework of democracy it established in this country. Should this Supreme Court
refuse to exercise jurisdiction in this case,such refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such shirking of official responsibility
cannot expect acquittal in the judgment of history. The gravity of the issues involved in this case, affecting not only the upper branch of
Congress, but also the presidential succession as provided by Republic Act No. 181, is a challenge to our sense of duty which we should not
fail to meet.

2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without the authority of the Senate, was illegal and, therefore, null and
void.
3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his supporters, after petitioner and his nine supporters had walked out
from the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to transact business.

4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and choosing respondent as acting President of the Senate,
has been adopted in contravention of the Constitution for lack of quorum. The fact that respondent has been designated only as acting
President of the Senate, a position not contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic Act No. 181 on presidential succession, so much so
that his position in acting capacity, according to his own counsel, would not entitle respondent to Succeedto the position of the President of
the Philippines, emphasizes the invalidity of respondent's election.

Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal issues involved are very simple, and it would not be hard to reach a prompt conclusion
if we could view the controversies with the attitude of a mathematician tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations which, from the
point of view of laymen, of the press, of public opinion in general and the people at large, may appear of great importance, such as who will
wield the power to control the Senate and whether or not petitioner is guilty of the serious charges filed against him, are completely alien to
the questions that this Court must answer. The motives and motivations of petitioner and respondent of their respective supporters in the
Senate in taking the moves upon which this case has arisen are their exclusive business and should not be minded for the purposes of our
decision.

The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to elect another Senator as president of the Senate, and their
freedom to make such change is subject only to the dictates of their own conscience and to anyverdict that the people, through the
electorate, may render at the polls, and to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of leadership, the Senate
and the Senators are bound to follow the orderlyprocesses set and outlined by the Constitution and by the rules adopted by the Senate as
authorized by the fundamental law. Any step beyond said legal bounds may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts
of justice, the latter cannot simply wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of jurisdiction, adopting the indifferent
attitude of a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of the wind may causea live wire to ignite a neighboring house.

When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court, complaining that the President of the Senate has adjourned or is
adjourning the daily session of the Senate over and above objections voiced from thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or consent
of the majority, we cannot close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich fashion: Otherwise, we would be
disregarding ours sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we would be printing the stamp of our approval to the existence and
continuation of a unipersonal tyranny imposed upon the upper chamber of Congress, a tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the functioning
and actuations of the Senate and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus depriving the country of the benefits of legislation.

When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being deprived of the powers and prerogative of the position of President
of the Senate, to which he has been duly elected because twelve Senators, without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted
to depose him and to elect another Senator in his place, he raises a constitutional question of momentous importance which we should not
fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us. Such complaint constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority
by the twelve Senators, in utter violation of the fundamental law. The situation would demand ready and noother agency of government can
offer that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint has been filed.

The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective collective action. Because a society or collective
body is composed of separate and independent individual units, it cannot exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can
onlyact in organized form. Every time it has to act, it has to an organic whole, and quorum here is the organizing element without which the
personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The importance of such organizing element has been recognize by the members of
our Constitutional Convention, and that is the reason why they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring the existence of quorum for
the former National Assembly to transact official business and that requirement was also imposed by the National Assembly when, amending
the Constitution, it voted itself out ofexistence, to be replaced by a bicameral Congress. The requirement, both in the original text of the
Constitution and in the amendment, had been ratified by the sovereign will of the people.

When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a quorum we did it for mighty reasons, such as that democracy is based
on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less than the majority of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present
controversy, is to allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where the Constitution provides for only one. If the
twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact official business, what willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from
constituting themselves into a quorum to transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend the session,
even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad and sides with petitioner's group. Then there will be, in effect, two
Senate and, according to respondent's theory the Supreme Court will have no jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and noone decide it except
public opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:

Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may take shelter when afraid to displease the powerful.

Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case, everybody must congratulate himself because petitioner, instead of
resorting to any high-handed mean to enforce his right to continue holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has come to us for
proper redress by the orderly by the orderly processes of judicial settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago, he impugned the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that ground — the injustice then committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera,
Diokno and Romero now being more generally recognized — petitioner came to this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.

The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme Court is premised on this sharing the conviction that said Tribunal is
the last bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people, the final arbiter on all constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty
of the law. That conviction and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more imperatively nowadays when the majesty of
the law, the basic tenets of the Constitution, the principles of humanity springing fromthe golden rule, which is the law of laws, are being the
subject of bold onslaughts from many elements of society, bent on taking justice in their own hands or on imposing their will through fraud or
violence. The malady is widespread enough to imperatively and urgently demand a more complete respect and faith in the effectiveness of
our system of administration of justice.

For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to disappoint the believers in a philosophy and social order based on
constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all conflicts that may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this
case that for this Court to refuse cognizance of it may not have other alternative,if the pressure of public opinion may fail — and by
experience we know that it had suffered many failures — than revolution. This immeasurable responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it should
falter in the performance of its plain duty and should dispose of this case with the indifference with which a beach vacationist would dismiss a
gust of wind.

The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked, to bind the hands of justice into futility, should not be understood as absolute. It is an
apt rule of the tri-partite division of government as enunciated by Aristotle and further developed by Montequieu, as the best scheme to put in
practice the system of check and balance considered necessary for a workable democracy. To make absolute that principle is to open the
doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three separate governments within a government and three independent states within a state.
Indeed, it is to avoid such a teratologiccreature that the Constitutional Convention had not inserted among the principles embodied in the
fundamental law.

Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal controversies is the inherent function of courts. The Constitution of the United States of
America, unlike our own Constitution, is silent a to the power of courts of justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress.
Notwithstanding the silence, when the proper case arose, the United States Supreme Court, under the wise leadership of Chief Justice
Marshall, had not hesitated in declaring null and void a law enacted in contravention of constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court of the
Republic of the Philippines should not fail to match such and outstanding evidence of evidence of judicial statesmanship.

To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the theory has been advanced that, the President of the Philippines
having recognized respondent as a duly elected acting President of the Senate, that recognition is final and should bind this Court. The
theory sprouts from the same ideology under which a former king of England tried to order Lord Coke how the latter should dispose of a
pending litigation. Our answer is to paraphrase the great English judge by saying that nothing should guide us except what in conscience we
believe is becoming of our official functions, disregarding completely what the President of the Philippines may say or feel about it.

As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the present case, Congress may split into two groups after a presidential
election and each group may proclaim a different candidate as the duly elected Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to
the scope of the principle of separation of powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall we, as Pontious Pilate, wash our hands and
let the people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of revolution?

There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret
more that such a decision had been rendered than petitioner himself, the very one whowon it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of
jurisdiction. The more said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of the blemishes without which the escutcheon of the post-liberation
Supreme Court would be spotless.

We vote to render judgment granting the petition and ordering respondent to relinquish the powers, prerogative and privileges of the position
of the President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on the other side, should be restrained from putting any obstacle or obstruction by
illegal adjournments or otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily session of the Senate. Said body should be allowed to continue
transacting official business unhampered by any procedure intended to impede the free expressionof the will of the majority.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve senators who elected Senator Cuenco Acting President of the Senate did
not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his election was illegal.

It appears tome that the basis for computing a quorum of the Senate is thenumber of senators who have been elected and duly qualified and
who have not ceased to be senators by death or legal disqualification. If this were not so, what is the standard of computation? No
satisfactory, reasonable alternative has been or can be offered.

Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by such absence, under the Constitution, a member of the Senate loses his office,
emoluments, and other prerogatives, temporarily or permanently. There is no claim that this happens when a senators' presence at the
session be the criterion, then serious illness or being in a remote island with which Manila has no regular means of communication should
operate to eliminate the sick or absent members from the counting for the purpose of determining the presence of a majority.

The distinction made between absentees form legislative sessions who are in the Philippines and absentees who are in a foreign country is,
to my arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the theoretical and the practical by members of Congress are sometimes found necessary to
fulfill their missions. If we test the interpretation by its consequences, its unsoundness and dangers become more apparent. The
interpretation would allow any number of legislators, no matter how small, to transact business so long as it is a majority of the legislators
present in the country. Nothing in my opinion could have been farther from the minds of the authors of the Constitution than to permit, under
circumstances, less than a majority of the chosen and qualified representatives of the people to approve measures that might vitally affect
their lives, their liberty, happiness and property. The necessity of arresting absent members to complete a quorum is too insignificant,
compared with the necessity of the attendance of an absolute majority, to make unamenability to arrest a factor for ruling out absentees who
are beyond the legislature's process. The Congress is eminently a law-making body and is little concerned with jurisdiction over its members.
The power to order arrest is an emergency measure and is rarely resorted to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if the authority to arrest could
always afford a satisfactory remedy even in the cases of members who were inside the Philippines territory. This is especially true in the
United States of America, after whose form of government ours is patterned and whose territorial possession extend to the other side of the
globe.

This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, (78 Phil., 1).

In those cases the petitions were directed against an action of a recognized Senate exercising authority within it own domain. Here the
process sought is to be issued against an appointee of a senate that, it is alleged was not validly constituted to do business because, among
other reasons alleged, there was not quorum. The Court is not asked to interfere with an action of a coordinate branch of the government so
much as to test the legality of the appointment of the respondent.

Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court provides:

An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or a franchise, or an office in a corporation
created by authority of law;

xxx xxx xxx

This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude officers appointed by the legislative branch of the government.
Although this Court has no control over either branch of the Congress, it does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends
to be its officer is holding his office according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can only be raised by the
supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures. (Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two
lesser officers of the Senate appointed by different faction thereof and contesting each other's right to the office, it would not be the Senate
by the Court which would be called upon to decide the controversy. There is more reason for the Court to intervene when the office of the
President of the Senate is at stake. The interest of the public are being greatly imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy
determination of the same is imperatively demanded, in the interest of good government and public order.

Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney General, ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers' Reports, annotated, 354, to which I am
indebted for much of the reasoning adduced in this dissent on the question of this Court's jurisdiction.

March 14, 1949

RESOLUTION

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R. L-2821, Jose Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without
prejudice towriting later an extended opinion, has resolved, by a majority of seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events whichjustify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the
grounds stated by Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice Briones in their separate opinions, to declare that there was
a quorum at the session where respondent Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate President.

The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case,the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism,it appearing from the evidence that any new session
with a quorum wouldresult in the respondent's election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting
opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail,
because of the latter's persistent effortsto block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, he believethat the group has done
enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest.

The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J. Cuencohas been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is
petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on the question of jurisdiction but concurs on the question of quorum.

Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on that on that of quorum.

Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and reserves his vote on the question of quorum.

Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.
FERIA, J., concurring:

In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil., 192), the principal question raised was whether this Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
set aside the Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as members of the
Senate, and compel the respondents had no power to pass said resolution, because it was contraryto the provisions of Sec. 11, Article VI, of
the Constitution, which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for the Senate as well as for the House of Representative, and provided that said
Tribunal shall be judge of all contestsrelating to the election returns and qualifications of their respective members. Respondent Avelino et
al., who were represented by Senator Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned the jurisdiction of this Court to take this Court to
take cognizance of said case on the ground that the question therein involved was a political question, and petitioners Veraet al., who were
represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno, who is now oneof the attorneys for respondents, who now contends that this Supreme Court has
no jurisdiction over the present case, then maintained that this Court had jurisdiction.

And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et al., 78 Phil., 1, the question involved was whether it was within the jurisdiction of
this Court to take cognizance of the case and prohibit the respondents from enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both Houses
proposing an amendment to the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance there", grantingcertain rights to the citizens of the United states
of American in the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and void because it was not passedby the vote of three-fourths of the members
of the Senate and House of Representatives, voting separately, as required by Sec. 1, Art. XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of
Congress who were not allowed to take part had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners Mabanag et al. contended that the Court had jurisdiction
and the respondents maintained the contrary on the ground that the question involved was apolitical one and within the exclusive province of
the Legislature.

The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the Courts of last resortfrom the State Constitution of the United States of American, after
which our owns is patterned, has given rise to the distinction between justiceable question which fall within the province of the judiciary, and
politicalquestions which are not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and are to be decided, under the Constitution, by the People in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government, except to the extent that the power to deal with such question has been conferred upon the court byexpress or statutory
provision. Although it is difficult to define a politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a justiceable one, it has been generally held that the
first involves political rights which consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or managementof the
government of the government, while justiceable questions are those which affect civil, personal or property rights accorded to every member
of the community or nation.

Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial Supremacy is the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate case and
controversies that present justiceable issues, which fall within the jurisdiction or power allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is a
political one which comeswithin the exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the Government to decide, the judicial
department or Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or not the act of the Legislative or Chief Executiveis against the
Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of thecourts is the issue involved, and not the law or constitutional provisionwhich may be
applied. Divorced from the remedy sought, the declaration of this Court on the matter of constitutionality or unconstitutionality of alegislative
or executive act, would be a mere advisory opinion, without a coercive force.

Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs. Governor General, 16 Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon,
46 Phil., 83, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of said respondent in both casesthat the question involved was a political question and
therefore this Court had no jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice who held that this Courthad jurisdiction, and dissented from the
decision of the majority.

When the present case was first submitted to us, I concurred with the majority, in view of the ruling of the Court in said two cases, which
constitutes a precedent which is applicable a fortiori to the present case and must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the doctrine or
maxim of stare decisis, and in order to escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce inAmerican Commonwealth when he said that "The
Supreme Court has changed its colori.e., its temper and tendencies, from time to time according to the political proclivities of the men who
composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally from the habits of though they had formed before their accession to the bench and from the
sympathy they could not but feel for the doctrineon whose behalf they had contended." (The ANNALS of the American Academyof Political
and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50).

Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling favorable to his contention in the Vera-Avelino case, supra, insist in his motion for
reconsideration that this Court assume jurisdiction and decide whether or not there was quorum in session of the Senate of February 21,
1949, and is willing to abide by the decision of this Court (notwithstanding the aforementioned precedent),and several of the Justices, who
have held before that this Supreme Courthad no jurisdiction, now uphold the jurisdiction of this Court, I gladly change my vote and concur
with the majority in that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present in accordance with my stand inthe above mentioned cases, so
as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well.

But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be reconsidered,that there was a quorum in the session of the Senate of
Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to
do business" and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to basethe majority, not on the number fixed or
provided for the Constitution,but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house is empowered to issue to compel
itsmembers to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a
mere oversight,or for considering the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI
of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member" was
amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitutional, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House". Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the
SEnate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative and judicial precedent. In the Resolution of both Houses proposing an amendment of
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended to the Constitution, granting parity rightto American citizen in the Philippines out of which
the case of Mabanag vs. Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in computing the three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and
the House of Representative votingseparately, required by Sec. 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was
based, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on the actual members who have qualifiedor were not disqualified. And
in the case of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec. 1, subsection 2, of Act No. 3104, which requiredunanimity of vote of the
Supreme Court in imposing death excepted from the court those members of the Court who were legally disqualified from the case, this
Court held that the absence of the Chief Justice Avanceña, authorized by resolution of the Court, was a legal disqualification, and his vote
was not necessary in the determination of the unanimity of the decision imposing death penalty.

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as practical question, as part of the infinitely motley aspects of human life.
They cannot be considered as scientific propositions or hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the
spirit which seen to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience appears to be the only reliable guide in judging human conduct.
Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in statistics for the study and determination of human behavior, and statistics are
one of the means by which the teaching may render their quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-being and
collective happiness.

The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from many quarters and sectors, is provenly far
from being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We intended to settle the controversy between petitioner and respondent, but actually we
left hanging in the air the important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed before us in quest of enlightenment and reasonable and just in a
quandary.

We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary functioning of the Senate has been
hampered by the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half of the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and
remained unexecuted like mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent persons with well-
known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news reporters and photographers. Farce and mockery have been
interspersed with actions and movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed.

It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the overflow of political passions and the irreconcilable
attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been shown to avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the situation,
as abstaining in the upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of the Representatives. It has already
involved in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable
national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter
other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.

The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous in belief that this Court should take
jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one way or another, and they are committed to abide by the decision regardless of
whether they believe it to be right or mistaken. Among the members of the so-called Cuenco group, there are several Senators who in not
remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) have shown their conviction that in cases
analogous to the present the Supreme Court has and should exercise jurisdiction. If we include the former attitude of the senator who is at
present abroad, we will find out that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another recognized the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court for the settlement of such momentous controversies as the one now challenging our judicial statesmanship, our patriotism,
our faith in democracy, the role of this Court as the last bulwark of the Constitution.

In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been made supporting the stand of the eighteen (18) senators, or of three-
fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the contention that we should decide this
case on the merits.

Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its parallel in the psychological field, it is
premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to
have a healthy appraisal of reality in its true form.

It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in the Alejandrinovs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is
absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a colonial Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains
its glaring inconsistencies.

Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the
colonial philosophy pervading the decision in Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturityif it has to be true to its role as spokesman of the collective
conscience, of the conscience of humanity.

For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution. Refusal to exercise the judicial power vested
in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case raises vital constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should
refuse to decide them. It would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our Constitutional Convention to
have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the organization of Philippine democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme
Court the authority to decide such constitutional questions.

Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike to attend the sessions of the Senate and
toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the legislative powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even
more harmful than a laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers temporarily stop to work. Society
may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But society is menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective
administration of justice. Anarchy and chaos are its alternatives.

There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest organs and officers of government. If they should fail to
perform their functions and duties, what is the use for minor officials and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question
of quorum should not be leftunanswered.

Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority requiredfor the Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal
changes made in the constitutional amendment, upon the creation of Congress to replace the National Assembly, have not affected the
substance of the constitutional concept of quorum in both the original and amended contexts. The words "all the members" used in the
original, for the determination of thequorum of the National Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the house of
Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. The writer of this opinion, as Member of the Second National Assembly and in his capacity
as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each
House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.

The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exactmathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half
(½). It can neverbe identified with one-half (½) or less than one-half (½). It involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more
and less is etched in the background of reality as a metaphysical absolute as much as the antithesis of all opposites, and in the same way
that the affirmative cannot be confused with the negative, the creation with nothingness, existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.

The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not
constitute the majority in a group composed of twelve four (24) units. This is so evident that is not necessary to have the mathematical
genius of Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school student may immediately perceive it.

No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of the two equal number constitute a majority part of the
two numbers combined. The five (5) fingers of one hand cannot be the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two hands. Majority is
incompatiblewith equality. It implies the idea of superiority.

Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a derivative of the Latin "magnus," meaning great. Majority means the greater of two
numbers that are regarded as part of a total: the number greater than half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater part or portion. It
presupposes the existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of twelve four (24) senators composing the Senate.

The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of choosing respondent merely as Acting
of the Senate, asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum created by petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer by his walked in
the session of February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12) senators was enough quorum.

The Constitution provides:

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10,
Article VI.)

The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the function
specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said "smaller
number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent member in such manner and underpenalties as such House may
provide," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller number" maybe twelve or even less
than twelve senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored.

As events have developed after the decision in this case has been rendered on March 4, 1949, the picture of the petitioner's attitude has
acquired clearerand more definite form, and that picture brings us to the conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.

At the hearing of this case for the reception of evidence before Mr. Justice Bengzon, Senator Mariano J. Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-
examination bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel for petitioner, manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to renounce the position
of Acting President of the Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the petitioner, should attend the sessions. He would only make of record
his protest, and never resort to force or violence to stop petitioner from presiding over said sessions.

The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions was made by respondent under oath twice, and petitioner, although
he refused to attend the hearing of this case, so much so that, instead of testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the rules of
procedure, is inadmissible as incompetent and is as valueless as an empty gesture, could not fail to learn about respondent's testimony,
because it was given publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and petitioner's counsel, Senator Francisco, would certainly not have failed to
inform him about it.

Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner failed to take advantage of it and continues to refuse to attend the sessions of the Senate
since he and his group of senators have walked out from the historic Monday session of February 21, 1949.

If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over the sessions of the Senate, for which reason he has sought the help of the Supreme
Court, why has he failed to take advantage of the commitment made under oath by respondent since February 26, 1949? Why has he, since
then, been not only failing but refusing to attend the sessions and preside over them? Why is it that petitioner and his group of Senators have
given occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the Cuenco group to issue warrants of arrest to remedy the lack of quorum that has been
hampering the sessions of the Senate? Why is it that the Senate sergeant-at-arms, his subordinates and the peace officers helping him,
have to be hunting for the senators of the Avelino group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical endeavor to compel them to attend the sessions?

The events that have been unfolding before our eyes, played up everyday in screaming headlines in all newspapers and of which, by their
very nature, we cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered, weighed and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the Friday and
Monday sessions, February 18 and 21, 1949, have driven into our mind the conviction that, powers and prestige which command the position
of President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest desire to preside over the sessions of the Senate, the most characteristic and
important function of President of the Senate.

His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's commitment to allow him to preside over them, can and should logically be
interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office. (Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil., 371; 46
Corpus Juris p. 980-981; Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43 American Jurisprudence p. 27).

What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions? What are his group's reason? They say that they want a square
decision on the merits of this case, for which reason the motion for reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe that the Supreme
majority vote, to exercise jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the position taken by some Members of the majority has only
increased public bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to sabotage the sessions of the Senate.

If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it, there cannot be any doubt that the Senate impasse would have been
settled many days ago and, with it, the present national crisis hampering and armstringing the legislative machinery. .

The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open defiance to warrants of arrest are highly demoralizing. People are
asking and wondering if senators are placed above the law that they can simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the authority of the
officers entrusted with the execution. Threats of violence pervade the air. Congress is neglecting the public interests that demand remedial
legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of bewilderment, of strife would have ended if, for the reasons we have stated in our
dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court would have ordered petitioner's reposition.

Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of the Senate, he would certainly have attended the Senate sessions to
preside over them. Then the sessions with senators of the Avelino group attending, would have been held with the constitutional quorum.
The twelve senators of the Cuenco group would have the opportunity of voting solidly to ratify or to reenact all the disputed actuations of the
rump session of February 21, 1949, and there is no doubt that they would have succeeded in ousting petitioner and electing respondent to
the position of President of the Senate.

Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the presence of a clear and unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his
followers would have no ground for any complaint, and respondent could have assumed the Senate's presidency without any hitch.

Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted again to the same strategy, by quorum the rump session of February
21, 1949, but it is not probable that they would have taken the same course of action after this Court, almost unanimously declared that
petitioner's action in adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and illegal. At any rate, the Senators of the Cuenco group
would have been by then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for immediate execution before the striking senators could leave the
building housing the session hall.

The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once. Legislation must go on. The serious charges filed or may be filed against
petitioner, respondent and other senators demand imperatively investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty ones.
Public interest cannot demand less.

Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position in controversy. This result will not legally or practically close any
door for him to again seek the position by attending the sessions of the Senate and by securing a majority that would support him in his bid.

The motion for reconsideration should be denied.

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on
the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de
Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At
11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He
was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion
and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of
a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on thequorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never
did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House
of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that
the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the
report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the
House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyos
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the
session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the
operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted.According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording
the word approved, which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript
certified on November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repeated
three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I
will raise the question of the quorum, which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point
as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding,
the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word approved appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are
in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the
House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a
quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,[3] the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declared the
report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,[5] the Chair suspended
the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged
motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on
November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of
a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had
been properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion
by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled
bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that
there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI,
16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the
courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee
reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
 In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed,
Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that On
Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill
No. 7198.[7] This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. [8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a
grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of
a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver
allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence
of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings [9] and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with,
this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10] the constitutional provision that each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners
cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.
Pendatun,[11] it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or
even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the
body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority
of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution.
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial
inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court,
that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules.
In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: The
Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of
the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter
clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the
court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own
rules of procedure.
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an act was so passed, no
inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in
their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they
have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of
procedure made by itself, or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If
there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for
three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in
case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling
statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been
approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any
rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon
proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of
the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for
the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was
actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act
of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald
v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway
Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting
on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above
principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in
a case where private rights are involved.[18]

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for
the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review. [19] Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can
adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has
broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those
relating to national security,[20] it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in
the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Courts function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error.[21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which
a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of
our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was railroaded. They claim that Rep. Arroyo
was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was
saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of
the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the
gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislators nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It
was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by
Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

....

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of
order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
announces the vote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on
second reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody
wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are
against.[22]

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and
even more just.[23] The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration.[24] In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court cannot provide a second opinion
on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that
the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem. [25]
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has
to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present,[27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in
the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have
been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. [29] It would appear, however, that the session was
suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo
did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of
Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to
say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows:

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four oclock in the afternoon of
Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos question as an obstacle to
the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of
privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyos question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would
have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. [31]
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A.
No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision,
the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where a branch of the government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[32]
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.[33] Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so
doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. [34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21,
1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day.No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the
manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference
committee proceedings.[35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report [36] but not to the manner it was
approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference
committee report.[37]
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate
opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here
or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive
presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims
that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been
obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.[39] This
Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic
theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they
aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve
the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and
to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. [40]

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained
provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should
decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. [41]

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of
Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed. [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here
and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and
overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed
from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members
(Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the
membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House
of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives of public
policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the most permanent character, thus: They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting
only in the memory of individuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside
a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be
made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of
that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.

The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to
represent the Twelfth Senatorial District. The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes,
Santiago Fonacier, Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez, Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre, Vicente de
Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez, Sergio Osmeña, Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose A. Clarin, Hadji
Butu, Espiridion Guanco, Hermenegildo Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago Lucero, all members of the Philippine
Senate; Faustino Aguilar, Secretary of the Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante, Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, and
Francisco Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.

The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924, depriving
Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924.
The resolution reads as follows:

Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby declared guilty of disorderly
conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera,
Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino;

Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his prerogatives, privileges and
emoluments as such Senator during one year from the first of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-four;

And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed by the Governor-General of these
Islands, a copy of this resolution be furnished said Governor-General for his information.

The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays
the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the
aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction
against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and
from carrying the order of suspension, into effect. By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, has
objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.

In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently embarrass us, we desire first of all to say that looking through the form of
the action to the substance, this is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate and
certain of its official employees. May the Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of
Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position? Without, therefore, at this time discussing any
of the other interesting questions which have been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the issue here suggested.

There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of
public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our system of government, each of the three departments is distinct and not directly
subject to the control of another department. The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp.
Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.

It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional
sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all
private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.

With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not lie from one
branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie
against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which
therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect
without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts
have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. (Code of Civil
Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604;
Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of
Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson
[1896], 33 L. R. A., 582; People ex rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex
rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.)

The authorities which support the doctrines above announced are numerous and instructive. They are found among the decisions of our own
court, of the United States Supreme Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate to the chief executive rather than to the
legislature, it is only necessary to explain that the same rules which govern the relations of the court to the chief executive likewise govern
the relations of the courts to the legislature.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910],
16 Phil., 366). This was an original application made in this court praying for a writ ofmandamus to the Governor-General to compel him to
call a special election as provided by law. The Attorney-General demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the court,
after an elaborate discussion, reached the conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as
the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts." The demurrer was accordingly sustained and the
complaint dismissed. It is noted that in this decision reliance was placed on the cases of Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall.,
475, and Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), which we will now proceed to notice.

State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, supra, concerned a bill praying the United States, Supreme Court to
enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General Commanding in the District of Mississippi and
Arkansas from executing certain Acts of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the court said the single point which
required consideration was this: Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be
unconstitutional? He continued:

The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the Executive Department.Neither can be
restrained in its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance.

The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible consequences.

Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the
court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and refuses
to execute the Acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur between the Executive and Legislative Departments of
the Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this court
interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the
United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an attempt
by this court to arrest proceedings in that court?

These questions answer themselves.

xxx xxx xxx

We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and
that no such bill ought to be received by us.

It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson, as President,
it may be granted against Andrew Johnson, as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution of an Act
of Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its execution by the President. . . .

Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the legal fraternity on account of being written by Judge Cooley, related to an
application for mandamus to the Governor to compel him to perform a duty imposed upon him by statute. Judge Cooley, in part, said:

. . . Our government is on whose powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct departments, which emanate
alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their
respective spheres of action equally independent.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the others, and that what are called the
checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each of these cases the action of the
department which controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that
reason gives no occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its
proper province in making laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within
their proper province, because they are only applying that which is law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give
judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept within their
jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by
another department of the government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the
constitution is its equal.

It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their judgments shall be, or set
aside or alter such judgments after they have been rendered. If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the
Legislature could in like manner override executive action also, the government would become only a despotism under popular
forms. On the other hand it would be readily cancelled that no court can compel the Legislature to make or to refrain from making
laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by
the constitution or the laws. In these cases the exemption of the one department from the control of the other is not only implied in
the framework of government, but is indispensably necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to exist.
 xxx xxx xxx

It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any other course than that which leaves the head of the
executive department to act independently in the discharge of his duties might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to
something worse, should the courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the executive refuse to obey. . . . And while we
should concede, if jurisdiction was plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our judgment would be no sufficient reason for
failing to pronounce it, especially against an officer who would be presumed ready and anxious in all cases to render obedience to
the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to pronounce judgments
which may be disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the executive to place him in position where, in a matter within his own
province, he must act contrary to his judgment, or strand convicted of a disregard of the laws.

We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns specifically the right of the judiciary to control bymandamus the action of the
legislature. French vs. Senate of the State of California, supra, was an original proceeding in mandamus brought by the petitioners who were
duly elected senators of the state to compel the Senate of California to admit them as members thereof. It was alleged that the petitioners
had been expelled without hearing or opportunity for defense. The writ was denied, Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the opinion of the court,
saying:

Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of the pleader, they do not make a case justifying the
interposition of this court. Under our form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, or of their house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to
that department by the constitution. . . .

There can be noted as specific corroborative authority, State vs. Bolte, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and Commonwealth of
Massachusetts vs. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of opinion by the United States Supreme
Court. The record discloses that it was the firm opinion of the late Chief Justice that the court should not assume jurisdiction of the
proceedings.

So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state that the principles laid down in some of the preceding authorities have been
the subject of adverse criticism. It is said that the fallacy of the argument lies in the statement that the three departments of the government
are independent of each other. "They are independent in so far as they proceed within their legitimate province and perform the duties that
the law requires; yet it has never been held that the executive was the sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in
which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department may
be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed,
but the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus, pp. 926-
927.) But these were arguments which should have been presented years ago in this court, and which when recently presented by counsel in
his argument for the petitioner in the case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867, 1 met with no favorable response from the court. It is now
too late to go back and revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this would be not only impracticable but impossible since at least
two decision of the United States Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.

No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature
or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of either of the other
departments, it will be the end of popular government as we know it in democracies.

It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of the Supreme Court to issuemandamus directed to the
Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or against the President of the
Philippine Senate and his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Senate. But this
begs the question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of subordinate
employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of
the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, we might have the spectable presented
of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the
Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to
whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314; Abueva vs. Wood,supra.)

The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing difficulty. On the one hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should
induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of policy or convenience should induce
this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not
prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where
mischievous consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or which
might be disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any possible collision between it as the highest court
in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief Executive or the
Chief Executive and the Legislature.

On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to appoint
two senators and nine representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature. These senators and
representatives "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine
Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus
punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the
power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in
the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis.
The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an
appointive member of the Legislature.

It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all its long history suspended a member. And the reason is obvious.
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation;
expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect
anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the
vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filed but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or
removal.

It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that
prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in the comparatively recent
case of Concepcion vs. Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when we had under particular consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief
Executive of his constitutional power of appointment. What was there announced is equally applicable to the instant proceedings.

While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct decision, it is inserted so that the vital question argued with so much ability
may not pass entirely unnoticed, and so that there may be at least an indication of the attitude of the court as a restraining force, with respect
to the checks and balances of government. The Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of the
government, takes no affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire system suggests the thought that no action should be taken
elsewhere which would constitute, or even seem to constitute, disregard for the Constitution.

Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on
appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the
judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of legislation
and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature and the Chief Executive.

We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any
judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the
petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.

Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AVANCEÑA, J., concurring:

I agree with the dispositive part and the grounds and considerations set forth in the decision about the want of jurisdiction of this court to
review the proceeding of the Senate. But this court having no jurisdiction, the insinuation contained in the decision that proceeding of the
Senate was illegal seems to me unnecessary and improper.

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

Among the important questions presented by the petition and demurrer in the present case, three may be mentioned:

First. Is the resolution in question legal or illegal?

Second. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction even to consider its legality?

Third. Can the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?

FIRST. Legality of the resolution

The Supreme Court is unanimous in its opinion that the resolution, by which Jose Alejandrino was deprived of "all his prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" as an appointed senator, is an expulsion or removal of him as such senator and
therefore illegal and ultra vires for the reason that the power of expulsion or removal of an appointed senator is vested exclusively in the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. (Section 17 of the Jones Law — Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 — Public Laws, vol. 12 p.
243.)

By reason of the unanimous opinion upon that question, it becomes unnecessary further to discuss it except to give the particular reasons
which induced my opinion. Said section 17 provides that: "Senators and representatives appointed by the Governor-General shall hold office
until removed by the Governor-General." Section 18 provides, among other things, that "each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." The petitioner
is an appointive member of the Senate.

It will be noted from the two quotations just given, that the power to expel a member of either branch of the Legislature, by the Legislature, is
limited to "elective members," while the power "to punish members for disorderly behavior" applies to all members whether elective or
appointive. In view of the fact that neither branch of the Legislature can expel an appointive member, can either branch deprive such a
member of all his "prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" under the power "to punish for disorderly behavior"? It
will be noted that the law contains no definition of the "punishment" which may be imposed for disorderly behavior. Considering, however,
that neither branch has the right to expel an appointive member, certainly no one will contend that the punishment imposed for disorderly
behavior may amount to an expulsion. If the punishment amounts to an expulsion then certainly the Legislature has exceeded its authority
and has encroached upon the power of the executive, for the reason that the power to expel belongs to the Governor-General.

We have, then, the question squarely presented, whether or not a resolution of the Senate of the Philippine Islands which deprives an
appointed senator of all his "prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" amounts to an expulsion. If it does, then the
resolution is illegal, null, and void, and beyond the powers of the legislative department of the Government and an unwarranted exercise of
the powers which belong to the Governor-General.

The said resolution not only deprives the petitioner of all his "prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" but
also deprives the people of his district, composed of about one million persons, of any representation or participation in the legislative, affairs
of the government for a period of one year, — a right which is guaranteed to them under the constitution. Such a result was certainly not
contemplated by the provisions of the Jones Law. Certainly the framers of the constitution of the Philippine Islands never dreamed that when
the Legislature of the Philippine Islands was given the power to "punish" its members for misbehavior, that such a power would ever be used
as a guise for "expelling" an appointive member.

The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a disciplinary measure. When a member of the Legislature is removed either by
the Governor-General or by the Legislature, a vacancy exists, and the law gives the Governor-General the right to appoint, and the people of
the district the right to fill the vacancy by election, so that the people may again, under either case, be represented. A "suspension" of a
member, however, does not create a vacancy, and the people of the district are without a representative and the Governor-General cannot
appoint one and the people cannot elect one during the period of suspension. They are without representation during that period. They are,
for the period of suspension, taxed without representation. If a member, under the power to punish, can be suspended for one year, for the
same reason he may be suspended for ten or more years, thus depriving the Governor-General of his right under the law, and the people of
the district, of a representative, and without a remedy in the premises.

If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior" includes the power to suspend or to deprive a member of all his rights, and if the suspension
is in effect a removal, then an appointed member may be removed, under the power to punish, by a mere majority, while the law requires a
two-thirds majority to remove an elective member. In other words, if under the power to "punish," any member of the Legislature, including an
appointive member, may be in effect removed, then an elective member may be removed by a majority vote only thus encroaching upon the
power of the executive department of the government, as well as violating the powers conferred upon the Legislature, because the
Legislature cannot remove an elective member except by two-thirds majority.

It is strenuously argued by the respondent that the resolution depriving the petitioner "of all his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for
the period of one year" is not a removal from his office but a mere suspension. The resolution does not use the word "suspend" but does use
the word "deprive." It provides that the petitioner is "deprived" of all his prerogatives, etc., for a period of one year. If that word means
anything it means that all of the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of the petitioner and the citizens whom he represents have been
taken from him and them. His prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments constitute his right to be a member of the Senate under his
appointment, his right to represent the people of his district, and his right to exercise all the duties and to assume all the responsibilities
pertaining to his office. His emoluments constitute his right to receive his salary and the benefits pertaining to his office as a senator. If a
value can be placed upon his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and if he has been deprived of them, then it must follow that they
have been removed from him, or that he has been removed from them. At any rate, the resolution has separated the petitioner and the
people whom he represents and deprived them of all of their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year; and, for all
intents and purposes, he and the people whom he represents, have been deprived of their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and in
effect, have been removed from any participation in the legislative affairs of the government.

A great many cases have been studied on the question of removal and suspension, and we are confident in the assertion that the power to
punish does not include the power to remove or suspend. A suspension from an office or a deprivation of the rights of an officer of all his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, is in effect a deprivation or a removal from office for the time mentioned in the order of suspension.
It has been held that a suspension from office for an indefinite time and lasting for a period of six months, lost its temporary character,
ceased to be a suspension, and in effect became a removal from such office. It was held, in the case of State vs.Chamber of Commerce, that
the suspension of a member was a qualified expulsion, and that whether it was called a suspension or expulsion or removal, it in effect
disfranchised the person suspended. In the case of Metsker vs. Nelly, it was held that a suspension or a deprivation for either a definite or
indefinite period is in effect a removal. In the case of Gregory vs. New York, it was held that the power to remove an officer or punish him
does not include the power to suspend him temporarily from his office. A mere suspension would not create a vacancy, and the anomalous
and unfortunate condition would exist of an office, — an officer, — but no vacancy, and of no one whose right and duty it was to execute the
office. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Barry, it was decided that to punish an officer for "disorderly behavior" such misbehavior must be
such as affects the performance of his duties or the legal or ordinary procedure of the body of which he is a member, and not disorderly
behavior which affects his character as a private individual.

In this connection it may be noted that the alleged "misbehavior" on the part of the petitioner was committed outside of the legislative halls
and at a time when there was no session of the Senate; that said alleged "misbehavior" did not take place in or near the Senate chamber,
nor cause any disorder, disturbance, annoyance, or impediment whatever to the orderly and dignified procedure of any session of the
Senate; that said "misbehavior" did not interfere in any manner whatever with the honor, dignity, and efficiency, nor with the orderly
proceedings of the Senate; that the petitioner did not know, at the time of the alleged "misbehavior," that he had been admitted as a member
of the Philippine Senate. The question of his admission as a senator had been under discussion for weeks theretofore.

Paragraph 2 of section 5 of the Constitution of the United States provides that "each house may determined the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." That provision of the Constitution of
the United States is exactly the language used in section 18 of the Jones Law, with the only difference that the phrase "expel a member" in
the Constitution is changed in the Jones Law to "expel and elective member." That provision of the Constitution of the United States has
been enforced for a period of about one hundred forty years. It will be noted that said provision of the Constitution of the United States
contains two provisions: (a) to punish and (b) to expel.

An examination of the long history of the Congress of the United States has been made for the purpose of ascertaining how that august body
has interpreted its powers under said provisions. First, it may be said that the Congress of the United States is perhaps as dignified a
legislative body as that of any of the states or territories of the United States. Its records have been searched upon the question of its power
to punish and remove its members, and no case has been found — and it is believed there are none — where Congress, under its power
topunish, has attempted to deprive a member of all his rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for anytime whatever, although many
cases of removal have been found under that power to remove. The power to punish for disorderly behavior has never been exercised
further than to impose a mere reprimand. We regard the fact that the Congress of the United States has never exercised its power,
to punish for disorderly behavior, by depriving a member of all of his rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, as strong proof that it
did not believe that its power to punish justified an order or resolution depriving a member of all of his rights, prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments. Many cases might be cited showing misbehavior of much more serious character than that charged against the petitioner and
where a reprimand only was imposed.

SECOND. Jurisdiction to consider question.

Whether or not the courts will take jurisdiction of any action whatever to interfere with, direct or control the action of either the executive or
legislative departments of the government, is a question which has been presented to the courts many times since the leading case
of Marbury vs. Madison was decided ([1803], 1 Cranch, [U. S.]., 137). In hundreds of cases which have come before the courts since that
time, the decisions have been about equally divided. One line of decisions indicates that the courts will never take jurisdiction to control,
order, or direct either the executive or legislative departments of the government to perform or not to perform any particular act expressly
imposed upon or confined to them either by the organic act or by statute. (Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4 Wall. [U. S.], 475;
Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320; Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Ark., 570; People vs.Bissell, 19 Ill., 229; State vs. Governor, 22 La. Ann., 1;
Rice vs. Governor, 27 Minn., 1; Vicksburg & Co. vs.Governor, 61 Miss., 102.)

The other line of decisions hold that the courts will take jurisdiction to control, order and direct both the executive and legislative departments
of the government to do and to perform what are generally termed purely ministerial duties imposed by either the organic act or by statute.
(Tennessee & Railway Co. vs. Governor, 36 Ala., 371; Middleton vs. Governor, 30 Cal., 596; State vs. Governor, 72 Ind., 567;
State vs. Governor, 5 Ohio State, 528.)

It is here confidently asserted that a careful study of the first line of decisions will show, that each case might have been decided upon the
ground that the duty, the performance of which was sought to be coerced, was one which was either a discretionary or official duty of the
respondent, and that the doctrine relied upon, as announced in said cases, was purely obiter dicta; that each of the first line of cases might
have been decided upon the ground that the performance of the particular acts was entirely within the discretion or official duty of the
respondent and a question confided solely to them.

From an examination of all of the cases upon the question before us, the following rule of law is accepted as thegeneral rule:

"That the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the government are distinct and independent, and neither is responsible to the
other for the performance of its duties, and neither can enforce the performance of the duties of the other." Exceptions or modifications of this
general rule will be noted later.

After a careful study of all the cases on the subject, we are of the opinion that a fair summary of the power of the courts in the premises may
be stated under two heads as follows:

First. That the courts have jurisdiction to examine acts "actually" taken by the executive or legislative departments of the government when
such acts affect the rights, privileges, property, or lives of individuals.

Second. That the courts will not take jurisdiction to order, coerce, or enjoin any act or acts of either the executive or legislative departments
of the government upon any question or questions, the performance of which is confided by law to said departments. The courts will not take
jurisdiction until some positive "action" is taken by the other coordinate departments of the government.

With reference to the first proposition, we desire to say that, while the courts hesitate, and rightfully so, to inquire into the legality of the acts
of the executive or legislative departments of government, yet they are without discretion in the premises in cases where it is alleged that a
person is illegally deprived of his life, liberty, or property by said departments. The law makes no distinction with reference to the person or
persons, or departments or bureaus who are responsible for the illegal and unlawful deprivation of the right of individuals in the state. The
mere fact that such alleged illegal deprivation of life, liberty or property is caused by the chief executive or the legislative department of the
government, in the face of mandatory provisions of the law, is no sufficient excuse or justification for a refusal on the part of the courts to take
jurisdiction for the purpose ofinquiring into such alleged illegal deprivation and to make pronouncement thereon. Under the system of checks
and balances, by virtue of the existence of the different departments of the government, in the Government of the United States and its
territories, it becomes the legal and bounded duty of the courts to inquire into the legality, when called upon so to do, of the acts of either of
the other departments of the government and to make pronouncements thereon. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87;
Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534 [228 U. S., 549]; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil., 41, 211 224; Borromeo vs. Mariano,
41 Phil., 322; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 65; U. S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.
S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)

There is no more sacred duty of the courts, when a case is presented to them in which the life, liberty, or property of the citizens of the state
are involved, than that of maintaining, unimpaired, those securities for the personal rights of the individuals of the state which have been
guaranteed to them by the organic law of the land and which have received for ages the sanction of the jurists and the statesmen of the
civilized nations of the world. In such cases no narrow or illiberal construction should be given to the language of the fundamental law of the
state. (Ex parte Lang, 85 U. S., 163.)

Since the Constitution of the Philippine Islands is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of the
government, and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, they are not liberty to overlook or disregard its command, and therefore
when it is clear that a statute or resolution of the Legislature transgresses the authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislature, it is the
duty of the courts to declare the acts or resolutions unconstitutional, and from that duty the courts cannot shrink without violating their oath of
office. (United States vs. Fisher, 2 Cranch [U. S.], 396; Darmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton [U. S.], 518; Green vs. Biddle, 8
Wheaton [U. S.], 1.)

The duty of the courts to declare a law or resolution unconstitutional, in a proper case, cannot be declined and must be performed in
accordance with the deliberate judgment of the court. (Pollock vs. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S., 429.) Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute or resolution of the legislature is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline to exercise jurisdiction upon the mere
suggestion that some action might be taken by the political agencies of the government in disregard of the judgment of the court.
(McPherson vs.Blacker, 146 U. S., 869.)

The doctrine of the all omnipotent power of the legislature as recognized by the Government of England, does not prevail in the United
States, and every law or resolution adopted by the legislative department of the government must conform to the constitution. When a statute
or a resolution of the legislative department exceeds the jurisdiction and powers of the legislature, it is null and void.

The principle which permits courts to pronounce an act or resolution of the legislature null and void, because it conflicts with the provisions of
the constitution, is a doctrine so well established under constitutional governments that it seems really unnecessary to discuss it here. It has
been declared in many cases that the power of the court to make pronouncements upon the legality of acts or resolutions of the legislative
department, is the strongest barrier ever devised against the tyrannies of political assemblies. The right to construe the constitution and to
apply it to particular laws or resolution of the legislature must necessarily be lodged in some department of the government to insure that
practical sanction to its mandates which are essential for the preservation of their validity and force and the perpetuation of stable and orderly
government. The duty of the court to maintain the constitution as the fundamental law of the state and to permit no one to transgress its
provisions, is imperative. Whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, it is the sworn duty of the courts so to adjudge. Any other
course would lead to the destruction of the fundamental law of the state. It has been said by eminent jurists and authorities that the judiciary
should protect the rights of the people with great care and jealousy, not only because it is its sworn duty, but also because in times of great
popular excitement the courts are the last resort. (Gardner vs. Stephens, 2 Am. Rep., 700; State vs. Peel Splint Co., 17 L. R. A., 385;
Rathbone vs. Wirth, 34 L. R. A., 408; Wells vs. Mo. Railway Co., 15 L. R. A., 847; State vs. Butler, 24 L. R. A., [N. S.], 744;
Sanders vs.Commonwealth, 111 Am. State Rep., 219; State vs. Miller, 87 Ohio State, 12; Miller vs. Johnson, 15 L. R. A., 524.)

The right and power of the courts to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid, has
always been considered a grave responsibility as well as a solemn duty, and its exercise is, at all times, a matter of much delicacy, for, apart
from the necessity of avoiding conflicts between coordinate branches of the government, it is often difficult to determine whether such
enactments are within the powers granted to or possessed by the legislature. It has also been said that the power of the courts to nullify acts
of the legislature, as being in violation of the constitution, is one of the highest functions and authorities of the courts. (Nichol vs. Ames, 173
U. S., 509; People vs. Henning Co., 260 Ill., 554; Edwards vs. Lesueur, 31 L. R. A., 815.)

The courts have no jurisdiction in matters of a purely political nature which have been confided to the executive or legislative department of
the government, nor the power to interfere with the duties of either of said departments, unless under special circumstances and when it
becomes necessary for the protection of the rights, the life and the property of the individuals of the state. (In re Sawyer, 124 U. S., 200;
Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard [U. S.], 1; Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4 Wall. [U. S.], 475.)

The jurisdiction of the courts over the acts of either of the other departments is limited to cases where the acts of such departments tend to
deprive the citizens of their rights, liberties, and property. To assume jurisdiction to control the exercise of purely political rights, would be to
invade the domain of the other departments of the government. (Fletcher vs. Tutle, 151 Ill., 41.)

We do not desire to be understood, however, as holding that even political rights are not a matter of judicial solicitude and protection and that
the appropriate judicial tribunal will not, in a proper case, give a prompt and efficient protection to citizens. (Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U.
S., 346.)

In the case of Burnham vs. Morrissey (14 Gray [Mass.], 226), Mr. Justice Hoar, later a United States Senator, said: "The house of
representatives is not the final judge of its own powers and privileges in cases in which the rights and liberties of the subject are
concerned; but the legality of its action may be examined and determined by this court. . . . Especially is it competent and proper for this
court to consider whether its (legislature's) proceedings are in conformity with the constitution and laws, because, living under a written
constitution no branch or department of the department is supreme; and it is the province and duty of the judicial department to determine, in
cases regularly brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of the government and even those of the legislature in the enactment
of laws (or resolutions), have been exercised in conformity with the constitution; and if they have not been, to treat their acts as null and void.

The house of representatives has the power, under the constitution, to imprison for contempt; but this power is limited to cases
expressly provided for by the constitution, or to cases where the power is necessarily implied from those constitutional functions
and duties, to the proper performance of which it is essential. . . .

The doctrine of the omnipotence of either the executive or legislative department of government has long since been denied, and has no
place under the American flag.

Of course, when a discretionary power is conferred, with the right to act or not to act, and when the discretion is honestly exercised and not
abused, then the official or department is relieved from personal responsibility; but when action is taken, and an individual of the state is
thereby deprived, illegally, of his life, liberty or property, his remedy to be restored to his rights is properly submitted to the courts. In every
case where the courts are called upon to exercise their original jurisdiction to question the illegality of action already taken by the legislative
or executive department of the government, they will not do so upon a mere formal or colorable showing either as to the parties or subject-
matter. The courts will look through the form to the real character or substance of the alleged illegal act. (Wisconsin vs. Insurance Co., 127
U. S., 265; Louisiana vs. Texas, 176 U. S., 1; Oklahoma vs.Railway Co., 220 U. S., 277.)

A statute or a resolution of the legislative department of the government which deprives a citizen of the rights guaranteed to him by the
Organic Law of the land is null and void. (Harrison vs. Railway Co., 232 U. S., 318; Terralvs. Burke & Co., 257 U. S., 529.)

Decision of the highest courts, without number, may be cited in support of the rule "that all governmental officers, departments or agencies
are subject to judicial restraint when they act in excess of their authority either statutory or constitutional, by virtue of which citizens are
deprived of their rights." (Osborn vs. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheaton [U. S.], 739; Board of Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 U. S., 531; United
States vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196; Virginia Cases, 114 U. S., 311; Regan vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U. S., 362; Smith vs. Ames, 169 U. S., 466; Ex
parte Young, 209 U. S., 123; Philadelphia Co. vs. Stimson, 223 U. S., 605.)

CHECKS AND BALANCES

The three great departments of the government — the executive, legislative, and judicial — were created for the purpose of "checks and
balances." Under the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands the executive power of the states is conferred upon the Governor-General. The
legislative power is vested in the Senate and House of Representatives. The judicial power is vested in the courts. The three great branches
of the government are separate and distinct, but are coequal and coordinate. Their powers have been carefully apportioned. The legislature
makes the laws, the courts construe them and adjudge as to the rights of persons to life, liberty, and property thereunder, while the executive
department executes the laws and the judgments of the courts. Each department, in its own sphere, is in a sense independent. Each
operates as a check or restraint upon the other. The Acts of the legislative department have to be presented to the executive department for
its approval. The executive department may disapprove the Acts of the legislature if in its judgment they are not in conformity with the organic
law of the state or if in their enforcement they might work a hardship upon the people. The judicial department is authorized to construe and
interpret the Acts of the legislature. The judicial department is authorized to determine the validity of the Acts of the legislature under the
constitution. The executive department may also set aside the judgments of the judicial department and modify the action of the courts by the
interposition of its pardoning power. The legislative department may also recall, modify, or annul decisions of the courts if in its judgment the
interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in harmony with the general policy of the state, by the enactment of a new law or by
an amendment of the old, giving its such a nondisputed meaning and interpretation as to clearly wipe out the decisions of the judicial
department.

Thus, we have the checks and balances known under the American form of government. But in every case in which one department controls,
modifies, or influences the action of another, it acts strictly within its own sphere, thus giving no occasion for conflict and thus preserving the
purpose of the original scheme of a division of powers among the three great coordinate branches of government, each operating as a
restraint upon the other, but still in harmony.

By the use of the power of veto and or pardoning, the executive department may annul and set aside absolutely the action of both the
legislative and judicial departments. The legislative department may, by adopting a new law or by amendment or by passing a law over the
veto of the executive department, annul, recall, and set aside the action of both the executive and judicial departments. But it must be
observed that when the judicial department inquires into an act of either the executive or legislative departments for the purpose or
determining the legality of such acts, it is not because it desires to impose its own opinions upon such departments nor to examine into the
wisdom or advisability of a particular act or statute, but simply because said departments have acted in a way which is forbidden by the
fundamental law of the land and because the will of the people, as declared in such fundamental law, is paramount and must be obeyed
even by the legislative and executive departments. In pronouncing a statute of the legislature illegal or an act of the executive department
beyond its powers, the courts are simply interpreting the meaning, force and application o the fundamental law of the state.

If the doctrine that the different departments — executive, legislative and judicial — are absolutely independent and one can never interfere
to control or restrain, modify or annul, the action of the other, then the very purpose of the organization of the three departments for "checks
and balances" would be defeated. (Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit vs. Peñaranda, 37 Phil., 155; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 899;
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366; U. S. vs. Bull., 15 Phil., 7; Borromeo vs. Mariano,
41 Phil., 322; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil., 599; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 152, 170, 172.)

The following are among the leading cases in which the courts have taken jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the legality or illegality
of acts, or orders or resolutions of the executive and legislative departments:

First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —

(a) Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson (5 Phil., 87), where the action of the Governor-General was pronounced legal;

(b) Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil., 534; 228 U. S., 549) where the action of the Governor-General was
pronounced legal;

(c) In re McCulloch Dick (38 Phil., 41, 62, 63, 109, 211, 244), where the action of the Governor-General was pronounced legal;

(d) Borromeo vs. Mariano (41 Phil., 322), where the action of the Governor-General was pronounced illegal.

Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of the Government —

(a) Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), where the act of the legislative department was pronounced illegal;

(b) Kilbourn vs. Thompson (103 U. S., 168, 181, 199), where the act of the one branch of the Congress of the United States was
held illegal.

Referring to the second "Summary of the Powers of the Courts" above, it may be said that in this jurisdiction the doctrine is now well
established, that, until the executive or legislative department has taken some steps or has acted upon some question, the courts will neither
undertake to compel action nor to restrain action in said departments. It is only when said departments have acted and their acts
detrimentally affect the interest of the citizen, that the courts will inquire into the legality or constitutionality of such acts. (Barcelon vs. Baker
and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; Perfecto vs. Wood,
R. G. No. 208671; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612.)

The judicial department of the government will not attempt to intervene or control or direct or command any action whatever upon any subject
which has been specifically confided by law to the other departments, until they have taken some action which tends to and does establish
some theory or policy contrary to the organic law of the land, or has deprived some citizen of his life, liberty, property, or privilege granted to
him by the organic law. Under such facts, the judicial department is, under the law, bound to take jurisdiction and to make pronouncements
thereon. In such cases it becomes the legal and bounden duty of the courts to inquire into the legality or illegality of the acts of the other
departments of the government and to declare what the law is and what the rights of the parties are. When such a case is presented to the
courts, its responsibility to the people of the state, under the law, demands that a thorough investigation of the facts be made and of the
rights of the parties under the law, and to make a pronouncement, without reference to the fact whether or not the court have the proper
machinery for the purpose of enforcing their conclusions and judgments.

The following are among the cases holding that the courts will not intervene for the purpose of compelling or directing any action on the part
of the executive or legislative departments of the government with reference to any duty or obligation specifically confided to said
departments:

First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —

(a) Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366;

(b) Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612;

(c) Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320;

(d) Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Ark., 570;

(e) People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill., 229.

Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of the Government —

Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612.

In view of the foregoing arguments and citation of authorities and inasmuch as the petitioner alleges that by an actor resolution of the Senate
of the Philippine Islands he has been deprived of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for a period of one year, which have been
granted to him by the organic law of the land, through the officers and employees of the Senate, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that
under such allegations the court is not only justified, but authorized and compelled under the duties and powers conferred upon it, to take
jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of examining into the question whether or not the petitioner has been deprived of any rights granted
to him under the Constitution of the Philippine Islands.

Are the facts stated in the petition and admitted by the demurrer sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and do they justify the court in
taking jurisdiction of the case?

The petitioner alleges that he is a Senator of the Philippine Islands legally appointed by the Governor-General under the provisions of section
16 of the Jones Law; that by virtue of said appointment he is given all the rights of a senator, with all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments thereunto belonging; that he has, as such senator, the right to continue to serve the people of his district; that he has the right to
be and act as a member of the Senate until removed by the Governor-General; that he has been deprived of the right to act as a senator and
has been removed as such senator by the respondents and thereby deprived of a right conferred upon him by law and of all of the rights,
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments belonging to him as a citizen of the Philippine Islands and as a member of the Senate; that the
citizens of his district have been deprived of their right to be represented and to participate in the affairs of their government; that unless the
said resolution of the Senate be pronounced illegal, null, and void, he will be unable to exercise the rights of a citizen and a senator and to
enjoy the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments to him rightfully belonging; that by becoming a member of the Senate he has not lost his
rights as a citizen; that he is still entitled to be protected in all of his rights and privileges as a citizen under the law; that the punishment
imposed by said resolution is one created after the alleged grounds for suspension had occurred; that the punishment imposed is quasi-
criminal; that no punishment for his acts had been prescribed as is expressly provided under the substantive law of the Philippine Islands;
that the punishment provided for in said resolution of the 5th day of February, 1924, was ex post facto and is illegal and void under section 3
of the Organic Law, in that his acts were pronounced to be illegal by said resolution long after they had been committed; that the respondents
were without authority of law to remove him as a member of the Senate; that the Governor-General only has the authority to remove him;
that the alleged acts for which he has been suspended were not committed in or near the Senate chamber; that they in no way tended to or
did interfere with the orderly procedure of the Senate and therefore cannot be regarded as "disorderly behavior;" that the Senate has no right
or authority to suspend or remove one of its members for disorderly behavior unless and until such disorderly behavior tends to and does
interfere with, hamper or impede the legal and orderly procedure of the body; that while it requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate to expel its
elective members, he has been removed, contrary to law, by the Senate, when the Governor-General is the only authority who can remove
him; that if the Senate can remove him under the power to punish, then an appointive member can be removed by a majority vote, while it
requires a two-thirds majority vote to remove an elective member; and, for all of the foregoing reasons, the petitioner and the people of his
district have been deprived of their rights, privileges, prerogatives, and emoluments by an actual act or resolution of the Senate, which is
contrary to law, and that he is entitled to have a pronouncement of his rights made by the courts and to be restored to his rights,
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of which he has been so illegally deprived.

The Constitution of the Philippine Islands, the Organic Act (Jones Law) provides: "That no law shall be enacted which deprives any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to person therein the equal protection of the laws." That provision of law is equally
binding upon each department of government. "Due process of law" cannot be used as a cloak for depriving a citizen of his rights when the
procedure is based upon a illegal or unconstitutional act or resolution.

Under the American form of government, the executive, legislative, and judicial departments are coequal and co-important. But it does not
follow that the judiciary, the constitutional duty of which is to declare and interpret the supreme law of the land, has not the power to declare
a law or a resolution, passed by the legislature or either of its branches, unconstitutional. The will of the people, as expressed in their
constitution, is the paramount law and controls every and each department of the government. The judiciary, under its powers to interpret the
constitution and the laws, has the duty and the right to declare what the will of the people is, as expressed in the fundamental law of the land.
Hence, where the acts of the executive or legislative departments violate the will of the people as expressed in the organic law of the land, it
is the sworn duty of the judiciary to interpret and to declare that the will of the people and the right of a citizen has been violated and
transgressed.

While the imposition of a disciplinary measure by the legislature or either branch thereof upon one of its members for an offense committed
against its dignity may be regarded as a matter of internal concern only of that body, over which the other departments may not exercise
jurisdiction by virtue of the separation established by the fundamental law, it does not follow that the legislature, in imposing disciplinary
measure, has not or may not overstep its own powers as limited or defined by the Organic Law. The legislative department of the
government cannot, under the guise of a resolution imposing disciplinary measure, transgress the constitution, and when it does, its acts
cease to be a mere internal concern. Even the members of the legislature have their rights under the constitution. They have not lost the
fundamental rights to their life, liberty, and privileges as citizens by becoming members of the legislative department of the government.

The argument of the respondents leads to the conclusion that under their power to punish they may impose any punishment which their wish,
whim, prejudice, or caprice may dictate. That contention will hardly withstand the scrutiny of modern civilization.

The respondents defend upon the ground that they are absolutely immune from judicial inquiry; that the courts have no power or authority to
inquire into the acts of the executive or legislative branches of the government, however clear it may be made to appear that such
departments do not possess the power or authority exercised. The fact is evidently overlooked by them that the provision of the Jones Law
above quoted is as binding upon them as it is upon any department, bureau, or person in the government. The provisions of the Jones Law,
for the security of the rights of the citizen, stand in the same connection and upon the same ground as they do in regard to his liberty and
his property. It cannot be denied that both were intended to be enforced by the judicial department of the government. As has been said, the
writ of habeas corpus has been often used to defend the liberty of the citizen, and even his life, against the exercise of unlawful authority on
the part of the executive and legislative branches of the government.
No man, individual, department, bureau, or officer in the Philippine Islands, under the Jones Law, is so high that he is above the law. No
officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law, and are bound to obey it. The Philippine Government is a government by law and not a government by the whim or caprice of any
individual or department. It (the law) is the only supreme power in our system of government; and every man who, by accepting an office by
appointment or election, participates in its function, is only the more strongly bound to that supremacy (the law) and to observe the limitations
which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it (the law) gives. Courts of justice are established, not only to decide upon the
controverted rights of the citizens as against each other, but also upon rights and controversies between them and the government, and the
dockets of the courts are not without cases containing controversies of the latter class.

Shall it be said, in the face of the provisions of the Jones Law, and of the acknowledged right of the judicial department of the government to
decide in proper cases, that statutes which have been passed by both branches of the Legislature and approved by the Governor-General
are illegal and unconstitutional, and that said department cannot give a remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his life or property
without lawful authority and without due compensation, simply because the executive or legislative department has ordered it? If that is the
law in the Philippines it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe nor in any other government which has a
just claim to a well-regulated liberty and the protection of the personal rights, privileges, life, and property of the individual.

Can it be said that the judicial department of the government can intervene in a petition for the writ of habeas corpus to relieve a citizen who
has been imprisoned, illegally, and cannot take jurisdiction in proper proceedings to consider the question whether or not he has been
deprived of his property even though such deprivation has been brought about by an illegal act or resolution of the Legislature, or by an order
of the executive department of the government? Here again we are of the opinion that the question contains its own answer to the average
citizen.

We cannot give our assent to the doctrine that the Senate or House of Representatives is the final judge of its own powers and
privileges, without restraint, especially in cases in which the rights, privileges, emoluments, property, and liberties of a citizen are concerned.
The legality of their action may always be examined and determined by the courts. Especially are the courts competent, and it is proper for
them to consider whether the proceedings of the legislative department of the government are in conformity with the laws and the constitution
of the land, because, living under a written constitution, no branch or department of the government is supreme; and it is not only the
province, but the sworn duty, of the judicial department, to determine in cases regularly brought before it, whether the powers of any
branch of the government, even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws or resolutions, have been exercised in conformity with the
organic law of the land, if they have not, to treat such acts or resolutions as null and void.

All of the foregoing arguments are intended to apply only to cases in which some action has been taken, which illegally deprives a citizen of
his rights, privileges, prerogatives, and emoluments. Nothing herein is intended to modify in the slightest degree the decisions heretofore
announced in the cases of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, Perfecto vs. Wood, and Abueva vs.
Wood, above cited. In those cases the courts were called upon to require one or both of the other two coordinate departments to act in a
particular way upon questions which were specially confided to those departments, while in the present case the courts are called upon to
decide whether or not the action which the legislative department of the government has taken is legal and in conformity with the powers
conferred by the organic law of the land. A wide distinction must be made between requiring a particular act to be done and a
pronouncement upon the legality of that act after it is performed. The courts will not require the legislative department of the government to
adopt a particular law, but they are authorized and empowered, and it is their sworn duty to pronounce a statute null and void after adoption if
the same is found to be contrary to the provisions of the organic law of the land and beyond the powers of the legislative department. This
doctrine is amply exemplified in the thousands of cases which have been brought before the courts in petitions for habeas corpus where the
petitioner alleged that he has been imprisoned under an unconstitutional law and in many, many cases where men have been deprived of
their rights and property by an illegal and unconstitutional act adopted by the legislature. In the first class of cases mentioned, the courts will
never interfere in this jurisdiction to direct or coerce action, while in the second class of cases the courts should always take jurisdiction for
the purpose of determining and making pronouncements upon the legality and constitutionality of acts actually taken.

In view of the facts and the law, we are compelled to decide that we are justified, authorized, and, under our oath of office, compelled to take
jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the petitioner has been deprived, illegally, of a right guaranteed to
him under the Constitution and laws of the Philippine Islands. In exercising the high authority conferred upon us to pronounce valid or invalid
a particular resolution or statute of the legislature, we are only the administrators of the public will as expressed in the fundamental law of the
land. If an act of the legislature is to be held illegal by the courts, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislature, but
because the particular statute or resolution is forbidden by the fundamental law of the land, and because the will of the people, as declared in
such fundamental law, is paramount and must be obeyed by every citizen, even the Legislature. In pronouncing a statute or resolution illegal,
we are simply interpreting the meaning, force, and application of the fundamental law of the state. If a particular resolution or statute of the
legislature is within its constitutional power, it will be sustained, whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the
resolution or statute covers a subject not authorized by the fundamental law of the land, then the courts are not only authorized but are
compelled and justified in pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise or beneficient such resolution or statute may seem to
be. The courts will not measure their opinion with the opinion of the legislative department, as expressed in the resolution or statute, upon the
question of the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular law, but the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular law must be tested
by the provisions of the fundamental law of the state. It is the sworn duty of the judicial department of the government to determine the limits,
under the law and the constitution, of the authority of both the executive and legislative departments.

THIRD. May the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?

In the Government of the Philippine Islands no man is so high that he is above the law. All the officers of the government, from the highest to
the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It cannot be said, in view of the acknowledge right of the judicial department of
the government to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes or resolutions of the legislative department, that the courts cannot give a
remedy to a citizen of the state when he has been illegally deprived of his life, his property, or his liberty by force, or by virtue of an
unconstitutional act or resolution of the legislative department. A contrary conclusion would sanction a tyranny under the American flag,
which has no existence even in the monarchies nor in any other government which has a just claim to a stable government, a well-regulated
liberty, and the protection of the personal rights of individuals.Every department, every officer of the government, and every individual, are
equally bound by the mandatory provisions of the fundamental law. When a citizen under the American flag has been deprived of his life, his
liberty, or his property by an illegal statute or resolution, the official or department so depriving him cannot say to the courts: "Stop here, for
the reason that I (we) have acted as a representative of a different department of the government."

A pronouncement, by the highest tribunal of justice in the Philippine Islands, that the resolution is ultra vires, illegal, and void, we confidently
believe, will be sufficient to cause an immediate revocation of the same, and the adoption of a further order to the effect that all persons
affected by it will be restored to their rights. We are confident in that belief, because we cannot believe that the resolution was adopted out of
a spirit of malice, hatred, or revenge, but in the full belief that the law permitted it as a disciplinary measure. We cannot believe that the
honorable senators who took part in its adoption intended to deprive any of the citizens of their county of the constitutional right. We are
confident that the honorable senators recognize, as fully as the courts do, that the constitution is the supreme law of the land and is equally
binding upon them as it is upon every citizen, high or low, and upon every branch, bureau, or department of the government. We are sure
that the respondents will be among the very first to openly criticize and vigorously denounce any person, entity, or department within the
Philippine Islands, who should be guilty of the slightest disregard or disobedience to the mandates of the constitution — the law of the
people.

The majority opinion decides that the petitioner and the people whom he represents have been illegally deprived of their rights, but that he
and they are without a remedy — damnum absque injuria. To that doctrine we cannot give our assent.

The nightmare which runs through the majority opinion concerning the impossibility of the execution of a judgment, is hardly justified in a
stable and well-organized government, among a people who love peace and good order, who despise disobedience to law and disloyalty to
the constituted authorities. The history of the Filipino people shows that they love peace, good order, and will, with a spirit of alacrity, obey
the law when they once understand what the law is. We rest in the confident faith that spirit still controls in the Philippine Islands. The remedy
prayed for should be granted in a modified form.

RESUME

1. The Organic Law (Jones Law) prohibits the removal of an appointive senator by the Legislature.

2. The said resolution has the effect of a removal of an appointive senator.

3. The resolution, therefore, is invalid, illegal, and void, according to the unanimous opinion of the court.

4. The legislative power and procedure of the Senate must be exercised in conformity with the Organic Law.

5. The courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the legality or constitutionality of a law or resolution of the legislative department, whenever a
citizen alleges that he has been deprived of his rights under such law or resolution.

6. The courts of the Philippine Islands have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of acts or resolutions or procedure of the Senate.

7. The petition and demurrer present the question of the constitutionality of said resolution, as well as the constitutional power of the Senate
to adopt it.

8. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, having jurisdiction, its decree or order should afford relief from the effect of said illegal
resolution.

Therefore, the enforcement of the said illegal and void resolution should be enjoined.

OSTRAND, J., dissenting:

With much of what is said in the majority opinion I am in entire accord. I agree that the Senate in suspending the petitioner, declaring his pay
forfeited and depriving his senatorial district of the representation granted by the Organic Act, exceeds its powers and jurisdiction. I also
concede that the courts will not, by mandamus or other writs, attempt to control the exercise by the other departments of the government of
discretional or executive powers or duties conferred upon them by the constitution or by constitutional statutes. I further concede that the
courts will not interfere with acts of another department when such acts are of a purely political and non-justiciable character.

But when the court holds, as it in effects does in this case, that because the respondents are members of officers of another department the
courts have no power to restrain or prohibit them from carrying into effect an unconstitutional and therefore void act of that department, an
act wholly outside of its province, and which deprives a citizen of rights and privileges to which he, by law, is entitled, I find myself unable to
follow its reasoning or to yield my assent to its conclusions.

Before entering upon a more extended discussion of the issues in the case, it may be well to emphasize that there is here no question as to
the power of the Philippine Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior. That is conceded. But I contend that the court may
intervene to prevent the execution of the penalty imposed if such penalty transcends the domain of the Legislature and encroaches upon that
of the Chief Executive in direct violation of the Organic Act. I shall also maintain that the assertion in the majority opinion to the effect that
this, in substance, is an action against the Senate as a body, is erroneous.

The fundamental error into which the court has fallen is that it has failed to note the distinction between acts within the province of a
department and those outside thereof; it confuses entire absence of power with the alleged improper exercise of legitimate powers. This
distinction is obvious and very important. Where a power or duty has been entrusted to the Chief Executive by the Organic Act, this court will
not, under the rule laid down in the case ofSeverino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366), attempt
to control or direct the exercise by him of that power or duty; he is presumed to be the best judge of the time and the manner of its exercise.
For the same reason, the court will not undertake to direct the exercise of the discretional powers of the legislative department within its
legitimate sphere. But it must necessarily be otherwise where either department steps outside of its province and arrogates to itself any of
the constitutional powers of the other. The doctrine of non-interference by the judiciary with the other departments of the government rests
primarily on the ground that each department is presumed to possess special qualifications and opportunities for the exercise of the powers
entrusted to it by the constitution. It follows that the doctrine does not apply to cases where a department goes beyond its legitimate sphere.
This is, indeed, the first time any court has ever held that in such cases there may be no judicial interference. (Bailey on Mandamus, p. 926.)

That the court has overlooked this distinction is very apparent from the fact that in all of the cases cited in support of its conclusion, the acts
complained of were within the province of the respondents and that in none of them is there any question of the encroachment by one
department upon the domain of another. It is very true that in some of the cases dicta are to be found which, taken by themselves alone and
without reference to the context, may, at first sight, lead to the inference that the separation of the various departments of the government is
so complete that the courts, under no circumstances, will review any act of the Legislature or the Executive, irrespective of its character, but
when the cases where such dicta occur are closely examined, this impression disappears and it becomes obvious that the dicta have no
reference to acts of clear usurpation of powers.

Five of the cases cited relate to judicial review of the exercise of the legislative powers. In the first of these cases,Hiss vs. Bartlett ([1853], 69
Mass., 468), a habeas corpus proceeding, it was held that the House of Representatives of Massachusetts had the implied power to expel a
member and that the reasons for the expulsion, and the question whether a member was duly heard before being expelled, could not be
inquired into by the courts.

French vs. Senate ([1905], 146 Cal., 604), was a proceeding in mandamus. The Constitution of the State of California expressly gives either
house of the Legislature authority to expel members by a two-thirds majority vote. The petitioners had been so expelled from the Senate but
alleged that it had been done without due process of law and therefore asked that the Senate be compelled to again admit them as
members. The court denied the writ holding that the judicial department had no power "to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of
the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
Constitution."

State vs. Bolte ([1899], 151 Mo., 362), was a suit for a writ of mandamus to compel the presiding officer and the secretary of the State
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and its chief clerk, to take the necessary steps to complete the enactment of a
certain bill, it being alleged that it had already passed both houses by a majority vote. The petition was resisted on the ground that the
presiding officer of the Senate had ruled that the bill did not pass the Senate and that the court had no jurisdiction to review the ruling. The
court held that the duty the performance of which it was sought to enforce was one strictly within the line of the duties of the presiding officer
of the Senate and was not merely ministerial. The writ was therefore denied.

The case of Ex-parte Echols ({[1886], 89 Ala., 698), was a petition by one of the members of the State Legislature for a writ of mandamus to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to compel him to send a certain bill to the Senate. The Speaker ruled that the bill had not
passed the house with the requisite majority of votes and therefore refused to certify it to the Senate. The petition was denied, the court
stating that it would not "interfere with either of the coordinate departments of the government in the legitimate exercise of their jurisdiction
and powers."

There is, as far as I can see, absolutely nothing in these cases which can have any direct bearing on the present case. In two of them the
question before the court was the alleged abuse of constitutional powers resting in the Legislature; the other three were actions to compel
the performance of duties entrusted by law to the Legislature or its officers and which were not merely ministerial. In all of them the
Legislature operated within its own domain.

The other cases cited to the same point in the majority opinion are actions directed against chief executives. The two most favorable to the
majority of the court are Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord (4 Wall., 475) and Sutherlandvs. Governor (29 Mich., 320). The facts of the first
case are stated in the majority opinion and need not be restated here. But the portions quoted from the decision in that case should be read
in connection with the following quotation from the same decision, which I think forms its real basis:

The single point which requires consideration is this: Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act
of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional?

It is assumed by the counsel of the State of Mississippi, that the President, in the execution of the Reconstruction Acts, is required
to perform a mere ministerial duty. In this assumption there is, we think, a confounding of the terms `ministerial' and `executive,'
which are by no means equivalent in import.
 A ministerial duty, the performance of which may, in proper cases, be required of the head of the department, by judicial process,
is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to
exist, and imposed by law.

Very different is the duty of the President in the exercise of the power to see that the laws are faithfully executed, and among
these laws the Acts named in the bill. By the first of these Acts he is required to assign generals to command in the several
military districts, and to detail sufficient military force to enable such officers to discharge their duties under the law. By the
supplementary Act, other duties are imposed on the several commanding generals, and these duties must necessarily be
performed under the supervision of the President as Commander-in-Chief. The duty thus imposed on the President is in no just
sense ministerial. It is purely executive and political.

Considering the language here quoted, it is difficult to regard the first paragraph of the quotation from the same decision in the majority
opinion as anything but dictum. In any event, if it is to be taken as authority for the proposition that the United States Supreme Court may
prevent officers or members of Congress from carrying into effect an unconstitutional resolution, it is definitely overruled by the decision in
the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson(103 U. S., 168), in which the court held that an action would lie against the Speaker and other officers of
the House of Representatives of Congress for attempting to carry into effect an unconstitutional resolution of the house committing Kilbourn
to prison for contempt. The court further held that "the House of Representatives (of Congress) is not the final judge of its own power and
privileges in cases in which the rights and liberties of the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action may be examined and
determined by this court."

The case of Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, is the leading case in favor of the view that all official acts of the chief executive of a State are
executive as distinguished from ministerial and therefore not subject to judicial review. The case represents the extreme limit to which courts
have gone in that direction and its soundness has been questioned by most authorities on the subject, but because of the high reputation of
the writer of the decision, Judge Cooley, it is, nevertheless, entitled to consideration.

The case was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor of Michigan to issue a certificate of the completion of the
construction of the Portage Lake and Lake Superior Ship Canal. The statutes required the governor to issue the certificate when he should
be satisfied that the work had been done in conformity with the law. The duty devolving upon the governor was therefore clearly discretional
and this was recognized by the court, but Judge Cooley preferred to plant the decision on additional and broader grounds, which may best
be stated in the language of the court:

. . . There is no very clear and palpable line of distinction between those duties of the governor which are political and those which
are to be considered ministerial merely; and if we should undertake to draw one, and to declare that in all cases falling on one side
the line the governor was subject to judicial process, and in all falling on the other he was independent of it, we should open the
doors to an endless train of litigation, and the cases would be numerous in which neither the governor nor the parties would be
able to determine whether his conclusion was, under the law, to be final, and the courts would be appealed to by every dissatisfied
party to subject a coordinate department of the government to their jurisdiction. However desirable a power in the judiciary to
interfere in such cases might seem from the standpoint of interested parties, it is manifest that harmony of action between the
executive and judicial departments would be directly threatened, and that the exercise of such power could only be justified on
most imperative reasons. Moreover, it is not customary in our republican government to confer upon the governor duties merely
ministerial, and in the performance of which he is to be left to no discretion whatever; and the presumption in all cases must be,
where a duty is devolved upon the chief executive of the State rather than upon an inferior officer, that it is so because this
superior judgment, discretion, and sense of responsibility were confided in for a more accurate, faithful, and discreet performance
than could be relied upon if the duty were devolved upon an officer chosen for inferior duties. And if we concede that cases may
be pointed out in which it is manifest that the governor is left to no discretion, the present is certainly not among them, for here, by
law, he is required to judge, on a personal inspection of the work, and must give his certificate on his own judgment, and not on
that of any other person, officer, or department.

We are not disposed, however, in the present case, to attempt on any grounds to distinguish it from other cases of executive duty
with a view to lay down a narrow rule which, while disposing of this motion, may leave the grave question it presents to be
presented again and again in other cases which the ingenuity of counsel may be able to distinguish in some minor particulars from
the one before us. If a broad general principle underlies all these cases, and requires the same decision in all, it would scarcely be
respectful to the governor, or consistent with our own sense of duty, that we should seek to avoid its application and strive to
decide each in succession upon some narrow and perhaps technical point peculiar to the special case, if such might be
discovered.

And that there is such a broad general principle seems to us very plain. Our government is one whose powers have been carefully
apportioned among three distinct departments, which emanate alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined
by the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective spheres of action equally independent. One makes the laws,
another applies the laws in contested cases, while the other must see that the laws are executed. This division is accepted as a
necessity in all free governments, and the very apportionment of power to one department is understood to be a prohibition of its
exercise by either of the others. The executive is forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same implication which forbids the
courts to take upon themselves his duties.

It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects independently of the others, and that what are called the
checks and balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. The legislature prescribes rules of action for the
courts, and in many particulars may increase or diminish their jurisdiction; it also, in many cases, may prescribe rules for executive
action, and impose duties upon, or take powers from the governor; while in turn the governor may veto legislative acts, and the
courts may declare them void where they conflict with the constitution, notwithstanding, after having been passed by the
legislature, they have received the governor's approval. But in each of these cases the action of the department which controls,
 modifies, or in any manner influences that of another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no occasion
for conflict, controversy, or jealousy. The legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its proper province in
making laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within their proper
province, because they are only applying that which is law to the controversies in which they are called upon to give judgment. It is
mainly by means of these checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if
they are disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by another
department of the government attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the constitution
is its equal.

It has long been a maxim in this country that the legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside
or alter such judgments after they have been rendered. If it could, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the legislature
could in like manner override executive action also, the government would become only a despotism under popular forms. On the
other hand it would be readily conceded that no court can compel the legislature to make or to refrain from making laws, or to
meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the
constitution or the laws. In these cases the exemption of the one department from the control of the other is not only implied in the
framework of government, but is indispensably necessary in any useful apportionment of power is to exist.

In view of the fact that the duty to be performed was discretional and therefore, by the concensus of judicial opinion, not subject to judicial
review, the extensive discussion of other grounds for the decision lays it open to the same criticism as that frequently voiced in regard to
Chief Justice Marshall's dissertation in the case of Murbury vs.Madison (1 Cranch, 137); namely, that it was unnecessary to the decision of
the case and therefore in the nature of obiter dicta. It may also be noted that the courts of last resort in the States of Alabama, California,
Colorado, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio and Wyoming have allowed writs ofmandamus to the
governors of their States for the performance of ministerial duties, without bringing about any of the serious consequences predicted in
Sutherland vs. Governor, supra. These States seem to have fared fully as well as the States of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesotta, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, and Texas which, together with the Philippine
Islands, have adopted the opposite view.

But taking the decision in Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, at its full face value, I am unable to see that it is determinative of the present case.
I readily concede that under the decisions of this court all acts of the chief executive within the limits of his jurisdiction are executive acts
involving a measure of discretion and may not be reviewed by the courts. It may also be conceded that no court can compel the legislature
as such to make or refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or "to take any action whatsoever though the duty to take
it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws." But that does not mean that the courts may not restrain officers and individual
members of the legislature from carrying into effect an unconstitutional resolution transcending the limits of the legislative department and
encroaching upon another. If that is beyond the power of the courts, what will then become of the checks and balances of which Judge
Cooley speaks and which are regarded fully as essential a feature of our system of government as that of departmental distribution of
powers?

Time forbids a full discussion of other decisions of courts in the United States which adhere to the doctrine that the judiciary will not interfere
with the acts of the chief executive within the limits of his jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that they all relate to acts within the domain of the
executive and that none of them has any direct application to the present case.

But we are given to understand that by reason of its own previous decisions this court stands committed to the doctrine that it has no power
to interfere with any act of the other coordinate departments of the government whether they transcend the limits of their jurisdiction or not.

A brief analysis of the decisions of this court upon the subject will show that this is a misapprehension.

The first of these decisions is that in the case of Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson (5 Phil., 87), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, conferred on the Governor-General the power to suspend the writ whenever the public
safety might require it in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, and the case involved the question as to whether the courts may inquire
into the legality of an order of the Governor-General suspending the privilege of the writ. The court held that "whenever a statute gives
discretionary power to a person to be exercised by him upon his own opinion on certain facts, such statute constitutes him the sole and
exclusive judge of the existence of those facts;" and that when the Governor-General, "with the approval of the Philippine Commission
declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion exists, this declaration or conclusion is conclusive against the judicial department
of the government." The writ was therefore denied.

The leading case of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366), was a petition for a writ
of mandamus to compel the Governor-General to call a special election for the purpose of electing a municipal president of the town of Silay,
Occidental Negros, and to restrain the provincial board of Occidental Negros from appointing a municipal president during the pendency of
the action. By statute, the duty of calling a special election devolves upon the Governor-General and the principal question presented for
consideration was whether the court had power to compel the Governor-General to immediately perform such duty. The court denied the writ
holding that "where a duty is devolved upon the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, rather that upon an inferior officer, it will be
presumed to have been done because his superior judgment, discretion, and sense of responsibility were confined in for a more accurate,
faithful, and discreet performance than could be relied upon if the duty were put upon an officer chosen for inferior duties," and that the court
would not undertake to direct or control the exercise of such duty. Incidentally, the court also stated that "the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands are far more comprehensive than those of State governors of the United
States;" and laid down the rule that "the courts of the Philippine Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere, by means of a writ of mandamus or
injunction, with the Governor-General as the head of the executive department in the performance of any of his official acts."

In the case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil., 534), the facts may be briefly stated as follows:
The Governor-General deported certain Chinese persons from Manila to Amoy, China. The deportees subsequently returned to Manila and
brought an action in the Court of First Instance against the Governor-General and certain police officials for damages, alleging that the
deportation was unlawful. The defendants thereupon filed a petition in this court for a writ of prohibition commanding the Judge of the Court
of First Instance to refrain from assuming jurisdiction in the case brought by the deportees, the petitioners alleging that "the power to deport
foreign subjects of the Chinese Empire is a privative one of the Governor-General and is not subject to judicial review." This court granted the
writ holding that "the Governor-General, acting in his political and executive capacity, is invested with plenary power to deport obnoxious
aliens whose continued presence in the territory is found by him to be injurious to the public interest, and in the absence of express or
prescribed rules as to the method of deporting or expelling them, he may use such methods as his official judgment and good conscience
may dictate;" that he could not be held liable in damages for the exercise of such power and that the courts would not interfere.

Case R. G. No. 20867, Perfecto vs. Wood (not published in the reports) involved exactly the same principles asSeverino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra, except that the special election was to be called for the purpose of filing a
vacancy in the Senate. The majority decision, signed by four justices, denied the petition on the same grounds as those stated in the
Severino case. Three justices concurred in the result on the ground that the case had then become a moot case.

The doctrine laid down in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, supra, was followed in the case of In reMcCulloch Dick.

The case of Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil., 612), was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Insular Auditor, the Executive Secretary of the Independence Committee and the
Secretary of the same Committee to permit the petitioners to examine all vouchers and documents in connection with disbursements and
payments made from the fund of the Independent Commission. The petition was denied, the court stating:

. . . It may be asserted as a principle founded upon the clearest legal reasoning that the legislature or legislative officers, in so far
as concerns their purely legislative functions, are beyond the control of the courts by the writ of mandamus. The legislative
department, being a coordinate and independent branch of the government, its action within its own sphere cannot be revised or
controlled by mandamus by the judicial department, without a gross usurpation of power upon the part of the latter. When the
legislative department of the government imposes upon its officers the performance of certain duties which are not prohibited by
the organic law of the land, the performance, the nonperformance, or the manner of the performance is under the direct control of
the legislature, and such officers are not subject to the direction of the courts. . . .

The case of Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), was a petition for a writ of prohibition commanding the respondent Secretary of Justice
to desist from carrying into effect the provisions of Act No. 2941 requiring the Judges of the Courts of First Instance to draw lots every five
years for exchange of districts. The court held that the Act constituted an encroachment by the Legislature upon the Governor-General's
power of appointment and was therefore unconstitutional. The writ was granted.

What is there in these cases which can serve as authority for the theory that the courts may not interfere with the execution of acts beyond
the jurisdiction of the department sought to be restrained? Absolutely nothing. The rather broad dictum in the case of Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros,supra, that the courts of the Philippine Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere with the
head of the executive department in the performance of any of his official acts, must be considered in connection with the context and is
clearly limited to acts within the limits of his jurisdiction.

In Abueva vs. Wood, supra, the doctrine of noninterference with the Legislature is carefully limited to "actions within its own sphere" and
"duties not prohibited by the organic law of the land."

In the present case we are not dealing with an act of political and nonjusticiable character, nor is there a question of interference with the
exercise of discretionary powers of duties resting in the Legislature under the Organic Act. We are simply called upon to prevent the carrying
into effect of unconstitutional and therefore, in a legal sense, nonexistent parts of a resolution of one of the branches of the Legislature
which, if executed, will result in an encroachment upon the domain of another department and deprive the petitioner of rights and privileges
to which he is by law entitled. There is no question as to the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior, but it must
be insisted that the penalty shall not constitute a usurpation of the powers of another department of the government in violation of the
Organic Act. It is agreed that as long as the penalty does not expressly or impliedly violate that Act, the courts will not interfere.

That the resolution is unconstitutional and void cannot be seriously questioned and is conceded in the majority opinion, but in order to bring
the issue into clear relief, it may be well to briefly state the reasons why it must be so held:

The Senate exercises delegated powers, all of which are derived from the Organic Act. That Act provides for twenty-two senators to be
elected by the people and for two other senators to be appointed by the Governor-General. In the language of the Act, the appointive
senators "shall hold office until removed by the Governor-General." The Act further provides that "The Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns and qualifications of their elective member." It will be observed that no power to
expel or remove appointive members is conferred on the houses of the Legislature, nor can such power be inferred or implied from the
statute, in view of the fact that it is expressly placed in the hands of the Governor-General. The Act does not limit or qualify the term "remove"
and it therefore includes both temporary and permanent removals.

An examination of the Senate resolution in question shows that in effect it provides for a complete temporary removal of the petitioner. It
does not merely exclude him from the floor of the Senate Chamber, but he is also "deprived of all his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments as such senator," for the period of one year. As far as he is concerned, his removal from office for that period could not be made
more complete. In attempting to exercise the power of such removal, the Senate clearly arrogated to itself powers which it does not possess
and which, under the Organic Act, rest in the Chief Executive. Its resolution to that effect is consequent unconstitutional and void. As is the
case with an unconstitutional statute, it has, in the eyes of the law, never existed.

We are therefore confronted with the facts that the petitioner is a duly appointed senate; that he, as a matter oflaw, is not and never has been
removed or suspended from office; that he, therefore, as such senate always has been, and still is, entitled to all the prerogative, privileges,
and emoluments of his office; and that, nevertheless, certain officers and members of the Senate, without any legal authority whatever,
deprive him of such prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, including his salary. The Senate has nothing to do with the appointment of an
appointive senator and is not, as in the case of elective members, the judge of his qualifications; when duly appointed, the officers of the
Senate are legally bound to recognize him as a senator; they have no discretion in the matter and their duties in regard thereto are purely
ministerial.

In the circumstances, upon what legal principles is this court precluded from granting the petitioner the relief he demands? Why cannot, for
instance, members of the Committee on Accounts and the Paymaster of the Senate be directed to cause to be paid to the petitioner the
salary fixed by law?

Other courts have not hesitated to use the writ of mandamus to compel performance of similar duties by officers of the legislature. In Ex
parte Pickett (24 Ala., 91), the writ was issued to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to compel him to certify to the Comptroller of
Public Accounts the amount to which the petitioner was entitled as a member of the House for mileage and per diem compensation. In
State vs. Elder (31 Neb., 169), the writ was issued to compel the Speaker to open and publish returns of the general election. In
State vs. Moffitt (5 Ohio, 350), mandamus was held to lie to the Speaker of the House to compel him to certify the election and appointment
of officers. In Wolfe vs. McCaull (76 Va., 87), the writ was issued to compel the Keeper of the Rolls of the House of Delegates to print and
publish a bill passed by the Legislature and upon request to furnish a copy thereof properly certified. (See also Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103
U. S., 168; State vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; Peoplevs. Marton, 156 N. Y., 136.) As stated as the outset, it is erroneously asserted in the
majority opinion that this action is, in substance, a suit against the Senate as a body. This might be true if the act complained of was an act
within the jurisdiction of the Senate, but such is not the case here. A practical illustration may, perhaps, make the point clear. Let us suppose
that a majority of the members of the Senate should agree to commit a crime against another member and should pass a senatorial
resolution to that effect. Would that, in anything but form, constitute a senatorial act? And suppose the same members should proceed to
carry the resolution into effect, would not an action lie against such members and could that, in substance, be regarded as an action against
the Senate? The questions answer themselves, and though in the present case the illegal act does not constitute a crime, the analogy is,
nevertheless obvious; the distinction is one without a difference. As has already been pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has held
that an action may, at the instances of the injured party, be maintained against the presiding officer, as well as other officers, of one of the
houses of Congress for the execution of an unconstitutional resolution. In the same case it is also intimated that the action will lie against all
members who take direct part in the execution of such a resolution. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)

It may further be noted that though the prayer in the petition in this case does not expressly so state, the body of the petition shows
sufficiently that the remedy to be applied may not be the same in regard to all of the defendants. The allegations seem broad enough to
cover both mandamus and prohibition and the petition is not demurred to on that ground. It is also possible that if evidence were permitted
some of the defendants might be absolved from the complaint.

It has been suggested that to entertain an action against a coordinate department of the government would be an unwarranted assertion of
superiority on our part. I fail to see the validity of this observation. This is not a question of departmental superiority or inferiority. This court
asserts no superiority for itself; it only maintains the superiority of the law to which all of us must yield obedience. The pronouncements of the
court are simply the voice of the law as understood by the court and are not personal matters. Even if this action were brought against a
coordinate department as a body — which it is not — the court would still be in duty bound to apply the law of the land to the case and do its
best to enforce that law irrespective of the rank or importance of the parties.

In the course of the argument of the case it was intimated that if the writ prayed for were issued its enforcement might be the cause of
disturbance and strife. The suggestion is almost an insult to the intelligence and patriotism of the defendants and I feel sure that the fear thus
expressed is entirely without foundation. At least there has been no trouble of that kind in other jurisdictions where writs have issued to
officers or members of the legislature. If courts perform their duties with firmless, rectitude and moderation, regardless of personal or political
considerations, their decisions will be respected and their orders and writs generally obeyed. It is usually when courts fail in these respects,
and thus prove unfaithful to their trust, that their orders are disregarded and trouble ensues.

The decision of the court in the present case enjoys the distinction of being without a precedent and of resting on no sound legal prejudice of
which I am aware. The arguments advanced in its support are excuses and not reasons. If carried to its logical conclusion, it may have far-
reaching and serious consequences. If one branch of the government may with impunity, and with freedom from judicial intervention, freely
usurp the powers of another branch, it may eventually lead either to anarchy or to tyranny. A wrong has been committed for which there is no
other remedy but that there sought by the petitioner, yet the court refuses to take jurisdiction on the strength of alleged precedents which, as
we have seen, in reality have no bearing whatever upon the issues of the case. It is hardly necessary to say that when men are deliberately
denied redress for wrongs, the temptation is strong for them to take the law into their own hands and there is perhaps no more fruitful source
of popular unrest and disturbance.

I regret to see the decision find a place in our jurisprudence and can only hope that it will not be followed by this court in the future.

The demurrer to the petition should be overruled.

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY,
FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA
SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59,respondents.

Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.

F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.

BENGZON, J.:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance
with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he
failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from
the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A
Message to Garcia;

WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated the following:.

xxx xxx xxx

The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to
get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the
gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with
a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is
dispensing. . . . .

WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in
truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the
one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .

Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and
the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require
the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so
to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a
report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines.

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech
and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened
after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to
hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such
circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee
continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960,
finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before
closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and
Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its
members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session
on July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery
against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the
purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce
evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly
behaviour.

Resolution No. 175 states in part:

WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous,
malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960;
and

WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of Representative:
Now, Therefore, be it

RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of
serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .

As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for
words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be
punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up
other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution
or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe
that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member
responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should
be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." 2 Such immunity
has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New
York was censured for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many
infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing
insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement
made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison3, even expelled
by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and
the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.

And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United
States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before
approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the
House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by
unanimous consent.

Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its
rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had
lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to
revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisited number of members have agreed to a particular measure."6

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:

The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies
to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against
hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo.
App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220,
230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas.
1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]

It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of
censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable
remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be
discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication
by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it
would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in
any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent
within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been
expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate
had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California
declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by
the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any
cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high
functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts
to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of
the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by
this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although
referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has
exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.

Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the
legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to
maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic
illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal
attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by
resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases
the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution.
Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it
nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and
the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator
Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."

The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to
residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.

It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to
the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth
District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.

It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law10;
whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution.
In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then
exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months
in 1949.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations are found in the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)

In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension
than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to
jail.12

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of
House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and
the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem,
therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic. 13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing
new pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most
probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs.
Qeuaon.15

At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time
its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:

I concur with the majority that the petition filed by Congressman Osmeña, Jr. does not make out a case either for declaratory judgment or
certiorari, since this Court has no original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment proceedings, and certiorari is available only against bodies
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The respondent committee, being merely fact finding, was not properly subject to certiorari.

I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was entitled to invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his petition for a writ of prohibition against the
committee, in so far as House Resolution No. 59 (and its sequel, Resolution No. 175) constituted an unlawful attempt to divest him of an
immunity from censure or punishment, an immunity vested under the very Rules of the House of Representatives.

House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V, provides as follows:
 If it is requested that a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the Member making such request shall indicate the
words excepted to, and they shall be taken down in writing by the Secretary and read aloud to the House; but the Member who
uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House therefor, if further debate or other business
has intervened.

Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña had delivered his speech and before the House adopted, fifteen days later, the
resolution (No. 59) creating the respondent Committee and empowering it to investigate and recommend proper action in the case, the
House had acted on other matters and debated them. That being the case, the Congressman, even before the resolution was adopted, had
ceased to be answerable for the words uttered by him in his privilege speech. By the express wording of the Rules, he was no longer subject
to censure or disciplinary action by the House. Hence, the resolution, in so far as it attempts to divest him of the immunity so acquired and
subject him to discipline and punishment, when he was previously not so subject, violates the constitutional inhibition against ex post
facto legislation, and Resolution Nos. 59 and 175 are legally obnoxious and invalid on that score. The rule is well established that a law
which deprives an accused person of any substantial right or immunity possessed by him before its passage is ex post facto as to prior
offenses (Cor. Jur. vol. 16-A, section 144, p. 153; People vs. Mc Donnell, 11 Fed. Supp. 1015; People vs. Talklington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U.
S. vs.Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp. 849).

The foregoing also answer the contention that since the immunity was but an effect of section 7 of House Rule XVII, the House could, at any
time, remove it by amending those Rules, and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 effected such an amendment by implication. the right of the
House to amend its Rules does not carry with it the right to retroactive divest the petitioner of an immunity he had already acquired. The Bill
of Rights is against it.

It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached when the Congressman delivered it, the subsequent action of the House only
affected the procedure for dealing with that liability. But whatever liability Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. then incurred was extinguished
when the House thereafter considered other business; and this extinction is a substantive right that can not be subsequently torn away to his
disadvantage. On an analogous issue, this Court, in People vs. Parel, 44 Phil., 437 has ruled:

In regards to the point that the subject of prescription of penalties and of penal actions pertains to remedial and not substantive
law, it is to be observed that in the Spanish legal system, provisions for limitation or prescription of actions are invariably classified
as substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the provisions for the prescription of criminal actions in the Penal Code and
not in the 'Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal.' This is in reality a more logical law. In criminal cases prescription is not, strictly
speaking, a matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to punish the crime and consequently, goes directly to the substance
of the action. . . . (Emphasis supplied.).

I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, that the objectionable
measures happen to be House Resolutions and not statutes. In so far as the position of petitioner Osmeña is concerned, the essential point
is that he is being subjected to a punishment to which he was formerly not amenable. And while he was only meted out a suspension of
privileges that suspension is as much a penalty as imprisonment or a fine, which the House could have inflicted upon him had it been so
minded. Such punitive action is violative of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the constitutional provision against ex post factolegislation. Nor is it
material that the punishment was inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power. "The ex post facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme
Court has ruled, "can not be evaded by giving civil form to that which is essentially criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U. S.] 1104,
1106; Cummings vs. MIssouri, 18 L. Ed. 276).

The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules is to protect the freedom of action of its members and to relieve them from
the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of political convenience, vindictiveness, or pressures. it is unrealistic to
overlook that, without the immunity so provided, no member of Congress can remain free from the haunting fear that his most innocuous
expressions may at any time afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment whenever a majority, however transient, should feel that the
shifting sands of political expediency so demand. A rule designed to assure that members of the House of the House may freely act as their
conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements the parliamentary immunity from outside pressure enshrined in our Constitution,
and is certainly deserving of liberal interpretation and application.

The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as instances of disciplinary taken notwithstanding intervening business, are not truly
applicable. Of the five instances cited by Deschkler (in his edition of Jefferson's Manual), the case of Congressman Watson of Georgia
involved also printed disparaging remarks by the respondent (III Hinds' Precedents, sec. 2637), so that the debate immunity rule afforded no
defense; that of Congressmen Weaver and Sparks was one of censure for actual disorderly conduct (II Hinds, sec. 1657); while the cases of
Congressmen Stanbery of Ohio, Alex Long of Ohio, and of Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II Hinds, sec. 1248, 1252 and 1655) were decided
under Rule 62 of the U. s. House of Representatives as it stood before the 1880 amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the
Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was to the following effect (II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):

This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle a semicolon, and the Chair asks the attention of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Wilson) top the language of that rule, as it settles the whole question:

62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the person calling him to be order shall repeat the words excerpted
to —

That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words spoken in debate "and they shall be taken done in writing at the Clerk's table;
and no Member shall be held to answer, or be subject to the censure of the House, for words spoken, or other business has
intervened, after the words spoken, and before exception to them shall have been taken.
 The first part of this rule declares that "calling to order" is "excepting to words spoken in debate." the second part of the rule
declares that a Member shall not be held subject to censure for words spoken in debate if other business has intervened after the
words have been spoken and before "exception" to them has been taken. Exception to the words of the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Grinnell) was taken by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Harding), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the gentleman
from Kentucky (Mr. Rosseau), and also by the Speaker of the House, as the records of the Congressional Globe will show. The
distinction is obvious between the two parts of the rule. In the first part it speaks of a Member excepting to language of another
and having the words taken down. In the last part of the rule it says he shall not be censured thereafter unless exception to his
words were taken; but it omits to add as an condition that words must also have been taken down. The substantial point, indeed
the only point, required in the latter part of the rule is, that exception to the objectionable words must have taken.

The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases and the Rules of our House of Representatives is easily apparent. As Rule 62 of
the United States House of Representatives stood before 1880, all that was required to preserve the disciplinary power of the Hose was
that exception should have been taken to the remarks on the floor before further debate or other business intervened. Under the rules of the
Philippines House of Representatives, however, the immunity becomes absolute if other debate or business has taken place before the
motion for censure is made, whether or not exceptions or point of order have been made to the remarks complained of at the time they were
uttered.

While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not bar the members being
questioned and disciplined by Congress itself fro remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary power does not, as I have noted, include the
right to retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a member of an immunity already gained. And if Courts can shield an ordinary citizen
from the effects of ex post facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of Congress should be deprived of the same protection. Surely
membership in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties enjoyed by the individual citizen.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. If may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraint
or violate fundamental rights and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitation all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or
even more just. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law Ed., 324-325.)

Court will not interfere with the action of the state senate in reconsideration its vote on a resolution submitting an amendment to
the Constitution, where its action was in compliance with its own rules, and there was no constitutional provision to the contrary.
(Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963) (Emphasis supplied.).

Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter it from
recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullify of the questioned resolutions and of all action that has been disbanded after the
case was filed, the basic issues remain so important as to require adjudication by this Court.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:

I fully concur in the above dissent Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, Reyes, and I venture to add:

Within a constitutional government and in a regime which purports to be one of law, where law is supreme, even the Congress in the
exercise of the power conferred upon it to discipline its members, must follow the rules and regulation that it had itself promulgated for its
guidance and for that of its members. The rules in force at the time Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech declared by the House to
constitutes a disorderly conduct provides:

. . . but the Member who uttered them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House therefor, if further
debate or other business has intervened. (Rule XVII, Sec. 7, Rules, House of Representatives.)

Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after June 23, 1060 when the
House created the committee that would investigated him. For fully 15 days the House took up other matters. All that was done, while the
speech was being delivered, was to have certains portions thereof deleted. I hold that pursuant to its own Rules the House may no longer
punish Congressman Osmeña for the delivered fifteen days before.

The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish Congressman Osmeña immediately after its delivery, except to have some part of the
speech deleted, show that the members of the House did not consider Osmeña's speech a disorderly conduct. The idea to punish
Congressman Osmeña, which came 15 days after, was, therefore, an afterthought. It is, therefore, clear that Congressman Osmeña is being
made to answer for an act, after the time during which he could be punished therefor had lapsed.

The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its rules any time. We do not dispute this principle, but we hold that the House may not
do so in utter disregard of the fundamental principle of law that an amendment takes place only after its approval, or, as in this case, to the
extent of punishing an offense after the time to punishing an had elapsed. Since the rule, that a member can be punished only before other
proceedings have intervened, was in force at the time Congressman Osmeña delivered his speech, the House may not ignore said rule. It is
said in the majority opinion that the rule limiting the period for imposition of a penalty for a speech to the day it was made, is merely one of
procedure. With due respect to the majority, we do not think that it is merely a rule of procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the
time in which the House may take punitive action against an offending member; it is alienation (in reference to time) on the liability to
punishment. As Mr. Justice J.B.L., Reyes points out, the rule is substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be ignored when
invoked.

If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House should observe its own rule and not violate it by punishing a member after the
period for indictment and punishment had already passed. Not because the subject of the Philippic is no less than the Chief Magistrate of the
nation should the rule of the House be ignored by itself. It is true that our Government is based on the principle of separation of powers
between the three branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition that this Court should not interfere with the legislature in the
manner it performs its functions; but I also hold that the Court cannot abandon its duty to pronounce what the law is when any of its (the
House) members, or any humble citizen, invokes the law.

Congressman Osmeña had invoked the protection of a rule of the House. I believe it is our bounden duty to state what the rule being invoked
by him is, to point out the fact that the rule is being violated in meting out punishment for his speech; we should not shirk our responsibility to
declare his rights under the rule simply on the board excuse of separation of powers. Even the legislature may not ignore the rule it has
promulgated for the government of the conduct of its members, and the fact that a coordinate branches of the Government is involved,
should not deter us from performing our duty. We may not possess the power to enforce our opinion if the House chooses to disregard the
same. In such case the members thereof stand before the bar of public opinion to answer for their act in ignoring what they themselves have
approved as their norm of conduct.

Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent personally believe that vitreous attacks against the Chief Executive, or any official or
citizen for that matter, should be condemned. But where the Rules, promulgated by the House itself, fix the period during which punishment
may be meted out, said Rules should be enforced regardless of who may be prejudicated thereby. Only in that way may the supermacy of
the law be maintained.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA,
JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND
MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending criminal
cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from Investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having
been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioners request, came up with a resolution which it
referred, for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum,
dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13
May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three
informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application
for legalization of the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong
Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu
Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua
Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu
Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo
Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya
Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13,
1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified,
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said
accused.[1]

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for
libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and no. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an
order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail
without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition
would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner
was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on
27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional
liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary
Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The
Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.
 The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioners arraignment and the consideration of
her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioners intention to accept a fellowship from the
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin
petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case
and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied
by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion
for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she
purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the
complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners arraignment
not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-
two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March
1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal
cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266,
assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice,
as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the nullification
thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and
desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11 th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post
bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceeding with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the
matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to
consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into
one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Redetermine probable Cause and to dismiss or quash
said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga).
The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31 st July 1995 motion for the
prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03rd August
1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was
elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan,
docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25
January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby suspends
the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any
other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days
only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the Philippines,
Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the implementation of the
suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court of the action taken thereon within five
(5) days from receipt hereof.

The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the suspension order as well
as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the time. [2]

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged
with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of
the statute provides:

SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should
he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received
such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16,
1982).

In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, [3] the Court reiterated:

The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an accused public
officer --- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.

xxx xxx xxx

The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act,
whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or
non-career service.[4]

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination
of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and
buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan[6] observed:

x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.[7]
 In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only
in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be
holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. [8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the
information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct
thereof. It has been said that-

x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should
be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the
revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he
may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which
he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court.

However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused is
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the
revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a
motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal
proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[9]

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding
before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the
evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in
office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records an other evidence
before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him,
such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the
Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.[10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioners case before the Sandiganbayan
has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon the resolve several other
matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, [11] petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs.
Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a Motion
to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago
vs. Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No.
16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting
in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as filed the 32 amended informations
against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, [14] petitioner assailed the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of her motion for her reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of
Pedellaga. In one of these cases,[15] the Court declared:

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos.
99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the delay in the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation
of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and
that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for
legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of qualified aliens even though they had arrived in the
Philippines after December 31 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to
quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad,
7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:

(1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.

The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. [16]

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-

x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.[17]

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its
resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., [18] the Court affirmed the order of
suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the
court on the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled:

x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each
House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a
vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section
13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter
is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
 The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-
equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers
the Court to act not only in the settlement of actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also in the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision
allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality
has evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any
emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to
an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view [19] that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute
its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear
disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial
intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the
people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate
to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.

Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno for
petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Tañada, and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for respondents.

TUASON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto." The members of the Commission on Elections,
the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the petitioners are
eight senators, seventeen representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.

The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go into the facts at length. We will
mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the issues. For this purpose it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff
senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been
elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after
the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the
same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.

As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their
membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on
the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in the petitioners' contention that this is confusing
jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and
practice. This objection, however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in
practice and in their operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both are founded on the
regard which the judiciary accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the Government. If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the
"enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to
the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16
C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or
citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government.

But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the
conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and
hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of whether
an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the state legislature, is not subject to review by the
court.

If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political
function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of
this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary
be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As
the Mississippi Supreme Court has once said:

There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could render it
dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure derives all its vital force from the action of the people at the
ballot box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will
change their fundamental law. The means provided for the exercise of their sovereign right of changing their constitution should
receive such a construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is
 the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by the
instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)

Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis
for discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful opinion we quote the following paragraphs:

The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control submission of constitutional amendments. Final determination by
Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken place "is conclusive upon the courts." In the exercise of that
power, Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, whether submission, intervening procedure or
Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a "political
department" of questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated "political." And decision of a "political question" by
the "political department" to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers,
citizens and subjects of . . . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has been ratified will
carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands. Upon this
assurance a proclaimed amendment must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority
of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are unable
to agree.

The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the proper procedure is being followed between submission and
final adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time"
within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or
voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions,
are all consistent only with an intimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the
course of amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the
political branch of government.

The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in some respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as
subject to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the
Constitution impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does
the Court now disapprove its prior assumption of power to make such a pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only
Congress has constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand,
the Court's opinion declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the "political questions" of whether as State whose
legislature has once acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and whether, in the
circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such division
between the political and judicial branches of the government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the amending of the
Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has been given by the Article exclusively and completely to
Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirely, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at the same conclusion. Though
his thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court — a point which not having been raised by the parties herein we will not decide — his
reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of the legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case
assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as political, saying:

The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S.
Ct., 217, of a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this doctrine and the reasons for it were explained in
Nixon vs. Herndon, 273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an action for $5,000 damages against the
Judges of Elections for refusing to permit the plaintiff to vote at a primary election in Texas. In disposing of the objection that the
plaintiff had no cause of action because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the Court:
"Of course the petition concerns political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage. That private damage may
be caused by such political action and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years,
since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710,
and has been recognized by this Court." "Private damage" is the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra, and
determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated
with the conception that a voter's franchise is a personal right, assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is
peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17,
and for which there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is
an injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng.
Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff for it: they cannot make him a
recompense." (2 Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)

The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has followed it leave intra-parliamentary controversies to parliaments
and outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in legislative assemblies — who are members, how and when
they should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how
they were counted — surely are matters that not merely concern political action but are of the very essence of political action, if
"political" has any connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct.,
495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they matters of "private
damage." They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative process. To open
the law courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for
 voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has not been
doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought
to be put to purposes like the present. In seeking redress here these Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the functions of
this Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed.

We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and
advanced thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as conceived in the fundamental law. Taken as persuasive
authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United States institutions after which ours are patterned.

But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are the opinions which should operate to
adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear, it is necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to
make a statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the annotation on that case in the American Law
Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the controversy.

Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate,
including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amendment, and by three members of the House of
Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase in indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by
the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as not passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of
Representatives from signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.

The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress in June, 1924; that in
January, 1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of
the United States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that
there were forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor
cast his vote in favor of the resolution.

The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of the proposed amendment and
alleged that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed amendment had been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of
twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and that by reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a
reasonable time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.

The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the merits. When the case reached the
Supreme Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the following manner:

First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have the judgment of the state court reversed;
second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a tie, as he did, it being the contention of the petitioners that "in the
light of the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the
Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he
could be permitted to have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment, when the Senate was equally divided"; and third,
the effect of the previous rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.

The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question, regarding the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court
avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable controversy, or a question which is political in its nature and hence not
justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally divided and therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third
question, the Court reached the conclusion before referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its control and of the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the
questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the
court.

The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated in the United States Supreme
Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners
had no personality to bring the petition and that all the questions raised are political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds
opined that all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition should have been
granted and the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and non-justiciable, passed by the question of the
authority of the Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court was equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the
rest of the questions.

The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone
and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the result to be reached, these two groups were divided. The
agreement between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed,
on the other, was on the result and on that part of the decision which declares certain questions political and non-justiciable.

As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four opinions "show interestingly divergent but confusing positions of
the Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in
the light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries" whether the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have
been to reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the
justices "leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the decision should be rested with the four justices who concurred in
Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the
article points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court would seem under any circumstances to bean equal division of
an odd number of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse to vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he
could not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the conference and have him walk away whole?" But
speaking in a more serious vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the
court had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have required reversal of the judgment below
regardless of the disposal of the other issues.

From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should be considered as laying down the rule of the case.

The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on
the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In point of numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost
equally pro and con the general principle (of these, two or three have changed from their original position), two or three adopted a special
variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are not clear, and one or two have not yet made their decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d
Edition, 685, footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on the side of those which
favor the rule. (Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)

If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the
old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings
of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a
copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."

But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.

This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and commentaries written with evident vehemence. Arguments for and
against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be presumptuous on our part to pretend to add more, even if we could, to what
has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection
and borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public policy.

The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our opinion, almost decisive. Some of these
reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as follows:

SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. — It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by
the respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the
administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but
would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which
might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced
had never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without
saying that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by some
court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the parties.

From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these passages:

I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few things would be more mischievous than the
introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that the Court should look at the journals of the Legislature to
ascertain whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the Secretary of State conforms in its contents with the statements of
such journals. This proposition means, if it has any legal value whatever, that, in the event of a material discrepancy between the
journal and the enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act is to be rejected. This is the test
which is to be applied not only to the statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws which have been recently
passed, but to laws the most ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the acceptance of this doctrine by the
Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the State. We have before us some evidence of the little reliability of these legislative
journals. . . . Can any one deny that if the laws of the State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so
unauthenticated, the stability of all written law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger, under
the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely
too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act would be at the mercy of all persons having access to
these journals. . . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)

But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a quorum of each House may be the aid
of corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution. It must be admitted that
the consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and political power must of necessity be confided to officers, who
being human may violate the trusts reposed in them. This perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human
agencies. It is not fit that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been able at all times with truth to
 say that its high places have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not constituted it with faculties to supervise
coordinate departments and correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that power does not
belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)

Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence — considered a classic, and described by one who himself is a noted jurist, author, and scholar,
as "a permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured nineteenth-century law in form to be used in a new era of growth"
— unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in the soundness of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the
argument of Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of securing in any other way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on
legislative action, says:

(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are bound to enforce the
constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore an act must be declared no law which
in fact was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a duty to determine according to the actual facts of the
readings and the votes. Now the journals may not represent the actual facts. That duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if
it can be shown beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented. The duty to uphold a law which in fact was
constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be going
as far wrong in repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal as it will be in upholding an act based on improper
votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that the constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop
short with the journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an examination into facts as provable by the
testimony of members present is not allowable. If to support that it be said that such an inquiry would be too uncertain and
impracticable, then it is answered that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after all; for if the duty
to get at the facts is a real and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty that is limited
by policy and practical convenience, then the argument changes into the second one above, namely, how far it is feasible to push
the inquiry with regard to policy and practical convenience; and from this point of view there can be but one answer.

(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain
point suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption whose defect is exposed only by carrying it to its logical
consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se"
capable of being enforced through the Judiciary and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet
there is certainly a large field of constitutional provision which does not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may
remain unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a
clause requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the
Constitution may remain unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and
enforce the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration may be had by imagining the Constitution to require the Executive to appoint
an officer or to call out the militia whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose he appoints or calls out
when in truth he has no such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his belief? Or suppose
the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain conditions exist;
can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a belief?
Or suppose the Constitution commands the Judiciary to decide a case only after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case the
Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be done?

These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial function of applying and enforcing the Constitution ceases to
operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties which affect the motives and judgment of a particular
independent department of government, — Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by
any other department if the one charged fails to perform them. The Constitution may provide that no legislator shall take a bribe,
but an act would not be treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the Constitution attempts to lay
injunctions in matters leading up to and motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the conscience of that
department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature as the vote of a
single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each legislator not to vote until he has carefully thought over the matter of
legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not to act finally until it has three times heard the proposition read
aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in the former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the
function of the Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try to keep the Legislature to its duty:

xxx xxx xxx

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they
aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons (34
Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out whether or not the contention of the appellant was right.
We think the petitioners are in error.

It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two
methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the documents offered in evidence. It
does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed before the Court; and it has not been shown that if
that had been done, this Court would not have held the copyconclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the
Court expressly stated that it "passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its
passage.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the
two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the
law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy
appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and representatives who were
ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of
the Philippine Constitution.

The petition is dismissed without costs.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I can't vote for them, because the enrolled copy of the resolution and the
legislative journals are conclusive upon us.

A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that the question whether an amendment to the existing constitution has
been duly proposed in the manner required by such constitution properly belongs to the judiciary. That is the position taken by Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J.,
880 and 16C.J.S., 437.) (See also 11 Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have adopted a different view. (16 C.J.S., 437, notes
41 and 43.)

"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted
according to the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question." (McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn.,
392, 409; 119 N.W., 408.) (12 C.J., 880.)

"An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of
the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It has been judicially determined whether a proposed
amendment received the constitutional majority of votes. (Knightvs. Shelton, 134 Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S.
W. 396; Green vs. State Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95 Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L. R.
A., 722; Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn., 400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N.W., 779; Bott vs. Wurts, 63
N.J.L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L.R.A., 251; State vs. Foraker, 46 Oh. St., 677; 23 N.E., 491; 6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J., 880.)

As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous to state systems than to the Federal theory of "grant" of powers, it is
proper to assume that the members of our Constitutional convention, composed mostly of lawyers, and even the members of the American
Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation, contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in this portion of
the world. Hence, my conclusion that in Philippine polity, courts may and should take cognizance of the subject of this controversy.

B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Article XV), the proposed amendment was not approved
"by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives." They complain that certain Senators and
some members of the House of Representatives were not allowed to participate and were not considered in determining the required three
fourths vote.
The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting, assert that the persons mentioned, for all practical purposed did not
belong to the Congress of the Philippines on the day the amendment was debated and approved.

Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino people, for approval or disapproval, the amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both
Houses, etc."

Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of legislation. Its first section provides that "the amendment to the Constitution
of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses,
adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-six, shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general
election which shall be held on March eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the Executive, declares in the most solemn manner that the resolution
proposing the amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether those petitioners who are members of the
Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not precluded from questioning its validity or veracity, unless they assert and prove that in
Congress they opposed its enactment. In default of a contrary showing, it is not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress they
endorsed-- or at least are bound by — the declarations of Republic Act No. 73? And if a private party is estopped from challenging the
constitutional efficacy of a law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C.J.S., 198 and 11 Am. Jur., 767) should not a member of
Congress be estopped from impugning a statute he helped (presumably) to pass? Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining
petitioners, as mere citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S., 169.)

C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision, because the instant litigation may be solved by the application of
other well-established principles founded mainly on the traditional respect which one department of the Government entertains for the actions
of the others.

On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to the applicability and binding effect of section 313 of Act No. 190, as
amended by Act No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated by the Rules of Court. I likewise believe the soundness of the
doctrine expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a question admittedly within the domain of the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill of resolution upon the judicial authorities.

D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the respondents could plausibly fall back on the time-honored rule that the
courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their veracity. (United Statesvs. Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)

According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate sixteenth (16) senators approved the resolution against five (5), with no
absences; whereas in the house sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes", eighteen(18) voted "no", one abstained from voting and one was
absent. Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the total membership of twenty-one of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-
fourths of the total membership of eighty-eight (88) of the House of Representatives (68 plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear that the
measure was upheld by the number of votes prescribed by the Constitution.

True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one congressman to the effect that the votes did not constitute the
majority required by the Constitution. However, in the fact of the incontestable arithmetical computation above shown, those protests must be
attributed to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having then asserted that "there were absent Senators or Congressmen who
had not been taken into account. "Ford although we might have judicial notice of the number of proclaimed members of Congress, still we
are no better qualified than the Legislature to determine the number of its actual membership at any given moment, what with demises or
demissions, remotions or suspensions.

HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds supporting the same in so far as they are not inconsistent with the
applicable reasons supporting my concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). But I dissent from that part of the majority opinion
(page 3, ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the Senate and House of Representatives had been counted "the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths of vote in either branch of
Congress."

The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino, supra, are, first, that the questions therein raised were
political in nature within the exclusive province of the legislature, and, second, that the judiciary does not possess jurisdiction over such
questions. It is to me evidence that the questions involved in the present proceeding are no less political than those involved in that former
Senate case. It is deemed unnecessary to dwell at more length upon the grounds of my said concurring opinion.

The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the majority opinion in the instant proceeding is that the suspension of the
said members of the Senate and the House of Representatives being a political question, the judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere
with the determination thereof by the proper political department of the government, has perforce to abide by said determination if it were to
go any further in the consideration of the case. In other words, any further discussion of the case in this Court will have to start from the
premise that said members have been suspended by the respective Houses of Congress and that we, being powerless to interfere with the
matter of said suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the determination of said political branches of the government. As said by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649), "in cases involving the action of the political
departments of the government, the judiciary is bound by such action." (Williams vs. Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet.,
511; Kennel vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of Carnatio vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon,
7 How., 1; R.I. vs. Mass., 12 Pet., 714.)

If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that said members have been thus suspended, there will be to my mind,
absolutely no justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the determination of whether or not the required three-fourths vote was
attained. Their case was entirely different from that of members who, not having been suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to
vote upon the resolution. In the case of the latter, they had, like all other members similarly situated, three alternatives, namely, to vote in
favor of the resolution, to vote against it, or to abstain from voting. If they voted in favor, of course, their votes had to be counted amount
those supporting the resolution. If they voted against, of course, their votes had to be counted with those opposing. And if they abstained
from voting, there would be sound justification for counting them as not in favor of the resolution, because by their very abstention they
impliedly but necessarily would signify that they did not favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if they did, they would have voted in favor of
it. On the other hand, those suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose validity or legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to
inquire into, cannot be similarly treated. In their case there would be no way of determining which way their votes would have gone or
whether or not they would have abstained from voting. In this connection, in considering the hypothesis of their voting in case they had not
been suspended, I must go upon the assumption that while those suspended members may belong to the political party which, as a party,
was opposed to the resolution, still they would have voted independently and following their individual convictions. In this connection, it might
not be amiss to mention that there were quite a number of minority members of the legislature who voted for the resolution. Hence, we are
not in a position to say that said suspended members, if they had not been suspended, would have voted against the resolution, nor in favor
of it either, nor that they would have abstained from voting. Why then should they bed counted with the members who voted against the
resolution or those who, having the right to vote, abstained from doing so? Why should we count them as though we knew that they would
have voted against the resolution, or even that they would have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that the Constitution
does not, and could not, include suspended members in the determination of the required three-fourths vote.

I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the Constitution that "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .", advisedly
used the vital and all-important word "voting" therein. I take it, that they meant to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all
members not suspended or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes one way or the other. But I am here even making a concession in
favor of the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain from voting, may be counted among those not in favor of the
measure. But what I cannot bring myself to conceive is that the quoted provision should have intended to count suspended or disqualified
members as opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being possible to know which way they would have voted or that
they would have abstained from voting — that they would never have voted in favor of the measure. If I should ask why we should not count
such suspended or disqualified members among those in favor of the measure, I am sure those who opine differently would answer, because
we do not know that they would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask me why we should not count them among
those against the measure, I would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it or that they would have abstained from
voting. All this inevitably leads to the conclusion — the only one possible — that such suspended or disqualified members should not and
cannot be counted due to that very impossibility of knowing which way they would have voted or whether they would have abstained from
voting. I stand for a sound and rational construction of the constitutional precept.

PARAS, J.:

I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.

The last bastion of democracy is in danger.

Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least resistance, and the banner of the Constitution is silently and meekly
hauled down from its pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty standard bearers of a new brand of Farcism. In t he words of Cicero,
"recedere de statu suae dignitatis."

Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos suffered by those, throwing overboard all ideals as burdensome and
dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual survival, even in ignominy, could not stand the impact of initial defeats
at the hands of invading fearsome military hordes.

The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to determinate and indeterminate ideological pressures. Very often man walks in
the darkness of a blind alley obeying the pullings and pushings of hidden and unhidden forces, or the arcane predeterminations of the genes
of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship floating in the middle of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the
advent of the first typhoon. From early youth we begin to hear and learn about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the guiding stars in
our actions and decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds dim or completely darken those stars and then we have only to
rely on our faith in their existence and on habit, becoming unerring if long enough followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm
and cloudless nights. We are sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes and disagreements of our fellowmen. Let us not forget
that the day shall come that we will be judged on how are are judging. Posterity shall always have the final say. When the time solvent has
dissolved the human snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as to whether we have faced our task fearlessly or whether our hearts
have shrunk upon the magnitude of our duties and have chosen the most comfortable path of retreat. Then it will be conclusively known
whether did keep burning the tripod fire in the temples of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity, covered by the cold mist of historical
oblivion; others will have their names as by words repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general contempt; and still others will be
remembered with universal gratefulness, love and veneration, the guard on accorded to all those who remained faithful to the fundamental
tenets of justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff from the grain.

This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this tribunal has the sturdy courage to keep its responsibility in proper
high level. It will need the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a conclusive verdict is rendered, whether we should merit the
scorn of our fellow citizens and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred Scot decision of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the
United States into civil war, or whether in the heart of each future Filipino citizen there will be a shrine in which our memory will be
remembered with gratefulness, because we have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief Justice Marshall, the legal genius
who fixed and held the rock bottom foundations which made of the American Constitution the veritable supreme law of the land and
established the role of the tribunals as the ultimate keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it will be impartial and
unbiased, exacting and pitiless, with unappealable finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote this lapidary line: "lasciate ogni
speranza."

Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque cornea of stubborn refusal to see reality or should be impaired by the
polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the resolution in question, proposing an amendment to the
Constitution, was adopted, the members of the Senate were 24 and the members of the House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16
members of the Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by undisputable mathematical computation, do not constituted three-fourths of
the 24 members thereof, and the 68 members of the House of Representatives who voted for the resolution, by equally simple arithmetical
operation, do not constitute three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber. The official certifications made by the presiding officers of
the two houses of Congress to the effect that three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and three-fourths of all the members of the
House of Representatives voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the facts. Nothing in existence can. The certification, being a
clear falsification of public document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000,
cannot give reality to a fiction based in a narration of facts that is in conflict with the absolute metaphysical reality of the events.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and besides some of them are members of the Senate, others are
members of the House of Representatives, and still others are presidents of political parties, duly registered, with considerable following in all
parts of the Philippines.

The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of the Commission on Elections and the remaining three are
respectively the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the Bureau of Printing.

Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8 elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23, 1946, and that the House of
Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946, minus 2d who resigned to assume other positions in the
Government.

On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the Congress of the Philippines a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto, which reads as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than
three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately. To propose, as they do hereby propose, the following
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto:

ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution,
during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United
States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven
hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition,
exploitation, development, and utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and
the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business
enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the
same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the
Philippines."

This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which it
is submitted to the people for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68 Representatives voted in favor and 18 against.
Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on March 11, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to the
people the proposed amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating P1,000,000 for said purpose.

Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional because Congress may not, by said act, submit to the people for
approval or disapproval the proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in resolution Exhibit B inasmuch as, to comply with the
express provisions of Article XV of the Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of the 24 members of the Senate is constituted by at least 18 Senators, 2 more
than those who actually voted for the resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98 members of the House of Representatives should at
least be 72 Representatives, or 4 more than those who actually voted for the resolution.

Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by excluding from them petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
E. Romero and allege that the House of Representatives is not composed of 98 members but of only 90. They admit that at the joint session
of Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution 16 votes were cast in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives 68 and 5 in the Senate and 18 in the House of Representatives had voted against. They admit the approval of Republic Act
No. 73 and that necessary steps to hold the plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said act is unconstitutional, and byway
of defense, allege that the resolution Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately and, consequently, Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people for approval or disapproval,
fixing a date for a general election, and appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and constitutional.

At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following stipulation:

The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the following facts:

1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero were, by the majority vote of the Commission on Elections,
proclaimed elected senators in the election of April 23, 1946;

2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said senators-elect took part in the election of the President of that body;
but that before the senators-elect were sworn in by the President of the Senate, a resolution was presented, and subsequently
approved, to defer the administration of oath and the seating of Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero,
pending the hearing and decision of the protest lodged against their election;

3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took their alleged oath of office before notaries public, and not on
the floor, and filed said oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the noon recess of the said date;

4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate other oaths of office accomplished by them outside of the
floor before a notary public and the Secretary of the Senate, on September 5 and August 31, 1946, respectively; and that their
corresponding salaries from April 23, 1946, were paid on August 31, 1946;

5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W. Diokno filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged oath of office
dated May 25, 1946, with the Auditor of the Senate on October 15,1946, and on said date his salary was paid corresponding to
the period from April 23 to October 15, 1946;

6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every fifteen days;

7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and oaths up to the present time, the said Messrs. Vera,
Diokno, and Romero have not been allowed to sit and take part in the deliberations of the Senate and to vote therein, not do their
names appear in the roll of the Senate;

8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of canvassers certified as having been elected in the election
held on April 23, 1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs. Alejo Santos and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose
Cando and Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and Luis Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for
Tarlac, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental;

9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of Representatives took part in the election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives held on May 25, 1946;

10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives were sworn in by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio Nueno,
representative for Manila, submitted a resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating of Luis Taruc and Amado Yuson for
Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, Alejo Santos and Jesus Lava
for Bulacan, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros Occidental "pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their
election," copy of the resolution being attached to and made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;

11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative Escareal and approved by the House, referred for study to a
committee of seven, which up to the present has not reported, as shown by the Congressional Record for the House of
Representatives;
 12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution were not shown in on the floor and have not been so sworn in or
allowed to sit up to the present time, nor have they participated in any of the proceedings of the House of Representatives except
during the debate of the Escareal motion referred to in paragraph 11 hereof, nor cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and
their names do not appear in the roll of the members of the House except as shown by the Congressional Record of the House of
Representatives, nor in the roll inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the Republic of the Philippines hereto
attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;

13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their alleged oaths of office on the date set opposite their names,
as follows:

Jose Cando May 25, 1946

Vicente Gustilo May 25, 1946
Constancio Padilla May 22, 1946
Alejo Santos May 23, 1946
Luis M. Taruc May 25, 1946
Amado M. Yuson May 25, 1946
Jesus B. Lava May 25, 1946
Alejandro Simpauco May 25, 1946

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the exception of the first four who took their oaths before Mr. Narciso
Pimentel, Secretary of the House;

14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of the Secretary of the House of Representatives;

15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries for the term beginning April 23, 1946, up to the present, with
the exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment was suspended since August 16;

16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths before the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
were allowed to sit on September 30, 1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;

17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two members of the House, Representatives Jose C. Zulueta and
Narciso Ramos, had resigned before the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was discussed and passed on
September 18,1946;

18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution was made by the Secretary calling the roll of
each house and the votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of the Secretary of the House of Representatives hereto
attached, marked Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof; and

19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of Representatives and the alleged oaths of office are made a part
of this Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right to question their materiality and admissibility.

Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.

For the petitioners: For the respondents:

JOSE E. ROMERO ROMAN OZAETA

ANTONIO BARREDO Secretary of Justice

JOSE B.L. REYES

First Asst. Solicitor General

PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY

Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in this case is the first question we have to consider.

No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the Court's deliberation, we should not evade deciding it and giving what in
law and justice should be the answer.

To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to institute the present recourse of prohibition. If petitioners should lack
that personality, such legal defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed by respondents themselves.

Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have the necessary legal personality to file the petition,
and we do not see any reason why such personality should be put in doubt.
Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of senators; the second, of representatives; and the third, of presidents of four
political parties.

All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception of Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are
members of either of the two houses of Congress and took part in the consideration of Resolution Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while
the above three excepted senators were the ones who were excluded in the consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted
for purposes of determining the three-fourths constitutional rule in the adoption of the resolution.

In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken all the necessary steps for the holding of the general election on
March 11, 1947, and that the carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to enforce the resolution and act aforementioned in open
violation of the Constitution," is without or in excess of respondents' jurisdiction and powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who are
members of the Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure and disbursement of public funds and end in an irreparable injury to the
taxpayers and the citizens of the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those represented by them in their capacities mentioned
above."

There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either senators or members of the House of Representatives have direct
interest in the legal issues involved in this case as members of the Congress which adopted the resolution, in open violation of the
Constitution, and passed the act intended to make effective such unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even
duty bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless
they are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it
that the fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled upon.

The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners, represent large groups of our population, perhaps nearly one-half of
the latter, and the numerous persons they represent are directly interested and will personally be affected by the question whether the
Constitution should be lightly taken and can easily be violated without any relief and whether it can be amended by a process openly
repugnant to the letter of the Constitution itself.

As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly each and every one of the citizens and inhabitants of this country.
Whether our Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or just a mere scrap of paper, only good to be thrown into a waste
basket, is a matter of far-reaching importance to the security, property, personal freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital
question will necessarily affect the way of life of the whole people and of its most unimportant unit. Each and every one of the individuals
inhabiting this land of ours shall have to make plans for the future depending on how the question is finally decided. No one can remain
indifferent; otherwise, it will at his peril.

Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute the present action; and much more, those who are members of
Congress have the legal duty to institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed in them by the electorate.

24 SENATORS

The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual number of the members of the Senate. According to petitioners there
are 24 of them while according to respondents there are only 21, excluding Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero,
because, according to them, "they are not duly qualified and sworn in members of the Senate."

This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the stipulation of facts submitted by both parties.

No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may change the meanings and effects of the words placed by respondents
themselves in said seven paragraphs. No amount of argument may delude anyone into believing that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero
are not senators notwithstanding their having been proclaimed as elected senators, their having taken part in the election of the President of
the Senate, their having taken their oaths of office, and their receiving salaries as senators.

Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in the undeveloped brains of the pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus
of five hundred millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting o the human mind of the twentieth century.

Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be counted as members of the Senate, without taking into consideration
whatever legal effects the Pendatun resolution may have produced, a question upon which we have already elaborated in our opinion in Vera
vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not suspended, they are senators anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so clear and
simple as the presence of the sun at day time. Therefore, counting said three Senators, there are 24 Senators in all in the present Senate.

96 REPRESENTATIVES

The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners' allegations to the effect that the present House of Representatives is
composed of 98 members and their own allegation to the effect that at present "only 90 members have qualified, have been fully sworn in,
and have taken their seats as such."

Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to seventeen of the stipulation of facts.
The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not Representatives Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos, Taruc, Yuson, Lava and
Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are members of the House of Representatives.

The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight persons are actual members of the House of Representatives. We may
even add that the conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even greater than in the case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero,
because no resolution of suspension has ever been adopted by the House of Representatives against said eight members, who are being
deprived of the exercise of some of their official functions and privileges by the unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the Speaker.

That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries where the insolence of totalitarian rulers have replaced all
constitutional guarantees and all concepts of decent government, raises again a constitutional question: whether it is permissible for the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to exercise the arbitrary power of depriving representatives duly elected by the people of their
constitutional functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the existence of such an arbitrary power and to permit its exercise unchecked
is to make of democracy a mockery.

The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught against the sovereignty itself of the people, an onslaught which may
cause the people sooner or later to take justice in their own hands. No system of representative government may subsist if those elected by
the people may so easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of their constitutional functions.

From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the last national election, 98 representatives were elected and at the
time the resolution Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of them were actual members of the House, as two (Representatives
Zulueta and Ramos) has resigned.

Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the resolution was adopted; three-fourths of them should at least be 18
and not the 16 who only voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96 representatives, three-fourths of them should certainly be more
than the 68 who voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is that, since not three-fourths of the senators and representatives
voting separately have voted in favor of the resolution as required by Article XV of the Constitution, there can be no question that the
resolution has not been validly adopted.

We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in agreement with the majority opinion, have skipped the questions as
to the actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, notwithstanding the fact that they are among the first important ones
squarely raised by the pleadings of both parties. If they had taken them into consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness will
bring them to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at least, with respect to the actual membership of the House of Representatives.

Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of Representatives, it appears evident that the remedy sought for in
the petition should be granted.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their own position concerning the questions of the actual membership of the
Senate and House of Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in the written arguments they have retreated to the theory of
conclusiveness of the certification of authenticity made by the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress as their last
redoubt.

The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session
assembled, by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the members of each House voting separately, . . .."

Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement, appears to be certified over the signatures of the President of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses, respondents want us to accept blindly as a fact what is not.
They want us to accept unconditionally as a dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith, what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official
falsehood.

Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.

An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice, throwing overboard all scruples, in the administration of justice, could
accept as true what we know is not and then perform our official functions upon that voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurb to be
entertained even for a moment. Anyone who keeps the minimum sense of justice will not fail to feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage
of justice which necessarily will result from the suggestion.

But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this Court to inquire behind the false certification made by the presiding
officers and the secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.

Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion, "the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution."
To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made part of this opinion, as Appendices A, B, and C,1 the memoranda
presented by both petitioners and respondents, where their attorneys appear to have amply and ably discussed the question. The perusal of
the memoranda will show petitioners' contentions to be standing on stronger ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their arguments.

In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority opinion.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary," except "by express constitutional
or statutory provision" to the contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule'
out of respect to the political departments."

The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."

This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We deem unnecessary to repeat
what we have already said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated on the question.

Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary is "too well-
established to need citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty "in determining what matters fall under the meaning of political
questions."

This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not accept it even as a good doctrine. It is a general proposition made
without a full comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial discernment lies behind it.

The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question" shows conclusively that the so-
called doctrine has recklessly been advanced.

This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of the confessed difficulty in determining what matters fall within the
designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term "is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political
department of the government."

Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the
body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of faith. "It is a synonym of principle, position, opinion, article, maxim,
rule, and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to any speculative truth or working principle, especially as taught to others or
recommended to their acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should be expressed on simple and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of
the elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.

A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting point for developing new propositions, as a guiding principle in the
solution of many problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an intellectual system. It is the basis of a more or less complex legal
structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main columns of an architectonic construction. If that groundwork,
cornerstone or column is supported by a thing whose existence still remains in dispute, it is liable to fall.

We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine which is based on the unsettled meaning of political question. The
general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of the judiciary" is just one of the many numerous general
pronouncements made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues
submitted to them.

It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of powers, the handful of sand with which judicial ostriches blind
themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act as a conjuration to drive away a danger or an evil.

We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution and the process to make it effective, as provided in Article XV of the
Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with their conclusion that a litigation as to whether said article has been
complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals, because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise
the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as erroneous and false.

Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all questions relating to it, therefore, betaken away from the courts?
Then, what about the constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court with the power to decide "all cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty or a law?"

COLEMAN versus MILLER

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller (122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the mainstay of the majority position.
No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the exposition and analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court.

The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of ratification by the State legislature of a proposed amendment to the
federal Constitution" and that "the decision by Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State of the questions of whether an amendment
has been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State legislature," are political questions and not justiciable.

At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions have no similarity or analogy with the constitutional questions herein
discussed. The questions as to the efficacy of the ratification by the Senate of Kansas of the Child Labor amendment proposed by the United
States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the decision of said Congress, "in its control of the Secretary of State," whether the amendment
has been adopted "within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the State legislature," either one of them does not raise a
controversy of violation of specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in the present case.

No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been violated because in January, 1925, the Legislature of Kansas rejected
the amendment, a copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of State of the United States, and in January, 1927, a new
resolution ratifying the amendment was adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-20 division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding
vote. Neither was there such mention of constitutional violation as to the effect of the previous rejection and of the lapse of time after
submission of the amendment to the State legislature.

No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated because the Lieutenant Governor had cast his vote or because by the
lapse of time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment had allegedly lost its vitality.

It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the efficacy of ratification by a State legislature of a proposed
amendment, it was within the ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide the question, in its decision rendered in the exercise of
its constitutional power, to control the action of the Secretary of State, and the promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not be
controlled by the courts.

Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in controversy in the present case.

We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in Coleman vs. Miller, according to the American Law Reports, show
"interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the justices," and are the subject of an amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455,
entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it happened that the nine-member United States Supreme Court could not reach a decision on
the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to cast his vote, because the odd number of justices was "equally divided."

How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman vs. Miller could be an authority is beyond our comprehension.

GREEN versus WELLER

One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Green vs.Miller (32 Miss., 650),
quoting one paragraph thereof.

Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its reversed effect.

The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the nature of the submission to the people of a proposal to amend the
Constitution which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government,
but in making this pronouncement, it assumes that the submission is made "in a established form," adding that the means provided for the
exercise by the people of their sovereign right of changing the fundamental law should receive such a construction as not to trample upon the
exercise of their right, and that the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to the people of the state
to change their Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the instrument."

So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that the majority position is wrong because the Mississippi Supreme
Court, in making the pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to the people is made "in a established form" and "in the
mode prescribed" by the Constitution, namely, in accordance with the provisions of the instrument, the pronouncements would be the
opposite if, as in the present case, the submission of the proposal of amendment to the people is made through a process flagrantly violative
of the Constitution, aggravated by wanton falsification of public records and tyrannical trampling of the constitutional prerogatives of duly
elected representatives of the people.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, in the
"confusing" and "amusing" decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked by the majority, but this other authority seems equally reluctant to
offer its helping hand to a helpless, desperate position.

The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The Constitution granted Congress exclusive power to control submission of
constitutional amendments."
Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked, omnipotent power is granted by our fundamental law to the Congress of the
Philippines. Our Congress may propose amendments or call a convention to make the proposal, but that is all. Nowhere in the Constitution
can be found any word, any grammatical sign, not even the faintest hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to the people,
Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the submission." That submission must be provided by law, and no law may be enacted and
come into effect by the exclusive power of Congress. It needs the concurring action of the President of the Philippines. And if the law
happens to violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its execution
devolves upon the Executive Department. As a matter of fact, it is the Executive Department which actually submits to the people the
proposed amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of the Philippines may refuse to submit it in the day fixed by
law if war, rebellion, or insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.

After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major premise not obtainable in the Philippines, his conclusions cannot help
the majority in anyway.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and "amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller is the next authority invoked by
the majority, but the opinion does not offered much help. The justice maintains that the proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are
matters that concern not merely political actions but are also of the very essence of political action," and then advances the following
argument: "To open the law-courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies."

The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an attitude, one of simple distaste for the idea, but fails to give any
sensible reason for the attitude. Ina totalitarian regime, where decisions are rendered not in answer to the promptings of a sense of justice,
but as expressions of moods, caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but then it
would be necessary to elevate him first to the category of a fuehrer.

In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be founded on reason, but never on passing unreasoned moods,
judicial or otherwise.

We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views, which in their judgment are in accord "with sound
principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced thought on the workings of constitutional and popular government.
"Our regret is not for ourselves alone but for those who happen to accept as authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental attitude of a
judicial officer of a foreign country, praising it even with the much-abused label as "liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it represents the
whimsical rule of personal attitudes and not the rule of well-matured reason.

THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY

This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached hereto as Appendices A, B, and C. Although we consider it
unnecessary to enlarge the discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is stated in the majority opinion. Respondents
contend, with the full approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.

The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory. How can we accept the absolute verity of the presiding officers'
certification that the resolution in question has been adopted by three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact the certification is false? How can we accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to
the category of truth?

The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England. Because the English have committed the nonsense of accepting the
theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our tribunals not think independently? Our
temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in the art of imitation but by human beings, and human beings must act according to
reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes may happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be
inconceivable for our courts to commit such a blunder.

Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685, footnote), the majority states that in the United States the jurisdictions are
divided almost equally pro and con on the theory, although in petitioners' memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-date evidence
to the effect that there is a great majority for the rejection. But to our mind, mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in the
decision as to whether the theory is or is not correct. Numbers do not make reason nor justice.

The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of our law-making body, invoking to said effect the now obsolete section
313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.

Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues upon the authority of laws which have been repealed or abolished, still
the evidence pointed out by the majority does not support their contention. Section 313 alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove
the procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso
that the existence of a copy of acts of said commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof."
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show conclusively that this
Supreme Court, in making the rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we
may take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and section 41 provides what evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but
nowhere in the rules can a provision be found that would make conclusive a certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both
House of Congress even if we know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.

The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy of our lawmaking body, upon the very evidence used in support
thereof, after a little analysis, has to banish as a mid-summer night's dream.

50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150

In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked as reasons for the
theory.

We will analyze the reasons adduced:

1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the government. This must be the strongest one, when it is first mentioned. It is
so flimsy to require much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and justice for the sake of a social courtesy, the mutual respect that must be
shown between different departments of the government? Has our sense of evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted that we can
make such a blunder in our choice? Since when have the social or official amenities become of paramount value to the extent of
overshadowing the principles of truth and justice?

2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate
power." This second reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather on a Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the
members of the majority are a king of emperos of Japan, to be worshipped but never to be discussed. The ideology depicted by the second
reason should be relegated to where it belongs: the archeological museum.

3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a perverted evaluation of human values. Is justice to be sacrificed for the
sake of convenience?

4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills authenticated as executed by the Constitution, for years, it might
be ascertained from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never become a law." This last reason personifies unreasonableness to
the nth degree. So we leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of the extent to which legal stupidity may reach.

WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE

Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We will also analyzed the arguments
relied upon.

1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute law of the State." This argument, as it appears quoted in the majority
decision, is premised on the unreliability of legislative journals, and it seems to depict a mind poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the
following: "We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of
evidences of this character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative action would be at the mercy of
all persons having access to these journals. . . ."

The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with American experience, which seems not to be too flattering to our former
metropolis.

Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative processes convinces us that Wigmore's assumption does not obtain in the
Philippines. It is true that in the pre-constitution legislative enactments we have seen few instances in which there had been disagreement
between what has actually been passed, as shown by the journal, and the authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few to justify
entertaining here the same fears entertained by Wigmore in America. Although those instances were few, we fought to correct the evil in the
Constitutional Convention, where we were able to introduce the following revolutionary provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be passed
by either House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in their final from furnished each member at least three calendar days prior to its
passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)

This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by Wigmore's fears.

2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the courts, then less than a quorum of each House may by the aid of
presiding officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition of the Constitution, Wigmore answers: "This perhaps cannot be
avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor
has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been disgraced."
The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt judicial officers is no reason why
arbitrary presiding officers and members of the legislature should be allowed to have their way unchecked. Precisely the system of checks
and balances established by the Constitution presupposes the possibility of error and corruption in any department of government and the
system is established to put a check on them.

When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by the legislature is placed at the bar of justice, the judiciary must not
shrink from its duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the proper remedy. Even we, the members of the highest tribunal,
cannot with impunity commit "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or other high crimes" without being liable to be removed
from office on impeachment, and we hope, if there is such a case, that the House of Representatives and the Senate will do their duty in
accordance with Article IX of the Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example which is given under the intellectual tutelage of
Wigmore.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES

The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution as a guarantee against the adoption of amendments to the
fundamental law by mere majorities.

The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and if any change is to be introduced in it, it must be in answer to a
pressing public need so powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
Said three-fourth rule has been adopted by the Constitutional Convention, as all the other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any
doubt that it must be complied with mathematical precision, with the same certainty of all numbers and fractions expressed or expressible in
arithmetical figures.

Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, it means
an exact number, not susceptible of any more or less. All the members means that no single member should be excluded in the counting. It
means not excluding three Senators and eight Representatives as respondents want us to do in order not to cause any inconvenience to the
presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress who had the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had been
complied within the adoption of the resolution in question, when such a certification is as false as any falsehood can be.

The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities, otherwise it would be the death knell of constitutionalism in our
country. If a constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened in the adoption of the resolution in question, it would mean
breaking faith with the vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its stead a whimsical government of men.

The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that the Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators (section 2, Article VI);
that Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5,
Article VI); that each House may expel a member with the concurrence of two-third of all the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that
electoral tribunals shall each be composed of nine members, three Justices of the Supreme Court and six legislature members (section 11,
Article VI); that to overrun the veto of the President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20
[1], Article VI), and in certain cases the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of each House is necessary (section 20 [2], Article
VI); that Congress shall, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House, have the sole power to declare war (section
25, Article VI); that no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment by a vote of two-thirds
of all its members (section 2, Article IX); and that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).

So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution affect matters not of momentary but of momentous importance. Each
and every one of them should be given effect with religious scruple, not only because our loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but
also because by inserting them the Constitutional Convention had abided by the wise teachings of experience.

By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the unconstitutional adoption of the resolution in question to have their way is to
set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the supremacy of an empire of lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening Pandora's box of
evils and disasters.

The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. From
now on, by the simple expediency of certification by the presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses that two-thirds had voted where a
bare majority had voted in fact, said majority may plunge our people into a maelstrome of war.

The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the House of Representatives.
From now on, a mere plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high officials, including the President, on the carpet.

To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate. From now
on, that three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or circumvented by not counting three actual Senators, as has been done in the resolution in
question, and thereby oust the President of the Philippines if he happens not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.

Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment, to submit which to the people high-handed means have been
resorted to, there can be no question that it is of vital importance to the people and it will affect future generations to unimaginable extent.
The Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that before such a momentous proposal could be submitted to the people the three-fourth
rule should be adhered to by Congress.

QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE

Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will summon all the forces of liberalism to wage a crusade for human
freedom. They should put on the armor of righteousness and rally behind the banner for the vindication of the principles and guarantees
embodied in the Constitution and the high purposes of the Chapter of the United Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in People
vs. Jalandoni, L-777. Concerning the judgment that the future may pass upon the actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same opinion we
ventured that the historian army, under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write as follows:

At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most reactionary and retrogressive. When the victims of a
constitutional violation, perpetrated by a group of the highest officials of the government, came to if for redress, it adopted a
hands-off policy, showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple with the situation and finding refuge in a comfortable retreat,
completely disappointing those who have pinned their faith and hope in it as the first pillar of the Constitution and the
inexpugnable bulwark of human fundamental rights. The issue of human freedom was disposed of by them most discouragingly
by nullifying the right of an accused to be free on bail on appeal, in flagrant violation of a constitutional guarantee and of one of the
fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same historian may record that the highest tribunal of the new Republic of
the Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional system, by refusing to do its duty in giving redress in a clear case
of violation of the fundamental law, to the great disappointment, despair and apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are pinning
their hopes on constitutionalism for the survival of humanity.

The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the deliberations of the several organs of the United Nations is
predicated in the adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all jurisdictions of our planet. The ethology of all mankind must be
shaped under the pattern of that single legal standard. But the whole system is liable to crash if it is not founded on the rock bed of the
elemental principle that the majesty of the law must always be held supreme.

To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the existing social organs, moral attitudes and habits of thinking should
undergo reforms and overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should be discarded to be replaced with more progressive ones and
inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these ideas are the wrong ones which are used as premises for the majority opinion in this case.

The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but innovation and reform should continuously be undertaken if death by
stagnation is to be avoided. New truths must be discovered and new ideas created. New formulas must be devised and invented, and those
outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be preserved, but those hampering the progressive evolution of cultured should be
stored in the museum of memory. The past and the present are just stepping stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the future.

Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had progressed by leaps and bounds. Polonium and radium were
discovered by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha, beta and gamma particles. Atom ceased to be the
smallest unit of matter to become an under-microscopic planetarian system of neutrons, protons, and electrons.

Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of Aladdin. Plants are grown in plain water, without any soil, but only with
anions and cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from it is produced wood sugar, weighing one-half of the sawdust
processed. Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost absolute, is being achieved to serve ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and other
microbes are harnessed to serve useful human purposes. The aspergillus niger is made to manufacture the acetic to produce vinegar for the
asking. Thepenicillum notatum and the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin and tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many
lives from formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful insects, thus checking effectively malaria, an illness that used to claim more than
one million victims a year in the world. The creation of synthetics had enriched the material treasures offered to man by nature. Means of
transportation are developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific dreams are fast becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science
marches on. There is no reason why the administration of justice should not progress onward, synchronized with the rhythm of general
human advancement towards a better future.

The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have without any qualm violated Article XV of the Constitution and the majority
of this Court, instead of granting the proper relief provided by law, preferred to adopt the comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers,
creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more violations of the fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to foresee.

Our vote is for the granting of the petition.

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.

Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.

Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee
Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959,
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and
veneer by plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the main
raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960,
petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said
Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the
last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although
the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in
audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of
urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by
petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.

The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale
of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis
supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this
connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:

Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions
of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when
applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of
plywood.

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress
intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the
Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off.
Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games
& Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.

Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The information in this case reads:

The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal importation of opium, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did,
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court,
520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said
accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided
each other in the transportation, receipt and concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that said
drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an act
committed in violation of law."

On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of
P1,000, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his
appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.

The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat
changed form of statement under the many propositions embraced in the elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly
understood, are these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915, and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in
finding that the legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.

In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for
1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on
the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise
questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that
the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature,
and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2)
whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed order.

Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the
Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other
things, "that the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the
Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the
ordinary and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature, the following appears:

The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature. The hour of midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of
the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.

The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall keep in journal of
its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of
1914 was duly published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28,
1914.

Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof;
but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it necessary for its own information, and
may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same
Code also provides that:

Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .

 (2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or of
Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified
by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order:Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof.

While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative
journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular
bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of
1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty, that
the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.

Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it
was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment
when such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science
which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated,
adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by extraneous
evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of
adjournment. In order to understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and character of the evidence thus
involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to influence the belief respecting it," and
"conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p.
701 et seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of
witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of
the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when
they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was
stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the
hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's
proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact,
stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of
legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so
imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the
rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for
all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many
contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon
the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:

Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various cases upon this question; and, out of a multitude of citations,
not one is found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the legislature, as recorded in the journals
required to be kept in each of its branches, on the question whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the limitation upon
judicial inquiry in such matters have not generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative
reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character.
They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the
faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only
in the memory of individuals.

In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union in support
of the rule therein laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has been in the least changed or
modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal
Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that
the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals.

On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain, bringing, among other cargo,
twenty-five barrels which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the arrival of this
cargo, engaged in the business of a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's
invoice and bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the release
of the merchandise from the customhouse and the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the warehouse of Beliso at the
aforementioned street and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed
that shipments of merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not
listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature of the merchandise so consigned, instituted an investigation and traced on the
10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry number of the shipment, the entry
number, and the serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse
about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's
warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left and shortly thereafter several of the
barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a
bull cart. This Sese did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-five and told
Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was complied with by Sese
and the barrels delivered to Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs secret service
agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date before the office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega
and placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the warehouse,
identifying the barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises.
Upon being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons at
144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano and here found the
five missing barrels, which were identified by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five barrels were empty,
the staves having been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels,
were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and on
further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was made, but some
clothing was discovered which bore the initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of
house No. 144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano
Limjap, and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced
by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering these facts they
returned to the house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these
three barrels each was found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin
contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty ones found at 144 Calle
General Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were in every way identical in size, form, etc."

While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons, apparently unaware that
anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs
secret service, and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained, however, that
the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at
the time the three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the
opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel, which had the impression of a bottle
stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated that he had
delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of April 10, following the instructions given him
by Beliso. On being further questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions; that the house at
No. 144 Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that
he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle
General Solano. The customs agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several large tin receptacles, in every way
similar to those found at 144 Calle General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the customhouse. At first Pons stated that F. C.
Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and
admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a wine merchant
and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in
the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he
had destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him. On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from
Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in this
letter that this opium was coming in barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to
get these barrels of wine."

The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court and these fats establish the guilt of the appellant beyond any question of a
doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the opium as shipped to him from Spain by a childhood fried named Garcia. The
appellant took a direct part in this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance
with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT,
in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO,
CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR.,
ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO
VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in
their capacities as members of the Municipal Board,respondents.

Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.

Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.

Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor
Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.

Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic
Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."

The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third
reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President
Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.

were
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 1
introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings
as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended
by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies
were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to
the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became
Republic Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from
Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the
President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate,
addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered
his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the
invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the
Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.

On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in
view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the
previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.

Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7,
1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of
Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members
of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.

Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and
that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.

On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order,
without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly
conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under
any other law until further orders from this Court."

The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and
Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda
on the issues raised by the parties.

Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have been
submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar
question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78
Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has
been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.

The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be
appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M.
Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of
separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question,
the reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."

Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the
question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:

The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case
of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the
due enactment thereof.

Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective
presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely
a
mode of authentication, to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been
3

duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection. The function of an attestation is
4

therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even
where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the
signatures are mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. The affirmative view, 5

it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a
strong argument to the contrary There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of
6

a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it
is submitted to the President.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed
mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case however,
under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. But in the case 8

of Field vs. Clark, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill,
9

although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the
United States are thus not unanimous on this point.

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of
an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received,
in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires
the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although
they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers
is present.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify
to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting
such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-
fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."

Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final
form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have
certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on
the Journal."

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is
said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that
the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the
Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it
invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the
validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes
law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is
the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the
presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to
have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is
pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal
is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which
admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified
by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent.

Vicente Rodriguez, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question calls for an interpretation of the
following provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864):

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate
who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant
colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G.
Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila.

On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but
rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead,
the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of
1967 which requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the
metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications which applicants should
possess.

The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from
which the mayor might appoint one as chief of police of the city. He contended that his service alone as captain for more than three years in
the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment. The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent on
October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for
mandamus to compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified persons."

The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his own phrasing, as follows:

NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE

(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines OR
the National Bureau of Investigation, OR

(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR

(3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; OR

(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or
higher.

As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is that he falls
under the third class of persons qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department.

In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place the local police service on a professional level,"1 and contends that
a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the other hand, one who, like the
petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of professionalism."

Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still we do not see how the requirement of a college degree as additional
qualification can run counter to the avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement of such additional
qualification will best carry out that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its assumption that the choice is between one who has
served long and loyally in a city police agency and another who, not having so served, has only a bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue
in this case. The issue rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have
educational qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the Act which provides:

Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a provincial, city or
municipal police agency although they have not qualified in an appropriate civil service examination are considered as civil service
eligibles for the purpose of this Act.

In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is considered a civil
service eligible, so must a person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree.

The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the statute may
allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational qualification. Second, section
9 governs the appointment of members of apolice agency only. On the other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is the precise
gravamen of section 10, the last paragraph of which states:

Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules:
Provided, that the appointee possesses the above educational qualification: Provided, further, That in no case shall such
appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service Commission.

Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a
police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing that a
person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally appointed2 chief of police "[ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the
above educational qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to
service) is an indispensable requisite.

It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a bachelor's degree, in addition to service either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or in the National Bureau of Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary record or as a captain in a city police department
for at least three years, would be to create an "absurd situation" in which a person who has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI
is in law considered the equal of another who has been a chief of police or has been a captain in a city police agency for at least three years.
From this it is concluded that "the only logical equivalence of these two groups (Chief of Police with exemplary record and Police Captain for
at least 3 years in a City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree."

Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must have been rendered, but an
admission of the existence of the ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily compel acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in cases
where the appointee's service has been in the AFP or in the NBI that he must be required to have a bachelor's degree. The logical
implication of the petitioner's argument that a person who has served as captain in a city police department for at least three years need not
have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is that such person need not even be a high school graduate. If such be the case would there still be
need for a person to be at least a high school graduate provided he has had at least eight years of service as captain in the AFP?

The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of the Act needs no
interpretation because its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and service qualifications of those seeking
appointment as chief of police is evidence from a reading of the original provision of House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it
underwent. Thus, section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read:

Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. — No chief of a police agency of a province or chartered city
shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police administration. Any
holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank
of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for appointment to the position of
chief of the police agency.

No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree course or a holder of a
Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.

Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules,
provided the appointee possesses the above educational qualification but in no case shall such appointment exceed beyond six
months.

It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as requiring both educational and service qualifications that the following exchanges
of view were made on the floor of the house of Representatives:

MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification for Appointment of Chief of a Police Agency, provides that the chief of a
police agency of a province or a chartered city should be at least a member of the Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's
degree in Police Administration; and the chief of police of a municipality should be at least a holder of a four years' college degree
or holder of a bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology.

At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to these minimum requirements; but I find such requirement very rigid
because it would not allow a man to rise from the ranks. Take a policeman who rose from the ranks. He became a corporal, a
 sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go higher? If he merited it, he should also be appointed chief of police of
a city or municipality.

MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I objected to this provision of the bill because it is a very high qualification.
However, somebody insisted that in order to professionalize our police system and also to attain a high standard of police
efficiency, we must have a chief of police who has a college degree. The point which the gentleman is now raising was brought up
by one Member in the sense that a policeman who rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even after serving for fifteen or
twenty years in the police force, cannot become chief of police for lack of a college degree.

The gentleman's objection is a very good and reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it up during the period of
amendments, I will consider it.

MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will accept my amendment. My only regret, however, is that because I made a
number of proposed amendments, I will not be ready to submit them immediately. We should just limit ourselves to the
sponsorship this evening.3

Thus it appears that it was because of the educational requirement contained in the bill that objections were expressed, but while it was
agreed to delete this requirement during the period of amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect the change. 4

In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure.5 It is to
this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.

Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served either in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of the substitute bill reads:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at
least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the capacity of captain for at least three years.

At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the provision
read:

No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who
has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.6

It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city
for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both
parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative
process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained.

Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and painstakingly read and
examined the enrolled bill in the possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the President and found that the text of section 10 of
the Act is as set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the Senate
Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the House of Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof those of Eliseo M. Tenza,
Secretary of the Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under
the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of the Act must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding
on the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark:9

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled
bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in the form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bill which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
house of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent department requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when the two chambers of the legislature met in conference committee, the phrase
"has served as chief of police with exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its presence in section 10 of the Act.11

What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that — except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police department of a
city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher" — a high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city police
department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police.

Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years irrespective
of the branch of service where he served can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree, completed two years in
Law School, and served as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not
to mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given the Congressional Commendation — the highest award
ever conferred in the history of the Manila Police Department."

The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in the law because it is
not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless such enlargements
are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:

An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom
may recomment the inclusion.

The vital difference between initiating policy, often involving a decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a formulated
policy, indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the extent to which interpreting law is
inescapably making law.12

In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law, the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as chief of police
of the city of Manila. Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding legal duty — and therefore may not be compelled by mandamus to
certify the petitioner as qualified and eligible.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No pronouncements as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

DIZON, J., concurring:

As stated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, petitioner Enrique V. Morales began his career in the Manila Police
Department in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position — that of Chief of the Detective Bureau thereof — and holds the
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

In my opinion, a man bearing such credentials can be reasonably expected to be a good Chief of the Manila Police Department. But the
issue before us is not whether or not his training and experience justify that expectation, but whether or not, under and in accordance with
the pertinent law, he is qualified for appointment to such office to the extent that he is entitled to the relief sought, namely, the issuance of a
writ of mandamus compelling the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants from
which the mayor of the City of Manila might choose the appointee who will fill the vacant position of Chief of Police of the City of Manila.

Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) — which controls the issue before us, reads as follows:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate
who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

The above legal provision may be construed as providing for two different kinds of academic qualification, namely, (1) a bachelor's degree
from a recognized institution of learning, and (2) a high school degree, each of which is coupled with separate and distinct service
qualifications. Any one of the latter, joined with either of the aforesaid academic requirements, would qualify a person for appointment as
Chief of a city police agency. In other words, an applicant who is a holder of a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation would make the grade, in the same manner
as would another applicant with a similar bachelor's degree who has served as chief of police with exemplary record, etc.

In the case of an applicant who is a mere high school graduate, the service qualification is not only different but is higher and more exacting
— for obvious reasons.
Petitioner, however, would construe and read the law as follows:

NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE

(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR

(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR

(3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; OR

(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.

While, in my view, petitioner's interpretation is not unreasonable, it falls short of showing that it is the true and correct meaning and intent of
the law aforesaid. This, in my opinion, must lead to the conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus for the
purpose stated in his petition because to be entitled thereto he must show that, in relation to the matter at issue, he has a clear enforceable
right, on the one hand, and that the respondent has an imperative legal duty to perform, on the other. Because of this I am constrained to
concur in the result.