THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

1. Definition

2. Purpose

3. Scope and Subjects

4. Requisites of Valid Classification

CASES:
Victoriano v. Elizalde, G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 (Read also: separate opinion of CJ
Corona & dissenting opinions of J. Sereno and J. Carpio)
Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005
Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009 (decision, per J. Nachura); February 22, 2010
(resolution of the MR, per C.J. Puno)
Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

5. Substantial Distinctions
CASES:
Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 (Read also the dissent of J. Teehankee)
Ceniza v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-52304, January 28, 1980
Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617, January 30, 1982
PASEI v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988
Tatad v. Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997
Facts:
The Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180 which allows any person or entity to import or purchase
any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,
subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy, is one of the laws created to accommodate innovations
and developments in the oil industry. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law contending, among others,
that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products (3%
is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products) violates the equal protection
clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries (Shell,
Petron, and Caltex) and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not
have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.
Issue:
WON R.A. 8180 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes, R.A. 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the “new players” insofar
as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil companies by requiring them to
meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
Some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution on the regulation
or prohibition of monopolies and unfair competition. Essentially, the said law only strengthens oligopoly, contrary
to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil
market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast
of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit.
Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market
power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those
who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product
cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is
to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new
players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle
dream.
 International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. PRBRES, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
PHILRECA v. Secretary of the DILG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003

6. Germane to the Purpose of the Law

CASES:
People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
Dumlao v. Comelec, supra, especially the dissent of J. Teehankee
PASEI v. Drilon, supra
Ichong v. Hernandez, supra
Quinto v. Comelec (resolution of the MR), supra
Abakada Guro v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

7. Duration: Not Limited to Existing Conditions Only

CASES:
People v. Cayat, supra
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968

8. Equal Application to All Members of the Same Class

CASES:
Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-15972, October 11, 1920
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978 (Example of equal application to all
members of the same class that instead leads to inequality)

9. Levels of Scrutiny in Equal Protection Analysis

CASE: Biraogo v. Truth Commission, supra, particularly the concurring and dissenting opinion of J.
Nachura, quoting British American Tobacco v. Camacho