1. Brownell v.

Sun Life Assurance of Canada, 95 Phil 228 (1954)

FACTS:

Subject of this petition is the endowment policy which insured AIhara and Gayapan and
upon its maturity the proceeds were payable to said insured. Brownell instituted this
case to compel Sun Life to comply the demand to pay representing the half of the
proceeds of endowment policy and payable to one Naogiro Aihara, a Japanese national.
Such claim is based on Section 5 (b) (2) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United
States. Which claim was approved and granted by the lower court ordering SLACOC to
pay herein petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such Act is still binding despite the complete independence of the
Philippines from American government.

HELD:

Yes. The extension of the Philippine Property Axr of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts
of the President of the Philippines and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

The operation of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 in the Philippines is not derived
from the unilateral act of the United States Congress, which made it expressly
applicable, or from the saving provision contained in the proclamation of independence.
It is well-settled in the United States that its laws have no extraterritorial effect. The
application of said law in the Philippines is based concurrently on said act (Philippine
Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the Philippine
Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.

2. Guerrerro’s Transport Services v. Blayblock Transp. Services 71 SCRA 621

(1976)

FACTS:

In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year
contract for the right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the
naval base. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerrero’s
Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent
concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport Services
Blayblock. Blayblock’s 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the
Union).

When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the
Union. Thus, the Union filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to
employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case
was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerrero’s MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there
being no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of
Labor remanded the case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering
Guererro to “absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or before the
deadline” set by Guerrero, except those who may have derogatory records w/ the US
Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.

Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor
affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the
individual complainants who failed to submit themselves for processing & examination.
The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The Union filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasn’t appealed so it was declared
final & executory

Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to

submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall be
reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The agreement is deemed to
have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the absorption
of 175 members of the Union subject to 2 conditions.

ISSUE

Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by
Guerrero.

RULING

YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forces
undertook, consistent w/ military requirements, "to provide security for employment,
and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed Forces
shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected
employees for employment.

A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement between states, and as municipal

law for the people of each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid
provision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract between Guerrero and
the US Naval Base authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero)
is, therefore, bound to give "priority" to the employment of the qualified employees of
the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such obligation that
Guerrero entered into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.

Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the
determination as to who of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by
Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor
issued an Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to
implement the absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero's Transport Services,
subject to the following conditions:
a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its
concession expired; and
b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of the
U.S. Naval Base concerned.

For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate
authorities of the U.S. naval Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and
approval, the names of the members of the Union.

Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract
and has the force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the
parties and their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the
effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable by execution upon approval by the
court.

3. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA, 297 SCRA 469 (1998)

FACTS: Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In
1990, while she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab
co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for
help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in Indonesia. Later,
Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila,
Saudia Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but
to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and
eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated
Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her
conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the
Prince absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on
dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under Article 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law of
Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines’ contention is correct.
HELD: No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the
latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs
effectively asked the court to make a determination of Saudia Airlines’s rights hence a
submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the
complaint of Morada, she is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our
Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC
because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an action in
personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides.
Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi
Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil
Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign
element involved, is the so called “locus actus” or where an act has been done. In the
case at bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was summoned by her
superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not
informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into
appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of
defrauding, which is tortuous, was committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation,
misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place).

4. Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990)

Facts:

Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which
is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as
reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.

Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public
dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case
because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents
have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over
the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2)
A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex
situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of
the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real
properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority
to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely
explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the
properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public
domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.

5. King Mau Wu v. Sycip, L-5887, April 23, 1954

FACTS: This is an action to collect P59,082.92, together with lawful interests from 14
October 1947, the date of the written demand for payment, and costs. The claim arises
out of a shipment of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion sold by the plaintiff, as agent of
the defendant, to Jas. Maxwell Fassett, who in turn assigned it to Fortrade Corporation.
Under an agency agreement set forth in a letter dated 7 November 1946 in New York
addressed to the defendant and accepted by the latter on the 22nd day of the same
month, the plaintiff was made the exclusive agent of the defendant in the sale of coconut
oil and its derivatives outside the Philippines and was to be paid 2 1/2 per cent on the
total actual sale price of sales obtained through his efforts in addition thereto 50 per
cent of the difference between the authorized sale price and the actual sale price.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction.

RULING: Yes. CFI has jurisdiction. A non-resident may sue a resident in the courts of
this country1where the defendant may be summoned and his property leviable upon
execution in the case of a favorable, final and executory judgment. It is a personal action
for the collection of a sum of money which the Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction
to try and decide. There is no conflict of laws involved in the case, because it is only a
question of enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract; and unless the
enforcement of the contract be against public policy of the forum, it must be enforced.

6. Hongkong v. Sheman, 176 SCRA 331 (1989)

FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted by
HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore
dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on
amounts due under said overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to it
through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and a certain
Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and
Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to
pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner
BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:

This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. …

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and
inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint for
collection of a sum of money against private respondents Sherman and Reloj before RTC
of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The trial court denied the motion. They then filed before the respondent IAC a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining
order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City from taking further
cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper court of
Singapore which is the proper forum. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee
stipulation regarding jurisdiction?

HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does
not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether
the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove,
that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or
expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action
here just to harass private respondents.

**

In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation was
“[i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.” We held:

Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a
stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the only venue
agreed upon by the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only
the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the
clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International
Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over
persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State
does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic
representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching
through State territory with the permission of the latter’s authorities. This authority,
which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout
the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees
fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought
before them

NOTES:
The respondent IAC likewise ruled that:
… In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not
authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still
refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non conveniens. …
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle
of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the IAC should not have relied
on such principle.

7. International School Alliance v. Quisombing, 333 SCRA 13 (2000)

FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is

a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign
diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School
to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-
hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate
labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This
issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the
matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local-

hires.

RULING: NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that
labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.

Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard
to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full
protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and
capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less

than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate
to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history;
and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to
be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective
bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure.
Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as
the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the
exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit
with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED
IN PART.

8. Gregorio v. Rodas, 81 Phil 506 (1948) (murag galahi ug bangag ang case!
Hahaha! Nagrefer pud ko sa full text)

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of this Court dismissing
the special civil action of certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioners against the
respondents, which asked that order of the respondent judge denying the petitioner's
motion to compel the other respondents to answer certain interrogatories submitted by
the former to the latter be set aside, and that the respondent be ordered to issue an
order compelling the respondent corporation to answer said interrogatories.

ISSUE: whether or not there is a rule of law which controls or guides the respondent
judge in deciding whether an interrogatory should be allowed or not

HELD: Since the scope of depositions and written interrogatories is limited to matters
which are not privileged and relevant to the subject matter involved in a pending action,
and the determination of whether or not an interrogatory is privileged or material is not
left to the discretion of the court or judge, for there is a law applicable which serves as
norm or guide for the court or judge to follow, the respondent judge could not commit a
grave abuse of discretion which it did not have in deciding whether or not the
interrogatories in question are immaterial to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, and therefore they cannot be allowed. If the respondent judge has acted contrary
to law in deciding that the written interrogatories propounded by the petitioners to the
other respondents are immaterial, he would have committed an error of law which this
court can not correct in the present case; but not a grave abuse of discretion.

9. Salvacion v. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997)

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of
rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him
several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however,
able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded
Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar
as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE
to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to
comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the
dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;
and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of
law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice
and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not
the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering
that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment
or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever,
is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of
the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.”
___________

NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein,
Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was
able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6,
and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued
Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The
policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control
No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-
8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-
122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed
Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

10. Sison v. board of Accountancy, 85 Phil 276 (1949)

Facts:

The Board of Accountancy issued a CPA certificate to a British national named Robert
Orr Ferguson to practice his profession in the Philippines without examination. The
issuance of the said certificate was questioned by herein petitioner on the ground that
there is no reciprocity between the Philippines and the United Kingdom as regards the
practice of accountancy.

To resolve this matter, the Board of Accountancy suspended the validity of the CPA
certificates until it can be proven that (a) Filipinos are allowed to take the professional
accountant examination given by the British government, if any, and (b) Filipino
certified public accountants can, upon application, be registered as chartered
accountants or granted similar degrees by the British Government." This resolution is
based on the findings that there is no law which regulates the practice of accountancy in
England. However, the Philippine Accountancy Law explicitly provides that the
suspension or revocation of the certificate issued under the said Act may be done by the
board for unprofessional conduct of the holder or other sufficient cause. The Secretary
of Justice further said that he believes that "the change in administrative interpretation
with respect to the existence of reciprocity between the Philippines and Great Britain as
to the practice of accountancy," does not constitute sufficient cause for the suspension
or revocation of the certificates in question within the meaning of said provision.

Issue:

W/N the issuance of the CPA certificates was valid in the absence of reciprocity between
the Philippines and the British Government?

Ruling:

Yes it is valid as it comes within the realm of comity as contemplated in our law. Comity
is defined as the recognition which one nation allows within its territory the acts of
foreign governments and tribunals, having due regard both to the international duty and
convenience and the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.

The British minister in a note sent to the President of the Philippines wrote that that
qualified Philippine citizen are allowed to practice the profession of accountancy
including income tax accounting, in the United Kingdom since there is no governmental
control of the accounting profession in the said country and any resident of the United
Kingdom, of whatever nationality, may engage in the profession of accounting without
formality.

Therefore, the SC finds no reason why Robert Orr Ferguson who had previously been
registered as certified public accountants and issued the corresponding certificate public
accountant in the Philippine Islands, should be suspended from the practice of his
profession in these Islands.

11. Cadalin v. POEA, 238 SCRA 721 (1994)

FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for
Certiorari.

On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of
728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an “Amended Complaint” with the POEA
for money claims arising from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC
(BRI) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on
behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all
the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax
not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the
suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII

On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to Strike Out of the
Records” filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the
complaint pointed out.

AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer. The POEA
kept on granting such motions.

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of
time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to file their answers.

On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and
BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.

On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the same
hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit
their respective position papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted
position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA
Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor
of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial
Appeal” from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition
to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.

NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The resolution
removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the
MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.

The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the
complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain,
issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for
the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the
claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:

“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage
entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours
worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked
during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the evening until
seven o’clock in the morning .”

Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.”

Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official
holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.”

Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous service with his
employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days for
each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous years of
service.”

A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the
proportion of his service in that year.”

Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be
terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party prior notice before such
termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in
respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice
shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to
the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.”

Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of
employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated on the
basis of fifteen days’ wages for each year of the first three years of service and of one
month’s wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to
payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his
service completed within a year.”

ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the
complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned benefits
provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).

2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable WON
complainants’ claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)

RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing
the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the
Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than
those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the
belief that where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the
workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract. It approved the observation of the POEA Administrator that in labor
proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and
its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII

themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated
therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which provides that the
compensation of the employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total
computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation”
therein agree,’ another part of the same provision categorically states “that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and
custom.”

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against

AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.”

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a

prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the
employees merely “take it or leave it.” The presumption is that there was an imposition
by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of
necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a contract may
select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as
a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity
to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of
performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the
parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions
of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the
foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms
deemed written in the contract.

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law.
The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their transaction.
There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in that country.

2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the
complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the lapse of
one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract”.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local court),
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites
for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may
be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given
such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]),
where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the
State of New York for claims arising from said Code, the claims would have prescribed
under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was
not “specifically intended to be substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period provided in
the law of the forum should apply. The Court observed: “. . . we are dealing with a
statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute
that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign
country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We think that
as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test is the most
satisfactory one.

The Court further noted: “Applying that test here it appears to us that the libellant is
entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian
period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular rights
which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad
objectives.” The American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead
of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian
law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum (local Court)
on prescription of actions.

However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there
are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the
laws of the place where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the
local statute was not run against it.

Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by the laws of the
state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in
the Philippine Islands.”

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the
light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore
insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on
the protection to labor.

In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized
that:“The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development” (Sec.
10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.”

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the claims is
3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a
judgment”
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts
between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the
New Civil Code should govern.

12. Oh Hek How v. Republic, 29 SCRA 94

Facts:

Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a
motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530
and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued
the corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On
that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of
February9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was
taken prior to judgment having been final and executory.

Issue: Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the

Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China.

Held:

It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization
of an alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and
cannot be controlled by any foreign law.

However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is
necessarily governed - pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code - by the laws of
China, not by those of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be
naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of
Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the
renunciation of nationality. Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No.473 provides, however,
that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear,"
inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or
citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former
nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have
two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do
not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of
citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly
democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his
Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens
and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign
country from which citizenship is acquired.

The order appealed from is reversed, and the oath of allegiance taken, on November 28,
1966, by petitioner Oh Hek How, as well as the certificate of naturalization issued in
pursuance thereto, are hereby declared null and void.

13. Nazareno v. CA, 343 SCRA 637 (2000) (nasalaag pud ni oh!)

FACTS: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died
on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five
children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and
Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo,
and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. After the death of Maximino, Sr.,
Romeo filed an intestate case and was appointed administrator of his father’s estate. In
the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed
several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister,
Natividad. It was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals that
Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE: Whether the restoration of the titles to the lots in question to the estate of
Maximino Sr. was proper.

RULING: Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by
fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Facts and
circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 29 January 1970 void and of no effect.

14. Limjoco v. Estate of Fragante, 80 Phil 776 (1948)

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a
certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.
His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate
of the deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims
that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of
the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended,
particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the
commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public
convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or
to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and
organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per
centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of
the Philippines or of the United States.

HELD: Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of
the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for
which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death.
His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received
from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist
here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is
the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said
case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the
meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

15. Manila Gas Corp. v Collector, 62 Phil 895

FACTS:

This is an action brought by the Manila Gas Corporation against the Collector of
Internal Revenue for the recovery of P56,757.37, which the plaintiff was required by the
defendant to deduct and withhold from the various sums paid it to foreign corporations
as dividends and interest on bonds and other indebtedness and which the plaintiff paid
under protest.

ISSUES:

Won the Collector of Internal Revenue was justified in withholding income taxes on
interest on bonds and other indebtedness paid to nonresident corporations

RULING:
YES. The approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within its jurisdiction
without violating the due process clause of the constitution. The taxing power of a state
does not extend beyond its territorial limits, but within such it may tax persons,
property, income, or business. If an interest in property is taxed, the situs of either the
property or interest must be found within the state. If an income is taxed, the recipient
thereof must have a domicile within the state or the property or business out of which
the income issues must be situated within the state so that the income may be said to
have a situs therein. Personal property may be separated from its owner, and he may be
taxed on its account at the place where the property is although it is not the place of his
own domicile and even though he is not a citizen or resident of the state which imposes
the tax. But debts owing by corporations are obligations of the debtors, and only possess
value in the hands of the creditors. The Manila Gas Corporation operates its business
entirely within the Philippines. Its earnings, therefore come from local sources. The
place of material delivery of the interest to the foreign corporations paid out of the
revenue of the domestic corporation is of no particular moment. The place of payment
even if conceded to be outside of the country cannot alter the fact that the income was
derived from the Philippines. The word "source" conveys only one idea, that of origin,
and the origin of the income was the Philippines.

16. Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358 (1967)

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3
legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his
distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal
shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was
admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
“Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock
amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children
in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of
their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof
at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing
that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would
still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for
the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would
arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on
legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

17. Gibbs v. Government, 59 Phil 293 (1993)

FACTS:
Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens of California and
domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was no antenuptial
marriage contract between the parties and during the existence their marriage
the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property. On
November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died and that in accordance with the law of California,
the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the
wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving
husband without administration. In intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on
September 22, 1930, filed an ex parte petition. The court granted said petition and
entered a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute
owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. When this
decree presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila and demanded for the
issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it declined to accept as binding said decree of
court and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison
D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Thereupon, Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said
register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring
previous payment of any inheritance tax.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the owner of a
descendible interest in the Philippine lands.

RULING:
The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides: Nevertheless, legal and
testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount
of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary

succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of
the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of
succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second
paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the 1deceased was vested with
a descendible interest inproperty within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
Islands.

In the case of Clarke vs . Clarke, the court said: It is principle firmly established that to
the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern
its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article
10
of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the
owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.”

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs
at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be
determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae . It is admitted that the Philippine lands
here in question were acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of
the appellee and his wife.

Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her
husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine
Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine
lands covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the
date of their acquisition to the date of her death. The descendible interest of Eva
Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of
inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It
is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent
of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be
regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect
at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

18. Government v. Frank, 13 Phil 236 (1909)

FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a
period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a
stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in
advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and
one-half salary during said period of travel.

Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of
Frank, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the
Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the
one-half salary paid during such period.

Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the
date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further
compliance with the terms of the contract.

The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the sum of
money, which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred
in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in
travel.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No.
224 should constitute a part of said contract.

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special
defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224
and had thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not
responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the
sum of 265. 90 dollars

ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into between
Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by
Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract
made between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from
altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had
acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by
the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the
contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the
Defendant.

2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore
the contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the
contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that
State and had full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of the fact that,
under that laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23
years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine
Islands governed.

It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place
of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity to make the
same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined b the law of the place where the
contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the
bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the
law of the place where the suit is brought.

19. Grey v. Insular Lumber Co., 67 Phil 139 (1939)

Philippine corporation laws were basically patterned after

American corporation and enterprise laws. Consequently, it is no wonder that
when unique situations confront Philippine courts, resort to American laws and
jurisprudence is made to resolve them.

FACTS:
Insular Lumber Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of New York, licensed to engage in business in the Philippines, with offices in the
City of Manila, in Fabrica, Occidental Negros, in New York and in Philadelphia. M. E
Gray is the owner and possessor of 6, shares of the capital stock of the defendant
corporation. The dispute arises when he asked the offices of insular lumber in Manila
and in Fabrica to permit him to examine the books and records of the business of said
defendant, but he was not allowed to do so. According to Insular Lumber, applying the
law of New York, the rights of a stockholder to examine the books and records of a
corporation organized under the laws of that State, have been, during the entire period
material to this action, only those provided in section 77 of the Stock Corporation Law
which substantially provides that only stockholder owning at least three percent of the
capital stock has the right to examine the books and records of the corporation. M.E
Gray, not being a stockholder owning at least three percent of the capital stock has not
right to examine. M.E Gray, contends that under our Corporation code, under which
insular lumber ompany was registered to do business in the Philippines, he is entitled,
as stockholder, to inspect the record of the transactions of the defendant corporation
(sec. 51, Act No. 1459), and this right, which is recognized in the common law, has not
been altered by section 77 of the Stock Corporation Law of New.
Lower Court’s Decision:
The petition for mandamus compelling the company to allow him examine the books
and records was denied.

ISSUE :1. Whether the M.E Gray is entitled, as stockholder of the Insular Lumber
Company, to inspect and examine the books and records of the transactions of said
company.

HELD:
No. The decision of the CFI was affirmed denying the mandamus against the company
and absolving it from the complaint.1. The stipulation of facts is binding upon both
parties and cannot be altered by either of them>On the strength of that principle M.E
Gray is bound to adhere to the agreement made by him with the Insular Lumber Co. in
paragraph four of the stipulation of facts, to the effect that the rights of a stockholder,
under the law of New York, to examine the books and records of a corporation organized
under the laws of said State, and during the entire period material to this action, are
only those provided in section 77 of the Stock Corporation Law of New York. Under this
law, plaintiff has the right to be furnished by the treasurer or other fiscal officer of the
corporation with a statement of its affairs embracing a particular account of all its assets
and liabilities. The right under the common law cannot be granted by insular lumber in
the present case, since the same can only be granted at the discretion of the court, under
certain conditions. To wit:

(a) That the stockholder of a corporation in New York has the right to inspect its
books and records if it can be shown that he seeks information for an honest
purpose (14 C. J., 853), or to protect his interest as stockholder. (In re Steinway,
159 N. Y., 250; 53 N. E., 1103; 45 L. R. A., 461 [aff. 31 App. Div., 70; 52 N. Y. S.,
343]).

(b) That said right to examine and inspect the books of the corporation must be
exercised in good faith, for a specific and honest purpose, and not to gratify
curiosity, or for speculative or vexatious purposes. (14 C. J., 854, 855.)

The appellant has made no effort to prove or even allege that the information he desired
to obtain through the examination and inspection of defendant's books was necessary to
protect his interests as stockholder of the corporation, or that it was for a specific and
honest purpose, and not to gratify curiosity, nor for speculative or vexatious purposes.

In view of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the lower court, with costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

20. Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento, 90 Phil 434 (1951)

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the city of
Manila and an importer of flour who sells it either to bakeries or to retail dealers for the
purposes of resale. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Manila
assessed against him the sum of P566.50 which, it is claimed, represents the alleged
deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales made to retail dealers
for the purposes of resale. Petitioner, instead of honoring the demand, filed the present
action for declaratory relief. In his answer, respondent admitted all the factual
allegations of the complaint, but contended that the sales in question are sales at retail
and in this sense are subject to the provisions of Ordinance No. 2723, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether the sales of flour made by petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured

into bread are retail or wholesale. ( If retail, they are subject to tax; if wholesale, they are
not)

RULING: The Ordinance under which the municipal license tax in question has been
assessed does not contain any definition of what is retail gross sale. Said ordinance
merely provides that the retail gross sales of a grocery store shall be subject to a license
fee to be fixed by the City Treasurer in accordance with certain schedule therein
specified, but is silent as to what are considered "retail gross sales". The National
Internal Revenue Code does not also furnish any lead as regards the nature of a sale for
purposes of taxation. It does not give any definition nor pattern as to how a sale to a
bakery or a manufacturer should be considered. This is a loophole that our Congress has
not foreseen.

We have taken notice of the fact that in many states of the American Union, sales of
tangible property to manufacturers, producers or processors, or "sales of goods which as
ingredients or constituents go into and form part of tangible personal property sold by
the buyer are not taxable" as retail transactions because they are considered wholesale
transactions upon the theory that they have to be resold even in a different form or
condition. But we have noted that if these transactions are so treated it is not by judicial
interpretation but by express statutory provisions. As well stated by counsel for the
appellee, these transactions are considered wholesale either because they are so
declared by retail sales statutes of different American States, by administrative rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, or by judicial decisions construing and applying
them. If there is an express provision of the law on the matter, there is no room for
judicial interpretation. Our duty is to apply the law. But, as we have already pointed out,
such is not the situation obtaining in the Philippines. Our law on the point is silent, and
being silent we do not feel justified to extend the force and effect of American statutes to
our jurisdiction. To do so would be to incorporate into our statutes some legislative
matter by judicial ruling which is certainly beyond our province to do.

The decision appealed from should be reversed, with costs against the appellee.

21. Bank of America v. American, 321 SCRA 659 (1999)

Facts:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a
property located in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third
party mortgagor who pledged its own property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign
corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to
enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially
foreclose the said mortgage, which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an
action for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-
judicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign
courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue:
WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the
recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure.

Held: Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against
the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By
such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two
remedies is complete in itself.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver
of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for
collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As
to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor
upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff
of the province where the sale is to be made.
In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the
debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise.
Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule
against splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of
filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to
foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party
mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions
and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect
transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence
and our statute books.

2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is
the governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose
its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our
jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local
or domestic or internal
law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

22. Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople, 190 SCRA 90 (1990)

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation

(PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in
Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and
the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on
9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of
the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to
terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in
advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the
EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and
only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter
arising out of or under this agreement.

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing
training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the
Middle East and Europe.

roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA
through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent
separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated effective September 1,
1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE).
PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there
claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the
habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA
personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs
officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed
that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions
of the employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had
attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of
continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to
3 years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the
dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was
illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which court
has jurisdiction?

HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection
with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest
and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered
illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at
least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while
petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing
business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based
in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All
the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a
proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given
effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them
by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to
plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the
applicable provisions of Philippine law.
[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]
Petition denied.

23. Hongkong v. Sheman, 176 SCRA 331 (1989) SAME AS CASE #6

24. Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470

FACTS: Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin.
Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led
an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory.
Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive
or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the SC.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to
appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this
Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in
essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue
against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the
question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes
which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and
those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context
and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

25. Wildvalley Shipping v. CA, 342 SCRA 213 (2000)

FACT: In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must
be piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master
of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained
the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the
Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while
being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such
vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k
worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC
sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred
under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two laws
provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of
the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to check on certain
vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said
Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court.
Only mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign
public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy;
and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and
with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of
the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign
law is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor
Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had
shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and
was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.

26. Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23

FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana
purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines,
Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All
three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken
all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22
names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner
Cesar Zalamea. The two others were not able to fly. Those holding full-fare tickets were
given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the
full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and
daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in
another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines. Upon their arrival in
the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of
air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners . CA
held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record
that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld
Airlines. Thus petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE;
WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and Examplary
damages.
RULING:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of said code was
presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which
require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is
issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in
the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling
the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals, where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last
minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on
a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has
every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not,
then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline
had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of
their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages.

For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to
self-interest or enrichment.

Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand
that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there
was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on
overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these
policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the
choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of
giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of
substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of
the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is
evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA,
thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed
seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when
it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA
placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage.
Such conscious disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral
damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the
future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight
to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused
TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York
to Los Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED

27. Phil Commercial v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 (1974)

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In
May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said
estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon
Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an
ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when
they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same
was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno
appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said
will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of
Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed
as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to
Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno
also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national
law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of
legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because
Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death (applying
the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Texas law should apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that what the Texas law contains at the time of Jane Hodges’
death is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the
probate court. At the time of her death, Texas law governs, thus, it would be the law to
be applied (and not said law at any other time).

28. Pardo vs Republic, 85 Phil 326 ( 1950)

Vicente Rosal Pardo, a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895 and residing in the
Philippines since 1905, where he married a Filipino woman and where he is at present
employed, in Manila, with an annual salary of P4,800, has been adjudged by the Court
of First Instance of Manila entitled to become a Filipino citizen. That the appellee is
unable to speak and write any of the principal Filipino languages is the first ground of
appeal by the Government.

The applicant testified that he knows enough Tagalog to be understood in that language.
Lino Gutierrez, a respectable citizen who has intimately known the applicant for 27
years, having had business relations with him, conformed the applicant's testimony.
And the trial judge, who has heard the applicant translate into Tagalog, "He venido
residiendo en Filipinas por el periodo de 36 años," appears to have been satisfied with
the correctness of translation (which was not transcribed). The fact that the applicant
arrived in the Philippines when he was only ten years old and has lived here 44 years
continuously except for a few months visit in Spain, mingling and dealing by reason of
his work with people who use Tagalog in their daily intercourse, lends credence in his
testimony that he has acquired a good working knowledge of that language. At one time,
according to the evidence he owned or managed two stores successively on the Escolta,
and lately he has been a foreman and warehouseman at Soriano & Co.

The portion of the applicant's brief should not be taken isolatedly and at face value. This
testimony is obviously extravagant understatement of the reality, typifying an extreme
modesty which is thought by some to be a virtue. We do not believe that this statement
represent appellant's sincere conviction of its literal meaning.

The other assignment of error goes to the sufficiency of the evidence on whether the
laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens of that country.
The applicant introduced a certificate signed by the Consul General of Spain in the
Philippines, stating that in accordance with articles 17 and 225 of the Spanish Civil
Code, among other Spanish legislation, Filipinos are eligible to Spanish citizenship in
Spain. Article 17 provides that foreigners who have obtained a certificate of
naturalization and those who have not obtained such certificate but have acquired
domicile in any town of the Monarchy are Spaniards. No discrimination being made in
these provisions, they apply to persons of any nationality.

As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force of the
Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as matters known to judges of
the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and nay be judicially recognized by
them without the introduction of proof. (Section 5, Rule 123.) Moreover, in a number of
decisions mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila has been held to be competent proof of that law.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed without costs.

29. Norse Management v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982)

Facts:

Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo,

was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke
in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY
(PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for
compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent
alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on
the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore
should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take
judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on
Board’s Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the
petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the
Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

Held:

The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in
a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or
death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is
registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between
 petitioner and respondent’s husband states that In the event of illness or injury to
Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own
willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention. If
such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's
services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the
EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his
willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance
with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic
of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is
greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its
implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.

30. Santos v. Northwest, 210 SCRA 256 (1992)

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest

Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A.
and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The
petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In
December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to
Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA
for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance

with the constitution so as to deprive the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over
the case

HELD:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the
Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred
in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine
instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950,
and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention
became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955,
President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal
adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be
observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens
thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine

government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons
performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation"
shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in
the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two
High Contracting Parties . . .

Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the

parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage
provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals
"within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the
Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the
airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the
United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the
four places where an action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual
concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular
court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the
question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken
up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was
Manila?

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined
by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the
passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate
destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the
contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the
petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely
an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping
place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for
purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and
ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates
the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has
one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the
carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so

ordered.

31. Aznar v. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95 (1963)

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner
Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN
Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen,
as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared
by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact
that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term “national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under
the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form
and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen
was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,
and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of
the decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict
of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with
the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to
the contrary in the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California
Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e.,
Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law
of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the
country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the
domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary

provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The “national law”
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean
or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of
the State of California.
32. Manufacturer’s v. Guerrero, GR NO. 136804, February 19, 2003

FACTS
The petition alleged the following:-

On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero fled before the Regional Trial Court
of Mania against Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank -

Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxed charged
against interests on his checking account with the Bank, (2) a returned check worth
$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of
his account.-

The bank filed its Answer alleging that Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law which
does not permit any Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
-

Seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, supported by an affidavit of New York attorney Alyssa Walden.-

The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.-

The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the RTC Orders

ISSUE
Whether the Walden affidavit does serve as proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence

HELD
The Walden affidavit stated conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of the
facts
of the case vis-à-vis, the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any laws in
particular. While the attached copies of some US court decisions do not comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts. Thus,
the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence.

Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit and Court of Appeal’s decision is affirmed.

33. Phil Trust v. Bohanam, 106 Phil 997 (1960)

QUICK FACTS: Decedent Bohanan was a US citizen. Nevada law allows a testator to
dispose of all his property according to his will. His ex-wife and children oppose the
project of partition filed by the executor-petitioner, saying they were deprived of their
legitimes. According to them, Philippine law must prevail, requiring decedent to reserve
the legitime for surviving spouse and children.

FACTS: Testator Bohanan was born in Nebraska and was a US citizen. He has some
properties in California. Despite his long residence in the Philippines, his stay was found
by the CFI to be merely temporary, and he remained to be a US citizen. The CFI
declared his will as fully in accordance with the laws of Nevada and admitted it to
probate. The Philippine Trust Co. was named executor of the will. A project of partition
was ²led by Phil Trust which distributed the residuary estate into 3: 1) ½ to his
grandson, 2) ½ to his brother and sister, to be distributed equally, 3) legacies of P6,000
each to his son and daughter, and4) legacies to other people. Respondent Magdalena
Bohanan, his ex-wife, questions the validity of the partition, claiming that she and her
children were deprived of their legitimes. (It must be noted that Magdalena and
decedent C.O. Bohanan were married in 1909 but he divorced her in 1922. She re-
married in 1925and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of decedent.)

Held:

The first issue refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan,
should be entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the
testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno
divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that
said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction. The court refused to
recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the
deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring
him to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or divorced) wife. No right to share
in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada, thus the
oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate left by the testator.

With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal
property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, thus the two-third rule is not enforceable. Wherefore, the court finds that the
testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of
the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament is fully in accordance with
the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. As in accordance with
Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada which allows
a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the
order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

34. Aznar v. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95 (1963) SAME AS CASE #31

 35. Frivaldo v. Comelec, 275 SCRA 727, (1996)

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed
office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for
the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that
he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos
during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be,
among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation.

He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated
that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop
his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

36. Valles vs. Comelec, 337 SCRA 543 ( 2000)

o
Principle of jus sanguinis
o How Philippine citizenship is acquired
o Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in
the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder,
a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and
at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine
Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws,
which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.

37. Vicente D. Ching, 316 SCRA 1 (1999)

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio
City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that
he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father
was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married
before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one
parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified
public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a
councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a
Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of
majority” is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21
years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar
in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-
General recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court
cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had
lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted
that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be
extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not
enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a
public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further,
Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship
(but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to
take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not
a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.

38. Bengson v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545 (2001)

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S.
Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost
Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed
Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson
who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-
born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

39. Co. vs. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

Facts:
 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino
citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
 Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
 The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds:
 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989.
This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
 WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
 The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in
the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of
Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
 As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration.
 The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood
in the province of Samar.
 As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As
the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two
fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
 The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
 Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
 The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-
up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and
in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
 On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring
the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
 Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly,
a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private
respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the
customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
 After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for
better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
 Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent
looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
 The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
  SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.

 The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question
was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born
 Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they
elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
 To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old.
 He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
 In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
 In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship
 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
 Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because
of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
 SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father
of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
40. Board of Immigration v. go, 25 SCRA 890 (1968)

FACTS:
On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of
Immigration that, on the basis of the findings made by the National Bureau of
Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M.
Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them authorizing the documentation of
Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. The Commissioner of Immigration
issued a warrant of exclusion commanding the deportation officer" to carry out the
exclusion of the above-named applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on the first available
transportation and on the same class of accommodation in which they arrived to the
port whence they came or to the country of which they are nationals."The warrant of
exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served immediately upon the parties
ordered deported, who, on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila an action for injunction to restrain the Board of Immigration Commissioners
and the Commissioner of Immigration from executing the order. They based their action
on the following grounds:

(1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude them from the Philippines because they
were not
Aliens but Filipino citizens, and
(2) that the order of exclusion was issued by the Board without due process and in
violation of the Constitution. Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the respondents in the case from deporting the
petitioners. After trial, the Court rendered judgment finding that, according to
petitioners' undisputed vidence, "the petitioners herein are the illegitimate children of
Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her common-law husband - a Chinese citizen,"
and concluding that "until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered
as citizens of the Philippines as they were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
who, however, was not married to their mother."Notwithstanding the above finding and
conclusion, however, the Court dismissed the case holding that the petitioners are
citizens of the Republic of China and not being properly documented for entry into the
Philippines as found by the Immigration Commissioner. The grounds upon which the
Court based its decision were:

(1) because petitioners stayed in China for a period of fifteen years before returning to
the Philippines, they must be considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic;

(2) as petitioners were recognized by their alien father as his children, they became
Chinese citizens under the Chinese law of nationality. While the Court also found that
the cable authorization mentioned heretofore was a forgery, it held that, for the purpose
of the petition before it, "it was immaterial to determine the genuineness or falsity of the
cable authorization. For if the petitioners are Filipino citizens, they are entitled to
remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic in whatever way they might
have entered."After the denial of herein respondents' motion for re-consideration, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals found
that herein respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese
citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen. hat Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and
Emilia Callano a Filipino, lived maritally in several municipalities of Leyte since 1934
and that out of their union the four private respondents were born, are facts found, after
appropriate proceedings, first, by the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong;
second, by the Board of Special Inquiry who investigated their case in Manila upon their
arrival thereat in 1961; third, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and lastly, by the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents are Filipino citizens?

HELD:
Before it can be said that the questioned signature is a forgery there must be competent
proof that the specimens are the genuine signature of the Secretary. Even if the
competent proofs were presented showing that the questioned signature is a forgery, the
forgery of the signature on the cable authorization would not have nullified the
documentation of the petitioners by the consulate in Hongkong. It must be stated in this
connection that the petitioners became Philippine citizens because of their relation with
their mother who is a Filipino. Their status was conferred on them neither by the
documentation by the consulate in Hongkong nor by the finding of the Board of Special
Inquiry in Manila. Consequently, whatever defects there are in the proceedings before
the consulate and the board of inquiry cannot affect their status. Therefore, even
assuming that the petitioners were not properly documented, there is no basis for the
finding of the respondent Board that they are aliens who can be excluded.

41. Mercado v Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999)

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-
Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said

elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of

the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US
citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31,
1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854
Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV
Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance
to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as
dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws,
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no
moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he

renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he
owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and
is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with
its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu
v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

42. Labo vs. Comelec, 176 SCRA 1( 1989)

FACTS:

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal
filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an
Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he
married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make
him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that
even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such
citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for
being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his
lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty
race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him.
He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian
that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath
of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an
Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an
immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his
Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that
when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his
Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino
through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship
should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could
not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code
and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted
for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding,
that he should be declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because
Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely
repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy
dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast
in the election.

43. Angat v. Republic, 314 SCRA 438 ( 1999)

FACTS:
Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a Philippine
citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on
October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC declared him as citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition should
have been dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.

RULING:
No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's
order was null and void.
RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for
repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost the Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity.
Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since
these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied country
or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition.
Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship would not even required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is to take
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said oath
with the proper civil registry.

44. Dyumantan v. Domingo, 240 SCRA 746 (1995)

Facts

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a

contract worker.Hethen embraced and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the
Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests”
of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner
and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,”
petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children
were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the
true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”,
however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an
alien certificate of registration. Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint
subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was
validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo
Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.
Issue

Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from
temporary to permanent resident legal.

Ruling

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the
country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.Never was the
marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens
are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure
permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted,
much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by
an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws
governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her
from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay
here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be
admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for
permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens
into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they
are legally married to Filipino citizens.

45. Ong v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 (1967)

FACTS: Petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita Tan (Special
Proceeding 03521, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court). Due publication was had.
The petition was set for hearing. But, before the petition could be heard on the merits,
the court, motu proprio, in its order of November 6, 1962 expressed the opinion "that an
alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of
name" and thereupon denied the petition. A move to reconsider was rejected in the
court's order of November 24, 1962. Offshoot is the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien may petition for a change of name.

RULING: NO. Only alien domiciled in the Philippines may apply for change of name in
the courts thereof.

Change of name — under our own law — is a special proceeding to establish the status of
a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard
to, the rest of the community. The petition therefor is directed against all. It is in rem.
So it is, that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of the petition is required.1

The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and
controlled by the lex domicilii.2Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be allowed to
change his name here only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means
"permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they
disclose intent."3

An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the right to
change his name. For, what good will that be if, after all, his stay will be for a short
period of time? It would not be of much benefit to him; court proceedings for the
purpose could yet be a useless ceremony; that salutary effects flowing from a change of
his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved. And then, stock should be
taken of the fact that in a change of name, third persons and the State are concerned.
Correct, then, it is to say that change of name is not temporary in nature; the new name
may not be shunted aside at will.

46. Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the
said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position,
filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet
the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC,
changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor
refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda,
thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run
and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that
when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention
to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident
of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this
ruling.

During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But
the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the
resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already
lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election
of members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period
of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held:

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore
possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat
in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until
a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change
of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife
does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term
residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another
thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-
affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should
only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from
this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation
of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate
(our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for
the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house,
an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the
PCGG Chairman.

47. Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 17 (1994)

FACTS: On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on
31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July
1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest,

A supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the
investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in
business."
ISSUE: What is the extent of CHR's investigative power?

RULING: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally
accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered
to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a
provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or
on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in
wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They include the rights
of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract,
etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person
by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also
refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed
in a civil action.

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.

Looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining

in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended
by the Constitution.

The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with
CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt.

48. Alcantara v. Secretary of Interior, 61 Phil 460

FACTS: Petitioners are confines at the Culion Leper Colony in Culion, Palawan, having
vote in previous decisions in the Philippine Islands. That after a public meeting, they
adopted a resolution demanding a right to vote in the upcoming plebiscite and
requesting the electoral precincts be established within the radius of the colony so that
qualified voters therein could register. The resolution was sent to the Governor General
who referred the same to the Secretary of the Interior, and through its legal division
ruled that no new electorate precincts could be created because the plebiscite was
considered a special election.

Because of the ruling, petitioners requested by telegram, the Interior Department to

authorize the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors to register the qualified voters of the
colony. The request was denied on the ground that petitioners were not bona fide
residents of Culion Palawan, not having been residents of Culion for six months next
preceding the day of the plebiscite, for they have not acquired residence in Culion as
they are confined lepers against their will and having no intention to reside therein as
provided in Secs. 430-431 of the Administrative Code, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan, and as such,
qualified to register and vote therein in the upcoming plebiscite.

RULING:

In the United States the right of suffrage is derived from the states under the state
constitutions, subject to the Fifteenth Amendment to the National Constitution which
limits the right of the states to discriminate against persons by reason of their race, color
or previous condition of servitude. This being so it follows that, when a state
constitution enumerates and fixes the qualifications of those who may exercise the right
of suffrage, the legislature cannot take from nor add to said qualifications unless the
power to do so is conferred upon it by the constitution itself.

At present the nearest approach to a constitution that we have in the Philippines in our
Organic Act, the Jones Law, enacted August 29, 1916, by the Congress of the United
States. "The organic law (or Act) of a territory takes the place of a constitution as the
fundamental law of the local government."

The Philippine Legislature has prescribed the qualifications and disqualifications of

voters in sections 431 and 432 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The court is of the opinion that, under our liberal law, such of the petitioners as have
been residents of the Philippine Islands for one year and residents for six months in the
municipality in which they desire to vote and have the other qualifications prescribed
for voters in section 431 of the Revised Administrative Code and who have none of the
disqualifications prescribed in section 432 of the same Code were entitled to register
and vote in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935. Having reached this conclusion and being
unable to determine from the record whether the petitioners have the prescribed
qualifications for voters and none of the prescribed disqualifications this court on May
11, 1935, sent the above mentioned telegram to the parties in this case.

49. Romualdez v RTC, 226 SCRA 408

Facts:

Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez and a niece
of Imelda Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
However, in 1986, during the days of People Power, relatives of the deposed President
(Marcos), fearing for their personal safety, fled the country. One of them are the
Romuladezes – they left the country and sought asylum in the United States.

However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the U.S. or else
they’ll be deported. Upon receipt of the information, Romuladez went back to the
Philippines and did not delay his return to his residence in Leyte and immediately
registered himself as a voter.

In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from
the list of the voters alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a
qualification for a registered voter. However, the MTC denied the petition but when the
respondent elevated the petition to the RTC, the appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling
and disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte

despite his sudden departure to the U.S?

Ruling:

The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter because he is still
considered a resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must
have caused great fear to the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the safety of
their families, their self-exile is understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure
cannot be described as ‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment of residence’.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right; a bounden
duty of every citizen enabling them to participate in the government process to ensure
the will of the people.
50. Macalintal v. Comelec, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said
act on the ground that the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant
abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and
in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the
election.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s argument is correct.

HELD: No.

There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside
in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one
is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the
place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the
Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.