RULE 128

A
RNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005

FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial
Court.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth
to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s
support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel
vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle
the case.

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved
to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if
not recognized by the putative father. In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal
charges for falsification of documents against and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing
in Martin’s birth certificate. He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the said motion is against petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

No.

Significantly, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing
and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In the case of People vs. Yatar, DNA
samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify the
accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood
sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination,
as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as
follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice
or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision
and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, was correct.
 RULE 129

GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her
minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed
JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL
JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-28100, November 29, 1971

FACTS:

The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff,
now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to
dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment. "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is
identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio
alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very
defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639.

Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real
Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant,
involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the
widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat.

That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one,
has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from order of this Honorable Court.
There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for
prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of
the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from which such a
conclusion may be inferred.

Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the
motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on
the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to
be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against
Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have
derived their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the
new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as
prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby dismissed.
 The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent
action against the same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same
plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him
resulting in the judgment relied upon.

HELD:

Yes.

A court may take judicial cognizance of the finality of judgment rendered by the same court in a
different case.

It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly
could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter
decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an
order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus:
"Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is
a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."

There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a

remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice
better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees
were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would
not have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has ever been the guiding principle from
Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality.
 RULE 130

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUDY BUDUHAN y BULLAN and ROBERT BUDUHAN y
BULLAN, defendants-appellants.
G.R No. 178196, August 6, 2008

FACTS:
On 26 August 1998, an Information was filed against Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan,
Boy Guinhicna, Boyet Ginyang and 3 John Does before the RTC of Maddela, Quirino, for the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. Finding accused-appellants Robert
Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide with respect to the deceased Larry Erese, and of the crime of homicide with respect
to the deceased Romualde Almeron.

On 20 October 1998, the accused filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that the court did not
legally acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The accused contended they were neither caught in
flagrante delicto, nor did the police have personal knowledge of the commission of the offense at
the time when their warrantless arrests were effected.

The RTC denied the above motion on the ground that the assertion of lack of personal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officers regarding the commission of the crime is a matter
of defense, which should be properly taken up during the trial. When arraigned on 12 January
2000, the accused Rudy Buduhan, Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang, with the assistance of
their counsel de oficio, entered their pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. With respect to
accused Boy Guinhicna, counsel for the accused informed the trial court of his death and thus
moved for the dismissal of the charges against him

The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that Police Inspector Chua-Camarao
conducted were contained in Physical Science Report No. C-25-98 which yielded a negative result
for all the four accused. Nonetheless, the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is
merely a corroborative evidence, neither proving nor disproving that a person did indeed fire a
gun. The positive or negative results of the test can be influenced by certain factors, such as the
wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity,
humidity, climate conditions, and the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed
trigger guard of the firearm.
ISSUE:
Whether the negative result of the paraffin test conducted by the forensic chemist was
disregarded.
HELD:
No.
Appellants cannot rely on the negative findings of Police Inspector Chua-Camarao on the
paraffin tests conducted in order to exculpate themselves. The said witness herself promptly stated
that paraffin test results are merely corroborative of the major evidence offered by any party, and
they are not conclusive with respect to the issue of whether or not the subjects did indeed fire a
gun. As previously mentioned, the positive and negative results of the paraffin test can also be
influenced by certain factors affecting the conditions surrounding the use of the firearm, namely:
the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity,
humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger
guard of the firearm.