Notes

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
2nd Semester 2016-2017

Atty. Amando Virgil D. Ligutan
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Remedial Law
Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005
Alvero v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946
Basic Concepts
i. Meaning of procedural law
Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012
ii. Nature and purpose of procedural law
Samahan v. Hon. Magsalin, G.R. No. 172303, June 6, 2011

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)
iii. Retroactive application of procedural rules
Light Railway Transit Authority v. Salvaña, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
An administrative agency has standing to appeal the Civil Service Commission's repeal or
modification of its original decision. In such instances, it is included in the concept of a "party adversely
affected" by a decision of the Civil Service Commission granted the statutory right to appeal.
"[t]he right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law."
If it is not granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed of when a statute provides for it. When
made available by law or regulation, however, a person cannot be deprived of that right to appeal.
Otherwise, there will be a violation of the constitutional requirement of due process of law.
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions,
such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the
following language:
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the
statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of
statutes.
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without
express provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of
their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions
undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.
Remedial rights are those rights granted by remedial or procedural laws. These are rights that
only operate to further the rules of procedure or to confirm vested rights. As such, the retroactive
application of remedial rights will not adversely affect the vested rights of any person. Considering that
the right to appeal is a right remedial in nature, we find that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the
RACCS applies in this case. Petitioner, therefore, had the right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service
Commission that modified its original decision of dismissal.
Panay Railways, Inc. v. Heva Management, G.R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any
right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that
a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
The payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step for the perfection of
an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees.
Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in accordance with the law.
We have repeatedly stated that the term substantial justice is not a magic wand that would
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like
all other rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
iv. Exceptions to the retroactive application of procedural rules
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject property
within the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate courts entry of judgment. The
appellate court, however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine,
it applied the new rule retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule, however,
has well-delineated exceptions.
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied
to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural
laws. It has been held that a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes
relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The
general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at
the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute
which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are
pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain
exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would
work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would
involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.
We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive
effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the
right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule
then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of
redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the
rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed
the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may
only be 34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, it is the only property left behind by their father, a
private law practitioner who was felled by an assassins bullet.
v. Fresh-Period Rule
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of
15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While
we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time,
we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998
or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence,
the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
NOTE: The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived
from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
Yu v. Hon. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a statutory privilege and of
statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. The period to appeal is specifically governed by
Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:
SEC. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. â€• The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall
be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the
period begins to run.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to
appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,
43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.3
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted
the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and
do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day
period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day
period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period”
to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129
categorically states that “[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.” Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any
distinction.4
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There
is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal
period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again
upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that
Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly
addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did
include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of
Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this
Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court
shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to
this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from
the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the “fresh period rule” in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to
appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil
case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives undue
favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double
standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a
situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal
standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence
that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non
permissum est in lege.5
Thus, we agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the
accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is
at stakeåß. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on
November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005,the date of
receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.
San Lorenzo Builders v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015
It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals.
In Panolino v. Tajala,1 the Court was confronted with a similar issue of whether the “fresh period rule”
applies to an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary,
an appeal which is administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the “fresh period rule” only covers
judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
The “fresh period rule” in Neypes declares:
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
xxxx
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the “fresh period rule” shall apply to
Rule 40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals);
and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of
the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the
motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal “during the remainder of the
period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;” whereas if the decision is reversed,
the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the “fresh period rule” in Neypes does not apply.
As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in
relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987:
Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations
governing appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President,
pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. – Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision
rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.
The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of appeal to the
Office of the President.
Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides that in
case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office,
the said party has the only remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned
from receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration.
Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the present case, we find that the CA correctly affirmed
the OP in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time.
Fortune Life v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes did not apply to the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court.
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for
review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the
period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion
for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule
64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact,
or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing
that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of
the challenged judgment or final order.
In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on
Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.
In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than
five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule
64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner
herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes
applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.
Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.
Jocson v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941, March 9, 2016

The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court
according to the Decision of the CA.
NO. THE 2009 DARAB RULES PROVIDES THAT THE FRESH PERIOD RULE IS NOT RETROACTIVE.
ACCORDING TO THE CA DECISION, THE PURPOSE IS to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
of Court and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus,
the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day
period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
[CA]; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]; and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
EALS AND NOT TO ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS.
“Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the
DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal “during the remainder of the period of
appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;” whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse
party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal.34 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)”
“The same principle was applied in the recent case of San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group,
Inc. and Oscar Violago v. Ma. Cristina F. Bayang,35 wherein this Court reiterated that the “fresh period
rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.”
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT OR PART OF DUE PROCESS BUT IS MERELY A STATUTORY
PRIVILEGE.
“As a final note, it is worthy to emphasize that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.
The right is unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the manner thus prescribed.
In addition, the liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and
not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.36
This exceptional situation, however, does not obtain in this case.”
B. Philippine Courts
1. Judicial Power
Article VIII, Sec. 1, Secs. 1, 5 par. 5, 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
2. Nature
Phil. Carpet Manufacturing v. Tagyamon, G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013
See:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 30 It has
been repeatedly31 held by the Court that:
x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law . Our courts are basically courts of
law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal
right. x x x Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion
to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the
rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be
barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time
limited for the commencement of actions at law."
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants’
rights which should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article
114633 of the Civil Code. Respondents’ complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal
was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure, laches
may be applied only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers
are protected under the social justice provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.
***
Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were allowed only to Courts of First
Instance. By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so amended that appeals can be
taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved.
This amendment of the procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts, but is confined to
the purpose stated — that is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance
upon which the judgment was predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such has uniformly been
the interpretation of section 43 by this court.
Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and equitable relief is
dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they are known and
distinguished in England and the United States. All cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the
same manner, including their final disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as
used in section 43 (supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to
another in its entirety, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be
interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction.
3. Classification
a) Constitutional and Statutory

b) Civil and Criminal
c) Inferior and Superior
4. Hierarchy of Courts
Rayos v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011

Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is the proper
remedy to challenge the order denying the motion to dismiss, the same must be dismissed for violation
of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court.
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction. However,
such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
In the present case, there is absolutely nothing which shows that it has far-reaching implications and
involves transcendental questions deserving of this Courts treatment of the petition as one for prohibition
or mandamus.
United Claimants Assoc. v. NEA, G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012
Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to
which the instant petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with this
Court directly.
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this
general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons.
Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA,
more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke.
This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013

Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its
constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket. 16 Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of
special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as,(1) when dictated by the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3)
when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this
Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which has been
dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final
judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and
seek final clarification.
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

The ponente posits that a judicial review of the size limitations under RA 9006 is necessary, as it has a
chilling effect on political speech. According to the ponente, the present petition has triggered the Court’s
expanded jurisdiction since the Comelec’s letter and notice threaten the fundamental right to speech.
To be sure, the concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution recognizes its (1)traditional
jurisdiction to settle actual cases or controversies; and (2)expanded jurisdiction to determine whether a
government agency or instrumentality committed a grave abuse of discretion.1 The exercise of either
power could pave the way to the Court’s power of judicial review, the Court’s authority to strike down acts
of the legislative and/or executive, constitutional bodies or administrative agencies that are contrary to
the Constitution.2
Judicial review under the traditional jurisdiction of the Court requires the following requirements of
justiciability: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of itsenforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis motaof the case.3
Failure to meet any of these requirements justifies the Court’s refusal to exercise its power of judicial
review under the Court’s traditional power. The Court, however, has, in several instances, opted to relax
one or more of these requirements to give due course to a petition presenting issues of transcendental
importance to the nation.
In these cases, the doctrine of transcendental importance relaxes the standing requirement, and thereby
indirectly relaxes the injury embodied in the actual case or controversy requirement. Note at this point
that an actual case or controversy is present when the issues it poses are ripe for adjudication, that is,
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it . Standing,
on the other hand, requires a personal and substantial interest manifested through a direct injury that
the petitioner has or will sustain as a result of the questioned act.
Thus, when the standing is relaxed because of the transcendental importance doctrine, the character of
the injury presented to fulfill the actual case or controversy requirement is likewise tempered. When we,
for instance, say that the petitioners have no standing as citizens or as taxpayers but we nevertheless give
the petition due course, we indirectly acknowledge that the injury that they had or will sustain is not
personally directed towards them, but to the more general and abstract Filipino public.
A readily apparent trend from jurisprudence invoking the transcendental importance doctrine shows its
application in cases where the government has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of,
or excess of jurisdiction. This strong correlation between the exercise of the Court’s expanded jurisdiction
and its use of the transcendental importance doctrine reflects the former’s distinct nature and origin. The
Court’s expanded jurisdiction roots from the constitutional commissioners’ perception of the political
question doctrine’s overuse prior to the 1987 Constitution, a situation that arguably contributed to
societal unrest in the years preceding the 1987 Constitution.
The political question doctrine prevents the Court from deciding cases that are of a political nature, and
leaves the decision to the elected officials of government. In other words, the Court, through the political
question doctrine, defers to the judgment and discretion of the Executive and Legislature, matters that
involve policy because they are the people’s elected officials and hence are more directly accountable to
them.
The 1987 Constitution, recognizing the importance of the Court’s active role in checking abuses in
government, relaxed the political question doctrine and made it a duty upon the Court to determine
whether there had been abuses in the government’s exercise of discretion and consequently nullify such
actions that violate the Constitution albeit in the narrow and limited instances of grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, when a government agency’s exercise of discretion is so grave as to amount to an excess
or lack of jurisdiction, it becomes the duty to step in and check for violations of the Constitution. In these
instances, the political question doctrine cannot prevent the Court from determining whether the
government gravely abused its jurisdiction, against the back drop of the Constitution.
Necessarily, the government’s act of grave abuse of discretion, more so if it has nationwide impact,
involves a matter of transcendental importance to the nation. On the other hand, when the government’s
act involves a legitimate exercise of discretion, or amounts to an abuse of discretion that is not grave, then
the need to temper standing requirements through the transcendental importance doctrine is not
apparent.
This correlation between the Court’s use of the transcendental doctrine requirement and its eventual
exercise of the power of judicial review under its expanded jurisdiction warrants a review, prima facie, of
whether there had been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of government. Where there is a showing
prima facieof grave abuse, the Court relaxes its locus standi requirement (and indirectly its actual case or
controversy requirement) through the transcendental importance doctrine. Where there is no showing of
prima faciegrave abuse, then the requirements of justiciability are applied strictly.
Thus, translated in terms of the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the actual case or controversy requirement
is fulfilled by a prima facieshowing of grave abuse of discretion. This approach reflects the textual
requirement of grave abuse of discretion in the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution.As I have earlier pointed out in my separate opinion in Araullo v. Aquino, justiciability under
the expanded judicial power expressly and textually depends only on the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion, as distinguished from a situation where the issue of constitutional validity is raised
within a "traditionally" justiciable case which demands that the requirement of actual controversy based
on specific legal rights must exist.
That a case presents issues of transcendental importance, on the other hand, justifies direct resort to this
Court without first complying with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
A review of the petition shows that it has failed to show a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Comelec.
The petition characterizes the noticesas administrative acts of the Comelec that are outside the latter’s
jurisdiction to perform. The Comelec’s administrative functionrefers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. Under the Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec is
expressly given the power to"prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." The constitutional grant to the Comelec of the
power to investigate and to prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and
administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively ensure to the people
the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.4
This administrative function is markedly distinct from the Comelec’s two other powers as an independent
government agency established under the 1987 Constitution, i.e., its quasi-legislative powerto issue rules
and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,5 the Omnibus Election Code,6 and
other election laws;7 and its quasi-judicial powerto resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications.8
The nature of the assailed action of the Comelec is essential to determine the proper remedy by which a
review of its actions can reach this Court. As a general rule, an administrative order of the Comelec is not
an appropriate subject of a special civil action for certiorari.9
Through jurisprudence, the Court has clarified that the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court covers only the Comelec’s quasi-judicial functions.10 By reason of its distinct
role in our scheme of government, the Comelec is allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods to ensure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created – free, orderly and
honest elections.11 The Court recognizes this reality and concedes that it has no general powers of
supervision over the Comelec except those specifically granted by the Constitution, i.e., to review its
decisions, orders and rulings within the limited terms of a petition for certiorari.12
Thus, the Court reviews Comelec’s administrative acts only by way of exception, when it acts
capriciouslyor whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Necessarily, this invokes the Court’s expanded jurisdiction under the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1. That there is an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec, however, does not
automatically mean that the petition should be given due course. It has to meet the requirements of
justiciability which, under the terms of the Court’s expanded judicial power, has been translated to mean a
prima facie showing of a governmental entity, office or official granted discretionary authority to act and
that this authority has been gravely abused. There can be no prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion unless something has already been done13 or has taken place under the law14 and the
petitioner sufficiently alleges the existence of a threatened or immediate injury to itself as a result of the
gravely abusive exercise of discretion.15
In the case of an administrative agency (more so, if it involves an independent constitutional body), a
matter cannot be considered ripe for judicial resolution unless administrative remedies have been
exhausted.16 Judicial review is appropriate only if, at the very least, those who have the power to
address the petitioner’s concerns have been given the opportunity to do so.In short, the requirement of
ripeness does not become less relevant under the courts’ expanded judicial power.
In this light, I find it worthy to note that that the petition challenges RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No.
9615 not because its text, on its face, violates fundamental rights,17 but because Comelec erroneously
applied an otherwise constitutional law. Comelec’s administrative act of including the petitioners’ poster
within the coverage of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 allegedly violated their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech and religion.
This issue could have been best decided by the Comelec, had the petitioners followed the regular course
ofprocedure in the investigation and prosecution of election offense cases. The assailed action of Comelec,
after all, contained a warning against possible prosecution for an election offense that would have had to
undergo an entire process before it is filed before the proper tribunal. This process allows suspected
election offenders to explain why an election offense should not be filed against them, and for the
Comelec to consider the explanation.
Comelec Resolution No. 9386 (Rules of Procedure in the Investigation and Prosecution of Election Offense
Cases in the Commission on Elections), in particular, provides that once a complaint is initiated, an
investigating officer would have to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether it warrants
prosecution. At this stage, the respondent(s) to the complaint may submit his counter-affidavit and other
supporting documents for the complaint’s dismissal.18 The investigating officer may also hold a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties and their witnesses. The parties may even submit
questions to the investigating officer, which the latter may propound to the parties or parties or witnesses
concerned.19
After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer has two options: if he finds no cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint; otherwise, he shall prepare a
recommendation to prosecute, and the corresponding Information.20 Whichever course he takes, the
investigating officer is required to forward the records of the case to the Commission En Banc (in cases
investigated by the Law Department or the Regional Election Director) or to the Regional Election Director
(in cases investigated by the Assistant Regional Election Director, Regional Election Attorney, or Provincial
Election Supervisor or any of the Commission's lawyers assigned in the field office) for their approval or
disapproval. In the latter case, the resolution of the Regional Election Director may be subject of a motion
for reconsideration and, if need be, a petition for review with the COMELEC En Banc.21
In the case before us, the petitioners ask us to exercise our power of judicial review over the action of the
COMELEC’s Election Officer, Mavil Majarucon, who ordered the petitioners to remove the subject poster,
and over the action of Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra of the Comelec Law Department, reiterating the
previous order with a warningof possible criminal prosecution – without any other action by the Comelec
at its higher levels as the established procedures provide.
Contrary to the petitioners’ allegation that they "have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the
above-described procedure before the Comelec clearly shows otherwise. By immediately invoking
remedies before this Court, the petitioners deprived the Comelec itself of the opportunity to pass upon
the issue before us– a procedure critical in a certiorari proceeding. In short, the direct invocation of
judicial intervention is clearly premature.
In the interest of orderly procedure and the respect for an independent constitutional commission such as
the Comelec, on matters that are prima faciewithin its jurisdiction, the expansion of the power of judicial
review could not have meant the power to review any and all acts of a department or office within an
administrative framework.
While I agree with the ponencia that Section 2(3), Article IX-C does not grant the Comelec the power to
determine "any and all" issues arising during elections, the Comelec under this provision can certainly
decide whether to initiate a preliminary investigation against the petitioners. It can decide based on the
arguments and pieces of evidence presented during the preliminary investigation ―whether there is
probable cause to file an information for an election offense against the petitioners. This determination is
even subject to review and reconsideration, as discussed in the above-described process.
To be sure, this is a matter that the Comelec should have been given first an opportunity to resolve before
the petitioners directly sought judicial recourse. While the freedoms invoked by the petitioners certainly
occupy preferential status in our hierarchy of freedoms, the Court cannot second guess what the
Comelec’s action would have been, particularly when the matters before us are nothing more than the
Election Officer Majarucon’s notice and the Director Amora-Ladra’s order.
In these lights, I see no occasion to discuss the traditional rules on hierarchy of courtsand transcendental
importance, which only concern the propriety of a direct resort to the Supreme Court instead of the lower
courts, and not the question of whether judicial intervention is proper in the first place. As I concluded
above, the direct invocation of judicial intervention is as yet premature.
C. Jurisdiction of Different Courts
A. Key Principles
i. Jurisdiction- Definition
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. In
addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law, the rule is settled that a court’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when
the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted. Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a
court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter, its
Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order, it stands to
reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
ii. Jurisdiction v. Venue
Davao Light v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001
The principal issue in the case at bar involves a question of venue. It is to be distinguished from
jurisdiction, as follows:
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by consent or waiver
upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the
venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that
the plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a
timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never
be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their
alteration.
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural person. But for
practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal
office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation (Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil.
526 [1916] Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillo, 19 SCRA 379 [1967]). The Corporation Code precisely
requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation the "place where the principal office of
the corporation is to be located which must be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14[3]). The purpose of this
requirement is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it to be
ambulatory.
Nocum v. Lucio Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case
at bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case
when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents cause of action is for
damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado,
differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows:
(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be
heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
(c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and,
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the
act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature
were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not
jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would
respondents failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction
over the case. Respondents failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon
motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.
iii. Determined by the allegations in the complaint
Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the
complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in
the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to
be consulted.
iv. Residual power/jurisdiction
Gonzales v. Quirico Pe, G.R. No. 167398, August 9, 2011
v. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts
even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is
sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss
the case without prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether
it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before
the court.
Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007
Euro-Med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006
Agra, et al v. COA, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011
Spouses Fajardo v. Flores, G.R. No. 167891, January 15, 2010
Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction, G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November
27, 2013
vi. Adherence of jurisdiction

> Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation
> Remains with the court until the case is finally terminated
> Exception to the rule: when a newly enacted statute changing the jurisdiction of a court
is given retroactive effect. It can divest a court of jurisdiction over cases already pending
before it is which were filed before the statute came to force or became effective.
Aruego v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996

Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman, G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010
vii. Doctrine of non-interference or judicial stability
Tan v. Cinco, et al, G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016

FACTS: In 2001, respondents Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F.
Cinco, and Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr. (individual lenders) extended a loan to one Dante Tan (Dante) in the
amount of P50,000,000.00. When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands, he
proposed to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to SLHI, the
individual lenders, and PentaCapital (respondents). However, when he was due to execute the
corresponding deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid. Hence,
respondents filed an action for sum of money against him before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
After due proceedings, the Makati R TC rendered judgment on May 21, 2002 ordering Dante to pay
respondents.
In order to enforce the writ, levied on a property registered in Dante's name (subject property). An
auction sale was then conducted. Consequently, Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an
affidavit executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita Tan (Teresita) attesting to the conjugal nature of
the subject property. Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject property lapsed without redemption
having been made; hence, a Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of respondents.
Dante filed an Omnibus Motion. The Makati RTC denied Dante's Omnibus Motion, ruling that Dante had
belatedly raised the issues respecting the conjugal nature of the subject property, and besides, the issue
on whether the subject property was a family home had already been previously resolved. Dante's motion
for reconsideration was denied, and there being no appeal taken therefrom, the Makati RTC's disposition
of the case became final.
On May 2, 2007, Teresita - Dante's wife - filed before the Paranaque R TC a complaint against respondents,
respondent Sheriff Ignacio, and the Register of Deeds of Paranaque City.
After due proceedings, the Parafiaque RTC initially dismissed27 the nullification case on the ground of res
judicata. However, upon Teresita's motion for reconsideration,29 the Parafiaque RTC, in an Order30 dated
January 6, 2011, reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration34 was denied in an Order35 dated April 27, 2011, which they
received on May 23, 2011.36 Intending to file a petition for certiorari before the CA, they filed a Motion
for Extension of Time37 on June 2, 2011. Eventually realizing their error, and apparently unaware that the
CA had already denied their motion for extension in an dated June 13, 2011, respondents withdrew their
motion for extension before the CA on June 17, 2011 and instead, simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal
38 before the Parafiaque RTC. Unfortunately, it was filed ten (10) days late.39
In an Order40 dated August 5, 2011, the Parafiaque RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed
out of time. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order41 dated October
17, 2011.42 Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari 43 before the CA, arguing, inter alia, that
the Parafiaque RTC had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a co-equal court.
THE CA: In a Decision44 dated January 22, 2013, the CA granted the petition and directed the Parafiaque
RTC to allow respondents' Notice of Appeal. While conceding that the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, the CA nonetheless found meritorious and sound
reasons for the exceptional allowance of respondents' appeal. 45 It held that it was a more prudent course
of action for the Parafiaque RTC to excuse respondents' technical lapse in order to afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal instead of disposing the case based on technicality. 46 Citing the
doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, it
found that the affirmance of the Parafiaque RTC's assailed issuances would allow Teresita's husband,
Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was already finally adjudicated by the Makati RTC, a co-
equal court and the first one to take cognizance of the controversy, on the basis of technicality.
Teresita's motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
ISSUE: At the core of the issues advanced for the Court's resolution is the question of whether or not the
Parafiaque R TC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the nullification case
filed by Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed
of Sale in favor of respondents.
HELD: The petition is devoid of merit.

In Barroso v. Omelia, 49 the Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows:
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regularorders or judgments of a
co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for
the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion
of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still
pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued
a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction
of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
To summarize, the various branches of the regional trial courts of a province or city, having as they do
the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should
not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders
or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
In this case, the Court finds that the Parafiaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated
falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC.
Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Parafiaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation
of the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as
well as the execution thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by
the Parafiaque RTC, a court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open,
modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which
the judgment or order is rendered or issued. Consequently, the Parafiaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over
the same, rendering all the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision and other orders issued
thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It
creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum
is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect.
Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer, G.R. No. 215348, June 20, 2016

FACTS: Sometime in February 2001, Ocampo-Ferrer obtained a loan in the amount of P850,000.00 from
Del Rosario, secured by a parcel of land. After Ocampo-Ferrer defaulted on said loan, Del Rosario filed a
complaint for sum of money against her before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pifias City. They entered into
a compromise agreement to which RTC Las Pinas approved. Despite the foregoing, Ocampo-Ferrer still
failed to comply with her obligation, thus, compelling Del Rosario to move for execution which was
granted by the RTC-Las Pifias Br. 275 in an Order11 dated December 16, 2005. At the auction sale, Del
Rosario came out as the sole and highest bidder, and consequently, a Certificate of Sale 15 dated
February 20, 2006 wa:s issued in his favor. 16 In view of the foregoing, Ocampo-Ferrer filed a complaint17
before the RTC-Las Pifias, Branch 198 (RTC-Las Pifias Br. 19~) seeking the annulment of the sheriffs sale, as
well as payment of damag~s, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-0037. In her complaint, Ocampo-Ferrer
claimed that Del Rosario and Sheriff Ortiz committed unlawful acts in enforcing the writ of execution in
Civil Case No. LP-03-0088.
The RTC-Las Pifias Br. 198 Ruling In a Decision21 dated November 9, 2012, the RTC-Las Pifias Br. 198 I
dismissed the case for lack of merit and ordered Del Rosario to return the owner's duplicate copy' of TCT
No. 'r-165897 to Ocampo-Ferrer. It found that Ocampo-Ferrer failed to prove tha~ the actions taken by Del
Rosario and Sheriff Ortiz in enforcing the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. LP- 03-0088 - by levying
:the property covered by TCT No. 30480 and its consequent auction sale - were unlawful and illegal. Since
the levy and auction sale operated to extinguish :Ocampo-Ferrer's obligation to Del
Rosario, the RTC-Las Riiias Br. 198 ordered the latter to return to the former the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. T-165897 in accordance with the aforesaid compromise jllldgment. 22 Ocampo-Ferrer moved for
reconsideration23 but the same was denied in an Order24 dated February 8, 2013. Aggrieved, she
appealed to the CA
CA: In a Decision26 dated May 27, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC-Las: Pifias Br.
198 and, accordingly, declared null and void the following: (a).the levy perfor:med by Sheriff Ortiz on the
property covered by TCT No. 30480 and the c01;1sequent auction sale of the same; and ( b) the Certificate
of Sale in favor of Del Rosario, the annotation thereof on TCT No. 30480, and the Officer's Beed of Final
Sale.
Explaining the appropriate manner of ,enforcing judgments for money as laid down under Section 9, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, the CA held that Sheriff Ortiz's levy on the property co\rered by TCT No. 30480
was procedurally defective as there was no showing that Sheriff Ortiz gave Ocampo-Ferrer the opportunity
to exercise the option of immediately choosing which among her properties should be levied upon.
ISSUE: The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the levy and
consequent sale of the property covered by TCT No. 30480 is null and void.
HELD: At the outset, the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province
or city, having the same equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with
their respective cases, much :less with their orders or judgments.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments 1 of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders 1of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the r~lief
sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on 1 the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
acquires jurisdiction over 'the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
Thus, we ha~e repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still
pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a
writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
appropriate1 forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction
is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate ~he law in issuing a
writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy,
however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the
action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article
VIII, Sectio~ 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has <· operationalized thrdugh a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the I Rules of Court.
xx xx
It is not a vi~ble legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an erring
sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself,
not merely th~ executing sheriff. x x x As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the
implementation of the writ before the issuing :court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to
seek redress through a higher judicial body.
In the case at bar, the Court notes that in performing a levy on and subsequent auction sale of the
property covered by TCT No. 30480, Sheriff Ortiz was merely enforcing the writ of execution issued by
the RTC-Las Pifias Br. 275 pursuant to its ruling in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088. Since said writ of execution
emanated from the RTC-Las Pifias Br. 275, its I enforcement cannot be assailed in a co-equal court such
as the R TC-Las Pifias Br. 198, as it w6uld violate the doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in
the r~gular orders or judgments of a co-equal court. Unfortunately, Ocampo-Ferrer still chose to assail
the enforcement of said writ by filing a case before the RTC-Las Pifias Br. 198. Worse, the RTC-Las Pifias
Br. 198 - and even the CA on appeal- chose to resolve the case on the merits instead of simply
dismissing the same in deference to the aforesaid doctrine.
Cabili v. Hon. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-22252, September 6, 2011

- can you apply this doctrine to courts that are non co-equal? This applies only
to courts of equal jurisdiction—Doctrine of judicial non-interference
FACTS: Is it right to impose the penalty of fine of P40,000.00 upon Judge Rasad G. Balindong for issuing a
temporary restraining order, pending hearing of an application for preliminary injunction, that enjoins a
sheriff from executing, in violation of the rules governing satisfaction of judgment against State
instrumentalities, upon Mindanao State Universitys Congress-appropriated funds needed for its
operations?
Complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili (Atty. Cabili) was counsel of the Heirs of Jesus Ledesma in the latters
action for damages against the Mindanao State University (MSU) and others arising from the death of the
late Jesus Ledesma in Civil Case 06-254 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 6. The RTC
rendered judgment against the defendants, including MSU, ordering them to pay damages to the Heirs.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the CA decision which became final and executory.`
Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, on
March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSUs depository bank,
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf of MSU.
The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to the denial by
filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and mandamus with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against
the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009. After
this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90
from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 06-
2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service
for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO to
enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings of a court of co-
equal jurisdiction.
HELD: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to
grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over
all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as
still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which
issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction
of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Jurisprudence shows that a violation of
this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
Villamor v. Salas, G.R. No. 101041, November 13, 1991

FACTS: In 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos) for recovery of ownership of a parcel
of coconut land was filed and subsequently raffled to the sala of the petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor.
While the civil case was pending there, respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991,
N-992 and N-993 for qualified theft against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also
assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor..
After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in favor of Naval who was declared the lawful
owner and possessor of the disputed land. Carlos was ordered to vacate the land. Thereafter, respondent
Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the archived criminal cases. Having declared Naval the lawful
owner and possessor of the contested land in Civil Case No. B-398, Judge Villamor dismissed the criminal
cases against her and her co-accused.
Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-87-105, against Judge Villamor, charging
him with having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in Civil Case No. B-398. On November 21,
1988, this Court, in an En Banc resolution, summarily dismissed the administrative case.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent Carlos filed a civil action for
damages (Civil Case No. CEB-6478) against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
when he dismissed the five (5) criminal cases against Naval, et al.
Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio Guerrero, filed separate complaints for damages against Judge
Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust order of contempt.
Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-8802) was raffled to Branch 21, Regional
Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Peary G. Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for damages was
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8823 and raffled to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided
over by Judge Bernardo LL. Salas.
Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8802 but it was denied by Judge Aleonar.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against Judge Aleonar to stop him
from proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the actions for damages against
Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order of direct contempt against Carlos and
Attorney Guerrero which this Court subsequently annulled.
HELD: The answer is no.
As very aptly held by this Court in a Resolution it issued in connection with a previous case filed by
respondent Carlos against Judge Villamor, over a similar action for "Damages and Attorney's Fees
Arising From Rendering an Unjust Judgment," in dismissing the five (5) criminal cases for qualified thef
which he (respondent Carlos) had filed against Gloria P. Naval and others —
Indeed, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a
judgment of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without
running afoul with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court, are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts.
To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of the actions for damages against
the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere
with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The
various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not
interfere with each other's cases, judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).
This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final judgment, has found that a trial
judge's errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
decision be levelled against the latter (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87 SCRA
179; Gahol vs. Riodique, 64 SCRA 494).
Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42,
November 13, 1989) can there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was rendered maliciously
or with conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt
issued by Judge Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was sustained by this Court (Jaynes C. Abarrientos,
et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1, 1988).
At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered an error of judgment for
which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.
A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering
it.
viii. Lack of jurisdiction- raised at earliest possible opportunity
If Lack of jurisdiction ONLY, it must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, but if lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it may be raised in any stage of the proceedings.
Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008

When did petitioners raise these issues: 1. Lack of jurisdiction with lack of failure to pay docket fee?
Before the SC. Can this still be allowed?
Sec 9. Rule 1 – Objections and defenses not pleaded are deemed waived.
Alicia owned in common

with her siblings 13
parcels of land called
Hacienda Sta. Rita in
Pili and
Minalabac, Camarines Sur.
Alicia left behind her 2/21
shares in the 13 parcels of
land.
Alicia was survived by her
siblings: Cesar, Apolonio,
Lilia, and Benito; Marissa, a
sister-in-law; and the
children of her brothers who
predeceased her: Francisco,
Horacio, and Octavio.
Complaint for Judicial
Partition of the Estate of
Alicia Marasigan was filed
before the RTC by her heirs
(private respondents)
namely, Apolonio, Lilia,
Octavio, Horacio, Benito,
and Marissa, against Cesar.
RTC decided in favor of the
heirs and issued an order of
partition of the estate of
Alicia Marasigan. They
ordered the partition into
1/7 each of the 2/21 shares
of the 13 parcels of land.
The parties could not agree
on how they shall
physically partition among
themselves Alicia’s estate,
private respondents filed a
Motion to Appoint
Commissioners following
the procedure outlined in
Sections
4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court.
The RTC granted the Motion
and appointed Badiong,
Assistant Provincial
Assessor of Camarines Sur,
as
Chairman of the Board
of Commissioners.
Private respondents
nominated Dacara as
the second
commissioner. Cesar failed
to nominate a third
commissioner despite due
notice. Upon lapse of the
period given, only two
commissioners were
appointed.
Commissioners conducted
an ocular inspection.
Commissioners’ Report was
released: “Considering that
the physical division of the
2/21 pro-indiviso share of
the decedent, Alicia
Marasigan cannot be done
because of the different
locations and conditions of
the properties, undersigned
Commissioners hereby
recommend that the heirs
may assign their 1/7 share
to one of the parties willing
to buy the same (Sec. 5,
Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court) provided he pays to
the heir[s] willing to assign
his/her 1/7 share such
amounts the
Commissioners have
recommended and duly
approved by the Honorable
Court.” Cesar
opposed and prayed for the
disapproval of the report.
RTC issued an Order
approving the
recommendations
embodied in the
Commissioners’ Report,
particularly that the
property be assigned to one
of the heirs. Motion for
Reconsideration by Cesar
that
was denied.
In the meantime, Cesar
died. He was substituted by
his heirs and herein
petitioners. The heirs of
Cesar,
petitioners, elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals
via a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under
Rule 65 claiming grave
abuse by the RTC judge in
approving the
Commissioners’ Report. CA
dismissed
the petition and ruled that
the RTC acted within its
authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not
the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming in toto
the RTC Order adopting
the
Commissioners’
recommendation on the
manner of partition of the
estate of Alicia Marasigan. –
They did
not err in affirming the RTC
Order!!
HELD:
In this jurisdiction, an action
for partition is comprised of
two phases: first, the trial
court, after determining
that a co- ownership in fact
exists and that partition is
proper, issues an order for
partition; and, second,
the trial court promulgates a
decision confirming the
sketch and subdivision of
the properties submitted by
the parties (if the parties
reach an agreement) or by
the appointed
commissioners (if the
parties fail to
agree), as the case may be.
The first phase of a partition
and/or accounting suit is
taken up with the
determination of whether or
not a
co- ownership in fact exists
and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the
property. This phase may
end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to
have a partition either
because a co-ownership
does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may
end, on the other hand
Pili and
land.
on how they shall
Motion to Appoint
Sections
4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court.
as
of Commissioners.
Private respondents
nominated Dacara as
the second
to nominate a third
commissioners were
appointed.
amounts the
Commissioners have
Court.” Cesar
RTC issued an Order
approving the
recommendations
embodied in the
that
was denied.
Cesar,
approving the
dismissed
authority.
the
Commissioners’
They did
Order!!
HELD:
the appointed
parties fail to
taken up with the
not a
and may be made by
Pili and
land.
on how they shall
Motion to Appoint
Sections
4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court.
as
of Commissioners.
Private respondents
nominated Dacara as
the second
to nominate a third
commissioners were
appointed.
amounts the
Commissioners have
Court.” Cesar
RTC issued an Order
approving the
recommendations
embodied in the
that
was denied.
Cesar,
approving the
dismissed
authority.
the
Commissioners’
They did
Order!!
HELD:
the appointed
parties fail to
taken up with the
not a
and may be made by
FACTS: Alicia owned in common with her siblings 13 parcels of land called Hacienda Sta. Rita
in Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur. Alicia left behind her 2/21 shares in the 13 parcels of land. Alicia
was survived by her siblings: Cesar, Apolonio, Lilia, and Benito; Marissa, a sister-in-law; and thechildren of
her brothers who predeceased her: Francisco, Horacio, and Octavio. Complaint for JudicialPartition of the
Estate of Alicia Marasigan was filed before the RTC by her heirs (private respondents) namely, Apolonio,
Lilia, Octavio, Horacio, Benito, and Marissa, against Cesar.RTC decided in favor of the heirs and issued an
order of partition of the estate of Alicia Marasigan. They ordered the partition into 1/7 each of the 2/21
shares of the 13 parcels of land. The parties could not agree on how they shall physically partition
among themselves Alicia’s estate, private respondents filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners following
the procedure outlined in Sections4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the
Motion and appointed Badiong, Assistant Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur, as Chairman of the
Board of Commissioners. Private respondents nominated Dacara as the second commissioner.
Cesar failed to nominate a third commissioner despite due notice. Upon lapse of the period given,
only two commissioners were appointed. Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection. Commissioners’
Report was released:
“Considering that the physical division of the 2/21 pro-indiviso share of the decedent, Alicia Marasigan
cannot be done because of the different locations and conditions of the properties, undersigned
Commissioners hereby recommend that the heirs may assign their 1/7 share to one of the parties willing
to buy the same (Sec. 5,Rule 69 of the Rules of Court) provided he pays to the heir[s] willing to assign
his/her 1/7 share such amounts the Commissioners have recommended and duly approved by the
Honorable Court.” Cesar opposed and prayed for the disapproval of the report. RTC issued an Order
approving the recommendations embodied in the Commissioners’ Report, particularly that the
property be assigned to one of the heirs. Motion for Reconsideration by Cesar that was denied.
In the meantime, Cesar died. He was substituted by his heirs and herein petitioners. The heirs of Cesar,
petitioners, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 claiming grave abuse by the RTC judge in approving the Commissioners’ Report. CA dismissed the
petition and ruled that the RTC acted within its authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming in toto the RTC Order adopting
theCommissioners’ recommendation on the manner of partition of the estate of Alicia Marasigan. – They
didnot err in affirming the RTC Order!!
HELD:In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, the trial court, after
determining that a co- ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition;
and, second, the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties
submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the
parties fail toagree), as the case may be.
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not
a co- ownership in fact exists and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand
with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In
the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. The second phase
commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. While the lack of notice
to Cesar of the viewing and examination by the Commissioners of the real properties comprising
Alicia’s estate is a procedural infirmity, it did not violate any of his substantive rights or did it deprive him
of due process. It is a matter of record, and petitioners cannot deny, that Cesar was able to file his
Comment/Opposition to the Commissioners’ Report. He had sufficient opportunity to present
before the RTC whatever objections or oppositions he may have had to the Commissioners’ Report. The
Commissioners found, after a viewing and examination of Alicia’s estate, that the same cannot be divided
without causing prejudice to the interests of the parties. The impracticality of physically dividingAlicia’s
estate becomes more apparent, considering that Hacienda Sta. Rita is composed of parcels andsnippets of
land located in two different municipalities, Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur. Cesar and his heirs are
entitled only to his 1/7 share in the yet unidentified, unsegregated 2/21 pro-indiviso shares of Alicia in
each of the 13 parcels of land that comprises Hacienda Sta. Rita. Dividing the parcels of land even further,
each portion allotted to Alicia’s heirs, with a significantly reduced land area and widely scattered in
two municipalities, would irrefragably diminish the value and use of each portion, as
compared to keeping the entire estate intact. The correctness of the finding of the RTC and the
Commissioners that dividing Alicia’s estate would be prejudicial to the parties cannot be passed upon by
the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court can only presume that the proceedings before
the RTC, including the recommendation made by the Commissioners, were fairly and regularly
conducted. Inasmuch as the parties continued to manifest their desire to terminate their co-ownership,
but the co-heirs/co- owners could not agree on which properties would be allotted to each of them, this
Court finds that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the Commissioners’
recommendation that the co-heirs/co-owners assign their shares to one of them in exchange for proper
compensation. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ averments, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
err in ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting and confirming the recommendations of the Commissioners. PETITION DENIED.
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968

FACTS:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond
with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution
was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was
granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack
of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of
the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case
to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue.
ISSUE:
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon
appeal.
HELD:
YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also
been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it
is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to
quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary
hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted"
(83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least
possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear
what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of
the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of
the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in
court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of
four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or
objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
Villagracia v. Fifth Shari-a District Court, G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014
Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
Jurisdiction over the person—must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
Roldan purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres.
Transfer Certificate of Title covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. Roldan had the parcel
of land surveyed. In a report, the Geodetic Engineer found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land
covered by Roldan’s certificate of title.
Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the
parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court alleging among others that he is a Filipino
Muslim
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However,
despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to
present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted. In its decision,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to
possess the parcel of land. Thereafter, it issued the notice of writ of execution to Vivencio.
Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
He argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both parties are
Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
However, respondent court denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Does the Shari’a District Court has jurisdictions over real action where one of the parties is not a muslim
even if it decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code?
RULING:
The Shari’a District Court has NO jurisdiction over real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong." This power is conferred by law, which may either be the
Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose,
consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court hears, tries, and
decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are
void.
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein the
parties involved are Muslims. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is applicable solely
when both parties are Muslims". When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before
the regular courts.
Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless
of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the action.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code,
customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law. Hence, Shari’a District Courts apply
Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District
Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of
general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking
cognizance of the action.
ix. Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised at any stage
Republic v. Bantigue Point Development, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

OR ESTOPPEL BY LACHES:
In TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY (131 Phil. 556 (1968), the party-litigant actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only
15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the
appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering
the unique facts in that case, the Supreme Court held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on
appeal. In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008, 558 SCRA 63, the
Supreme Court cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general
rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that
in the latter case (REPUBLIC VS. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G. R. NO. 162322, MARCH 14, 2012,SERENO, J.).
FACTS:
- On 17 July 1997, respondent
Bantigue Point Development
Corporation filed with the
RTC of Rosario, Batangas
an
application for ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION of TITLE
over a
parcel of land with an assessed
value of P4,330, P1,920 and
P8,670, or a total
ASSESSED VALUE of
P14,920 for the
entire property, more
particularly described as Lot
8060 of
Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre,
with an area of more or less
10,732 square meters,
located at Barangay
Barualte, San
Juan, Batangas.
- On 18 July 1997, the RTC
issued an Order setting the
case
for initial hearing on 22
October 1997.
- On 7 August 1997, it issued a
second Order setting the initial
hearing on 4 November 1997.
- Petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application
for registration on 8 January
1998 while the records were
still with the RTC.
- On 31 March 1998, the
RTC Clerk of Court
transmitted
motu proprio the records of
the case to the MTC of San
Juan, because the assessed
value of the property was
allegedly less than P100,000.
- Thereafter, the MTC entered
an Order of General Default
and commenced with the
reception of evidence and
awarded
the land to respondent
Corporation.
- Acting on an appeal filed by
the Republic, the CA RULED
that since the former had
actively participated in the
proceedings before the
lower court, but failed to
raise the
jurisdictional challenge
therein, petitioner is thereby
estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the
lower
court on appeal.
- The CA further found
that respondent Corporation
had
sufficiently established the
latter’s registrable title over
the
subject property after
having proven open,
continuous,
exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation
of the
subject land by itself and
its predecessors-in-interest
even
before the outbreak of World
War II.
- Dissatisfied with the CA’s
ruling, petitioner Republic filed
this
instant Rule 45 Petition and
raised the following arguments
in
support of its appeal:
ISSUE: Whether the
Republic can be estopped
from
questioning the jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court over
the
application for original
registration of land title even
for the first
time on appeal – NO
RULING: The Republic is not
estopped from raising the
issue of jurisdiction in this case.
- At the outset, we rule that
petitioner Republic is not
estopped
from questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower court,
even if the
former raised the jurisdictional
question only on appeal.
- The rule is settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at
any stage of the
proceedings.
Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by
the
Constitution or the law. It
cannot be acquired through a
waiver
or enlarged by the omission of
the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of
jurisdiction may be cognizable
even if raised for the first
time on appeal.
- The ruling of the Court
of Appeals that “a party
may be
estopped from raising such
[jurisdictional] question if he
has
actively taken part in the very
proceeding which he questions,
belatedly objecting to the
court’s jurisdiction in the event
that
the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is
adverse to
him” is not applicable. (Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.)
- In this case, petitioner
Republic has not displayed
such
unreasonable failure or neglect
that would lead us to conclude
that it has abandoned or
declined to assert its right to
question
the lower court's jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether THE

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
FAILED
TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION
OVER THE APPLICATION
FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
OF LAND TITLE. – NO
RULING: The Municipal Trial
Court properly acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
First, petitioner argued that
the lower court failed to
acquire
jurisdiction over the
application, because the RTC
set the date
and hour of the initial
hearing beyond the 90-day
period
provided under the Property
Registration Decree.
The Property Registration
Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial
hearing, publication, etc. - The
court
shall, within five days from
filing of the application, issue
an
order setting the date and hour
of the initial hearing which shall
not be earlier than forty-five
days nor later than ninety
days
from the date of the order. x
xx.
- We ruled that the lapse of
time between the issuance of
the
Order setting the date of
initial hearing and the date
of the
initial hearing itself was not
fatal to the application.
Based on the Doctrine of Estoppel by Laches (Doctrine of Stale demands) a
party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has
actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting
to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him. Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration when the records were still with the RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner
could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because
the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the
MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that
court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its
Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the
instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[27] In this case, petitioner
Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead
us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the
lower court's jurisdiction.
If issue is on the jurisdiction over THE SUBJECT MATTER, IT MAY BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
OPPORTUNITY
FACTS:- On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the RTC of
Rosario, Batangas an application for ORIGINAL REGISTRATION of TITLE over a parcel of land with
an assessed value of P4,330, P1,920 andP8,670, or a total ASSESSED VALUE of P14,920 for the
entire property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an
area of more or less10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.- On
18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.- On 7 August
1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.- Petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with the
RTC.- On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case
to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than
P100,000.- Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception
of evidence and awarded the land to respondent Corporation.- Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,
the CA RULED that since the former had actively participated in the proceedings before the
lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.- The CA further
found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s registrable title over
the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the
outbreak of World War II.- Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45
Petition and raised the following arguments in support of its appeal:
ISSUE: Whether the Republic can be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the municipal
trial court over the application for original registration of land title even for the first time on appeal – NO
RULING: The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.- At the
outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question
only on appeal. - The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may
be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.- The ruling of the Court of Appeals that
“a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in
the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that
the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him” is not applicable. (Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.-raised for the FIRST time afer 15 YEARS)- In this case, petitioner Republic has not
displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or
declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled
that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.[18]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.[19]It cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of
the court.[20] Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.[21]The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such
[jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is
adverse to him[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first
enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In , the party-litigant actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after
receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the
lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa
v. Peoplewe cautioned that must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the
most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case The facts are starkly
different in this case, making the exceptional rule in inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the RTC. At that point,
petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was
not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings
nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the
jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to
the instant appeal. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In this case, petitioner Republic
has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has
abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968
De Herrera v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011

- No considerable time yet has lapsed between the objection
FACTS: Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by Emelita Bernardo,
filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim,
harassment and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig,
Cardona, Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square meters.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their
predecessor-in-interest, Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto S.
Bernardo. The parcel of land was later on covered by Tax Declaration No. CD-006-0828
under the name of the respondents.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the subject property
consisting of about 700 square meters was bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's father,
from a certain Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo inherited
the 700-square-meter lot.
The COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject
property.
Aggrieved, petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of Alfredo,
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive
jurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the land dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is already estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of lack of
jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the proceedings before
the said body. Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle
and decide the question of ownership over the subject land. Further, the present case
cannot be classified as explosive in nature as the parties never resorted to violence in
resolving the controversy. Petitioner submits that it is the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership
between the parties.
HELD: YES. CIVIL LAW: Jurisdiction of COSLAP The COSLAP was created by virtue
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for
the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and
members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest. Administrative agencies, like
the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling statute.
Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land
dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the
matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is
critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved,
the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the
same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions
raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to
persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on
the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem In the instant case, the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint.
The present case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section
3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561.The dispute between the parties is not critical
and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as
involving a critical situation that requires immediate action. Respondents' cause of
action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject property,
which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the
Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value of the subject property Since the
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the
decision rendered, are null and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without
jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Having no
legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It
leaves the parties in the position they were before the proceedings. Respondents'
allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by
reason of laches does not hold water.
Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel. The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a
court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties.
x. Objection to jurisdiction over a party; holding out theory or doctrine of

ostensible agency
Megan Sugar Corp. v. RTC of Iloilo, G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011
FACTS:
Respondent New Frontier Sugar Corporation (NFSC) obtained a loan from respondent Equitable PCI Bank
(EPCIB) which was secured by a real estate mortgage over NFSC land consisting of ninety-two (92) hectares
located in Passi City, Iloilo, and a chattel mortgage over NFSC sugar mill.
NFSC subsequently entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Central Iloilo Milling
Corporation (CIMICO), whereby the latter agreed to take-over the operation and management of the NFSC
raw sugar factory and facilities.
NFSC filed a compliant for specific performance and collection against CIMICO for the latter failure to pay
its obligations under the MOA.
CIMICO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumangas, Iloilo, Branch 68, a case against NFSC for
sum of money and/or breach of contract. For NFSC failure to pay its debt, EPCIB instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings over NFSC land and sugar mill. During public auction, EPCIB was the sole bidder
and was thus able to buy the entire property and consolidate the titles in its name.
The RTC issued a restraining order, directing EPCIB and PISA to desist from taking possession over the
property in dispute. Hence, CIMICO was able to continue its possession over the property.
CIMICO and petitioner Megan Sugar Corporation (MEGAN) entered into a MOA whereby MEGAN assumed
CIMICO rights, interests and obligations over the property.
During the hearing on the motion for intervention, Atty. Reuben Mikhail Sabig (Atty. Sabig) appeared
before the RTC and entered his appearance as counsel for MEGAN. Several counsels objected to Atty. Sabig
appearance since MEGAN was not a party to the proceedings; however, Atty. Sabig explained to the court
that MEGAN had purchased the interest of CIMICO and manifested that his statements would bind
MEGAN./span>
In denying MEGAN petition, the CA ruled that since Atty. Sabig had actively participated before the RTC,
MEGAN was already estopped from assailing the RTC jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Sabig is the agent of MEGAN and is thus estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
HELD: YES.
CIVIL LAW: Doctrine of Estoppel, Relationship of Principal and Agent
After a judicial examination of the records pertinent to the case at bar, this Court agrees with the finding
of the CA that MEGAN is already estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice,
and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the
injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.
The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case. It is
designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result. It has
been applied by this Court wherever and whenever special circumstances of a case so demand.
Based on the events and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the assailed orders, this Court rules
that MEGAN is estopped from assailing both the authority of Atty. Sabig and the jurisdiction of the RTC.
While it is true, as claimed by MEGAN, that Atty. Sabig said in court that he was only appearing for the
hearing of Passi Sugar motion for intervention and not for the case itself, his subsequent acts, coupled
with MEGAN inaction and negligence to repudiate his authority, effectively bars MEGAN from assailing the
validity of the RTC proceedings under the principle of estoppel.
MEGAN can no longer deny the authority of Atty. Sabig as they have already clothed him with apparent
authority to act in their behalf. It must be remembered that when Atty. Sabig entered his appearance, he
was accompanied by Concha, MEGAN director and general manager.Concha himself attended several
court hearings, and on December 17, 2002, even sent a letter to the RTC asking for the status of the case.
A corporation may be held in estoppel from denying as against innocent third persons the authority of its
officers or agents who have been clothed by it with ostensible or apparent authority. Atty. Sabig may not
have been armed with a board resolution, but the appearance of Concha made the parties assume that
MEGAN had knowledge of Atty. Sabig actions and, thus, clothed Atty. Sabig with apparent authority such
that the parties were made to believe that the proper person and entity to address was Atty. Sabig.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible
agency, imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of
the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the
relationship or the authority exists. – basis not contractual in nature, but in misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority exists—lawyer is accompanied by Concha, a director of the
company, even though he does not have a board of resolution. No contract between Sabig and Megan, but
the holding out theory.
One of the instances of estoppel is when the principal has clothed the agent with indicia of authority as to
lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the agent actually has such authority. With the case of
MEGAN, it had all the opportunity to repudiate the authority of Atty. Sabig since all motions, pleadings
and court orders were sent to MEGAN office. However, MEGAN never questioned the acts of Atty. Sabig
and even took time and effort to forward all the court documents to him.
To this Court mind, MEGAN cannot feign knowledge of the acts of Atty. Sabig, as MEGAN was aware from
the very beginning that CIMICO was involved in an on-going litigation.
xi. Payment of filing/docket fees- jurisdictional
Phil. Women’s Chrisitian Temperance Union v. Yangco, G.R. No.

199595, April 2, 2014
Are dockets and filing fees similar?
NO.
Differentiate the two. Filing fees are to take care of court expenses, docket fees
vests the trial court jurisdiction over the case.
Payment of docket fees is a jurisdiction requirement.
2. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed, the filing must be
accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. The fees must
be paid because as a rule, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon
payment of the prescribed fees. Without payment, the general rule is that the complaint
is not considered filed. Payment of the full amount of the docket fee is mandatory and
jurisdictional. This rule was however, relaxed by the Supreme Court in some cases in
which payment of the fee within a reasonable time but not beyond the prescriptive
period was permitted. If the fees are not paid at the time of the filing, the court acquires
jurisdiction only upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may
grant, barring prescription.
Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987

Put a stop in the practice of lawyers, in not specifying the amount in the pleadings.
The original complaint filed: In the complaint, 78 million, but in the prayer specific performance incapable
of pecuniary estimation. How much was the docket fee? 410 pesos.
You don’t just amend the complaint and pay the proper docket fees, for the court to acquire jurisdiction.
Here amendment cannot cure a fatal defect on your complaint. That applies to the payment of docket
fees.
Who ordered the reassessment? The SC issured a reassessment of the filing fee?
The Court immediately conducted investigation in the matter, plaintiffs filed amendment .
MAGASPI CASE: they based the amount of the docket fees when they amended the case. The trial court
ordered the complainants.
The case is already deeded filed at the payment of docket fees, regardless of actual date of filing. This is
controlling—not the actual date of filing. Neither can the amendment of the complaint, vest jurisdiction in
the court. Consequently, the ordered admitting the amendment of complaint, and the subsequent
proceedings, are null and void.
PUT AMOUNT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE COMPLAINT, BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER.
Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006

Indeed, a court acquires jurisdiction over the claim of damages upon payment of the
correct docket fees
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fees that vests a trial court jurisdiction.
2. Same rule applies to permissive claims, thirdparty claims, etc
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the case, and the
payment .. but subsequently, lien on the judgment. What monetary
awards may be awarded by the court which are not specifically. Filing
fee—lien to the award.
The rule on payment of docket fee has, in some instances, been made subject to the rule
on liberal interpretation. Thus, in a case, it was held that while the payment of the
required docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of
filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period (Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation [PAGCOR] v. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76, 92; See also Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274, 285). Also, if the amount of docket fees is
insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the party filing the case will be
required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost (Rivera v. Del
Rosario, 419 SCRA 626, 635).
Do not include interests and costs in the computation of the docket fee.
If you do not state amount in body prayer may either be:

1. Dismissed
2. Such claims expunged
3. Motion to amend the same provided that it is not yet barred by prescription
 Where the pleadings stated the amount but the payment is deficient—the court may now
allow a reasonable time for the payment of prescribed docket fee. Defect is cured and the court
will assume jurisdiction, provided that prescription has yet to set in.
 If you cannot fathom the measure of damages, the LAW COMPELS YOU TO COME OUT AN
AMOUNT. It is an excuse not to come out of an amount.
 Damages that may arise afer the filing case, though you did not cite them in the pleadings,
may be awarded, the additional filing fees will be a lien on the judgment award
Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No.
192649, March 9, 2011 (Supra)
What is peculiar in this case? They amended the original complaint, but did not pay the docket fees. So
what’s the effect? For the failure to pay docket fees, which is both mandatory and jurisdictional,
jurisdiction does not attach.
Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed
fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or
proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter, its
Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order, it stands to
reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
B. Kinds of Jurisdiction
B.P. 129 as amended, R.A. 7691, R.A. 7902
a. General Jurisdiction
1. Courts of general jurisdiction are those with competence to decide on their own
jurisdiction and to take cognizance of all cases, civil and criminal, of a particular
nature. Courts of special (limited) jurisdiction are those which have a special
jurisdiction only for a particular purpose or are clothed with special powers for the
performance of specified duties beyond which they have no authority of any kind
(21 C.J.S., Courts, § 3).
← there are only particular cases which may be under the jurisdiction of that
court
- RTC is the only court with general jurisdiction
- jurisdiction of SC limited, because provided by the Constitution
2. A court may also be considered ‘general’ if it has the competence to exercise
jurisdiction over cases not falling within the jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person, or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions (Sec. 19[6J, Sec. 20, BP 129, Judiciary
Reorganization Act of1980). It is in this context that the Regional Trial Court is considered
a court of general jurisdiction.
Regional Trial Court
The RTC is a court of general jurisdiction

Unlike the Municipal Trial Court, which is a court of limited jurisdiction because it can only take
cognizance of cases expressly provided by law, the Regional Trial Court is a court of general
jurisdiction because all cases, the jurisdiction of which is not specifically provided by law to be
within the jurisdiction of any other court falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
(Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 377 SCRA 353; Sec. 19[6], B.P. 129).
Durisol Phil. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121106, February 20, 2002
b. Special or Limited Jurisdiction
Sandiganbayan
MANDATE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. (Art.
XIII), 1973 Constitution.
SEC. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law. (Art. XI), 1987 Constitution.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10660]

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads:
“(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations.
“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
“(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
“b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.
“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
“Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a)
does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government
or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00).
“Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the official holds
office.
“In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ’27’ or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
“The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
“The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases
filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers
or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be
tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
“Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized:
Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein
has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as
the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.”
Court of Tax Appeals
Aside from its jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses, Sec. 7 of R.A. 9282 provides that
the Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise:
A. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code
provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties,
fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines,
forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs
Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally
decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for
review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government
under Sec. 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product,
commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Secs. 301 and 302,
respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under R.A. 8800,
where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
B. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases
where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is
less than One million pesos (PI,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdictions.
Shari’ah District Court
1. The Shari’a courts were created under Art. 137 of P.D. 1083 dated February 4,1977. Their
creation, as stated in Art. 2 of the decree, is a recognition of “the legal system of the Muslims
in the Philippines as part of the law of the land and seeks to make Islamic institutions more
effective.”
2. The courts created under the decree are the (a) Shari’a District Courts and the (b) Shari’a
Circuit Courts (Art. 137, P.D. 1083). Under the same article, the Shari’a courts and the
personnel thereof are subject to the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
3. The Shari’a District judges receive the same compensation and enjoy the same privileges
as the judges of Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts (Art. 142, P.D. 1083).
Shari’a Circuit Court judges shall receive the same compensation and enjoy the same
privileges as judges of Municipal Circuit Courts. (Art. 154, P.D. 1083) or of the present
Municipal Trial Courts.
Original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts

By virtue of Art. 143 of P.D. 1083, the Shari’a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising
under the Code;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of the deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of
administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or correction of
entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of the Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they
have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all
other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Concurrent jurisdiction of Shari’a District courts
Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a District Court shall have original
jurisdiction over: (a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of
name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph (d) of the immediately
preceding topic, wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are
Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
Appellate jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts 1. Shari’a District Courts shall have
appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a Circuit Courts within their territorial
jurisdiction.
2. The Shari’a District Court shall decide every case appealed to it on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral arguments as
the parties may submit (Art. 144, P.D. 1083).
Finality of decisions
Under Art. 145 of the decree, the decisions of the Shari’a District Courts whether on appeal
from the Shari’a Circuit Court or not, shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall
affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the
Constitution.
Original jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts
The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married
in accordance with Art. 13 involving disputes relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under the Code (P.D. 1083);
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mu?a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties. (Art. 155, P.D. 1083).
Rules applicable
The Shari’a courts shall be governed by special rules of procedure as the Supreme Court may
promulgate (Art. 148 and Art. 158, P.D. 1083).
Also: Regional Trial Court- Family Courts, Probate Court-

Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Court
c. Original Jurisdiction
i. Supreme Court
Sec. 5, par. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Petition for writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
Petition for writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
Petition for writ of continuing Mandamus
(Sec. 2, Rule 8, Part III of Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases, A.M. 09-6-8-SC)
Petition for writ of Kalikasan
ii. Court of Appeals
Sec. 9, B.P. 129

Petition for writ of Kalikasan
Actions for Annulment of RTC judgment
Petition for freeze order on monetary instrument, etc.
relating to unlawful activity under Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001 or R.A. 9160 as amended by R.A.9194 (Sec. 44
of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC)
iii. Regional Trial Court
Sec. 21, B.P. 129

iv. Shari’ah Distric Court
Art. 413, par. 2, P.D. 1083
d. Appellate Jurisdiction
i. Supreme Court
Sec. 5., par. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Rule 45, Sec. 1, 1997 Rules of Court (“Rules of Court”)
See: Sec. 7, P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.’s 7975, 8249,
Sec. 19, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Writ of Amparo)
Sec. 19, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (Writ of Habeas Data)
Secs. 9, 34, B.P. 129

Rule 41, Sec. 2, a, Rules of Court
Rule 42, Rules of Court
Sec. 22, B.P. 129

iv. Shari’ah Distric Court
Art. 144 P.D. 1083
e. Exclusive Jurisdiction
f. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction
i. Supreme Court
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus against

judgment, final order and resolutions of:
a) Court of Appeals
b) Sandiganbayan
c) Court of Tax Appeals
d) COMELEC
e) Commission on Audit
f) Ombudsman (criminal cases)
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus against:

a) Regional Trial Court- decisions, final orders, resolution
b) National Labor Relations Commission- decisions, final
orders, resolution
c) Secretary of Labor and Employment in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction on decisions, final orders of:
1) POEA Administrator
2) National Wage Productivity Commission
3) Bureau of Labor Relations
Sec. 9 (2), B.P. 129- Actions for Annulment of RTC judgment
Sec. 19, B.P. 129 as amended by R.A. 7691

Sec. 5.2, Securities Regulations Code or R.A. 8799
As Special Agrarian Court in the determination of just
compensation
Annulment of MTC Judgment
Civil Cases for Copyright Infringement/Unfair Competition
Family Law cases
Civil Forfeiture of Proceeds of Money Laundering offenses
iv. Shari’ah District Court
Art. 413, P.D. 1083

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Muslims
Montaner v. Shari’ah District Court, G.R. No. 174975,
January 20, 2009
v. Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit

Trial Court
Sec. 33, B.P. 129 as amended
g. Concurrent/Confluent/Coordinate
i. Supreme Court and Regional Trial Court
Civil actions involving ambassadors, public ministers, consuls

Cases on the constitutionality of treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction (Sec. 5, 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
Vera v. Hon. Arca, G.R. No. L-25721, May 26, 1969

FACTS: With the judiciary called upon to apply the law on the facts as found by it and with the supremacy
of the Constitution as a cardinal postulate, the exercise of the power of the judicial review by a court of
justice, an inferior tribunal not accepted, is unavoidable. There are times, and not infrequently either,
when both a constitutional provision and a statute may govern the matter before it. In the event,
therefore, that there is a contrariety or repugnancy between them, such delicate and awesome power
comes into play. Even prior to adjudication, at the inception of a lawsuit, a party who seeks to annul such
legislative act may pray for a writ of preliminary injunction so that its operation would be arrested.
So it was in this case, respondent Judge Francisco Arca, now retired, indulging the other respondents 2 in
their plea for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Tax Census Act. 3 Petitioners 4
through this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition would have the validity of such preliminary
injunction tested. That is the initial issue before us. In the event that there was such an improvident
exercise of the power to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, does a petition for certiorari and
prohibition lie? That question, we must likewise resolve.
The other respondents, on February 4, 1966, started a special civil action for prohibition and injunction in
the sala of respondent Judge, seeking to declare the Tax Census Act 5 as unconstitutional, illegal and
invalid. The respondents in that suit were the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of
Finance and the Executive Secretary, now the petitioners before us. 6
Reference was made to its first section, which would require of every resident of the Philippines over 18
years of age within the month of February, 1962 and thereafter within the same month every four years to
file with the City or Municipal Treasurer in a form prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, a statement under oath containing such data as the name;
age; sex; nationality (if alien, the number of the Alien Registration Certificate, and aliases used, or
authorized to be used, if any), address; occupation; place of business; wife's or husband's name, age, sex,
occupation and place of business; and the members of his family, age and sex 7 as well as real property
owned, stating the nature thereof, location and assessed value thereof, and the annual gross income
therefrom during the preceding year; property held under lease stating also the nature, location and
assessed value thereof and the annual income during the preceding year; business subject to tax giving
the nature and location thereof and the annual gross receipts or earnings during the preceding year;
stocks in corporations or shares in partnerships or associations; inventories of assets particularly
machineries and buildings, merchandise on hand, unfinished goods and raw materials on hand, short and
long term receivables, and investments in stocks and bonds; professions or occupations, stating the kind
and location thereof and the annual salaries or gross receipts or earnings during the preceding year; and
personal properties except those worth less than five hundred pesos. 8
Two other sections were likewise cited in the petition. 9 It was then alleged that the Tax Census
Act has been enforced and implemented since 1962 and that the parties who filed the suit, now
respondents before us, "are required to make and file Sworn Statements of Assets, Income and Liabilities"
in accordance with the Act. 10 It was likewise asserted that the then Senator Camilo Osias filed a bill to
repeal such legislation and that the Secretary of Finance had admitted that it had not been able to
produce the result expected from it, the information yielded not justifying the trouble caused not only to
the public but also to the government. 11
The main portion of the petition before respondent Judge dealt with the alleged infirmity of the Tax
Census Act as being violative of the constitutional right to liberty, to the guarantee against self-
incrimination and the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures with a citation from both
Philippine and American cases in support of such a plea. 12 A writ of preliminary injunction was therein
likewise sought, the argument being advanced that the other respondents before us in the petition before
respondent Judge "would suffer great and irreparable damage arising from the non-filing of their Sworn
Statement of Assets, Income and Liabilities, as they are subject to criminal prosecution under Section 5 of
the Tax Census Law which is in clear violation of herein petitioners' aforesaid constitutional and legal rights
and which would render the judgment in favor of herein petitioners ineffectual" 13
The present petitioners, as respondents in such special civil action, in their answer filed on February 18,
1966, after denying specifically the allegations contained in the petition intended to establish the
unconstitutionality of the Tax Census Act, emphasized in the special and affirmative defenses interposed
that such an enactment was intended to implement the governmental function "for a just, equal and
efficient system of collecting taxes." The purpose of Republic Act No. 2070, in the language of its authors,
Senators Puyat and Roy, is to provide" "for a national tax census and the keeping of national registers in
every city and municipality of the Philippines. ... to provide the Department of Finance and the Bureau of
Internal Revenue with vital tax statistics upon which they can formulate sound policies and recommend
reforms in the tax system and in revenue to achieve efficiency and honesty in the collection of taxes. ... It is
believed that the establishment of a national tax census will enhance revenue collection, minimize evasion
of taxes, promote honesty and efficiency in revenue administration and, above all, give fair assurance that
every citizen pays his just proportion of the public burden, and thus develop in this country tax
consciousness which is vital to tax collection.; ..." 14 Stress was likewise laid on the undeniable power of
Congress to enact such a measure. Then came an extended discussion to demonstrate that the right
against self-incrimination as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures did not suffer any
infringement as a result of the challenged legislation. 15 There was a vehement opposition to the plea for
preliminary injunction. 16 The prayer was for a denial of the preliminary injunction and the dismissal of
the petition.
Then came the order of respondent Judge of February 21, 1966, which is the basis of the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition, noting that a hearing on the plea for the issuance of the writ for preliminary
injunction took place on February 19, 1966 and ordering the issuance thereof upon the posting of a bond
of P1,000.00, thus restraining petitioners before us from requiring the other respondents and other
similarly situated to file their sworn statements of assets, income and liabilities under Republic Act No.
2070. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, dated February 23, 1966.
Petitioners in this special civil action seek the setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by respondent Judge and would restrain him perpetually from further hearing the suit for prohibition
and injunction pending before him. Petitioners predicate their plea on the allegation that respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction as the Tax Census Act is
valid and constitutional, there being neither any self-incrimination feature nor unreasonable search and
seizure taint, there being moreover a presumption of its conformity with the fundamental law and no
grave and irreparable injury being suffered by the other respondents, petitioners before respondent
Judge. 17 Petitioners likewise justify their contention that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Judge in the issuance of such writ of preliminary injunction due to his failure to
consider the serious injury it would cause the paramount public interest, to realize that the enforcement
of penal laws cannot thus be restrained and to take note that the other respondents as petitioners before
him are guilty of laches. 18
This Court, in a resolution dated February 25, 1966, gave due course to the foregoing petition for certiorari
and prohibition and required respondents to file an answer within 10 days from notice.
Such an answer was filed on March 8, 1966, wherein after admitting the jurisdictional facts alleged as well
as the statement of the case as set forth in the petition, respondents specially denied the allegations in the
petition to the effect that Republic Act No. 2070 is valid and constitutional, reference being made to the
alleged violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination and against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 19 Then came the specific denial of that portion of the petition which pointed to the alleged
grave abuse of discretion of respondent Judge in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. 20 In their
special and affirmative defenses respondents would reiterate their argument against the validity of the Act
for the asserted transgression on the constitutional protection against self-incrimination and against
unreasonable searches and seizures. They did likewise question its validity as being in excess of the State's
taxing power, ignoring the fact that the Act is more properly a police power legislation.
At the hearing of the case scheduled for May 16, 1966, nobody appeared for any of the parties, petitioners
however filing a motion, seeking a period of 30 days within which to submit a memorandum. With its filing
on September 5, 1966, the arguments set forth in the petition to uphold the validity of the Tax Census Act
being reiterated therein and the respondents' reply memorandum on December 27, 1966, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
1. The primary question before us then is whether respondent Judge ought to have issued the writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Tax Census Act. The answer must be in the
negative.
As far back as March 23, 1909, more than 60 years ago, this Court, in the leading case of Devesa v. Arbes,
21 made the categorical pronouncement that the issuance of an injunction is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, the exercise of which is controlled not so much by the then applicable sections of
the Code of Civil Procedure, now the Rules of Court, but by the accepted doctrines, one of which is that it
should not be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined except in extraordinary
cases where material and irreparable injury will be done. For it is an action in equity appropriate only
when there can be no compensation in damages for the injury thus sustained and where no adequate
remedy in law exists. Such a holding reflected the prevailing American doctrine that there is no power
"the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion
or more dangerous in a doubtful case," being "the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended,"
except where the injury is great and irreparable. 22
We have remained committed to such an approach since then. Only last year, in Palanan Lumber &
Plywood Co. v. Arranz, 23 we emphasized: "It is not amiss to recall here that time and again this Court has
had occasion to deplore the readiness of some judges to grant and issue injunctions ex parte against acts
of public functionaries, ignoring the presumption of regularity and validity of official actuations, in
disregard of the deference and courtesy due to a coordinate branch of the government, and with no
other guide than the far from impartial assertions in pleadings of interested parties, which a summary
hearing would have shown to be either dubious or unfounded. The result has been that all too often, the
public interest has been prejudiced through unnecessary delays. It bears repeating here that preliminary
injunctions remain extraordinary remedies that should be dispensed with circumspection, and that both
sides should be first heard whenever possible."
It is true that the evil of ex parte injunction was stressed in the above excerpt. It is equally true that a
reminder was made of the extraordinary character of this remedy "to be dispensed with circumspection"
to avoid its invocation by interested parties whose claims could be shown "to be either dubious or
unfounded." What cannot be sufficiently pointed out is that a party seeking injunction must show that his
right to it must be clear and unmistakable. 24 The propriety of its issuance, therefore, requires
unmistakable proof "that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint
shows fact entitling him to such relief." 25
Whatever may be said of the original petition for prohibition and injunction filed by the other respondents
before the respondent Judge, it cannot be plausibly asserted the facts have been alleged which would
make manifest the violation of any of their constitutional rights. Instead of relying on facts, they
contended themselves with the general allegation that for them the Tax Census Act was null. It was
assailed for presumably violating the right to liberty, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the prohibition against self-incrimination. What was thus being sought in effect was a
declaration of invalidity based on the belief that its constitutional infirmity is apparent on its face.
Independently then of whether or not there has been an unwarranted departure from the governing
principle that the power to issue a preliminary injunction is not to be availed of indiscriminately, the more
specific and pivotal question is whether it could be exercised to restrain the enforcement of the Tax
Census Act under the circumstances disclosed. The answer, to repeat, must be in the negative.
In the order granting the petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, 26 it was stated
that a hearing on the matter took place on February 19, 1966. Then came a summary of the legal
arguments advanced both by the other respondents as petitioners and the then Solicitor General, now
Justice Antonio P. Barredo, on behalf of the petitioners before us, who were the parties proceeded against
before the lower court..
It is apparent on the face of such order that respondent Judge took into consideration purely legal
arguments, no evidence being introduced, both for and against the validity of the challenged statute.
Moreover, his attention was invited to the presumption of validity that every legislative act has in its favor
as well as the doctrine that the task of suspending the operation of the law "is a matter of extreme
delicacy because that is an interference with the official acts not only with the duly elected
representatives of the people in Congress but also of the highest magistrate of the land." 27 Respondent
Judge was deaf to the force of such cogent and persuasive constitutional law doctrines. He issued the
preliminary injunction nonetheless.
It is manifest that respondent Judge did overstep the bounds of discretion that set limits to the authority
he is entitled to exercise in the issuance of the preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of a
statute. There can be no dissent from the proposition that where the action required of a lower court
would be tantamount, even if only for a temporary period, to disregarding the clearly expressed will of the
two branches of the government, the need for caution is greatest. Here, respondent Judge was apparently
oblivious of such a need.
It might be said, of course, that the issuance of a preliminary injunction does not have the impress of
finality. After hearing on the merits, the legislative act could regain its full vigor and could then be
enforced. There is much to be said though in favor of Cooley's approach in the exercise of what he
referred to as the "high prerogative of declaring a legislative enactment void," a lower court, "conscious of
the fallibility of human judgment" being admonished to manifest the utmost reluctance. 28 That attitude
should be displayed even at the stage of considering whether a preliminary injunction should issue. Had
respondent Judge been of such a frame of mind, he would have arrived at a more acceptable conclusion.
He would have refrained from indulging the other respondents in their plea for a preliminary injunction.
To borrow from the language of Justice Laurel, he was hardly conscious of the truism "that a becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position they occupy in the interrelation
and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." 29 For if note be taken of the rigorous
requirement of a two-thirds vote for this Court to annul a statute, 30 the confidence displayed by
respondent Judge in thus restraining the enforcement of the act does indeed appear to be quite excessive,
under all the circumstances disclosed by the record. Correspondingly, it could be interpreted as the failure
to observe what Cooley referred to as "due caution and circumspection" as well as "the respect due to the
action and judgement of the lawmakers." 31
It might have been different if at the hearing the attention of respondent Judge was invited to facts which
would overcome the presumption of validity. Even with reference to municipal ordinances, Justice
Malcolm so clearly emphasized that "the presumption is all in favor of validity." 32 In the recent decision
of Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Asso. v. City Mayor of Manila, 33 we announced the view that
as underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation, "the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." It would appear clear, therefore, that the force of such a presumption would preclude the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, unless there be facts disclosed which would serve to weaken if not to
defeat the presumption of validity. No such facts have even been alleged.
It could be argued, of course, that what was sought before the lower court was to declare the Tax Census
Act void on its face which would do away with the requirement of a factual foundation to establish nullity.
Considering that its operation would serve to curtail individual liberty as every resident of the Philippines
above 18 years of age would be required to furnish certain information even against his will, such a plea
could indeed have been raised. 34 It could then be plausibly maintained that the need for a factual
foundation for invalidity vanishes. Support for such a view may be furnished by the cardinal principle that
on the whole the Bill of Rights does raise barriers to unwarranted intrusion and that in such a realm the
primacy of liberty demands that the individual be left alone. 35
That is so but it is equally undeniable that the liberty in its general sense enshrined by the Constitution
does not rule out in appropriate cases legislative deprivation as long as due process is observed. 36 While
courts should not relax its vigilance in assuring that no undue curtailment of liberty exists, still it is to be
admitted that except in cases where the specific freedoms of belief whether religious or secular, of
expression, of assembly and of association are concerned, 37 a domain where Congress is forbidden to
trespass except under the clear and present danger doctrine, 38 the need for introducing evidence to
counteract the assumption that a statute is valid may be unavoidable. So it was in this case. The absence
thereof sufficed to cast on the issuance of the preliminary injunction, now challenged, the mark of a grave
abuse of discretion.
Such a temporary injunction, in the language of Justice Black, "is in reality a suspension of an act, delaying
the date selected by Congress to put its chosen policies into effect. [Judicial] power to stay an act of
Congress, like judicial power to hold an act unconstitutional, is an awesome responsibility calling for the
utmost circumspection in its exercise." 39 Respondent Judge was of a different persuasion.
2. Petitioners thus are clearly entitled to the writ of certiorari prayed for . Respondent Judge did possess
discretion to issue or not to issue a preliminary injunction. That discretion, however, according to the
circumstances disclosed, was abused, and abused gravely. Even on a matter of less significance, this
Court has not hesitated to exercise its supervisory authority by correcting such failure to abide by
controlling legal principles with a petition for certiorari as the appropriate remedy. We have made that,
clear in past pronouncements. Thus, in a 1919 decision: 40 "We are also of the opinion that the action of a
Court of First Instance in exercising this power may, under certain conditions, amount to an abuse of
discretion and constitute an irregularity so far in excess of the proper power of the court as to give rise to
a right in the injured part to have relief by the writ of certiorari." So also in Silen v. Vera: 41 "Therefore, the
respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and abused his discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction the nullity of which is sought, and the writ of certiorari applied for should be issued.
There is much greater reason for a writ of preliminary injunction being set aside in this case by the grant of
the certiorari prayed for. It may serve to deter other inferior tribunals similarly minded. It may serve to
induce the conviction on the part of a lower court judge that it is a matter of the utmost seriousness to
stop the enforcement of an act after it has been enacted by a bicameral legislative body composed of the
House and the Senate and approved by the President, two of the coordinate branches of the government.
The greatest care should thus be taken before its operation is enjoined. Thereby, it would be manifesting
not judicial timidity but judicial wisdom.lawphi1.ñet
This is not to say that in no case should a writ of preliminary injunction issue. There are times the exercise
of such an authority is appropriate. Thus when there is an invasion of the preferred freedoms of belief, of
expression as well as the cognate rights to freedom of assembly and association, an affirmative response
to a plea for preliminary injunction would indeed be called for. The primacy of the freedom of the mind is
entitled to the highest respect. This is not such a case, however, and the writ of certiorari must be granted.
3. Petitioners likewise seek from us a writ of prohibition to restrain respondent Judge "from further
hearing the petition before him filed by the other respondents to annul and declare invalid the Tax Census
Act." Considering that as of now what had transpired was merely the hearing on the preliminary
injunction, this particular prayer obviously poses a more difficult question than the plea for a writ of
certiorari. There may be cases where at this particular stage reached, prohibition may be granted. 42
After due reflection, we feel that it is not one of them. To call a halt to any further proceeding before
respondent Judge in connection with this particular suit before him to invalidate such legislative act might
be to run the risk of acting prematurely. Since the lower court is possessed of the power to act in the
premises, respect must be accorded such authority in the absence of any compelling reason justifying
direct action on our part. It is our conclusion that under the circumstances disclosed, prohibition does not
lie.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for declaring null and void and setting aside the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on February 21, 1966 is granted. The writ of prohibition
sought is denied. Without pronouncement as to costs.
ii. Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, (Sandiganbayan), Regional Trial

Court
Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Quo Warranto,

Habeas Corpus, writs of Amparo, Habeas Data, Kalikasan,
injunctions
Mendoza v. Mayor Villas, G.R. No. 187256, February 23,

2011
FACTS: Before this Court is a Petition dated April 7, 200] filed by Constancio F. Mendoza and Sangguniang
Barangay of Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro. In the Petition, it is prayed that the Court: (1) set
aside the Order dated February 2, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) , Branch 43 in Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro and its Order dated March 17, 2009[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated February 2, 2009; and (2) direct the RTC to continue with the proceedings in Special Civil
Action No. 08-10 entitled Constancio Mendoza v. Mayor Enrilo Villas.
In the 2007 barangay elections, Mendoza obtained the highest votes for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, while respondent Liwanag Herato obtained
the highest number of votes for the position of Barangay Kagawad. Notably, Mayor Enrilo Villas was the
incumbent Mayor of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro at the time of the barangay elections.
After the elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed Mendoza as the duly-
elected Punong Barangay of Balatasan. Thus, the losing candidate, Thomas Pajanel, filed a petition for quo
warranto with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mansalay-Bulalacao which was docketed as Election Case
No. 407-B. The MTC issued a Decision dated February 23, 2008, disqualifying Mendoza and declaring that
Herato was entitled to succeed him as Punong Barangay with Herato garnering the highest number of
votes as a Barangay Kagawad. Mendoza appealed the MTC Decision to the COMELEC.
On February 28, 2008, Villas administered the Oath of Office to Herato.[5] Then, Villas issued
Memorandum No. 2008-03-010 dated March 3, 2008,[6] directing all department heads of the Municipal
Government to act only on documents signed or authorized by Herato.
Meanwhile, Mendoza sought the advice of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) as to who should exercise the powers of Punong Barangay of Balatasan given the prevailing
controversy.
In a letter dated April 11, 2008,[7] DILG Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero responded to
Mendozas inquiry informing Villas that Mendoza should occupy the post of Punong Barangay as there was
no Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the MTC Decision dated February 23, 2008.
Nevertheless, the Bulalacao Municipal Administrator, Edezer Aceron, by the authority of Villas,
issued a letter dated April 23, 2008[8] to respondent Marlon de Castro, Manager, Pinamalayan Branch,
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), requesting that transactions entered into by Mendoza in behalf of
Barangay Bulalacao should not be honored. In the same letter, Aceron dismissed the DILG letter dated
April 11, 2008, saying that it is merely advisory and not binding on the municipal government of Bulalacao
and the LBP.
In response, de Castro issued Villas and Mendoza a letter dated April 24, 2008,[9] advising both
parties that the LBP shall not honor any transaction with regard the accounts of Barangay Balatasan.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Petition dated May 5, 2008 for Mandamus with Damages and
Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 08-10
pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioners prayed that the
LBP be directed to release the funds of Barangay Balatasan to them in order to render necessary, basic
public services to the inhabitants of the barangay.
Thus, Villas and Herato filed an Answer dated May 16, 2008 interposing the following affirmative
defenses: (1) that the petition for mandamus was defective, being directed against two or more different
entities and requiring to perform different acts; and (2) that Mendoza does not have any clear and legal
right for the writ of mandamus.
On the other hand, the LBP also filed its Answer dated June 5, 2008, stating that its decision of
withholding the barangay funds was a mere act of prudence given the controversy surrounding the true
Punong Barangay of Balatasan while manifesting that it will release the funds to whom the Court directs it
to.
Thereafter, Villas and Herato filed a Motion to Dismiss dated November 7, 2008. In the Motion, a
copy of the COMELEC Resolution dated September 8, 2008 in COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY was
attached. This case originated from a disqualification case against Mendoza filed with the COMELEC by
Senen Familara before the conduct of the 2007 barangay elections. In the Resolution, the COMELEC
disqualified Mendoza as a candidate for Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan in the 2007 barangay
elections for having already served three (3) consecutive terms for the same position. In response,
Mendoza presented a Certification dated February 27, 2009[10] from the COMELEC which stated that
COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY is still pending with the Commission.
In an attempt to clarify the issues on the matter, Mendoza again sought the opinion of the DILG
regarding the controversy. Thus, the DILG issued another letter, denominated as DILG Opinion No. 5, Series
of 2009 dated January 2009,[11] reiterating its stance that the MTC Decision dated February 23, 2008 has
not yet become final and executory.
Nevertheless, the RTC issued the assailed order dated February 2, 2009 dismissing the petition on
the strength of the COMELEC Resolution dated September 8, 2008 disqualifying Mendoza from running in
the 2007 elections. As stated, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 2, 2009
was denied in an Order dated March 17, 2009.
From such orders the petitioners went directly to this Court.
The instant petition is a direct recourse to this Court from the assailed orders of the RTC. Notably,
petitioners did not cite the rule under the Rules of Court by which the petition was filed. If the petition is
to be treated as a petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition must be dismissed
outright for having been filed prematurely.
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
[12] a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court,
violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following
pronouncements:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This
is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
further over-crowding of the Courts docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, there are no special and important reasons that petitioners cite to justify their direct
recourse to this Court under Rule 65.
On the other hand, direct recourse to this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under Rule
45 when only questions of law are raised, as in this case. Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v. Tomas:[13]
Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following may be appealed to the Supreme Court
through a petition for review by certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts, whenever authorized by law. The
appeal must involve only questions of law, not of fact.
This Court has, time and time again, pointed out that it is not a trier of facts; and that, save for a
few exceptional instances, its function is not to analyze or weigh all over again the factual findings of the
lower courts. There is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as to what law pertains to a
certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final orders or resolutions of an MTC
should be appealed to the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the other hand, RTC
judgments, final orders or resolutions are appealable to the CA through either of the following: an
ordinary appeal if the case was originally decided by the RTC; or a petition for review under Rule 42, if the
case was decided under the RTC's appellate jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, final
orders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
xxxx
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions is provided
for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
xxxx
(c) Appeal by certiorari.In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1) to this
Court on questions of law only; or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA -- as they in fact
did. Unfortunately for petitioners, the CA properly dismissed their petition for review because of serious
procedural defects. This action foreclosed their only available avenue for the review of the factual findings
of the RTC. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Court shall exercise liberality and consider the instant petition as one filed under Rule
45. In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowners Association, Inc.,[14] citing Republic v.
Court of Appeals,[15] the Court noted that it has the discretion to determine whether a petition was filed
under Rule 45 or 65 of the Rules of Court:
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule
45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.
Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was not filed prematurely, it must still be dismissed
for having become moot and academic.
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections,[16] the Court defined a moot and
academic case as follows:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event has transpired that has
rendered this case moot and academic and subject to dismissal. This is because, as stated in Fernandez v.
Commission on Elections,[17] whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical
legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced. Mendozas term of office has expired
with the conduct of last years local elections. As such, Special Civil Action No. 08-10, where the assailed
Orders were issued, can no longer prosper. Mendoza no longer has any legal standing to further pursue
the case, rendering the instant petition moot and academic.
CREBA v. DAR Secretary, G.R. 183409, June 18, 2010

FACTS: This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to
nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative for having
been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and
unconstitutional.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private
corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and
housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and
services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development
financing.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the
DAR whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3 entitled
"Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Use.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily
suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slowdown of housing projects, which,
in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial
prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED
AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
II.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO
REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his discretion is AO No. 01-
02, as amended, which states:
Section 3. Applicability of Rules. – These guidelines shall apply to all applications for conversion,
from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use, such as:
xxxx
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU or by way of a
Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after
the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988,
HELD:
This petition must be dismissed.
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This
is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication
of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier
of facts.
This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a) Chavez v.
Romulo,21 on citizens’ right to bear arms; (b) Government of [the] United States of America v. Hon.
Purganan,22 on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla,23 on
government contract involving modernization and computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora,24 on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Hon. Fortich v.
Hon. Corona,25 on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the
approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and
important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due course to this
petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it seeks
the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02,
as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory
Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.28 Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Emphasis supplied.)
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are involved.
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Also- Hierarchy of Court doctrine (Supra.)
Hierarchy of courts; exceptions to the doctrine.
"x x x.
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this

Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort
and
must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its
constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its
docket.16 Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly
stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded
by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders
were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate
and direct handling of the case.
h. Territorial Jurisdiction
 in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional
C. Manner of Acquiring Jurisdiction
a. Over Subject Matter
Allied Domecq Phil. v. Hon. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004
1. What is jurisdiction over the subject matter?
o Power to hear and decide cases, conferred by law
2. How do we determine jurisdiction over the subject matter?
o Allegations in the complaint
3. What are the exceptions to the rule?
o Exception to the rule that subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint BUT if the actual issues are evident from the records of the case, and then we
need to apply the applicable law.
In this case, what is the case all about?
Petitioner filed complaint for injunction and damages. Yes, allegations are there, but a party is under a law,
which specifies that injunction may be given by CA and SC. Petitioner is registered under the law, and the
law specifically provides which court or tribunal has jurisdiction.
Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013
Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165849, December 10, 2007
Barayuga v. Adventist University, G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011
City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24,
2011
Petitioner filed in the RTC for original registration of title. The Republic and the respondent opposed the
application, as it remains in the public domain. Opposed as the RTC has no jurisdiction to the case. The
subject property is not alienable and disposable as it is a foreshore land which is not registrable.
Thus the court have jurisdiction over the case?
According to the allegations in the complaint, regardless whether the complainant is entitled to the
availments of the suit. But here comes the defendant, who said NO.
The Court said, the rule still remains. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined in the
allegations in the complaint, and not in the defenses in the answer or in the motion to dismiss.
Republic v. Bantigue Point Development, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012
How do we know the value of the land involved? Look at the assessed value in the tax declaration. The
value of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways 1. Affidavits 2. Averments
3. Categorized
Tax declaration: contains market value & assessed value
We need to look at assessed value as stated in the tax declaration.
This case is about land registration. If it is about land registration, we need to look at the three options.
b. Over the Case
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, March 29, 2004
Jurisdiction over the subject matter v Jurisdiction over the case
 When does the court have jurisdiction over the case—simple, when there is a case filed before
it. Thus, this is specific.
c. Over the Issues – READ PLS
Rule 10, Sec. 5, Rules of Court

General rule: For issue to be raised in the trial, you put in the pleadings.
Lazo v. Republic Surety, G.R. No. L-27365, January 30, 1970

Complaint: extrajudicial foreclosure of the complainant. Lazo claimed the foreclosure is invalid because
the plaintiff has paid the mortgage loan and continued to make payments.
Buce v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136913, May 12, 2000
Mercader v. DBP, G.R. No. 130699, May 12, 2000
This case was brought on appeal, and issue ruled upon by the trial court
DBP:
d. Over the Person or Party
Plaintiff
Cesar v. Hon. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415, October 31, 2006
Defendant
1. by service of summons- Rule 14, Secs. 1-3, Rules of Court
i. personal service- Sec. 6

ii. substituted service- Sec. 7
iii. service by publication- Sec. 14
iv. extra-territorial service- Sec. 15
2. by voluntary appearance- Rule 14, Sec. 20, Rules
of Court
Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143736, August

11, 2004
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the petition to annul the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch
73, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner Ofelia Herrera-Felix.
It was alleged therein that, during the period from November 16, 1992 to December 14, 1992,
the Felix Spouses purchased from the respondent tubs of assorted fish.
The Felix spouses had an outstanding obligation and the respondent prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in its favor.
The trial court granted the respondent’s prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond
which was posted.
The Sheriff levied and took custody of some of the personal properties of the Felix spouses. A
copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, summons and complaint were served on them at their
residence, through the sister of Ofelia Herrera-Felix, Ma. Luisa Herrera. According to sheriff’s return,
Herrera was out of the country.
The Felix spouses, through their lawyer, filed a motion praying for an extension of time to file
their answer to the complaint. The trial court issued an Order granting the motion.
However, the Felix Sps. Failed to file their answer to the complaint.
The respondent then filed a Motion to declare said spouses in default, which was granted by the
court.
Copies of the said decision were mailed to the Sps and their counsel, by registered mail. The copy
of the decision addressed to the spouses was returned to the court after two notices for having been
“Unclaimed”. However, then counsel for the Felix Sps received his copy of the decision.
The decision of the trial court became final and executory after the Felix sps failed to appeal the
same.
The respondent filed a motion for a writ of execution. A copy thereof was served on the said
spouses by registered mail, but they failed to oppose the motion. The court thereafter issued an order
granting the motion and directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The counsel for the Felix spouses
received a copy of the said order. Thereafter, the personal properties of the latter were levied upon and
sold by the sheriff at public auction with respondent as the highest bidder. The Sheriff executed a
Certificate of Sale of personal properties.
Petitioner Ofelia Felix, represented by her sister, filed a petition with the CA under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court for the nullification of the trial court's judgment by default, the writ of execution issued by
the said court, and the sale of her properties at public auction. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
complaint and summons were handed over to her sister, Ma. Luisa Herrera, who was merely a visitor in
her house and, as such, was not a valid substituted service under Rule 14, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.
She also alleged that her husband Restituto Felix had died as early as April 23, 1988, as evidenced by his
Certificate of Death.
In its comment on the petition, the respondent alleged that the substituted service of the
complaint and summons on the petitioner, who was then temporarily outside the Philippines, through her
sister Ma. Luisa Herrera, was valid and effective. The respondent, likewise, averred that even if such
substituted service on the petitioner was defective, the defect was cured when the latter, through her
counsel, Atty. Celestino C. Juan, appeared in court and moved for an extension of time to file her
responsive pleading. The respondent also maintained that the petitioner and her counsel were served
with copies of the decision of the court a quo, but that the petitioner failed to appeal the decision.
The petitioner, through her sister, Jovita Herrera-Seña, now comes to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. She alleges that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person through the service of the complaint and summons
on her sister, Ma. Luisa Herrera. She maintains that the latter was a mere visitor in her house, not a
resident therein; hence, the decision of the trial court is null and void. She further alleges that even
assuming the validity of the trial court's decision, such decision never became final and executory since
she was not served a copy of the same. As such, the writ of execution issued by the trial court, the
sale of her personal properties at public auction, as well as the issuance of the Certificate of Sale, are null
and void. She asserts that the actuations of both the trial court and the Sheriff deprived her of her right to
due process.
HELD: THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER HAVE NO MERIT.

The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of the complaint and
summons on him, either by personal service or by substituted service or by extra-territorial service thereof
or by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel. In this case, the petitioner
appeared before the court, through counsel, and filed a motion for extension of time to file her answer to
the complaint which the trial court granted. She even admitted in the said motion that she was served
with a copy of the complaint as well as the summons. The admissions made in a motion are judicial
admissions which are binding on the party who made them. Such party is precluded from denying the
same unless there is proof of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
By filing the said motion, through counsel, the petitioner thereby submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in
whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of entering an
appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to
enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a
formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear
without such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear
by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the
jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. When
the appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court .If his motion is for any other
purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
The essence of due process is a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one's defense. What the law proscribes, therefore, is the lack of opportunity to be heard. A
party who opts not to avail of the opportunity to answer cannot complain of procedural due process.
There can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings
but failed to do so through his own fault.
JAPRIL Dev. Corp. v. Security Bank, G.R. No. 190107, June 6,
2011
FACTS: JAPRL Development Corp (JAPRL), a domestic corporation engaged in fabrication, manufacture and
distribution of steel products, applied for a credit facility in the amount of 50 million pesos with Security
Bank Corporation (SBC). The Application was approved and the credit agreement took effect on July 15,
1996.
The petitioners JAPRL chairman and president executed a continuing suretyship agreement (CSA)
in favor of SBC wherein they guaranteed the due and full payment and performance of JAPRL’s guaranteed
obligations under the credit facility. JAPRL’s existing load obligations were restructured.
SBC soon discovered material inconsistencies in the financial statements given by MRM vis-à-vis those
submitted by
JAPRL when it applied for a credit facility, drawing SBC to conclude that JAPRL committed
misrepresentation.
As paragraph 10 (c) of the Credit Agreement4 provided, if "any representation or warranty,
covenant or undertaking embodied [therein] and [in] the Credit Instrument or in any certificate,
statement or document submitted to SBC turns out to be untrue or ceases to be true in any material
respect, or is violated or not complied with," such will constitute an event of default committed by JAPRL
and its sureties. FBC the filed letter of demand, and petitioners failed to comply with such demand.
Hence, SBC filed a complaint for sum of money with application for issuance of writ of
preliminary attachment before the RTC.
During the hearing of the preliminary attachment, SBC’s counsel manifested that it received a
copy of a Stay Order issued by the RTC of Quezon City, wherein JAPRL’s petition for rehabilitation was
lodged. The Makati RTC once ordered in open court the archiving of SBC’s complaint for sum of money
until disposition of the QC RTC of JAPRL’s petition for rehabilitation.
When Makati RTC reduced to writing its open court, it instead declared the dismissal of SBC’s
complaint without prejudice.
When the case was called for hearing, plaintiff’s counsel manifested that they received a Stay
Order from the RTC Quezon City, relative to the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan filed by defendant
JAPRL Dev Corp and in view thereof he prayed that the present case be archived instead. However, the
Court is of view to have the case dismissed without prejudice so that a disposition be made on the case.
SBC filed a motion for reconsideration to which Limson and Arollado separately filed an
opposition wherein they claimed that summons were not served on them, hence the Makati RTC failed
to acquire jurisdiction over their person.
Meanwhile, the proposed rehabilitation of JAPRL was disapproved. On SBC’s motion, the Makati
RTC thus reinstated SBC’s complaint to its docket.
Petitioners later filed before the Makati RTC a manifestation (Ad Cautelam) informing that a Stay
Order dated March 13, 2006 was issued, this time by the Calamba RTC, Branch 34, in a new petition for
rehabilitation filed by JAPRL and its subsidiary, RAPID Forming Corporation, and praying for the archiving
of SBC’s complaint.
The appellate court held that Limson and Arollado voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, despite the qualification that the filing of their respective "Opposition[s] Ad
Cautelam" and "Manifestation[s] Ad Cautelam," was "by way of special appearance" they having sought
affirmative relief by praying for the archiving of SBC’s complaint.
The Manifestations and Oppositions filed by the individual private respondents to the court a quo
have the purpose of asking the court to archive the case until the final resolution of either the Petition for
Rehabilitation filed by private respondent corporation JAPRL in Quezon City or the subsisting Petition for
Rehabilitation filed in Calamba City, Laguna.
Clearly, the purpose of those pleadings is to seek for affirmative relief, (i.e. Suspending the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-1036) from the said court. By those pleadings asking for affirmative
relief, the individual private respondents had voluntarily appeared in court. As expressly stated in Rule
14, Section 20, of the Rules of Court, the defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. It is well settled that any form of appearance in court, by the
defendant, by his agent authorized to do so, or by attorney, is equivalent to service except where such
appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
A reading of the separate Oppositions Ad Cautelam by Limson and Arollado to SBC’s Motion for
Reconsideration25shows that they did not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction. Albeit both pleadings
contained prefatory statements that the two did not receive summons, they pleaded defenses in their
favor,
When a defendant’s appearance is made precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, it cannot be considered as appearance in court. Limson and Arollado glossed over the alleged
lack of service of summons, however, and proceeded to exhaustively discuss why SBC’s complaint could
not prosper against them as sureties . They thereby voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the Makati RTC .
Rapid City Realty v. Villa, G.R. No. 184197, February 11, 2010
FACTS: Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of subdivision plans, mandamus and dmages against several defendants including Sps. Orlando and
Lourdes (respondents). After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, the process server
resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents’ househelp who did not
acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names.
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to filed their answer, prompting petitioner to file a
“motion to declare defendants in default” which the trial court granted on May 3, 2005.
More than 8 months thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Loft Order of Default, claiming that
on January 27, 2006 they officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes .And that
they denied the existence of two helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of
summons.
The trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein respondents 5 days to file their
Answer. Respondents did not file answer (this seems to be a recurring theme). Petitioner once again filed a
Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court granted.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration on the second order declaring them in
default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons due to invalid service of summons.
Trial court denied the respondents’ Omnibus Motion and proceeded to receive evidence ex parte
for petitioner.
Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial court’s orders before the CA.
In the meantime, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
The appellate court annulled the trial court’s orders declaring respondents in default for the
second time.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance.
Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lif order of
default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a
special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.
In their first Motion to Lift the Order of Default8 dated January 30, 2006,
respondents alleged:
4. In the case of respondents, there is no reason why they should not receive the Orders of this
Honorable Court since the subject of the case is their multi-million real estate property and
naturally they would not want to be declared in default or lose the same outright without the
benefit of a trial on the merits;
5. It would be the height of injustice if the respondents is [sic] denied the equal protection of the
laws[;]
6. Respondents must be afforded "Due process of Law" as enshrined in the New Constitution,
which is a basic
right of every Filipino, since they were not furnished copies of pleadings by the plaintiff and the
Order dated May
3, 2005;
x x x x9
and accordingly prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, . . . it is most respectfully prayed . . . that the Order dated May 5, 2005 declaring
[them] in default be LIFTED.
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance
for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons.
Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.
Allan Co v. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinson’s objection over the
improper resort to summons by publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in
personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the issue
of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the
filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either
through the service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid
service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically
stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had
earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time
provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional
appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication
issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently,
Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the
jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he
effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction. He is now estopped from
asserting otherwise, even before this Court.
Lhuillier v. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15,

2010
Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good on account of the necessity of
dispensing justice.
Petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint2 for damages against respondent British
Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28,
2005, she took respondent’s flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on
board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondent’s flight
attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However,
Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were
to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!"
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another
flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in
the business class section to lecture on plane safety.
Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant,
uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane.
Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the plane’s safety regulations being a
frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away
from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that "We don’t like your attitude."
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent
through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.
Respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent.
Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention,5 Article 28(1)
of which provides:
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of
domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.
Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondent’s
principal place of business is in London; c) petitionervbought her ticket in
Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome);6 and d) Rome, Italy is
petitioner’s place of destination,vthen it follows that the complaint should
only be filed in the proper courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent because the summons
was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not
its resident agent in the Philippines.
Issue: RESPONDENT AIR CARRIER OF PASSENGERS, IN FILING ITS

MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CASE AND OVER ITS PERSON MAY BE DEEMED AS HAVING IN
FACT AND IN LAW SUBMITTED ITSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER
COURT, ESPECIALLY SO, WHEN THE VERY LAWYER ARGUING FOR IT IS
HIMSELF THE RESIDENT AGENT OF THE CARRIER.
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the
provisions of the Wawrsaw Convention.
Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special
appearance of counsel, is not deemed to have voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when the latter stated in its Comment/Opposition
to the Motion for Reconsideration that "Defendant [is at a loss] x x x how the
plaintiff arrived at her erroneous impression that it is/was Euro-Philippines
Airlines Services, Inc. that has been making a special appearance since x x x
British Airways x x x has been clearly specifying in all the pleadings that it
has filed with this Honorable Court that it is the one making a special
appearance."
Even if a party "challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
as by reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he also
invokes other grounds for the dismissal of the action under Rule 16, he is not
deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the
jurisdiction over his person.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised
therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What
the rule on voluntary appearance – the first sentence of the above-quoted
rule – means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is
without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his
defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of
summons.
A special appearance before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over
the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes
other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the
movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is
not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in
filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court cannot
be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial
court.
by voluntary submission
Rodriguez vs. Alikpala, G.R. No. L-38314, June 25, 1974
FACTS: Failing to levy on the properties of the respondents Federico and Felissa Tolentino because of a
prohibitory judgment rendered by the respondent CFI of Manila, the petitioners Rodriguez and Santos
have come to this Court on appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner s filed an action with the city court in Manila against the spouses Manuel and Fe
Rebollado for recover of sum of money. A writ of attachment was issues and served on the Rebollados at
their store in Divisoria market.
Rodriguez agreed to cause the suspension of the attachment writ on condition that Fe
Rebollado's parents, the now respondents Federico and Felisa Tolentino, would bind themselves, jointly
and severally with the Rebollado's, to pay the entire obligation subject of the suit. Felisa Tolentino who
was then present agreed to this proposal, and so the petitioner Santos, at the request of the petitioner
Rodriguez, drew up a motion for judgment on a compromise embodying the terms of the agreement of
the parties.
The Rebollado's subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the compromise, thus
prompting the petitioner Rodriguez to ask the city court for a writ of execution not only against
the Rebollados but as well against the Tolentino's.
After hearing duly had, the respondent court rendered judgment excluding the
Tolentinos from the effects of the writ of execution granted by the city court in civil case 204601.
It is this judgment that is the subject of the present appeal.
In excluding the Tolentino's from the effects of the judgment on a compromise rendered
by the city court, the respondent court invokes two reasons: first, the dispositive portion of the
judgment quoted above cannot be executed because it does not explicitly enjoin the Tolentino's
to pay, jointly and severally with the Rebollado's, the amount due to the plaintiff; and second,
the city court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the Tolentino's and, therefore, the
latter cannot be bound by the judgment rendered.
HELD:
The respondent court is in error on both counts.
The dispositive portion of the judgment in civil case 204601 of the city court approving
the compromise and enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties" is adequate for purposes
of execution. These rights and obligations, although not reproduced in the dispositive portion of
the judgment in obvious avoidance of repetition, are understood to constitute the terms under
which execution may issue.
Moreover, because they signed and executed the compromise agreement willingly and
voluntarily, and, in a manner of speaking, with their eyes wide open, they should be bound by its
terms. A person cannot, to paraphrase Justice Alejo Labrador, repudiate the effects of his
voluntary acts simply because they do not suit him. In the very words of Justice Labrador, "in a
regime of law and order, repudiation of an agreement validly entered into can not be made
without any ground or reason in law or in fact for such repudiation."
And even if we assume that estoppel does not apply in this case, we nonetheless cannot
shunt aside the principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not formally or originally a
party to a litigation may nevertheless be acquired, under proper conditions, thru the voluntary
appearance of that person before the court. Thus, judgment may be directed against one who,
although not a formal party in the case, has assumed or participated in the defense. By coming
forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on a compromise and,
furthermore, by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case as would place
them in unequivocal liability, together with the Rebollado's, to the plaintiff therein, the
Tolentino's effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the city court. They were
and are thus subject to its judgment.
e. Over the Res
Midgely v. Hon. Fernando, G.R. No. L-34314, May 13, 1975

FACTS: Sofia Pastor de Midgely, a British subject residing at Cura Planelles, 10 Cura Jardin, Alicante, Spain,
filed this special civil action of certiorari against Judge Pio B. Ferandos and Lewelyn Barlito Quemada in
order to set aside the Judge's order dated May 8, 1971 which denied her motion to dismiss based on lack
of jurisdiction and on article 222 of the Civil Code.
She prayed for a declaration that the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Toledo City, Branch IX has no
jurisdiction over her person and properties and for the dismissal of the complaint against her in Civil
Case No. 274-T of that court.
Through counsel, Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor, Jr. spouses entered a special appearance and filed
a motion to dismiss onthe ground of lack of jurisdiction. They contended that as nonresidents they could
be summoned only with leave of courtand that the requirements laid down in section 17 of Rule 14 should
have been observed. As additional, ground they alleged that the complaint does not show that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, as required in article 222 of the Civil Code in suits between
members of the same family (See sec. 1[j], Rule 16, Rules of Court).
Quemada was appointed special administrator of the decedent's estate.
As such administrator and as heir of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., Quemada filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu at Toledo City a complaint dated December 7, 1970 against the spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr.
and Maria Elena Achaval, Mrs. Midgely,Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation and
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. to settle the question of ownership over certain real properties and the rights in
some mining claims, to obtain an accounting and payment of the royalties and income thereof and for the
payment of damages amounting to P25,000. Quemada's theory is that those properties and income belong to
the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr.
Quemada opposed the motion to dismiss.
As already stated, Judge Ferandos denied the motion. He ruled that Mrs. Midgely and the Pastor,
Jr. spouses had been properly summoned.
The lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Midgely by reason of
her voluntary appearance. The reservation in her motion to dismiss that she was making a
special appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction over her person may be disregarded.
It may be disregarded because it was nullified by the fact that in her motion to dismiss
she relied not only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person but also on the ground
that there was no showing that earnest efforts were exerted to compromise the case and
because she prayed "for such other relief as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper"
(necessarily admitted court’s jurisdiction).
"When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court . A
special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion
should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter."
The case may be viewed from another angle. Supposing arguendo that the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Midgely, still her motion to dismiss was
properly denied because Quemada's action against her may be regarded as a quasi in rem action
where jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not necessary and where
service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due
process.
An action quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach
and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein.
Under section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper (1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines, and (4) when
defendant nonresident's property has been attached within the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14,
Rules of Court).
In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected
out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, and (3) service of summons may be effected in any other manner
which the court may deem sufficient. That third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was
substantially complied with in this case.
In Civil Case No. 274-T the subject matter of the action for reconveyance consists of
properties of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. which are located in Cebu. Mrs. Midgely claims an actual interest
in those properties. She has been receiving a share of the income therefrom. Therefore, the
extraterritorial service of summons upon her was proper. As already noted, the action against
her is quasi in rem.
The record does not show whether Judge Ferandos was consulted by the Clerk of Court
and by Quemada's counsel when the service of summons was effected through the Philippine
Embassy in Madrid. But although there was no court order allowing service in that manner, that
mode of service was later sanctioned or ratified by Judge Ferandos in his order of May 8, 1971.
In another order he corrected the defect in the summons by giving Mrs. Midgely the sixty-day
reglementary period for answering the complaint.
Perkins v. Dizon, G.R. No. 46631, November 16, 1939

Macahilig v. Heis of Magalit, G.R. No. 141423, November 15, 2000
Jurisdiction
Petitioner further contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
turnover of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit, because of its earlier ruling that it had no jurisdiction over said
property.
We cannot place much weight on this Order. First, the September 9, 1992 Motion for
Reconsideration taken up in said Order has not been attached to or alleged in the herein Petition. Hence,
we cannot fully consider the nature of the claim that was denied by this Order or speculate on why the
trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the movant’s claim.
We cannot even guess which Order the unidentified movant wanted to be reconsidered.
More important, it is too late in the day for petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. She
clearly submitted to its authority by her unqualified participation in Civil Case No. 3517. We cannot allow
her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation
in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. 26 One
cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to
secure affirmative relief against one’s opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. 27 If, by deed or
conduct, a party has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the former
from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to
the
latter.
Petitioner insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the res of Lot 4417 when it issued its
September 17, 1992 Order. Again, we disagree.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either

(a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody
of the law; or
(b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective.
In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the
court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of the
Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents’ predecessors in interest. Without taking actual
physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized potential jurisdiction or potential custody
over the res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the
surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
See: Joya v. Judge Marquez, G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the
complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive
process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction
over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of
the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the
pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or
stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to
evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation).
This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in
question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by
provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or
subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or
suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Brief History
Code of Civil Procedure or Act No. 190- August 7, 1901

(Old) Rules of Court- July 1, 1940
Revised Rules of Court- January 1, 1964
(New) Rules of Court- July 1, 1997
Rules 1-71
RULE 1- GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 1. Title of the Rules of Court
Alvero v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-286, March 29, 1946 (Supra.)

Primicias v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953
Sec. 2. In what courts applicable
Sec. 4. In what case not applicable
GSIS v. Villaviza, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010

SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI,
Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal
Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his right to
file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely
translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges
are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with
clear and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a
"suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies."10 It means that the provisions in
the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There
is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required
answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
and evidence submitted by the prosecution." Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
finds application in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not
deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and incorrect
conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint.11 Thus, even if respondents failed to file their
answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct
in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must
not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners,
who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the
formal charges.
Reyes v. Barrios, G.R. No. 172841, December 15, 2010

Sec. 3. Cases governed
A. Kinds of Actions in the Rules of Court
a) Civil Action
b) Criminal Action
c) Special Proceedings
B. Kinds of Civil Actions in the Rules of Court
a) Ordinary Civil Action

b) Special Civil Action
DBM v. Manila’s Finest Retirees, G.R. No. 169466, May 9, 2007

In a further bid to scuttle respondents’ entitlement to the desired retirement benefits, the
petitioners fault the trial court for ordering the immediate adjustments of the respondents’ retirement
benefits when the basic petition filed before it was one for declaratory relief. To the petitioners, such
petition does not essentially entail an executory process, the only relief proper under that setting being a
declaration of the parties’ rights and duties.
Petitioners’ above posture is valid to a point. However, the execution of judgments in a petition
for declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible. In Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation[PDIC] v.
Court of Appeals,27 wherein the Court affirmed the order for the petitioners therein to pay the balance of
the deposit insurance to the therein respondents, we categorically ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes
the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A
special civil action is afer all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally
governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject
matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental
nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions
if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules
governing special civil actions.
Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action
and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an … ordinance, should take place." In the present case,
no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees
imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still
proper because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved,
although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid …. In its
petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the enforcement of the
municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant to the
said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the respondents
be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of
the case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the respondents
in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced.
Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would happen if the
ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
Amberti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79981, 2 April 1991

A careful scrutiny of the records shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 10786 is a special civil action for
certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which
petitioner filed on December 8, 1986 to annul the judgment of the trial court of January 10, 1986 and the
order of denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of November 4, 1986 on the grounds of lack of
due process and grave abuse of discretion.12 As above related, before respondents could submit their
comment, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw the petition stating that she was no longer interested in
pursuing the case. The motion was granted by the Appellate Court in its resolution of January 9, 1987. On
March 24, 1987, said resolution having become final, entry of judgment was issued and the case was
remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment.
Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court under the heading SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS provides
as follows:
Sec. 1. Preceding rules applicable in special civil actions. — The provisions of the preceding
rules shall apply in special actions for interpleader, declaratory relief and similar remedies,
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, eminent domain, foreclosure of
mortgage, partition, forcible entry and detainer, and contempt, which are not inconsistent
with or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rules relating to such special civil
actions.
From the foregoing, it is clearly stated that in special civil actions the preceding rules are
applicable in a supplementary manner.
Applying the foregoing rules in a supplementary manner, upon the
withdrawal of a petition in a special civil action before the answer or comment
thereto has been filed, the case shall stand as though no appeal has been taken, so
that the judgment or order of the lower court being questioned becomes
immediately final and executory. Thus, a resolution granting the withdrawal of such
a petition is with prejudice and petitioner is precluded from bringing a second
action based on the same subject matter.
C. Kinds of Civil Actions as to Cause
a) Real Actions
Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76431, October 16, 1989
See Rule 4, Sec. 1
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner's action for annulment of the real estate
mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of Fortune Building is a personal action or a real action for venue
purposes.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the Court of First
Instance of the province where the property or any part thereof lies.
Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the Court of First Instance where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives
and nature of the action which is to recover real property.
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined
with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the
recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the
annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime
objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue
(Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16).
"Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the
property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an
action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and
tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies."
b) Personal Actions
Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013

To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the serving
officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only afer the attempt at
personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to
substituted service.
Chua v. Total Office Products, G.R. No. 152808, September 30, 2005
Paderanga v. Hon. Buissan, G.R. No. L-49475, September 28, 1993
See Rule 4, Sec. 2
c) Mixed Actions
De la Cruz v. El Seminario, G.R. No. L-5402, January 28, 1911

Emergency Loan Pawnshop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129184, February
28, 2001
D. Kinds of Civil Actions as to Object
a) Action in Personam
Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009

Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59731, January 11, 1990
b) Action in Rem
Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003

Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
c) Action Quasi in Rem
Spouses Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009 (Supra.)

Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998
d) Mixed Action
BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, July 5, 1996
E. Kinds of Actions as to Place of Filing of Complaint
a) Local Action
b) Transitory Action
Sec. 5. Commencement of action
Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-30738, July 30, 1982

See: Sotelo vs. Dizon, 67 Phil. 537; Cabrera vs. Tianco, 8 SCRA 582
Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987 (Supra.)
Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006 (Supra.)
Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989 (Supra.)
Phil. First Insurance v. Paramount Gen. Insurance, G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008
(Supra.)
Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders, G.R. No.
192649, March 9, 2011 (Supra.)
Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013 (Supra.)
Sec. 6. Construction
Anama v. Phil. Savings Bank, G.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998
Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence, G.R. No. 150870, December 11, 2002
Republic v. Kenrick Development, G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006
Building Care Corp. v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, December 10, 2012
Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009
Llamas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149588, August 16, 2010
RULE 2- CAUSE OF ACTION
Sec. 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of

Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping, G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010
FACTS: This case concerns the right of dissenting stockholders to demand payment of the value
of their shareholdings. A corporate move with regard to the removal of pre-emptive right to
newly shares of stock were deemed by the dissenting stockholders as prejudicial to their
interests, so they voted against the amendment and demanded payment of their shares. The
respondent found the fair value of the shares demanded by the petitioners as unacceptable.
There was a disagreement on the valuation of the shares, which led to the parties to constitute
an appraisal committee pursuant to the Corporation Code. The appraisal committee made its
valuation, and the petitioners demanded payment based on it.
On a letter to the petitioners, the respondent refused the petitioners’ demand since it
had no unrestricted retained earnings at that time. Thus, the petitioners sued the respondent for
collection and damages in the RTC in Makati City, initially assigned to Branch 132.
The petitioners then filed their motion for summary judgment, to which the respondent
opposed.
During the pendency of the motion for partial summary judgment, however, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 133 transmitted the records to the Clerk of Court for re-raffling to any
of the RTC’s special commercial courts in the Makati City due to the case being an intra-
corporate dispute. Hence, the case was re-raffled to Branch 142.
Nevertheless, because the principal office of the respondent was in Manila, the case was
ultimately transferred to Branch 46 of RTC Manila presided by Judge Tipon.
After the conference set in the case which the petitioners counsel did not attend, Judge
Tipon issued an order, granting the petitioners motion for partial summary judgment.
Respondent corporation filed a motion for reconsideration.
On the schedules hearing of the MR, the petitioners filed a motion for immediate
execution and a motion to strike out motion for reconsideration.
The Judge denied the MR and granted the petitioner’s motion for immediate execution.
Thus, a writ for execution was issued.
Aggrieved, the respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to
challenge the order of Judge Tipon. The CA issued a TRO. The TRO lapsed without the CA issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the execution. Thereupon, the sheriff resumed the
enforcement of the writ of execution.
The CA promulgated its decision in favor of the respondent. It is clear that the Turners’
(petitioners) appraisal right is subject to the legal condition that no payment shall be made to
any dissenting stockholder unless the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books
to cover such payment.
In this case, it was established that there were no URE when the Turners filed their
complaint. The Turners’ right to payment had not yet accrued when they filed their Complaint on
Jan 22, 2001, albeit their appraisal had already existed.
In Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., the Supreme
Court declared that:
Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the
cause of action must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid
conditions precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute,
fixed by agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with
before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has been such as to
prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition.
It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of
action, while a cause of action consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of
action. The right of action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to
the action and may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitations, through
estoppel, or by other circumstances which do not affect the cause of action. Performance or
fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon which a right of action depends must be
sufficiently alleged, considering that the burden of proof to show that a party has a right of
action is upon the person initiating the suit.
The Turners’ right of action arose only when petitioner had already retained earnings in
the amount ofP11,975,490.00 on March 21, 2002; such right of action was inexistent on January
22, 2001 when they filed the Complaint.
Subject to certain qualifications, and except as otherwise provided by law, an action

commenced before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be
dismissed. The fact that the cause of action accrues afer the action is commenced and while it
is pending is of no moment. It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either
at law or in equity, that to recover at all there must be some cause of action at the
commencement of the suit. There are reasons of public policy why there should be no
needless haste in bringing up litigation, and why people who are in no default and against
whom there is as yet no cause of action should not be summoned before the public tribunals
to answer complaints which are groundless. An action prematurely brought is a groundless
suit. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is
commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one
while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such
afer-accrued cause of action is not permissible.
The Turners’ apprehension that their claim for payment may prescribe if they wait for
the petitioner to have unrestricted retained earnings is misplaced. It is the legal possibility of
bringing the action that determines the starting point for the computation of the period of
prescription. Stated otherwise, the prescriptive period is to be reckoned from the accrual of their
right of action. Accordingly, the SC hold that public respondent exceeded its jurisdiction when it
entertained the herein Complaint and issued the assailed Orders.
HELD: That the respondent had indisputably no unrestricted retained earnings in its books at the
time the petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 01-086 on January 22, 2001 proved that the
respondent’s legal obligation to pay the value of the petitioners’ shares did not yet arise. Thus,
the CA did not err in holding that the petitioners had no cause of action, and in ruling that the
RTC did not validly render the partial summary judgment.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The
essential elements of a cause of action are:
(a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
(b) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and
(c) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting
injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery
of relief from the defendant.
Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the
occurrence of the last element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
Section 1, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court requires that every ordinary civil action must be
based on a cause of action.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 01-086 was dismissible from the beginning for being without
any cause of action.
Subject to certain qualification, and except as otherwise provided by law, an action

commenced before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be
dismissed. The fact that the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while the
case is pending is of no moment. It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps no exception,
either in law or in equity, that to recover at all there must be some cause of action at the
commencement of the suit. There are reasons of public policy why there should be no needless
haste in bringing up litigation, and why people who are in no default and against whom there is
as yet no cause of action should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer
complaints which are groundless. An action prematurely brought is a groundless suit. Unless the
plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the
defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is
pending, and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of
action is not permissible.
Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined

Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013
FACTS: This is a direct recourse to the Court from the RTC of Toledo, Branch 59 (RTC), through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of
law.
Petitioners assail the order of the RTC dismissing the civil case for lack of cause of action.
Petitioner, together with some cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages against respondent Gaudioso. In their complaint, they alleged that
Magdaleno died intestate and childless leaving behind lots. Claiming to be sole heir of
Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of
the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name, to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidence by
his certificate of Live Birth, 2 letters from school, and a certified true copy of his passport.
Further, by affirmative defense, he claimed that a. petitioners have no cause of action
against him; b. the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and c. the case is not prosecuted by
the real parties in interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially
declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.
The RTC issued an Order finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of
action against Gaudioso. The RTC noted that while the plaintiffs had established their
relationship with Magdaleno is a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs; while Gausioso satisfactorily established that he is Magdaleno’s son.
ISSUE: The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s
dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
was proper.
HELD: The petition has no merit. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.
It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of
action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled
to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses
that may be averred by the defendants.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein,
alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the
transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing
allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of
title and reconveyance, from granting the same.
In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents,
held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper
special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership
and/or possession.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same
fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a
determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper.
In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship
which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special
proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
effect.
Swagman Hotels v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005

FACTS:
May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a
cause of action during the pendency of the case?
Petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. through Atty. Leonor L. Infante and Rodney
David Hegerty, its president and VP respectively, obtained from private respondent Neal
Christian loans evidenced by 3 promissory notes, payable after 3 years from its date with an
interest of 15% per annum payable every 3 months. Christian informed the petitioner
corporation that he was terminating the notes and demanded from the patter payment of the
total amount, plus unpaid interests.
The private respondent on Feb 1999, Christian then filed with the RTC of Baguio City a
complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation, Hergerty and
Atty Infante.
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president, filed an
Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of the principal obligations.
According to them, Christian had no cause of action because the 3 promissory notes were not
yet due and demandable. In Dec 1997, since the petitioner corporation was experiencing huge
losses, Christian agreed to waive the interest of 15% and accept payments of the principal loans
in installment basis, the amount and period of which would depend on the state of business of
the petitioner corporation. Thus, the petitioner paid Christian capital repayment until the
complaint was filed in Feb 1999.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of Christian, declaring first two promissory notes
as due and demandable. The trial court said that when the instant case was filed in Feb 2, 1999,
none of the promissory notes were due and demandable. As of date, however, the first and
second promissory notes have already matured. Hence, payment is already due.
Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which states
no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if the
plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint, as defendants’
obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two
promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations covered
by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable.
HELD:
Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as
follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
It is undisputed that the three promissory notes were for the amount of P50,000 each
and uniformly provided for (1) a term of three years; (2) an interest of 15 % per annum, payable
quarterly; and (3) the repayment of the principal loans after three years from their respective
dates. However, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that a renegotiation of the
three promissory notes indeed happened in December 1997 between the private respondent
and the petitioner resulting in the reduction – not waiver – of the interest from 15% to 6% per
annum, which from then on was payable monthly, instead of quarterly. The term of the principal
loans remained unchanged in that they were still due three years from the respective dates of
the promissory notes. Thus, at the time the complaint was filed with the trial court on 2
February 1999, none of the three promissory notes was due yet; although, two of the
promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000 matured during the
pendency of the case with the trial court. Both courts also found that the petitioner had been
religiously paying the private respondent US$750 per month from January 1998 and even during
the pendency of the case before the trial court and that the private respondent had accepted all
these monthly payments.
With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for
a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of
action has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the
terms of the three promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997.
Without a cause of action, the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court,
and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint.
Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation of Sec 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is erroneous.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious
and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in
the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section
5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is
presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of
action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact
exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the
essential facts. It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued
cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence
or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. It is a rule of law to which there is,
perhaps, no exception, either at law or in equity, that to recover at all there must be some
cause of action at the commencement of the suit.
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the plaintiff has a valid and
subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or
remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental
complaint or an amendment setting up such afer-accrued cause of action is not permissible.
Sec. 3. One suit for a single cause of action
Injury - a party is prejudiced because of a violation of his right by a person who has the obligation
to respect that right ELSE: damnum absque injuria
Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-41423, February 23, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting aside of the
order, dated July 8, 1975, dismissing petitioner’s complaint, as well as the order denying his
motion for reconsideration of said dismissal.
Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73 entitled "Luis Joseph vs.
Patrocinio Perez, Domingo Villa y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas, Antonio Sioson, Lazaro Villanueva and
Jacinto Pagarigan", filed before the CFI of Bulacan, Branch III, and presided over by respondent
Judge Crispin V. Bautista; while private respondents Patrocinio Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto
Pagarigan and Lazaro Villanueva are four of the defendants in said case.
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and
passengers for a consideration, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its
way to Valenzuela. Petitioner, with a cargo full of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan
City after paying the fare. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise
proceeding in the same direction. At the same time, a pick up truck supposedly owned by Sioson
and Jacinto Pagarigan ,then driven by respondent Villaneuva tried to overtake the cargo truck
which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer
towards the shoulder of the road ad to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a
bone fracture in one of his legs.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner
of the cargo truck, based on the breach of contract of carriage against and against respondents
Sioson and Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck based on quasi-
delict.
GR: The singleness of cause of action lies in the singleness of delict or wrong violating
the right.
Nevertheless, if only one injury arose, then there is only one cause of action.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of
the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended
complaint impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said
cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was the real
owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer,
the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for
damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to
Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already
paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents
Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable
settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2,
1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised on
the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured
to the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to
herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and
a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal, petitioner contending
that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor
of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo,
it likewise erred in dismissing the case.
HELD: The SC finds the present recourse devoid of merit.

The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence
the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict
is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed
by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes
juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations.
However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. The
singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights
of one person.
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of
action arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative
rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed
by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of
action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants
therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically
circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars
recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law
against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On
the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is
undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold
respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint
clearly impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention of
petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply only in the event that execution be issued
in his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would countenance such a procedure.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment
made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to
petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other
solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
Phil. Bank of Comm. v. Lim, G.R. No. 158138, April 12, 2005
A restrictive stipulation on the venue of actions contained in a promissory note applies
to the surety agreement supporting it, because the nature of the two contracts and the factual
circumstances surrounding their execution are intertwined or interconnected. The surety
agreement is merely an accessory to the principal loan agreement embodied in the promissory
note. Hence, the enforcement of the former depends upon the latter.
FACTS: This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the CA
granting the petition.
The petitioner bank filed a complaint against respondents with the RTC of Manila for the
collection of a deficiency. Petitioner alleged therein that respondents obtained a loan from it and
executed a continuing surety agreement in favor of petitioner for all loans, credits, etc that were
extended or may be extended in the future to the respondents. Petitioner granted a renewal of
said loan upon request, as evidence by a promissory note. It was expressly stipulated therein
that the venue for any legal action that may arise out of the said promissory note shall be in
Makati City, ‘to the exclusion of other courts’. Respondents allegedly failed to pay said obligation
upon maturity, thus petitioner foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by respondents.
"[Respondents] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue,
invoking the stipulation contained in the last paragraph of the promissory note with respect to
the restrictive/exclusive venue. [The trial court] denied said motion asseverating that [petitioner]
ha[d] separate causes of action arising from the promissory note and the continuing surety
agreement. Thus, [under] Rule 4, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, x x
x venue was properly laid in Manila. [The trial court] supported [its] order with cases where
venue was held to be merely permissive. A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise
denied."
HERE, THERE ARE 2 CAUSES OF ACTION. YOU CAN RUN AFTER ANY OF THEM, AND
EACH WILL EXTINGUISH HERE. YOU CAN FILE EACH TO THE TWO, BUT YOU CANNOT RECOVER
TWO TO AVOID MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.
Here, there is failure to pay. Tri Oro or the surety may pay. THUS, we follow the GR in
Joseph v Bautista.
The cause of action to recover on the basis of the Surety Agreement is inseparable from
that which is based on the Promissory Note.
Section 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that personal actions must be
commenced and tried (1) in the place where the plaintiff resides, or (2) where the defendant
resides, or (3) in case of non-resident defendants, where they may be found, at the choice of the
plaintiff.
This rule on venue does not apply when the law specifically provides otherwise, or when
-- before the filing of the action -- the contracting parties agree in writing on the exclusive venue
thereof. Venue is not jurisdictional and may be waived by the parties.
A stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless
qualifying or restrictive words are used in the agreement.
In the instant case, the stipulation on the exclusivity of the venue as stated in the PN is
not at issue. What petitioner claims is that there was no restriction on the venue, because none
was stipulated in the SA on which petitioner had allegedly based its suit. Accordingly, the action
on the SA may be filed in Manila, petitioner’s place of residence.
Petitioner correctly argues that there are two causes of action contained in its
Complaint. A cause of action is a party’s act or omission that violates the rights of the other.
Only one suit may be commenced for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, only one case should remain and the
others must be dismissed.
Because of the variance between the causes of action, petitioner could have filed
separate actions against respondents to recover the debt, on condition that it could not
recover twice from the same cause. It could have proceeded against only one or all of them, as
full payment by any one of them would have extinguished the obligation. By the same token,
respondents could have been joined as defendants in one suit, because petitioner’s alleged
right of relief arose from the same transaction or series of transactions that had common
questions of fact. To avoid a multiplicity of suits, joinder of parties is encouraged by the law.
The cause of action, however, does not affect the venue of the action. The vital issue in
the present case is whether the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on
venue stipulated in the PN. As earlier stated, the answer is in the affirmative. Since the cases
pertaining to both causes of action are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue,
petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

Chua v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009
> There can be more than 1 remedy for one wrong
> If that’s the case, there’s still a singleness of the cause of action
> On the basis of that, 1 wrong, there can be one injury
Remedies > Wrong Done > Injury Sustained
Even if there are 2 separate remedies, into 2 different cases

The action for damages in the second case is already contained in the 1 st complaint
> The rule here is for prevention of multiplicity of suits
FACTS: Petitioner Chua is president of co-petitioner Filiden, a domestic corporation, engaged in

the realty business. Respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (respondent Metrobank) is a
domestic corporation and a duly licensed banking institution.
Petitioners obtained from respondent bank a loan which was secured by a real estate
mortgage on parcels of land registered in petitioner Chua’s name. Since the value of the
collateral was more than the loan, the petitioners were given an open credit line on future loans.
Thereafter, petitioner obtained other loans from the respondent bank, and the real
estate mortgages were repeatedly amended in accordance with the increase in petitioners’
liabilities.
Having failed to pay their obligations, petitioners entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement with respondent, whereby the loan obligations of the former were restructured.
In a letter, the lawyers of the respondent demanded that petitioners fully pay and settle
their liabilities, including interests and penalties, within 3 days from the receipt of said letter.
When petitioners still failed to pay their loans, respondent sought to extra-judicially
foreclose the REM constituted on the subject properties.
Petitioner Chua, in his personal capacity and acting on behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed
before the RTC a Complaint for Injunction against respondents. The RTC issued a TRO enjoining
respondents from conducting the auction sale of the mortgaged properties.
After the expiration of the TRO, no injunction having issued by the RTC, respondent reset
the auction date. The RTC issued an Order directing that the said sale be reset anew after Nov 8,
and such Order was served on Nov 2001. The auction date proceeded on the same date and a
Certificate of Sale was accordingly issued to respondent bank as the highest bidder of foreclosed
properties.
Petitioners filed before the RTC a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint alleging that the
Certificate of Sale was a falsified document since there was no actual sale that took place. And,
even if an auction sale was conducted, it would be void was such sale was done in disobedience
to a lawful order of the RTC.
In an Order dated 6 March 2002, RTC-Branch 257 denied petitioners’ application for
injunction on the ground that the sale of the foreclosed properties rendered the same moot and
academic. The auction sale, which was conducted by respondents Metrobank and Atty. Celestra,
after the expiration of the TRO, and without knowledge of the Order dated November 2001 of
RTC-Branch 257, was considered as proper and valid.
Petitioners filed an MR with the RTC 257, which failed to take action on the motion.
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for Certiorari, and the CA reversed the order of the RTC
257 and remanded the case for further proceedings. The SC dismissed the appeal of the
respondents with finality.
Petitioners then filed with RTC-195 of Paranaque a Verified Complaint for Damages
against respondents for making it appear that the auction of the properties took place.
Petitioners filed with the RTC 195 a Motion to Consolidate, seeking the consolidation of
the action for damages pending before said court, with the injunction case being heard before
the RTC-258.
The respondents filed with the RTC 195 Opposition to Consolidate praying for the
dismissal of the Complaint for damages on the ground of forum shopping.
The RTC 195 grated the Motion to Consolidate and ordered the civil case for damages be
transferred to RTC 258.
RTC 258 ISSUED AN Order dismissing the case for injunction on the ground of forum
shopping.
In a Decision dated 31 January 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 3 July 2006 Order
of RTC-Branch 258. The appellate court observed that although the defendants in the two cases
were not identical, they represented a community of interest. It also declared that the cause of
action of the two cases, upon which the recovery of damages was based, was the same, i.e., the
feigned auction sale, such that the nullification of the foreclosure of the subject properties,
which petitioners sought in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, would render proper the award for
damages, claimed by petitioners in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402. Thus, judgment in either case
would result in res judicata. The Court of Appeals additionally noted that petitioners admitted in
their Motion for Consolidation that Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV- 05-0402
involved the same parties, central issue, and subject properties.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE "FIRST" AND THE "SECOND" CASES HAVE THE SAME ULTIMATE
OBJECTIVE, I.E., TO HAVE THE AUCTION SALE BE DECLARED AS NULL AND VOID.
HELD:
The successive filing of the Civil Case on injunction and civil case on damages amounts to forum
shopping.
The proscription against forum shopping is found in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, which provides that:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia);
(2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate
of Non-Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before
RTC-Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01- 0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258.
Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum shopping, since (1) the two
cases do not have the same ultimate objective.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, although with different prayers.
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of.—If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Petitioners would like to make it appear that Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 was solely concerned
with the nullification of the auction sale and certification of sale, while Civil Case No. CV-05-0402
was a totally separate claim for damages.
If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be
dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if
the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions
shall be dismissed with prejudice. In this case, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No.
CV-05-0402 for the purpose of seeking a favorable decision in another forum. Otherwise, they
would not have moved for the consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil Case No. CV-05-0402
is dismissed and the hearing of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258 will be
continued.
Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or
a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
FACTS: Sps Chus executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving 5 parcels of land
in Pamanga in favor of Trinidad Cunanan for a consideration of P5,161,090. They also executed a
so-called side agreement, whereby they clarified that Cunananan had paid only 1M to the Chus
despite the Chus, as vendors, hacving acknowledged receiving the full amount; that the amount
of P1,600,00 was to be paid directly to Benito Co and to Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC)
in whose favor the 5 lots have been mortgaged; and that Cunanan would pay the balance of
P2,561.90 within 3 months, with a grace period of 1 month subject to 3%/month interest on any
remaining amount. The parties further stipulated that the ownership of the lots would remain
with the Chus as the vendors and would be transferred to Cunanan only upon complete payment
of the total consideration and compliance with the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage.
There can only be one action when the action is entire and the breach is total.
There is only 1 deed of sale involving the 5 lots.
The breach is total.
You can only file one action, and you should recover all your claims and damages in only 1
action. BECAUSE THERES ONLY ONE CONTRACT. AND THE VIOLATION OF THAT CONTRACT
CONSTITUTES A BREACH, AND SUCH BREACH IS TOTAL.
The Contract was single and INDIVISIBLE as far as they are concerned.
You implead as much parties as possible, and ask for all claims and damages from the cause of
action.
Thereafter, the Chus executed a special power of attorney authorizing Cunanan to

borrow P5,161,090.00 from any banking institution and to mortgage the five lots as security, and
then to deliver the proceeds to the Chus net of the balance of the mortgage obligation and the
downpayment. Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her name without the
knowledge of the Chus, and to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the
balance of the purchase price to the Chus. She later transferred two of the lots to Spouses
Amado and Gloria Carlos (Carloses) on July 29, 1987. As a result, on March 18, 1988, the Chus
caused the annotation of an unpaid vendor’s lien on three of the lots. Nonetheless, Cunanan still
assigned the remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty on May 25, 1989 despite the annotation.
Considering that the Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate
Development Corporation (Benelda Estate) in 1995, the Chus further amended the complaint in
Civil Case No. G-1936 to implead Benelda Estate as additional defendant.
On December 2, 1999, the Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty entered into a
compromise agreement, whereby the Cunanans transferred to the Chus their 50% share in "all
the parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando, Pampanga" registered in the name of Cool
Town Realty "for and in consideration of the full settlement of their case." The RTC approved the
compromise agreement in a partial decision dated January 25, 2000.
Thereafter, on April 30, 2001, the petitioners herein (i.e., Catalina Chu and her children)
brought another suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the Carloses and Benelda Estate, seeking the
cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate, and the issuance of new
TCTs in their favor, plus damages.
The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds, namely:
(a) bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid, waived, and abandoned.
Benelda Estate likewise moved to dismiss the amended complaint, citing as grounds: (a) forum
shopping; (b) bar by prior judgment, and (c) failure to state a cause of action.
On their part, the Carloses raised affirmative defenses in their answer, namely: (a) the
failure to state a cause of action; (b) res judicata or bar by prior judgment; and (c) bar by statute
of limitations.
On April 25, 2002, the RTC denied both motions to dismiss, holding that the amended
complaint stated a cause of action against all the defendants; that the action was not barred by
res judicata because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between Civil Case
No.12251 and Civil Case No. G-1936; and that the Cunanans did not establish that the
petitioners had waived and abandoned their claim or that their claim had been paid by virtue of
the compromise agreement, pointing out that the compromise agreement involved only the
three parcels of land registered in the name of Cool Town Realty.
The Cunanans sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied on May 31, 2002. On
September 2, 2002, the Cunanans filed a petition for certiorari in the CA (SP-72558), assailing the
RTC’s denial of their motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
On November 19, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision, granting the petition for
certiorari and nullifying the challenged orders of the RTC. The CA ruled that the compromise
agreement had ended the legal controversy between the parties with respect to the cause of
action arising from the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage covering all the five parcels of
land; that Civil Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No.12251 involved the violation by the Cunanans
of the same legal right under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage; and that the filing
of Civil Case No.12251 contravened the rule against splitting of a cause of action, and rendered
Civil Case No.12251 subject of a motion to dismiss based on bar byres judicata.
ISSUE: Was Civil Case No. 12251 barred by res judicata although the compromise agreement did
not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise agreement made
no reference to the lots now registered in Benelda Estate’s name?
HELD: YES.
The petitioners contend that the compromise agreement did not apply or extend to the
Carloses and Benelda Estate; hence, their Civil Case No. 12251 was not barred by res judicata.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an
end to one already commenced.
It encompasses the objects specifically stated therein, although it may include other
objects by necessary implication, and is binding on the contracting parties, being expressly
acknowledged as a juridical agreement between them.21 It has the effect and authority of res
judicata upon the parties.
In the construction or interpretation of a compromise agreement, the intention of the
parties is to be ascertained from the agreement itself, and effect should be given to that
intention. Thus, the compromise agreement must be read as a whole.
The compromise agreement indicate that the parties intended to thereby settle all their
claims against each other
To limit the compromise agreement only to the three lots mentioned therein would
contravene the avowed objective of Civil Case No. G-1936 to enforce or to rescind the entire
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Such interpretation is akin to saying that the
Cunanans separately sold the five lots, which is not the truth. For one, Civil Case No. G-1936 did
not demand separate amounts for each of the purchased lots. Also, the compromise agreement
did not state that the value being thereby transferred to the petitioners by the Cunanans
corresponded only to that of the three lots.
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce
or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the
act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting
two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be
split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.
Thus, Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause
of action, viz:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of
the grounds upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would
be no end to litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose
primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their
contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by
res judicata.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on
the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.
Yet, in order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur:– (a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii)
identity of the subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
The first requisite was attendant. Civil Case No. G-1936 was already terminated under
the compromise agreement, for the judgment, being upon a compromise, was immediately final
and unappealable. As to the second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action
in Civil Case No. G-1936 for the enforcement or rescission of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage, which was an action whose subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation.
That the compromise agreement explicitly settled the entirety of Civil Case No. G-1936 by
resolving all the claims of the parties against each other indicated that the third requisite was
also satisfied.
But was there an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action between
Civil Case No.G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251?
There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is
privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity. The requirement of the identity of parties was fully met, because the Chus, on
the one hand, and the Cunanans, on the other hand, were the parties in both cases along with
their respective privies. The fact that the Carloses and Benelda Estate, defendants in Civil Case
No. 12251, were not parties in the compromise agreement was inconsequential, for they were
also the privies of the Cunanans as transferees and successors-in-interest.
It is settled that the absolute identity of parties was not a condition sine qua non for res
judicata to apply, because a shared identity of interest sufficed. Mere substantial identity of
parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even
if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, was sufficient.
As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved in
the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Identity of the causes of action was also met,
because Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one and the same cause of
action – the failure of Cunanan to pay in full the purchase price of the five lots subject of the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In other words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised Civil
Case No. G-1936, the only difference between them being that the petitioners alleged in the
former that Benelda Estate was "not also a purchaser for value and in good faith.
In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis-à-vis the five lots were all defined
and governed by the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the only contract between
them. That contract was single and indivisible, as far as they were concerned. Consequently,
the Chus could not properly proceed against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251, despite
the silence of the compromise agreement as to the Carloses and Benelda Estate because there
can only be one action where the contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners
must therein recover all their claims and damages. The Chus could not be permitted to split up a
single cause of action and make that single cause of action the basis of several suits.
Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005

How do you determine the cause of action?
There is identity of cause of action if two cases are filed and the same evidence is
necessary to satisfy the 2nd cause of action as the 1st cause of action.
In this case, there is only one evidence necessary-- WON the driver of the bus was
negligent, resulting to the bus hitting the rearside of the jeepney-- identity of evidence
necessary to satisfy the 2 causes of action.
That goes to show a singleness of cause of action which you should not split.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari on the CA decision entitled "Standard Insurance
Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale vs. PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and Alexander Buncan."
Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina
Gicale, respondent herein. While driving north bound along the National Highway in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by
Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were
negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the
passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the police station and respondent Standard, insurer of
the jeepney. The respondent only paid a fraction (8k) of the total cost of repair (21, 415).
Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P 13, 415.
Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from
petitioners Pantranco and its driver Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to file
with the RTC Manila a complaint for sum of money.
Both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it is
the MTC, not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the case. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the respondents Standard and Martina. The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
"The appellants argue that appellee Gicale’s claim of P13,415.00 and appellee insurance
company’s claim of P8,000.00 individually fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. This is not correct because under the Totality Rule provided for under Sec.
19, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the jurisdictional
amount.
In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00
which at the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial
Court.
Appellants contend that there was a misjoinder of parties. Assuming that there was,
under the Rules of Court (Sec. 11, Rule 7) as well as under the Rules of Civil Procedure (ditto),
the same does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint.
Appellees’ Gigale’s and insurance company’s individual claims against appellees arose
from the same vehicular accident, involving appellant Pantranco’s bus and appellee Gicale’s
jeepney.
For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims arose out of the same
vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Hence, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of
action of each respondent did not
arise from the same transaction and that there are no common questions of law and fact
common to both parties. Section
6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,5 provides:
"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. – All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to
exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in
these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question
of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action;
but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from
being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may
have no interest."
Permissive joinder of parties requires that:
(a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b)
there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c)
such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on
jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear
side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are
negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they
have the same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to
authorize a recovery in the first.
Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would
have been presented to sustain the same cause of action.
Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order.
Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:

"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."
The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined
accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder
of parties is involved
The issue of whether respondents’ claims shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified
by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 1299 which states, among others, that "where there are several
claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions."
As previously stated, respondents’ cause of action against petitioners arose out of the
same transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.
Umale v. Canoga Park, G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011

What are the 2 cases filed?
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari, filed by George Umale (petitioner), challenging
the decision of CA that denied his MR. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, that dismissed
Canoga Part Development Corporation’s complaint for unlawful detainer on the ground of litis
pendentia.
On January 4, 2000, the parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the petitioner
agreed to lease, for a period of two (2) years starting from January 16, 2000, an eight hundred
sixty (860)-square-meter prime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the
respondent. The respondent acquired the subject lot from Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership through
a Deed of Absolute Sale, subject to certain conditions.
However, allegedly, the petitioner violated one of the stipulated conditions, in which
such petitioner used the premises for commercial purposes different to what was previously
agreed. The respondent used this as a ground for filing a case of unlawful detainer against the
petitioner in the MTC, and on appeal the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The case was however,
re-raffled to another RTC branch because the Presiding Judge of the former branch inhibited
himself from resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC granted the
petitioner’s motion, thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC decision. Accordingly, the civil
case for unlawful detainer was dismissed for being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed
for review with the CA.
During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed ANOTHER case for
unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC Pasig City. This time, the respondent
used as a ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties’ lease contract.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the RTC reversed
and set aside the decision of the MTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The petitioner however,
was still ordered to pay rent.
Aggrieved by the reversal, respondent filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
Court with the CA.
The respondent argued that there exists no litis pendentia between Civil Case Nos. 8084
and 9210 because the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment, i.e., the first case was
filed because of violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the
expiration of the lease contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed
based on an event or a cause not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case.
The CA nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC and ruled that there was
no litis pendentia because 2 civil cases have different causes of action.
In presenting his case before this Court, the petitioner insists that litis pendentia exists
between the two ejectment cases filed against him because of their identity with one another
and that any judgment on the first case will amount to res judicata on the other. The petitioner
argues that the respondent reiterated the ground of violations of the lease contract, with the
additional ground of the expiration of the lease contract in the second ejectment case. Also, the
petitioner alleges that all of the elements of litis pendentia are present in this case, thus, he
prays for the reversal and setting aside of the assailed CA decision and resolution, and for the
dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia and/or forum
shopping.
HELD: There is no litis pendentia.

As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where
two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of
them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:
 identity of the parties in the two actions;
 substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
 the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be
rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
We rule that Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.
Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. If two or more suits
are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the
merits in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of
action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and
second causes of action (also known as the "same evidence" test), or whether the defenses in
one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second
case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint .
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e.,
whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint – and to which we answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the
first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioner’s violation of stipulations in the lease
contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease contract.
Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014

> the main case was Injunction, damages for unlawfully taking possession of land
> Specific Performance
> here, there is forum shopping
1. Litis pendentia
2. Res judicata
3. Splitting of cause of action
> grounded on the same right-- ownership
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners,
Sps. Silvestre Plaza and Elena Plaza, seek the reversal of the decision dated Oct. 24, 2005 and the
Resolution dated April 6, 2006 of the CA.
On Aug 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza siblings, Barbara was the owner of
the subject agricultural land. The decision became final and executory and Barbara’s successors,
respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have
continued occupying the property.
Then, Vidal’s (one of the siblings) son and daughter-in-law, the petitioners, filed a
complaint for Injunction, Damages Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and TRO against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan,
praying that respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take
possession of the subject property. According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from
Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in a tax delinquency sale
conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27, 1996.
In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying
the land taxes and were in fact not aware that their property had been offered for public
auction. Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was disqualified to bid in the public
auction, as stated in Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991. As Tuazon’s participation
in the sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the petitioners. Equally
important, the petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting the name of
the petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land. Armed with the
falsified tax declaration, the petitioners, as heirs of their father, fraudulently redeemed the land
from Tuazon. Nonetheless, there was nothing to redeem as the land was not sold. For these
irregularities, the petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for against them.
The RTC reconsidered the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and ordered the
possession and occupation of the land be returned to the respondents. The RTC found that the
auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government employee disqualified
in accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The petitioners are not
buyers in good faith either. On the contrary, they were in bad faith for having falsified the tax
declaration they redeemed the property with.
Through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioners challenged the
RTC’s order before the CA.
While the petition for review on certiorari was pending before the CA, the petitioners
filed an action for SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE against the City Government of Butuan. According to
them, they acquired possession and ownership over the auctioned property when they
redeemed it from Tuazon. The City Government of Butuan must therefore issue them a
certificate of sale.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling, and found the petitioners guilty of forum shopping,
dismissed the case, and referred the case to the Court and to the IBP for investigation. CA also
rejected the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners filed the present petition for review on Certiorari with the SC to
challenge the CA ruling.
the petitioners argue that they did not commit forum shopping, as the reliefs prayed for in the
present case and in
the specific performance case are not the same. In the present case, they merely impleaded the
City Government of Butuan as a nominal party to pay for the value of the land only if possession
of the land was awarded to the respondents.
On the other hand, the complaint for specific performance prayed that the City
Government of Butuan execute the necessary certificate of sale and other relevant documents
pertaining to the auction.
HELD: Petition denied.

First, the factual contests are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. The Court is not a trier of facts.
The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the
writ; the present action has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the main
action.
As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the
petitioners despite the latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. Because they
were never owners of the property, the petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the writ of
preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of
an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the
complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and,
therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper."
Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the
question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. A
writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to
the determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case,
any appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
The petitioners are guilty of forum shopping when they filed the specific performance
case despite the pendency of the present case before the CA.
The Court laid down the three ways forum shopping may be committed:
1) through litis pendentia — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved
yet;
2) through res judicata — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved; and
3) splitting of causes of action — filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action but with different prayers — the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res
judicata. "The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions;
(b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Noticeable among these three types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of
action in the different cases filed.
Cause of action is "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
The cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners’ claim of ownership
of the land when they bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon.
This ownership is the petitioners’ basis in enjoining the respondents from dispossessing them of
the property. On the other hand, the specific performance case prayed that the City Government
of Butuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale grounded on the petitioners’
ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or
from Tuazon. While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the present injunction case is
different from what was prayed for in the specific performance case, the cause of action which
serves as the basis for the reliefs remains the same — the petitioners’ alleged ownership of the
property after its purchase in a public auction.
Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum
shopping of the third kind-splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, but with different prayers. As the Court has held in the past, "there is still forum
shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases
raise substantially the same issues."
Bayang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-53564, February 27, 1987
FACTS: Sometime Nov 1969, Juan Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of title with
damages against Benigno Biong in the CFI of Surigao del Norte. In 1970, while the case
was pending, Biong succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question and
remained there until Jan 25, 1978. On February 21, 1972, the case was decided in favor
of Biong, but the CA reversed the trial court.
On Feb 1978, Bayang filed another case with the CFI of Surigao, seeking to
recover from Biong the incomes earned from the same land from 1970 up to the
quarterly incomes from 1978 until the land was delivered to the plaintiff.
Biong filed a motion for summary judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense
of raised judicata raised in his answer. An opposition to this motion was duly filed by
Bayang.
The trial court, after considering the arguments of the parties, granted the
motion and rendered a summary judgment on Oct 30, 1978. The decision was sustained
by the CA, and Bayang filed for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC, claiming
that there was no res judicata and the summary judgment should not have been made.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the respondents.

On the nature and functions of the summary judgment:
Summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned in the present Rules of
Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions wherein there exists no serious
controversy. The procedure may be availed of not only by claimants, but also by
defending parties who may be the object of unfounded claims. A motion for summary
judgment assumes that scrutinizing of the facts will disclose that the issues presented by
the pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as not to be
genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or where the
facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits.
There was no genuine or triable issue of fact raised by the parties, in view particularly of
the affirmative defense of res judicata invoked by the private respondent.
A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res judicata to apply:
a) the former judgment must be final;
b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
d) there must be between the first case and the second case identity of parties,
identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action.
The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and executory on February 2, 1978.
There is no dispute that the trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties to the proceeding. The case was tried on the
merits. The parties to Civil Case No. 1892 and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the
same petitioner and private respondent now before us.
The petitioner would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No.
1892 and the income from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is in
our view splitting hairs to split a cause of action. The subject-matter is essentially the
same in both cases as the income is only a consequence or accessory of the disputed
property. We cannot agree that there are involved here two causes of action calling for
two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land was incidental to, and
should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.
We note that while the first case was pending, the private respondent, by the
petitioner's own account, "succeeded in dispossessing" him of the disputed land 11 and
that at the pretrial conference on Civil Case No. 2589, Bayang's counsel admitted that
Biong had vacated the said property as of January 25, 1978. 12 This means that from
1970 to the date the respondent surrendered the property in 1978, Biong was
presumably collecting and enjoying the income therefrom to the exclusion of the
petitioner.
Civil Case No. 1892 was commenced in November 1969 and was finally decided
only on February 2, 1978. The private respondent entered the disputed property in 1970
and left it only in 1978. For about seven years, therefore, the petitioner made no move
at all to amend his complaint to include a claim for the income supposedly received by
the private respondent during that period.
De Larena v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-29155, November 5, 1928

FACTS:
In G.R. No. 21706, the Court of First Instance ordered the rescission of a lease of
the Tacgajan Sugar Pleantation and the payment by Villanueva of the unpaid balance of
the rent with interest.
The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to
Larena.
Before levy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money
judgment was to be satisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to
Larena of a dwelling house. The agreement was carried out in accordance with its terms.
In the meantime, Villanueva had harvested the sugarcane crop produced, and
after having satisfied the aforesaid money judgment, he also continued in possession of
the plantation long enough to appropriate to himself the following ratoon cane crop.
De Larena filed an action wherein she alleged that while first case was on appeal
to the Supreme Court, Villanueva knew positively that the aforesaid lease was declared
rescinded by the Court of First Instance and that Villanueva, also knew that he thereafter
was not entitled to the possession of the aforesaid hacienda; that he, nevertheless, in
bad faith continued in such possession during the agricultural year 1922-1924 and
appropriated to himself the cane harvest for that year. In his answer Villanueva alleges
that according to the pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action were
included in that case and, therefore, must be considered s judicata.
ISSUE: WON this case involved the doctrine of res judicata?
HELD: No. Properly speaking, this argument does not involve the doctrine of res
judicata but rests on the well-known and firmly established principle that a party will
not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it the basis for several
suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well established that when a lease provides
for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment is an
independent cause of action, though it has been held and is good law, that in an action
upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action
brought must be included in the complaint and that failure to do so will constitute a
bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent.
The aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706, was brought on August 23, 1922, Larena
demanding payment of then sue rent in addition to the rescission of the lease. In 1923,
Larena amended the prayer of the complaint by asking judgment for rent for years
subsequent to 1922. The lease did not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any
definite time, and it appears that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered
due until the end of the corresponding year. It follows that the rent for the agricultural
year 1922-1924 has not become due at the time of the trial of the case and that
consequently the trial court could not render judgment therefore. The action referred to
is, therefore, no bar to the first cause of action in the present litigation.
Blossom & Company v. Manila Gas Corp., G.R. No. L-32958, November 8, 1930
>
FACTS: Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into a
contract. The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of
specified amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It was agreed that
the price would prevail only so long as the raw materials (coal and crude oil) used by the
defendants in the manufacture of gas should cost the same price as that prevailing at
the time of the contract. In the event of an increase or decrease in the cost of raw
materials, there would be a corresponding increase or decrease in the price of tar.
• The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. In consideration of
the modification, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant a certain piece of
land lying adjacent to its plant. The defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff
which in turn executed a mortgage to secure the payment of the balance of the
purchase price.
• Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an action against the
defendant to obtain specific performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that
the defendant breached the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar
solely because of the increase in price of tar products and its desire to secure better
prices than what the plaintiff paid.
• CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for damages
but refused to order the defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for
damages against the defendants for any subsequent breach of contract.
• Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that the defendant
breached the contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation under the same
contract.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages
Ruling: Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.
When you first filed for the case, it was for the TOTAL BREACH of such contract. You
cannot file another case for damages because you already filed for damages for the
ONE CONTRACT and there was already judgment in the first case. ONE ENTIRE
CONTRACT = 1 TOTAL BREACH OF CONTRACT.
Options: File once and include all damages; OR wait it out and file ALL damages --
point is, you are entitled to only one suit.
Otherwise, there is already a splitting of cause of action.
Doctrine
• Divisible contracts (as a general rule)
- A contract to do several things at several times is divisible. A judgement for a single
breach of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach.
• Entire contract (case at bar)

- When the contract is indivisible and the breach is total, there can only be one action in
which the plaintiff must recover all damages. The recovery of a judgement for damages
by reason of a breach is a bar to another action on the same contract and on account of
the continuous breach.
Danfoss v. Continental Cement, G.R. No. 143788, September 9, 2005

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure of the Feb 11, 2000 decision of the CA, and its resolution denying petitioner’s
MR.
Respondent Continental Cement Corp (CCC) filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner DANFOSS and MINCI before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that the
Plaintiff CCC purchased from defendant 2 units of Frequency Converter. Under the terms
and conditions of the purchase order, the delivery of the 2 units are to be delivered
within 8-10 weeks from the opening of the letter of credit.
There was a delay on the delivery, and in reply the CCC reiterated its demand
that every delay of the shipment will cause substantial losses in its operations. However
the defendant DANFOSS informed the other defendant MINCI through fax transmission,
copy furnished plaintiff CCC that the reason why DANFOSS has delivery problems was
that some of the supplied components for the units did not meet the agreed quality
standard.
Due to this information, plaintiff CCC assumed that defendants could not be able
to deliver such units within the max period of 10 weeks. Thereafter, no definite
commitment was received by plaintiff from defendants for the delivery of the units.
By reason of the delay of the defendants, the plaintiff CCC informed defendant
MINCI of the plaintiff’s intention to cancel said order.
As a consequence, plaintiff CCC suffered actual production losses due to the time
lost and delay of the delivery. Plaintiff was compelled to look for another supplier.
Petitioner DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of the ground that it
did not state a cause of action. DANFOSS alleges that plaintiff canceled order before
expiry of agreed delivery commitment, and thus has not incurred delay and has 7 days
more within which to make delivery. DANFOSS alleged that plaintiff’s cause of action
against DANFOSS of plaintiff’s right to demand delivery cannot arise earlier than
November 19, 1997.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of
petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to
state a cause of action.
HELD: The respondent’s complaint for damages against petitioner failed to state a
cause of action.
Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that the pleading asserting the
claim states no cause of action.
Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. – A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.
It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of
the primary right of the plaintiff.
In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the

insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment thereon in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint.
When respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not violated any right of
respondent from which a cause of action had arisen. Respondent only surmised that
petitioner would not be able to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter on
the date agreed upon by them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order six
days prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold petitioner liable for
damages
(1) when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver the goods and
(2) after respondent made it impossible for petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its
order even before the agreed delivery date?
Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to affirm the order of the trial court denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for its failure to state a cause of action.
The principle of anticipatory breach enunciated in Blossom & Company, Inc. v. Manila
Gas Corporation does not apply here. In that case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered
into a contract with Manila Gas Corporation for the sale and delivery of water gas and
coal gas tar at stipulated prices for a period of four years. On the second year of the
contract, Manila Gas willfully and deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas
tar to Blossom and Company, Inc. because it was asking for a higher price than what had
been previously stipulated by them. The price of its tar products had gone up. We held
that:
… even if the contract is divisible in its performance and the future periodic deliveries
are not yet due, if the obligor has already manifested his refusal to comply with his
future periodic obligations, "the contract is entire and the breach total," hence, there
can only be one action for damages.
Thus, the principle contemplates future periodic deliveries and a willful refusal to
comply therewith. Here, the obligation was single and indivisible – to deliver two units of
frequency converter/inverter by November 19, 1997. The records do not show that
petitioner refused to deliver the goods on the date agreed upon. On the contrary,
petitioner exerted efforts to make good its obligation by looking for other suppliers who
could provide it the parts needed to make timely delivery of the frequency
converter/inverter ordered by respondent.
Furthermore, respondent’s complaint suffered from another fatal infirmity. It was
premature. The obligation of petitioner to respondent was not yet due and demandable
at the time the latter filed the complaint. The alleged violation of respondent’s right
being no more than mere speculation, there was no need to call for judicial intervention.
The premature invocation of the court’s intervention was fatal to respondent’s
cause of action. Hence, the dismissal of respondent’s complaint was in order.
Bank of America v. American Realty, G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Bank of America (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing

institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, USA while private respondent
American Realty (ARC) is a domestic corporation.
On numerous occasions, BANTSA and Bank of America International Limited (BAIL),

organized under the laws of England, granted US Dollar loans to certain foreign
corporate borrowers. These loans were later restructured, the restructured loans
secured by two real estate mortgages with private respondent ARC as third-party
mortgagor. When the corporate borrowers defaulted, BANTSA sued them for collection
before foreign courts, without impleading ARC as party-defendant. While these civil suits
are still pending before the foreign courts, BANTSA filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines.
The properties were sold at public auction, prompting ARC to file this action for damages
against BANTSA.
The trial court ruled in favour of ARC and this was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors
for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure
Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favour
of private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is proper.
HELD:
Available Remedies
THEORIES OF PETITIONER:
A waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of 2 requisites: an
ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and subsequently a final judgment be
correspondingly rendered therein.
Under English law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the
principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing
civil actions for sums of money.
REMEDIES ARE ALTERNATIVE, NOT CUMULATIVE: A mortgage creditor may institute

against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver
of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for
collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage,
pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon
filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its
properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private
respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law,
third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property.
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which

makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another‘s obligation by mortgaging
his own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the
principal contract—loan—remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the
latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the
mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan.
In the instant case, petitioner’s contention that the requisites of filing the action for
collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable.
PHILIPPINE LAW, NOT ENGLISH LAW, SHALL APPLY: In the case at bench, Philippine law
shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English
law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our
jurisdiction that there is judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual
presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved xxx, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
Award of Damages
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the
award of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA in
extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a clear violation of the
rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
Allandale Sportsline v. Good Development Corp, G.R. No. 164521, December 18, 2008
> Extrajudicial foreclosure, there is a deficiency, you may claim the deficiency in an
independent civil action, but it must be first raised in the pre-trial
1. Extrajudicial
2. Replevin with damages
3. Deficiency
> if already pretrial, amend the complaint-- if you don’t do that, you may no longer
claim for deficiency
FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
dismissed the petition of Allandale Sportsline, Inc and Melbarose Sasot from the
decision of the RTC.
ASI obtained a loan from the Good Development Corp (GDC) under a PN signed
by Melbarose and Alalndale, president and VP, respectively of ASI. The PN provides that
the loan is payable in daily equal instalments. In case of default, the entire balance of
the obligation shall become immediately due and payable, and subject to liquidated
penalty charge equivalent to 2% of the principal.
To provide additional security, ASI and Melbarose executed in favor of GDC a
Deed of Mortgage, which includes the stipulation that should the mortgagors fail to
comply with the terms of the PN and the mortgage contract, the mortgagee shall
automatically have the absolute right without need of prior notice or demand to
forthwith judicially or extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage.
On June 24, 1991, GDC demanded that Melbarose pay the unpaid account or
surrender the mortgaged chattels within 5 days from notice.
When no payment was made, GDC filed with the RTC a Complaint for Replevin
and sum of money with damages against ASI and Melabarose. GDC prayed for
alternative reliefs.
The RTC issued a Writ of Replevin and by virtue thereof, seized only some of the
mortgaged chattels.
Then, GDC filed an Amended Complaint to include in its application for replevin
the items under the List. After admitting the Amended Complaint, the RTC issued an
Alias Writ of Replevin over the items in List, and by virtue thereof, the Sheriff seized and
delivered to GDC the assorted items enumerated therein.
ASI and Melbarose filed their Answer with a Counterclaim claiming that they
have repeatedly tendered payment but GDC rejected their efforts for no valid reason.
I. Whether or not petitioners’ check payment of Php171,000.00, PCIB Check

No. 851688, to cover the total balance of their loan to respondent, became a
valid tender of payment by virtue of the respondent’s acceptance thereof.
HELD:
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that they were relieved of their
obligation to pay GDC (respondent) when they made several attempts to tender
payment but respondent refused to accept them without any valid reason. Petitioners
claim that the first tender of payment was made on July 3, 1991 when petitioner Sasot
sent respondent a PCIB checkpostdated October 31, 1991 in the amount of
P171,000.00.33 Respondent rejected the check, citing that the amount was insufficient
for, as of July 4, 1991, the balance of the principal loan was P175,000.00,
notP171,000.00; and its maturity was September 13, 1991, not October 31, 1991.34
On October 15, 1997, petitioners tendered payment of P171,000.00 in cash,35
but respondent refused to accept it due to the insufficiency of the amount.36 Instead,
respondent sent petitioners a Statement of Account dated October 29, 1991, indicating
that as of October 15, 1991 the total balance due was P228,071.61.37
On October 29, 1991, petitioners tendered cash payment of P174,986.96,38 but
respondent still refused to accept it for insufficiency of the amount.39 The question then
is whether petitioners’ tender of payment and respondent’s refusal thereof discharged
petitioners from their obligation.
Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect; rather, tender of payment
must be followed by a valid consignation in order to produce the effect of payment and
extinguish an obligation.
Tender of payment is but a preparatory act to consignation. It is the
manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused
without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to
pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the
proper court.
Consignation is the deposit of the proper amount with a judicial authority, before
whom the debtor must establish compliance with the following mandatory
requirements: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation
had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to
accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claim
to be entitled to receive the amount due, or because the title to the obligation has been
lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in
the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the
court; and (5) after the consignation had been made, the person interested was notified
thereof. Failure to prove any of these requirements is enough ground to render a
consignation ineffective.
Petitioners did not allege or prove that after their tender of payment was refused
by respondents, they attempted or pursued consignation of the payment with the
proper court. Their tender of payment not having been followed by a valid consignation,
it produced no effect whatsoever, least of all the extinguishment of the loan obligation.
Therefore, the first issue of the validity or invalidity of their tender of payment is
completely moot and academic, for either way the discussion will go, it will lead to no
other conclusion but that, without an accompanying valid consignation, the tender of
payment did not result in the payment and extinguishment of the loan obligation. The
Court cannot take cognizance of such a purely hypothetical issue.
Enriquez v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-16797, February 27, 1963

NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a direct appeal made by Socorro upon the decision of the CFI
against her averment that the Enriquez and the spouses Dizon are guilty of splitting a single
cause of action.
FACTS: Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Dizon sold to Socorro
Ramos 11 parcels of land located in Quezon City which are covered by their
corresponding certificates of title. The lands were sold to Ramos for the price of P101,
000 through a notarial deed. Ramos paid P5,000 down, P2,500 cash, and P2,500 by
check drawn against the PNB. Ramos agreed to pay the remaining P96,000 balance
within 90 days. For security, Ramos mortgaged the eleven parcels of land in favor of the
vendors in the same deed of sale. Additionally, Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children
and as judicial guardian of her minor child, executed another morgage on a lot situated
in Malinta.
Ramos failed to comply with some conditions of the mortgage so Enriquez and
the spouses Dizon filed an action for foreclosure of the mortgage. In response, Ramos
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Enriquez and the spouses Dizon had
previously filed an action against her in the CFI of Manila for the recovery of P2,500 paid
by check as part of the down payment accrued and demandable. Enriquez and the
spouses Dizon, then, are guilty of splitting a single cause of action under sec. 4 of Rule 2
of the Rules of Court. The filing of the first action for P2,500 was a defense that could be
pleaded in abatement of the second suit.
Enriquez and the spouses Dizon opposed Ramos' motion to dismiss, which was
granted by the CFI of Quezon City. But, Ramos repleaded her aforementioned averments
as a special defense in her answer.
CFI: Its decision was against Ramos and she was ordered to pay P96,000 with 12%
interest from Feb. 24, 1959 ntil payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and
the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90) days.
RAMOS: She insists that the action should be dismissed on account of the alleged
splitting of appellee's cause of action, and that the obligation not having fixed a period,
although one was intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity
before ordering payment or foreclosure.
ENRIQUEZ, ET.AL. : They did not split a single cause of action. They are correct in filing
two cases against Ramos. The first case they filed was for collection of the unsecured
portion of the consideration of the sale or collection of the check drawn by Ramos, while
the second was to foreclose the mortgage used as security on the balance.
ISSUE: WON the case filed by Enriquez, et. al. should be dismissed on the ground of
splitting their cause of action.
HELD: No, the Court finds no merit on this appeal.
An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance
of Manila shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of
the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the
present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the
mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the
security; and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the
appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of action
being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.
Tarnate v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-26266, December 29, 1972

FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Batangas denying a petition to
restrain the Municipal Court of Batangas, from proceeding with its Civil Case on the
ground of pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause.
Herein respondent Garcia filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein
petitioner Ramon Tarnate in the Municipal Court of Batangas, docketed as Civil Case
1083.
On September 1964 respondent Garcia filed another complaint for forcible entry
against the same defendant in the same court, which was docketed as Civil Case
No.1091, alleging that: That on Aug 2 1964 plaintiff was and sometime prior thereto, had
been in lawful and peaceful possession of strips of land, and that plaintiff’s possession of
said strips of land is as a lessee.
Tarnate moved to dismiss the second case on the ground of pendency of another
action between the same parties of the same cause. Garcia opposed the motion.
The MTC denied the motion to dismiss because it did not find the ground for
dismissal to be indubitable (impossible to doubt; unquestionable).
Having failed to secure a reconsideration, petitioner Tarnate filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus against the municipal court of Batangas and Lucio Garcia in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Special Civil Case No. 1033), praying that the
order of denial by the municipal court be annulled and that the said court be
commanded not to give due course to, but to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1091.
After trial, where evidence was introduced and stipulations of facts were made by the
parties, the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered judgment on 12 January 1966
denying the writ prayed for.
ISSUE: The issue here is whether or not the municipal court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss the second complaint because the ground therefor,
namely, pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, was
not indubitable. The court of first instance held that there was no abuse of discretion
and that if the municipal court committed an error it was an error of judgment, which
was not correctible by certiorari or prohibition.
HELD: The two separate complaints filed by the private respondent is due to the fact
that after instituting the first action and upon reinspection of the premises, he found
that the defendant had intruded not only the subject matter of the first case, but also
including the subject matter of the second case.
While from the strictly technical viewpoint there was a splitting of the cause of
action in pursuing the same remedy in two separate complaints notwithstanding the fact
that the alleged forcible entry constituted one and the same act, still a realistic and
practical approach dictated the action taken by the municipal court. It should be
remembered that the first complaint was commenced on 17 August 1964 and had not
yet been tried when the second was filed about three weeks later. The two cases could
be tried together as one, or the second complaint could be treated as an amendment of
the first. Either way the entire controversy between the parties could be judicially
settled, disregarding unessential procedural niceties, especially in the light of the
reasonable explanation offered by the plaintiff below.
Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action
See: Sec. 6, Rule 3
Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012

FACTS: Sps. Baylon died on November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974 respectively. At the time
of their death, they were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita, Victoria,
Dolores, Panfila, Ramon and therein petitioner Lilia.
Dolores died intestate and without issue. Victoria died and was survived by her
daughter, herein petitioner Luz Adanza. Ramon died intestate and was survived by
herein respondent Florante, his child from his first marriage, as well as by petitioner
Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children, namely Ramon Jr and herein
petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all surnamed Baylon.
On July 3, 1996, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition,
accounting and damages against Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein that
Sps. Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels of land all situated in Negros
Oriental. After the death of Sps. Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of the
said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for petition, accounting and
damages against Florante, Rita and Panfila. Averred that Rita deferred to effect a
partition of the said parcels of land.
During the pendency of the case Rita died intestate and without any issue, the said
donation intervivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a supplemental pleading,
praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance
with Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code.
Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said donation, asserting that the
Article 1381 (4) of the Civil Code applies only when there is already a prior judicial
decree on who between the contending parties actually owned the properties under
litigation.
The RTC rescinded the donation inter vivos. However, the CA reversed and set
aside this decision.
The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they
must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706
actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA
asserted, an action for rescission is premature. Further, the CA ruled that the petitioners’
action for rescission cannot be joined with their action for partition, accounting and
damages through a mere supplemental pleading. Thus:
If Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 belonged to the Spouses’ estate, then
Rita Baylon’s donation thereof in favor of Florante Baylon, in excess of her undivided
share therein as co-heir, is void. Surely, she could not have validly disposed of something
she did not own. In such a case, an action for rescission of the donation may, therefore,
prosper.
If the lots, however, are found to have belonged exclusively to Rita Baylon, during
her lifetime, her donation thereof in favor of Florante Baylon is valid. For then, she
merely exercised her ownership right to dispose of what legally belonged to her. Upon
her death, the lots no longer form part of her estate as their ownership now pertains to
Florante Baylon. On this score, an action for rescission against such donation will not
prosper.
Issue:
The lone issue to be resolved by this Court is whether the CA erred in ruling that the
donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in favor of Florante may
only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that the same actually
belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon.
HELD:
Misjoinder of Causes of Action
The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate,
distinct and independent actions – partition and rescission. First, the petitioners raised
the refusal of their co-heirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties which
they inherited from Spouses Baylon. Second, in their supplemental pleading, the
petitioners assailed the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706
made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite.
The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single action.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant
the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of
more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes
of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same
complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join
several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint
or petition.
Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an opposing
party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the
joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by
the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation
inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special
civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an
ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure.
The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the
ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being
tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern
the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of
requisite elements of each particular cause of action.
A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the
court sua sponte, may be adjudicated by the court together with the other causes of
action.
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed,
the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte,
to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately.
However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not
motu proprio direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous
adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with
the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint
application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a
misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed
separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. They are not even accepted
grounds for dismissal thereof. Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of
causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court’s jurisdiction. It
acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or
on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to
be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
 A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it

has some relation to the original cause of action set forth in the original complaint.
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. – Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental
pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead
thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental
pleading.
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or

events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented,
even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
Admittedly, in Leobrera v. Court of Appeals, we held that a supplemental
pleading must be based on matters arising subsequent to the original pleading related to
the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action. We
further stressed therein that a supplemental pleading may not be used to try a new
cause of action.
However, in Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp.,
we clarified that, while a matter stated in a supplemental complaint should have some
relation to the cause of action set forth in the original pleading, the fact that the
supplemental pleading technically states a new cause of action should not be a bar to its
allowance but only a matter that may be considered by the court in the exercise of its
discretion. In such cases, we stressed that a broad definition of "cause of action" should
be applied.
Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005 (Supra.)
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the
cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that
there are no common questions of law and fact common to both parties. Section 6, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court,5 provides:
"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. – All persons in whom or against whom any
right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may,
except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such
orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest."
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the
same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact
common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise
proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus
hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is,
whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both
respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
Union Glass Corp. v. SEC, G.R. No. 64013, November 28, 1983
FACTS: This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the Order
of the SEC commission, upholding its jurisdiction in a case before it.
Private respondent Carolina, is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass, a domestic
corporation engaged in the operation of silica mines and the manufacture of glass and
silverware. Since 1967, Pioneer Glass had obtained various loan accommodations from
the DBP and also from other local and foreign sources which DBP guaranteed.
As a security for said loan accommodations, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or
assigned its assets, real and personal, to the DBP, in addition to the mortgages executed
by some of its corporate officers over their personal assets.
Due to the serious liquidity problems suffered by Pioneer Glass, it entered into a
dacion en pago agreement with DBP, whereby all its assets mortgaged to DBP were
ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the corporation’s obligations.
Carolina filed a complaint before the respondent SEC against CBP, Union Glass
and Pioneer Glass. Of the 5 causes of action pleaded only the first cause of action
concerned petitioner Union Glass as transferee and possessor of the glass plant. Such
first cause of action was based on the alleged illegality of the aforesaid dacion en pago.
She asked DBP to be sentenced to pay Pioneer Glass actual, consequential, motal and
exemplary damages.
Pioneer Glass filed its answer. Petitioners moved for dismissal of the case on the
ground that the Sec had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit.
Respondent Hofilena filed her opposition, to which herein petitioners filed a rejoinder.
SEC Hearing Officer granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
However, upon MR, this was reversed. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to set aside the order.
ISSUE: Is it the regular court of the Sec that has the jurisidiction over the case?
HELD: In the ordinary course of things, petitioner Union Glass, as transferee and
possessor of the glass plant covered by the dacion en pago agreement, should be joined
as party-defendant under the general rule which requires the joinder of every party who
has an interest in or lien on the property subject matter of the dispute. Such joinder of
parties avoids multiplicity of suits as well as ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly
But since petitioner Union Glass has no intra-corporate relation with either the
complainant or the DBP, its joinder as party-defendant in SEC Case No. 2035 brings the
cause of action asserted against it outside the jurisdiction of the respondent SEC.
Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps, G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986

FACTS
Flores sued the respondents for the collection of sum of money with the RTC.
The first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to
pay the amount of P11,643representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
Flores on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
The second cause of action was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from pet on
several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand
against said resp was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20K.
Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion joined
in moving for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE
WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties
RULING
The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in
Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Section 33(l) of BP129

That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules
Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate claims are owned by or
due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must
be specifically alleged.
former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948

Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test. ...
comparison of former and present rules

Present Rules Former Rules
Where a plaintiff Totality of the claims in all the causes of Totality of the claims in all the causes of
sues a defendant action irrespective of whether the COA arose action irrespective of whether the COA arose
on two or more out of the same or diff transactions. If the out of the same or diff transactions. If the
separate causes of total demand exceeds P20K – RTC has total demand exceeds P20K – RTC has
action jurisdiction jurisdiction
If the causes of action are separate and If the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is independent, their joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory, and anypermissive and not mandatory, and any
cause of action where the amount of the cause of action where the amount of the
demand is 20K or less may be the subject ofdemand is 20K or less may be the subject of
a separate complaint filed with aa separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or MTC. metropolitan or MTC.
Two or more Where the claims or causes of action joined The causes of action in favor of the two or
plaintiffs having a in a single complaint are separately owned more plaintiffs or against the two or more
separate causes of by or due to different parties, each defendants should arise out of the same
action against a separate claim shall furnish the transaction or series of transactions and
defendant join in a jurisdictional test there should be a common question of law or
single complaint fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
The former rule applied only to cases of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.
However, it was also applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties defendant.
Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):

Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not
more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court. The
several claims do not arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and
there seem to be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may
warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive joinder of
parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario
vs. Justice of the Peace as exceptions to the totality rule.
· Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant
to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal
court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that
under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs'
demands were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test.
· International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued for unpaid
salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although
the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties
plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the
several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a
common question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under
Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test .
Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions
are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of
parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that,
after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for
the reason that the claims against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and
neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
Genesis Investment v. Heirs of Ebarasabal, G.R. No. 181622, November 20, 2013
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution respectively, of the CA.
Herein respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint for Declaration
of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney’s Fees.
The Complaint was filed in the RTC of Barili, Cebu.
Herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to or possession
of real property or any interest therein and since the assessed value of the subject
property does not exceed 20k, the action falls within the MTC.
The RTC granted the petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss.
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that their
complaint consists of several causes of action, including one for annulment of
documents, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, as such, falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
The RTC issued an Order granting respondents’ Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and reversing earlier order. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. However, the CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60 of Barili, Cebu has jurisdiction over the instant case
when the ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT clearly shows that the main cause of action
of the respondents is for the Recovery of their Title, Interest, and Share over a Parcel of
Land, which has an assessed value of P11,990.00 and thus, within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title,
possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property,
the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on
the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As stated above, it is clear from the records that respondents' complaint was for
"Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and
Attorney's Fees." In filing their Complaint with the RTC, respondents sought to recover
ownership and possession of their shares in the disputed parcel of land by questioning
the due execution and validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well
as the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between some of their co-heirs
and herein petitioners. Aside from praying that the RTC render judgment declaring as
null and void the said Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale and Memorandum of
Agreement, respondents likewise sought the following: (1) nullification of the Tax
Declarations subsequently issued in the name of petitioner Cebu Jaya Realty, Inc.; (2)
partition of the property in litigation; (3) reconveyance of their respective shares; and (3)
payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, plus appearance
fees.
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more
than the issue of partition of or recovery of shares or interest over the real property in
question but includes an action for declaration of nullity of contracts and documents
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance [now
Regional Trial Courts].
Unicapital v. Consing, G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does
not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the
complain may be brought before other venues.
FACTS: Uniwide Holdings, Inc. entered into a franchise agreement with Alexander M.
Cruz granting the latter a five-year franchise to adopt and use the ―Uniwide Family
Store System‖ for the establishment and operation of a ―Uniwide Family Store in
Marikina City.
The contract stipulated that Cruz will pay a monthly service fee of P50,000.00 or three
percent of gross monthly purchases, whichever is higher to UHI, payable within five days
after the end of each month without need of formal billing or demand from UHI. In case
of any delay in the payment of the monthly service fee, Cruz would, under Article 10.3 of
the agreement, be liable to pay an interest charge of three percent per month. Cruz
thereafter purchased goods from UHI’s affiliated companies First Paragon Corporation
(FPC) and Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
FPC and USWCI subsequently executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI assigning all
their rights and interests over Cruz‘s accounts payable to them. Cruz had outstanding
obligations with UHI, FPC and USWCI in the amount of P1, 358, 531.89.00. UHI sent a
letter demanding for the payment of such amount but it was not settled.
Thus, UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque against Cruz praying for payment of service fee, accounts payable to
FPC and USWCI and attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses.
Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He invokes Article 27.5
of the agreement which provides that exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the courts f
Quezon City. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is dismissible on the ground of
improper venue where only one of the causes of action arises from a contract with
exclusive venue stipulation
HELD:
In this case, UHI contended that nowhere in the agreement is there a mention of FPC
and USWCI, and neither are the two parties thereto, hence, they cannot be bound to the
stipulation on ―exclusive venue.‖ The Court found merit in this contention.
The Supreme Court cited Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that all
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action does not,

however, exclude parties from bringing a case to other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which
does not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the
complaint, as in the one at bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such
other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.
It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts are not based on a
breach of the agreement between UHI and Cruz. They are based on separate, distinct
and independent contracts-deeds of assignment in which UHI is the assignee of Cruz‘s
obligations to the assignors FPC and USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the deeds of
assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive venue stipulation embodied in the
agreement.
Iniego v. Hon. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006

FACTS: For this Court to grant this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner has to persuade us on two engaging questions of law. First, he
has to convince us that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore would fall under the jurisdiction of the
municipal courts if the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P400,000.00
in Metro Manila. Second, he has to convince us that the moral and exemplary damages
claimed by the private respondent should be excluded from the computation of the
above-mentioned jurisdictional amount because they arose from a cause of action other
than the negligent act of the defendant.
On 1 March 2002, private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict
and damages against Jimmy Pinon, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and
against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion.
On 11 December 1999, when the freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion
hit private respondent’s jitney which private respondent was driving at the time of the
accident.
August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of
action of the case.
HELD: Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions
for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the
defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.
The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the
claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of
courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes
of action.
Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages
arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of the
defendant) should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount.
According to petitioner, the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the respondents
in the case at bar are not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent
act. Petitioner points out that the complaint.
The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries in a

quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more
apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent originate from the same
cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the employee and the juris
tantum presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and supervision are
the seeds of the damages claimed, without distinction.
Sec. 6, Rules of Procedure on Small Claims (A.M. 08-8-7-SC, October 27,

2009)
A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC
THE RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES
RESOLUTION
Pursuant to the action of the Court en banc in its session held on October 27, 2009, Sections
11, 12, 14, 16, 21, and 22 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, including the
attached Forms, are AMENDED to read as follows:
Section 11. Response. - The defendant shall file with the court and serve on the plaintiff a
duly accomplished and verified Response within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt of summons. The Response shall be accompanied by certified photocopies of
documents, as well as affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in support thereof. No
evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted
together with the Response, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional
evidence.
THE GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM, UNDER RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF COURT, SHOULD BE PLEADED.
Section 12. Effect of Failure to File Response. - Should the defendant fail to file his
Response within the required period, AND LIKEWISE FAIL TO APPEAR AT THE DATE
SET FOR HEARING, THE COURT SHALL RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE SAME DAY, AS
MAY BE WARRANTED BY THE FACTS.
SHOULD THE DEFENDANT FAIL TO FILE RESPONSE WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD
BUT APPEARS AT THE DATE SET FOR HEARING, THE COURT SHALL ASCERTAIN
WHAT DEFENSE HE HAS TO OFFER AND PROCEED TO HEAR, MEDIATE OR
ADJUDICATE THE CASE ON THE SAME DAY AS IF A RESPONSE HAS BEEN FILED.
Section 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third-party complaints; and
(l) Interventions.
Section 16. Appearance .- The parties shall appear at thedesignated date of hearing
personally.
APPEARANCE THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE FOR A VALID

CAUSE. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF AN INDIVIDUAL-PARTY MUST NOT BE A
LAWYER, AND MUST BE RELATED TO OR NEXT-OF-SKIN OF THE INDIVIDUAL-
PARTY. JURIDICAL ENTITIES SHALL NOT BE REPRESENTED BY A LAWYER IN
ANY CAPACITY.
THE REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE authorized under a Special Power of Attorney ( Form 5-

SCC ) to enter into an amicable SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documentary exhibits.
Section 21. HEARING. - At the hearing, the judge shall EXERT EFFORTS TO BRING THE
PARTIES TO AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE. Any settlement ( Form
7-SCC ) or resolution ( Form 8-SCC ) of the dispute shall be reduced into writing, signed by
the parties and submitted to the court for approval ( Form 12-SCC ).
SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS SHALL BE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND ANY

REFERENCE TO ANY SETTLEMENT MADE IN THE COURSE OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS
SHALL BE PUNISHABLE BY CONTEMPT.
Section 22. Failure of SETTLEMENT. - If EFFORTS AT SETTLEMENT FAIL, the hearing

shall proceed in an informal and expenditious manner and BE terminated within one (1)
day. EITHER PARTY MAY MOVE IN WRITING ( FORM 10-SCC ) TO HAVE ANOTHER
JUDGE HEAR AND DECIDE THE CASE. THE REASSIGNMENT WITH EXISTING
ISSUANCES.
THE REFERRAL BY THE ORIGINAL JUDGE TO THE EXECUTIVE JUGDE SHALL BE

MADE WITHIN THE SAME DAY THE MOTION IS FILED AND GRANTED, AND BY THE
EXECUTIVE JUDGE TO THE DESIGNATED JUDGE WITHIN THA SAME DAY OF THE
REFERRAL. THE NEW JUDGE SHALL HEAR AND DECIDE THE CASE WITHIN FIVE (5)
WORKING DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE ORDER OF REASIGNMENT.
The amendments of the Rule shall take effect on November 3, 2009 following its publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
October 27, 2009
Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action
Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012 (Supra.)
RULE 3- PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
Sec. 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant
Art. 44, Civil Code

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
Arts. 1772 & 1768, Civil Code
Art. 1772. Every contract of partnership having a capital of three thousand pesos or
more, in money or property, shall appear in a public instrument, which must be
recorded in the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Failure to comply with the requirements of the preceding paragraph shall not affect the
liability of the partnership and the members thereof to third persons. (n)
Art. 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and distinct from that of
each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of Article
1772, first paragraph. (n)
Secs. 21 & 122, Corporation Code

Section 21. Corporation by estoppel. - All persons who assume to act as a corporation
knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all
debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof: Provided, however,
That when any such ostensible corporation is sued on any transaction entered by it as a
corporation or on any tort committed by it as such, it shall not be allowed to use as a
defense its lack of corporate personality.
Section 122. Corporate liquidation. - Every corporation whose charter expires by its own
limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for
other purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a
body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it would have been so dissolved,
for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to
settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its
assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, the corporation is authorized and empowered to
convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of stockholders, members, creditors,
and other persons in interest. From and after any such conveyance by the corporation of
its property in trust for the benefit of its stockholders, members, creditors and others in
interest, all interest which the corporation had in the property terminates, the legal
interest vests in the trustees, and the beneficial interest in the stockholders, members,
creditors or other persons in interest. Upon the winding up of the corporate affairs, any
asset distributable to any creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot
be found shall be escheated to the city or municipality where such assets are located.
Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by this Code, no
corporation shall distribute any of its assets or property except upon lawful dissolution
and after payment of all its debts and liabilities.
Art. 242 (5), Labor Code

Art. 242. Rights of legitimate labor organizations. A legitimate labor organization shall
have the right:
(5) To sue and be sued in its registered name.
Sec. 15, Rule 2
-Estate of deceased (See: Limjoco v. Instestate Estate, G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948)
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said
intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily
productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and
to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of
Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied
for is a contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante

had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission
the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his
death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate
and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and
assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the
estate of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the
impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise
during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations
of his estate which survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up
a part and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or
legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the
commission.
-Roman Catholic church (See: Barlin vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-2832, Nov. 24, 1906)
Facts : The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took
possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his
superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a
demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and
the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by
a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of
Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection
w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino
Church, the head of w/c is at Mla.
In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that
the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery,
the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to
the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had
received and w/c was retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines
ruled in favor of the pltff.
HELD: The court held that the church was a property of the Roman Catholic Church.
There was a law that states that all church buildings were made by the Spanish
government and representatives in the Philippines using government and private local
funds, but the Spanish government implemented this to the effect that the churches and
its income were dedicated for the propagation of the faith. Hence, its properties were
beyond the commerce of man. Priests held them in the concept of guardians or
stewards. The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the
Philippines to the United States, churches and other consecrated objects were
considered outside of the commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could
they be subjects of private property in the sense that any private person could the
owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which
was that it was devoted to the worship of God Furthermore, the municipality cannot
show evidence of title, right of ownership or possession. On the contention that the
Roman Catholic Church no longer had legal and juridical personality in the islands, since
the latter half of the third century, and more particularly since the year 313, when
Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the
latter gradually entered upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the
acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the same as any other juridical
entity under the laws of the Empire..
Ventanilla Enterprises v. Hon. Lazaro, G.R. No. L-53856, August 21, 1980
FACTS: Petitioner Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation, in these special civil actions
of certiorari and prohibition, seeks to restrain the enforcement against it of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated November 14, 1978 in Civil Case
No. 107607 entitled "Emperor Films Int'l. (Phils.), Inc. vs. Broadway Theater".
A similar petition was filed in the Court of Appeals by the herein petitioner. It was
dismissed because that Court can issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition only in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and there was no more appeal in Civil Case No. 107607.
Moreover, as reasoned out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner, not being a party in
Civil Case No. 107607, cannot ask for a review of any order issued in that case (CA-G.R.
No. SP-09510-R, April 30,1980).
It is at once obvious that the complaint in Civil Case No. 107607 is defective because
the defendant is not a natural or juridical person. However, that defect was cured by
the answer of Ricardo C. Ventanilla, the lessee of the Broadway Theater (who
admitted having issued three postdated checks to guarantee his wife's obligation to
the plaintiff), and by the compromise agreement dated October 11, 1978 executed
between the plaintiff and Ricardo C. Ventanilla, who, in effect, substituted himself for
defendant "Broadway theater".
In that compromise agreement, which is in reality a confession of judgment, Ricardo C.

Ventanilla, as defendant, acknowledged that he was obligated to pay Emperor Films Int'l.
(Phils.), Inc. the sum of P12,662 which he promised to pay in installments. He agreed
that, in case he defaulted in the payment of any installment, "execution shall
immediately issue".
The lower court rendered judgment in accordance with the compromise agreement.
Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation alleged that the deputy sheriff of Branch XXXV
of the Court of First Instance of Manila would enforce against the Broadway Theater the
writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 107607. It claims to be the owner of the
Broadway Theater located at Burgos Avenue, Cabanatuan City which it leased to Ricardo
C. Ventanilla for a ten-year period starting January 1, 1975 (Annex A).
We hold that Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation is entitled to the writ of

prohibition enjoining the sheriff from levying on the Broadway Theater for the
satisfaction of the judgment rendered against Ricardo C. Ventanilla who is a mere lessee
of the theater.
This incident would not have arisen if Emperor Films Int'l. (Phils.), Inc. had sued directly
Ricardo C. Ventanilla and not "Broadway Theater" and if respondent Judge had
perceived the anomaly that the defendant is not a natural or juridical person and had
ordered the substitution of Ricardo C. Ventanilla for "Broadway Theater" as the real
party defendant in Civil Case No. 107607.
WHEREFORE, the lower court and the sheriff of Manila are directed to desist from
enforcing the judgment in question against the properties of the petitioner in the
Broadway Theater at Cabanatuan City.
Chiang Kai Shek School v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58028, April 18, 1989
FACTS: On the first week of school at Chiang Kai Shek, Fausta Oh was told she had no
assignment for the next semester. She was shocked as she had been teaching in the
school since 1932 for a continuous period of almost 33 years.
Oh sued, demanding for separation pay, social security benefits, salary
differentials, maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages.
The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. Certain
officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with school.
The CFI of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason
alone of its long continued existence and recognition by the government
HELD: We hold against the petitioner on the first question. It is true that Rule 3, Section
1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that "only natural or juridical persons may be
parties in a civil action." It is also not denied that the school has not been incorporated.
However, this omission should not prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of
her claims against the school.
As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule
3, Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical
personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has been shown that the
individual members of the board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only
after the private respondent's dismissal.
Sec. 1 (d) & (g), Rule 16
Sec. 2. Parties in interest
Stronghold Insurance v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013
Civil procedure; real party in interest. Accordingly, a person, to be a real

party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced,
that is, his interest must be a present substantial interest, not a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the
motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action. The reason for this is that the
courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived from any actual
controversy.
Indeed, considering that all civil actions must be based on a cause of

action, defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another, the former as the defendant must be allowed to insist upon
being opposed by the real party in interest so that he is protected from
further suits regarding the same claim. Under this rationale, the
requirement benefits the defendant because “the defendant can insist
upon a plaintiff who will afford him a setup providing good res judicata
protection if the struggle is carried through on the merits to the end.”
Mayor Dagdag v. Tongnawa, G.R. Nos. 161166-67, February 3, 2005
Facts: Dagadag was the former Mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga. Tongnawa and Gammod are
the municipal engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator,
respectively, of the said town. During his mayorship, Dagadag issued memos to
Tongnawa and Gammod asking them to explain why they should not be sanctioned for
acts unbecoming of public servants. They complied by submitting their explanation on
the matter. Dagadag then issued an order creating a Municipal Grievance Committee to
investigate the charges against the two. The chairman was Vice-Mayor Dangpason. The
committee found respondents liable for insubordination, non-performance of duties and
being AWOL. In turn, Mayor Dagadag issued an order suspending Tongnawa and
Gammod. Tongnawa and Gammod appealed to the CSC contending that they were
deprived of due process. While this appeal was pending, Dagadag issued an order
dropping the two from the roll of employees by reason of unauthorized absences. The
CSC then affirmed the orders of Dagadag. Dahil nakupal ng CSC, they went to the CA to
with a 45certio.
The appellate court reversed the CSC.
Tongnawa and Gammod presented the sworn statement of Vice-Mayor Dangpason. The
statement had renounced the contents of the minutes of the supposed investigation.
Dangpason who ‘wish(ed) to set the record straight…in fairness to all concerned’
categorically declared that the two were not given an opportunity to defend themselves
since there was no actual investigation conducted and even expressed his willingness ‘to
testify and confirm’ his declarations just to ascertain the truth. These declarations of
were not denied by the Mayor. In the absence therefore of any showing of ill intent or
bad faith on the part of Dangpason and Tumbali, their Affidavits are to be afforded great
weight and credence. Dagadag filed an M.R. but was denied, hence, the current
recourse.In their comment, Tongnawa and Gammod aver that Dagadag has no legal
personality to filed the instant petition since he has already ceased to be the municipal
mayor of the town.
ISSUE: W/N Dagadag still has legal personality to pursue the case. (SC: WULAH NAH)
HELD: The SC held that a Mayor can legally pursue a case since he/she has the power of
appointment. Similarly, where a municipal mayor orders the suspension or
Dismissal of a municipal employee on grounds he believes to be proper, but his order is
reversed or nullified by the CSC or the Court of Appeals (as in this case), he has the right
to contest such adverse ruling. His right to appeal flows from the fact that hispower to
appoint carries with it the power to remove. The second reason why the municipal
mayor of Tanudan has legal personality to challenge the Decision of the CA is because
the salaries of the respondents, being municipal officials, are drawn from the municipal
funds. Obviously, the mayor has real and substantial interest in the outcome of the
administrative cases against respondents. However, Dagadag, at the time he filed with
this Court the instant petition assailing the Appellate Court Decision, was n olonger the
mayor of Tanudan. Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, asamended,
is relevant, thus:
"Sec. 17.
Death or separation of a party who is a public officer
.
–
When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its
pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued
and maintained by or against his successor if
, xxx,
it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for
continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to
adopt or continue the action of his predecessor
. xxx "Interpreting the above rule, where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be
mayor, the appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his
successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to pursue the
appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed. Records show that upon Dagadag’s
cessation from public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to the effect
that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal. Thus, Dagadag has lost his legal
personality to interpose the instant petition.
Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006

Basic in procedural law is the rule that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. In the present case, the respondent,
who was not a party to the contracts being sued upon, was not able to prove material
interest in the litigation. For his failure to do so, the trial court cannot be faulted for
dismissing the action to rescind the contracts. His status as trustor remained a bare
allegation, as he had failed to rebut the legal presumption: that there is absence of a
trust when the purchase price in a deed of sale is paid by a parent in favor of a child.
Here, the prima facie presumption is that there is a gift in favor of the child. Any
allegation to the contrary must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence, a burden
that was not discharged by the plaintiff.
Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120465, September 9, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioners Uy and Roxas are agents authorized to sell eight parcels of land by the
owners thereof. By virtue of such authority, petitioners offered to sell the lands located
in Benguet to respondent NHA to be utilized and developed as a housing project. On
February 14, 1989, the NHA Board approved the acquisition of said lands, at the cost of
P23.87M, pursuant to which the parties executed a series of Deeds of Absolute Sale
covering the subject lands. Of the eight parcels, however, only five were paid for by the
NHA because of the report it received from the Land Geosciences Bureau of the DENR
that the remaining area is located at an active landslide area and therefore, not suitable
for development into a housing project. In 1991, the NHA cancelled the sale of the 3
parcels of land and subsequently offered the amount of P1.225 million to the
landowners as daños perjuicios. On 9 March 1992, petitioners filed before the QC RTC a
Complaint for Damages. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the cancellation of the
contract to be justified. The trial court nevertheless awarded damages to plaintiffs in the
same amount offered by NHA to petitioners as damages. Upon appeal by petitioners,
the CA held that since there was "sufficient justifiable basis" in cancelling the sale, "it
saw no reason" for the award of damages. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Was there a legal basis for the rescission of the sale of the 3 parcels of land? And
granting arguendo that NHA has legal basis to rescind, does the petitioner have the right
to claim for damages?(2) [Irrelevant] Were the petitioners allowed to lodge a complaint
as agents?
HELD:
(1) There was no “rescission” per se. What is involved is a
cancellation based on the negation of the cause of the contract.(2) [Irrelevant] No.
Petitioners are not parties, heirs, assignees, or beneficiaries of a stipulation pour autrui
under the contracts of sale, they do not, under substantive law, possess the right they
seek to enforce.
RATIO:
(1) Petitioners confuse the cancellation of the contract by the NHA as a rescission of the
contract under Art. 1191. The right of rescission or, more accurately, resolution, is
predicated on a breach of faith by the other party .NHA did not have the right to rescind
for the other parties to the contract, the vendors, did not commit any breach of their
obligation. The cancellation was based on the negation of the cause arising from the
realization that the lands ,which were the object of the sale, were not suitable for
housing. Cause, which is the essential reason for the contract, should be distinguished
from motive, which is the particular reason of a party which does not affect the other
party. In a contract of sale of a piece of land, such as in this case, the cause of the vendor
(petitioners' principals) in entering into the contract is to obtain the price. For the
vendee, NHA, it is the acquisition of the land. The motive of the NHA, on the other hand,
is to use said lands for housing. Ordinarily, a party's motives for entering into the
contract do not affect the contract. However, when the motive predetermines the cause,
the motive may be regarded as the cause. In this case, it is clear, and petitioners do not
dispute, that NHA would not have entered into the contract were the lands not suitable
for housing.
In other words, the quality of the land was an implied condition for the NHA to enter
into the contract.
On NHA’s part, therefore, the motive was the cause for its being a party to the sale. The
findings of the Land Geosciences Bureau were sufficient for the cancellation of the sale
NHA was justified in canceling the contract. The realization of the mistake as regards the
quality of the land resulted in the negation of the motive/cause thus rendering the
contract inexistent. Article 1318 of the Civil Code enumerates the essential requisites of
a contract: (1) Consent of the parties; (2) Subject matter; and (3) Cause of the obligation
which is established. Therefore, assuming that petitioners are parties, assignees or
beneficiaries to the contract of sale, they would not be entitled to any award of
damages.
Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010

Tampico v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 76225, March 31, 1992
Salonga v. Warner, Barnes, G.R. No. L-2246, January 31, 1951
Sec. 1 (g), Rules of Court
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties
Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012

Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59731, January 11, 1990 (Supra.)
MIA v. Rivera Village, G.R. No. 143870, September 30, 2005
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006

FACTS: The Sps Carandag and Quirino De Guzman are stockholders as well as corporate
officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS). The capital stock of MBS was increased
from 500k to 1m and P345k of this increase was subscribed by the spouses. Thereafter,
MBS again increased its capital stock, and the sps subscribed again to the increase. De
Guzman claims that part of the payment of these subscriptions were paid by him, thus
he sent a demand letter to the Sps for payment of the said total amount. The Sps
refused to pay, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed between
Carandag and de Guzman whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions
of the former without cost in consideration for a certain undertaking, therefore there is
no indebtedness on their part.
De Guzman filed his complaint, seeking to recover P336k with damages. The trial
court rendered judgment in favour of De Guzman, directing the Sps to jointly and
severally pa de Guzman. The Sps appealed to the CA, which affirmed such decision. The
Sps then appealed to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed error in failing to comply with section 2 and 3
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as s 16, Rule 3.
HELD:
Whether or not the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court
The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered after
the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or representatives to

appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if

the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may
order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs.
The spouses Carandang posits that such failure to comply with the above rule renders
void the decision of the RTC.
However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by law and is not
subject to the discretion of the parties, jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the
case may be waived either expressly or impliedly. Implied waiver comes in the form of
either voluntary appearance or a failure to object.
In the cases cited by the spouses Carandang, we held that there had been no valid
substitution by the heirs of the deceased party, and therefore the judgment cannot be
made binding upon them. In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman
interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are
actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver is not even
merely implied (by their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but express (by
their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in this Court). The
heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision of the RTC.
In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their
persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further
proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans counsel.
Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action,
considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a
party-plaintiff.
Spouses as Parties
The spouses Carandang claim that, since three of the four checks used to pay their stock
subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered
an indispensable party. Being such, the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to join Mrs. de
Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the dismissal of the action because (i)f a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.
The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and Milagros de Guzman from which
the four (4) checks were drawn is part of their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code
and the Family Code the husband alone may institute an action for the recovery or protection of
the spouses conjugal property. Unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of
both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband
and wife always act together.
Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms real party in interest and indispensable
party. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable
party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in
contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined
as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.
The spouses Carandang are indeed correct that (i)f a suit is not brought in the name of
or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action. However, what dismissal on this ground entails is an
examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the
litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The
latter query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in
discussions concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are
considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit.
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family Code
on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains govern their property relations.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved. Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan
or other credit transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the
marriage are presumed to be conjugal property.
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the spouses
Carandang are liable, such credits are presumed to be conjugal property. There being no
evidence to the contrary, such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-
owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party in interest. Dismissal on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that the suit was allegedly not brought by
a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted.
So now we come to the discussion concerning indispensable and necessary parties.

When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should likewise be dismissed.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present . On the
other hand, the non-joinder of necessary parties do not result in the dismissal of the case.
Instead, Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides for the consequences of such non-
joinder:
Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. Whenever in any

pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader
shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the
court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion
of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be
deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in
the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
necessary party.
Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not warrant
the dismissal of the complaint. This is an exception to Section 3, Rule 17 which allows the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with an order of the court, as Section 9, Rule 3
specifically provides for the effect of such non-inclusion: it shall not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise provides that the non-joinder of
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of the action.
Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of parties: the
pro-forma parties, which are those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or
against another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or procedural rule.
An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.
Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor

necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property
which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no legal interest in such
property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined as a party.
In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the general
rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal.
Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join
the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse does not
warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured by amendment.
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also indispensable or
necessary parties, the rules concerning indispensable or necessary parties, as the case may be,
should be applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the
complaint is an indispensable party.
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended

to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an
indispensable party, dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not
warranted, whether or not there was an order for her inclusion in the complaint pursuant to
Section 9, Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superceded:
Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that [a] partner is a co-owner
with the other partners of specific partnership property. Taken with the presumption of the
conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners stock
subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds,
Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may
separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v. Hular
and Adlawan v. Adlawan, we held that, in a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the
recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In
the latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of Appeals, we also held that Article 487 of the
Civil Code, which provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, covers
all kinds of action for the recovery of possession.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them
may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore,
only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-
owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable
parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit
even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of
all co-owners.
We therefore hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action
for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not
have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a
party thereto.
Sec. 5. Minor or incompetent persons
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties
Flores v. Hon. Mallare-Philipps, G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986 (Supra.)
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of
the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which
provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or
be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as
may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in
connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
FACTS: Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Helia Mallare-
Phillips of the RTC which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Flores had two causes of action: 1. Against respondent Binongcal for refusing to
pay the amount of P11,643 representing the cost of truck tires which he purchased on
credit from Flores on various occasions from August to October, 1981; 2. Against
respondent Calion for allegedly refusing to pay P10,212 representing the cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March
1981 to January, 1982.
, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only
P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although
another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.
At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for
petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule
introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:
... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims
in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the
amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by
or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
HELD: Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of
action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in
Section 6 of Rule 3.
the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also,
if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to
the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that
there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents
Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of
preliminary attachment against the Sps. Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent
filed an Answer in which she alleged that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel is
already dead. As a result, petitioner filed a motion to require respondent to disclose the
heirs of Manuel. In compliance, the respondent submitted the required names of the
heirs. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted
by his children as party defendants. It appears that this motion was granted by the trial
court.
In the trial, respondent filed a MTD the complaint, citing among others, that the
complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence the
case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Trial court denied MTD
having been filed out of time.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the trial
court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her MTD despite
discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that would constitute a ground for
dismissal of the case. The CA granted the petition, rationalizing tt is elementary that
courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant x x x only when the latter
voluntarily appeared or submitted to the court or by coercive process issued by the
court to him, x x x. In this case, it is undisputed that when petitioner Boston filed the
complaint on December 24, 1997, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead, and
thus the court could not have acquired jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.
ISSUE: CA erred in holding that: 1. Petitioner never failed to implead an indispensable

party as the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party;
2. The inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not
warranting the dismissal of the case before the lower court; and
3. Since the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party, it is not necessary that
petitioner file its claim against the estate of Manuel.
HELD: The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one
of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense
must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a
waiver of the defense.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he
was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the
trial court.
On whether or not the estate of Manuel
Toledo is an indispensable party
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case that a final
adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. He or
she is a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but "an interest of such
nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a
condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also
been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable."
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly
proceed.
A "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable
from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a
decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his
presence would merely permit complete relief between him or her and those already parties to the
action, or if he or she has no interest in the subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient reason to
declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her presence will avoid multiple
litigations.
It is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple
reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
In other words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only, even
without impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s
complaint for sum of money.
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein
prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets
up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate
of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has
the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor.
On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as

party defendant is a misjoinder of party
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that "neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal
of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded
with separately."
Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must have the capacity
to sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued in a separate
case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder,
as in fact, the action would have proceeded against him had he been alive at the time the collection case
was filed by petitioner.
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the
complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action
or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a
complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the
dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel
by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted died during the pendency of the
case.
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.
Malazarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009

Facts:
In 1974, Plasabas and Malazarte filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with
damages before CFI Maasin, Leyte. The subject property was a parcel of coconut land
declared in the name of Plasabas. They pray for their rights over the land be confirmed
and for Lumen and Aunzo to vacate the land.
Aunzo and Lumen interposed that they inherited the land from their common ancestor,
Francisco Plasabas. In the course of trial, it was found out that Nieves Plasabas was not
the absolute owner of the land.
Aunzo and Lumen then raised the argument that the case should have been terminated
at inception for petitioner's failure to implead indispensable parties—the other co-
owners (Jose, Victor and Victoria).
CFI dismissed the case. The instant case should have been dismissed without prejudice a
long time ago for lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte and
Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves
alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as
the latter in the final determination of the case. Not impleading them, any judgment
would have no effectiveness.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA. CA affirmed the ruling of the CFI. CA
declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the principle of
due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that
the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action
for ejectment.
Held:
With a motion to reconsider, SC grants the petition and remands the case to the CFI for
disposition on the merits, citing Article 487 that provides any one of the co-owners may
bring an action for ejectment.
In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they
summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a
protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead
indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable.
Quilatan v. Heirs of Quilatan, G.R. No. 183059, August 28, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners Ely Quilatan and Rosvida Quilatan-Elias filed for the nullification of Tax
Declaration and Partition of the Estate of the late Pedro Quilatan with damages, against
respondent heirs of Lorenzo Quilatan. They claim that during his lifetime, Pedro owned 2
parcels of land in Taguig, Manila, that sometime in 1998, they discovered that said tax
declarations were cancelled without their knowledge and new ones were issued
The trial court rendered a decision rendering as void the cancellation of the Tax
Declarations. IT also ordered the partition of the subject properties into 3 equal shares
among the heirs of Francisco, Criciaco and Lorenzo, all surnamed Quilatan.
On appeal, the CA reversed without prejudice the decision of the trial court on
the ground that the petitioner failed to implead other co-heirs who are indispensable
parties to the case. Thus, the judgment of the trial court was null and void for want of
jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition for review where petitioners argue that the issue for the
failure to implead the indispensable parties was a mere afterthought because
respondents did not raise the same in their Answer to the complaint, but only for the
first time in their MR of the decision of the trial court. Petitioners further argue that the
order of dismissal without prejudice and the re-filing of the case in order to implead the
heirs of Ciriaco only invite multiplicity of suits since the second action would be a
repetition of the first action, where the judgment therein rightly partitioned the subject
properties into three equal shares, apportioning each share to the heirs of the chidlre of
Pedro Quilatan.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
Records show that Pedro Quilatan died intestate in 1960 and was survived by his three children, namely, Ciriaco,
Francisco and Lorenzo, all of whom are now deceased. Ciriaco was survived by his children, namely Purita Santos,
Rosita Reyes, Renato Quilatan, Danilo Quilatan, and Carlito Quilatan; Francisco was survived by herein petitioners and
their two other siblings, Solita Trapsi and Rolando Quilatan; while Lorenzo was survived by his children, herein
respondents.
In the complaint filed by petitioners before the trial court, they failed to implead their two siblings, Solita and Rolando, and
all the heirs of Ciriaco, as co-plaintiffs or as defendants.
. It is clear that the central thrust of the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 67367 was to revert the subject properties back to
the estate of Pedro Quilatan, thereby making all his heirs pro indiviso co-owners thereof, and to partition them equally
among themselves; and that all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the subject properties are indispensable
parties to an action for partition, which will not lie without the joinder of said parties.
Respondents could not be blamed if they did not raise this issue in their Answer because in an action for partition of real
estate, it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the
absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly applied Section 1, Rule 69 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which read:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real
estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in
the property. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest. A party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made
without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a
person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. In Commissioner Andrea D.
Domingo v. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, the Court held that the joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by
the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, with no authority to act not only as to the
absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the
indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
In fine, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Metrobank v. Hon. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001
In a suit to nullify an existing Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real estate
mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee is an indispensable party. In such suit, a decision
canceling the TCT and the mortgage annotation is subject to a petition for annulment of
judgment, because the non-joinder of the mortgagee deprived the court of jurisdiction to
pass upon the controversy.
Guy v. Guy, G.R. No. 189486, September 5, 2012

Monis v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, June 16, 2009
Sec. 8. Necessary party
Chua v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005

Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. 44339, December 2, 1987
Wee v. Castro, G.R. No. 176405, August 20, 2008
Mayor of Parañaque v. Ebio, G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010
Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006 (Supra.)
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff
Emata v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72714, June 29, 1989
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
Boston Equity v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 (Supra.)
Leonis Navigation v. Villamater, G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013
Sec. 12. Class suit
Juana Complex v. Fil-Estate Land, G.R. No. 152272, March 5, 2012

Newsweek, Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank, G.R. No. L-23136, August 26, 1974
Borlasa v. Polistico, G.R. No. L-22909, January 28, 1925
Note: No class suit if interest of those who filed the action conflicts with those sought to
be represented. (See: Ibañez v. Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil. 227)
Llana v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111014, May 31, 1996
Sec. 13. Alternative Defendants
Insurance Company v. US Lines, G.R. No. L-21839 April 30, 1968
Sec. 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant
See: Sec. 14, Rule 14
Sec. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant
See: Sec. 8, Rule 14
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel

Saligumba v. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365, December 4, 2008
Hon. Sumaliag v. Spouses Literato, G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006 (Supra.)
Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer
Commissioner v. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007
Sec. 18. Incompetency or incapacity
Sec. 19. Transfer of Interest
Associated Bank v. Spouses Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, September 3, 2009
Sec. 20. Action on contractual and money claims
See: Sec. 5, Rule 86; Sec. 7, Rule 39
Gabriel v. Pagaygay, G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007
Sec. 21. Indigent party
Sec. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General
RULE 4- VENUE OF ACTIONS
Sec. 1. Venue of real actions
Fortune Motors v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76431, October 16, 1989 (Supra.)
Paglaum Management v. Union Bank, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012
Ochoa v. China Bank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011
Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions
Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012 (Supra.)

Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096, August 22. 2008
Emergency Loan Pawnshop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129184, February 28, 2001
Hyatt Elevators v. Goldstar, G.R. No. 161026, October 24, 2005
Sec. 3. Venue of actions against non-residents
Time, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-28882, May 31, 1971
Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable

Union Bank v. Maunlad Homes, G.R. No. 190071, August 5, 2012
Pilipino Telephone v. Tecson, G.R. No. 156966, May 7, 2004
Ochoa v. China Bank, G.R. No. 192877, March 23, 2011 (Supra.)
Republic v. Glasgow Credit, G.R. No. 170281, January 18, 2008
i. Except cases under the Rules on Summary Procedure
ii. Without prejudice of refilling in case of dismissal
RULE 5- UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS
Sec. 1. Uniform procedure
Sec. 2. Meaning of terms
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Sec. De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
A.L. Ang v. Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014
RULE 6- KINDS OF PLEADINGS
Sec. 1. Pleadings defined
Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed
Sec. 3. Complaint
Sec. 4. Answer
See: Rule 8, Sec. 10

Rule 16, Sec. 6
PBCom v. Spouses Go, G.R. No. 175514, February 14, 2011

BPI v. Spouses Royeca, G.R. No. 176664, July 21, 2008
Sec. 5. Defenses

Rule 16, Sec. 6
PBCom v. Spouses Go, G.R. No. 175514, February 14, 2011 (Supra.)
Sec. 6. Counterclaim
Lafarge Cement v. Continental, G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004

Yulienco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131692, June 10, 1999
Sec. 7. Compulsory Counterclaim

Rule 9, Sec. 2
Lafarge Cement v. Continental, G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004 (Supra.)
Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169576, October 17, 2008
Calibre Traders v. Bayer, G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010
Dio v. Subic Bay, G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014
Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos, G.R. No. 102942, April 18, 1997
Sec. 8. Cross-claim
See: Rule 9, Sec. 2
Hon. Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101566, August 17, 1992
Sec. 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims
Sec. 10. Reply
See: Rule 8, Sec. 8
Casent Realty v. Philbank, G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007
Sec. 11. Third (fourth, etc.)- party complaint
Capayas v. CFI, 43 Off. Gaz., 2071, 2074; 77 Phil., 181

Allied Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123871, August 31, 1998
Philtranco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012
Sec. 12. Bringing new parties
Sec. 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)- party complaint

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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

2nd Semester 2016-2017

Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

i. Meaning of procedural law

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012

ii. Nature and purpose of procedural law

Samahan v. Hon. Magsalin, G.R. No. 172303, June 6, 2011

iii. Retroactive application of procedural rules

iv. Exceptions to the retroactive application of procedural rules

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

Yu v. Hon. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x

The “fresh period rule” in Neypes declares:

Jocson v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941, March 9, 2016

Article VIII, Sec. 1, Secs. 1, 5 par. 5, 1987 Constitution

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

a) Constitutional and Statutory

Rayos v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011

Ernesto Dy v. Hon. Palamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

C. Jurisdiction of Different Courts

ii. Jurisdiction v. Venue

iii. Determined by the allegations in the complaint

Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013

Gonzales v. Quirico Pe, G.R. No. 167398, August 9, 2011

v. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

Bagunu v. Spouses Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

vi. Adherence of jurisdiction

Aruego v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996

vii. Doctrine of non-interference or judicial stability

Tan v. Cinco, et al, G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016

Teresita's motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.

HELD: The petition is devoid of merit.

Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer, G.R. No. 215348, June 20, 2016

Cabili v. Hon. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-10-22252, September 6, 2011

Villamor v. Salas, G.R. No. 101041, November 13, 1991

HELD: The answer is no.

Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008

Alicia owned in common

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968

DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

ISSUE: Whether THE

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968

De Herrera v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011

x. Objection to jurisdiction over a party; holding out theory or doctrine of

CIVIL LAW: Doctrine of Estoppel, Relationship of Principal and Agent

Phil. Women’s Chrisitian Temperance Union v. Yangco, G.R. No.

Manchester Development v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987

Nestle Phils. v. FY Sons, G.R. No. 150780, May 5, 2006

Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989

If you do not state amount in body prayer may either be:

B.P. 129 as amended, R.A. 7691, R.A. 7902

Regional Trial Court

The RTC is a court of general jurisdiction

b. Special or Limited Jurisdiction

MANDATE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10660]

“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state