A summary Report on
FPSO Lessons Learned, gathered
from 5 Norwegian FPSOs - May 2002
20 September 2002
Preface
The OLF workgroup members provided the essential guidance and support for
the interviews and can be contacted if further information is required. The
workgroup members were;
Stavanger 20.9.02
David Llewelyn
Workgroup Facilitator OLF
Contents
1. Executive Summary 3
2. Introduction 4
4. Methodology 4
6. Industry Challenges 17
1. Executive Summary
In April/May 2002 the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) initiated a research
project to collect specific lessons learned from the operation of five Norwegian
Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessels (FPSO’s).
The findings were jointly written up by the project team against 64 topics and
categorised for importance and underlying causes.
The most significant of these issues and related lessons learned are summarised in
Chapter 5 and the Appendix Table 1.
Approximately 350 FPSO related issues/problems were reported. Where the primary
underlying cause was identified the percentage number of attributions were design
issues (63%), operational issues (16%), construction issues (12%), and
commissioning issues (9%). It would appear that during the first 18 months
problems are often down to poor construction and commissioning after that issues
are usually attributable to design.
Most lessons learned arise from the experience of problem resolution. Although
selected feedback on Norwegian FPSO successes is presented in Chapter 7 and
Appendix, Table 3; this was not the primary emphasis in the information collection
and respondents feedback.
A similar research exercise into lessons learned was undertaken for UKCS FPSO’s in
2001. In Chapter 8 and Appendix Tables 4 and 5 some general and selected
links have been drawn between the Norwegian and UK experiences.
2. Introduction
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) initiated this preliminary research
exercise. It was undertaken by David Llewelyn (OLF Project Manager, Stavanger), Mark
Capsey (General Manager, Offshore Management Centre, Robert Gordon University,
Aberdeen) and Erik Dyrkoren (Research Engineer, Norwegian Marine Technology
Research Institute, Trondheim).
The purpose of this joint industry initiative has been to collect lessons learned from the
experiences of operators of Norwegian Floating Production Storage and Offloading
vessels (FPSO’s). Information was collected from three operators responsible for five
FPSO’s; ExxonMobil (Balder & Jotun A), Norsk Hydro (Varg) and Statoil (Asgård &
Norne) and the DNV. The objective has been to ensure that project and operating
experience is not lost but that generic lessons learned are widely disseminated to allow
continuous improvement, to assist common problem resolution and to seek to minimise
repetition of mistakes.
4. Methodology
The project team together with contributions from the participating company
representatives identified a suite of categories of FPSO issues for investigation. These
were formatted into a survey tool under seven main headings: Hull & Marine; Turret;
Layout; Project Management; Operations & Support; Codes/Classification; Manning &
Safety. The survey tool invited respondents to identify issues/problems related to
FPSO’s, to rank their relative level of importance, and to identify the underlying cause as
either design, construction, commissioning or operational related. Where remedial
actions had been undertaken comments on the effectiveness of these were invited.
Finally respondents were asked to comment on any lessons learned.
Experience suggests that the most valuable feedback is derived from respondents who
have had a chance to consider the subject matter in advance. Therefore the survey tool
was issued for completion to the interviewees some days prior to their formal interviews
as a catalyst for meaningful discussion. It was observed however that the majority of
participants had not completed the form before their interview, but preferred to
‘brainstorm’ on the day.
Between 22-26 April 2002 the project team met with and interviewed 23 representatives
of ExxonMobil, Norsk Hydro, Statoil and DNV in Stavanger, Sandvika and Stordal plus a
videoconference with Harstad.
The project team would like to thank all the participating companies for the excellent
timetabling arrangements and the useful feedback supplied by all their representatives.
Once reviewed the interviewee’s comments were collated by FPSO Company. These
were then returned to each participating company for any additional feedback
comments and amendments. To maintain client confidentiality in this final report all
indications of information source including specific FPSO references and mentions of
vendors have been removed.
Part of this project has also involved linking the Norwegian FPSO experience with
information collected by the Robert Gordon University, Offshore Management Centre for
a UK FPSO research exercise conducted in 2001.
In this exercise a substantial amount of information related to FPSO operations has been
gathered. To best review the data it is recommended that the Appendix be
viewed on-line. A large number of hyperlinks have been created to assist users to
move from one data set to another. The Norwegian interview notes have been
evaluated and synthesised by the project team and compiled into a simple MS Excel
database. From this considerable information set a summary of the key issues, lessons
learned and challenges still to be faced have been compiled in Table 1. The bulk of the
raw data on which this interpretation is based is presented in Table 2. Where given,
insights into the perceived successes of Norwegian FPSO projects are documented in
Table 3.
The most widely reported issues/problems relating to UK FPSO’s are presented in Table
4. A particularly useful output from the UK research exercise was a checklist of design,
construction, commissioning and operational issues, which if acknowledged might assist
avoidance of decisions, and actions, that potentially could lead to problems during start-
up and operations. A version of this is reproduced in Table 5 with hyperlinks to the
Norwegian case study material.
A total of 172 hull and marine related issues/problems were reported. Where the
primary underlying cause was identified the number of attributions were design issues
(97), construction issues (20), operational issues (16) and commissioning issues (3).
Retroactive repairs/redesign including the fitting of side panels, raising bow walls and
moving sensitive equipment appear to have reduced the problem. In some cases cargo
limits have been imposed. A joint North Sea workgroup including the authorities and
classification societies has now led to a greater understanding of green water design
requirements.
Conventional hull design and basic fatigue analysis has been unable to eliminate FPSO
hull cracking in service. While this is not unusual for trading vessels the operational
problems and costs of offshore repair make this situation undesirable. Future hull
designs should make use of fatigue analysis in all critical and high-risk areas with
construction detail subject to high levels of control.
Accommodation (critical)
The FPSO accommodation has insufficient beds (4 out of 5 FPSO’s). The situation is
worsened by recent proposals from the unions that two people should not sleep in the
same cabin simultaneously. This lack of beds seriously hampers summer maintenance
programmes and delays major repairs or upgrades.
The economic impact of limited accommodation on operations and project (start-up and
upgrades) is likely to be significantly greater than the cost of the extra beds and
facilities. Future FPSO’s should have 100+ usable beds and/or have provision for
temporary expansion.
Operators should have an ongoing inspection programme of tank bottom coatings and
wall thickness measurement. Highest risk areas are slops tanks, areas under solids build
up and locations where coatings may crack as a result of hull strains.
Cranes (Major)
The choice of cranes - solid boom for 4 out of 5 FPSO’s was not optimum. These heavily
built booms are strongly affected by the wind and due to their weight, are insufficiently
responsive when offloading a supply vessel or for working on equipment. The general
view is that these cranes were not designed for active load handling but for in-port
offloading.
Helicopters (Major)
The forward positioned accommodation and helideck on all Norwegian FPSO’s is not
optimum for helicopter landing - misaligned approach, no forward visual reference-point
and increased vertical movement (cf. aft helidecks). However it does have the
advantage of clean air (no vessel-induced turbulence and no take off obstructions.
The cost benefits of increased FPSO storage volumes should be considered at the
earliest opportunity in the design phase. It is likely that matching storage volumes to
the size of the planned shuttle tanker will prove the most cost-effective option.
This newly introduced technology has proven successful. Note: a key aspect of
hydrocarbon blanketing is O2 detection. This instrumentation must be kept in service
and backed up at all times.
Moorings (Major)
Different approaches have been taken by Norwegian FPSO’s. Use of individual anchor
winches has the advantage of facilitating winter installation, allowing active
management of the mooring system and enabling movement of the chain wear point.
The permanently stopped design is simpler with reduced maintenance and lower capex.
It is not yet known if wear will be a problem for the permanently stopped design,
however there is as yet no straightforward method to inspect the top of the chain and
service the fairlead. Good experience with such a design may lead to increased use of
this lower cost approach. To date (other than minor drilling rig damage - better
monitoring is required here) there have been no problems with the mooring lines and
anchors.
However operating experience for at least one FPSO has shown roll limits to be under-
estimated. This has required an upgrade of the topsides fatigue design.
PAU design, supports and associated pipework are a critical area. Design must take full
account of vessel movement, machinery vibration, vessel role, wind and live liquid
loading and construction tolerances.
3 out of 5 FPSO’s have either inadequate power or incorrect engine sizes for efficient
running. The best solution seems to lie in smaller gas turbine packages in combination
with a large back-up diesel generator. Gas turbines also provide ample waste heat for
crude heating. The use of reciprocating diesels for main power has only been considered
appropriate for smaller FPSO’s.
HVAC (Moderate)
There have been a number of examples of poor HVAC design. The most serious was
the level of noise, which failed to meet Working Environment rules. Modifications after
construction are expensive and disruptive. Other problems are balancing difficulties,
lack of external air locks; poor access for maintenance, stuck dampers and excessive
dryness in the air.
HVAC design is a key area of design as a safety critical system. A contractor familiar
with North Sea conditions and Norwegian Working Environment legislation should
manage the work.
Workshops (Moderate)
Workshop design and locations vary on the FPSO’s. The most successful are accessible
via forklift, on the same level and close to stores, well equipped with mechanical
handling equipment, separate from the accommodation (for noise) and in a safe area
allowing welding (forward).
Getting the workshop design right is important for maintenance efficiency and crew
morale. The working environment, access and conditions in the workshop will reduce
repair costs, as the crew becomes confident to repair and service equipment on board.
Turret
Experience to date from the single Norwegian FPSO with a free turret indicates lower
maintenance and crew involvement than with the other FPSO’s. In addition that FPSO
has managed to achieve adequate safety of the accommodation forward of the turret,
by using a firewall. Current experience suggests that a free turret with swivel and
thrusters used for offloading only, results in the lowest Opex.
Turret bearing design has evolved over time. While simple rails and wheels have proven
inadequate, heavy duty rails and multiple bogies with rubber pads to spread the load
have proven an effective solution. Hydraulic pads were selected to deal with high
mooring loads on a large turret. While this has been effective leading to no downtime,
maintenance has been excessive. A key learning from all designs is the need to make all
components easily serviceable and replaceable.
Risers (Major)
Risers are a critical component of the FPSO system. Damage to the outer sheath and
seawater ingress can reduce fatigue life significantly. Gas permeation can have
unexpected effects including collapse, and HP gas flow can cause vibration or loosening
of the inner carcass. To date however, there have been no catastrophic failures of risers.
Good riser design and operational management is a key success factor. Monitoring
systems, the ability to flush the annulus and protect the riser from damage, particularly
on installation are needed to ensure long and trouble free life.
Swivels (Major)
Overall the performance of swivels on the 3 FPSO’s has been good. There have been no
significant leaks; the only major problem was two failures and an explosion in the oil
filled 11KV-power transfer swivel. This was due to water entering the insulation oil
medium.
Initial worries about swivel reliability have now been reduced. However, only one FPSO
has continuous swivel movement (free turret) and this has only been in service two
years, so long term wear concerns and repair methods remain untested.
While simpler than swivels, high maintenance and operability problems have indicated
that swivels would have been a better option. This is endorsed by one FPSO where the
operator has elected to replace the gas transfer hose with a swivel.
Layout
Layout (Critical)
The layout of equipment on an FPSO is a critical design phase. Concerns noted include
placing main generators too close to the accommodation, poor mechanical handling
solutions, exhaust and flare radiation problems, module overcrowding when others are
very spacious, poorly placed vents, access and escape routes restricted by cable and
pipework, poor workshop and store locations.
It is recommended that when a basic FPSO layout is outlined more time is spent with all
interested parties both informally and through formal design reviews to ensure the best
compromises are achieved. Relevant specialists must carefully consider all Capex, Opex
and Safety issues.
More attention should be paid at the design stage to any source of hydrocarbon venting.
This requires a significantly different approach from a trading tanker. Minor releases
can be cold vented but lines need to be located and sized to minimise any risk of
explosion or tripping gas detectors under any weather conditions.
Project Management
Almost all FPSO projects in the 90s were underbid by the main contractor. The Operator
can either participate actively implementing upgrades when poor quality or low cost
solutions are offered, or impose the contractual terms. In general an optimum balance
can be struck by working with the contractor to maintain quality and provide assistance
to improve efficiency.
Functional specifications generally give the yard and designers too little guidance. More
work should be done up front on the selection of key equipment and specification of
quality. In all 5 cases the operator has had to provide significant resources to support
the project or in 3 cases take over responsibility for completing the project.
A total of 74 hull and marine related issues/problems were reported. Where the primary
underlying cause was identified the number of attributions were design issues (20),
operational issues (17) commissioning issues (9) and construction issues (4).
Compression
A). (Critical) 3 out of 5 FPSO’s had serious compression problems (gas seal failures,
repeated bundle change-outs and cracked pistons) due to undersized scrubbers and
liquid carry-over. Upgrades, improved instrumentation and online equipment monitoring
solved problems. The cost of these failures which includes; service costs, spares, CO2
tax, substitute diesel fuel, and lost gas export income was substantial.
B). (Major) Vibration from reciprocating compressors can be a serious problem. On one
FPSO poor mounting of the compressors and failure to fit bellows and flexible hoses has
led to an ongoing sequence of high potential leaks and failures. Vibration has also
affected the drive motors with isolating pads coming loose and damaging rotors. Noise
is also a problem for personnel.
Reciprocating compressor vibration is a key design issue. Only a competent supplier with
experience of packaging such units offshore should design such systems. An
independent review of noise and vibration levels is recommended.
C). (Moderate) One FPSO achieved Gas Compression start-up 7 days after first oil. This
is probably an industry record. This was achieved through comprehensive pre-start-up
commissioning work and operator training.
Gas plant commissioning should be fully completed before sailaway. Equipment should
be run on load with simulated gas. Operations staff involvement with commissioning,
use of plant tuning simulators also with a rapid start-up.
There is a lack of fully objective data and it is too early to fully evaluate the success or
failure of different FPSO designs and operating strategies. To date high performances
have been achieved but often at the expense of major modification and/or ongoing
repair programmes. Opex data was not available for the review.
Lessons learned include the need to identify contact zones at the rear of the FPSO to
ensure damage escalation risk is minimised, improvements to hose care when sliding in
and out of the shute, better procedures for handling the messenger line and
identification of critical components for maintenance/sparing.
Hydraulic submersible pumps are highly sensitive to debris and any weaknesses in the
pipework. This should be an area of special focus during commissioning. Simpler
methods to access and repair submersible pumps should be also implemented.
Process (Moderate)
There is often inadequate provision for sand and solids in the separation system.
Although wells are predicted to be sand free, when water arrives they often produce
sand. It is also useful to be able to clean up wells directly through the test separator,
which should have sand jetting installed.
Provision for sand and solids’ handling is generally a good long-term investment, despite
optimistic predictions from the reservoir engineers.
Codes/Classification
A total of 7 manning and safety related issues/problems were reported. Where the
primary underlying cause was identified the numbers of attributions were operational
issues (3) and commissioning issues (1).
There is evidence that active attention to and reporting of hazards improves safety
awareness and thereby performance.
Crew (Major)
All FPSO’s operate with a base crew of 35-40. This required a number of staff
particularly crane operators and mariners to be multi-skilled. However most FPSO’s
carry typical POB levels of 55-70. This can cause significant problems for major
maintenance or upgrade projects.
FPSO management must continue to be sensitive to the problem this can pose for
certain individuals. Again this underlines the importance of having a core crew of
mariners on board.
6. Industry Challenges
Respondents highlighted a number of challenges that not only they, but also the FPSO
community in general faced.
Accommodation (Major)
A means is required to increase FPSO accommodation for short periods (say 2-6
months) for project or major repair/remedial work. The upgrade would have to meet all
applicable safety requirements including the provision of recreation space, lifeboat,
refuge and escape facilities.
The design option selected is likely to be different for each FPSO - these may range
from an additional deck mounted module to beds installed in unused rooms. Lifeboat
and escape facility upgrades will also be required. Close and early consultation with the
workforce will also be essential.
It is suggested that the best practices developed from experience with - choice of
cranes, use of forklifts, layout, storage and landing areas and protection, hydraulic
manipulators, lifting beams and appliances in the hull should be documented in a "code
of practice" so in future contractors can design and optimise handling systems from the
outset.
Lessons have been learned with the compromises in hull shape for harsh environment
FPSO’s. These lessons need to be documented and in combination with improved model
testing and environmental data used to design and specify the optimum FPSO shape for
each situation.
Painting (Major)
All 5 FPSO’s have suffered from inadequate paintwork. The underlying problem is lack of
priority and time allocated to this activity. Quality control of preparation and finishing
has also been lacking. Painting in Singapore has been particularly poor due to the
humid conditions. There has been a serious problem on several FPSO’s with a topsides
paint system failure in Norway - premature thickening of the paint, that has led to
extensive remedial work.
Painting of FPSO’s is a critical area to ensure a low maintenance facility over a long
period offshore. The inability to dry dock the vessel and its limited accommodation
demand that the initial paint finish is to the highest standard. However this work is
often conducted late when the pressure for sailaway is high. The challenge is to
develop painting technology and methods compatible with project demands and a 20-
year offshore life.
Thrusters (Major)
Service or repair of thrusters is a major challenge, particularly as reliability has not been
as high as expected. Most FPSO’s require thrusters at all times; a failure in winter could
impact safety and production. Most thrusters have to be withdrawn externally and ROV
work is weather sensitive and high risk. Use of FPSO cranes while helpful, is not always
feasible due to thruster weights and position.
Methods for removal and repair of thrusters in field need to be developed and shared.
One solution for the future is that thrusters are not safety critical (this is true of one
FPSO), and thrusters should be designed for internal retrieval and service. This design
has been achieved on one FPSO.
Painting (Moderate)
Painting the hull in the area of the water line will present a challenge as this is normally
done at 5-year dry dock. The vessel can be raised under light ballast however the work,
if required, will be very exposed with no provision for scaffolding.
The challenge is to devise a methodology to safely clean, prepare and paint FPSO hulls
at the splash zone while the vessel is on location and in production. The work must be
conducted by a small crew so minimising impact on other summer maintenance
activities.
Crude and ballast tanks should be designed to facilitate maintenance. This involves
special provisions for cleaning, venting and access. For existing FPSO’s, tools and
methodologies should be developed to improve the safety and efficiency - best practice
should be shared.
Work is required into the emulsification of produced oil in seawater and reasons for the
formation of a free oil sheen. Studies should indicate an appropriate mitigation and
provide guidelines on when it's use should be necessary.
The need for sea chests (normally used in vessels underway) needs to be reconsidered.
Options that reduce opportunities for marine growth and allow blanking off in the event
of valve failure are required. Consideration should also be given to submersible pumps
in a caisson - (see above).
Turret
Swivels/Tie-backs (Major)
Increasingly opportunities to tie back new fields are being considered. This allows
volumes to be maintained while the primary field reaches tail end production. There are
a number of constraints including available riser slots, swivel capacity or paths, ability to
produce separate streams, metering and control upgrades.
Typically the swivel and turret are the most challenging areas for upgrade. A low cost
method is required to upgrade swivel capacity and pull in new risers with minimum shut
down time.
Swivels (Moderate)
While swivel repairs have not yet been required, a methodology to simplify repair and
seal replacement is required. At present a repair to a key seal may take up to 5 days.
Project Management
The challenge for operations staff is to be able to provide a reasoned justification for
Capex vs. Opex trade offs based on past operating experience. Data must be presented
in a quantitative way and early enough to support investment decisions in appropriate
design and quality requirements.
The challenge is to revise all aspects of marine standards including quality control,
material specifications, coatings, fatigue analysis, subcontractor management, and
mechanical handling to take account of the need for minimum maintenance and in field
repair.
Process (Major)
Failure of separator or coalescer internals due to sloshing is a common problem of
FPSO’s (reported by 3 out of 5). Reason is fatigue of internals due to poor support. The
cost of such failures is very high - shut down and repair costs.
It appears that suppliers have not adequately understood loads associated with
separators on FPSO’s. Work is required to define fluid loading and build an industry
specification for moving separation equipment to eliminate the problem.
Consideration should be given to a third slops tank specifically designed for high solids
fluids and solids drop out. The tank would have easy cleanable surfaces with jetting
lines and solids/slurry handling pumps.
Documentation (Moderate)
Every Operator has complained of inadequate documentation. Primary problems have
been late documentation from suppliers, missing data from subcontractors (particularly
marine suppliers), inability to get paperless systems up and running even one year after
start-up, missing as built drawing and loop diagrams, incompatible tags and poor links
to maintenance databases.
The challenge is to share best practices and agree a common role for the vessel and it's
specifications so that every FPSO can get best value from the vessel and achieve
appropriate standby cover at most economical price.
Codes/Classification
There is potential value in classification, but there is a view that the societies have not
kept up with the demanding design, build and manning requirements of FPSO’s. The
challenge is for Classification Societies and Operators to tighten FPSO’s class
specifications so they become fully effective both for Operators, builders and regulators,
in both build and operation phases.
Evidence suggests that what goes wrong is more likely to be remembered than what
goes right. In both the Norwegian and the UK research exercises the interviewees were
more forthcoming with information about problems and challenges faced, solutions
identified, remedial actions undertaken and lessons learned. People were often reticent
or unsure about classifying something as a success or a potential best practice. This is
often in part because of the difficulty people have in comparing their experiences with
those of others and then coming to an informed conclusion as to what is a good or bad
practice or performance relative to a norm. It is hoped that these type of knowledge
exchange initiatives will in future assist FPSO specialists to report both positive and
negative experiences relative to established best practice.
Reported Norwegian success stories are highlighted in Table 3 of the Appendix. These
include:
Turret
Swivels (Major)
Overall the performance of swivels on the 3 FPSO’s has been good. There have been no
significant leaks; the only major problem was two failures and an explosion in the oil
Project Management
Crew Organisation
Decision to have good professional marine competency onboard has been beneficial.
OIM is mariner, plus additional marine superintendents. Onshore management has
strong confidence in offshore team to use their judgement to maintain stability and
routinely undertake vessel related activities e.g. tank cleaning.
Safety Performance
All operators reported good FPSO safety performances, backed up by proactive safety
cultures to enhance and extend good safety practices within project contractors and
shipyards.
In 2001 the Offshore Management Centre at the Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen
completed a similar knowledge sharing research exercise on behalf of the FPSO
committee of the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA). Part of the
research involved the collection of lessons learned from the first 12-18 months operation
of FPSO’s on the UKCS. Like the OLF project a number of specialists representing ten
FPSO’s were interviewed and their views collated. Whereas the emphasis and
information reporting in the UK study were slightly different, it is worthwhile trying to
align some of the experiences and lessons learned from the two areas.
• It appears that the majority of problems arose because of the way the projects were
structured and managed.
• Decision and actions taken in the design and construction phase are the most
probable causes of problems in commissioning and early operation.
• Problems have also been caused by lack of communication between isolated groups
involved in design.
• It appears that the responsibility for QA/QC was not clear and this has led to
problems with equipment delivered which was not fit for purpose.
• A major cause of early operational problems was that FPSO’s were sailed to their
location before their construction was complete and before their systems had been
fully tested.
• Knowledge of lessons learned does not seem to be shared readily across the UK
FPSO industry. A change of attitude will probably be needed before the situation will
improve.
A significant majority of FPSO related problems are attributable to the design phase.
There is clear evidence from both the Norwegian and UKCS research of the existence of
communication problems in the design process and that input from personnel with
operational experience has been undervalued at this stage. Emphasis on initial capital
cost control and fast-tracking has lead to poor design decisions negatively impacting for
years to come on the operational efficiency of a number of FPSO’s and their workforce.
There have been a number of problematic issues common to both Norwegian and UK
FPSO’s. These have included:
Crane design and mechanical handling issues. Many FPSO’s have been designed with
inefficient cranes, poor crane coverage and inadequate lay-down areas, bumper bars
and mechanical handling capabilities. This appears to be due to lack of familiarity of
operational needs by designers.
Both Norwegian and UKCS FPSO’s have struggled with accommodation POB restrictions.
Prioritisation of construction and engineering work presents real challenges because of
limited POB flexibility.
There are examples from both the Norwegian and UK project experiences that too much
faith can be placed in the knowledge of the supplier. This can be a significant problem if
functional specifications are not clarified down the supply chain. There are many
examples of suppliers and even constructors not appreciating the distinctive nature of
FPSO operations i.e. assuming that the vessel can be taken off station and brought into
port if there are any problems. Designers have not adequately faced up to the
challenges of simplifying failed equipment removal mechanisms for FPSO’s. The change
out of power generation systems and thrusters has and will continue to represent a
major operational challenge.
Both Norwegian and UK FPSO’s have had experiences of poor quality painting and
coatings during the construction phase. When not properly addressed at the time this
factor has the potential to create significant POB scheduling problems at a later stage.
Some problems attributable to the effects of motion have been reported from both
Norwegian and UK FPSO’s. These appear to be mainly where there has been insufficient
attention to the effects of sloshing inside tanks and damage to separator internals as a
consequence of fatigue.
Vessel orientation and location of venting problems resulting in exhausts and other
emissions being blown over vessels have been experienced in both the UK and Norway.