Entries in the Course of Business

​Canque v. CA (G.R. No. 96202, April 12, 1999)

Title: CANQUE v. CA
Topic: Entries in the Course of Business
Principle:
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires
the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the
country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty

Facts:

Petitioner is a contractor doing business under the name of RDC

Construction. It entered into two contracts with Socor
Contruction as sub-contractor for her projects with the
government. On May 28, 1986, Socor sent a bill marked as
Exhibit C representing the balance of Canque for materials
delivered and services rendered by Socor under the two
contracts. However, Canque refused to pay, claiming that
private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts.

Hence, Socor brought a suit in the RTC to recover from the

Canque. The latter disputed that the deliveries of Socor were not
signed and acknowledged by Canques’s checkers and no receipts
was issued to Canque when it made payments.

Socor submitted as evidence the Book of Collectible Accounts

particularly page 17 thereof marked as Exhibit K containing
entries of both payments and billings and reflecting the principal
indebtedness of Canque. During the trial, Dolores Aday its
bookkeeper, was likewise presented to testify on the entries of
their Book of Collectible Accounts. RTC rendered a decision in
favor of Socor, citing Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court
and argues that the entries in question constitute "entries in the
course of business" sufficient to prove deliveries made for the
government projects. The RTC ruled that undeniably, the book
contains a detailed account of SOCORs commercial transactions
with RDC which were entered therein in the course of business
thus it carries with it some degree of trustworthiness.

Canque however, argues that the entries in Socor's Book of

Collectible Accounts cannot take the place of the delivery
receipts and that the person who made said entries actually
testified in this case but unfortunately had no personal
knowledge of said entries. Thus, such entries are mere hearsay
and, thus, inadmissible.

Issue:
Whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh.
K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery?

Ruling:

No.

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires

the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the
country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty. 16

As petitioner points out, the business entries in question do not

meet the first and third requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the
entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the
account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her
testimony that the entries were presented and marked in
evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor
necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who
made them was available to testify in court.
Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they
are the best available evidence. Said a learned judge: What a
man has actually done and committed to writing when under
obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he
has undertaken, and he being dead, there seems to be no danger
in submitting to the consideration of the court. The person who
may be called to court to testify on these entries being dead,
there arises the necessity of their admission without the one who
made them being called to court be sworn and subjected to
cross-examination. And this is permissible in order to prevent a
failure of justice.
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of
the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries
based on the bills given to her. The deliveries of the materials
stated in the bills were supervised by an engineer for (such)
functions. The person, therefore, who has personal knowledge of
the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made
in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the company’s
project engineer. The entries made by Aday show only that the
billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that she
faithfully recorded the amounts stated therein in the books of
account.

​Aznar v. Citibank (G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007) -

Title: AZNAR v. CITIBANK

Topic: Entries in the Course of Business
Principle: Under Sec 43 of Rule 130, the following conditions
are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or
unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated
in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or
in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
FACTS:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), is a holder of a Preferred Master
Credit Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank. Aznar decided to
treat his family for an Asian Tour using his Citibank credit card.
Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Ingtan
Tour and Travel Agency in Indonesia (to purchase tickets to
Bali) but that was not honoured for the reason that his card was
blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the
tickets in cash. He further claims that his humiliation caused by
the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke
of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards. They decided to go
back Philippines and instantly filed a complaint for damages.
To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar
presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the
signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that
his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over
the limit, banking this contention with Section 43 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court as his legal basis. On the other hand, to prove
that they did not blacklist Aznar's card, Citibank's Credit Card
Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning
Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled
cards covering the period of Aznar's trip.
The trial court held that as between the computer print-out 16
presented byAznar and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins 17
presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due
execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of

Evidence is applicable in the case at bar to support the
admissibility of Exhibit G.

HELD:
No. Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or
near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to
testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.47
As correctly pointed out by the RTC, there appears on the
computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi"
and a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at the left
dorsal side were handwritten the words "Sorry for the delay
since the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It
is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information
stated in the print-out and was the one who printed the same.
The handwritten annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario
even suggests that it was Mario who printed the same and only
handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant,
required by the provision above mentioned, was therefore not
established. Neither did petitioner establish in what professional
capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether the
entries were made in the performance of their duty in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

J​ ose v. Michaelmar Phils. (G.R. No. 169606, November 27,

2009)
G.R. No. 169606, November 27, 2009
BERNARDO B. JOSE, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
MICHAELMAR PHILS., INC. AND MICHAELMAR
SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
Topic: SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. -- Entries
made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Principles:
- Requisites for admission in evidence of entries in the course of
business: (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the
country, or unable to testify;
(2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer;
(3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries;
(4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty; and
(5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.

- Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business,

enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43
of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the Philippine agent of
Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI). In an undertaking
and an employment contract MSSI through MPI engaged the
services of Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of M/T Limar.
Jose, Jr. began performing his duties on board the M/T Limar on
21 August 2002. On 8 October 2002, a random drug test was
conducted on all officers and crew members of M/T Limar at the
port of Curacao. Jose, Jr. was found positive for marijuana. Jose,
Jr. was informed about the result of his drug test and was asked
if he was taking any medication. Jose, Jr. said that he was taking
Centrum vitamins.
Jose, Jr. was repatriated to the Philippines. When Jose, Jr.
arrived in the Philippines, he asked MPI that a drug test be
conducted on him. MPI ignored his request. On his own, Jose, Jr.
procured drug tests from Manila Doctors Hospital, S.M. Lazo
Medical Clinic, Inc., and Maritime Clinic for International
Services, Inc. He was found negative for marijuana.
Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and MSSI
for illegal dismissal with claim for his salaries for the unexpired
portion of the employment contract.
In her 18 June 2003 Decision, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that:
Based from the facts and evidence, this office inclined [sic] to
rule in favor of the respondents: we find that complainant's
termination from employment was valid and lawful. It is
established that complainant, after an unannounced drug test
conducted by the respondent principal on the officers and crew
on board the vessel, was found positive of marijuana, a
prohibited drug. It is a universally known fact the menace that
drugs bring on the user as well as to others who may have got on
his way. It is noted too that complainant worked on board a
tanker vessel which carries toxic materials such as fuels,
gasoline and other combustible materials which require delicate
and careful handling and being an oiler, complainant is expected
to be in a proper disposition. Thus, we agree with respondents
that immediate repatriation of complainant is warranted for the
safety of the vessel as well as to complainant's co-workers on
board.
As to the complainant's contention that the ship doctor's report
can not be relied upon in the absence of other evidence
supporting the doctor's findings for the simple reason that the
ship doctor is under the control of the principal employer, the
same is untenable. On the contrary, the findings of the doctor on
board should be given credence as he would not make a false
clarification.
The NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter’s. The NLRC held that
Jose, Jr.'s dismissal was illegal and ordered MPI and MSSI to
pay Jose, Jr. his salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract. The NLRC held that:
Said test result does not contain any signature, much less the
signature of any of the doctors whose names were printed
therein (Page 45, Records). Verily, the veracity of this purported
drug test result is questionable, hence, it cannot be deemed as
substantial proof that Complainant violated his employer's "no
alcohol, no drug" policy.

Issue:
WON the drug test result was admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
In the present case, Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of
Appeals' ruling is violative of any law or jurisprudence. Section
43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. -- Entries made at, or
near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the
requisites for admission in evidence of entries in the course of
business: (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the
country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near
the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the person
who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries; (4) the entries were made in a professional capacity
or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the
country; (2) the entries were made near the time the random
drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a position to know
the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in
his professional capacity and in the performance of his duty; and
(5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found positive for
marijuana. In KAR ASIA, Inc. v. Corona, the Court admitted in
evidence unsigned payrolls. In that case, the Court held that:
Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business,
enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43
of the Rules of Court. It is therefore incumbent upon the
respondents to adduce clear and convincing evidence in support
of their claim.
In the present case, the following facts are established (1)
random drug tests are regularly conducted on all officers and
crew members of M/T Limar; (2) a random drug test was
conducted at the port of Curacao on 8 October 2002; (3) Dr.
Heath was the authorized physician of M/T Limar; (4) the drug
test result of Jose, Jr. showed that he was positive for marijuana;
(5) the drug test result was issued under Dr. Heath's name and
contained his handwritten comments.

Entries in Official Records

​Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc (supra)

​
Rudy Lao v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 140023,
August 14, 2003)

Principle:
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative
value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence.
Facts:
Lao was an owner of a truck insured by Standard Insurance. The
subject truck met an accident sometime in April 1985, which led
Lao to file an Insurance claim for the proceeds of his policy.

The insurance company denied the claim having found out after
their independent investigation that the truck driver of the
insured vehicle did not possess a valid Driver’s license, as
shown in the police blotter. Lao contended that the police blotter
is not admissible and lacks probative value considering that the
testimony of the investigating policeman does not match the
blotter after testifying that a different person was indeed behind
the wheels during the incident and not Leonardo Anit who failed
to possess a driver’s license.

Issue:
Whether a Police Blotter is admissible as evidence and has a
probative value considering that the entry therein was belied by
the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the
investigating policeman himself.

Ruling:
Yes. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative
value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value,
they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.

In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the

information subject of the controversy.

​ allem Maritime Services v. NLRC (G.R. No. 108433,

W
October 15, 1996)
​Manalo v. Robles (G.R. L-8171, August 16, 1956)
​
Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (G.R.
No. 166645, November 11, 2005)

Principle:
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to
the entries made therein could be grounded on (1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, (2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, (3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and (4)
the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
Facts:
Sometime in the years 1956 and 1957, Juanita Carpena and
company applied for the judicial registration of forty-four (44)
parcels of land all situated in Cabuyao, Laguna. After trial on the
merits, the trial court granted the application and directed the
issuance of a decree of registration for the aforesaid forty-four
parcels.
However, out of these forty-four parcels, only forty-two were
issued decrees of registration. One of these two parcels for
which no decree of registration was issued was made the subject
of cadastral proceedings instituted by the Republic of the
Philippines in 1976.
Petitioner Vicente D. Herce filed an opposition to the
proceedings, informing the court that he had acquired ownership
over the subject property, having purchased the same from a
certain Jose Carpena in August of 1975. He alleged that Jose
Carpena is one of the heirs of Juanita Carpena.
After trial, the court rendered decision on May 30, 1980
awarding the subject property in favor of petitioner Vicente
Herce. However, in spite of the favorable decision, a decree of
registration could not be immediately issued considering that the
subject property was included in the 1956-57 case filed by
Juanita Carpena.
After hearing, the trial court issued an order dated May 3, 1996
granting the motion and directing the Land Registration
Authority (hereinafter LRA) to finally issue a decree of
registration in the name of petitioner Vicente Herce.
The LRA issued a decree of registration in favor of petitioner on
January 28, 1997 followed by the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-2099 in his name.
On January 27, 1998, the Municipality of Cabuyao filed a
petition for the reopening of the decree of registration issued in
favor of petitioner. This led to the issuance of the questioned
August 21, 1998 Order directing the reopening and review of the
decree of registration. The said order likewise set aside the order
dated May 29, 1957 in LRC Case No. N-438 as well as the order
dated May 3, 1996.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court’s order to reopen the decree of registration.

Ruling:
The Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, now P.D. No. 1529) as
well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in
good faith and cannot be used as a shield for frauds or that one
8

should enrich himself at the expense of another. One cannot

conceal under the cloak of its provisions to perpetrate fraud and
obtain a better title than what he really and lawfully owns. Thus,
if he secures a certificate of title by mistake or obtain more land
than what he really owns, the certificate of title should be
cancelled or corrected.
In other words, indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the
cornerstones of land registration proceedings. Barring any
mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of the title, owners
may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their
title is registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens
system. Thus, once a decree of registration is made under the
Torrens system, and the reglementary period has passed within
which the decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and
cannot be collaterally questioned later on.
9

Applying these legal precepts to the case at bar, it is clear that

Decree No. 4244 issued in favor of the respondent municipality
in 1911 has become indefeasible; as such, petitioner is now
barred from claiming the subject land. Although the
municipality’s claim of ownership is based on the entry in the
Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing
that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911 and that Lot
1 Plan II-2719 was one of the six parcels of land previously
applied for registration by the Municipality of Cabuyao in LRC
(GLRO) Record No. 6763, being a public document, the
Ordinary Decree Book is prima facie proof of the entries
appearing therein. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to
the entries made therein could be grounded on (1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, (2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, (3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and (4)
the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred. Besides, these
10

incidents were attested to by Acting Chief, Division of Ordinary

Registration, Silverio G. Perez, in the report dated December 2,
1980.11

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree

Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No.
4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have been
regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy
the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their
functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of
Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot
be overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary.

Title:City of Manila v. Cabangis (supra)

Citation: GR No. L-3898 February 18, 1908

Topic: Entries in Official Records

Doctrines:
• ​It is a constant practice of court to receive as evidence
picture, drawings, and photographs of objects which cannot be
brought into court, upon proof of their exactness and accuracy
as representations of the original subject.
• ​It has been held that photograph may be introduced to
show the appearance of any place which might be properly
viewed by the jury, where such a view by the jury is impossible
or impracticable (Omaha S. Ry. Co. vs. Beeson, 36 Nebraska,
361; see also People vs. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y., 487), and since
in all cases this court may be called upon to review the evidence
taken in the court below, we think that in this jurisdiction
photographs of any place which may properly be viewed by the
trial court should be admitted in the record upon proper proof of
their exactness and accuracy, as appropriate aids in applying
the evidence as it appears of record. Satisfactory testimony was
introduced as to the accuracy and exactness of these
photographs and the conditions under which they were taken,
and we are of opinion that they were properly admitted in
evidence.
• ​The admission of a letter containing an offer of
compromise is not error where no objection was interposed in
the trial court.

Facts:

​ laintiff filed an action against the defendant who allegedly

P
obstructed the course of a public navigable river known as
Sunog-Apog and converted it into a private fishing pond.
Plaintiff claims his right of possession and control of the said
river. On the other hand, the defendant denies the existence of
waterway or rover and further alleges that the subject matter of
the litigation forms an integral part of the island of Balot
purchased by his forefathers from Augsutinian Order and it has
been in the continuous and peaceable control of himself since
time immemorial.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and contends
that the defendant failed to sustain allegations of ownership
admitting Exhibit B and C which purports to be maps of the
section of City of Manila wherein the fisheries in question are
located. They were offered in evidence to show: 1. existence and
location of the bed river of Sunog apog and 2. existence of the
location of the fisheries of the defendant. Furthermore, Exhibits
D, E, and F where photographs of a part of the fisheries of the
defendant, which are alleged to occupy the bed of the former
river. Likewise the city engineer was presented to testify on the
accuracy of the exhibits and the maps which showed the location
of the subject matter of the litigation. Lastly, Exhibit G is a letter
from the defendant to the attorney for the plaintiff wherein the
defendant admits that thepesquerias in question, which the
plaintiff alleges were unlawfully constructed on the bed of a
river, estero, or waterway known as Sunog-Apog, are located
within the boundary lines of the city of Manila.

Issue:
I. Whether or not the maps as well as the photographs of a part
of the fisheries of the defendant are admissible as evidence.
II. Whether or not the letter from the defendant to the attorney of
the plaintiff is admissible.
(Note: the second issue pertains to the topic on admissibility of
evidence just in case , Atty. A Acosta will ask)

Ruling:
​The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
​Taken together with the testimony of the city engineer, who
testified as to their accuracy, and the admissions of the defendant
as to the existence and locations of his fisheries, we think these
maps were properly admitted in evidence to show the location of
the subject-matter in litigation by reference to the Bay of
Manila, and the Rivers Maypajo and Vitas, whose existence and
identity have never been questioned; they were, however, wholly
incompetent as evidence of the existence or location of the River
Sunog-Apog, or as evidence as to the disputed fact that the
subject-matter in litigation, is within the jurisdictional limits of
the city of Manila. The plaintiff failed to establish the
authenticity of these maps as maps of territory included within
the jurisdiction of the present city of Manila and the evidence
shows that the former bed of the River Sunog-Apog, which
appears on one of these maps, was placed there by one of the
engineers of the city of Manila at a time when, according to the
allegations of the complaint, the territory in question was in the
possession of the defendant and used as a fishery, and neither the
authority of the engineer so to do nor the source of his
information are disclosed in the record. These maps, therefore,
so far as they purport to establish the existence and location of
the Sunog-Apog River, are no more than an expression of
opinion of the engineer who prepared them, unsupported by
evidence as to the grounds upon which his opinion was based.

​It is not quite clear from the record whether these maps
were finally admitted as evidence as to the existence and
location of the Rio Sunog-Apog, but granting that they were, we
think their admission for the purpose indicated would not
constitute reversible error, because the fact that the fisheries in
question are within the jurisdictional limits of the city of Manila
and occupy the bed of a former river, or waterway known as the
Sunog-Apog, in proof of which these maps were offered in
evidence, is sufficiently established by other evidence of record
such as photographs of a part of the fisheries of the defendant
and a letter from the defendant to the attorney for the plaintiff
wherein the defendant admits that the pesquerias in question,
which the plaintiff alleges were unlawfully constructed on the
bed of a river, estero, or waterway known as Sunog-Apog, are
located within the boundary lines of the city of Manila. This
admission was made in the course of an offer to compromise,
and the letter was manifestly inadmissible as evidence against
the defendant over his objection.

I​ I. Exhibit G is a letter from the defendant to the attorney

for the plaintiff wherein the defendant admits that thepesquerias
in question, which the plaintiff alleges were unlawfully
constructed on the bed of a river, estero, or waterway known as
Sunog-Apog, are located within the boundary lines of the city of
Manila. This admission was made in the course of an offer to
compromise, and the letter was manifestly inadmissible as
evidence against the defendant over his objection. It appears,
however, that the defendant made no objection when it was
offered and admitted in evidence, although he testified at some
length with reference thereto. He cannot, therefore, be heard on
appeal to assign the admission s reversible error
 ​Fernandez v. CA (G.R. No. 108366, December 16, 1994)

G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ,
respondents.

PRINCIPLE:
“As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that
although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as
a child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the
baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of
parentage. . .. The reason for this rule that canonical records do
not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115
and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such
canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the
priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act
done by himself or in his presence, like the administration of the
sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in
the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or
of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete
evidence.”

In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), the

Court also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.

FACTS:
VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA (V), single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO
FERNANDEZ (X) and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ (Y), met
sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A
Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito (Z) used to
spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where V's father
served as tennis instructor. V pointed to Carlito as the father of
her two sons.

X and Y filed a case against Z for Recognition and Support.

X and Y presented the following documentary evidence:

1. Certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Z as their
father;
2. The baptismal certificate of X which also states that Z is his
father;
3. Photographs of Z taken during the baptism of X; and
4. Pictures of respondent Z and X taken at the home of the
mother of X.

X and Y also presented the following testimonial evidence:

1. Three (3) witnesses, who told the trial court that the mother of
X and Y had, at different times, introduced Z to them as her
"husband".
2. The priest who administered the baptismal rites who testified
that Z was the one who presented himself as the father of X
during the latter's baptism.

ISSUE:
Are the pieces of evidence provided sufficient proof of filiation
or paternity?

RULING:
NO. The evidence is insufficient to prove filiation or paternity.

1. The certificates of live birth of X and Y identifying Z as their

father are not competent evidence on the issue of their paternity.
The records do not show that Z had a hand in the preparation of
said certificates.

2. The baptismal certificates of X naming Z as his father has

scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that Z participated
in its preparation. In Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53
(1984):
“As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that
although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as
a child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the
baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of
parentage. . .. The reason for this rule that canonical records do
not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115
and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such
canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the
priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act
done by himself or in his presence, like the administration of the
sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in
the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or
of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete
evidence.”

In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), the

Court also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of
the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.

3. X and Y cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence

of Z in the baptism of X. These photographs are far from proofs
that Z is the father of X. As explained by Z, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of X. The latter's testimony was
corroborated by another sponsor.

4. The pictures taken in the house of the mother of X and Y

showing Z showering affection to X fall short of the evidence
required to prove paternity. As held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA
764:
“. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness between
Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him
paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels
and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to
each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and
much less would prove violation of complaint's person and
honor.” (Emphasis supplied)

5. Their mother's testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving

and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of X and Y.

6. X and Y capitalize on the testimony of the priest who

solemnized the baptismal ceremony of X. However, there is no
proof that the priest is a close friend of X and Y's mother, and Z,
which should render unquestionable his identification of Z
during X's baptism. In the absence of this proof, the Court does
not concede that the said priest who officiates numerous
baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the
parents of the children he has baptized.

In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Juan Locsin, Sr. (G.R. No.
146737, December 10, 2001)

I. TITLE ​ ​: ​In the matter of the intestate estate

of the late JUAN "JHONNY"
II. CITATION ​ ​: ​G.R. No. 146737, December 10,
2001
III. TOPIC ​ ​: ​A Certificate of Live Birth duly
recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is
transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil
Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the
one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.
IV. FACTS ​ ​:

Respondents herein, as the administrator of the Intestate

Estate of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr., claimed he is an
acknowledged natural child. To support his claim, he submitted
a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") found in the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City which contained the information that respondent's father is
Juan C. Locsin, Sr. who was the informant of the facts stated
therein, as evidenced by his signatures. Respondent also offered
in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") 4 4 showing him and his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C.
Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows
that he and his mother have been recognized as family members
of the deceased.

Petitioners, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased,

filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of
administration, and claimed that the signatures in "Exhibit D"
are forgeries. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General,
Metro Manila, (marked "Exhibit 8") indicating that the birth of
respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and
that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C.
Locsin. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a
handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C.
Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is
a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound
volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City.

V. ISSUE ​:
Which of the two documents - Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8")
is genuine.

VI. RULING ​:

The records of the instant case adequately support a finding

that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D",
should have been given more faith and credence by the courts
below.
 Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a
Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and
municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly
forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the
Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several
decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access
them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate
one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not
more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these
employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a
particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil
Registry of Iloilo City. With respect to Local Civil Registries,
access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in
proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D", more convincing
evidence than those considered by the trial court should have
been presented by respondent. The trial court held that the
doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are
dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City.

The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the
record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22,
1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's
knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and
entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based
merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that
Office.

When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the

Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy
transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil
Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive
and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation
not convincing. Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form.
Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when
respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that ". . .
during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already
exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new
form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."

The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It

does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated
December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 o r
almost (2) years earlie r . Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the
petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila
is on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956 . We find
no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956
forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for
a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely . There are other
indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D". The back
cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of
Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound
volume, not sewn like the other entries. The documents bound
into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon
copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb
because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of
all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of
those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important
particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race,
occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an
entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of
Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father,
but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his
Residence Certificate were not filled up.

There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this

vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the
volume. Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from
explaining the anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit
"D", she actually highlighted the suspicious circumstances
surrounding its existence. The records of the instant case
adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners,
not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith
and credence by the courts below.

​Africa v. Caltex (G.R. No. 12986, March 3, 1966)

​Barcelon v. CIR [G.R. No. 157064, August 7, 2006)

Barcelon v. CIR [G.R. No. 157064, August 7, 2006)

Topic: Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official

records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.

PRINCIPLES: There are three requisites for admissibility

under the rule (Sec.44, Rule 130) just mentioned: (a) that the
entry was made by a public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the
public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.

When a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a

presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, that it was received in the regular course of mail. The
facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a) that
the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b)
that it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received by
the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a
disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct
denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party
favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was
indeed received by the addressee.

FACTS:

Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP

Securities, Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the trading of
securities. They filed their Annual Income Tax Return for
taxable year 1987 on April 1988. Respondent CIR issued an
assessment for deficiency of income tax which was covered by
Formal Assessment Notice dated 1 February 1991, which,
respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through registered mail
on 6 February 1991. However, petitioner denies receiving the
formal assessment notice. A warrant of distraint and/or levy for
collection was served upon the petitioner. Petitioner filed a
formal protest, which was denied by the respondent with finality.
A petition for review was filed to CTA. CTA granted the petition
and ordered respondent to desist from collecting said deficiency
tax finding that the BIR records submitted by the respondent
were immaterial, self-serving, and therefore insufficient to prove
that the assessment notice was mailed and duly received by the
petitioner, thus prescription had set in under Sec. 203 of NIRC.

CA reversed CTA’s decision on the reason that the presentation

of BIR record book establishes a legal presumption that tax
assessment notice was mailed to the petitioner. Hence, the
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not BIR record book is sufficient to prove that

a notice was sent to the petitioner before the right of the BIR to
assess prescribes.

Held: No.
Section 44, Rule 130 of Rules of court, must be read in
accordance with this Court’s pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex
(Phil.), Inc., where it has been held that an entrant must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were
acquired by him from reports made by persons under a legal
duty to submit the same.

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official
information x x x.

In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based
on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that
she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor
was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how and
from whom she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover,
she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from
persons under a legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130,
Section 44 finds no application in the present case. Thus, the
evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception
to the rule against hearsay evidence.

The failure of the respondent to prove receipt of the assessment

by the Petitioner leads to the conclusion that no assessment was
issued. Consequently, the government’s right to issue an
assessment for the said period has already prescribed.

​ almon, Dexter v. Wijangco (G.R. No. L-21649, October 9,

S
1924)
IN RE: Public documents being admissible in evidence as
exception to hearsay.
Facts:
Salmon, Dexter, and Co. entered into a contract with Wijangco
for the purchase and sale of a tractor and threshing machine
upon the conditions specified in said contract. The price of the
machineries sold is P12,400, payable by installments as follows:
P400 at the signing of the contract sale, to wit, October 8, 1920;
P4,000 upon the delivery of said machineries by the defendant to
the plaintiff; another P4,000 on June 15, 1921, and, finally,
another P4,000 on December 15, 1921. -The plaintiff prays for a
sum of money plus legal interests. -Wijangco denies generally
and specifically the facts alleged in the complaint. He alleged
that the tractor and threshing machine, which is the subject-
matter of the contract was sold by the plaintiff company to the
defendant, does not meet the conditions specified and
guaranteed in the aforesaid contract of sale. Lower court
rendered judgment sentencing the Wijangco (defendant) to pay
the plaintiff relying among other evidence to the certificate
issued by the Director of the Bureau of Agriculture.

Issue:
Whether or not the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of
Agriculture as to the average crop of palay produced in the
municipality of Magalang in the 1920-1921 agricultural year
should be admissible.

Ruling:
Yes. The statistics prepared by the Bureau of Agriculture is
chiefly based on the quarterly reports of the municipal presidents
made pursuant to section 2202 of the Administrative Code. The
certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in
evidence as an official document issued by a public officer
authorized by law. Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, vol. 3,
section 1636, speaking of exceptions to the rule as to the
inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, among other things, says: 6.
Certificates. Every officer has an implied duty or authority to
prepare and deliver out to an applicant a certificate stating
anything which has been done or observed by him or exists in
his office by virtue of some authority or duty, and the certificate
is admissible.

​Tarapen v. People (G.R. No. 173824, August 8, 2008)

​
DOJ v. Pennisi (G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010)

Principle:
The Rule stands that documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Facts:
Mike Pen was born in Queensland, Australia to Al Pen, an
Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino
citizen. In March 1999, He filed a petition for recognition as
Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI).

BI Associate Commissioner issued an order granting Mike

Pen’s petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. In a 2 nd

Indorsement, the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ)

disapproved the order. However, upon submission of additional
documents, BI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez granted the
order.

Thereafter, Mike Pen was drafted and played for the Red Bull, a
professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball
Association (PBA).

Later on, the Senate Committees jointly submitted Committee

Report recommending, among other things, that (1) the BI
conduct summary deportation proceedings against several
Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent; and (2) the
DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review of all orders of
recognition. Respondent was included in the list on the ground
that verification on the authenticity of the above documents
reveals highly suspicious circumstances.

His alleged mother and other relatives, are not known and have
never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
According to the affidavits executed by Barangay Captain
Ramon Soliman and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta of
the abovementioned place, there are no Quintoses or Tomedas
that have lived or have resided in the said barangay.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
finding that respondent is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
The petition has no merit. SC affirmed the decision of CA. In
this case, the SC sustain the CA that the evidence presented
before the BI and the DOJ have more probative value and must
prevail over the statements of Soliman and Peralta before the
Senate Committee.

His mother’s certificate of birth in the civil registrar of Nueva,

Ecija was issued on the basis of an application for late
registration, which is ten (10) years after the date of birth.

The SC agree with the CA that while the affidavits of Soliman

and Peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of Quintos
Certificate of Live Birth, such certificate remains valid unless
declared invalid by competent authority. The Rule stands that
documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.

​Seguritan v. People (G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010)

​

Commercial Lists

​ NOC Shipping v. CA (G.R. No. 107518, October 8,

P
1998)

Remedial Law: Evidence

Topic: Section 45, Rule 130. ​Commercial lists and the like.
— Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical,
or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein.

Principle
Price quotations are not commercial lists if they are not
published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on
the relevant subject matter. Neither are they market reports or
quotations within the purview of commercial lists as they are not
standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday
professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.

Facts
M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation (MEFC), navigated the waters near Fortune Island
in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila
when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel. Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LSC) owned Petroparcel. After investigation,
Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro
found the Petroparcel at fault. MEFC sued LSC and the
Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo. MEFC prayed for an
award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the
fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia
XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney’s
fees.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in
place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of the
Petroparcel.
MEFC later sought to amend its complaint because the original
complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the
hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. MEFC averred that M/V Maria
Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after
deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of
P600,000.00 should be claimed. MEFC also alleged that
inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso
had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its
equipment and its lost cargoes. MEFC also incurred unrealized
profits and lost business opportunities.
MEFC presented of the testimony of its general manager and
sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. In addition, MEFC offered
the following pieces of documentary evidence:
Exhibits A: A certified xerox copy of the certificate of
ownership of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;
B: a document stating that as a result of the collision, the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV sustained a hole at its left side that caused it
to sink with its cargo of 1,050 baeras valued at P170,000.00;
C: a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler;
D: pro forma invoice showing 2 units of CUMMINS Marine
Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost
P1,160,000.00;
E: quotation of prices showing that a unit of radar, would cost
P100,000.00, a unit of video sounder would cost P45,000.00;
F: quotation of prices showing how much 2 rolls of nylon rope
would cost xxx;
G: retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong
Associates Law Offices;
H: price quotation showing the cost of poly nettings xxx.
Question
Are the abovementioned exhibits admissible in evidence?
Answer
No. The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the
nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons who
issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative
value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls
within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. On this point,
the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided
under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
Nor are B, C, D, E, F, and H commercial lists for they do not
belong to the category of other published compilations under
Section 45. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned. The exhibits mentioned are mere
price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested
for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the
collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any
list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant
subject matter. Neither are these market reports or quotations
within the purview of commercial lists as these are not
standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of
everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation. These are simply letters responding to the queries of
Del Rosario.
Under Section 45, a document is a commercial list if:
1. it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged
in an occupation;
2. such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical
or other published compilation;
3. said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and
4. it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the
same occupation.
Question
Is MEFC entitled to award of damages?
Answer
Yes. But MEFC is not entitled to actual damages. To enable
an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he
is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable
degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence available. The burden of proof is on the party who
would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either
side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence
which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side
is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot
be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out
specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.
MEFC is entitled to nominal damages. In the absence of
competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is entitled to nominal damages which, as the law
says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated
and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered. Since Petroparcel was at fault,
petitioner is liable for nominal damages to respondent.

Learned Treatise

​Seguritan v. People (supra)

Opinion Rule

​China Banking Corporation v. CA (G.R. No. 155299,

July 24, 2007)

Principle:
The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses
applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matter that are within the common
knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone
familiar with the facts.

FACTS
On August 27, 1991, Alfonso Kipte obtained a P1,200,000.00
loan from petitioner, secured by a promissory note and a real
estate mortgage signed by Avelina (Avelina died was substituted
by her predecessor-in-interest) over her properties. The
mortgage was annotated on the titles. The loan was also secured
by a surety agreement signed by Kipte as principal and by
Avelina as surety. Due to Kipte’s failure to pay his indebtedness,
the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and auction sale was
scheduled on August 17, 1992.

Thus, Avelina and respondent Emmanuel Piero filed the

complaint with the RTC, with Avelina denying having signed the
documents. They alleged that: Sometime in 1990, Emmanuel’s
common-law wife, Ludivina Rinnoces, asked Avelina to sign
some documents allegedly pertaining to a loan from one Cerila
de Leon; Avelina signed these documents without reading the
same, as she is blind, and without knowing the contents thereof;
in 1991, Ludivina again asked her to sign some documents,
allegedly to pay the account to Cerila; again, Avelina was not
able to read or know the contents of these documents.

Petitioner claimed that Avelina, though physically weak was

mentally sound and in complete possession of her faculties and
she understood fully the transactions and freely and voluntarily
signed the documents.
ISSUE
Whether or not an ophthalmologist is necessary to prove
Respondent’s blindness

RULING
NO. The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert
witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the domain
of medical science, and not to matters that are within the
common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by
anyone familiar with the facts. Thus, to prove whether one is
blind, it is not necessary to submit a medical certificate attesting
to the blindness or to require an expert witness, such as an
ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, since the fact of
blindness can be determined through common knowledge and by
anyone with sufficient familiarity of such fact. In this case,
Avelina, then alive during the trial of the case, categorically
testified and attested to her own blindness, facts which even the
trial court noted.

Also established are the facts that Avelina was already blind
when she was manipulated into signing the questioned
documents by her daughter-in-law, Ludivina, who did not
explain to her the contents and true nature of the documents
beforehand; that her hand had to be guided by Ludivina during
the act of signing.

Avelina's blindness was further confirmed by the testimonies of

her children, respondents Emmanuel M. Piero and Rebecca
Piero-Galang. Even the notary before whom she supposedly
appeared testified to the fact that she was indeed blind and that
she was not made to understand the documents.

​ arquez v. Sandiganbayan (G.R No. 187912-14,

M
January 31, 2011)
​Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes (G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18,
2010)

Roxas v. Arroyo

SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS RAMON REYES

PRINCIPLE: Opinion of expert witness

Sec 49, Rule 130: The opinion of a witness on a matter

requiring special knowledge, skill, expertise or
training which he is shown to possess may be
received in evidence.

FACTS:
1. ​Socorro filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage with her husband alleging
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
2. ​She presented several expert witnesses to show
that her husband is psychologically incapacitated.
Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent]
as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality
Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social
Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist
Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an
Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed
[respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder
of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features.
3. ​The RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: WON the testimonies of Dorctors Magno and

Villegas were not admissible for being hearsay as they
never examined personally the respondent.

RULING:

The lack of personal examination and interview of

the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in
their exclusion as evidence.
For another, the clinical psychologists’ and
psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on
the narration or personal interview of the petitioner.
Other informants such as respondent’s own son,
siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of
petitioner), testified on their own observations of
respondent’s behavior and interactions with them,
spanning the period of time they knew him. These
were also used as the basis of the doctors’
assessments. Within their acknowledged field of
expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological
make up of a person based on a number of factors
culled from various sources.

ptember 7, 2010)

Petitioner: Melissa Roxas

Interrogators: Dex, James and RC
Woman who bath her: Rose

FACTS:
1. Petitioner is a member of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-
United States of America (BAYAN-USA).
2. She volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future
medical mission. After doing survey work, petitioner and her
companions, Carabeo and Jandoc decided to rest and were
startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door
and a voice demanding that they open up. Fifteen heavily armed
men (in civilian clothing and wearing bonnets) forcibly entered
the house and dragged them inside a van and sped away.
3. After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. The
petitioner and her companions were ordered to alight. After she
was informed that she is being detained for being a member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army
(CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and
was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell. She
inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
4. What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation
coupled with torture. The thrust of the interrogations was to
convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of
returning to the fold.
5. On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and
returned to her uncles house in Quezon City. However, petitioner
continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given
to her.

RTC: It issued the desired writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action.
CA: It was not convinced that the military or any other person
acting under the acquiescence of the government, were
responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. The
appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the
petitioner merely believed that the military was behind her
abduction.

PETITIONER:
1. She insists that the manner by which her abduction and
torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction,
gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these
were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open
court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government
involvement.
2. Petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military
camp Fort Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer
from the travel time required to reach the place where she was
actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-
fire and airplanes she heard while thereat

ISSUE: WON the inferences of the petitioner stand as

substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.

RULING:
No, the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does
not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were
military or police officers and that she was detained at Fort
Magsaysay.

Section 48, Rule 130 (General Rule): “The opinion of a

witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following
sections.”

Section 50, Rule 130 (Exceptions): The opinion of a witness

for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence
regarding –
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

The petitioner’s testimony is merely circumstantial. In Amparo

proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends
largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity
and affiliation of the perpetrators.

Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred

over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty
as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An
amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and
hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly
ascertain.

IN THE CASE AT BAR:

The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular
case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of
enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such
abduction.
Petitioner claims that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains
a mere speculation because they were made mostly while she
was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a
mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful.

These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to

determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner
was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public
respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public
respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
​
Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro (supra)

Presumptions

​Tarapen v. People (supra)

​Borje v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. L-55436. November 25,
1983)
​Capili v. Cardaňa (G.R. No. 157906, November 2, 2006)
Principle: As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee
the safety of the school's premises. The fact that she failed to see
the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows
she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her
position.
FACTS:
Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the
San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree
located within the school premises fell on her, causing her
instantaneous death. Thus, her parents, Dominador and Rosalita
Cardaña, filed a case for damages against petitioner.
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that a resident of the
barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible danger the
tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the
tree that stood near the principal's office. The Cardañas averred
that petitioner's gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the
death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios
had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that
the tree was dead and rotting. To prove her point, she presented
witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of
Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on December 15,
1992 and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
RTC – dismiss
CA - liable
Issue: whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of
Jasmin Cardaña.
SC: principal is liable
To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was
negligent or not is a question of fact which is generally not
proper in a petition for review, and when this determination is
supported by substantial evidence, it becomes conclusive and
binding on this Court. However, there is an exception, that is,
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with
the findings of the lower court. In our view, the exception finds
application in the present case.
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly
done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which
creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another
because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an
animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which
an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or
similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of
harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a
more careful manner.
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could
fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As
the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the
maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children
within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the
rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death
of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her
position. IEcaHS
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of
the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
The fact, however, that respondents' daughter, Jasmin, died as a
result of the dead and rotting tree within the school's premises
shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone
passing by and calls for application of the principle ofres ipsa
loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident
was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of
the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents'
daughter was a result of petitioner's negligence, being in charge
of the school.
Was petitioner's explanation as to why she failed to have the tree
removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety
of the school's premises. The fact that she failed to see the
immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she
failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to
another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee.

​Santos v NSO (G.R. 171129, April 6, 2011) DEBBIE

ENRICO SANTOS vs. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE

G.R. No. 171129 April 6, 2011

REMEDIAL LAW: EVIDENCE

TOPIC: ​Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The

following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe
a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them. (3a)

PRINCIPLE: The tenant may show that the landlord’s title has
expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not
estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or
evicted by title paramount.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of lease three

times for a period of about five years. The 2 and 3 lease
nd rd

contract were entered for renewal of the lease contract and

covering a bigger area while the 3 contract was entered to cover
rd

an additional space. Respondent failed to pay rentals and refuse

to vacate thus prompting petitioner to file an ejectment case
against the former. On respondent’s answer it alleges that
petitioner never informed them that when they entered into the
1 contract lease the property was collateral for a real estate
st

mortgage. That when they entered the 2 and 3 contract

nd rd

petitioner never informed respondent that the property was

already foreclosed and China Banking Corp. is now the owner.
Petitioner misrepresented himself as still the absolute owner of
the subject property when he entered into said contracts.

The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner stating that a tenant cannot,

in an action involving the possession of leased premises,
controvert the title of his landlord.
The RTC affirmed in toto leaning its decision of the settled rule
that the fact of lease and the expiration of its terms are the only
elements in an action for ejectment, which it found to have been
established in this case. According to said court, a plaintiff need
not prove his ownership and defendant cannot deny it.
The CA overturned the RTC’s decision stating that the rule on
estoppels against tenants does not apply if the landlords title has
expired, or has been conveyed to another; or has been defeated
by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-
lessee relationship. The respondent was able to prove that title to
the subject property has already been effectively consolidated in
the name of China Bank. That there was no landlord-tenant
relationship created between the parties because the agreements
between them are void.

ISSUE: WON the rule on estoppels against tenants is applicable

in this case.

RULING: No.
Rule 131, Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are
instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) x x x x

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that "what a tenant is

estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the
title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired
subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply." Hence, "the tenant may show that
the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or
himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has
been ousted or evicted by title paramount."

The SC explained that the provision above is clear that what hat
a tenant is estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord
at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.
If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired
subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the
landlords title has expired or been conveyed to another or
himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has
been ousted or evicted by title paramount.
In this case, respondent was able to prove that petitioner was no
longer the owner to the subject property even before they
entered the 2 and 3 contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not
nd rd

stopped to deny a claim for rent.

​ arquez v. Fernandez (A.M. No. P-07-2358, October 19,

M
2010)
​Century Savings Bank v. Samonte (G.R. No. 176212,
October 20, 2010)

CIR v. Metro Star (G.R. No. 185371, December 8, 2010)

TOPIC: PRESUMPTIONS
PRINCIPLE:
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if the taxpayer
denies ever having received an assessment from the BIR, it is
incumbent upon the latter to prove by competent evidence that
such notice was indeed received by the addressee.

The onus probandi was shifted to respondent to prove by

contrary evidence that the Petitioner received the assessment in
the due course of mail. In this case as ruled in a jurisprudence,
"The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are
(a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid,
and
(b) that it was mailed.
CASE: CIR v METRO STAR SUPERAMA INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. On
2001, the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 10, Legazpi
City, issued Letter of Authority No. 00006561 for Revenue
Officer Daisy G.
Justiniana to examine petitioner's books of accounts and other
accounting records for income tax and other internal revenue
taxes for the taxable year 1999.
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS BY COMPANY
For petitioner's failure to comply with several requests for the
presentation of records and Subpoena Duces Tecum , [the] OIC
of BIR Legal Division issued an Indorsement dated September
26, 2001 informing Revenue District Officer of Revenue Region
No.
67, Legazpi City to proceed with the investigation based on the
best evidence obtainable preparatory to the issuance of
assessment notice.
DEFICIENCY VAT AND WITHOLDING TAXES
Revenue District Officer Socorro O. Ramos-Lafuente issued a
Preliminary 15-day Letter, which petitioner received on
November 9, 2001. The said letter stated that a post audit
review was held and it was ascertained that there was
deficiencyvalue-added and withholding taxes due from
petitioner in the amount of P 292,874.16.
DEFENSES OF METRO
Denying that it received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN)
and claiming that it was not accorded due process, Metro Star
filed a petition for review with the
CTA.
COUNTERCLAIMS OF CIR
The CIR, insisting that Metro Star received the PAN, dated
January 16, 2002, and that due process was served nonetheless
because the latter received the Final Assessment Notice (FAN).
CTA Second Division and CTA En Banc
Ruled in favor of Metro
ISSUE:
Whether or not Metro Star was denied due process
RULING:
Yes, Metro Star was denied due process.
The general rule is that the Court will not lightly set aside the
conclusions reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its
functions, has accordingly developed an
exclusive expertise on the resolution unless there has been an
abuse or improvident exercise of authority.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if the taxpayer
denies ever having received an assessment from the BIR, it is
incumbent upon the latter to prove by competent evidence that
such notice was indeed received by the addressee.

The onus probandi was shifted to respondent to prove by

contrary evidence that the Petitioner received the assessment in
the due course of mail.
In this case as ruled in a jurisprudence,
"The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are
(a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid,
and
(b) that it was mailed.
What is essential to prove the fact of mailing is the registry
receipt issued by the Bureau of Posts or the Registry return card
which would have been signed by the Petitioner or its authorized
representative. And if said documents cannot be located,
Respondent at the very least, should have submitted to the Court
a certification issued by the Bureau of Posts and any other
pertinent document which is executed with the intervention of
the Bureau of Posts.
This Court does not put much credence to the self serving
documentations made by the BIR personnel especially if they
are unsupported by substantial evidence establishing the fact of
mailing.
Indeed, Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the
taxpayer must first be informed that he is liable for deficiency
taxes through the sending of a PAN. He must be informed of the
facts and the law upon which the assessment is made. The law
imposes a substantive, not merely a formal, requirement.
To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without first
establishing a valid assessment is evidently violative of the
cardinal principle in administrative investigations — that
taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce
supporting evidence.
The Court agrees with the CTA that the CIR failed to discharge
its duty and present any evidence to show that Metro Star indeed
received the PAN dated January16, 2002.

​
Alferez v. People (G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011)

Remedial Law: Evidence

TOPIC: Presumptions under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of

Court.

PRINCIPLE: The presumption (knowledge of insufficient

funds) arises when it is proved that the issuer had received this
notice, and that within five banking days from its receipt, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements
for its payment. The full payment of the amount appearing in the
check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a
complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due process requires
that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the petitioner
to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.

FACTS: Jaime Alferez was charged of three counts of violation

of BP 22 for issuing three unfunded checks in the total amount
of P830, 998.40 as payment of the construction materials
purchased from Cebu ABC Sales. Ten months after prosecution
rested its case, Alferez files a Demurrer to Evidence without
leave of court citing that the prosecution failed to show that he
received the notice of dishonor or demand letter.

The MTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and convicted

Alferez as guilty of the crime charged. The RTC and CA also
affirmed the MTC's decision. It was averred that the registry
receipt and the return card adequately show the fact of receipt of
the Notice of Dishonor. In Alferez’s petition, he sustained his
argument that no notice of dishonor was given to him.

The CA maintains that, aside from not testifying because of the

consequence of his demurrer he did not object to the
prosecution’s evidence aimed at proving the fact of receipt of the
notice of dishonor, the registry receipt and the return card of the
post office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the registry receipt and the return card
alone without presenting the person who mailed/or served the
demand letter is sufficient Notice of Dishonor as required by BP
22?
HELD: NO.

The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer had

received this notice, and that within five banking days from its
receipt, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make
arrangements for its payment. The full payment of the amount
appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due
process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received
by the petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution
under B.P. Blg. 22.

It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of

dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution
must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of
service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such
notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.

In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the

demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return
card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt
to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return
card. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by
themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to
serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor.

​ eirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport (G.R. 170071, 170125,

H
March 9, 2011)
​Metropolitan Bank v. Tobias (G.R. No. 177780, January 25,
2012)

Syed Azhar Abbas vs. Gloria Goo Abbas (G.R. No. 183896,
January 30, 2013
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

TOPIC: PRESUMPTIONS

PRINCIPLE: The presumption of regularity of official acts

may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.” No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a
diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact
that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

FACTS:

Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of

nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the
RTC of Pasay City, Syed alleged the absence of a marriage
license, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of

Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to
participate in a ceremony which was meant to welcome him to
the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know
that the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.

Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly

married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.

To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the

declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.To prove the
validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract
signed by Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who
celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the
alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.

Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil

Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its
number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued to
Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no
diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license
issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was
issued in another municipality).

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her

appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for
the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus
held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.

The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and

documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having

signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that
Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case
against him for bigamy.

Issue:

WoN There was a valid marriage license?

In reversing the RTC, Did the Court of Appeal was correct when
it did focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it
did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court?

Held:

The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued.
The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license,

or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as
the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to
the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals such certification

43

was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of

Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement

signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry
of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil

Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to

certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including
the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by

the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the

marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued
a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the

certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite

diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and
thus the certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v.

Court of Appeals. It is worth noting that in that particular case,
45

the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a

marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the
alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not
appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for
Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a

disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty.”

No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal

Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking
the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand.
In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located
and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.

WHEREFORE, The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,

annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January
9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

​Heirs of Luna v. Afable (supra)

​People v. Laba (G.R. No. 199938, January 28, 2013)

TOPIC: Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The

following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
DOCTRINE: “The presumption of the law is that, if a
person carries with him more than five grams, that is not for
his personal consumption. He is out to traffic the rest of it”.

Appellant arrived at Manila Domestic Airport in Pasay City to

take his flight to Davao City. While arriving thereat, non-
uniform personnel frisked him, physically searched the person
and suspected the latters oversized white rubber shoes with the
identifying mark “spicer” seemed to contained what it felt like
rice. Upon the inspection, it turned out that it contained 3 plastic
sachets of shabu- 2 in the left shoe and 1- inside the right shoe.
Appellant tried to compromise it with the said authority but such
negotiation failed to realize.
The following day, the confiscated sachet contained a total of
196.63 grams upon examination and found positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous prohibited drug.
Then appellant was charged with the crime of transporting
dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the appellant in the

lower courts for the transportation of drugs proper?

HELD: YES.
It may be reasonable inferred from the Congres (in enacting
the law) that if a person is found to have more than five (5)
grams of shabu in his possession, then his purpose in
carrying them is to dispose, traffic, or sell it.

“The presumption of the law is that, if he carries with him

more than five grams, that is not for his personal
consumption. He is out to traffic the rest of it”.

In this case, Laba was apprehended inside the airport with a

substantial amount or 196.63 grams of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in his possession thus the conviction
of the crime of transporting dangerous prohibited drugs is
proper.

Laying the predicate

​People v. Molo (supra)

People v. Buduhan (G.R. No. 178196, August 6, 2008)

Topic:
Section 13 Rule 132. How witness impeached by evidence
of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances
of the times and places and the persons present, and he
must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing
they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.
Doctrine: The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be
first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements
of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to
protect the character of a witness.

FACTS:

Robert Buduhan and Rudy Buduhan were charged of the crime

of robbery with homicide. During the trial, Cherry Rose, a guest
relations officer of the beerhouse testified that Robert, Rudy and
2 others went inside the beerhouse. As he was entertaining Larry
Erese, Robert poked a gun at Larry and another man pointed a
gun at Romualde the manager of the bar and announced hold-up.
Larry then gave robert his watched and they started firing at
Larry and Romualde which caused their death. Hwoever, The
appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible witness
because of her conflicting claims with the police, in the
preliminary investigation and her testimony in open court.
During the preliminary investigation, Cherry Rose stated that a
man wearing a white Giordano tshirt shot Larry but pointed out
Guinchicna as the white man in tshirt but during open court she
identifed Robert as the man who was wearing a white giordano
shirt.

ISSUE:

WON the inconsistencies in the testimony of Cherry Rose will

affect her credibility

HELD:

No.

Section 13 of Rule 131 states that, Before a witness can be

impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid

before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a
witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to
protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by
the necessary inquiries, which enable him to explain the
statements referred to and to show that they were made by
mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his
testimony.

In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose during

the preliminary investigation with respect to the identities of the
accused were not related to her during the trial. Indeed, it is only
during the appeal of this case that appellants pointed out the
supposed inconsistencies in Cherry Roses identification of the
appellants in order to destroy her credibility as a witness. No
opportunity was ever afforded her to provide an explanation.
Without such explanation, whether plausible or not, we are left
with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility, on the
rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given
by a witness in reconciling her conflicting declarations that she
should be deemed impeached.

We rule, that this inconsistency relates only to an insignificant

aspect of the case and does not involve a material fact in dispute.

Exclusion/Separation of Witnesses

​ esign Sources International Inc. v. Eristingcol (G.R. No.

D
193966, February 19, 2014)

Title: DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC. V.

ERISTINGCOL
Topic: Exclusion/Separation of Witnesses
Principle: The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has
long been recognized as a means of discouraging fabrication,
inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from
the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in
the rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of
other witnesses.

FACTS:
Design Sources International, Inc is a distributor of Pergo
flooring. Private Respondent bought the said brand of flooring of
the "Cherry Blocked" type from the Petitioner Corporation. The
flooring was installed in her house.Private Respondent
discovered that the Pergo flooring installed had unsightly bulges
at the joints and seams. A complaint for damages was against the
petitioner after it failed to comply with private respondent’s
demand to replace the installed flooring.Kenneth Sy, one of the
Petitioners' witnesses, testified in open court. Respondent’s
counsel objected to the presentation of Stephen Sy as
petitioner’s witness considering that Stephen Sy was already
inside the courtroom during the presentation of witness Kenneth
Sy.
RTC ordered the exclusion of Stephen as witness on the ground
that "the Court deems it no longer necessary to allow Stephen Sy
from testifying [sic] when a different witness could testify on
matters similar to the intended testimony of the former."The
Order also stated that "to allow Stephen Sy from testifying [sic]
would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he already
heard the testimony of witness Kenneth Sy."

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing the assailed Orders disallowing petitioners
from presenting Stephen as their witness.

RULING: Yes.
Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial
or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness not
at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the
testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause
witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another until all shall have been examined.
Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time
another witness is testifying, or ordering that these witnesses be
kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them
from conversing with one another. The purpose is to ensure that
the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from being
influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words, this
measure is meant to prevent connivance or collusion among
witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has
long been recognized as a means of discouraging fabrication,
inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without any motion from
the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in
the rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the testimonies of
other witnesses.
There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that
there was an order of exclusion from the RTC, or that there was
any motion from respondent’s counsel to exclude other
witnesses from the courtroom prior to or even during the
presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are one with the
CA in finding that under such circumstances, there was nothing
to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of Kenneth.
Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to testify for
petitioners.

Reference to Memorandum
​
​Figueras v. Serrano (G.R. No. 28208, September 3, 1928)
​People v. Odencio (G.R. No. L-31961, January 9, 1979)
​
Borromeo v. CA (supra)

Principle:
Sec. 42, Rule 130 that statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.

Facts:
In its per curiam resolution, the Court of Appeals overturned its
previous decision and allowed Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5,
which were put into Memoranda by C as admissible as evidence
in supporting D, the administrator of the estate of the deceased
B, who claimed that the contracts executed between A and
deceased B, the father of C, were deed of absolute sale and not
contracts of equitable mortgages. A, the opponent contended that
the the Court of Appeals erred because the Memoranda offered
by C is biased as C will benefited on the result of the case. Also,
A contended that Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 are not part of
the res gestae.

Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in reversing its decision?

Ruling:
No. It is provided in Sec. 42, Rule 130 that statements made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the
res gestae. So, also statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.
Moreover, SEC. 10 of Rule 32 states that a witness may be
allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything
written by himself or under his direction at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time
when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the
same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the
writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse
party and such evidence must be received with caution.
In this case, Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 cannot be given
credit as these were not part of res gestae because C, the offeror
of such exhibits, who claimed that these were her notes during
the transactions of her deceased father and B, was not a party to
the contract and her presence is questionable. In fact, her
testimony was self-serving and unsatisfactory as evidence of the
facts asserted. The Memoranda suffered defect as it duly
uncorroborated with other witnesses. The Court of Appeals
failed in receiving the evidence with caution therefore such
exhibit is devoid of credibility.

​ ​

Part of transaction
​
​Eagleridge v. Cameron (G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013)

Proof of Private Document

​Aznar v. Citibank (supra)

​
Tan Shuy v. Maulawin (G.R. No. 190375, February 8,
2012)

Principle:
The due execution and authenticity of a private document may
be proved by: 1.) anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or 2.) evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Facts:
Petitioner Tan Shuy is engaged in the business of buying copra
and corn in the Fourth District of Quezon Province. According
to Vicente Tan (Vicente), son of petitioner, whenever they would
buy copra or corn from crop sellers, they would prepare and
issue a pesada in their favor. Guillermo Maulawin (Guillermo),
respondent in this case, is a farmer-businessman engaged in the
buying and selling of copra and corn. On 10 July 1997, Tan
Shuy extended a loan to Guillermo in the amount of ₱420,000.
In consideration thereof, Guillermo obligated himself to pay the
loan and to sell lucad or copra to petitioner.
Petitioner alleged that despite repeated demands, Guillermo
remitted only ₱23,000 in August 1998 and ₱5,500 in October
1998, or a total of ₱28,500. He claimed that respondent had an
[4]

outstanding balance of ₱391,500. Thus, convinced that

Guillermo no longer had the intention to pay the loan, petitioner
brought the controversy to the Lupon Tagapamayapa. When no
settlement was reached, petitioner filed a Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondent Guillermo countered that he had already paid the
subject loan in full. According to him, he continuously delivered
and sold copra to petitioner from April 1998 to April 1999.
Respondent said they had an oral arrangement that the net
proceeds thereof shall be applied as installment payments for the
loan. He alleged that his deliveries amounted to ₱420,537.68
worth of copra. To bolster his claim, he presented copies of
pesadas issued by Elena and Vicente. He pointed out that the
pesadas did not contain the notation pd, which meant that actual
payment of the net proceeds from copra deliveries was not given
to him, but was instead applied as loan payment. He averred that
Tan Shuy filed a case against him, because petitioner got mad at
him for selling copra to other copra buyers.

Issue:
Whether the pesadas require authentication before they can be
admitted in evidence.

Ruling:
We found no clear showing that the trial court and the CA
committed reversible errors of law in giving credence and
according weight to the pesadas presented by respondents.
According to Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, there
are two ways of proving the due execution and authenticity of a
private document, to wit:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document

 executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that

which it is claimed to be. (21a)
As reproduced above, the trial court found that the due execution
and authenticity of the pesadas were established by the plaintiffs
daughter Elena Tan and sometimes by plaintiffs son Vicente Tan.
The RTC said:
On cross-examination, [Vicente] reiterated that he and her [sic]
sister Elena Tan who acted as their cashier are helping their
father in their business of buying copras and mais. That witness
agreed that in the business of buying copra and mais of their
father, if a seller is selling copra, a pesada is being issued by his
sister. The pesada that she is preparing consists of the date when
the copra is being sold to the seller. Being familiar with the
penmanship of Elena Tan, the witness was shown a sample of
the pesada issued by his sister Elena Tan. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
x x x. He clarified that in the pesada (Exh. 1) prepared by Elena
and also in Exh 2, there appears on the lower right hand portion
of the said pesadas the letter pd, the meaning of which is to the
effect that the seller of the copra has already been paid during
that day. He also confirmed the penmanship and handwriting
of his sister Ate Elena who acted as a cashier in the pesada
being shown to him. He was even made to compare the xerox
copies of the pesadas with the original copies presented to
him and affirmed that they are faithful reproduction of the
originals. (Emphasis supplied)
[17]

In any event, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the

due execution and authenticity of the pesadas. As found by the
CA, Tan Shuy could have easily belied the existence of x x x the
pesadas or receipts, and the purposes for which they were
offered in evidence by simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan
Shuy, but no effort to do so was actually done by the former
given that scenario. The pesadas having been admitted in
evidence, with petitioner failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are already deemed sufficient proof of the facts
contained therein. We hereby uphold the factual findings of the
[18]

RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in that the pesadas served as proof

that the net proceeds from the copra deliveries were used as
installment payments for the debts of respondents. [19]

​Torres v. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011)

G.R. No. 193531 December 14, 2011
ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, Petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING
CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R.
BAUTISTA, JR., Respondent.

PRINCIPLE:
It is settled in Garvida v. Sales, Jr, G.R. No. 124893, April 18,
1997, that it is found inadmissible as evidence the filing of
pleadings through fax machines because a facsimile or fax
transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter. A facsimile is not a
genuine and authentic pleading. Without the original, there is no
way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and
his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

FACTS:
Petitioner (X) was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor
(SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence
report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the
slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-
Hyatt (CF Hyatt), and in connivance with slot machine
customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit
(CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity
of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding
which was committed by adding zero after the first digit of the
actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first
digit of the actual CMR. The CIU served X with a Memorandum
of Charges for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and
violation of office rules and regulations which were considered
grave offenses where the penalty imposable is dismissal. To file
a motion for reconsideration against X’s dismissal from his
employment, X sent his letter of reconsideration to P
Corporation via facsimile or fax transmission. However, it was
not received by P Corporation resulting the lapse of his appeal
because the facsimile or fax transmission was not considered a
valid mode in filing his reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Assuming that facsimile or fax transmission is considered as a
valid mode of filing, may it be admissible as evidence which
falls under the best evidence rule?

RULING:
No. It is settled in Garvida v. Sales, Jr, G.R. No. 124893, April
18, 1997, that it is found inadmissible as evidence the filing of
pleadings through fax machines because a facsimile or fax
transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter. A facsimile is not a
genuine and authentic pleading. Without the original, there is no
way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and
his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. Applying in the
case, the subject of inquiry is the letter of reconsideration of X
which was allegedly sent via fax transmission. Clearly, it cannot
be admitted as evidence because it was not the original
document submitted and that it devoid authentication and
signature on X’s part.

Genuineness of Signature

Title:Bernales v. Sambaan

Citation:G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010

Topic: Genuineness of Signature

Doctrines:
· As held in Sali v. Abubakar,30 the fact that the NBI
conducted the examination of certain contested documents upon
the request of a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the
examination thus made:
x x x Its purpose is, presumably, to assist the court
having jurisdiction over said litigations, in the
performance of its duty to settle correctly the issue
relative to said documents. Even a non-expert
private individual may examine the same, if there
are facts within his knowledge which may help the
courts in the determination of said issue. Such
examination, which may properly be undertaken by
a non-expert private individual, does not, certainly,
become null and void when the examiner is an
expert and/or an officer of the NBI.

Facts:

Plaintiff in this case is the eldest child of Spouses Julian and

Guillerma. Respondents are his siblings together with their
mother Guillerma filed a complaint for annulment of Deed of
Absolute Same and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
against the plaintiff alleging among others that the signature in
the Deed of Absolute Sale presented in the Register of Deeds.
That the property was only mortgaged to the plaintiff by her
parents and one of the last two wishes of their father who died in
an ambushed was to redeem the property.

Petitioners in their answer contends that the subject property was

originally owned by Clodualdo and Gliceria and upon the death
of the spouses three of the heirs namely Juanito, Aida and
Renato sold their share to Ebarrat and Julian , and the latter sold
the same share to the petitioners. Further, they alleged that the
imputation of falsification of the signatures of Julian and
Guillerma is a product of respondent’s inflamed imagination
because they envy the petitioners for they have been successful
in managing their property.

Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondents and was

affirmed by the Court of Appeals in toto.

Issue:
Whether or not the examination of the genuiness of the
signatures commissioned by the respondents is null and void.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

It is of no moment that the examination of the Deed of Absolute

Sale was commissioned by the respondents. In the end, it is the
court which has the discretion and authority on whether to give
probative value to the results of the examination. As held in Sali
v. Abubakar,30 the fact that the NBI conducted the examination
of certain contested documents upon the request of a private
litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination thus made:

x x x Its purpose is, presumably, to assist the court having

jurisdiction over said litigations, in the performance of its duty
to settle correctly the issue relative to said documents. Even a
non-expert private individual may examine the same, if there are
facts within his knowledge which may help the courts in the
determination of said issue. Such examination, which may
properly be undertaken by a non-expert private individual, does
not, certainly, become null and void when the examiner is an
expert and/or an officer of the NBI.
Indeed, any person, expert or not, either in his private or in his
official capacity, may testify in court on matters, within his
personal knowledge, which are relevant to a suit, subject to the
judicial authority to determine the credibility of said testimony
and the weight thereof. [On] the other hand, the question
whether a public official may or shall be ordered or permitted by
his superior to examine documents and testify thereon in a given
case, is one mainly administrative in character, which is within
the competence of said superior officer, or the Bureau Director
or Head of the Office, or the corresponding department head to
decide, and is independent of the validity of the examination
thus made or of the credence and weight to be given by the
Court to the conclusions reached, in consequence of said
examination, by the official who made it.
 ​ acu v. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 187752,
N
November 23, 2010)

Public Documents

​Heirs of Ochoa v. G & S Transport (supra)

Topic: Public Documents

Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
Section 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.

Title: HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA vs. G & S

TRANSPORT CORPORATION ​(G.R. No. 170071
March 9, 2011)
Principle:

Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an

agency (USAID) will issue a certification containing unreliable
information regarding an employee’s income. Besides, there
exists a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.

Facts:

Jose Marcial Ochoa died while on board an Avis taxicab owned

and operated by G & S Transport. The Heirs of Ochoa filed a
Complaint for Damages against G & S Transport (operator of
Avis taxicab) for breach of contract of carriage demanding the
latter to indemnify them for Jose Marcial’s death, loss of earning
capacity and funeral expenses. Petitioner contended that G & S
failed to observe and exercise extraordinary diligence because it
failed transport Jose safely. Respondent claimed that it exercised
the diligence required of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees including Padilla (the
driver). G & S also argued that the proximate cause of Jose
Marcial’s death is a fortuitous event and/or the fault or
negligence of another and not of its employee. According to G &
S, the collision was totally unforeseen since Padilla had every
right to expect that the delivery van would just overtake him and
not hit the right side of the taxicab.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Heirs and awarded

P6,537,244.96 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased
which was based on the Certification given by the USAID of
Jose’s annual income. On appeal, CA deleted the award and
declared the Certification as self-serving and biased.

The HEIRS argued that bias and personal interest cannot be

attributed to Jose Marcial’s employer, the USAID. Unlike in
Ereño, USAID here does not stand to be benefited by an award
for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity. Clearly, the
Certification issued by it is far from being self-serving. In
addition, the heirs point out that the authenticity and accuracy of
said Certification was neither questioned by G & S nor
discredited by any controverting evidence.

For its part, G & S avers that the Certification issued by USAID
is self-serving because the USAID officer who issued it has not
been put on the witness stand to validate the contents thereof.
Moreover, said Certification was not supported by competent
evidence such as income tax returns and receipts.
Issue: WON the Certification by the USAID admissible as
evidence?

Ruling: Yes

The CA sweepingly concluded that the USAID Certification is

self-serving and unreliable without elaborating on how it was
able to arrive at such a conclusion.

A research on USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United

States] agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from
disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic
reforms”. It is an "independent federal government agency that
receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of
the State [of the United States]." Given this background, it is
highly improbable that such an agency will issue a certification
containing unreliable information regarding an employee’s
income. Besides, there exists a presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed.

Absent any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that Cruz, as

Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly
performed his duty relative to the issuance of said certification
and therefore, the correctness of its contents can be relied upon.
This presumption remains especially so where the authenticity,
due execution and correctness of said certification have not been
put in issue either before the trial court or the CA.

Moreover, "Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to

mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest. The term,
if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations
made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of
court.
Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be self-serving
because it does not refer to an act or declaration made out of
court by the heirs themselves as parties to this case.

The certification is a sufficient basis for the court to make a fair

and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial’s loss of earning
capacity just like in Tamayo v. Señora where we based the
victim’s gross annual income on his pay slip from the Philippine
National Police. Hence, we
uphold the trial court’s award for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning
capacity.
 ​ omplaint of Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers
C
(A.M. OCA IPI No. 10- ​ ​ 1​ 77-CA-J, April 12,
2011)

RE: COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED MEMBERS OF

CHINESE GROCERS ASSOCIATION AGAINST
JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS

Remedial Law: Evidence

Topic: Rule 132, Section 23 - Public documents as evidence. —
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents
are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave
rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

PRINCIPLE: A PUBLIC DOCUMENT HAS IN ITS

FAVOR THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY. CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESENTED
TO CONTRADICT SUCH PRESUMPTION.

FACTS:
CGA is the owner of a land in Manila with TCT No. 42417. In
2008, dela Cruz filed a petition for issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417 claiming that the old one had
been misplaced. This was assigned to the sala of then Judge
Inting. In the petition, dela Cruz claimed that his interest in
filing this petition is based on his right as a vendee of the
property, evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
08/19/2008 allegedly executed between CGA, represented by
Ang E. Bio, and dela Cruz. Judge Inting issued an order granting
the petition., and subsequently became final and executory.

CGA claimed that Justice Inting acted with gross neglect when
he granted the petition and pointed out that the Deed of Absolute
Sale should have aroused suspicion, as Ang E. Bio died
08/28/2001. Justice Inting forwarded that no representative of
CGA appeared to participate in the proceedings or oppose the
petition at the initial hearing.

ISSUE:
WON Justice Inting is guilty of misconduct for granting the
petition.
RULING:
No.
PD 1529 provides that “upon petition of the registered owner or
other person in interest” the court may, after notice and due
hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate. This
therefore allows a person who is not the owner of property to
file, provided he has interest in it.

Further, dela Cruz is a person in interest as what appeared to be

a validly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in
his favor. As a public document, the Deed of Absolute Sale has
in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict it, one
must present evidence that is clear and convincing; otherwise,
the document should be upheld.

Further, complainants attached a mere photocopy of Ang Bio’s

Certificate of Death. While the certificate of death is indeed a
public document, to prove its contents, there is a need to present
a certified copy of this document, issued by the public officer in
the custody of the original document. Since it is not a certified
copy, it is inadmissible as proof, and is considered a mere scrap
of paper without any evidentiary value.

Official Record

​ TCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin (G.R. No. 178551,

A
October 11, 2010)

G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL
AND MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT
PETITIONERS, VS. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, RESPONDENT.

Topic:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. -- Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Principle:
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Facts:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI
Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the
position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait's
Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not
having allegedly passed the probationary period.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry,
as the foreign principal.
By Decision of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding
that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to
warrant respondent's dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a
regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed
and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00,
representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of
her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the
Labor Arbiter's decision.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because
respondent's employment contract specifically stipulates that her
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent
error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the
Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in
deciding the present case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and
Regulation shall apply in this case.
Ruling:
As to petitioners' contentions that Philippine labor laws on
probationary employment are not applicable since it was
expressly provided in respondent's employment contract, which
she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement
shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and
Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules,
customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. -- Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:
MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by
ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a
probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country's
Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy
(Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating
that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the
grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of
termination, both of which documents were certified by Mr.
Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-
Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation
Unit; and respondent's letter of reconsideration to the Ministry,
wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of
employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it
changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.
Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor
laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials
thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners
submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the
correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti
civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under
such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated.

​ da. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee (G.R. No. 183622,

V
February 8, 2012)
​Republic v. Capco de Tensuan (G.R. No. 171136, October
23, 2013)
​
Ancient Document Rule

​Heirs of Lacsa v. CA (G.R. Nos. 79597-98, May 20, 1991)

Principle:
The last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a
document must be unblemished by any alteration or
circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the
document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages,
therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in
question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file
with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free
from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

Facts:
Heirs of X filed an action for recovery of possession and
cancellation of title, based on the allegations that A and B, and
their predecessors-in-interest, thru stealth, fraud and other forms
of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the
property, and succeeded in transferring the title to said property
in his name, to the damage and prejudice of the petitioners. And
B, in their defense, presented a certified true copy of Deed of
Sale authenticated by the Register of Deeds. Applying the
Ancient Document Rule under Rule 132 of Rules of Court, RTC
and CA, ruled in respondents favor. Hence, Heirs of X, filed an
appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that in order for a
document to be classified as an "ancient document", it must not
only be at least thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in
the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is
otherwise free from suspicion. Since the "first pages" of said
documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties
thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget
unlimited alterations.

Issue:
Is the petitioner correct in this case?

Ruling:
No. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient
document to be exempt from proof of due execution and
authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30)
years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are
fulfilled:
(1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally
be found if genuine; and
(2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of
suspicion.

The first document, Exhibit , entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano

de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7
April 1923 whereas the second document, exhibit, entitled
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924.
These documents are, therefore, more than thirty (30) years old.
Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as
exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of
Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the
Pampango translation of the document of extrajudicial partition
which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records
Management of the Department of General Services.

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule"

that a document must be unblemished by any alteration or
circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the
document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages,
therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of suspicion
cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in
question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file
with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free
from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

Notarial Documents

​Go v. Costelo (A.M. No. P-08-2450, June 20, 2009)

​
Unchuan v. Lozada (G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009)

MARISSA UNCHUAN VS. ANTONIO JP LOZADA,

ANITA LOZADA, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CEBU GR No. 172671 April 16, 2009

Remedial Law: Evidence

Topic: Rule 132, Section 31.

PRINCIPLE: The party producing a document as genuine

which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its
execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must
account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was
made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the
consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning
or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document
shall not be admissible in evidence.
FACTS:

Sisters Anita and Peregrina Lozada were registered co-owners of

lots in Cebu. Both of them were based in the United States of
America. They sold their lots to their nephew, Antonio JP
Lozada, under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a Special Power of
Attorney from Anita, Peregrina went to their brother’s house
who agreed to advance the purchase price for his nephew. The
Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the
Philippine Consul’s Office. Thereafter, the deed, the Special
Power of Attorney, and the owner’s copies of the Certificates of
Title were sent to Antonio in the Philippines. Upon receipt,
Antonio recorded the sale in the Register of Deeds. Accordingly,
transfer certificates of title were issued in his name.

Pending registration, petitioner, Marissa Unchuan, caused the

annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. She claimed that
Anita donated an undivided portion of the lots to her by way of
an unregistered Deed of Donation. The respondents brought a
case against the petitioner for quieting of title and on her part,
the latter filed a case to declare the Deed of Sale void and for the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of title.

At the trial, the respondents presented the notarized and duly

authenticated sworn statement and a videotape where Anita
denied the donation in favor of Marissa. On her part, the Marissa
testified that she accompanied Anita to the office of Atty.
Cresencio Tomakin for the signing of the Deed of Donation but
allegedly kept it in a safety deposit box. The Regional Trial
Court declared the validity of the instrument which was reversed
by the Court of Appeals.

An examination of the Deed of Donation revealed that the Deed

does not appear to be duly notarized. In page three of the deed,
the stamped name of Cresencio Tomakin appears above the
words Notary Public until December 31, 1983 but below it were
the typewritten words Notary Public until December 31, 1987. A
closer examination of the document further reveals that the
number 7 in 1987 and Series of 1987 were merely superimposed.
This was confirmed by petitioner’s nephew Richard Unchuan
who testified that he saw petitioner’s husband write 7 over 1983
to make it appear that the deed was notarized in 1987. Moreover,
a Certification from Clerk of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino of the
Notarial Records Division disclosed that the Deed of Donation
purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and
Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and filed with said
office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the declaring the
Deed of Donation void?

RULING:

No.

According to Section 31 of Rule 132 “The party producing a

document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have
been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question
in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was
made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was
otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did
not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails
to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence.”

In this case, the Deed of Donation does not appear to be duly

notarized. In page three of the deed, the stamped name of
Cresencio Tomakin appears above the words Notary Public until
December 31, 1983 but below it were the typewritten words
Notary Public until December 31, 1987. A closer examination of
the document further reveals that the number 7 in 1987 and
Series of 1987 were merely superimposed. This was confirmed
by petitioner’s nephew Richard Unchuan who testified that he
saw petitioner’s husband write 7 over 1983 to make it appear
that the deed was notarized in 1987. Moreover, a Certification
from Clerk of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino of the Notarial
Records Division disclosed that the Deed of Donation
purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and
Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and filed with said
office.

​
Heirs of Arcilla v. Teodoro (G.R. No. 162886, August 11,
2008)

Principle:
The required certification of an officer in the foreign service
under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in
Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines or of a foreign
country.
Facts:
On December 19, 1995, Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro (respondent)
initially filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac,
Catanduanes an application for land registration of two parcels
of land. The case was then transferred to MTC. Respondent
alleged that, with the exception of the commercial building
constructed thereon, she purchased the subject lots from her
father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by a Deed of Sale
dated December 9, 1966, and that, prior thereto, Pacifico
acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the estate of
his father, Jose Arcilla evidenced by a document entitled
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Respondent also presented as
evidence an Affidavit of Quit-Claim in favor of Pacifico,
executed by herein petitioners as Heirs of Vicente Arcilla
(Vicente), brother of Pacifico.

In their Opposition dated August 19, 1996, petitioners contended

that they are the owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots including
the building and other improvements constructed thereon by
virtue of inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses
Vicente and Josefa Arcilla; contrary to the claim of respondent,
the lots in question were owned by their father, Vicente, having
purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento sometime
in 1917; Vicente's ownership is evidenced by several tax
declarations attached to the record; petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject
lots since 1906.

The respondent filed a Motion for Admission contending that

through oversight and inadvertence she failed to include in her
application, the verification and certificate against forum
shopping required by Supreme Court (SC) Revised Circular No.
28-91 in relation to SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application on the ground

that respondent should have filed the certificate against forum
shopping simultaneously with the petition for land registration
which is a mandatory requirement of SC Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 and that any violation of the said Circular shall be a
cause for the dismissal of the application upon motion and after
hearing.

On June 25, 2001, the MTC rendered a decision and held that
Respondent has sufficient title over the subject land. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The CA
dismissed the Petition for Review filed by the Petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification of non-forum shopping executed
in a foreign country is covered by Sec. 24 of Rule 132.

Ruling:
The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign
country is not covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.

There is no merit to petitioners contentions that the verification

and certification subsequently submitted by respondent did not
state the country or city where the notary public exercised her
notarial functions; and that the MTC simply concluded, without
any basis, that said notary public was from Maryland, USA; that
even granting that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping were notarized in the USA, the same may not be
deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure
to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court that the notarized document must be
accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines who is stationed in the country in
which a record of the subject document is kept, proving or
authenticating that the person who notarized the document is
indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.
The Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA, to wit:

From the foregoing provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132,

Rules of Court], it can be gathered that it does not include
documents acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For
foreign public documents to be admissible for any purpose here
in our courts, the same must be certified by any officer of the
Philippine legation stationed in the country where the documents
could be found or had been executed. However, after judicious
studies of the rule, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court
basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the
official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to
paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover
notarial documents, the rule could have included the same. Thus,
petitioners-oppositors' contention that the certificate of forum
shopping that was submitted was defective, as it did not bear the
certification provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, is devoid of any merit. What is important is the fact that
the respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer
clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and
will not commit forum shopping. [33]

When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25,

Rule 132 became Section 24, Rule 132; and the amendment
consisted in the deletion of the introductory phrase An official
record or an entry therein, which was substituted by the phrase
The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19.
Thus, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court now reads as
follows:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public

documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their

presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of

the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign
country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last

wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents

required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.

It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an

officer in the foreign service under Section 24 refers only to the
documents enumerated in Section 19(a), to wit: written official
acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the
Philippines or of a foreign country. The Court agrees with the
CA that had the Court intended to include notarial documents as
one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of
Section 24, it should not have specified only the documents
referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.

​Lazaro v. Agustin (G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010)

G.R. No. 152364 April 15, 2010 ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO,

assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO
D. SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR;
ANGELINA S. SAGLES, assisted by her husband,
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN
SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON
AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA
AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO,
GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN,
Respondents.

PRINCIPLE:
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries
the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Moreover, not all notarized
documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus,
an affidavit does not automatically become a public document
just because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that
attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it
is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.

FACTS:
D filed petition for judicial partition on the strength of an
affidavit allegedly executed by Y, wherein she purportedly
acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her
siblings A, B and C. Heirs of Y prayed that X’s complaint be
dismissed contending that at the time the affidavit was supposed
to have been signed and sworn to before the notary public, Y
was already bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise
her hand to feed herself. MTCC, RTC, CA, all ruled in favor of
dismissing petition for Extrajudicial Partition.

ISSUE:
Is the decision of the lower court correct in dismissing filed
Extrajudicial Partition filed by D?

RULING:
Yes. Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favor the presumption of regularity.
However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Moreover, not
all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become
a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. The
presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed
only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was
regular. Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity
accorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed, a
notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed
is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. As
earlier discussed, the presumption is not absolute and may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The
presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because
the regularity in the execution of the sworn statement was
challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie
validity was overthrown by the highly questionable
circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as well
as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the
improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on
the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the
questioned document was supposedly executed. The trial and
appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to the
testimonies of these witnesses. The Court has repeatedly held
that it will not interfere with the trial court's determination of the
credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
The reason for this is that the trial court was in a better position
to do so, because it heard the witnesses testify before it and had
every opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment on
the witness stand.

​Alcantara v. Nido (G.R. No. 165133, April 19, 2010)

​Oño v. Lim (G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010)
​Abadiano v. Martin (G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008)

Facts:
 ​The subject lot was covered by OCT No. 20461 issued in
the name of spouses Inocentes Banares and Feliciana
Villanueva. Before the issuance of the OCT, Inocentes and the
heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her
husband) executed an Agreement of Partition of said lot. The
partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition and notarized the
following day. The lot was partitioned and distributed in favor of
Demetrio, Ramon, David, and Amando.

​ he OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted and

T
in lief thereof OCT No. RO-8211 was issued over the subject lot
in the name of Inocentes and Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at
the back of the reconstituted title were the Agreement of
Partition and the Deed of Confirmation.

​ emetrio Banares sold his share of the lot to his son,

D
Leopoldo. The same was annotated at the back of said OCT.
Subsequently, Leopoldo filed before the CFI an ex-parte petition
praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition,
the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of
Sale between him and his father; and second, the cancellation of
the OCT and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new Certificate of
Title over the property. The Court order the cancellation of said
OCT and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of
Leopoldo, Amando, Ramon and David.

​ etitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting

P
title over the subject lot and that no sale of the portion pertaining
to Ramon and David ever took place. On the other, respondent
spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT, Ramon, for
himself and on behalf of David, had already sold their rights and
interests over the subject lot. The sale was allegedly evidenced
by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) and acknowledged
before a Notary Public and bearing notarial inscription. The sale
was allegedly affirmed by David.

​ fter trial, the court issued in favor of the spouses Martir.

A
It’s grounds, to wit:
1. The Compra Y Venta was not null and void despite the
absence of the consent of one of the co-owners; and
2. Notwithstanding that the Compra Y Venta contained the
same notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition, the same
may be considered an error which does not nullify Compra
Y Venta. The would would be non-registrable but still valid.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale (Compra Y Venta is a

spurious document.

Ruling: Yes.

​Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
ITHADC
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole;
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
​ ​ ​ ​ ​
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in
evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of
the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the
trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to
determine its validity based on such assumption.

​ notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear

A
unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.

I​ n this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial

inscription would not have invalidated the sale - if indeed it took
place - the same error would have meant that the document
cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to
the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out
of the realm of public documents genuineness and due execution
need not be proved. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​ ​ ​
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution
and genuineness of the purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of
evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.

​ abunas v. Scanmar (G.R. No. 188637, December 15,

G
2010)
​
Philippine Trust Company v. CA (G.R. No. 150318, November
22, 2010)
IN RE: Certifications as competent evidence

Facts:
Sometime in 1958, Iluminada Lumen Policarpio, obtained a loan
from Philippine Trust Company in the sum of P300,000.00. As
security for the loan, Lumens parents, as sureties, executed a
deed of mortgage to the bank over some parcels of land,
including all the improvements thereon. Upon failure of Lumen
Policarpio to pay the loan when it fell due, Philtrust initiated
foreclosure proceedings before the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Manila. The trial court rendered judgment for foreclosure on
October 14, 1963.
October 15, 1970, Philtrust purchased the properties at the
auction sale. The sale was confirmed by the trial court in 1971.
That same year, the bank was able to consolidate ownership over
the property. On March 13, 1972, a Transfer Certificate of Title
was issued in the name of the bank. Policarpio filed for certiorari
with the CA but was dismissed for lack of merit.
In February 1974, the ancestral house of the Policarpios situated
in the same property already owned by the bank was destroyed
by a typhoon. Lumen Policarpio sent letters to the bank officers
informing them of the destruction and her plan to rebuild the
house. Philtrust, however, never acted on any of the letters.
Thus, Lumen Policarpio proceeded to construct the house,
purportedly to provide shelter for her ailing mother. Meanwhile,
on October 10, 1976, Philtrust filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession of said properties. On February 28, 1977,
the trial court issued an order declaring that the bank was
entitled to the possession of the properties but allowed the
previous owners, the Policarpios, to adduce evidence showing
that they built the house in good faith. Despite having been
given several opportunities to do so, the Policarpios failed to
introduce any evidence in their behalf, prompting the trial court
to issue on May 29, 1979 the writ of possession.
Multiple remedies were sought by Policarpio until the court
issued an order for second alias writ of possession which they
also sought to counter through a writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence, herein petitioner sought its dismissal on the ground of
res judicata. Petitioner further alleged that the complaint states
no cause of action since the property covered by OCT-R-165 is
no longer owned by private respondent but by the Land Bank of
the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not Simeon policarpio and Shipyard and
shipbuilding corporation (The name registered in the OCT) has
no cause of action.

Ruling:
Private respondent SPSSC does not dispute that the parcel of
land covered by OCT R-165 has been mortgaged to the
Landbank of the Philippines to secure a loan in the sum of Four
Million Five Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos
(P4,529,000.00) on April 30, 1982. The property was foreclosed
as early as April 27, 1987 as evidenced by a certificate of sale
issued by the ex-officio sheriff of Malabon. The certificate of
sale was inscribed in the Register of Deeds on September 21,
1987, giving private respondent one year to redeem it. However,
private respondent failed to redeem the said property within the
one year redemption period. Nevertheless, despite failure of
private respondent to redeem the property within the one year
period following its foreclosure, the bank has deferred
consolidation of title and has given private respondent the option
to re-acquire the property subject to certain terms under
negotiation. A certification issued by the bank dated October 18,
1994 reads:
This is to certify that a certain property located in Navotas,
Rizal owned by Simeon Policarpio Shipyard and Building
Corporation and covered by OCT-R-165 was foreclosed by the
bank per certificate of sale dated April 29, 1994. The said
corporation, represented by Atty. Lumen Policarpio, was given
the option to re-acquire the property under the terms presently
being negotiated with Landbank.
Although the one year period of redemption had expired on
September 21, 1988, this bank has deferred the consolidation of
title in view of the report that said property is fully submerged in
water.
Since private respondent was in possession of the aforesaid
parcel of land when the writ of possession was improperly
implemented by the sheriff, it is not correct therefore to say that
private respondent does not have a cause of action, simply
because it was no longer the owner of the property in question
when the writ of possession was implemented. It is elementary
that a lawful possessor of a thing has the right to institute an
action should he be disturbed in its enjoyment.
 ​

Spouses Lehner vs Chua (G.R. No. 174240, March 20, 2013)

Principle:
· SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument
duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law,
may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of
the execution of the instrument of document involved.
· A defective notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument.

Facts:
X filed an action for reconveyance against Y alleging that the
subject lots were transferred in the name of Y by virtue of a
forged Deed of Transfer. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of Y. In reversing the decision of the trial court, the CA did
not upheld the deed of transfer executed by X in favor of Y for
the following reasons:
(1) the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial
Section of the RTC which supposedly attested that a copy of the
subject Deed of Transfer is on file with the said court, was
contradicted by the Certification issued by the Administrative
Officer of the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by
the testimony of the court employee who prepared the
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the effect that the
subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in fact, be found in their files;
(2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the subject
Deed of Transfer; and
(3) the subject document did not state the date of execution.
​
Issue:
Did the court erred in not upholding the deed of transfer?

Ruling:
No. Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides as
follows:
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the execution
of the instrument of document involved.

While notarized documents carry evidentiary weight conferred

upon them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity, the presumptions that attach to
notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective
notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument.

In the case at bar, the CA pointed out dubious circumstances and

irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the Deed of
Transfer.

Official Language

​Doronio v. Doronio (G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007.

Principle:
Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately
after the offer is made is made.
​Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a ​witness ​shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably ​apparent.

​An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within

three (3) days after ​notice of the offer unless a different
period is allowed by the court. In ​any case, the
​grounds for the objections must be specified.

Facts:

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both

deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located
at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan. A private deed of
donation propter nuptias was executed by spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and
the latter’s wife, Veronica Pico. There is a significant
discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent
property at the eastern side with respect to the identity of the
owner of adjacent property based on the original certificate of
title, written in Spanish language and on the deed of donation.

Respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed an action for

reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction against petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio.
Respondents contended, among others, that the subject land is
different from what was donated as the descriptions of the
property under OCT and under the private deed of donation were
different. They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante intended to donate only one-half of the property.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among
others, that the property was originally covered by OCT No. 352
which was cancelled by TCT No. 44481.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio.

Respondents appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
decision. Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the
CA.

Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence

on the ground that it is written in Spanish language. They posit
that (d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial language shall not
be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino.

Issues:

Whether or not OCT No. 352 written in Spanish language

without a translation in English or Filipino is admissible in
evidence.

Ruling:

Yes.

The requirement that documents written in an unofficial

language must be accompanied with a translation in English or
Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be
insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court, where
a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.
Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in
English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to,
either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the
language in which the document is written is understood by all,
and the document is admissible in evidence.

Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of

Evidence provides:

SECTION 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally

must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three

(3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is
allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections
must be specified. (Emphasis ours)

Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary

evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to
question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected
may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the
court in arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by its
nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been
rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.

Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible

under an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it.
Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became
property of the case, and all parties to the case are considered
amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from
the said evidence

Offer of Evidence

​Parel v. Prudencio (G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006)

Remedial Law: Evidence

Topic: Section 34, Rule 132. Offer of evidence.—The court

shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Principle
That a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has been offered as part of the evidence of
a party.

Facts
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against Danilo Parel with
the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey
residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National
Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS)
compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely
from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of said
house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the
second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed
Danilo's parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to
move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction
of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction
and to safeguard the materials; when the construction of the
second floor was finished in 1975, Simeon allowed Danilo's
parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it
was done out of sheer magnanimity as Danilo's parents have no
house of their own and since Simeon's wife is the older sister of
Florentino, Danilo's father; in November 1985, Simeon wrote
Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the
former was due for retirement and he needed the place to which
Danilo's parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986;
however, without Simeon's knowledge, Danilo and his family
unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of
Simeon's house; Danilo's refusal to vacate the house despite
repeated demands prompted Simeon to file the instant action for
recovery of... possession. Simeon also asked Danilo for a
monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month
thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and surrender
possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and cost of suit.
The RTC found the following matters as conclusive: that
Danilo's father was an allocatee of the land on which the subject
house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government
employees at that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave
them the chance to construct their own house on said
reservation; that Simeon failed to show proof of any contract,
written or oral, express or implied, that the late Florentino and
his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere
lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his
sole... ownership of the house; and, that the late Florentino was
the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the
house and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-
ownership existed between Simeon and Danilo's father,
Florentino.
RTC rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the
house as owned by Simeon saying that the affidavit should be
read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its execution;
that it was executed because of an advisement addressed to the
late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the property's
tax assessment and Florentino, thought then that it should be the
Simeon who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot
be accepted for being hearsay.
But CA found as meritorious respondent’s contention that since
petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any documentary
evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by
respondent.
(NB: For the relevant issue under this topic, skip to the 2 nd

Question)
Question
Was the affidavit admissible in evidence against Florentino and,
by extension, Danilo?
Answer
Yes. Section 38 of Rule 130 states: The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against
third persons.
The affidavit
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was Danilo's father
and had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered
by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building,
he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by Simeon who is
residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not
have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it
is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children's interests as
his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
Notably, during Florentino's lifetime, from 1973, the year he
executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death there is
no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a
criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by
Simeon against him (Florentino) and Danilo in 1988 regarding
the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the
absence of evidence showing that Danilo entered the house
against the latter's will and held that the remedy of Simeon was
to file an action for ejectment; and even when a complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed against Danilo and his wife also in
1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that
Simeon's action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received
in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are... against his own pecuniary or moral
interest.
Tax Declaration
Notably, Simeon has been religiously paying the real estate
property taxes on the house declared under his name since 1974.
In fact, Danilo during his cross-examination admitted that there
was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared
any portion of the house in their name.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The house which Danilo claims to be co-owned by his... late
father had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Simeon, and this fact, taken with the other
circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the
conclusion that Simeon is the sole owner of the house subject
matter of the litigation.
Question
Shall petitioner’s documentary evidence be considered without
being formally offered?
Answer
No. Respondent having established his claim of exclusive
ownership of the subject property, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to contravene respondent’s claim. The burden of
evidence shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a co-
owner of the subject house. In this case, the records show that
although petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer
his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file
the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were
not formally offered, the same were marked during the
presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be
taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., the Court allowed
evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of the
birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not
formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the
birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail
to prove petitioner’s minority which was never challenged by
the prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the
case.

​Seguritan v. People (supra)

Principle:
A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base
their findings of fact and judgment only - and strictly - upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To rule otherwise
would deprive the opposing party of his chance to examine the
document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will
have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized
by the court below. Any evidence which a party desires to
submit to the courts must be offered formally because a judge
must base his findings strictly on the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial.

FACTS
In the afternoon of November 25, 1995, petitioner was having a
drinking session with his uncles, one of which is Lucrecio
Seguritan. Petitioner, who was seated beside Lucrecio, claimed
that Lucrecio's carabao entered his farm and destroyed his crops.
A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which petitioner
punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about to stand up.
Petitioner's punches landed on Lucrecio's right and left temple,
causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block
which was being used as an improvised stove.

At around 9 o'clock in the evening, Lucrecio's wife and daughter

noticed that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance
was coming out of his mouth. Attempts were made to revive
Lucrecio but to no avail. He died that same night.

The wife learned about the involvement of the petitioner in her

husband’s death, so she sought the assistance if the NBI. NBI
Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Vertido exhumed Lucrecio's body and
performed the autopsy. He concluded that Lucrecio's cause of
death was traumatic head injury.
The petitioner’s denied hitting Lucrecio and alleged that the
latter died of cardiac arrest. Petitioner claimed that he suddenly
stood up during their heated argument with the intent to punch
Lucrecio. However, since the latter was seated at the opposite
end of the bench, Lucrecio lost his balance and fell before he
could be hit. Lucrecio's head hit the improvised stove as a result
of which he lost consciousness.

Petitioner presented Joel Cabebe, the Assistant Registration

Officer of Gonzaga, Cagayan, and Dr. Corazon Flor, the
Municipal Health Officer of Sta. Teresita, Cagayan, to prove that
Lucrecio died of a heart attack.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Petitioner can make use of the book of Solis
on Legal Medicine as evidence on his claim on the delay in
autopsy

RULING
NO. The petitioner belatedly contends that the delay in the
autopsy of Lucrecio's body and its embalming compromised the
results thereof. To substantiate his claim, he quotes the book
entitled Legal Medicine authored by Dr. Pedro Solis.

Petitioner's reliance on this citation is misplaced. Petitioner

failed to adduce evidence that the one month delay in the
autopsy indeed modified the possible findings. He also failed to
substantiate his claim that the embalming fluid rendered the
tissue and blood of Lucrecio unfit for toxilogical analysis.

Further, it is settled that courts will only consider as evidence

that which has been formally offered. The allegation that the
results of the autopsy are unworthy of credence was based on a
book that was neither marked for identification nor formally
offered in evidence during the hearing of the case. Thus, the trial
court as well as the appellate court correctly disregarded them.
The prosecution was not even given the opportunity to object as
the book or a portion thereof was never offered in evidence.

A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base

their findings of fact and judgment only - and strictly - upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To rule otherwise
would deprive the opposing party of his chance to examine the
document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will
have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized
by the court below. Any evidence which a party desires to
submit to the courts must be offered formally because a judge
must base his findings strictly on the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial.

​Yu v. Lim Yu (G.R. No. 154115, November 29, 2005)

​Heirs of Saves v. Heirs of Saves (G.R. No. 152866, October
6, 2010)

Dycoco, et al. v. Orina, et al. (G.R. No. 184843, July 30, 2010)

REM signed on April 9, 1995

Dycoco:
§ Date of Entry in the Philippines: April 2, 1990
§ Arrived in the United States: April 9, 1990

FACTS:
1. Virgilio Dycoco is alleged to have executed a Real Estate
Mortgage with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged Property
without Judicial Proceedings in favor of respondent Adelaida
Orina, covering a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title in Dycocos name.
The REM was notarized on even date by Notary Public Arwin
Juco Sinaguinan.
2. Adelaida claims that Dycoco was indebted to her in the
amount of P250,000.00 and to secure Such, Dycoco executed the
REM.
3. Adelaida extrajudicially foreclosed the REM and as no
redemption was made within the reglementary period, Dycocos
TCT was cancelled and, in its stead, TCT was issued in her
name for Dycoco’s failure to pay his obligation.
4. Dycocos attorneys-in-fact-brothers-in-law Cristino, Jose
and Adolfo, all surnamed Grafilo, who occupy the property
covered by the REM as caretakers/tenants, did not turn-over its
possession to Adelaida, hence, she, joined by her husband
represented by her attorney-in-fact Evelyn Sagalongos (Evelyn),
filed a complaint for ejectment against them before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
5. Upon receiving notice of the complaint, Dycoco,
represented by his attorneys-in-fact, filed a complaint for
annulment of the REM and transfer certificate of title with
damagesagainst Adelaida and her husband German Orina
represented by Evelyn before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila.
6. Dycocos attorneys-in-fact claimed that Dycocos signature
on the REM was forged, to prove which they presented various
documents that Dycoco was working in the United States of
America as a licensed physician on the alleged date of execution
of the REM. They also presented Dycocos U.S. Passport,
personal checks, Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit; and a
Certification from the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila that the
office does not possess a copy of the REM, Notary Public
Sinaguinan having not submitted her notarial report for October
1995.

RESPONDENT: Respondents Comment/Opposition to

Dycocos formal offer of evidence, the passport was objected to
as being immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent.

RTC: Dismissed Dycoco’s complaint. Plaintiffs failed to

establish that the mortgagor, defendant Adelaida Orina, knew it
was not Virgilio Dycoco who mortgaged the same.
CA: Affirmed the RTC’s dismissal. Dycocos questioned
signature appearing on the REM and the documentary evidence
presented by his attorneys-in-fact bear striking differences, since
Dycoco was not presented on the witness stand to establish the
genuineness, due execution and contents of the documentary
evidence, no probative value can be ascribed thereto.

ISSUE: WON it is necessary to present Dycoco on the witness

stand to establish the genuineness, due execution and contents of
the documentary evidence.

RULING:
No, there was necessity to present Dycoco on the witness stand.

In respondents Comment/Opposition to Dycocos formal offer of

evidence, the passport was objected to as being immaterial,
irrelevant and impertinent. Such comment is a virtual admission
of the authenticity of the entries in the passport.

But more important, one of the documents offered by Dycoco is

a Special Power of Attorney executed on June 2, 2000 in
Illinois, U.S.A. showing his signature, notarized and certified in
accordance with Public Act No. 2103, which effectively
dispenses with the requirement of presenting him on the witness
stand.

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and

authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic
if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in
accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg
daffaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
 United States, acting within the country or place to
which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him, and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep
a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case
the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or
an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary
of legation, charg daffaires, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the United States, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited. The officer
making the authentication shall certify under his
official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to
act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the
functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed
to act, and that as such he had authority under the law
to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents
in the place where the acknowledgment was taken,
and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.

IN THE CASE AT BAR: The passport was objected to as being

“immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent” and the Special Power
of Attorney was notarized and certified in accordance with
Public Act No. 2013, which effectively dispenses with the
requirement of presenting Dycoco on the witness stand.

​Star-Two, Inc. v Ko (G.R. 185454, March 23, 2011)

​Laborte v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative
(G.R. No. 183860, January 15,
​ ​ 2014)
​Republic v. Sandiganbayan ( G.R. No. 188881, April 21,
2014)

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

 ​ eople v. Valero (supra)
P
Principle in relation to weight and sufficiency: The failure of the
defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent
evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule
of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of
the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The
lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence
admissible. But admissibility of evidence whether objected to or
not has no probative value
Summary: Children died from eating sliced bread with rat
poisoning. One of the witness is a deaf-mute.

​ ebron v. Loyola (G.R. No. 168960, July 5, 2010)

H
DEBBIE
AMELIA B. HEBRON vs. FRANCO L. LOYOLA, et. Al.
G.R. No. 168960 July 5, 2010

REMEDIAL LAW: ​EVIDENCE

TOPIC: ​Rule 131 Section 1. Burden of

Proof- Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense
by the amount of evidence required by law.

PRINCIPLE: ​Courts, not being omniscient, can

only strive to determine what actually and truly transpired based
on the evidence before it and the imperfect rules that were
designed to assist in establishing the truth in disputed situations.
Despite the difficulties in ascertaining the truth, the courts must
ultimately decide. In civil cases, its decision must rest on
preponderance of admissible evidence.

FACTS:
This case originated from a suit for partition and damages
concerning the two parcels of land of the Carmona cadastre. Lot
1 was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to Januario
Loyola. Lot 2 was owned by Januario Loyola, the husband of
Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven children,
namely Conrado, Jose, Benjamin, Candida, Soledad, Cristeta
and Encarnacion, all surnamed Loyola.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion
Loyola-Bautista. All the heirs of Januario and Remigia received
their shares in the fruits of the subject properties during
Encarnacion's administration thereof. With the latter's death on
September 15, 1969, administration of the subject properties was
assumed by her daughter, Amelia Bautista-Hebron, who, after
some time, started withholding the shares of Candida and the
heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of the said properties was
formally demanded on November 4, 1990, Candida was the only
one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia. The
rest were survived and represented by their respective
descendants and children.

For petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand, respondents

filed with the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, the complaint for
partition and damages from which the instant suit stemmed.
While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded by
her co-heirs, petitioner claimed in her amended answer that
Candida and the heirs of Conrado have already relinquished
their shares in consideration of the financial support extended
them by her mother, Encarnacion. In the pre-trial order, the trial
court consequently limited the issue to be resolved to the
veracity of the aforesaid waiver or assignment of shares claimed
by petitioner.

Trial on the merits then ensued. While conceding their receipt of

financial assistance from Encarnacion, Candida and the heirs of
Conrado maintained that adequate recompense had been
effectively made when they worked without pay at the former's
rice mill and household or, in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-
Manabo, when she subsequently surrendered her earnings as a
public school teacher to her said aunt.

The trial court rendered a Decision granting the partition sought.

The CA found the petitioner entitled to participate in the
partition of the subject properties. It stated that petitioner's
inadvertent exclusion from the partition of the subject properties
arose from the trial court's use of the phrase "seven (7) sets of
plaintiffs" in the dispositive portion of the appealed Decision
instead of the more accurate "seven (7) sets of heirs."

The CA however, like the trial court, found that petitioner was
not able to prove the existence of the waiver or assignment of
their shares by Candida and the heirs of Conrado.

Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner contends that she has no affirmative allegation to
prove, hence, the burden of proof is on respondents and not on
her. And if at all, she has proven that Candida and the heirs of
Conrado have relinquished their respective shares.

She further contends that ownership of inherited properties does

not fall under Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code and thus,
the properties inherited by the children of Conrado can be
alienated by their mother, Victorina, in favor of petitioner's
mother.

Petitioner also contends that her parol evidence proved the

alleged executed agreement of waiver of shares in the two
subject inherited properties in consideration of the educational
and other financial support extended by Encarnacion to Candida
and Conrado's respective families.
Finally, petitioner posits that Candida and the heirs of Conrado
are estopped by laches from asserting their entitlement to shares
in the subject properties.

Respondents' Arguments
On the other hand, respondents argue that Candida and the heirs
of Conrado have not relinquished their shares in the litigated
properties. They insist that the alleged agreement of
relinquishment of shares cannot be proved by parol evidence.

They also contend that all the issues raised are factual in nature,
and the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and
thus, may not be the subject of review by the Supreme Court,
absent any of the recognized exceptions to the said rule.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS SHIFTED TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AMELIA B. HEBRON AND
THAT THE LATTER FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE HER
CLAIM WITH PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE

RULING: NO

Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Burden of Proof.- Burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law.

From the above provision it is clear that the defendant, not only
the plaintiff, also has a burden of proof. The plaintiffs have the
duty to establish their claims. And, it is the defendants who have
the duty to establish their defenses.
Children of the deceased, like Candida and her siblings, are
compulsory heirs who are entitled to a share in the properties of
the deceased. Art. 980 of the Civil Code states: "The children of
the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares." The heirs of Conrado
are also heirs of Remigia and Januario, being the children of a
child of Remigia and Januario; and as such are entitled to their
shares in the estate of Remigia and Januario.

Petitioner has admitted in her answer that respondents are heirs

of Remigia and Januario; and that the two subject properties
were left behind by Remigia and Januario. "An admission,
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof." Hence,
we find no error committed by the CA when it affirmed the
ruling of the trial court that the burden was on petitioner to
establish her affirmative defense of waiver or sale of the shares
of Candida and the heirs of Conrado.

The defense of petitioner is that Candida and the heirs of

Conrado have waived or sold their shares in the subject
properties. This alleged fact is denied by the respondents. Hence,
this is the fact that is at issue and this alleged fact has to be
proven by petitioner, who is the one who raised the said alleged
fact. The burden of proof of the defense of waiver or sale is on
petitioner.

Whether petitioner has been able to prove the said fact is

undoubtedly a question of fact, not of law. It involves the
weighing and calibration of the evidence presented. In the
absence of any of the exceptions that call for the Court to do so,
the Court will not disturb the factual findings of the RTC that
were affirmed by the CA in the present case.

I​ n the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased Josefa

Delgado and
​ ​Guillermo Rustia. Delgado v. Rustia (G.R. No.
155733, January 27, 2006)
​Bautista v. Sarmiento (G.R. No. L-45137, September 23,
1985)

Abarquez v. People (G.R. No. 150762, January 20, 2006)

TOPIC: WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
PRINCIPLE:
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine
the value and weight of the testimony of a witness. The
exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of
substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result
of the case. This case is an exception to the rule.
CASE: ABARQUEZ y EVANGELISTA v PEOPLE
FACTS:
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide
and attempted homicide. The said accused (ABARQUEZ)
conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO
ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA mutually helping each other,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing
him twice with abladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the
back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds.
Furthermore, the accused conspiring and confederating with one
ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA mutually helping
each other, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the
crime of homicide directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and
there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm,
but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crimeof homicide as a
consequence, by reason of causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said
JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is only slight and not fatal.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyet's house,
ALMOJUELA also known as Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain
Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise drinking
liquor in front of Almojuela's house. As the group of Paz was
passing towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions
blocked their path.

Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?"

Paz replied, "Why?"
Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried
the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez
held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela.
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation,
followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who
continued restraining him.

Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz

struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached
Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the
Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up
Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the
exit of San Jose St. to ask for help.
While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You
left your companion already wounded!"When Paz and his
companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground.
Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his
companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital.

They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the

incident. However, there was nobody in the precinct. About 9:15
p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the
WPD Homicide
Division, his station received a call from the UST Hospital
informing them of the death of Quejong.

SPO1 Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue

and
investigated the incident. They learned that Almojuela, assisted
by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn
statements by Paz and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela
and Abarquez for homicide and frustrated homicide and
prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.
VERSION OF DEFENSE
Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his
residence at 3363 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30
p.m., Almojuela's wife informed him that the group of Paz was
challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay
kagawad, proceeded to Almojuela's house.

Almojuela's house was about twenty meters away from

Abarquez's house. When he arrived at Almojuela's house,
Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by
Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuela's waist and boxing him at
the stomach. Masula was near Almojuela's head holding a piece
of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted
at the group to stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing
him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still, the group did not
heed Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz,
Quejong, and Masula scampered away.
Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the
group of Paz from smoking marijuana. Almojuela then went
inside his house while Abarquez went home.
On his way home, Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the
barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego ("Lego")
advised him to report the incident to the police. They all
proceeded to Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to
the desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person had
been stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw
policemen and media men with their barangay chairman. He
informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon the
request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police station
to shed light on the incident.
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the
crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution
failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela
in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not be
convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the
trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz,
prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed
Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision.

COUNTER CLAIM BY ABARQUEZ

Abarquez alleges that the prosecution's evidence does not satisfy
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his
conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a
misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals reached their conclusion based entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the credibility of
the witnesses against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving
more
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

RULING:
YES,
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine
the value and weight of the testimony of a witness. The
exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of
substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result
of the case.
Paz's testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with
Almojuela's criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop."
Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray,
not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to
talk to
Almojuela.

However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela,

as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling
with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez's action as
an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His
interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the
Court of Appeals.
Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him,
Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to
stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from
helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to
stop Paz from
joining the fight. Abarquez's act of trying to stop Paz does not
translate to assistance to Almojuela.
REVISED PENAL CODE
To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both
knowledge of andparticipation in the criminal act. In other
words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in
conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is
essential that both were united in their criminal design.
The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the
(principal's) criminal design did not automatically make him an
accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his
concurrence in the principal's criminal intent.
The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as
a barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to the then
wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show
concurrence in Almojuela's criminal act. When Paz ran away,
Abarquez shouted at him that he left his wounded companion.
Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejong's
injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.
We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on
an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses.

Hence:
. . . The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction.

Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the

accused of the crime charged is found lacking.
The Court ACQUITTED ABARQUEZ y EVANGELISTA in
this case.
​
DBP Pool v. Radio Mindanao Network Inc. (supra)

Remedial Law: Evidence

TOPIC: Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence under Rule 133 of

the Rules of Court.

PRINCIPLE: 1. Admissibility of evidence should not be

equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade.

FACTS: In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondents radio

station located in SSS Building, Bacolod City, was razed by fire
causing damage in the amount of P 1,044,040.00. Respondent
sought recovery under the two insurance policies but the claims
were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an excepted
risk excluded under condition no. 6 (c) and (d). The insurance
companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was
caused by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA). Consequently, the
claims were denied. Hence, respondent was constrained to file
Civil Case against petitioner and Provident.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, rendered a

decision in favor of respondent. The trial court found that: the
only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if the
fire was due to the intentional act committed by the members of
the New Peoples Army (NPA), are the testimony of witnesses
Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who were
admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their testimony
was limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted and
in the course of the investigation they were informed by
bystanders that heavily armed men entered the transmitter house,
poured gasoline in it and then lighted it. After that, they went out
shouting Mabuhay ang NPA. The persons whom they
investigated and actually saw the burning of the station were not
presented as witnesses.

Both insurance companies appealed from the trial courts

decision but the CA affirmed the decision. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner DBP which was denied
by the CA. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: A. Whether or not the declaration of the bystanders that

it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be
admitted as evidence and that such declarations are sufficient
proof.

B. Whether or not the testimonies of the by standers can be

admitted as part of res gestae.
HELD:

A. The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to

establish that the cause of the fire was the intentional burning of
the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection,
rebellion or usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned
the radio facilities shouted Mabuhay ang NPA does not furnish
logical conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that
their act was an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional
convincing proof need be submitted. Defendants failed to
discharge their responsibility to present adequate proof that the
loss was due to a risk excluded.

While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1)

the police blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod Police
Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be considered
exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records,
nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these documents
categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the
CPP/NPA.

Rather, it was stated in the police blotter that: a group of persons

accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA
more or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA, while the
certification from the Bacolod Police station stated that some 20
or more armed men believed to be members of the New Peoples
Army NPA, and the fire investigation report concluded that (I)t
is therefore believed by this Investigating Team that the cause of
the fire is intentional, and the armed men suspected to be
members of the CPP/NPA where (sic) the ones responsible. All
these documents show that indeed, the suspected executor of the
fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But
suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence
being the quantum of proof.

B. No. A witness can testify only to those facts which he

knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts
which are derived from his perception. A witness may not testify
as to what he merely learned from others either because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he
has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns
about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence
inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or solemn
affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to
cross-examination by opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-
court statement depends.

Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those

exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when
the declarant himself did not testify and provided that the
testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with
the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediate attending circumstances.

The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of

res gestae. While it may concede that these statements were
made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot
be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously
by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres
received the bystanders’ statements while they were making
their investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to
assume that when these statements were noted down, the
bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill
around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to
mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It
cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were
the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk
is not remote.

People v. Murcia (G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010)

Topic: Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: In order to justify a conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must
be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the
criminal responsibility of the accused.

FACTS:

On March 24, 2004, Jessie Murcia was having a drinking spree

with his cousin Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey and Ricky.
While drinking, Murcia and Herminio had heated argument and
Murcia went inside the house to get a bolo. When he emerged
from the house, he ran after Herminio but Herminio managed to
escape and Murcia went back to the house. A few minutes later,
Ricky saw a smoke coming from the room of Murcia and when
he went inside to check Murcia tried to stab him but was
unsuccessful. Ricky however saw Murcia stab Felicidad and
Alicia.

Herminio also testified that that after he went back to the

drinking table, he peeped through the window and saw Murcia
burning his clothes in the sala. When he went inside to save his
belongings he saw his mother Alicia covered with blood. Alicia
also testified that she saw the smoke from Murcia’s room and
before she could react Murcia is already charging at her and
stabbed her. On the part of Eulogio, when he heard of the
commotion he went down and saw the smoke and saw Felicidad
bleeding from her mouth and when he was about to help her, he
saw Murcia bringing a knife for he immediately ran away.

Murcia also testified as the lone witness of the defense. He said

that he went inside the house with Felicidad he noticed that she
was lighting a gas lamp. When he went outside he got into a
heated argument with Herminio, went inside the house to get a
bolo. He then confronted Alicia about Herminio but Alicia
cursed him so he hit her with a knife and she fell on the ground.

Jessie Murcia was accused of arson for burning the house of

Felicidad Quilates and for killing her. He also burned and
damage 9 houses in the process and inflicted wound upon Alicia.

ISSUE:

WON the circumstantial evidence against Murcia will justify his

conviction.
HELD:
Yes. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, however, there is no direct evidence to establish the

culpability of appellant. At any rate, direct evidence is not the
sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the
mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning
towards a conviction. Indeed, rules on evidence and principles in
jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may be
convicted through circumstantial evidence.

In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the

combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of
the accused.

People v. Dela Cruz (G.R. No. 187683, February 11, 2010)

People v. Notarion (G.R. 181493, August 28, 2008)

TOPIC: SECTION 4, RULE 133 - Circumstantial Evidence is
sufficient for conviction.

PRINCIPLE:
It is settled that as between bare denials and positive
testimony on affirmative matters, the latter is accorded
greater evidentiary weight. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the inference is based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Facts:

On 28 November 2001, an Information[3] was filed with the

RTC charging appellant with the special complex crime of rape
with homicide. The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 25th day of July, 2001, in the afternoon

thereof, at XXX, Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX,
Province of XXX, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
AAA against the latters will and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab said AAA with the use of a hunting knife, hitting the latter
on the different parts of her body which caused her death.

When arraigned on 7 March 2002, appellant, assisted by his

counsel de oficio, pleaded Not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Dionilo Cabague

(Cabague), BBB (AAAs husband), and Dr. George Galindez (Dr.
Galindez). Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

Cabague, neighbor of appellant, testified that on 25 July 2001,

at about 4:30 p.m., he and his wife arrived at their house in
Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX. He
noticed that the buri leaves which served as the doors lock was
untied. Thereupon, he heard a noise coming from inside the
house. He pushed the door and saw appellant and AAA.
Appellant was then putting on his shorts, while AAA was
sprawled and motionless on the floor near appellant. Appellant
approached and pointed a knife at him. Appellant warned him
not to tell anyone of what he saw or he would kill him, his wife
and his relatives. Frightened, Cabague and his wife immediately
left their house and proceeded to his brothers house where they
spent the whole night.

In the morning of the following day, he and his wife returned to

their house and learned that AAA was already dead, and that the
latters cadaver was found 10 meters away therefrom.[8]

BBB, husband of AAA, recounted that in the early morning of

25 July 2001, he went out fishing. Upon arriving home at about
4:00 p.m., he noticed that AAA was not around. He went out of
the house to look for AAA. At around 8:00 p.m. of the same day,
he met appellant who asked him where he came from. He replied
that he was looking for AAA. Appellant became nervous,
dropped his torch and hurriedly left. Later that evening, he and
some relatives and neighbors found AAAs lifeless body several
meters away from Cabagues house

Dr. Galindez, Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate,

declared that he conducted a post-mortem examination on AAAs
corpse.

Dr. Galindez stated that the confluent hematoma (wound no. 11)
around AAAs neck and shoulder indicated suffocation. He said
that AAA died of asphyxia secondary to strangulation.

He also concluded that AAA was raped as shown by the

following observations: (1) enlargement of AAAs cervical area;
(2) second-degree burns in AAAs labia majora (wound no. 15);
(3) second-degree burns in AAAs left and right thighs (wound
nos. 16 and 17); (4) multiple nail marks in AAAs buttocks
(wound no. 18); and (5) the presence of human spermatozoa in
AAAs vagina.

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant

and Maricar Notarion (Maricar). Appellant denied the foregoing
accusation and pointed to a certain Solomon Monsanto
(Monsanto) as the real perpetrator.

Appellant testified that on 25 July 2001, at about 4:30 p.m., he

was at his farm tending his carabao. Later, he saw Monsanto
standing beside the lifeless body of AAA which was lying on the
ground. Monsanto approached him, poked a gun at him, and
threatened to kill him and his family if he would report what he
saw. Subsequently, appellant was arrested and charged with
raping and killing AAA.

Maricar, daughter of appellant, narrated that on 25 July 2001, at

about 4:30 in the afternoon, she and appellant went to their farm
to fetch their carabao. Thereafter, she and appellant saw
Monsanto hack and shoot AAA. Monsanto approached appellant
and poked a gun at the latter. Monsanto warned appellant not to
tell anyone of the incident or he and his family would be killed.
She and appellant then hurriedly went home.

RTC Convincted appellant of special complex crime of rape

with homicide.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. appellate court
promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC
Decision. It held that the death penalty imposed by the RTC on
appellant should be reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 9346 with appellant not
eligible for parole under the said law. It also ruled that although
the heirs of AAA were not entitled to actual damages because
they did not present proof thereof, such as receipts for funeral
and burial expenses, they were, nonetheless, entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, since it was
reasonable to expect that the heirs of AAA incurred funeral and
burial expenses. Further, it increased the amount of moral
damages to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P25,000.00.
[20] Thus:

ISSUE:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING

WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

HELD:

Apropos the first issue, appellant maintains that his testimony

pointing to Monsanto as the one who raped and killed AAA is
more credible than the testimony of Cabague.

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses,

this Court is guided by the following well-settled principles: (1)
the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower
court, unless there is a showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that may affect the result of the case;

(2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses

are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on
the witness stand

; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and

convincing manner is a credible witness.

We have gone over the testimony of Cabague and found no

cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding Cabagues
testimony credible. Cabague testified in a clear and truthful
manner that he saw appellant and AAA inside his house on the
day and time of the incident. Appellant then was putting on his
shorts while AAA was slumped motionless on the floor near
appellant. Appellant approached him and pointed a knife at him.
Appellant warned him not to tell anyone of what he saw or he
would kill him, his wife and his relatives. Terrified, Cabague and
his wife immediately left their house and proceeded to his
brothers house where they spent the whole night.

BBB and Dr. Galindez corroborated the testimony of Cabague

on its relevant points.

Further, the above-mentioned testimonies are consistent with the

documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC
and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Cabague,
BBB and Dr. Galindez to be consistent and honest. Both courts
did not find any ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses.

In stark contrast, the testimony of appellant and Maricar

composed of denial and alibi were confusing, contradictory and
unreliable. Appellant did not mention in his testimony that he
was with Maricar when he allegedly saw Monsanto kill AAA.
Maricar, nevertheless, testified that she was with appellant when
the alleged incident transpired. Further, appellant and Maricar
testified that they saw Monsanto kill AAA. Subsequently,
however, appellant and Maricar declared that they did not see
Monsanto kill AAA.

It is settled that as between bare denials and positive

testimony on affirmative matters, the latter is accorded
greater evidentiary weight

In rape with homicide, the evidence against the accused is

usually circumstantial. The nature of the crime, in which only
the victim and the rapist-killer would have been around during
its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense
particularly difficult because the victim could no longer testify
against the perpetrator. Thus, resorting to circumstantial
evidence is almost always inevitable, and to demand direct
evidence to prove in such instance the modality of the offense
and the identity of the perpetrator would be unreasonable.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that

circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inference is
based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused.

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying

the foregoing parameters to this case, we hold that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution adequately proved the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the appellant. As correctly found by the
RTC, the following circumstances, when pieced together, lead to
the ineluctable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of
the crime charged:

1. ​The victim and the accused were inside a single

room house;

2. ​The uncontroverted fact that the victim was lying

motionless on the floor while the accused was sitting and putting
on his short pants;

3. ​There was no other person in the house;

4. ​The accused threatened to kill the witness

(Cabague) and the latters relatives if he (the witness) says
anything on what he saw;

5. ​The witness did not see any wound or blood on

the motionless body of the victim;

6. ​Death of the victim by strangulation;

7. ​The victims dead body was found about ten (10)

meters away from the house (of Cabague).[36]

In addition thereto, BBB narrated that appellant was nervous and

uneasy when he met him along the road on the night of 25 July
2001. When he told appellant that he was looking for AAA,
appellant dropped his torch and hurriedly walked away.[37]

Further, Dr. Galindez testified that AAA was raped because

human spermatozoa and several wounds were found in and near
AAAs vagina.[38]

All of the foregoing circumstances, which were duly proven,

undoubtedly constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to a
fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant raped and killed
AAA.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable

doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to
exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which
produces a conviction in an unprejudiced mind.This was
sufficiently established in the case at bar.

​People vs. Soriano (G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013)

​People v. Larrañaga (G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21,
2005) ​

TOPIC: Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a

criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, physical evidence is one of

the highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than
all witnesses put together. Being evidence that is negative in
nature and self-serving, alibi cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on
clear and positive evidence.

FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and

Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the expected time.
Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a
cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast
and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered
with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff.
The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months,
accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police
having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified
appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and
James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was
discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the
body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the
other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants
contended that the lower court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of Rusia.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving

credence to the testimony of Rusia?

HELD: NO.

In deciding a criminal case, physical evidence is one of the

highest degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all
witnesses put together. Being evidence that is negative in
nature and self-serving, alibi cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on
clear and positive evidence.

The presence of Marijoys ravished body in a deep ravine at

Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on
her wrists certainly
bolstered Rusias testimony on what actually took place from
Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to
the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness
who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish.
Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other
witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated.

Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak

and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Being
evidence that is negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot
attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence and alibi
becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated
only by relatives or close friends of the accused.

This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on

one end is appellants alibi supported by witnesses who were
either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the
other end is the positive identification of the herein
appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any
way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as
guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the
latter.
 ​ ps. Magno v. Heirs of Parulan (G.R. No. 183916, April
S
25, 2012)
​
San Mateo vs People (G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013)

Title: SAN MATEO v. PEOPLE

Topic: Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Principle: Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates the presumption that the
issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when
he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption,
however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor.

FACTS:
Petitioner Erlinda San Mateo ordered assorted yarns from ITSP
through its the Vice President for Operations, Ravin A. Sehwani.
In partial payment, thereof, she issued 11 postdated checks. But
whenever a check matured, San Mateo would call Sehwani
requesting him not to deposit the checks.

Sehwani finally deposited one check, but was it dishonored due

to insufficient funds. He informed San Mateo of the dishonor,
who asked him to defer depositing the other checks since she
was encountering financial difficulties. Sehwani deposited
another check but was dishonored due to a stop payment order.
Sehwani deposited the remaining checks which were all
dishonored because the account had been closed. Sehwani
attempted to contact San Mateo but she never responded.

Sehwani’s counsel then sent a demand letter to San Mateo’s

residence but the security guard of the townhouse complex
refused to accept the letter. Thereafter, he sent a copy of the
demand letter to San Mateo by registered mail which was
returned to his counsel’s office with the notation "N/S Party Out
12/12/05" and that San Mateo did not claim it despite three
notices to her.

San Mateo was charged with 11 counts of violation of B.P. 22,

and was found guilty of 10 counts by the MTC. On appeal, the
ruling was affirmed by the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N San Mateo was guilty of violating B.P. 22.

RULING: No.

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential

elements must be present:
1. The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.

In this case, the third element is present and had been adequately
established. The first element had also been established since
San Mateo herself admitted that she drew and issued the same as
payment for the yarns she ordered from ITSP. Besides, the issue
of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks
which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is
immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of B.P.
22.

However, the second element was not sufficiently established.

Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the
check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a
check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however,
arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written
notice of dishonor.

Here, when Sehwani's counsel's attempted to serve the notice by

leaving a copy with the security guard, there was no showing
that the letter ever reached San Mateo.

On the second occasion, Sehwani's counsel sent a demand letter

to San Mateo by registered mail. However, the prosecution must
not only prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused,
it must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact
of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of
such notice of dishonor by the accused.

Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received

the notice of dishonor, the presumption that she knew of the
insufficiency of her funds cannot arise. For this reason, the Court
cannot convict her of violation of B.P. 22.

Nevertheless, San Mateo’s acquittal does not entail the

extinguishment of her civil liability for the dishonored checks.
An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not preclude the award of civil damages.

​People v. Junaide (G.R. No. 193856, April 21, 2014)

​Gamboa v. People (G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014)

Special Rules: ​ ​

​Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

​ ​Ramos v. CA (G.R. No. 12354, December 29, 1999)

​ ​Capili v. Cardaňa (G.R. 157906, Nov. 2, 2006)
​ ​
​Rule on DNA Evidence

​Herrera v. Alba (G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005)

HERRERA V. ALBA G.R. NO. 148220, June 15,

2005

Remedial Law: Evidence

Topic: DNA Evidence

PRINCIPLE: NEGATIVE RESULT OF DNA TEST IS

CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF NON-PATERNITY. IF LESS
THAN 99.9%, IT IS CONSIDERED CORROBORATIVE
EVIDENCE. IF EQUAL/MORE THAN 99.9%, THERE IS
REFUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY.

FACTS:
13 years old, Romendo Alba, represented by mother Armi Alba,
filed for compulsory recognition, support and damages.
Respondent denied that he is the biological father and physical
contact with Armi. Rosendo filed a motion to direct the taking of
DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceeding. Herrera
opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not
gained acceptability and it violates his right against self-
incrimination.

ISSUES:
1. WON DNA test is a valid probative tool to determine filiation.
2. WON DNA paternity testing violates right to self-
incrimination.

RULING:
1. In Pp v. Vallejo, the court provided that in assessing the
probative value of DNA evidence, the court should consider the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. This
discussed the probative value, not the admissibility of DNA
evidence. (VALLEJO STANDARDS)

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from

paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the
value is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis
should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the
value is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable
presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of
paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.

2. Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or

from the respondent in a paternity case, will not violate the right
against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence
that is communicative in essence taken under duress. The right
against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be material. The gist
of the privilege is the restriction on testimonial compulsion.

​People v. Vallejo (G.R. 144656, 5-9-02)

​
Ong v. Diaz (G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007)

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor
JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and
Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.

Remedial Law: Evidence

Topic: News Rules on DNA Evidence

Principle: Death of a party does not ipso facto negate the

application of DNA testing for as long as there exists appropriate
biological samples of his DNA.

Facts:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz
(Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
(Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. As alleged by Jinky in her
Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio
got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a
Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding
solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge
Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky
and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane
Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City. From this
live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived
and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon
Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City. Rogelio brought Jinky to the
hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses
and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the
child as his. In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor
Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely
alleging that he is not the father of the child. Rogelio, despite
Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing
and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge
her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore
adverted complaint.
Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz
was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the
law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses
Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code).
The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may
have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid). It was
established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national
and that he was living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27,
1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a year. Both
evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the
country and no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the
country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne
Rodjin Diaz. While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had
a relationship with another man before she met the defendant,
there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with other
men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin
was her second child so her first child, a certain Nicole
(according to defendant) must have a different father or may be
the son of Hasegawa Kutsuo. The defendant admitted having
been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing the
expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an
evidence of admission that he is the real father of plaintiff.
Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out
with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996.
Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to
see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even
the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne. On the
strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is
the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just
that the latter should support plaintiff.
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals,
Rogelio’s counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that
Rogelio died on 21 February 2005.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of a party bars DNA Testing?

RULING:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that in case proof of filiation or
paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.
Therefore, death of a party does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exists appropriate
biological samples of his DNA.
In this case, even if Rogelio had already died, DNA Sampling
may still be had if biological samples may still be obtained. The
petitioner in this case has not shown any impossibility of
obtaining the said samples.

​
People v. Umanito (G.R. No. 172607, April 16,
2009)

Principle:
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or
higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
Facts:
The accused Rufino Umanito (Umanito) was found by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged many

incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense.
At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private
complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the
birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as BBB. In view
of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by
Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not
Umanito is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the
resolution of the appeal.

The RTC set the case for hearing on 27 November 2007 to

ascertain the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to
the standards set in Sections 4(a), (b), (c) and (e) of the
DNA Rules. Both AAA and BBB (now 17 years old)
testified during the hearing. They also manifested their
willingness to undergo DNA examination to determine
whether Umanito is the father of BBB.

The RTC issued an Order on even date directing that

biological samples be taken from AAA, BBB and Umanito
on 9 January 2008at the courtroom.

DNA samples were thus extracted from AAA and BBB

in the presence of Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the counsel
for the defense, and DCA De la Cruz. On 8 February
2008, DNA samples were extracted from Umanito at
the New Bilibid Prisons by NBI chemist Aranas, as
witnessed by Judge Fe, the prosecutor, the defense
counsel, DCA De la Cruz, and other personnel of the
Court and the New Bilibid Prisons.

The RTC ordered the NBI to submit the result of the DNA
examination within thirty (30) days after the extraction of
biological samples of Umanito, and directed its duly
authorized representatives to attend a hearing on the
admissibility of such DNA evidence scheduled for 10
March 2008.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is the father of the child.

Ruling:
At the Forensic Laboratory of the National Bureau of
Investigation, the envelopes containing the DNA
samples were opened and the specimens were
subjected to sampling, extraction, amplification and
analysis. Duplicate analysis were made. The Forensic
Chemist, Mary Ann Aranas caused the examination of
the blood samples and the buccal swabs were
separately processed by Mrs. Demelen dela Cruz.
In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic
chemists adopted the following procedure: (1)
Sampling which is the cutting of a portion from the
media (swabs and FTA paper); (2) then subjected the
cut portions for extraction to release the DNA; (3)
After the DNA was released into the solution, it was
further processed using the formarine chain reaction to
amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using the
Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16
portions of the DNA samples. The Powerplex 16
System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After
the target, DNA is multiplied, the amplified products
are analyzed using the genetic analyzer. The Powerplex
16 System has 16 markers at the same time. It is highly
reliable as it has already been validated for forensic
use. It has also another function which is to determine
the gender of the DNA being examined.
The accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits
A and B inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not
also present evidence to controvert the results of the
DNA analysis.

Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: If the

value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher,
there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of
Court).

The disputable presumption that was established as a

result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and
overcome by other evidence considering that the
accused did not object to the admission of the results of
the DNA testing (Exhibits A and B inclusive of sub-
markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
​
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court
rules that based on the result of the DNA analysis
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation,
Forensic Division, RUFINO UMANITO y MILLARES
is the biological father of [BBB].

​Lejano v. People (G.R. No. 176864, December 14,

 2010)

G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010 ANTONIO

LEJANO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

PRINCIPLE:
Due process does not require the State to preserve the
semen specimen although it might be useful to the
accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on
the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the
State presented a medical expert who testified on the
existence of the specimen and A in fact sought to have
the same subjected to DNA test. When the accused
raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have
the technology for conducting the test, and no
Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence.

FACTS:
A has been accused of rape and was convicted before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. On January 1, 1999
while on appeal, the accused reiterated his motion for
DNA testing. Court issued a Resolution granting the
request of A to submit for DNA analysis the semen
specimen taken from the victim’s cadaver, which
specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping
of the NBI. Unfortunately, the NBI informed the Court
that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same
having been turned over to the trial court. The trial
record shows, however, that the specimen was not
among the object evidence that the prosecution offered
in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted A to
file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence
has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion shall be granted.

RULING:
No. Motion should be denied. Due process does not require
the State to preserve the semen specimen although it
might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able
to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the
police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who
 testified on the existence of the specimen and A in fact
sought to have the same subjected to DNA test. When
the accused raised the DNA issue, the rule governing
DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not
yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no
Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its
admissibility as evidence. On the other hand, the idea
of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial
court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not
come up. Indeed, the accused did not bring up the
matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

​[Agustin v. CA, G.R.No. 162571, June 15, 2005]

Rules on Electronic Evidence

​ ruz v. Nuez-Apao (A.M. No. CA-05-18-P, April 12,

C
2005)
​NPC v. Codilla (G.R. No. 170491, April 3, 2007)

Facts:

MV Win, owned by private respondent Bangpai

Shipping, allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s
Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu
International Port. Thus, petitioner filed before the
RTC a complaint for damages against private
respondent for the alleged damages caused on
petitioner’s power barges. Thereafter, petitioner filed
an Amended Complaint impleading herein private
respondent Wallem, as additional defendant,
contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai
Shipping.

Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of

the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the
lower court consisting of Exhibits “A” to “V” together
with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently,
private respondents filed their respective objections to
petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.

The judge issued the assailed order denying the

admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s
Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its submarkings, I, J and its
sub-markings, K, L, M and its submarkings, N and its
 sub-markings, O, P, and its submarkings, Q and its
submarkings, R and S and its submarkings.

The lower court’s ground:

​ he records shows that the plaintiff has been

T
given every opportunity to present the originals of the
Xerox or photocopies it offered. It never produced the
originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the
admission of the photocopies by contending that the
“photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of
the document” on the basis of the Electronic Evidence.
But as rightly pointed out in defendant’s reply to the
comment of plaintiff, the Xerox copies do not
constitute the electronic evidence defined in the law.
Issue: Whether or not the photocopies offered by the
petitioner as formal evidence before the trial court are
the functional equivalent of their original based on its
inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.

Ruling: No.

​ lectronic document refers to information or

E
representation of information, data figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or
an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout,
readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic
data message or electronic document. The rules use the word "information"
to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained
therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as
proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document
from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is
processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such
as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may
be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can
a person's signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved
or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper
printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of
the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not
tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may
not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in
 the law. Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying
admission and excluding from the records petitioner's Exhibits "A", "C",
"D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L",
"M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-
markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in
rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of
electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against
incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and
the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule
has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings
occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of
writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory
as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or
incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated. 11 The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the
predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the
part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; 12 (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction
of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but
unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. 13
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as
documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance
with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find
no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies
offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
​ ​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​
​ ​
​
​ ​ ​
​ ​

​ ​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​
​ ​

​ ​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​ ​
​ ​ ​
​ ​

​ CC v. Ssangyong (G.R. No. 170633, October 17,

M
2007)
​Torres v. PAGCOR (supra)
​ ​SHS Perforated Materials, Inc. v. Diaz (G.R. No.
185814, October 13, ​ ​ ​ ​2010)
 ​ ​Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (G.R. No. 199149; January
22, 2013)

Principle:
Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where
AES is utilized as the "paper ballot, whether printed or generated
by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents
the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic
form."

Facts:

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May

10, 2010 elections as representative of the Second Legislative
District of Camarines Norte, composed of the seven (7)
Municipalities. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was
proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having garnered a total
of 51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of
3,885 votes.

Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which was docketed
as HRET Case No. 10-040, assailing the results in all the 160
clustered precincts in four (4) municipalities.

The HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of

ballots relative to the protest, which was scheduled to commence
on April 25, 2011 and everyday thereafter until completion.
Chato, however, moved for the cancellation of the decryption
and copying of ballot images arguing inter alia that there was no
legal basis therefor and that the HRET had not issued any
guidelines governing the exercise thereof.

Chato then filed an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by

Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images in the
Instant Casereiterating the lack of legal basis for the decryption
and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary
hearing had been conducted showing that the integrity of the
ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved. She cited Section
10(d) of the HRET Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots.

Issue:

Whether or not the picture images of the ballots be considered as

“official ballots”.

Ruling:
Yes.

Sec.15. Official Ballot. – x x x

xxxx
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots
shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of
private printers under proper security measures which the
Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contact the
services of private printers upon certification by the National
Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet
the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and
deputized citizen's arms of the Commission shall assign
watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official
ballots.

xxxx

Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where

AES is utilized as the "paper ballot, whether printed or generated
by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents
the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic
form."
An automated election system, or AES, is a system using
appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the
voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of
election result, and other electoral process.

There are two types of AES identified under R.A. No. 9369:
(1) paper-based election system; and
(2) direct recording electronic election system.

A paper-based election system, such as the one adopted during

the May 10, 2010 elections, is the type of AES that "use paper
ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates,
consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of
the vote count."
On the other hand, direct recording electronic election system
"uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a ballot
display provided with mechanical or electro-optical component
that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of
computer programs, record voting data and ballot images, and
transmits voting results electronically."

As earlier stated, the May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based

technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot
by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen
candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his
ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine
which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously,
meaning, in just one pass. As established during the required
demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in
encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were
found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast.

We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the
picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the
PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully captures in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section
2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the
functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters
and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest.

​ ​Maliksi v. Comelec(G.R. No. 203302, March 12,

2013)

Remedial Law: Evidence

Topic: Rules on Electronic Evidence

Principle
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that
are regarded as the functional equivalents of the original official
ballots themselves. As such, they have the same evidentiary
weight.
Facts
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of
Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there
were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes,
and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the
duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease
and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the
RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and
Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without
giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots
through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF
cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the
expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for
Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution
nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the
duly elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had
been denied his right to due process because he had not been
notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort
to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary
evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that
the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
Question
Do printouts of the ballot images have the same evidentiary
value as the official ballots?
Answer
Yes. The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents
that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots
themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, the Court held that the picture images of the
ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts are the functional equivalent of the
paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture
image—are considered "original documents" simply means that
both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when
either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as
weightier than the other.
Question
Did Comelec First Division deprive Maliksi of his right to due
process?
Answer
Yes. Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 as
amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164; Section 6, Rule 10
(Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for
Municipal Election Contests; and 2010 Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal stipulate that the printing of the picture
images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper
Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that the
integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
They further require that the decryption of the images stored in
the CF cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place
during the revision or recount proceedings. There is a good
reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and
the printing should be conducted. It is during the revision or
recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when
the parties are allowed to be represented, with their
representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising
their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover,
whenever the Revision/Recount Committee makes any
determination that the ballots have been tampered and have
become unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of
such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount
Committee or the RTC exercising original jurisdiction over the
protest that made the finding that the ballots had been tampered,
but the First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
the parties should have been given a formal notice thereof.
Thus, since Comelec First Division did not notify Maliksi, the
Commission on Elections En Banc should conduct proceedings
for the decryption of the picture images of the ballots involved
in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of
ballots by using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to
and in the presence of the parties or their representatives.
​
Rule on Examination of Child Witness

​[Rule on the Writ of Amparo

​ ​A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Sec.'s 13, 17, 18 (October 16,

2007)
​ ​Razon v. Tagitis (G.R. No. 182498, Dec. 3, 2009)
(Medyo taas ni nga digest kay taas sad kaayo ang case)

Principle:
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a
protective remedy against violations or threats of violation
against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a
remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an
individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not
determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address
the disappearance.

FACTS
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and
the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development
Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar,
Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October
31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately
checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to
buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis
was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went
out to buy food and even left his room key with the
desk.Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to
the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis
whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to
simply wait.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir

N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow
student counselor at the IDB, reported the disappearance to the
Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a
sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances
surrounding Tagitis disappearance.

More than a month later the Respondent – wife of Engr. Tagitis,

filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with the CA. The petition
was directed against some Police Officials. According to reliable
information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody
of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG,
PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with
the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah
or JI.

She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but

to no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her
husband, Engr. Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors,
their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total
violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except
the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

The CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file
their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service
of the writ. The petitioners denied any involvement in or
knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They all claimed that
they exhausted all means to investigate, search and locate Tagitis
and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that

the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance"
under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA extended
the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family and directed the
CIDG Chief and PNP Chief Razon, and the others, to exert
extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA
dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the
military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based
on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military that was
involved.

ISSUE
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is applicable
to Engr. Tagitis

RULING
YES. The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as
an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo applies. Under the UN Declaration enforced
disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such
a person outside the protection of the law."

The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers
"enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the
drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an
elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance.

Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such

does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the
legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court,
through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and
thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or
threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the
obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if
only procedurally – in a situation when the very same
investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the
threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.

The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these

situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and
investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt
from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his
or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders
and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are
not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination
of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production
of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty
and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of
criminal action against the guilty parties.

The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced

disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting
that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party
whose involvement is alleged – investigates enforced
disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that
the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold - First, there
may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
perpetrators; Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent
evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central
piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance; Third is the
element of denial.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.

The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief

as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full
and exhaustive proceedings.

​ ​Yano v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 186640, February 11,

2010)]

​[Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data ​

​ ​A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Sec.'s 1, 16 (Jan. 22, 2008)

​ ​Roxas v. Arroyo (supra)]

​[R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)

People v. Alberto (G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010)

FACTS:
PROSECUTION
1. An informant went to the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU)
of the Makati Police Station to inform PO1 Alex Inopia (PO1
Inopia) that appellant Nieva Alberto y De Nieva was selling
shabu.
2. An entrapment team was thus immediately formed
consisting of SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan, PO1 Jaime Laura,
PO1 Inopia and PO1 Randy Santos (PO1 Santos). PO1 Inopia
was designated as poseur-buyer and was provided with a
P500.00 bill marked money.
3. The appellant asked PO1 Inopia how much shabu he
needed and the latter handed over the P500.00 buy-bust money.
The appellant then gave a small plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance.
4. The sachet containing the white crystalline substance was
marked with the initials NDA and sent to the crime laboratory
for examination. The examination showed that the contents of
the plastic sachet weighed 0.25 gram and are positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

DEFENSE
1. Angeles informed her that somebody was looking for a
buyer of a cellphone for P1,500.00.
2. The appellant went to the house of Angeles in Comembo,
Makati to meet the seller, but the latter was not there. The
appellant wanted to leave but Angeles prevailed upon her to
stay, believing that the seller may still arrive.
3. When she could no longer wait and was about to leave,
several persons barged into the house and announced that they
were conducting a raid. They poked a gun at her, handcuffed her,
searched her person, and confiscated her money which was
intended as payment for the cellphone. At around seven oclock
in the evening, she was taken to the Criminal Investigation
Division.
4. The appellant claimed that during her detention, a certain
Wilmer Antonio demanded P50,000.00 from her so that she
would be not be charged with any offense. She alleged that she
could not file a complaint against the people responsible for her
apprehension since nobody could help her while she was already
detained.

RTC: The guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable

doubt.
CA: It affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving full weight and credence

on the testimony of the prosecution sole witness.

RULING:
No, the CA did not err in giving full weight and credence on the
testimony of the prosecution sole witness.

In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, the

pivotal issue usually boils down to the question of credibility of
witness. The testimonies of the police officers who apprehended
the accused in a buy-bust operation are usually accorded
credence because of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty, which presumption may be
overturned only if there is clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary or that they were inspired by improper motive.

Moreover, non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team

with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal and will not render the
arrest of an accused illegal or the items seized from her
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the appellant.

People v. Gonzaga (G.R. No. 184952, October 11,

2010)
​ ​People v. Magpayo (G.R. No. 187069, October 20,
2010)
Principle: Strict compliance with the prescribed procedures is
required because of the unique characteristic of illegal drugs,
rendering them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident
or otherwise. Hence, the rules on the measures to be observed
during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of
the drugs for examination, and at all times up to their
presentation in court.
Facts:
Police officers received information from an asset that
appellant was selling shabu. A team composed of PO3 Angulo,
PO1 Realubit and two others was immediately dispatched to
conduct a buy-bust operation. PO1 Jimmy Gaya (PO1 Gaya),
the designated poseur-buyer, approached appellant to carry out
the buy-bust. PO1 Gaya first handed the marked money to
appellant who then handed him what was presumed to be
shabu. After which, PO1 Gaya held appellant — the pre-
arranged signal — to indicate that the sale had been
consummated. The rest of the team immediately rushed to the
scene, arrested appellant and frisked him for deadly weapon.
The searched yielded four more plastic sachets containing a
white crystalline substance.
The team thereafter brought appellant to the Alabat Police
Station for investigation. There the team recovered the four
P100 bills marked money, as well as unmarked cash amounting
to P2,500.00 which Police Inspector Interino, Jr., required to be
confiscated as proceeds from appellant's sale of shabu. The
markings "ACA 01," "ACA 02," "ACA 03," "ACA 04" and
"ACA 05" were then affixed to the five plastic sachets
recovered from appellant before transmitting them to the
Quezon Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination.
The contents of the plastic sachets tested positive for shabu.
Appellant denied the charge against him claiming that he was
merely at the balcony of his house waiting for food when he
was arrested. Gloria Martinez, appellant's sister, was presented
to corroborate appellant's testimony.
RTC & CA - guilty
SC: acquit
Appellant alleged that no coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was made by the buy-bust team,
contrary to the mandate by the above-mentioned provision.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the
transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. Proof of the
corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not
only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as
well that the drugs seized and examined are the same drugs
presented in court.
In the case at bar, the buy-bust team committed lapses in the
handling of the drugs taken from accused which seriously
undermine the integrity of the seized substance.
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 provides that:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Section 86 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. 9165 states that:
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and
Other Agencies — The PDEA shall be the lead
agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP,
the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall
continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support
of the PDEA: Provided, that the said agencies shall,
as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA
prior to anti-drug operations; Provided, further,
that, in any case, said agencies shall inform the
PDEA of their anti-drug operations within twenty-
four (24) hours from the time of the actual custody of
the suspects or seizure of said drugs and substances,
as well as paraphernalia and transport equipment
used in illegal activities involving such drugs and/or
substances, and shall regularly update the PDEA on
the status of the cases involving the said anti-drug
operations; . . . . (Emphasis supplied) HIEASa
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedures is required
because of the unique characteristic of illegal drugs, rendering
them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise. Hence, the rules on the measures to be observed
during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of
the drugs for examination, and at all times up to their
presentation in court.
In the present case, the records do not show that the above-
mentioned procedural requirements were complied with. No
physical inventory and photographs of the seized items were
taken. Likewise, no prior coordination with the PDEA, prior to
and after the conduct of the buy-bust operation, was made.
While Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. 9165 excuses non-compliance with the
afore-quoted procedure, the same holds true only for as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers. Here, the
failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural
requirements cannot be excused since there was a break in the
chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It
should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is
established by showing its chain of custody.
Thus, the following are the links that must be established in the
chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly demonstrate how
the seized items were handled from the time they were taken
from appellant to the moment they were presented as evidence
in court. Although PO3 Angulo testified that PO1 Gaya, the
poseur-buyer, surrendered the same to their chief of police at
the police station and that he (PO3 Angulo) marked the same,
as well as the other plastic sachets of shabu which their search
on appellant yielded, it was not clear, however, when the
markings were made: whether it was done before or after PO1
Gaya turned over the sold shabu to their chief of police. This
detail assumes utmost importance when it is taken into account
that there were a total of five (5) plastic sachets taken from
appellant, but only one of those is the subject of this case for
illegal sale of prohibited drugs. Since the poseur-buyer was not
presented as a witness, it becomes absolutely necessary for the
prosecution to identify with utmost certainty which substance
was the subject of the sale. HIESTA
In addition, there was no clear evidence as to who handled the
seized items next after they were marked. Based on the records,
a request for examination was made by Police Inspector
Interino, Jr., to the Quezon Provincial Crime Laboratory Office
Clearly, there was a break in the chain of custody of the seized
substances. The failure of the prosecution to establish the
evidence's chain of custody is fatal to its case.
​ ​People v. Martinez (G.R. No. 191366, December 13,
2010) DEBBIE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ARNOLD MARTINEZ

ET. AL
G.R. No. 191366 December 13, 2010

REMEDIAL LAW: ​EVIDENCE

TOPIC: ​RA 9165 COMPREHENSIVE

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

PRINCIPLE: The essential requisites to establish illegal

possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused was in
possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not
authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the dangerous drug. Additionally, this being a case
[25]

for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an additional

element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug
must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2)
persons.

The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition
sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish the existence of
the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently established.
The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that
doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed
through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the
seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic
chemist, and finally to the court.

Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines

[28]

chain of custody as follows:

b. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded

authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of
 the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and used in
court as evidence, and the final disposition;

Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides

for safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of
dangerous drugs seized, to wit:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,

and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and

control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

FACTS:

On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard

Azarden was on duty at the Police Community Precinct along
Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported
that a pot session was underway in the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan,
PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry
from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located. As
the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested
while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold
Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez. Seized from the
accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue),
pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to police
station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial
Police Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were
found positive for methylamphetamine HCL.

​ n February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez,

O
Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael Gonzales guilty
beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11,
Art. II of RA 9165 and sentenced each to life imprisonment and
fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit.

​The CA supported the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused proven beyond
reasonable doubt?

RULING:

No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt because (1) evidence
against the accused are inadmissible and (2) even if the evidence
were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established .

​ he evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal

T
arrest, search and seizure. Searches and seizures without a
warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) “plain
view” search of evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4)
consented search, (5) customs search, (6) stop and frisk,
(7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of
RRCP warrantless arrest can only be done in in flagrante cases,
hot pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-
appellants were based solely on the report of a concerned
citizen, no surveillance of the place was conducted. Under Rule
113, fugitive case does not apply. In flagrante and hot pursuit
case may apply only upon probable cause, which means actual
belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable ground
of suspicion when suspicion of a person to be arrested is
probably guilty of the offense based on actual facts, that is,
supported by circumstances. In case at bar, this is not the case
since the entire arrest was based on uncorroborated statement of
a concerned citizen.

​ he chain of custody as outlined in Sec. 21, Art. II of

T
RA 9165 was not observed as no proper inventory,
photographing, was done in the presence of the accused nor
were there representatives from the media, the DOJ and any
popularly elected official present, although in warrantless
seizures, marking and photographing of evidence may be done at
the nearest police station.

​ ourt sets aside and reverses the decision of the CA

C
dated August 7, 2009, acquits the accused and orders their
immediate release.

​ ​People v. Ditona (G.R. No.189841, December 15,

2010)]
​ ​People v. Hong Yeng E (G.R. No. 181826, January 9,
2013)]

​[R.A. 1379

Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho (G.R. No. 185685,

January 31, 2011)]
TOPIC: RA 1379
PRINCIPLE:
Section 2 of R.A. 1379 states that "whenever any public officer
or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired."
CASE: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v RACHO
FACTS:
In a Joint Order of the Ombudsman found respondent Nieto A.
Racho (Racho) guilty of dishonesty and ordered him dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual
disqualification from public office. The assailed CA Decision,
however, found Racho guilty of negligence only and reduced the
penalty to suspension from
office for six months, without pay.
A concerned citizen's complaint regarding the alleged
unexplained wealth of Racho, then Chief of the Special
Investigation Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
Cebu City and to support the allegation, the complainant
attached copies of bank certifications, all issued in June of 1999,
-by Metrobank Cebu (Tabunok Branch),
-BPI Cebu (Mango Branch), and
-PCI Bank (Magallanes Branch).

In total, Racho appeared to have an aggregate bank deposit of

P5,798,801.39. Soon, the Ombudsman found that Racho did not
declare the bank deposits in his SALN, as mentioned in the
DYHP's letter. Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed a Complaint
for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code (OMB-V-C-02-0240-E) and Dishonesty
(OMB-V-A-02-0214-E) against Racho.

The Ombudsman, in its August 21, 2002 Memorandum, adopted

the Final Evaluation Report of Administrative Officer Elpidio
Montecillo as the sworn complaint.

Thereafter, Racho submitted his counter-affidavit attacking the

procedural infirmities of the complaint against him. 10 At the
scheduled clarificatory hearing, Racho invoked his right to
remain silent.
Director Virginia Palanca, through a memorandum dated May
30, 2003, decreed that Racho's act of not declaring said bank
deposits in his SALN, which were disproportionate to his and
his wife's salaries, constituted falsification and dishonesty.
She found Racho guilty of the administrative charges against
him and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold
public office.
RULING OF THE CA
In compliance with the CA's decision, the Ombudsman
reinvestigated the case. In his Comment, Racho denied sole
ownership of the bank deposits. In support of his position, he
presented the Joint Affidavit of his brothers and nephew,
particularly Vieto, Dean and Henry Racho, allegedly executed
on December 18, 2004. In the joint sworn statement.
However, On January 10, 2005, in its Reinvestigation Report,
the Office of the Ombudsman- Visayas found no reason to
deviate from its previous findings against Racho .

ISSUE:
Whether or not Racho's non-disclosure of the bank deposits in
his SALN constitutes dishonesty.
RULING:
YES,

Section 2 of R.A. 1379 states that "whenever any public officer

or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired."
By mandate of law, every public official or government
employee is required to make a complete disclosure of his
assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any
questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually
results from nondisclosure of such matters.

Hence, a public official or employee who has acquired money or

property manifestly disproportionate to his salary or his other
lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have illegally
acquired it. It should be understood that what the law seeks to
curtail
is "acquisition of unexplained wealth."

Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly

accounted, then it is "explained wealth" which the law does not
penalize. In this case, Racho not only failed to disclose his bank
accounts containing substantial deposits but he also failed to
satisfactorily explain the accumulation of his wealth or
even identify the sources of such accumulated wealth.
The documents that Racho presented, like those purportedly
showing that his brothers and nephew were financially capable
of sending or contributing large amounts of money for their
business, do not prove that they did contribute or remit money
for their supposed joint business venture.

[​ R.A. 8505.6 (Rape Victim Assistance & Protection Act) –

rape shield rule]