TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

REFERENCE:
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA
FERTILIZER CORPORATION
FACTS:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
272. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5) years counting from
9 August 1973.1 When ISA's original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was
extended for another ten (10) years by Executive Order No. 555 dated 31 August 1979.
The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National
Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such a steel mill
was considered a priority and major industrial project of the Government. Pursuant to the
expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of
the Philippines on 16 November 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of
public land (totalling about 30.25 hectares in area) located in Iligan City, and reserving
that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter Proclamation No. 2239 were
occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by
private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), Letter of Instruction
(LOI), No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to
"negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land." LOI No. 1277
also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement
within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner ISA was to
exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation
proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the
subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same
to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly, on 18
August 1983, petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against private
respondent MCFC in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, of Iligan City, praying that it (ISA)
be places in possession of the property involved upon depositing in court the amount of
P1,760,789.69 representing ten percent (10%) of the declared market values of that
property. The Philippine National Bank, as mortgagee of the plant facilities and
improvements involved in the expropriation proceedings, was also impleaded as party-
defendant.
On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA.
ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by MCFC's
fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory existence
of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be
a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this motion.
In an Order dated 9 November 1988, the trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss
and did dismiss the case. The dismissal was anchored on the provision of the Rules of
Court stating that "only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil case."3 The trial court also referred to non-compliance by petitioner ISA
with the requirements of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.4
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court's Order, contending that despite
the expiration of its term, its juridical existence continued until the winding up of its affairs
could be completed. In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic of the
Philippines, being the real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be substituted for
petitioner ISA. In this connection, ISA referred to a letter from the Office of the President
dated 28 September 1988 which especially directed the Solicitor General to continue the
expropriation case.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in
view of the expiration of ISA's term.
RULING:
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with
juridical personality but did not possess general or comprehensive juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court
to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the
Republic of the Philippines.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-
assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such
powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter of
that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as
folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed
once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent
or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority
under P.D. No. 272.From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff
in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration
of ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent
domain proceedings.
TOPIC:
REFERENCE:
ANTONIO A. MECANO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
FACTS:
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for
brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled
to the benefits under Section 6991 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of
duty. — When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to
receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct
that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay,
though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize
the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and
hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged
first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in
the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the
necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990,
to the Secretary of Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda
Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding
petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of
the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated
November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the
statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990,
to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S.
19912 dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary
Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to
repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular
Section 699 of the latter".
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo
Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the
advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires".
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of
the RAC?
RULING: NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law
is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration
in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by
its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or
not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly
depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found
in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing
provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that
substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under
the category of an implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier
one.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt
to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in
the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness
benefits under Section 699, and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is
the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration,
organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years
ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the
matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such
conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by
petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy
for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
TOPIC:
REFERENCE:
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA,
BENJAMIN KHO, BENIGNO MANGA, LULU MENDOZA vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA, HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY ARTEMIO
TUQUERO, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. Nos. 142801-802 July 10, 2001
FACTS:
On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 1273
establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the
structural organization of the Ministry of Finance.
In a desire to achieve harmony of efforts and to prevent possible conflicts among agencies
in the course of their anti-smuggling operations, President Aquino issued Memorandum
Order No. 225 on March 17, 1989, providing, among others, that the EIIB "shall be the
agency of primary responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland
waters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs."
Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 191 entitled "Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau."7 Motivated by the fact that "the designated functions of the EIIB are also being
performed by the other existing agencies of the government" and that "there is a need to
constantly monitor the overlapping of functions" among these agencies, former President
Estrada ordered the deactivation of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of
Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation.
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 1968 creating the Presidential
Anti-Smuggling Task Force "Aduana."
Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 22310 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions
specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division,
or consolidation of positions.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the petition has merit.
RULING: NO.
It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature.
The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the
executive department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to control power over
such offices, unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the
president’s power to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has
its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has
always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed
to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million.
Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure
and arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad
faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist, there is no
separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to
hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
REFERENCE:
DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI,
SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM, RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG,
GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG vs.
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and
PERLITA BAULA
G.R. No. 152845 August 5, 2003
FACTS:
President Joseph Estrada issued on 30 September 1998 Executive Order No. 29, entitled
"Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA)," a
government agency under the Department of Agriculture. The order was followed by
another issuance, on 27 October 1998, by President Estrada of Executive Order No. 36,
amending Executive Order No. 29, insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by
increasing from four hundred (400) to not exceeding seven hundred fifty (750) the
positions affected thereby. In compliance therewith, the NTA prepared and adopted a
new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) which, on 29 October 1998, was
submitted to the Office of the President.
On 11 November 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA Batac, among whom included
herein petitioners, filed a letter-appeal with the Civil Service Commission and sought its
assistance in recalling the OSSP. On 04 December 1998, the OSSP was approved by
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) subject to certain revisions. On even
date, the NTA created a placement committee to assist the appointing authority in the
selection and placement of permanent personnel in the revised OSSP. The results of the
evaluation by the committee on the individual qualifications of applicants to the positions
in the new OSSP were then disseminated and posted at the central and provincial offices
of the NTA.
On 10 June 1996, petitioners, all occupying different positions at the NTA office in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of termination of their employment with the NTA
effective thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Finding themselves without any immediate
relief from their dismissal from the service, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte,
and prayed -
"1) that a restraining order be immediately issued enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the notice of termination addressed individually to the petitioners and/or from
committing further acts of dispossession and/or ousting the petitioners from their
respective offices;
"2) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the respondents, commanding
them to maintain the status quo to protect the rights of the petitioners pending the
determination of the validity of the implementation of their dismissal from the service; and
"3) that, after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered declaring the notice of termination
of the petitioners illegal and the reorganization null and void and ordering their
reinstatement with backwages, if applicable, commanding the respondents to desist from
further terminating their services, and making the injunction permanent."1
The RTC, on 09 September 2000, ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the new
OSSP to positions similar or comparable to their respective former assignments. A motion
for reconsideration filed by the NTA was denied by the trial court in its order of 28 February
2001. Thereupon, the NTA filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true
issuance of executive order by the president.
RULING:
The president has the power to reorganize an office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency as provided under executive order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which
provides that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer
essential for the delivery of public service.
In passing, relative to petitioners’ "Motion for an En Banc Resolution of the Case," it may
be well to remind counsel, that the Court En Banc is not an appellate tribunal to which
appeals from a Division of the Court may be taken. A Division of the Court is the Supreme
Court as fully and veritably as the Court En Banc itself and a decision of its Division is as
authoritative and final as a decision of the Court En Banc. Referrals of cases from a
Division to the Court En Banc do not take place as just a matter of routine but only on
such specified grounds as the Court in its discretion may allow.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an
En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be made in due
course. No costs.
TOPIC: POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
REFERENCE:
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING
AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD
OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS,
and JUAN MIGUEL F. ZUBIRI
G.R. No. 178413 March 13, 2008
FACTS:
On 4 July 2007, petitioner Aquilino L. Pimentel III (Pimentel) filed the present Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus (with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Status Quo Ante Order).
The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. At
the time of filing of the Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11
candidates with the highest number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and
had taken their oaths of office as Senators. With other candidates conceding, the only
remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private
respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to
conduct canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the
14 May 2007 elections.
Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial
and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of
Maguindanao were respectively canvassed.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held before
the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-Maguindanao),
chaired by Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) Lintang Bedol, were marred by
irregularities, and the PCOC (Bedol PCOC) and other electoral documents submitted by
the said PBOC-Maguindanao were tainted with fraud and statistical improbabilities.
Hence, the Bedol PCOC was excluded from the national canvass then being conducted
by the NBC.
Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and
Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs from the
municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly copy 2, or the copy intended to be posted on the
wall. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was then tasked to re-canvass the MCOCs submitted by
Task Force Maguindanao. The re-canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs was
conducted by the SPBOC-Maguindanao from 25 to 26 June 2007 at Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao. Although PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of Maguindanao (MBOCs-Maguindanao) were present during the canvass
proceedings before the SPBOC-Maguindanao, the candidates’ legal counsels were not
allowed to ask them any questions. Due to the consistent denial by the SPBOC-
Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by Pimentel’s counsel to
propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao
regarding the due execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentel’s
counsel manifested her continuing objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an
unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for Senator?
RULING:
A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as follows:
SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining
to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.
Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections,
pre-proclamation controversies refer to matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appearance of election returns and certificates of canvass
Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for Senators, did not
violate Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, when
it denied Pimentel’s request to question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-
Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao, and his subsequent motion to exclude the
second Maguindanao PCOC.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings, properly refused
to allow Pimentel to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning PES
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to
prove the alleged manufactured nature of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount
to a pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, even
after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.
According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369,
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, shall determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass for President, Vice-President
and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to them by the local boards
of canvassers. For the province of Maguindanao, it is the PBOC which transmits the
PCOC to the NBC.
Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s request before the NBC to still
question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-
Maguindanao regarding the Maguindanao MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude
the second Maguindanao PCOC from the national canvass of votes for Senators after its
authenticity and due execution had been determined by the NBC in accordance with the
criteria provided by the law.
This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process problematic since he
has not established what he is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a
candidate in the senatorial elections. At the time he filed the instant Petition, he might
have been leading in the canvassing of votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still
ongoing, and no winner for the twelfth and last senatorial post had been proclaimed. May
he already claim a right to the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass
proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a
property right which he cannot be deprived of without due process? These were clearly
substantial and weighty issues which Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately, this Court
cannot argue and settle them for him.
Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, did introduce an additional exception to the prohibition against
pre-proclamation controversies in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators,
this Court has already established in the preceding discussion that Pimentel cannot
invoke the same in his Petition. The provisions in question did not materially change the
nature of canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers, which still remain
summary and administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and
determining the elected official with as little delay as possible and in time for the
commencement of the new term of office.
TOPIC: POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
REFERENCE:
ALEJANDRO V. DONATO, JR. Petitioner vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. 1
G.R. No. 165788 February 7, 2007
FACTS:
Donato, Jr. was a secondary school teacher at the San Pedro Apartado National High
School in Alcala, Pangasinan while Gil C. Arce held the position of Assessment Clerk II
at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the said municipality. On October 5, 1998, the
Management Information Office of the CSC in Diliman, Quezon City received an
anonymous letter-complaint requesting an investigation on the alleged dishonest act
committed by Donato, Jr. It was alleged that Donato, Jr., falsely representing himself as
Arce during the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in 1995, took the said
examination in behalf of the latter.
Subsequently, a trial-type hearing was conducted where the parties, particularly Donato,
Jr. and Arce, were given the opportunity to proffer documentary and testimonial evidence.
Thereafter, the CSCRO 1, through Lorenzo S. Danipog, Director IV, rendered Decision
No. 2001-1137 dated May 30, 2001 in Administrative Case No. 99-27, dismissing Donato,
Jr. and Arce from the service for dishonesty and falsification of official document.
Donato, Jr. and Arce sought reconsideration of the said decision and/or new trial but their
respective motions were denied by the CSCRO 1 for lack of merit. By way of appeal, they
elevated the case to the CSC.
After due consideration of the pleadings, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 020348
dated March 7, 2002, affirming the earlier decision of the CSCRO 1. The CSC ruled that
there was substantial evidence to hold both Donato, Jr. and Arce guilty of the charges of
dishonesty and falsification of official document. Specifically, the ID picture of Donato, Jr.
pasted on the PSP during the August 5, 1990 Career Service Sub-Professional
Examination above Arce’s name and the marked dissimilarity between Arce’s purported
signature thereon and his signature as appearing in his answer were taken by the CSC
as indicative of the fact that it was Donato, Jr. who actually took the said examination in
behalf of Arce.
Donato, Jr. and Arce forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review
assailing the aforesaid resolutions of the CSC. The CA, however, in the assailed Decision
dated October 11, 2004, affirmed CSC Resolution Nos. 020348 and 021423.
The CA did not give credence to their insistence that the letter-complaint should have
been dismissed outright for non-compliance with Section 8,10 Rule II of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In particular, it was Donato, Jr. and Arce’s
contention that the CSC should have dismissed outright the anonymous letter-complaint.
Addressing this argument, the CA, echoing the reasoning of the CSC, pointed out that
the basis for the formal investigation against them was not the anonymous complaint but
the finding of a prima facie case against them after a fact-finding investigation.
The CA, likewise, considered as puerile Donato, Jr. and Arce’s claim that the
documentary evidence against them had no probative value as the public officials who
were in custody of these documents were not presented.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there was irregularity in the proceeding undertaken by respondent.
RULING:
As a general rule, factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, that are
affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon and generally not reviewable by this Court.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given
opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Such
minimum requirements have been satisfied in this case for, in fact, hearings were
conducted by the CSCRO 1 and the petitioner and Arce actively participated therein and
even submitted their respective evidence.
Moreover, they were able to seek reconsideration of the decision of the CSCRO 1 and,
subsequently, to elevate the case for review to the CSC and the CA. The CSCRO 1 in
this case, being an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers, is not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases, subject only to
limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As earlier opined, these basic
requirements of due process have been complied with by the CSC, including the CSCRO
1.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error when it affirmed the resolutions of the CSC
finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty and falsification of official document. The
petitioner has miserably failed to present any cogent reason for the Court to deviate from
the salutary rule that factual findings of administrative agencies, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are generally held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence in the record of the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated October 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73854 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
TOPIC: POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
REFERENCE:
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON.
MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF CALOOCAN
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
FACTS:
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on
the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a
tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the
City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and clearance from
LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint
of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and
the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters
since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have
contaminated the sample during collection or handling.7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA
issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop
and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the
Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting
held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau
Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992,
the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an
Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing
its dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump
trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
ISSUE/S:
1. ISSUE
Whether or not the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature
and effect was injunctive.
RULING: YES.
1. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human
life and ecological systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution in the Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces and cities, including
Caloocan.
While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from
special laws that provide another forum.
In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass
upon or approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and
agencies within the region and their underlying environmental/ecological repercussions.
The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the
DENR acted as intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city
government, LLDA and the residents.
2. LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
a. Explicit in the law.
§4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power “to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order” in that language, the provision granting authority to “make (…) orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution”, has the same effect.
b. Necessarily implied powers.
Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order” was not expressly conferred by law,
there is jurisprudence enough to the effect.
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such power as
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.
Otherwise, it will be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency.
In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the PAB has the
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order on prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country.
LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the projects
within the Laguna Lake region, and this includes the implementation of relevant anti-
pollution laws in the area.
TOPIC: POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
REFERENCE:
LEO ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
FACTS:
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents
attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled
"Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to
review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty,
notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was
concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the
scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on
congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution
was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging
the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment
will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various
resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are
not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on
automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this
case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law)
and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason,
the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of
Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her
counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the
case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the
Solicitor General.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment
has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD: NO.
Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal
and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts
the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the
convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court,
without further delay.