CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

Foreign policy is a global concept and there is virtually no nation-state or country without foreign

policy. As a future foreign policy maker, this unit provides you with simple and clear meanings of

the term policy, definitions of the concept of foreign policy, the fundamental components of

foreign policy as well as the relationship between national interest and foreign policy. This unit is

significant, as it serves as a good foundation for comprehending the subject of this course on

foreign policy discussion.

We live in an interdependent world where no nation is an island. Nations must interact with each

other if they must survive. The essence of the interaction is to be able to derive from other nations,

those things that they need but which they cannot produce and to also dispose of those they have

in abundance in order to derive the resources they will use in paying for their needs (Obi, 2006:2).

Also, by interactions nations are able to maintain friendly relations with others, so as to make the

world friendlier, safer and more conducive for human habitation. Due to these overriding reasons

for nations to relate with other nations, most now have in place a dynamic process of interactions

between the changing domestic demands and support and the changing external circumstances

(Frankel, 1963). This is what is referred to as foreign policy. According to Chandra (1963) foreign

policy is an important key to the rational explanation of international behaviors. It is not possible

to understand interstate relations without understanding foreign policies of states (Chandra, 1963).

Nigeria has being a player in international politics since the attainment of political independence

in 1960. The various regimes in the country have to outline what they considered the objectives of

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Nigeria’s foreign policy, though it was the Murtala/Obasanjo, regime that really articulated it in a

more comprehensive and comprehensible pattern (Obi, 2006:2). Virtually all Nigerian leaders have

claimed to pursue a foreign that is based on the national interest of the country. However, for most

Nigerians, they have not been able to agree on what the nation’s national interest is, so as to able

to objectively assess the country’s foreign policy in the light of its national interest. This confusion

about what our national interest is, has been made worse by the fact that, actions that are clearly

not in favour of Nigeria have been defended to be in the country’s national interest.

One is not unaware of the robust international engagements that interspersed practically all

Nigerian leaders’ foreign policies, including President Yar’Adua. The nation’s commitment to the

cause of international peace and security especially in Africa, involvement in non-aligned

movement, decolonization of the continent, the frontline role in the struggle against apartheid in

Southern Africa, commitment to the cause of democratization in Africa, etc. were purposeful at

their various times, and, image boosting for Nigeria. They all can conveniently be articulated

largely within the framework of Afro-centricism. However, such engagements have hardly been

embedded in, or linked to, the nation’s domestic priorities such that The Guardian (2011) would

opine that a Father Christmas attitude underpins Nigeria’s engagement with other countries

(Guardian Editorial, 2011).

Yet, assumed as rational self-interested actor, the first and foremost concern of any State’s foreign

policy, including Nigeria, should be with her security and prosperity. In the case of Nigeria, this

would imply that even her Afro-centric policies in terms of which she has proudly defined her

foreign policy over the years, ought to have been pursued from the perspective of the nation’s

security and prosperity. The failure of such policies over the years to impact domestic priorities of

Nigeria is the background to the recommendation of the National Technical Working Group

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(NTWG) on Vision 20:2020 report on Foreign Policy (2009) that Nigeria (not Africa) should

henceforth be the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Indeed, vision 20:2020 represents

contemporary attempt at focusing policies on Nigeria’s domestic priorities.

President Good luck Jonathan following his victory in the 2011 elections, before the anxious 100

days in office, directed presidential advisory council on international relations (PACIR) to

coordinate the reforming of Nigeria's foreign policy to be investment oriented. Coupled with his

interactive forum with Nigerians abroad during his foreign visits, the president asked the nation's

foreign policy experts, seasoned diplomats, professionals and intelligentsia to chart a new way for

the future without discarding the past. Nigeria's foreign policy under President Goodluck

Jonathan's administration focused on the following:

• Improved cooperation with other military forces all over the world to bring about peace globally;

• Improved bilateral and multilateral trade relationship among nations;

• Cooperation and assistance in curbing health challenges all over the world;

• Promoting the welfare of Nigerian's abroad to ensure they are treated with respect and dignity at

all circumstances.

1.2 Statement of problem

The goal of every foreign policy is to establish and maintain a cordial relationship with other

nations as well as to build a good image for a nation and meet its national or domestic interest.

This invariably means that foreign policy is important in formulating, maintaining and sustaining

a nation's good image. The Jonathan administration, like many other administrations in Nigeria

has never lacked good foreign policies. The problem of Nigeria's foreign policy that is affecting

the country's image is not in formulation, but in implementation [4]. In response to this, the

research work therefore aims at investigating the effect of Nigerian foreign policy on its global

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image among the comity of nations during President Goodluck Jonathan's administration from

2011-2015. The research will also find out the extent of implementation of the foreign policy issues

that President Jonathan focused on to implement.

This study set out to examine the foreign policy of the Goodluck Jonathan administration who had

served as president of the federal Republic of Nigeria between 2009 and 2015. In so doing, our

focus will be on looking at the dynamics of the Nigerian foreign policy as comparative analysis

will be made to describe the foreign policy of the Obasanjo/Yara’dua/Jonathan administrations.

1.3 Research questions

1. What are the objectives of Nigeria foreign policy under Goodluck Jonathan's

administration?

2. To what extent were these objectives realized?

3. What were the challenges faced by the Jonathan Administration in the realization

of Nigeria foreign policy objectives?

4. How could these challenges be addressed positively in the overall interest of

Nigeria?

1.4 Objective of the study

The aim of this study is to examine the foreign policy under Goodluck Jonathan, 2009 – 2015.

To achieve this aim, the study has the following objectives:

1. To critically examine the Nigerian foreign policy under Goodluck Jonathan's

administration.

2. To access the extent to which the foreign policy objectives of the Jonathan administration

were realized.

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 3. To examine the challenges faced by the Jonathan administration in the implementation of

the foreign policy.

4. To examine how these challenges could be addressed positively in the overall interest of

Nigeria.

1.5 Assumption of the Research

The following research assumption shall be adopted for this research:

1. That the Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Goodluck Jonathan's administration

plays no significant role in boosting Nigeria's international image.

2. That the foreign direct investment under the foreign policy of the Jonathan

administration was negligible.

3. That Nigeria was able to play a crucial role in the maintenance of peace in Africa under

the Jonathan administration.

4. That there are plenty challenges in implementing the Nigeria’s foreign policy under

Goodluck Jonathan.

1.6 Significance of the Study

A nation foreign policy is not an ego trip, hence it should be based on achievable goals that

translates to the betterment of the entire citizenry. This why the concept of national interest which

sprang from a country’s national image is a guiding light or a road map through a successful and

fruitful foreign policy. This study as we have continually emphasized is therefore going to analyse

Nigeria’s foreign policy of the Goodluck Jonathan’s administration, using national image as a

gauge in measuring the Jonathan’s regime.

This study will be useful to both scholars and practitioners (public policy makers). To the scholar,

it will add, to the existing literature on Nigeria foreign policy and would equally be an advance on

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its present standard. Somehow, the research would have added arguments and thoughts that would

elicit further interest and research. The benefits of the work to policy makers will lie in its

definition and articulation of the nations, national interest and its compelling argument that a nation

foreign policy should be based on its national interest and national image, the nation will be better

for it. This way, this study would have achieved its main objective by contributing towards making

Nigeria a better place for all.

1.7 Scope of the Study

Foreign policies have been made by different governments that have ruled the Nation Nigeria one

way or the other. The scope of this study is to narrow the foreign policies made down to President

Goodluck Jonathan's administration and the effect such policies have had on the global image of

Nigeria. This research work will therefore contain a critical assessment of President Goodluck

Jonathan administration's (2010-2015) foreign policies as well as its effect on Nigeria's image

globally.

As such this study has would be restricted to 2010 and 2015. This period becomes important

because there are so many political and economic issues within this era, one of which were the

Libyan Civil War, the Malian Crisis, the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast and other

political problems in Nigeria at this particular point in time.

1.8 Limitation of the Study

Obtaining of relevant documents that may be required in this study may be met with difficulties

owing to administrative secrecy and the NIIA attitude toward covering activities of the nation’s

foreign policy anlasis. Nevertheless, efforts will be made by the researcher to overcome these

challenges by relying on online publications, bulletin of universities programmes, non-

governmental organization and other independent sources.

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1.9 Research Methodology

Introduction

Methodology includes the process of collection of information and data for purpose of conducting

research. Methodology may include publication research, interviews, survey and other research

techniques and could both be present and historical information. Methodology is the systematic,

theoretical analysis of the methods applied to a field of study. It comprises the theoretical analysis

of the body of methods and principles associated with branch of knowledge. Typically, it

encompasses concepts such as paradigm, theoretical model, phase and quantitative or qualitative

techniques. (Lrny and Rose 2005)

Methodology does set out to provide solutions, however it offers the theoretical blue print method

to be applied to a specific case. This chapter presents the methodology adopted for the research

and the analysis of data gathered in the course of the research. It dwells on the mix of methodology

deemed appropriate for the research study including the research design, the sources of data

collections, sample and sample technique, instrument for data collection and method of data

analysis.

Research Design

It is the blue print of the study and also the framework that has been created to seek answers to

research questions. It covers where and how data is to be collected, what instrument is to be

employed, how the instrument will be employed, how the instruments will be used and the intended

means for analyzing data collected. According to Denscombe (2010), a good research does three

things; first, it provides a description of the various components of the investigation. It specifies

the general approach to the research that will be adopted, strategy and gives detail about the

methods of data collection and analysis that will be used. Second, the research design provides a

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rationale for the choice of research strategy in relation to the research question and thirdly, a

research design explains how the key components of a research project link together. The research

typology adopted for this study is secondary data collection. This method is best used to collect

large and standardized data from the field especially from documents, reports, textbooks,

pamphlets, newspapers and magazines. This study used content analysis to make systematic

discuss and description of the study from data collected in the course of this work.

Description of the Study Area

The place considered in this research are mainly agencies, ministries, ECOWAS, AU, UN,

Embassies and the host of other relevant bodies of this research. The ministry of foreign affairs is

viable tool to this research as information derived from it is most reliable and sensitive.

Sources of Data Collection

Primary Data

The primary data were sourced from research works, documents and reports from The National

Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). This method was due mainly because of the sensitivity of

the research works, and the difficulty that the research may face in going into the affected area.

Secondary Data

The secondary sources consist of a review of existing literature on the topic by visiting both

website and libraries. Such literatures consulted are textbooks, journals, government reports,

newspapers, internet sources, among others. The libraries visited in the course of this research are

Nigeria Defence Academy Library, Arewa House Library, Kaduna, General Aliyu Mohammed

Gusau Institute Library, Kaduna.

Instrument Design and Validation

Validity refers to the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to be measuring

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(Uys & Basson 1991:80). Validity can be sub-categorised as external and internal validity.

External Validity

Burns and Grove (1999:191) describe external validity as “the extent to which the results can be

generalised beyond the sample used in the study”. This usually depends on the degree to which

the sample represents the population. Low external validity in this study implies that the results

can apply only to adolescent mothers visiting well-baby clinics in the Piet Retief (Mkhondo) area

(Burns & Grove 1997:234; Neuman 1997:145). This study depends mainly on reports and

documents that explained the Jonathan how the domestic policy of Goodluck Jonathan our foreign

policy and in extension our socio-economic wellbeing as a nation and also battered our image

oversea.

Internal Validity

Internal validity is the extent to which factors or activities are mainly affecting the nigerian

domestic policy and how this translated to the Nigeria foreign policy or how it affects our image

abroad.

Study Population

Parahoo (1997:218) defines population as “the total number of units from which data can be

collected”, such as individuals, artifacts, events or organisations. Burns and Grove (2003:213)

describe population as all the elements that meet the criteria for inclusion in a study. Based on the

above definition and the research that was carried out the study cannot state study population

because the research relied on secondary source such as reports, documents, textbooks among

others.

Sample Size and Sampling Technique

Sampling which is part of the sampling frame is an essential part of all scientific procedure (Goode

9
and Hart, 1952:210). Thus, the possibility of an error in the estimation exist (Kumar, 2005: 164).

Sampling is the process of selecting a few (sample) from a bigger group (the sampling population)

to become the basis for estimation or predicting the prevalence of an unknown piece of

information, situation or outcome regarding the bigger group. (Kumar, 2005: 164).

By virtue of the definition and that this study relied only on secondary data, this research cannot

draw sample size or sampling technique.

Method of Data Collection

In view of the nature of the research, the research depended on secondary data collection. This

implies that researcher adopted the empirical method of data collection. The variables in this

research are both dependent and independent variables. While policy, foreign policy, national

image and diplomacy are considered as independent variables, the dependent variables are

economic diplomacy, diplomat, national interest, transformation agenda, presidency, etc.

This research was conceived as a necessary process aimed at a reliable and dependable solution to

the problems associated with the above variables, through planned and systematic collection,

analysis and dependent variables.

The adoption of secondary source of data collection is to give descriptive and analytical

explanation and examination of how the weakness or inability of the Jonathan foreign policy

weakened Nigerian image abroad. This was due mainly of his inability to control members of his

appetite from looting the national treasury.

Instrument of Data Collection

There are many research data collection instruments. These instruments allow or enable researcher

10
to collect data to measure the assumption of the research.

For this research, the instrument for data collection is the secondary source of data collection such

as textbooks, report, document, journals among others.

Method of Data Analysis

The quantitative method adopted for this research would be based on empirical study of related

literature and documents of issues relating to the Nigerian foreign policy under the Goodluck

Jonathan Regime.

The qualitative method of analysis is be based on descriptive presentation and content analysis

derived from documents, reports, journals, newspapers, textbooks, etc.

Ethical Consideration

In the process of the study, ethical principles were the guiding factor behind my reliance on

secondary data. The whole essence of this study is to arrive at a dependable solution or towards

problem solving. This relates to moral standards that the researcher should consider in all research

methods in all stages of the research design. The researcher considered the risk-benefit ratio and

kept risk to the minimum. This became the basic reason why the research chose not to go into the

research area and instead depended on secondary source of data collection.

1.10 Conceptual Clarification of Terms

Policy

Policy according to Presthus (1975) is a definite course or methods of action selected from among

alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usually determine present and future

decisions (Presthus, 1975 cited in Obi, 2006:17). Calvert also defined it as a continuous process

11
of decisions and implementation taking place within the organizational structure of a state (Calvert,

1975). Every policy must involve a conscious choice between or among alternatives. Polices are

usually goals oriented and targeted at solving problems or pre-empting problems.

Domestic Policy:

Beginning with the concept of policy, Akinboye & Ottoh (2005: 115) viewed policy as a course

of action or a reasoned choice emerging from the consideration of competing options. Looking at

domestic policy in this context, domestic policy can be said to be the course of action which a

state’s government not only formulates but also implements within its territory. Policy in this

respect becomes public policy. Several Political Scientists have given scholarly definitions to the

concept. According to Friedrich (1963:79), public policy is a proposed course of action of a person,

group, or government within a given environment providing obstacles and opportunities which the

policy was proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realize the objective or

a purpose. Anderson (1975: 3) also shared similar view with Friedrich, perceiving public policy to

be a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with problem or

matter of concern. In all, domestic or public policy is whatever governments choose to door not to

do (Dye, 1978: 3).

Foreign Policy:

According to Aluko (1981), nobody has really formulated a universally acceptable definition of

the concept of foreign policy and probably nobody will succeed in doing so. This notwithstanding,

quite a number of scholars in the discipline of International Relations has over the years formulated

definitions which are adjudged to represent the concept of foreign policy.

For instance, Modelski (1962: 6) explained that a State’s foreign policy is the system of activities

evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own

12
activities to the international environment. While Frankel (1963, 9), defined foreign policy as

referring to those decisions and actions, which involve, to an appreciable extent, relations between

one state and others. Unlike the above intellectuals, Northedge, (1968:15) opted for a more

simplified definition. Accordingly, he defined foreign policy as interplay between the outside and

the inside. Therefore, it can be concluded that the decisions in form of actions or reactions, dealing

with such matters requiring cooperation and or active support of others across the borders of a

given State for their attainment, fall within the ambit of foreign policy (Nwankwo, 2013: 212).

The Nexus between Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy

Domestic and foreign policy when placed side by side are set of policies interconnected and

flowing one to the other. The intensity of this interdependency is so tight that the external reality

of the dynamic world is central to the public policy domain which makes foreign policy an

extension of public policy (Jinadu, 2005:18).

National Interest:

The point of convergence between domestic and foreign policy crystallises to what is known as

national interest. According to Ojo & Sesay, (2002:87) the concept of national interest remains

one of the most controversial concepts in contemporary international relations due to various

interpretations and misconceptions by analysts and practitioners as well as politicians and decision

makers throughout the world. However, the challenge behind the conceptualization of national

interest lies whether to stick to its definition as the aggregate or totality of individual groups –

ethnic or religious interest groups within a polity or opt for an understanding of the concept to

mean what decision-makers conceive them to be (Rosenau, 1968:259). Going by the more popular

subjective misnomer statesmen think and act in terms of national interest (Morgenthau, 1951:242).

Thus when statesmen and bureaucrats are expected or are required to act in the national

13
interest…what is meant is that they are being called upon to take action on issues that would

improve the political situation, the economic and social wellbeing, the health and culture of the

people as well as their political survival. They are being urged to take action that will improve the

lots of the people, rather than pursue policies that will subject the people to domination by other

countries (Adeniran, 1983:191).

Diplomacy:

Diplomacy has been variously defined by many scholars, authors and practitioners. We now take

a look at some of these definitions in order to help us better understand the concept.

Padelford and Lincoln have defined diplomacy as the process of representation and negotiation by

which stages states customarily deal with one another in terms of peace (Padelford and Lincoln,

1966). It is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the

governments of independent states (Setow, 1972). Panikker (1957) sees diplomacy as the art of

forwarding and one’s interests in relation to other countries (Panikker, 1957), while Quincy Wright

(1955) states that diplomacy in the popular sense is the employment of tact, shrewdness and skill

in any negotiation or transaction (Wright, 1955). In the more special sense used in international

relations, in order to achieve the maximum of costs within a system of politics in which war is

possible.

Economic Diplomacy:

The concept of economic diplomacy as a foreign policy plank was introduced in Nigeria’s foreign

policy during the Ibrahim Babangida administration. The government conceptualized economic

diplomacy policy as, 'the promotion of export trade, investment and increased financial assistance

from friendly countries. Building on this, the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Ike Nwachukwu in

his June 1988 speech entitled: The Dynamics of Nigeria's Foreign Policy, provided the policy

14
direction when he stated that, “it is the responsibility of our foreign policy apparatus to advance

the course of our national economic recovery' (Pine, 2011:5-7).

Citizen Diplomacy:

Citizen diplomacy is the foreign policy thrust that has been embarked upon since the advent of

democratic governance in 1999. It was spearheaded by President Olusegun Obasanjo and has since

been in place all through the administrations of Musa Yar'Adua and Jonathan Goodluck. Basically,

citizen diplomacy contends that the citizens, that is, Nigerians are the centre piece of Nigeria's

foreign policy. Commenting on what the concept is all about, Ozoemenam Mbachu, posits that,

'the basic thrust revolve around concern for the basic needs, human rights and socio-economic

welfare of Nigerian citizens in conducting bilateral and multilateral engagements with other

countries'.

Through the instrumentality of the citizen diplomacy, it is envisaged that Nigeria will harness the

resources and potentials of her diaspora, mainstream the doctrine of reciprocity, and create an

enabling environment for her citizens to prosper and engage in broad issues of human importance

at both the national and international levels. In the event too, it will enhance Nigeria's export

portfolio and attract foreign direct investments.

1.10 Breakdown of Chapters

This work would be divided into five chapters.

Chapter one include General Introduction, Statement of Research Problems, Research Questions,

Research Objectives, Significant of the Study, Research Methodology, Scope and Limitation of

the Study, Definition of Concepts and Break Down of Chapters.

Chapter Two consists of Literature Review and Theoretical Framework.

15
Chapter Three discusses Nigeria foreign policy: a historical perspective.

Chapter Four describes Nigerian foreign policy under Jonathan administration.

Chapter Six consists of summary, conclusion and recommendation.

16
 REFERENCE

Adeniran, T., (2007) Introduction to International Relations, Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria Ltd.

Akinboye S. & Ottoh F. O., (2005) A systematic approach to international relations, Lagos
Concept Publications

Chandra, P (1982) International Politics. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

Frankel, J (1970) National Interest. London: Macmillan.

Calvert, P. (1986) The Foreign Policy of New States. Sussex; Wheatsheef Books Limited.

Obi, Emeka Anthony (2006) Fundamentals of Nigerian Foreign Policy: a Study on the Role of
National Interest in Foreign Policy Making. Onitsha; Bookpoint Ltd.

Jinadu, A., (2005) “The Philosophical Foundations and Fundamental Principles of Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy” in Ogwu, J. (ed.) New Horizons for Nigeria in World Affairs, Lagos: N.I.I.A.

Ojo, O. & Sesay, A., (2002) Concepts in International Relations, Cleanprint Publisher, Ile - Ife
Guardian Editorial (2011) Wednesday, 25 May 2011

Anderson, J. E., (1975) Public Policy-Making, New York: Praeger.

Aluko, O., (1981) Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, London: George Allen & Unwin.

Dye, T.D., (1978) Understanding Public Policy, 3rd edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Friedrich, C.J., (1963) Man and his Government, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Modelski G., (1962) A Theory of Foreign Policy, London: Pall Mall Press

Northedge, F.S., (1968) The Foreign Policies of the Powers, London: Faber & Faber

Nwankwo, O.B.C., (2013) Shifting the Paradigm in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Goodluck Jonathan
and Nigeria’s Vision 20: 2020, Social Sciences. 2 (6) 212-231

Ojo, O. & Sesay, A., (2002) Concepts in International Relations, Cleanprint Publisher Ile – Ife.

Rosenau, J., (1969) “National Interest”. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New
York: Macmillan, Free Press Vol. II.

Morgenthau, H. J., (1951) In Defence of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American
Foreign Policy, New York: Knopf

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Panikkar, K.M (1952) “The Principles and Practice of Diplomacy”. Lectures at the Delhi School
of Economics. Cited in Palmer, ND & Perkins, H.C. (1964) International Relations. The World
Community in Transition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Padelford/Lincoln and Oglivey (1986) The Dynamics of International Politics. New York:
Macmillan.

Wright, Quincy (1955) “The Study of International Relations” cited in Chandra, P (1982)
International Politics. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.

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 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

A review of Nigeria’s foreign policy positions over the years does point up a number of

philosophical-conceptual building blocks which are strongly related to the state of the international

environment. Within the context of decolonization, “self-determination and self-government”

were core philosophical principles that informed the country’s foreign policy. As the country

matured as an independent and sovereign nation, other philosophical principles that became part

of Nigeria’s foreign policy fundamentals are enlightened national interest, African solidarity,

interdependence, internationalism, asymmetric world order and supranational authority (Ogwu,

2005:7).

To be sure, it is generally asserted that there has been continuity in the substantive content or focus,

meaning the principal objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy, since independence (Akinyemi, 1989;

Akindele, 1990; Isah, 1991; Akinboye, 1993; Gambari, 1986; Saliu, 1999; Obiozor, 2007; Ayam,

2010; Akinboye, 2013). It is further stated that whatever difference there is or has been, is, by and

large, a matter of style, emphasis, personality, institutional reform, and historical circumstances

within and outside Nigeria. Solomon Akinboye boldly reaffirms the above submission, thus:

It is very clear that there is continuity across regimes in spite of changes in the
pursuit of national interest. There is constancy in Nigeria’s foreign policy
objectives and foreign relations from the civilian regime of Prime Minister
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to President Goodluck Jonathan (Akinboye, 2013:13).

2.2 The Concept of Nigeria Foreign Policy

The pursuit of Nigerian foreign policy began in earnest after the attainment of independence in

October 1, 1960. In the foreign policy statements made in August and December 1960 respectively,

19
the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Tafawa Balewa, outlined some objectives of the country’s

foreign policy. These objectives or goals of the Nigerian foreign policy have consistently been

maintained despite numerous changes in government. At independence, the country’s foreign

policy sought to achieve the following objectives: promotion of the economic well-being of

Nigerians and Africans; promotion of Nigeria’s territorial integrity; eradication of all forms of

racism and colonialism from African continent; protection of the rights of black men all over the

world; and promotion of international peace and security (Ogwu, 1986:8; Olusanya and Akindele,

1986:3-5).

However, the philosophical foundation of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the first republic was not

unconnected to the country’s colonial experience, the nature and structure of the world system,

and the vocabulary of politics. It is the combination of these interrelated factors that provides the

sources of the philosophical foundations of the country’s foreign policy, at a time when the anti-

colonial struggle and the crisis of collective racial identity of colonized peoples were critical issues

in world politics (Jinadu, 2005).

Despite these lofty aspirations, Nigeria’s foreign policy in the First Republic has often been

generally described as timid, docile, ambivalent, dissonant, indecisive and inert (Akinboye,

2013:5). The colonial legacy which restricted the policy options of the immediate post-

independence leaders, the relative poverty of the country at the time, the lack of experience in

international affairs, the conservative outlook of the prime minister Tafawa Balewa and other

members of his cabinet, and serious domestic divisions which led the regions to open different

consulates abroad are some of the reasons that have been advanced for the low-profile foreign

policy (Idang, 1973; Aluko, 1981; Osaghae, 2002).

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The brief interregnum that ushered in the administration of General Aguiyi Ironsi, following the

Nigerian military coup of January 15, 1966, led by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, saw his government

pursue essentially the same objectives that characterized Nigeria’s foreign policy from

independence (Ademoyega, 1981). This was based on General Ironsi’s world view and perception

of the hierarchy of Nigeria’s interests, in relation to the concepts of solidarity and national interest

as the philosophical building blocks of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In all, it can be argued that the

timid and moderate foreign policy that had become the hallmark of Balewa’s regime equally

persisted under Ironsi’s regime. Consequently, three main factors led to Nigeria’s shift away from

a ‘moderate’ and timid foreign policy during the 1960s to a relatively more activist and influential

role during the 1970s.

First, the post-civil war military governments of Generals Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed

and Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded in dramatically and effectively redressing the balance of power

in favour of the central government in relation to Nigeria’s regions and states; second, the Nigerian

civil war of 1967-70 marked a watershed in the country’s foreign policy; third, and perhaps most

importantly, the increasing wealth from oil revenues and membership of the Organization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries provided Nigeria with the resources to pursue an activist foreign

policy ((Aluko, 1971; Nwolise, 1989; Akinterinwa, 1999; Gambari, 2008:64). Much has been

written in the scholarly circles about the 1970s being the “golden era” of Nigeria’s foreign policy

(Garba, 1987; Fawole, 2003; Saliu, 2006a).

However, the contradictions in Nigeria’s foreign policy remained evident in the 1970s despite the

zest and tempo that characterized it. In retrospect, Garba (1987) had argued that the Angolan policy

of General Mohammed’s administration which made Nigeria to collide with the USA was a barren

adventure. He attributed this to the attitude of Popular Movement for the Peoples’ Liberation of

21
Angola (MPLA) leaders who only saw Nigeria in the light of ‘Naira-spraying diplomacy’, and

never showed any commitment on their part to reciprocate Nigeria’s role in the independence of

their country. Garba (1987:26-27), puts it succinctly;

...at the first appearance of the MPLA Government at the OAU summit in
Mauritius in July 1976, Nigeria’s name was conspicuously absent from the list
of countries to which they publicly paid tribute for assistance in achieving their
independence (Garba, 1987:26).
Again, Garba (1987:27) regretted:

The Prime Minister (Lopo do Nasimento of the MPLA) was very soft-spoken,
but he was profuse in his expression of gratitude, and our subsequent
conversation was full of the promise of intimate cooperation between our
countries, a promise which....they never fulfilled (Garba, 1987:27).
Saliu (2006a:211) however, argued that Nigeria’s African policy has always lacked the standard

requirement which is reciprocity, which appears to be a recurring phenomenon in her diplomatic

practice. According to him, the dictates of the global system frown at giving without anything in

return. He stressed that assistance is rendered without any visible reference to either the short or

long term interests of Nigeria. Thus, the recipient nations do not know how to behave to meet the

country’s expectations afterwards. This, he concluded is interpreted to mean a show of ingratitude

to Nigeria.

The next phase in the development of Nigeria’s foreign policy started in 1979, with the return to

civilian rule under the Presidency of Shehu Shagari. Shagari came to power after an election that

had seen no significant debate on foreign policy issues (Chidozie, 2013:183). The presidential

candidates were well aware that the overwhelming majority of Nigeria’s electorates generally had

little interest in foreign policy. The outcome was a lack of well articulated foreign policy for the

country right from the out-set of the Second Republic. In essence, in the sphere of foreign policy,

the main challenge remained how to revive and sustain the momentum of the Murtala/Obasanjo

22
era, which continued to enjoy the support of the informed public (Ogwu, 1986:56; Otubanjo,

1989).

There was a paradox that characterized Nigeria’s foreign policy at this phase. It concerned the fact

that the Nigeria’s oil wealth and the technology that produced it came from the West, and her

national power was anchored in Africa, while seeking at the same time to borrow models of social

and national emancipation from the East. Gambari puts it very clearly;

How could Nigeria’s civilian regime be economically dependent on the West on

the one hand, while looking (vaguely, and without deep conviction or sustained
effort) to the Eastern bloc for models of social and national liberation on the
other, and yet continue to walk in the ideological non-alignment middle?
(Gambari, 2008:67).
Again, Nigeria’s leadership in African affairs was seriously eroded as the country vacillated on

issues such as Western Sahara, Chad and Namibia. As a result of these Afro-centric policy

inconsistencies, coupled with crippling domestic challenges, Nigeria’s neighbours had scant

respect for the country, and some of them such as Cameroun and Chad, even crossed into Nigerian

territory and attacked and killed its civilians and soldiers with impunity. Indeed, smaller

neighbours disrespected Nigeria, using its borders for illegal smuggling and bunkering along with

Nigerian partners, violated its territorial integrity and disregarded any threat or warning from the

Nigerian authorities (Osaghae, 2002; Fawole, 2008; Osuntokun, 2008; Folarin, 2010; Akinboye,

2013).

General Buhari which came to power in 1983 strove to give clearer form to the country’s foreign

policy orientation. Africa was to constitute the area of primary concern to the country. It was also

emphasized that Nigeria’s national security and economic wellbeing would constitute the axis

around which revolved its foreign policy, with a promise to put on a more constructive footing in

relation with Nigeria’s immediate neighbours. The Buhari administration believed that the old
23
conception of Africa being the policy center-piece would be properly defined (Gambari, 1986: 74,

cited in Folarin, 2010).

However, the articulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy under Buhari’s regime to accommodate

‘good neighbourliness’ became an issue of serious concern in literatures. In essence, under

Buhari’s regime, relations with member-states of the sub-regional body, Economic Community of

West African States (ECOWAS) reached an all time low. Not only were the nation’s borders

permanently closed against its neighbours, thus badly hurting their economies, the regime did not

heed all the appeals for them to be re-opened (Akinrinade, 1992; Fawole, 2002:21; Adeniji,

2003&2004; Akinboye, 2013:33). The position of the Buhari regime’s foreign policy towards its

neighbours has been justified in literature as premised on the basic rationale behind the coup itself,

which was to arrest the country’s rapidly deteriorating economic situation, eliminate corruption

and improve the well being of the generality of Nigerians (Osaghae, 2002; Folarin, 2010).

The General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida regime was the sixth military rulership in Nigeria. He

shot himself to power after sacking the regime of his former boss, General Muhammadu Buhari

on August 27, 1985, and thereafter declared himself “Military President”, thus becoming the first

Military President in Africa and probably the world (Folarin, 2010:253). Babangida had

demonstrated his dissatisfaction and disaffection with his predecessor’s policies, especially in the

external context which he felt was not in tune with the expectations of the international community.

Thus, in the area of foreign policy he registered unmistaken doubt and what he considered as

inconsistencies with the country’s founding philosophy. According to Babangida,

Nigeria’s foreign policy was characterized by inconsistency and incoherence. It

lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood in matters of international
concern to enable other countries relate to us with seriousness. Our external

24
 relations have been conducted by a policy of retaliatory reactions (cited in Saliu,
2006a:297).
Therefore, the regime of Babangida set out early to repair the damages done to Nigeria’s foreign

policy by the Buhari administration. Both the IMF loan stalemate and the frosty relations with the

West were quickly resolved. Nigeria soon resumed its diplomatic relations with Britain. In the

same spirit, the closure of Nigeria’s borders with her neighbours together with the vexing issue of

illegal aliens, which had converged to worsen relations between Nigeria and her neighbours were

astutely reversed to the admiration of West African countries (Saliu, 2006a), culminating in the

provision of economic assistance to these countries, which won him the Chairmanship of

ECOWAS for three consecutive terms (Adeniji, 2005:6).

In essence, this era, not only marked a high point of the country’s rising international profile, it

also conferred commensurate prestige to Nigeria in her foreign policy. Saliu (2006) attributed the

success of Babangida’s foreign policy initiatives to the crop of intellectuals whom he assembled

as members of his ‘kitchen cabinet’. Among them were personalities such as Elaigwu, Obiozor,

Ofoegbu, Akinyemi, Chime, Olagunju, Oyovbaire, Ogunsanwo, Oshuntokun, among others.

Despite the remarkable contributions to Nigeria’s foreign policy by these intellectual giants,

Osaghae (2002) argued that the foreign policy arena under Babangida nonetheless, suffered great

confusion and incoherence resulting in the arbitrary change in the ministers of external affairs.

This confusion was greatly reflected in the regime’s bid to elevate religion as a conscious guide to

Nigeria’s foreign policy. This was demonstrated by the circumstances that surrounded Nigeria’s

membership of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1987. The regime decided to

change Nigeria’s status from that of an observer status to a full-fledged member without due

consideration of both domestic and international concerns. The direct result of this was a serious

25
and lasting dent on the regime’s credibility. For instance, Fawole (2012:156) argued that the

decision by Babangida to make Nigeria a full member of a largely Islamic grouping of states

generated considerable opposition at home and remains one of the most highly contentious and

unresolved issues in the country till date. It was all the more so, with the unending transition

programme of the administration that permanently eroded the gains made at the external context

(Olukoshi and Agbu, 1995; Akinboye, 2013:34).

This deliberate subversion of its own transition programme by the government became evident

when the June 12 1993 presidential election was annulled. The emergence of Abacha

administration in Nigeria on 17 November 1993 could be traceable to the annulment of June 12

1993 election, adjudged to be the ‘freest and fairest’, by the Babangida regime. The political

instability that arose from the incident made the military believe Nigeria needed a more ‘radical’

approach to reverse the dangerous political trend in the country (Saliu, 2006a).

Indeed, radical and combative approach to foreign policy became almost synonymous with the

Abacha regime, prompting Fawole (2002) to describe it as the most combative and defensive

foreign policy in Nigeria’s history. For Abacha, his recognition meant ‘an eye for an eye’ approach

to international relations (The Guardian, 1998), which prompted him to employ an “area boy”

diplomatic style to survive the hostile domestic and international environment into which his

regime was born. This explains the uncoordinated approach and misunderstanding of the

international environment that occasioned the regime’s approach to foreign policy.

It is important to mention that Abacha’s adamant nationalism and autonomy consciousness which,

led to the abrogation of liberalization policies and a sustained anti-Western stance on many issues,

reinforced this hostility. Accordingly, the United States and other Western powers actively

26
encouraged and supported opposition groups in the country as well as those based abroad, and on

some occasions, issued statements which amounted to gross interference in the country’s internal

affairs (Osaghae, 2002:309). This reached its height with the formation of National Democratic

Coalition (NADECO) in May, 1994, a loose coalition of old and new-breed ‘progressives’ mostly

from the South-West of the country, which consistently promoted and fuelled anti-Abacha

sentiment abroad (Zabadi, 2004).

However, some scholars have argued that Nigeria’s foreign policy under Abacha revealed that the

military administration, in its own way, conducted the country’s foreign policy to an arguably level

of delivery (Lipede & Adelusi, 1995; Onadipe, 1997; Useni, 1997; Saliu, 2006a). This was evident

in its ability to create policy confusion in the West; the latter did not know how to relate with the

Nigerian administration. Its purported deft steps at shifting significantly to Asia and having

political romance with some anti-Western countries in the world could be accepted as tangible

achievements of the regime (Saliu, 2006a). But given Nigeria’s potentials and against the

background of her past external involvement, these achievements are easily dismissible. In all,

Abacha’s administration of Nigeria’s foreign policy could be said to be circumstantial. The regime

was born when the domestic environment had been polarized, no less the external environment.

Thus, the argument that “Nigeria’s foreign policy under the regime was to respond to the pressure

from abroad and not to exert pressure abroad” becomes tenable (Olukoya, 1996:30).

Following General Abacha’s sudden death in June 1998, General Abdul salaam Abubakar, his

successor, initiated a transition programme (ten months programme) that resulted in the coming of

power of President Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 May, 1999. Indeed, the post-cold war international

environment that characterized President Obasanjo’s accession to power in May, 1999 required

new approach to Nigeria’s foreign policy. To be sure, the international security environment had

27
altered significantly for Nigeria at this period, with the emergence of multivariate level of threats

to the task of nation building. This period was marked fundamentally with the linkage of domestic

issues with international relations and the gradual erosion of the concept of absolutist sovereignty

(Ayam, 2004; Dokubo, 2010; Alao, 2011).

As a matter of fact, the ‘concentric rings’ of Nigeria’s foreign policy priorities which relegated the

global societies to the fourth level, indicating that national, sub-regional, and regional concerns

should precede the international agenda was fast losing its relevance (Magbadelo, 2007). Abiodun

Alao puts it succinctly:

This new era of foreign policy differed from the preceding period in Nigeria’s
diplomacy, in which it had always prioritized sub-regional and continental
interest. The relative stability along these fronts enabled the country to strike a
better balance between external policies and domestic interests. This was
especially important because many Nigerians believed that the country had little
to show for the generosity and sacrifices it had made in regional and continental
diplomacy. Many also felt that Nigeria should replace its past practice of
confronting major powers in the pursuit of an African-centred agenda with a new
practice that better suited Nigeria’s national interests (Alao, 2011:7).
Akinterinwa (2004) argued that, with the emergence of President Obasanjo in 1999, there was a

paradigm shift from an African-centered, to a global-focused, foreign policy. According to him,

Nigeria’s foreign policy still remained essentially Africa-focused at the political level while it was

global-centered at the economic level. The poor situation of the Nigerian economy inherited by

Obasanjo, coupled with political vulnerability at the time, demanded new tactics and strategies,

and indeed, prompted the need to focus greater attention on extra-African actors, without

necessarily implying any form of neglect of Africa. Thus, Nigeria emphasised the economic factor

to the detriment of political considerations. This dramatic shift was explicated by President

Obasanjo, that Nigeria’s foreign policy interests extend:

28
 Beyond our concern for the wellbeing of our continent. The debt burden is not
an exclusively African predicament. Many countries in Asia, the Caribbean and
South America are facing similar problems with it. It is imperative therefore that
the countries of these regions harmonize their efforts in their search for a fairer
deal from the industrialized nations of the world and this requires of us a more
global approach to world affairs than was previously the case (cited in
Akinterinwa, 2004:445).
Additionally, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, Obasanjo’s Foreign Affairs Minister (2003-2006),

expounded on this shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust from the original ‘cornerstone’ and

‘centre-piece’ trajectory that had informed it since independence. He argued that Nigeria’s foreign

policy direction had to lead to where there are development funds and technical assistance,

particularly in the light of the weakness in intra-African cooperation, crisis and conflicts in Africa,

as well as Africa’s inability to bail Nigeria out of her economic doldrums. He submitted that Africa

as cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy was geo-culturally- and proximity factor- induced, while

the global setting was issue- and economic reality- compelled (Adeniji, 2003). Again Alao puts it

this way:

A number of major trends are clearly discernible in Nigeria’s foreign policy since
1999. Perhaps the most important of these is the desire to establish and maintain
friendships with countries that have historically shaped global diplomacy, while
cultivating deep alliances with emerging powers featured in recent global
economic developments. Nigeria has also sought to align its diplomacy with
domestic developments, especially as these relate to the consolidation of its new
democracy... Consequently, the country’s diplomacy from 1999 to 2011 has
been a cautious balance of devotion to traditional obligations towards West
Africa and African concerns, and the desire to ensure that external relations,
especially with global powers, also assist in domestic concerns (Alao, 2011:6).
In fact, the logical explanation for the shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy in 1999 can be located

within the forceful and seemingly irresistible influence of globalization, which continued to

encroach on national borders and by implication redefining the scope of sovereignty. In essence,

the doctrines of capitalism and democratization had been elevated to the supreme standards of

international relations by the key players in the international system (Ayam, 2004; Okolie, 2010).

29
The relevant point in Obasanjo’s administration’s fundamental shift of Nigeria’s foreign policy

thrust in a globalizing international environment is that Nigeria and more importantly, the Nigerian

person, stood to benefit from globalization as thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Put differently,

the ‘concentric circles’ principle that had guided Nigeria’s foreign policy from 1980s was

inadequate and needed to be reconceptualized to reflect contemporary realities by making its

epicentral consideration the Nigerian person. In view of this, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji

considers that, “concentricism, as a foreign policy guide, has to be made constructive and

beneficial”, and that “the focus of a constructive and beneficial foreign policy should, first of all,

be the Nigerian people”. By implication, anything ‘Nigerian’ should really be the focus

(Akinterinwa, 2004:452). In Ambassador Adeniji’s words:

The Nigerian has not really been made the main focus of our policy. Emphasis
is placed on law but not on the man himself... the law cannot be more important
than the man who made it and defending and protecting a nation whose people
are valueless is at best also meaningless. In the same vein, Africa as cornerstone
or centre-piece of our foreign policy is also meaningless without the Nigerians.
Foreign policy successes in which the Nigerians are not direct beneficiaries are
not likely to impact on, or enjoy the support of, the people... constructive and
beneficial concentricism therefore, fills this gap in foreign policy thrust...
(Adeniji, 2004:423).
It is important to mention that the author of ‘concentricism’ (predicated mainly on geo-political

prioritization and operationalization of Nigeria’s foreign policy) as Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust

in the 1980s, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, had articulated this direction of foreign policy based on

what he perceived to be the discrepancy or asymmetry between Nigeria’s foreign policy and the

peoples’ direct needs. He averred that:

Nigeria’s foreign policy has never been directly related to the needs of the
masses of the people; rather it is formulated, articulated and implemented in
highly elitist circles. Hence, the country’s foreign policy relations have reflected
the needs and aspirations of a national super elite of business, bureaucratic,
military and traditional ruling group... (cited in Akinterinwa, 2004:451).

30
In essence, constructive and beneficial foreign policy direction of the Obasanjo administration was

intended to address and redress the perceived inadequacy inherent in concentricism: which was

the fact that “concentricism was not at all an objective but a means; it was more or less a foreign

policy tactic that had not been fully taken advantage of; and as a means to an end, concentricism

had to have focus” (Akinterinwa, 2004:453).

Consequently, Obasanjo’s foreign policy was largely shaped by the above philosophy, which

guided his diplomatic approaches to issues in regional and global politics. He nonetheless, set out

in achieving this lofty principle through a number of approaches. The most visible was his

deliberate decision to personally embark on shuttle political diplomacy, earning him the title of

the most travelled Nigerian Head of State (Zabadi, 2004; Saliu, 2006a; The Punch Editorial

2007:14; Okolie, 2010).

President Obasanjo was succeeded by the Late Umaru Musa Yaradua who was reputed to have

introduced the concept of “citizen diplomacy” as the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy

(Ogunsanwo, 2009:19). According to Agbu (2009:52) citizen diplomacy is a political concept

depicting the involvement of average citizens engaging representatives of another country or cause

either inadvertently or by design. He stressed that the concept sometimes refers to “Track Two

Diplomacy”, which connotes unofficial contacts between people of different nations, as

differentiated from official contacts between governmental representatives. He argued that the

concept was construed by Nigeria under President Yar’Adua to mean that Nigeria’s foreign policy

would henceforth be focused on the Nigerian citizens at home and in the Diaspora.

The foreign policy position of the current administration of President Goodluck Jonathan which

succeeded the late Yar’Adua is generally perceived as a continuation of the foreign policy thrust

31
of his predecessor. Many commentators and scholars agree that there is no radical departure in

terms of Nigeria’s foreign policy transactions to warrant serious reflections. However, it will

suffice to mention that the current spate and direction of Nigeria’s domestic insecurity have

intensified the debates on the country’s national image.

2.3 Origin, Nature and Dynamics in Nigeria’s Image Crisis

Nigeria’s image crisis is rooted in her history, nature of her independence, character of her

federalism and complexities of her ethnic composition (Agbodike, 1998; Ayoade, 1998; Tamuno,

1998). In short, it is rooted in the “national question” as a recurring and nagging issue in her

national discourse (Alapiki, 2005; Lalude, 2005:501; Nnadozie, 2005; Olasupo, 2005). An

understanding of Nigeria’s national question is an understanding of her image crisis. Jonah Onuoha

captures the interpenetration of the concept of national question and foreign policy enterprise most

succinctly thus:

Essentially, the national question involves not only the territorial integrity of
Nigeria, power sharing and management of Nigeria’s resources in terms of
access, control and distribution, but also the issues of minority interests,
ethnicity, citizenship, revenue allocation, the creation of states as well as
religious, linguistic, cultural and educational policies. It is about resolving the
antagonistic contradictions between the majority and minority ethnic groups,
combating tribalism, racialism and any form of ethnic chauvinism....the central
question is, to what extent does the issues of national question influence external
relations between one country and another? (Onuoha, 2005:406-407).
The point remains that a critical view of the above array of contradictions contained in the national

question discourse portray the stark reality about the origin, nature and indeed dynamic character

of Nigeria’s image crisis. Hence, it can be safely posited that the origin of Nigeria’s image crisis

is the violent electoral politics in the First Republic that culminated in the first military coup of

January 15, 1966 (Ademoyega, 1981; Akinsanya, 2005). Indeed, this was followed by a counter

32
coup on July 29, 1966 culminating in series of political drama that ultimately resulted in the civil

war of 1967 (Achebe, 2012).

The Nigeria-Biafra civil war of 1967-1970 which was prompted by the collapse of the ‘Aburi

Accord’ in Ghana and the consequent Igbo pogrom in northern Nigeria followed after. Following

the end of the civil war in 1970, the Federal Government of Nigeria initiated the 3Rs

(Reconciliation; Reconstruction and Rehabilitation) as a post-civil war image-redeeming strategy

to both pacify the aggrieved parties in the war and redeem Nigeria’s troubled international image.

But scholars have dismissed the venture as mere propaganda and thus, did not succeed in

redressing the fundamental issues that caused the war (Aluko, 1971; Nwolise, 1989; Akinterinwa,

1999; Fawole, 2003; Achebe, 2012).

However, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme became a major image-booster for

Nigeria and arguably one of the most enduring legacies of the civil war experience for the country,

irrespective of its shortcomings. The introduction of the NYSC scheme, coincided with the oil

politics of the 1970s, accentuated by the Yom-Kippur War, and attracted petroleum windfall for

Nigeria, thus ushering the country into the “golden era” of her foreign policy (Garba, 1987;

Olaitan, 1997:97). To be sure, other indices that attracted international recognition for Nigeria

during the 1970s include the radical/revolutionary military administrations of the era, Nigeria’s

diplomatic credentials on the multilateral platforms and Pan-Africanist and Afrocentrist foreign

policy architecture of Nigeria (Ajala, 1986; Saliu, 1995; Osaghae, 2002; Enuka and Odife, 2005;

Saliu, 2006a; Gambari, 2008; Akinboye, 2013).

The Second Republic began on a shaky note for Nigeria’s image as a result of the widely faulted

electoral process of 1979 that birthed the era (Nwolise, 1988:36). In the specific context of foreign

33
policy, it was evident that Shehu Shagari was bestowed with relatively radical foreign policy

credentials that both overwhelmed his introspective and taciturn milieu and dwarfed his

professional and technocratic dispositions (Shoremekun, 1988:219). In essence, in the sphere of

foreign policy, the main challenge remained how to revive and sustain the momentum of the

Murtala/Obasanjo era, which continued to enjoy the support of the informed public. As Femi

Otubanjo succinctly noted:

The ... regime of Shehu Shagari inherited a foreign policy which was very
popular with the people as well as being the object of respect in the international
system. But while adapting its principles, goals and rhetoric, the regime quickly
showed that it neither had the zeal nor the competence to keep up the pace it
inherited... The result was that Nigeria’s foreign policy remained at the level of
routine observance of existing relations and obligations...The four years of the
regime were, therefore, a period of recess for Nigeria’s foreign policy (Otubanjo,
1989:6).
The above assessment typified the foreign policy effort of Shagari. It is therefore, in order to affirm

that the Second Republic administration of Shagari erased, indeed, reversed all the gains made in

the earlier decades in Nigeria’s foreign policy enterprise; and when the grossly inexperienced and

revolutionary military administration of Idiagbon/Buhari is added to the picture, the negative

impact on the country’s international image becomes complete. The following accounted for this

assessment: the excessive corruption and ineptitude of the ruling class, poor human rights records

of the succeeding military administration, the “diplomatic baggage” involving Umaru Dikko that

strained Nigeria’s relations with Britain, highhandedness, militarization and uncompromising

posturing of the Idiagbon/Buhari military regime and crippling economic indices, which all

connived to discredit the Nigeria’s Second Republic and the succeeding military administration

(Achebe, 1983; Akinsanya, 1983; Ogwu, 1986; Graf, 1988; Akinrinade, 1992; Soyinka, 1994;

Osaghae, 2002; Fawole, 2008; Osuntokun, 2008; Folarin, 2010; Akinboye, 2013).

34
The aborted Third Republic which was supervised by the military administrations of General

Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha have been adjudged respectively in scholarly circles

as “the most hated” and “the most harassed” governments in Nigeria’s post-independence history

(Ayagi, 1997:13; Onadipe, 1997:52; Osaghae, 2002:273). In other words, the two administrations

accounted for, indeed, supervised the worst era in the image crisis in Nigeria’s external relations.

For the Babangida’s regime, a number of factors connived to sabotage his foreign policy efforts,

in relation to Nigeria’s external image.

For instance, under the Babangida regime, the poor handling of the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) debates; the failure to

address the allegations that the state supported and condoned the Advanced Fee Fraud (419) and

other related corrupt practices; the circumstances that surrounded Nigeria’s membership of the

Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1987; and the endless transitions that eventually led

to the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections, adjudged by both local and

international observers as the “freest and fairest” elections in Nigeria, all contributed immensely

to undermine Nigeria’s international image (Olukoshi & Agbu, 1995; Adeniji, 2005; Saliu, 2006;

Akinboye, 2013). From a more vintage position, Ibrahim Ayagi passed the verdict on the regime

this way:

We have had a worst administration that any country could be unlucky to have
(1985-1993)... The style of the administration was ‘Maradonic’. Within the eight
(8) years (1985-1993), Nigeria joined the rank of the 13 world poorest
countries...poverty has eaten deep into our living conditions, we are and have
been poverty-stricken (Ayagi, 1997:13).
It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion that the General Abacha administration

came into power on November 17, 1993. Abacha was fortunate to have supervised the termination

of racism in South Africa in 1994 which marked the official end of colonialism in Africa, thus

35
heralding a new international environment for the Nigerian state (Chidozie, 2013). However,

Abacha squandered the opportunities created by the new international climate through poor

understanding and assessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy, prompting Fawole (2002), as earlier

alluded, to describe the country’s foreign policy during that era as the most combative and

defensive foreign policy in Nigeria’s history. This was amply demonstrated by the decision of

Abacha to execute Ken Saro-Wiwa and his Ogoni brothers, popularly referred to as “Ogoni Nine”,

in November, 1995, at a time when the Commonwealth Auckland Summit in New Zealand was

on (Zabadi, 2004). This singular incident attracted heavy sanctions on the Nigerian state and

earned her a pariah status (Saliu, 2006a:348).

The Abacha regime also sustained its clamp-down on pro-democracy groups, especially the

National Democratic Coalition (NADECO); continued the detention and harassment of political

prisoners, prominent among whom where Chief M.K.O Abiola, the presumed winner of the

annulled June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections, Olusegun Obasanjo, former Head of State and Chris

Anyanwu, a civil right activists; assassinated many civil rights leaders, such as Chief Alfred

Rewane, Mrs Kudirat Abiola, and Bagauda Kaltho, among others; and unleashed state terrorism

on the Nigerian state (Akinyemi, 1995; Olukoya, 1996; Onadipe, 1997; Amuwo, 1998; Zabadi,

2004; Saliu, 2006). All these domestic developments attracted immense international sanctions

and isolation for the Nigerian state and earned Abacha the title of the most oppressive leader in

the history of the country (Osaghae, 2002; Soyinka, 2006).

Scholars have reached the consensus that Nigeria’s image crisis attained the peak under Abacha’s

regime and was in tatters when he left office through the historic “apple drama” on June 8, 1998.

Fawole (1999) eloquently summarizes the scholarly verdict on Abacha’s highly discredited

regime, thus:

36
 ...in the five years he reigned, General Abacha presided over the most combative
and defensive foreign policy in Nigerian history. Abacha’s brand of diplomacy
pitched the regime in conflict with the West, because of poor domestic policies
particularly the issue of human rights which condemned the regime to a state of
permanent isolation (cited in Akinboye, 2013:35).
The fourth republic arguably began with a transitional programme by the brief but exciting and

circumstantial regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar in 1998. To that effect, at its inception

on June 9, 1998, General Abubakar’s regime inherited an explosive, traumatized and volatile

socio-political situation, which made his regime basically a corrective and reconciliatory one

(Badmus & Ogunmola, 2003:381). Indeed, the apparent sincerity of General Abubakar’s transition

programme generated tremendous goodwill for the country and earned Nigeria a measure of

international respectability (Adeniji, 2005:8; Saliu, 2006a:356, Dokubo, 2010:256).

What can however, be considered as the biggest snag on the administration of General Abubakar

was the sudden death in detention, of Chief MKO Abiola, the supposed winner of the aborted June

12, Presidential Elections, who was detained under Decree Number 2 by the former military

administration of General Abacha. Chief Abiola’s death on July 6, 1998, while at a meeting with

a high profile delegation from the US led by Susan Rice was mired in controversy and attracted

wide scale violence domestically and international condemnation from notable figures like

Reverend Jesse Jackson and Walter Carrington, the former US Ambassador to Nigeria. Susan Rice

gave a graphic detail of the sad event that resulted in the death of Chief Abiola’s thus:

At the beginning of our discussion, Moshood Abiola had a coughing fit.

First of all we thought that it was an irritation of his throat before it dawned
upon us that it was a heart attack. We then decided to call a medical doctor
who came immediately. Unfortunately, it was too late (cited in Badmus &
Ogunmola, 2003:385).
With the successful completion of General Abubakar’s transition to civil rule programme,

President Olusegun Obasanjo assumed office on May 29, 1999, presumably the most experienced

37
of all Nigeria’s Head of State with impressive political pedigree and diplomatic credentials

(Fawole, 2002:26; Saliu, 2006b:359; Folarin, 2010). Consequently, upon the realization of the

damage that had been done to the international image of Nigeria and the likely disadvantaged

position this would foist on the country in taking maximum advantage of globalization, the regime

of Obasanjo set out early through shuttle diplomacy to redress the image problem of the country.

In essence, the task before the new administration was how to change the pariah status of Nigeria

and regain the lost ground in international reckoning. As President Obasanjo’s National Security

Adviser, Lt-General Aliyu Mohammed (rtd), opined, regarding the new direction of Nigeria’s

diplomacy:

The current thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy is to regain respectability and

relevance in the international community... The grand strategy seeks the
conversion of foreign policy activities into concrete achievements which are of
direct benefit to Nigeria. The main objective is “peace, security and prosperity
through friendship”. The goals to be achieved are as follows: (a) Economic
integration of ECOWAS; (b) Responsibilities in Multilateral organizations –
UN, AU, the Commonwealth, OPEC, NAM, and G-77; (c) Cooperation with the
Far East; (d) Promotion of foreign investment and trade; (e) Debt reduction
(Mohammed, 2001, cited in Zabadi, 2004:348).
Furthermore, Obasanjo succeeded in re-positioning Nigeria to take its rightful place among the

comity of civilized nations by “re-branding” her foreign policy especially through personalization

of the process and economic diplomacy. Despite Obasanjo’s lofty achievements in Nigeria’s

foreign policy circle, a number of factors connived to dent the country’s international image, and

by implication blight Obasanjo’s laudable legacy. These include, but not limited to the following:

the controversial US$30b debt negotiation and eventual “forgiveness” in 2006; the contested

agreement on Bakassi Peninsula territory (Green Tree Agreement) facilitated by the United

Nations (UN) between Nigeria and Cameroun in 2006; and the attempt to subvert the constitution

in April 2006 to extend his tenure in office (Magbadelo, 2007; Mustapha, 2007:13; Saliu,

38
2007:405; Adebajo, 2008:4; Menkene and Fonkeng, 2010; Alao, 2011:21; Akinboye,

2013:25&36).

According to a survey by Afrobarometre, Obasanjo’s approval rating dropped from 84 percent in

2000 to 32 percent by 2005, as Nigerians became increasingly disenchanted with his autocratic

leadership style (Mustapha, 2007:13). In the specific case of the “Green Tree Agreement”,

arguably considered as Obasanjo’s worst legacy in foreign policy transaction, Solomon Akinboye

brilliantly submitted that:

The overriding import of the Green Tree Agreement was to ensure that the two
parties (Nigeria and Cameroon) uphold the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
verdict. Perhaps, one may conjecture that Obasanjo acted in order to curry favour
of America and the other Western Countries to secure their support for his third
term agenda bid... Indeed, the general consensus, mostly in informed circle, is
that Bakassi crisis constituted a major sore in the country’s diplomatic pursuit
(cited in Akinboye, 2013:36).
In all appearances, President Obasanjo left a “big shoe” in the diplomatic circle for his successor,

late Musa Yar’Adua to fill in. Hence, despite the introduction of citizen diplomacy as a plank of

Nigeria’s foreign policy, alluded to earlier as one of the most practical approach to diplomacy,

cleverly combining national image and national interest as critical components of Nigeria’s foreign

policy, Yar’Adua will be remembered for his 100-Day absence from office as result of health-

related problems which created an unprecedented leadership vacuum in the history of Nigeria. This

singular incident is arguably one of the most damaging to the country’s international image in

recent time.

In fairness to President Goodluck Jonathan, it is premature to pre-empt Nigeria’s national image

in relation to the country’s foreign policy in view of the fact that the former is still in office.

However, this observation does not detract from the obvious national security challenges in the

country involving the Boko Haram Islamic insurgency, which has been rightly considered as the
39
most damaging factor to Nigeria’s international image in recent time and the litmus test on the

current administration’s ability to manage Nigeria’s national question (Danjuma, 2014; Omitola,

2014; Omotosho, 2014; Onuoha, 2014; Sampson, 2014). In short, Jacob and Akintola (2014:211)

have asserted that the terrorist activities of Boko Haram sect have greatly affected Nigeria’s

external relations on international economic relations with serious consequences for the country’s

economic development. According to Standard and Poor’s Rating Services (S&P), an international

rating agency:

Nigeria had a ‘very high risk’ in ‘economic resilience’, a ‘high risk’ in terms of
‘economic imbalances’, and a ‘very high risk’ in ‘credit risk in the economy’.
Nigeria is a country with a high political risk, low GDP per capita, and large
infrastructure needs, all factors that contribute to a volatile and risky operating
environment for banks... The industry risk score of ‘7’ for the country was based
on its opinion that the country faced ‘very high risk’ in its ‘institutional
framework’ and ‘competitive dynamics’, and ‘intermediate risk’ in ‘system wide
funding’ (Daily Sun, Monday March 05, 2012, cited in Jacob and Akintola,
2014:212).
It must be mentioned that, in addition to the Boko Haram insurgency, the 2015 General Elections

in Nigeria will ultimately determine not only the historic verdict on President Jonathan

administration’s Transformational Agenda, but more fundamentally the future of Nigeria’s foreign

policy among the comity of nations (Oche, 2013; Jega, 2014).

2.4 Gaps in the Literature

The various literature gave clear description and evaluation of the Nigerian Foreign Policy, giving

the historical process of Nigerian foreign politics they were able to explain the shortfalls of the

foreign policy of Nigeria is mainly associated with individual leader. That the foreign policy of

Nigeria is dynamic and do not depend on the ministry of foreign affairs or foreign missions.

However, this study is meant to fill the gap in the literature that deals with the Nigeria Foreign

Policy under the Goodluck Jonathan six years leadership of the country, making comparative
40
analysis of the Obasanjo-Yar’adua-Jonathan administrations assessing the Nigerian image during

their tenures.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

Realism provides the most widely accepted and least complicated answer to the working of the

international system and the politics therein. Realist theoretical tradition has been extensively

debated, fine-tuned, and even, in a sense, radically recast. The roots of political realism, as it was

referred to before the advent of the 'scientific approach' to the theoretical tradition, are often traced

back to Greek historian Thucydides (460 BC - 395 BC) and his book The History of the

Peloponnesian War, written in 431 BC. Thucydides writes that it is a universal principle that all

states pursue their own interests and address justice and morality only when it suites their interests.

Power politics, according to him, is a law of human behaviour and it is this human behavior that

guides politics among states.

The realist tradition became more prominent through the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-

1527) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in the mid-seventeenth century. In fact, the foundation of

modem realism was laid by Machiavelli. He examined issues regarding foreign policy, the nature

of international relations and the role of military force (Shultz 1993: 47). Machiavelli's The Prince

praises the ancient Roman leaders for their policy of universal domination. Machiavelli thinks that

it was the nature of the existing international system that forced the Romans to strive for universal

domination -conquest was perceived to be necessary to fend off threats to their own security and

preemptive strikes are adopted by prudent states. Even those states that do not pose a threat should

be brought under control as those states can be won over by one's enemies Machiavelli argued.

Hobbes' philosophy of human nature informs his theory of state behaviour, wherein he laid the

foundation of one of Classical Realism's most important tenets. A prominent Social Contractrian

41
Hobbes talks about the existence of a state of nature before the society was founded. The state of

nature was a state of insecurity and 'Yar’Adua. Even though the individuals agreed to end this state

of nature among themselves by forming societies, the societies thus formed continue to remain in

a state of war. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), a later social contractarian, is a milder version

of Hobbesian realism. He talks about the existence of a 'general will' which exists in the society

but it does not apply to the international society. The key difference between Hobbes and Rousseau

is that while the former talks about biological determinism of conflict the latter holds the power

dynamics in. the international system responsible for conflict, much like the neorealists.

However, Hobbesian realism underwent a great deal of moderation in the thought of Montesquieu

(1689-1755) .(The Spirit of the Laws) and John Locke (1632-1704) (Questions Concerning the

Law of Nature and Second Treatise of Government), who were the proponents of liberal realism.

The enlightenment period also saw the idealism of Kantian philosophy which emphasized

morality, universalism, law and international organizations (Shultz 1993: 47).

Later in the 20th century, the famous 14 points proposed by Woodrow Wilson further watered

down the realist logic of international politics.

Power politics, balance of power, the human urge for power, and such related concepts

were eventually clubbed together under the umbrella term 'realism'. As Barry Buzan

points out, the "focus on power politics provides the apparent continuity of the realist

tradition" (Buzan 1996: 51). This loosely used concept of realism was properly shaped

and defined by post-World War I Western scholars of International Relations. The realist

tradition was further theoretically nuanced by E. H. Carr in his book The Twenty Years'

Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations wherein he

argued for making a distinction between idealist views and realist views of international

42
politics. He wrote the book with the aim "of counteracting the glaring and dangerous

defect of nearly all thinking, both academic and popular, about international politics in

English-speaking countries from 1919 to 1939- the almost total neglect of the factor of

power" (Carr 1964: vii). The historically and conceptually scattered realist dogmas were further

systematized and given the shape of a proper theory by Hans J. Morgenthau's defining book

Politics Among Nations, published in 1948. The famous scholar-practitioners of realism during

the Cold War namely, Henry Kissinger and George Kennan, not only called themselves realists

but also promoted the cause of the theory in realpolitik. The theory became more 'scientific' with

the publication of Kenneth Waltz's seminal 1979 work, the Theory of International Politics, in

which he propounded a structural or systemic approach to international politics as opposed to one

based on human nature.

The field of international relations is today flooded with many variants of realism. To

quote Glenn Snyder: "The field of international relations now has at least two varieties of

"structural realism," probably three kinds of "offensive realism," and several types of

"defensive realism," in addition to "neoclassical," "contingent," "specific," and

"generalist" realism (2002: 149-150)" Snyder includes the writings of John J.

Mearsheimer, Eric J. Labs, Robert Gilpin and Fareed Zakaria among the offensive

realists. The others in this group, who are overlooked by Snyder, could include William

Wohlfarth and Randall Schweller. Snyder himself, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis, Sean

M. Lynn-Jones, Barry R. Posen, Stephen Van Evera, Stephen M. Walt are considered to be

defensive realists by him. Dale Copeland, Charles Glaser and Benjamin Miller could also be

included in that group. While Charles L. Glaser is a "contingent realist" by his own admission,

43
Richard Rosecrance proposes "specific" and "generalist" strands of

realism (Snyder 2002: 149-173).

Indeed, both neorealism and neoclassical realism have their defensive and offensive

variants. Within neorealism the defensive variants suggest that there are incentives in the

international system for expansion but it is not a permanent feature because such

incentives exist only under certain conditions. The major proponents of the defensive

position are: Kenneth Waltz (balance-of-power theory), Stephan Walt (balance-of-threat

theory), Dale Copeland (dynamic differentials theory), the great pow~~ cooperation

theories of Robert Jervis, Charles Glaser and Benjamin Miller. The defensive variants in

neoclassical realism are the following: Thomas Christensen (domestic mobilization

theory) and the offense-defense theories of Stephan Van Evera, Jack Snyder, Charles

Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann (Taliaferro 2000-2001: 135).

Similarly, both neorealism and neoclassical realism have their offensive variants as well.

Within neorealism, the offensive variants suggest that there are always incentives in the

international system for expansion. The offensive variants are Gilpin (hegemonic stability theory),

A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler (power transition theory), and John

Mearsheimer (theory of great power politics). The offensive variants within neoclassical

realism include: Fareed Zakaria (state-centered realism), Eric Labs, (theory of war aims), Randall

Schweller (balance of interests theory) and William Wohlforth (hegemonic theory of foreign

policy) (Taliaferro 2000-2001: 135). Before exploring the major themes running through realist

thought, it is perhaps apt to see what fuels the engine of realist theoretical thinking. Much of

contemporary realist thought, with the exception of classical realism, holds that it is the feeling of

being insecure that forces states behave the way they do. It is the existence of a security deficit, in

44
other words, that leads to security competition among states, as security is perceived by them to

be a scarce commodity that is not easy to find in the international system. Security competition

leads to a security dilemma. In 1952, John Hertz put the logic of security dilemma and the

circumstances leading to it very succinctly:

For it stems from a fundamental social constellation, one where a plurality

of otherwise interconnected groups constitute ultimate units of political life,
that is, where groups live alongside each other without being organized
into a higher unity. Wherever such anarchic society has existed--and it has
existed in most periods of known history on some level-there has arisen
what may be called the "security dilemma" of men, or groups, or their
leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and
usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected,
dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to
attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more
power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn,
renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the
worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of
competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of
security and power accumulation is on (Hertz 1952: 157).

The centrality of the state as the principle actor is an important feature of the realist

understanding. However, the state need not be taken in a literal sense here. The shape and form of

the key actor varies according to historical circumstances. In the present global system it is the

state that is the primary actor. However in other historical milieus the state could be replaced,

preserving the same analytical validity, with other actors such as city-states, tribes, principalities,

and regional political unions. These units are called 'conflict groups', "each organized as a un,itary

political actor that rationally pursues distinctive goals" (Legro & Moravcsik 1999: 7).

A common misnomer about realism that deserves mention here is that international

anarchy is equated with incessant conflict. Anarchy only means lack of an organizing and

overseeing agent in the international system, which makes it possible to have conflicts in the

international arena and that the states are aware of such a state of affairs leading them to prepare

45
for survival. In other words, realism does not predict constant conflict, but only the constant

possibility of conflict.

Relevance of the Theory to the Study

The relevance of this theory to the study is that it was able to explain the domestic importance to

foreign policy and how it played on the world stage. The theory is also of importance because it

gave a clear standing on the image making of every country is sole responsibility of the charisma

of the internal dynamics of the nation’s dealings. It also support the claim that the weakness of the

Goodluck Jonathan regime is a requisite of the troubled waters that has plagued Nigerian image

abroad.

46
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 CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Introduction

Having looked at the machinery for and the determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the

preceding chapter, we are now going to look at the foreign policies of the various Nigerian

administrations, starting from Balewa’s to Olusegun Obasanjo. Our review of the various regimes

policies would be done, bearing in mind the fact that our study is interested in seeing the role of

national interest in foreign policy. Consequently, we should be able at the end of this study to see

how far each regime tried to based its foreign policy on the national interest. We are starting on

review as said earlier from the Balewa’s regime.

3.2 The First Republic (Balewa 1960 – 1966)

Most writings on Nigeria’s foreign policy under Balewa, seem to agree that his conservative nature

as a person, influenced his conservative policies. Sir, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the country’s first

prime minister was born in 1012 into a muslim family of Tafawa Balewa, a small town in Lere

District of Bauchi Emirate. He was from the Gerawa, tribe, a Habe tribal group of which the Bauchi

Royal family belongs. His father who attended to the horses of the District Head of Lere was also

a traditional Fulani councilor to the Emir, Abubakar attended the Bauchi provincial school (1925

– 1928) and Katsina Teacher Training College (1928-1933). He thereafter became a teacher and

later Headmaster at the Bauchi middle school. Between 1945-1946 he studied for a Teachers

Professional Certificate at the London University Institute of Education (Obi, 2006). He was

elected to represent Bauchi Native Administration in the Northern House of Assembly. He was

later elected to the House of Representatives in 1954 and was in 1957 made the country’s first

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prime minister. In his Foreign policy statement to the House of Representatives on August 20

1960, Independence Day address on October 1, 1960 and his acceptance speech at the United

Nations, on October 8 1960, Balewa clearly outlined, his governments foreign policy thrusts.

From the three speeches Balewa emphasized that Nigeria will be committed to the following;

1. Maintenance of peaceful and cordial relations with all states, big and small;
2. Championing of burning African issues such as continental unity, opposition to racism and
apartheid, decolonization etc.;
3. Maintenance of friendly and cordial relations with Great Britain and other developed
western nation;
4. Contribution to the maintenance of word peace through the instrumentality of the united
nations and participation in its peace keeping operation;
5. Membership of multi-lateral organization that have a functional relevance for the country,
especially the U.N and the Common Wealth.
6. Non-alignment with any of the existing ideological and military power blocks, especially
to protect Africa from needless super power rivalries and their ugly consequences;
7. Adherence to the principles of the UN as basis for relations with other independent states
and the foundations for a peaceful world order;
8. Respect for the sanctity of African boarders inherited from colonialism, inspite of their
evident imperfections and disadvantages;
9. That Nigeria, notwithstanding it’s geographical and demographic advantages would
respect the legal equality of all state without exception, and that at the sub-regional level,
the country would harbor no territorial or expansionist designs against its neighbours;
10. Commitment to speedy economic and technological development of the African continent
as a political priority; and
11. Opposition to any continental political union of uncertain future. (Fawole, 2003).
It is Balewa’s credit that the four broad principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy which he declared at

the UN on October 8 1960, have remained essentially the principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy till

date. In his own words he outlined the principles as;

Firstly, it is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to
participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organizations. Secondly,
Nigeria, as a large and populous country of over thirty-five million, has resolutely
no territorial or expansionist intentions. Thirdly, we shall not forget our old friends
and we are proud to have been accepted as a member of the Common Wealth, but
nevertheless we do not intend to align ourselves as a matter of routine with an of
the powers because we are committed to the principles upon which the United
Nations Organization is founded. Fourthly, Nigeria hopes to work with other

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 African states for the progress of Africa, and to assist in bringing all African
territories to a state of responsible independence (Fawole, 2003:32).

3.2.1 Foreign Policy Machinery under Balewa

Though Nigeria, was granted the authority over foreign policy matters in 1954 by Britain, it was

in 1957 that Nigerians started exercising this limited authority. It was appointed the nation’s first

Prime Minister. It was also in this year that the External Affairs Department was transferred to the

Prime Minister’s office from the office of the Chief Secretary where it hitherto existed. In 1960

the Department was elevated to a full ministry of Foreign Affairs and common Wealth Relations,

but Aluko (1981) observes that;

It was no more than a mere administrative machine. For Sir. Abubakar, assisted by his
British Secretary to the cabinet Mr. Peter Stallard, retained his autocratic control of the
country’s external relations. From independence until 1961 when Mr. Jaja Wachukwu was
appointed foreign minister, Sir. Abubakar remained his own foreign secretary. Similarly,
between December 1964 and 15 January 1966, when his government was overthrown in a
coup ‘detat’ he was his non foreign minister. Even during the brief period when Sir
Abubakar retained Jaja Wachukwu as his foreign minister his near dictatorial control of the
country’s external policy was never seriously challenged. In actual fact Mr. Jaja
Wachukwu confessed to parliament in 1962 that decisions on some important international
matters were left by the cabinet to the prime minister.
In a seeming collaboration of Aliko’s view above, Ofoegbu (1990) observe that

When finally a ministry was created, the confusion and muddle noticeable between 1964
and 1960 were not removed. The prime-minister, who was also the first foreign minister
(1st October 1960 to July 1961) was unable, because of his many other duties, to devote
much time and effort to effort to foreign affairs. He established representation between
Europe and Africa, and accelerated the recruitment of External Affairs officers. But his
ministry of Foreign Affairs and Common Wealth Relations suffered neglect, shortage of
trained staff and unsatisfactory internal administration organization. It could not provide
adequately for specialization, research and functional competence… The most outstanding
defect was in the critical sphere of coordination and leadership… for example, there did
not exist any organizational devices of the ministry of Foreign Affairs and overseas
activities. Any coordination which was Achieved was through the position and role of the
prime minister as leader of the cabinet rather than as foreign minister.

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We have quoted the above passage extensively in other to highlight the gross deficiencies which

characterized the foreign ministry under Balewa, in order to show why it was not really possible

for Balewa to record a high success in his foreign policy pursuits. This is because, in the absence

of a suitable and responsible machinery, it would have been impossible for any leader to achieve

his policy targets either in the domestic or external realms.

Apart from dominating the foreign policy making apparatus, Balewa, was extremely protective of

his foreign policy beliefs, that he never felt comfortable allowing members of the House of

Representatives (where he was primus inter pares) to contribute to decisions in that regards.

Fawole (2003) cited an instance when a member of the opposition in the Federal House of

Representatives Hon. Anthony Enahoro, suggested that an app-party committee be set up to look

into the issue of foreign policy. Balewa replied that “it was a good suggestion, but I do not think

that it is practicable, because after all this is the House of Representatives where we have the

government and the opposition, and the foreign policy of government is for the government of the

day”. It is the same House which a member called “an instrument to rubber stamp government

decisions on foreign policy issues” (Aluko 1981). Most unfortunately, these government decisions

on foreign policy issues were the views of just one man, Sir. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

3.2.2 Afrocentrism

So far I have concentrated on the problems of Africa. Please do not think that we are not

interestd in the probles of the rest of the world; we are intensely interested in them and

hope to be allowed to assist in finding solutions to them through this organistion, but being

human we are naturally concerned first with what affects our immediate neighbourhood

(Tafawa Balewa’s speech at the UN Oct 8 1960).

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Tafawa Balewa’s interest in Africa was never really in doubt. He was always interested in the

wellbeing of Africa and Africans. Although his love for the West especially Britain made him

disagree with some of his contemporaries in matters involving the West and Africa. Balewa was

committed to the decolonization of Africa, though he argued in 1962 that “independence should

not be granted without due regard to economic, sociological and political factors of each territory”.

Nigeria under Balewa, played a leading role in the formation of the organization of African unity

(OAU) in 1963 and the chad Basin Commission in 1964. Nigeria equally contributed substantially

to the special fund of the OAU liberation committee and played an active role in expulsion of

South Africa from the common wealth in 1961.

When in 1962, the former Angolan nationalist leader, Holden Robert visited Nigeria, to ask for

assistance in their liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonial rulers, Balewa told him the

only assistance Nigeria could offer will be non-military in nature. Nigeria offered to train

administrative and medical staff for provisional Angolan independent government. The thought of

training Angolan armed force or police was out rightly rejected.

Balewa could be said to believe more in dialogue than confrontation in the decolonisaton process.

Thus Aluko (1980) maintains that, it appeared the Balewa government believe in maintaining some

sort of contact with South Africa and other racist, and colonial regimes in order to make the change

their policies. For example, up till early 1963, the defunct federation of Central Africa, though not

yet independent, maintained a High commission in Lagos. Likewise, Portugal was allowed to

maintain a diplomatic post in Lagos up till the overthrow of Balewa’s government in 1966, while

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there were twenty-eight white South African’s in Nigeria, contrary to OAU resolutions on total

ban on white South Africans.

Balewa’s conservative nature, made him dislike Nkrumah’s radical views on African issues

especially as it concerns African unification. Philip’s (1964) reports Balewa’s rebuff of Nkrumah’s

call for a union of Africa States when he asserted that “Nigeria is big enough and does not need to

join others” adding that “if others wish to join with Nigeria, their position would be made clear to

them in such a union” Balewa believed that Nigeria was in a position to lead the rest of Africa and

should therefore not be led by Nkrumah, for in his speech to the House of Representatives on 20

August 1960, he said that:

Very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clear and practicable policies as

regards Africa. It will be our aim to assist any African country to find a solution to its

problems and to foster the growth of a common understanding among the new nations of

the continent.

Balewa’s distate for Nkrumah’s idea, which was quite known in the 60’s led to a cold war between

both leaders, thus being a cog in the wheel of African unity. Nnoli (1989) regrets that Balewa

disspated much energy fighting Nkrumah instead of the real enemies of Africa.

3.2.3 Non-Alignment Policy

Despite Balewa’s avowed policy of non-alignment, which he interpreted to mean that

Nigeria shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone. So far as it is possible, the policy on
each occasion will be selected with a proper independent objectivity in Nigeria’s interest.
Nigeria will not associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs.

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He was rabidly pro-west and according to Schwarz (1968) ad a “frank distate for non-alignment”.

While Balewa maintained very warm relations with Britain and America, he was openly hostile to

the Eastern bloc especially the Soviet Union, the leader of the bloc. It was even suggested that he

believed out of his religions conviction that communism was evil, hence his apathy towards them.

On most international issues that had the seal of the cold war, Balewa clearly supported the West,

issues like the Berlin crises of 1962, the American nuclear test of 1962, the Congo crises and the

Vietnam conflict clearly showed Balewa’s leaning towards the west. The only exception was

Nigeria’s decision to break diplomatic ties with France in reaction to three French nuclear tests

carried out in the Sahara. It was based on the third test which was carried out on 27 December

1960, that Nigeria severed relations with France on 5 January 1961. However, the decision should

not really be seen as outrightly radical because before Nigeria’s action, Ghana which was Nigeria’s

main rival in the struggle for continental leadership, had already withdrawn her Ambassador from

Paris and had also taken other sanctionary trade measures against France, due to the first and

second nuclear tests. The Arab league , Japan, Tunisia, Morocco sand the United Arab Republic

had already protested while Sudan withrew her Ambassador from Paris on 2 January 1961. It

should therefore not be surprising that Balewa, accepted to ‘follow suit’ after all the Arabs were

highly incensed by France’s action.

Akinterinwa (1990) has also argued that the decision did not seem to sought to protect any political

or economic interests. Nigeria had no embassy or Ambassador in France as at January 1961 when

the decision was taken. She also has little or no interests to protect in France. Consequently,

Nigeria might have thought there was little or nothing to lose and everything to gain, in terms of

being able to assert Nigeria’s sovereignty, especially when considering that the decision was taken

only three months after independence.

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Perhaps one would wonder what would have happened if it were Britain that carried out the tests.

Would Nigeria under Balewa have the temerity to rect the same way against the people Balewa

openly declared that

We are grateful to the British officials whom we have known first, as masters, and then as
leaders and finally as partners, but always as friends.
The most Porgnant act that showed Balewa’s ‘Frank distate’ for non-alignment was the Anglo-

Nigeria Defence pact of 1960, which would have allowed Britain to operate on air base in Nigeria.

One of the key reasons why Britain needed the pact and for which Balewa and his Nigerian allies

had an interest was the fear of communist infiltration. Specially, Ojo (1990) argued that the then

Britain Defence Secretary fo state for Common Wealth Relations (1960-1964) when the pact was

signed and abrogated, Mr. Duncan Sandys “raised the bogey of communist infiltration and

subversion-new and severe presures’ he called it, thus capitalizing on Nigeria leaders’morbid fear

of communism”. He equally quoted Nigerias minister of state for Navy Mr. Matthew Mbu as

saying that “Nigeria could not afford to be neutral in the Cold war, that her security needed to be

protected and this could as well be done within the Western bloc”. We can as well add that he has

said it all that the government was never really non-aligned.

Though the Soviet Union was allowed to open an embassy in Lagos, its staff strength was limited

by the government to 10. The government also restricted the flow of communist literature into

Nigeria, while the government was very lukewarm towards allowing Nigerians to school in the

USSR. This made it reluctant to take up all the scholarships offered Nigerian students in the Soviet

Union. Balewa’s economic development policy clearly did not include soviet involvement despite

her willingness to support the Nigerian economy. All these were happening under a government

that clearly declared itself non-aligned. Balewa’s pro-British orientation was succinctly portrayed

61
by Sklar (1963) in his masterpiece Nigerian Political Parties when he wrote that “politically as

prime minister in the federal government, especially as prime minister during the final phase of

colonial rule from 1957 to 1960, Balewa gained the reputation of being closer to the British than

any other Nigerian leader”. This closeness, as his actions suggested continued and remained until

that tragic morning of Jan 15 1966 when the death of the first republic was announced and with it

the death of the “golden voice from Africa”.

In conclusion, we make bold to say that though Balewa set the principles for Nigeria’s foreign

policy which has served as the compass for successive Nigerian Governments, he recorded

minimal success due to factors that were clearly beyond his control. These factors that were the

absence of nationally-based political parties, the existence in the coalition federal government of

two ideologically opposed parties, the NPC and NCNC, the unbalanced structure of the federation

and the acrimonious political rivalry between political leaders. (Aluko, 1981).

In as much as the above factors seem clearly beyond Balewa’s control, it is still apparent from our

study that his firm grip of the foreign policy machinery, which he personalized and imbued with

his conservatism largely accounted for the lack of dynamism in the nation’s foreign policy. Also

his morbid fear of communism limited his policy choices and options and equally limited the

benefits which Nigeria would have derived from a true non-aligned policy. Finally, Balewa’s non-

assertive personality which made him almost a tool in the hands of the Sarduana made him a weak

leader who could not take independent decisions and stand by them. Thus his having to consult

with Kaduna on almost all major issues created a situation where authority was divorced from

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leadership position, and this has never made for an effective leadership anywhere, and Nigeria’s

foreign policy under him did not prove this continent wrong.

3.3 Nigeria Foreign Policy under Gen. Aguyi Ironsi (1966)

General Aguiyi Ironsi, who came to power in January 1966, after the Nzeogwu led coup, remains

the shortest regime in Nigeria (Aside Shonekan’s ING contraption). The government came to

power amid a lot of internal strife and was therefore too much occupied trying to handle it, and

bringing the country back into the path of political stability after the numerous crises that rocked

the first republic. In his maiden broadcast on 16th January 1966, General Ironsi; stated inter alia

that:

The federal military government announces in connection with the external affairs of the
country, that it is its intention to honour all treaty obligations and all financial agreements
and obligations entered into by the previous government.

Ironsi’s attitude towards apartheid and white supremacist regimes was remarkably different from

Balewa allowed white South Africans entry into Nigeria, despite O.A.U resolutions against such,

Ironsi declared them and Portuguese, prohibited immigrants. He went a step further to ban

Portuguese ships and aircrafts from entering Nigeria ports and aircrafts because of its settler-

colonialism. Another important step which Ironsi took that impacted positively on the nation’s

foreign policy, was stopping the regions from establishing and operating economic missions

abroad and also making external relations the sole preserve of the federal government, thereby

stopping the Governors from making pronouncements that affected Nigeria’s external relations.

Unfortunately, Ironsi was killed in a counter-coup on 29 July 1966 and the leadership of the

nation fell on Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon.

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3.4 Nigeria Foreign Policy under Gen. Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975)

Yakubu Gowon’s regime remains so far the longest administration in Nigeria. The political

dynamics that threw up the regime is clearly beyond the purview of this study. Suffice it to say,

that the domestic environment when this regime came to power was so charged that it had little or

no time initially to embark on a remarkable foreign policy. The Nigerian political crises, which

worsened with Gowon’s ascendancy to power led to the secession of Biafran on the 30th of May

1967. On the 6th July 1967 the Federal Ministry Government declared war on Biafra, in order to

bring them back into Nigeria. This war, which the federal government termed “a police action”

and that was expected to last for just a few weeks, lasted for 30 months with the casualty rate

exceeding a million lives.

3.4.1 War Diplomacy

Throughout the war, the government’s foreign policy, was first geared towards countering Biafran

War propaganda, which in any case was quite formidable. Secondly, stopping other countries from

recognizing Biafra. Thirdly, struggling towards the non-internationalization of the conflict, thus

making the world know that it was purely Nigeria’s internal affair, which it needed arms to

prosecute the war, and finally, dissuading Nigeria’s neigbour’s from allowing their territories to

be used for arms suppliers to Biafra in order to beat the Federal Governments blockade of

secessionists.

Now, how did this war foreign policy fare? We are going to look at them one in other to fairly

assess their operation success.

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3.4.1.1 Counting Biafran War Propaganda

At initial stages of the war, the Federal Government was not really much interest in the public

relations/propaganda aspect of the war, while the turf was left for the Biafrans to take over, and

they did a jolly good job of it. According to Fawole (2003), while the Nigerian authorities were

rather complacent that their good intentions were transparent enough for the rest of the world to

see and appreciate, the secessionist propagandists did a marvelous job of painting Nigeria in the

worst colours possible. The Federal Government was portrayed as conducting a gecidal compaign

against the Igbo’s and Eastern minorities. They claimed that what was being termed by Nigeria’s

Federal Government, as a war of national unity was actually a disguise for a more insidious

campaign to exterminate the entire Igbo people from Nigeria. They pointed to the massacre of Igbo

officers and soldiers during the July 1996 counter coup as well as the anti-Igbo pogrom that swept

the entire northern region between July and September 1996. The propaganda was, therefore, to

the effect that all these were part of a carefully conceived master plan to rid Nigeria of the Igbo

people. Pictures and images of suffering people were flashed across the globe to prove the point

and convince a skeptical world opinion that Nigeria was not fighting a civil war but a war of

extermination.

It was based on this charge of genocide against Nigeria, that the British official mission came to

Lagos between 23-26 June 1968 to meet with the federal government. The fallout of the meeting

was that foreign observers should be invited to Niger ‘to inspect the behavior of the federal troops

at the fronts and investigate the Biafran charge of genocide’ (de st. Jorre 1972). The federal

government on 28 July 1969, extended a formal invitations Organisation and the OAU. The

international observer team was in Nigeria for almost sixteen months and their reports helped to

exonerate the federal government of the genocide charge.

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In a work on foreign policy and public opinion centered on the British foreign policy over the

Nigeria civil war, Ajibola (1978) concluded that.

We have supplied examples to show that the information by newspaper reports conveyed
to the reading public mostly justified the Biafran position. We have shown, too, that the
newspaper reports contributed to the creation of a pro-Biafran sympathy in Britain,
crystallizing in members of the public contacting their M.Ps and ministers, as well as
participation in pressure group activities.
In the same report he also asserted that

In this respect, it seems that radio and television coverage saw the conflict in terms
advantageous to the position of Biafra and therefore against that of federal as well as British
policy.
3.4.1.2 Non-Recognition of Biafra

This was an area where Nigerian foreign policy recorded a lot of success. From the beginning of

hostilities on 6th July 1967. Nigeria tried so much to dissuade her friends and the international

community at large from granting recognition to the secessionist Biafra. The only European

powers France and Portugal that recognized and aided Biafra in the war did it as a way of hitting

back at Nigeria for previous reprisals against them.

Nigeria had broken diplomatic ties with France in 1961 for carryout nuclear tests in the Sahara

Desert. Though the embargo against France was lifted on 18 May 1961, France felt heavily insulted

by the act, which seemed to reduce its’ stature and status in Africa. Consequently, France lobbied

against Nigeria’s Associate Membership of the EEC IN 1963. France as a matter of policy has

always worked against a strong Nigeria, which it perceived as a direct threat to its hehemony in

West Africa. On the other hand, Portugal has also received Nigeria’s horse whip when Ironsi in

1966, banned their ships and aircrafts from entering Nigeria’s port and aircrafts from entering

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Nigeria’s ports and airfield and equally declared, Portuguese prohibited immigrants on Nigerian

soil. For both countries therefore, the civil war was payback time.

Also, by April and May 1968, four Africa nations recognized Biafra. They were Tanzania, Ivory

Coast (Cote d’Ivoire) Gabon and Zambia. It should however be noted that as at the period of the

Nigerian Civil War, Africa had about forty independent states. So if only four out of this lot

recognized Biafra, it was really a victory for Nigeria’s efforts at non-recognition of Biafra.

3.4.1.3 Non-Internationalization of the Conflict

Right from the on-set, the Federal Government regarded the civil war as Nigeria’s internal affair,

and as such beyond OAU’s competence to discuss. It saw any attempt b the O.A.U to discuss the

issue as a violation of Article 3 (2) of the O.A.U charter, which is against interference in the internal

affairs of member nations and Articles 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, which equally counsels

against meddling into the internal affairs of U.N member nations. When, however, the casualities

of the war started growing and it really didn’t seem that the Nigerian authorities were about

bringing the war to an end, five presidents of OAU member states namely; Jomo Kenya, Julius

Nyerere of Tanzania, Milton Obote of Uganda, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Haille Selessie of

Ethiopia issued a joint appeal for a cease-fire and negotiated settlement on 8 July 1967.

After the British and the commonwealth’s organized conference on the crises held in Kampala

Uganda failed, the OAU held a consultive meeting in Naimey, Niger Republic, preceding full scale

negotiations at Addis Ababa, where it was hoped that a permanent settlement would be found for

the crises. This was not to be as the Addis Ababa talks could not resolve the issue. At the OAU’s

5th Assembly of Heads of state meeting in Algiers in September 1968, four African countries and

members of the organization, namely; Ivory Coast, Zambia, Gabon and Tanzania had recognized

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Biafra. The Assembly, against the protests of these four countries gave an unreserved backing to

Nigeria’s government. It called for a cease fire, urging to cooperate with the federal government

which it equally urged to grant a general amnesty to the secessionists. It equally rejected the

recognition accorded Biafra by the four nations.

Another major role which the OAU played in the crises was its successful role in aborting Biafran

attempt to further internationalized the war through referring it to the United stopped it by saying

that it was already handling the issue. The demand by leaving the matter to it and instead

concentrated on purely humanitarian issues as it concerns the crises. On 1 August 1968 he

appointed a representative that will assist Nigeria on relief supplies. He equally appointed a

representative on the the international observer Team already mentioned in this study, that came

to monitor the war in the light of Biafra’s charge of genocide against the Nigerian authorities. He

finally visited Nigeria on the 18 and 19 of January 1968; in search of a solution to the crises and

also to monitor the humanitarian efforts of the crises. It must be said that the OAU really played a

commendable role in not allowing the internationalization of the conflict which Biafra seriously

needed and worked for and which may have changed the face or coloration of the conflict and may

be the geographic landscape called Nigeria.

3.4.1.4 Getting the Needed Arms to Prosecute the War

At the beginning of the war in 1976, the British government refused to grant Nigeria license to buy

heavy arms from Britain. The full import of this decision becomes clearer when it is realized that

traditionally, Britain was Nigeria’s major arms supplier. Moreso, the Nigerian army which was a

creation of the British was modeled after the British army. Following the British’s refusal, Nigeria

approached America but was equally turned down on the excuse that Nigeria falls under Britain’s

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sphere of influence. In fact the then American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was quoted by de st

jorre (1972) as saying that “we regard Nigeria as part of Britain’s sphere of influence”.

It was then out of desperation that Nigeria approached the Soviet Union, which it had always

remained cold to. The soviet’s seeing this as an opportunity to gain a real foothold had no choice

than to say yes, and consequently availed Nigeria of her request, thus becoming a friend in need.

It was only when Britain saw the soviet response that they changed their policy, in the fear that the

communists would make much in-roads into Nigeria.

3.5 Murtala/Obasanjo Regimes 1975 – 1979

The period 1975 to 1979 is usually seen by most authors and scholars as the golden era of Nigeria’s

foreign policy. This is mainly because it was in this period, that a new form of dynamism and

assertiveness that was quite alien to Nigeria’s external relations, was injected into the system.

We now to review the nations of foreign policy in this era, under three main sub-headingss;

Afrocentrism, Apartheid and De-colonisation and relationship with the Great powers. Note must

be taken at this point that due to the faxct that Obasanjo’s regime was basically a continuation of

Murtala’s we are going to treat both as the same though we shall try to show any difference in the

main, the substance was the same.

3.5.1 Afrocentrism

Nigeria should be grateful to the United States. Not in the way Americans expect or
particularly like; not in any of the ways Nigerians would be quik to rightly protest. But in
a way unexpected, unpredictable, and surely regretted by some Americans, including the
Administration of Gerald ford. For it was the United State that, in its misunderstanding and
mishandling of the crises of the imminent Angolian independence, handed Nigeria the
foreign policy issue that would catapult it to the centre stage, and not just Africa’s stage
(Joe Garba 1991).

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Nigeria’ss handly of the Angolan crises was the major issue that launched the Murtala regime into

international limelight, as a regime that was committed to backing it’s foreign policy decisions

with concrete actions without minding whose ox is gored. A little background information on the

origin of the Angolan crises will be in order here. Angolan was a Portuguese colony. Right from

the early 1960s, Angolan nationalist were engaged in an anti-colonial war, in order to force

Portugal to grant them independence, However, the major problem that negatively affected the

struggle was the fictionalization in the rans of the liberation movements, Three main movements

were involved in the struggle. They were the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. Each of these

movements, were claiming of having more support and popularity than the orders but in actual fact

the main difference among them were due to ethnic, regional, ideological and personality factors

which were exacerbated by the pattern of foreign support (Sotunmbi 1990).

As the struggle for supremacy among them was going on, a military coup took place in Portugal.

The new military regime was not favourably disposed towards retaining the Portuguese colonies.

Hence, an accelerated programme of pranting them independence. The major problem in Agola

therefore, was that none of the groups enjoyed a dominant position that would make the Portuguese

hand over to it, and the Portuguese were bent on leaving Angola. It was therefore apparent that

with this scenario, there was likely not going to be an orderly transfer of power.

In fairness to the liberation movements, one must admit that they were all committed to the defeat

of the common enemy, Portugal, but they also clashed with one another in a bid to expand their

operational bases and establish their dominance. While the MPLA had its training and operational

base at Congo and Zambia, FNLA had theirs at Zaire, while UNITA’s Was at Zambia. The OAU

in realization of the unique circumstances of the Angolan situation and its potential for catastrophe,

favoured a government of national unity, comprised of the three major liberation movements. This

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was the stand of the OAU summit at Kampala Uganda in July 1975, which Gowon was attending,

when his regime at home was toppled. In fact in May 1975 preceding the OAU summit, Gowon

had in recognition of a ‘provisional Government of Angola by the OAU, written to the three

movements that:

We in Nigeria rejoice with you on this happy occasion and salute your wisdom, patriotism,
statesmanship and realism in reaching agreement for the common good of your fatherland.
The event you are celebrating today is of great importance not only to the Angolan people
who have sacrificed so much but also to Africa and indeed all lovers of freedom, justice
and human dignity throught the world. (Oyediran, 1978:43)
It was against this backdrop, that the Murtala regime got involved in the Angolan crises. Nigeria’s

interest in Angolan was mainly due to the involvement of racist South Africa in the conflict.

Nigeria from the onset supported a government of national unity in line with the OAU’s position.

Gowon as well as Murtala (at the initial stage) toed this line. However, the preponderance of

evidence at the disposal of the Murtala government that south Africa’s involvement in the conflict

was at the instance of both the FNLA and UNITA, made Head of State to make up his mind on

issue. This was to support the MPLA government. This was announced to a stunned world on 25th

of November 1975 Later at the OAU’s Extra ordinary session on Angola held in Addis Ababa in

January 1976, Murtala delivered a powerful speech in which he argued that the issue was not so

much that of recognition of the MPLA government but that.

It is a much deeper danger of extra-power in collusion with th inhuman and

Obnoxious apartheid regime in Pretoria. Trying to frustrate the will of a people who
have sustained a heroic struggle against a most brutal colonialist repression to self-
determination. If the colonialists succeed in Angola, then our hope for Southern
Africa would have been dead.
He also lashed America’s president Ford who had written to most African leaders at the eve of the

conference, urging them not to recognize the MPLA government because it was a proxy of the

Soviet Union, describing the letter as ‘a most intolerable presumption and a flagrant insult on the

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intelligence of African rulerss’. He defended Nigeria’s decision to recognize one of African

movements (MPLA) ‘have forfeited their right to the leadership of the Angolan people by joining

hands with neo-colonalist adventurers and racist soldiers of fortune’ (Fawole, 2003).

The summit was inconclusive as the admission of MPLA tied at 22 for and 22 against. However,

through shuttle diplomacy, Nigeria was able to convince more countries to support her stand, so

on the 11 February 1976, the OAU recognized the MPLA government in Angola Ironically,

Murtala Mohammed could not really savour the victory of a project he had invested so much

energy, passion and resources, for he was cut down by Dimka’s bullets two days later, on the 123

of February 1976. Nigeria’s recognition of the MPLA also came with some financial back up. the

Angolans were given twenty million dollars, military hardware, fighter planners, clothing’s and

even tons of meat. In the Angolan struggles, Nigeria won, but then the next question is, at what

cost? And in whose interest? Is it in Nigeria’s national interest? Well we have to turn to the man

who was at the centre of all this for an answer. According to Joe Garba Nigeria’s External Affairs

Commissioner then stated that:

Now, here was twenty million dollars in cash going to Agola without even a discussion of
what Nigeria might gain, or even what uses it would be put to Some might argue that to
think of a quid pro quo from a country fighting for survival veges on the immoral, but two
years later, no one could pin down a ‘normal’ Angola to any firm bilateral economic
agreement. (Garba, 1991)
This might be seen as a case of acting before thinking, which Nigeria’s diplomacy over the years

has been known for. How ca a nation where over half of its citizen are living below the poverty

line continue to waste her scares resources on ‘gifts’ and ‘grants’ to ‘needy’ countries, without

thinking about her own needy citizens or the benefits of such gestures to her. In international

politics there is no free dinner. Every ‘favour’ done ideally is targeted at a future benefits, which

as at then might not be known to the recipient nation.

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In the case of Angola, nobody thought about that, instead people were thinking about pride, about

being the ‘giant of Africa’ about thought Nigeria, a lesson on how not to operate a wasteful foreign

policy, but the lessons were not learnt. This is quite sad. Despite all Nigeria did for Angola,

Nigeria‘s name was conspicuously absent from the list of countries that Angola paid tribute, for

assisting them in their independence struggle, in their first appearance at the OAU summit at

Maunritius in July 1976. To cap it all, after Murtala’S death, it took Angola the death of their

benefactor. ‘When eventually a message did arrive from Angola, only it’s first three sentences

made any reference to our tragic loss. The remainder contained another shopping list’ (Garba

1991).

The Nigeria government as part of its agreement with the MPLA government was to make the

nation national carrier, Nigeria Airways, to operate direct flights to Kuanda the Angolan capital,

in order to give the Angolans an air outlet. These flights from the beginning were to, and did run

at a loss because there were very few Nigerians flying to Angola. Ditto for the Agolanss, except

for government officials flying to Lagos. Diverting the aircraft to the non-lucrative Angol route

was not only a loss to Nigeria, but also meant more hardship for Nigerian air travelers who had to

contend with endless rushes at the Lagos airport, occasioned by inadequacy of planes. These flights

continued till 1978 when it was stopped. Interestingly when the Angolans started their own Airline,

it didn’t have direct flights to Lagos but to Lisbon Portugal. This meant that any Nigeria going to

Luanda, would first of all fly to Lisbon before connecting a flight to Luanda, Talk about

reciprocity.

Nigeria, tried very hard, but quit unsuccessful to conclude an Agreement with the Angolan

government to allow Nigerian trawlers fish off the Angolan coast, Despite the numerous

delegations that went for this agreement, their discussions were inconclusive fishing rights in this

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coast. The intriguing part of the whole thing was that while the Angolans were always coming to

Lagos for assistance in different areas, they never believed that they ought to at least show some

gratitude and perhaps some concessions. Take for instance the flight operations which Nigeria

sustained at heavy losses. At a point the Nigerian government approached the Angolan authorities

for transit rights to Zambia, so that Nigerian Airways can make some little money on the return

trip since the plane flew almost empty most of the time to Luanda. The Angolan government turned

down the request, on the grounds that they too were interest in the route.

What still baffles one, is why is it that despite all these, the Nigerian government still feels

obligated to such countries that have shown open hostility to it despite its benevolence? On the

Angolan case Joe Garba frankly accepted that:

As we have seen, the benefits to Nigeria as a result were no more than those that came to
those countries who just sat back and watched. Stripped of emotional commitment, our
working of the system of international relations in which the national interest is always in
view and reciprocity is a constant factor, we did not get high marks. What, after all, did
Nigeria gain? High visibility in the international community; an awakening of our
government officials as to what serious lobbying involved; and rally a large percentage of
our population to an international cause
One may simply classify these so called gains as ornamental gains, which in international relations,

are not the main motivating, or driving factors of forces in making foreign policy decisions. This

is so, especially in cases, where you have to involved substantial national resources. In an apparent

acceptance of the fact that Nigeria’s national interest was not the main factors in the Angolan issue

and that it was not really a worthy venture, at least considering the amount of resources that went

into that project, and its opportunity cost to a poor dependent nation like Nigeria, Garba. (1991)

concluded by saying that: ‘But in bilateral terms which are, after all, the core of relations between

states, we gave and gave to Angola, and in return got nothing.’ Perhaps, since then, Nigeria has

74
continued to give and give and may not have bohered whether it is getting ‘nothing’. Our study

will address this issue as we progress.

3.5.2 APARTHEID AND DECOLONIZATION

Despite Nigeria’s experience with Angola, which by all standards was unsavoury, Nigeria’s

commitment to the eradication of colonialism and white supremacist regimes in Africa did not

waver. So it was with its role in the Rhodesian crises. Nigeria’s involvement in the crises was

prompted by Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, which

attracted worldwide condemnation and the UN Security Council’s Economic Sanctions, to force

the regime to set up black majority rule on the basis of the principle of self-determination and

universal adult suffrage.

Based on the pressure on Ian Smiths Rhodesian from government, it decided on an ‘internal

settlement’ through which it would hand over power to a few select leaders. This “internal

settlement” through which it would hand over power to a few selected leaders. This ‘internal

settlement’ arrangement was rejected by the UN security council via resolutions 435 and 439 of

1978.

The OAU, which on its part had been sponsoring resolutions at both the UN and Non-Aligned

conferences, decided in its 1977 summit to recognize the Zimbabwe African National Union

(ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union the patriotic front alliance that represents the

people’s Union (ZAPU) as called on all its members to apply both diplomatic and economic

sanctions against South Africa and the white minority regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In 1978

the OAU rejected, just like the UN Security Council, the ‘internal arrangement’ of Ian Smith. It

75
was against this backdrop that Nigeria was already recognized as a front line state in view of her

role in the Angolan crises got involved.

Nigeria intervened on the side of the patriotic front and got deeply involved in series of meetings

with the frontline states, liberation movements, the United Nations, the OAU and the great powers

especially the U.S AND Britain. Nigeria in 1978 gave a free grant of N2 million and in March

equally gave of N5 million to Mozambique and Zambia respectively, in order to enable both

frontline states strenghthen their defence capability against the racist forces. (Aluko 1990).

The Ian Smith regime, organized a sham election in April 1979 through which it installed Bishop

Muzorewa. This was roundly rejected by the parties to the resolution which was sponsored by the

non-aligned nations, calling for the continuation of sanctions against the Zimbabwean government

now headed by Bishop Muzorewa, the first Black prime minister, and also for its continued

diplomatic isolation.

The U.S President, Jimmy Carter, in a press statement on June 7th 1979, castigated the constitution

under which the elections were helds, saying it was unjust and undemocratic. The Soviet Union

equal condemned the elections as unfree and unacceptable. Nigeria, which has been the major

force behind OAU’s stand on this issue, naturally rejected the elections. However, the British

response to the crises was to say the least reprehensible. Though, the labour party was quite

sensitive to the prevailing feelings of the period on the issue which was anti-Ian Smiths policies,

the conservative party’s, (which won the May general elections in Britain), attitude was a different

ball game. The conservative party, had during the elections committed itself to restoring legality

in Zimbabwe and to equally lift the sanctions on the country if it eventually won the elections. It

also at that time sent an official delegation, under the leadership of Lennox-Boyd to report on the

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April elections in Zimbabwe. The delegation reported at the end of its trip that the elections were

free and fair.

Aluko (1990) reports that almost immediately after the conservative party’s decisive victory, a

number of steps were taken that suggested that the new government was going to resident British

diplomatic representative was immediately accredited to Salisbury. Secondly, Sir Ian Gilmour, the

Lord Privy Seal said in the middle of June 1979 that since the Zimbabwe elections were free and

fair, there would be nothing stopping the government from fulfilling its election promises as

regards Zimbabwe. Thirdly, at the beginning of July 1979, the new Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher

said in a press conference in Canberra, Australia, that her government would be able to secure the

revival of sanctions against Zimbabwe from the British House of Commons in November 1979.

The full import of this statement was clear to everyone, that since Britain is a democratic nation,

if the sanctions were not renewed by the commons, the Thatcher cannot do otherwise. While this

statement and its import were still being digested, Lord Carrington, a few days later was reported

to have told the Indian Prime Minister that the British government soon after the Lusaka summit

of the Common Wealth leaders in early August 1979, and that London did not intend to starve

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of petroleum; Nigeria was simply alarmed at this statement.

In apparent recognition of the impact of this statement on Nigeria’s leaders, the British High

commission in Niheria, issued a statement denying that Lord Carrington actually said, what he was

quoted as saying, insisting that what he said was that no formal recognition would take place until

after full consultation with most members of the international community. Despite the denial, the

truth was that British posturing has caused a lot of harm and pain to all those who were committed

to enthroning a black majority rule in Zimbabwe.

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Nigeria, immediately took some steps to show her displeasure with the British posture on

Zimbabwe. Starting from May 1979, the Obasanjo government started issuing statements

condemning the Zimbabwe elections, warning that any attempt to recognize the Muzoruwa

government or lifting of sanctions against the government, would be met with hostility from the

Nigerian government. The government also sent notes to the British government, stating that the

recognition of the Muzorewa government would be viewed as a calculated spite and deliberate

challenge to the black race and the OAU and that if it happens, it would accordingly be met with

an appropriate response (New Nigeria Paper, 1979). The government also sent a special note to

Mrs. Thatcher in June 1979 on the issue. The Thatcher government ignored all these.

In May 1979, the Nigerian government arrested the S.K. Kulu, a tanker owned by the South

African Maritime Corporation of Cape Town, but flying the flag of the Panama Republic, which

was on charter to British Petroleum (BP), to lift crude oil from Bonny Oil terminal to Holland.

After the arrest, the government decided against selling the 1,616,636 barrels of oil in the tanker

to BP and also decided to reduce to about a third BPs take of Nigerian crude with effect from 1 st

August 1979. The government also in May 1979, barred British firms from tendering for contracts

in Nigeria until, the British government clarified its position on Zimbabwe (Aliko 1990). It was

clear that the Thatcher government apparently under estimated Nigeria’s feelings about Zimbabwe

and her clear threads on the issue, despite the nature of the nation’s statements and personal notes

to Thatcher and her government. For instance, the governments statement of May 1st 1979, warned

against those in Britain and other western nations.

For whom the glitter and lure of share dividends and the multinational corporate profits are
irresistible and more precious than buckets full of Black Zimbabwean blood.

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Also in General Obasanjo’s note to Mrs. Thatcher on 5th June 1979, he warned that recognizing

the Muzorewa government in Salisbury, tantamount, to:

Provocations and a calculated spite, constituting a woman disregard for African opinion
and well-being and deserving of an appropriate response.
That appropriate response came, when on 31st July 1979, the Federal cabinet office in Lagos,

announced that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) had decided to take over the assets of 1979.

The statement, added that the government would pay compensation for BPs assets. The action, the

statement explained was a reaction to the British governments permission to BP to start exporting

North-sea and non-embargoed oil to South Africa and that the arrangement was a ‘mere

subterfuge’ to make Nigerian oil available to the apartheid regime in Pretoria and that the most

effective way to stop Nigerian oil production.

3.6 Shehu Shagari Regime (1979–1983)

The Shehu Shagari regime marked the end of thirteen years of military rule and the beginning of

the second republic. The Shagari regime like previous regimes, focused on Nigeria’s African

oriented foreign policy as entrenched in the 1979 Constitution. This position was made clear when

President Shehu Shagari, in his speech declared that: “Nigeria would continue to make Africa the

centerpiece of her foreign policy.” Professor Ibrahim Gambari, did not mixed words as he defined

the focus of Shagari’s diplomatic policy in the following terms:

“President Shehu Shagari’s administration inherited a high degree of national consensus

which emerged behind the main features of Nigerian foreign policy goals and objectives.
These include support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa, opposition to
racism and racial discrimination throughout the world, reasoned support for regional
economic cooperation such as ECOWAS, the pursuit for New International Order, Africa
as the central focus of the country’s foreign policy and the operationalisation of a trule non-
aligned foreign policy (cited in Jibril, 2004)."

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This foreign policy feat, made Ogbodeze (1990) to described Shagari major foreign policy trust as

“Frouser extension.” This however, did not ignore the Extra-African affairs aspect of Shagari’s

regime, as the regimes recognized and observed international principles in the conduct of the

Nation’s diplomatic practice. The administration was guided by world body’s principles such as

United Nations Principles and Objectives, Commitment to the aims and objectives of the non-

aligned movement, support for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and active

participation in the prevailing International Economic Order for the enhancement of the social

wellbeing of mankind and evaluation of a fair, just and peaceful world (the Herald, April 24, 1980).

In pursuance of African centeredness of his foreign policy, Shagari regime gave $5 million to

Mugabe’s government. Shagari also demonstrated Nigeria’s commitment to the peaceful

settlement of inter-state disputes and conflicts.These conflicts include Chadian Conflict between

Goukonni Weddeye and Hissen Habre; Ethiopia and between Morocco and Polisario Movement

over the Western Sahara.

3.7 The Buhari’s Regime (1984–1985)

Buhari’s regime inherited a very weak economy and therefore embarked on a foreign policy

commitment that were over-ambitious in scope. To save the nation from total collapse, the regime

had to re-order Nigeria’s priorities to cope with the available resources. To this extent, the regime

reduced the nation’s diplomatic missions abroad, ordered the closure of Nigerian borders and

expelled illegal aliens, who were citizens from Nigeria’s neighbours.

According to Ogbodeze (1990), Buhari’s Foreign Policy was characterized by what he terms

“hostility to Nigeria’s neighbours, undefined objectives, confrontational diplomacy, a demoralized

foreign service and contracted instruments of diplomacy” (Ogbodeze, 1990 cited in Kia, et al

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2016:27). Under the short-lived regime, relations between Nigeria and Britain became strained

following the rejection of Umaru Dikko extradition request made by the regime. In spite of this

constraint, the regime supported Liberian struggles: Recognized the right of Namibian people for

independence Encourage inter-state economic cooperation in West Africa, through the provision

of land in Abuja for the building of ECOWAS permanent headquarters. The regime refusal to

accept the proposal by the Arab Moslem Group of the Organization of Islamic and Financial

Conference which promised Nigeria economic and financial assistance.

3.8 Babangida’s Regime (1985–1993)

General Babangida tool over government from Buhari on August 27, 1985; as Head of State, a

change in foreign policy was anticipated. The immediate domestic context of the decision by the

regime to reorder the nation’s foreign policy was the deep-seated and seemingly intractable crisis

of accumulation, which has bedeviled the Nigerian economy. The crisis in the nation’s economy

provide the basis for the embrace by the regime of Structural Adjustment which, in turn,

strengthens the hands of the international financial institutions and the leading advanced capitalist

economy. Both the contexts of domestic economic crisis and structural adjustment and a rapidly

changing international politico-economic environment have acted to shape the decision to adopt

economic diplomacy as an object of foreign policy action (Kia, et al, 2016).

The main tenet of economic diplomacy inform necessity for a more direct linkage to be established

between Nigeria’s domestic economic requirements and its foreign policy with a view to ensuring

that the latter served the needs of the former more systematically, (Gabriel, 1988). This foreign

policy feat is not new as element of economic diplomacy is observed in all the regime, but what is

new is that, this regime signals the spirited attempt to realign the conduct of the country’s foreign

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relations in line with domestic economic realities. This situation is blame on disposition of the

nation’s leaders.

According to Ate (2002), since independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been marked by two

prominent features. First, the political leadership has generally tended to conduct foreign policy as

if this exercise were merely an external manifestation of the sovereign status of Nigeria. Second,

Nigeria’s foreign policy has largely tended to react to external forces rather than serving as a

conscious set of policy measures to address crucial national problems (Ate, 2002 cited in Kia, et

al, 2016). Consequently, the Nigerian political leadership of the period had little disposition to

contemplate the positive use of foreign policy as a strategic instrument for engineering national

economic transformation and political integration.

Essentially, one could argue that this pattern of foreign policy did not change significantly until

end of the 20 century. Though the Babangida regime attempted a paradigm shift in foreign policy
th

when it officially introduced economic diplomacy, the feat was not fully achieved as intended

because most of the reforms like Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), and creation of the

National Directorate for Employment, etc. were grounded due to corruption and lack of political

commitment with regards to implementation.

3.9 Nigeria Foreign Policy under Abacha

Again, Nigeria’s foreign policy suffered a devastating blow under the Abacha administration.

Under this period, the domestic environment witnessed a great deal of instability, conflicts,

demonstrations, politically motivated killings, and bombings as well as the aggressive attempt to

consolidate power. This culminated in the killing of nine Ogoni Citizens in the Niger Delta

alongside an international environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa and subsequent expulsion of Nigeria

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from the Commonwealth of Nations. Nigeria’s foreign policy lost focus and attracted series of

face-offs, strains, and blunders which qualified her “a pariah state” (Kia, 2016).

In the thirty-nine years of Nigeria’s foreign policy from prime minister, Tafawa Balewa to General

Abdusallami Abubakar, the thrust of her foreign policy had tended to revolve around some basic

principles. Retrospectively, Nigeria’s foreign policy had been influenced and guided by a strong

commitment to African’s centeredness. The foregone analysis in not miss-giving as Nigeria’s

diplomatic practice has over the year’s demonstrated continuity than change. The evaluation, show

a seeming inversion of the objective in which leadership posture in Africa takes procedure in her

diplomatic practice over other more pertinent economic targets or goals that would reverberate in

greater economic opportunity and prosperity for the people and the state (Kia, et al, 2016).

Successive regime in Nigeria places more emphasis on African interest than on vital national

interest; though some scholars are of the view that by protecting African interest, Nigeria is

automatically protecting its ‘core values’ in terms of security and protection of her sovereignty

and territorial integrity (Akenyemi, 1986). What is paramount here is that, these scholars do not

consider the enormity of Nigeria’s commitments to these principles and the great resources

expended on them as against the limited resources for the welfare and wellbeing of the Nigeria’s

citizens.

3.10 Obasanjo Regime (1999 –2007)

The 1999 Obasanjo regime marked the end of military era, and the inception of democratic

dispensation with democracy in place, with new expectations in Nigeria’s foreign policy. On the

eve of the 21 Century, Nigeria’s foreign policy is faced with new and complex challenges arising,
st

at least in parts from the nation’s internal social and geo-political composition. The inept political

83
leadership mostly under the military accentuated rather than reduced the differences among the

various groups. Corruption, lack of transparency, and human rights abuse became the

distinguishing traits of government.

This domestic crisis and the desire to rectify the sad experiences essentially, made the Obasanjo’s

democratic dispensation to commit itself to maintaining and nurturing the mechanisms essential

for consolidating democracy and human rights. President Obasanjo in his speech said:

We must return to the true spirit of federalism in which equity, fairness and justice must
become sacred principles. In particular, we need to uncover human rights abuses of the
past in order to learn the right lessons, to comfort the injured, and to promote national
reconciliation (Obasanjo, 1999).”
The disposition above, acknowledged the nexus between foreign policy and domestic policy of a

state. Both do not exist in separate compartments. They are related products of the same leadership

and have their origin in the same basic national purposes and must be actually supporting in order

to be successful. Political stability of a nation is very important in the pursuit of any political

system include political culture of the nation, the nature of the leadership of the country, discipline

and patriotism of its citizens. All these factors were lacking in Nigeria during the military era (Kia,

2016).

This, perhaps, explains why Obasanjo (1999) advised that: “Democracy would not be complete if

it does not directly address, in a concrete manner, the human condition of the Nigerian people, the

majority of whom are impoverished. It is paradoxical Nigeria is fading one of the poorest countries

in the world despite her immense natural and human resources” (Obasanjo, 1999).

The reality of the above problems informed the regime’s attempts to strengthen foreign policy

apparatus to make it more result oriented, the overall aim being to shift from a virtually reactive

approach to a more proactive orientation. In his worlds, Obasanjo (1999) declared: “The overriding

84
and permanent of our foreign policy is to project and safeguard the national interest” (Obasanjo,

1999). Historically, the main thrust our foreign policy has been the struggle for peace, unity,

security, economic development and cooperation. Africa will continue to be the primary theatre of

our foreign policy. Nevertheless, his administration endorses the universal values of the

contemporary globalization process, which are development, human security, equity ethnics,

inclusion and sustainability.

The assertion implies a combination of Afro-centricism and multi-nationalism pattern of foreign

policy. On African perspective, the regime supported to bring an end to war in Liberia and

facilitated the enthronement of democracy in that country. In August 2003, the President of Sao

Tome and principle was ousted in a military coup while attending the Sullivan Summit in Abuja,

Nigeria but was later restored to power by Obasanjo administration. At the multinational level,

President Obasanjo made the presence of Nigeria well felt with several trips abroad to attend

sessions of United Nations (UN), G77, G15, G8, OPEC, World Bank, IMF, UNESCO, Non-

Aligned Movement, Commonwealth Organization, African Union (AU), ECOWAS and many

other organizations. On the bilateral angles, Obasanjo diplomatic practice resulted in the

followings:

Nigeria – South Africa Bi-National Commission Nigeria – Cameroon Joint

Commission Nigeria – Ethiopia on Technical Aid Corp Nigeria – Morocco Joint
Commission Nigeria – Niger Joint Commission (Consolidate) Nigeria – Egypt
Cooperation Nigeria – Nigeria Bilateral Economic Relations Nigeria – Sao Tome
Joint Development Relations (Jibril 2004)
In 2005, Nigeria was accorded the right to host the Common Wealth Heads of State and

Government Meeting (CHOGM) which subsequently make President Obasanjo its Chairman after

being suspended indefinitely in 1995. Nigeria entered into more the six bilateral agreements with

China, one of which resulted in the reconstruction of the Nigerian railway system. On the whole,

the following achievements were made the following policy statements:

85
 The regime reintegrates Nigeria into the County of Nations and repairs the sore spots in Nigeria’s
relations with the international community.
 The administration equally achieved debt relief
 The administration made frantic efforts to recover stolen monies lodged in foreign banks by
corrupt leaders.
 The African Renaissance is another important contribution of the require foreign
policy
 Enthronement of democracy in Liberia
 Attraction of foreign instruments, but not remarkably into the non-oil sector as
compare to Ghana and India (Kia, 2016).

86
 REFERENCES

Akinterinwa, B. (1990) “The Termination and Re-establish of Diplomatic Relations with France.
A study in Nigeria’s foreign policy Decision – making” in Olusanya G.O. & Akindele R. A. The
structure and processes of foreign policy making and implementation in Nigeria 1960 – 1990.
Lagos: NIIA.
Gabriel, O. (1988): Welcome Address delivered at the National Conference on Economic
Development and Foreign policy in Nigeria.

Aluko, O. (1981), Essays on Nigeria Foreign Policy. London: Allen and Unwin
Fawole, W.A (2003) Nigeria’s External Relations And Foreign Policy under military Rle (1966-
1999) Ile Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press Ltd.
Nnoli, O. (1976) “Nigerian Policy Towards Southern Africa”. Nigerian Jounrnal of international
Affairs Vol. 2 number 1&2.
Obasanjo, O. (1999): Nigeria’s Foreign Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century. Lagos: NIIA.
Jibril, A. (2004): Obasanjo and the New face of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, Kaduna: M O D Press.

Ofoegbu, R.O. (1990) “The structure and process of foreign policy formulation and
implementation in Nigeria. A study of the ministry of external Affairs”, in Olusanya G.O. &
Akindele R. A. The structure and processes of foreign policy making and implementation in
Nigeria 1960 – 1990. Lagos: NIIA
Ojo, O.J.B. (1990) “The making and Termination of the Anglo Nigeria Defence Pact” in Olusanya
G.O. & Akindele R. A. The structure and processes of foreign policy making and implementation
in Nigeria 1960 – 1990. Lagos: NIIA.
Schwarz F. (1965) Nigeria: The Tribes, The Nation or the Race. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press
Oyediran, O (1978) Survey of Nigerian Affairs. Ibadan: Oxford University Press.
Sotumbi, A.O (1990) “From Support to a Government of National Unity to a Pro-MPLA Policy
in 1975” in Olusanya G.O. & Akindele R. A. The structure and processes of foreign policy
making and implementation in Nigeria 1960 – 1990. Lagos: NIIA.
Garba, J (1991) Diplomatic Soldiering. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
Nweke, A.G (1990) “Policy Response to the May 1981 Nigeria-Cameroon Border Crisis in
Olusanya G.O. & Akindele R. A. The structure and processes of foreign policy making and
implementation in Nigeria 1960 – 1990. Lagos: NIIA.
Macebuh, S. (1981) “Public Opinion and the Nigeria-Cameroon Crisis”. Nigeria Forum.

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Kia, Bariledum, Nwigbo, Tambari S., & Ojie, Peter Abang (2016) “Foreign Policy Strategy of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960-2012: The Missing Link”. Journal of International Relations and
Foreign Policy, June 2016, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 21-38

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 CHAPTER FOUR

NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER GOODLUCK JONATHAN’S ADMINISTRATION

4.1 Introduction

President Goodluck Jonathan in August, 2011 declared open a four-day seminal aimed at

reviewing Nigeria & foreign policy. He challenged the participants to chart a new foreign policy

roadmap that can ensure industrialization and tackle the problem of youth unemployment and other

socio-economic problems. Having reviewed the foreign policy roadmap since independence to the

present dispensation, we discovered that there have been conceptual and doctrinal transition in

Nigeria foreign policy, in actual sense, they are not anchored in deep philosophical, visionary

imagination and broad based considerations of long term benefits to the national interests.

According to Pine (2011) Nigeria foreign policy have been borne out of pragmatic exigencies,

political faddism, conceptual elegance and regime identity. The current effort must be need based

and focused on short term, medium term and long term goals stated in achievable terms and devoid

of political rhetoric. The transformation agenda of Goodluck Jonathan & administration aims at

addressing the following:

Macroeconomics frame work and economic direction, Job creation, Public Expenditure
Management, Governance, Justice and Judicially, Legislature, Education, Health Sector,
Labour and Productivity, Power Sector, Information and Communication, Technology,
Niger Delta, Transportation, Foreign Policy and Economic Diplomacy (Pine, 2011:17).
In his capacity as the acting President, Jonathan embarked on a number of diplomatic shuttles, as

part of a deliberate attempt to reassure the world that Nigeria was well and secure despite the

internal political challenges especially with the challenges of succession it was going through.

Nigeria literally returned to the international arena. One of the shuttles took him to the USA where

he met with his American counterpart. The delisting of Nigeria from the discriminatory rule of the

Department of Homeland Security on special screening of passengers on international flights to

89
the United States that specifically targeted Nigerians (consequent upon the Christmas day

attempted bombing a US airline by a Nigerian) was the effect of the re-invigorated diplomatic

contact. Earlier he recalled Nigeria’s Ambassador to Libya in protest of suggestion by Muammar

Gaddafi that Nigeria should separate into a Muslim North State and a Christian South. The action

was aimed at checkmating the excesses of the then Libyan leader and sending a strong signal that

Nigeria can no longer tolerate such undue interference in the nation’s internal affairs from any

State.

4.2 Nigerian Foreign Policy in West Africa under the Jonathan Administration, 2010-

2015

Nigeria foreign policy goals and leadership aspirations in West Africa receive, perhaps, the

greatest challenges from her neighbours and by extension, the French, their colonial masters. In

spite of attempts to improve relations between Nigeria and her neighbours, the fact still remains

that they belong to sphere of influence of France in West Africa. They have strong economic,

social, cultural and security relations with France. This notwithstanding, Nigeria’s foreign policy

towards West African States since independence had been based largely on the following four

principles:

a. The sovereign equality of all African states;

b. Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African

state;

c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other African countries; and

d. Commitment to functional cooperation through the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) as a means of promoting African unity (Ahmad, 2012:397).

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These foreign policy objectives of the Nigerian states towards the formulation and

implementations of the Nigeria foreign policy on West African states and Africa in general made

Nigeria the big brother in Africa but this was not reflective of economic prosperity and its socio-

political position in the African continent. In order to address this the Jonathan administration

setup committee to review the Nigerian foreign policy.

Table 4.1: Selected Economic Indicators of ECOWAS States

Country per capita population below HDI
poverty line Rating
income
Benin 1364 39.0 167
Burkina Faso 1141 46.4 181
Cape Verde 3402 26.6 133
Côte d􀀾Ivoire 1387 46.7 170
Gambia 1282 58.0 168
Ghana 1584 28.5 135
Guinea Bissau 994 64.7 176
Guinea 863 53.0 178
Liberia 265 63.8 182
Mali 1123 47.4 175
Niger 641 59.5 186
Nigeria 2069 54.7 156
Senegal 1708 50.8 155
Sierra Leone 737 66.4 180
Togo 798 61.7 162
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2011. Sustainability and Equity:
A Better Future for All, New York, UNDP. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statis

Table 4.1 describes the economic strength of each member of the ECOWAS states and this was

supported by their ratings according to the per capita income, population below poverty lines and

also HDI rating. It is important to state here at this moment that the leadership role of Nigeria in

the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was due mainly of its population

and financial capability.

Shortly after his re-election as the president of Nigeria, Jonathan directed a review of Nigeria’s

foreign policy, “to reflect current realities”. According to him, “after 50 years of independence, it

91
is time to review the country’s foreign policy, in line with modern realities and international

developments’’ (http://dailytimes.com.ng). In his address to the Presidential Advisory Committee

on Foreign Affairs, earlier setup by Yar’Adua, he hinted the direction of the review, namely,

foreign policy with focus on Nigeria’s domestic priorities.

Thus in a follow up seminar the President clearly noted that although the country had played a

leading and facilitating role in the emancipation of the African continent from colonialism, racial

discrimination and reintegration in the past, there was now need to focus on new priorities and

challenges, such as job creation, economic progress, poverty eradication and security, which, he

said, were topmost on the nation’s national agenda. According to him also, in the era of

globalization; at a time of grave challenges to national and international security such as we face

from terrorism and transnational criminal networks; at a time of massive poverty and youth

restiveness in our country, we have no choice but to adjust and adapt the way we conduct foreign

policy. As we respond to the forces of globalization, our diplomacy must be put at the service of

our domestic priorities (Jonathan, 2011).

Putting diplomacy at the service of domestic priorities is the driving phrase. Accordingly, for him,

Nigeria’s diplomacy must articulate and vigorously market the country as an environment where

business can thrive. Thus foreign policy came rightly to be seen as the externalization of domestic

priorities and the aspirations of citizens. If Yar’Adua anchored his government’s policies on

“Seven Point Agenda”, Jonathan called his own “transformation agenda” which in essence entail

all the elements of the seven points agenda. Its key priorities which include Real sector, Agriculture

& Rural Development, Water Resources, Commerce & Industry, Mines & Steel Development,

Physical Infrastructure, Defence and Security, etc. address issues central to the people of Nigeria.

It is such domestic priorities that have continued to propel Nigeria’s actions and reactions on the

92
international arena. As part of the economic diplomacy which is evidently at the centre stage of

Vision 20:2020, strengthening of Nigeria's economic interest through the protection of the

country's businessmen and women wherever they exist in Africa and the rest of the world became

a top priority of Government (http://www.radionigeriaibadan.com).

Today, more than ever, while the organized private sectors are following the Nigerian diplomatic

flag around the globe to generate needed development at home, Nigeria’s diplomacy, at the same

time is following trade and sources of foreign direct investment for the same reason. The

administration is giving special attention to the improvement and strengthening of economic ties

with the country’s partners in the international community as a foundation for stability and growth.

(http://dailytimes.com.ng).

According to Jonathan (2011), Nigeria’s foreign policy and diplomacy are now anchored on the

realization of the Transformation Agenda through the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment.

This, the Minister of Foreign Affairs re-echoed when he observed: “We believe that foreign policy

must be used to support domestic programmes of government because your primary responsibility

is to ensure that there is peace, progress and economic development in Africa and we are using our

foreign policy today to support all government efforts in that direction

(http://www.compassnewspaper.org/index.php/politics/90-front-page-/5430-jonathan-receives-

revised-foreign-policy).

4.2.1 Nigeria Peacekeeping Mission in West Africa under Goodluck Jonathan

Administration

Goodluck Jonathan came at an instance when Nigerian foreign policy pursued a strong leadership

role in Africa and West Africa in particular to propelling the ground for democratic governance

and also supporting peacefully transmission of power. However, his administration, in order to

93
achieve this proposed agenda to look inward, i.e. the benefits of the average Nigerians in this

foreign policy implementation. This means that focusing on Nigeria’s domestic priorities has not

meant the abandonment of African issues. In fact, in partnership with the African Union, Nigeria

continues to lead the process for democracy and development in the continent. The main focus of

this initiative is to see that at least within the continent there are true democracies where people

elect their leaders.

This policy focus according to the President is very much compatible with Nigeria’s economic

diplomacy. In his words, “economic diplomacy is entirely compatible with democracy promotion,

for at least two reasons. First, building a strong economy will help us build a strong, stable,

prosperous and peaceful country, where democracy will thrive and business will flourish, and

where citizens can live and pursue their dreams with dignity under the protection of the law.

Second, it is in Nigeria’s interest to promote the culture of democracy across Africa, since it is the

surest way to guarantee peace, justice and happiness in the continent” (Jonathan, 2011). It is on

this commitment that the regime and through its leadership in ECOWAS effectively managed the

ouster of Laurent Gbagbo of Cote D’Ivoire when he refused to hand over power, after the 2010

Presidential elections in that country.

Table 4:1 Nigeria intervention on West African states failing to respect democratic principles
and rebellion under Jonathan Government.

Year/Country Cause of Nos of Nigeria Troops Outcome of

Conflict/Event Troops Casualties conflicts
Committed
2010/Cote Refusal to About 3000 No casualty Ouster ofGbabgo
d’Ivoire abdicate seat troops from power and
after losing an installation of
election to Ouatara as
Ouatara. President, 2011

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 2012/Mali Crisis of the about $34 Undisclosed for Nigeria’s
Armed Groups’ million, and security reasons intervention
occupation to 1200 Troops therefore serves
North Mali 900 combat its strategic
soldiers and 300 interest in
air force preventing north
personnel. Mali from
providing safe
havens for
Islamists that
threaten its
existence as a
secular state.
2012/Guinea Seizure of power Undisclosed for Undisclosed Negotiation still
Bissau by the military security reasons ongoing before
of Guinea Bissau voted out of
office
Source: Field Survey, 2017

Table 4.1 describes the participation of the Nigerian armed forces in crisis ridded West African

States and how Nigerian participation propelled Nigerian interest. The ouster of Gbagbo by the

combined forces of France and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group spearheaded by the Nigerian

government increased the international image of the Jonathan’s administration. While that of Mali

was strictly for security reasons because of the impending war Nigeria was fighting against home

insurgency. Guinea Bissau crisis was due mainly of the political instability that led to the taking

over of military junta.

4.2.1.1 Nigeria Intervention in Cote D’Ivoire Crisis 2010-2011

Côte d’Ivoire’s 28 November 2010 presidential election, and the months of tension and political

violence that followed, marked a new type of challenge for the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS)1. For the first time the organization was expected to react to a post-

electoral dispute within the context of a long-running, costly, multilateral peacekeeping operation.

The significant difficulties created by acting in an environment populated by several external

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bodies were magnified by the importance of Côte d’Ivoire, a major regional economic power

(Giles, 2012:1). The challenges faced by ECOWAS can be broadly divided between those internal

to the organization and those that concern its relationship with external partners. Internally, there

were multiple organizational, logistical and political issues as the institution sought to develop and

pursue a united response from West Africa’s diverse collection of states. Externally, difficulties

emerged as the institution attempted to manage a web of external partners that included the African

Union, the United Nations and France (Giles, 2012:1). The lessons that can be drawn from the

crisis of 2010-11 have a broad relevance for future peacekeeping and electoral missions.

Following the declaration by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that

Ouattara was the duly elected president of the country and statements by Nigerian President

Goodluck Jonathan in support of Ouattara, there were numerous reports of harassment by

Nigerians residing in the country. There were reports of targeting and destruction of Nigerian shops

and businesses by security forces and pro-Gbagbo supporters and militias (www.state.gov/g/tip).

On December 31 2010, the United Kingdom announced that it would politically support use of

force by ECOWAS in the UNSC, but did not offer or commit any troops for such a purpose. The

UK has also prepared military contingency plans with the French, but the objective of such plans,

which may pertain to evacuations of foreign citizens, has not been described publicly

(Aljazeera.net, 2011). In late March 2011, France and Nigeria, backed by ECOWAS, proposed

expanded U.N. travel and asset freeze sanctions targeting members of the Gbagbo administration

and imposing a ban on heavy weapons in Abidjan (Charbonneau and Worsnip, 2011 & Reuters,

2011).

A Nigerian defense spokesman, speaking on December 31, stated that ECOWAS military chiefs

from several member countries had “prepared plans to ‘forcefully take over power’ from” Gbagbo

96
using a grouping of troops called the ECOWAS standby force, said to consist of 6,500 troops, if

diplomatic efforts to pressure him to cede the presidency fail. A further logistics meeting was held

in mid-January 2011 in Mali to “finalize when troops would be deployed and how long they could

remain in the country.” The chiefs of staff were also slated to travel to Bouaké, in north-central

Côte d’Ivoire, a possible intervention staging point. Ghana, however, later declined to participate

in a potential intervention, citing an overburden of international peacekeeping deployments in

other regions, a preference for “quiet diplomacy”, and the presence of an estimated 600,000 or so

Ghanaians in Côte d’Ivoire (Cook, 2011:40). Nigeria was also thought to have domestic security

concerns of its own that might preclude it from contributing forces.

While supporting global peacekeeping operations, the Nigerian military continues to play an

important role in internal security and carries out functions traditionally reserved for the police.

As a result of these efforts, the populace has a greater trust in its military. In a 20 April 2012

editorial to the Nigerian Sunday Tribune, a reader indirectly praised the Nigerian Army,

commenting on the Nigerian Police’s demand for new uniforms. He mentioned, “The Nigerian

Army has never changed its uniform, yet it is not found wanting when it comes to efficient

discharge of its duties. Besides, it is known for discipline, commitment and dedication to duties

(Ajiboye, 2012).” Accolades for the military vis-à-vis their peacekeeping role have even garnered

praise from the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan. In public comments at a promotion

ceremony in December 2010 for new Nigerian Navy and Air Force Flag Officers, President

Jonathan stated that the world at large was looking to Nigeria to help settle the political situation

in Cote d’Ivoire. He went on to say; “We have to thank the [Nigerian] military for keeping the

country together [Cote d’Ivoire]. You have shown leadership in the whole of Africa (NBF News,

2012).” President Jonathan received calls from leaders worldwide praising Nigeria for helping to

97
resolve the situation in Cote d’Ivoire. He also said; “That tells you how others rate Nigeria and we

have no reason to derail. I have to commend the military for doing that. We have a standing role

in the society because of the role the military is playing (NBF News, 2010).”

The capture of Gbagbo by pro-Ouattara FRCI military forces appears to have nearly ended the

military conflict spurred by the post-electoral crisis. As of mid-April, FRCI forces were attempting

to defeat and force the surrender of a small number of die-hard armed Gbagbo supporters, but the

Gbagbo regime otherwise appeared to have ended. Many leading figures in Gbagbo’s

administration were also in FRCI custody, and the Ouattara government was investigating many

of them for human rights abuses and killings, arms purchases, or embezzlement and other financial

crimes. Prospects for the further resolution of the crisis and the factors that underlay it are unclear,

but the Ouattara government has garnered substantial pledges of international political and

financial support for its efforts to achieve these ends.

Key objectives include the imposition of Transitional Justice and accountability for Human Rights

crimes during and prior to the electoral crisis; postwar economic recovery, notably focusing on the

resumption of cocoa exports; and military and police and governance reform. Success in these

efforts will require that the Ouattara government build its legitimacy in the eyes of the entire

Ivoirian population, including those portions of the electorate that voted for Gbagbo, some

elements of which may remain aggrieved and attempt to obstruct the political process. A lengthy,

complex, and possibly politically volatile series of attempts to achieve national reconciliation and

unity are likely, as are efforts to address root causes of the conflict through land, constitutional,

and governance reform, as well as the conduct of legislative elections.

While Ouattara appears to be taking some of the actions recommended by the high-level AU

mediation panel in mid-March, it is not clear how closely he will adhere to the full range of these

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proposals, or to what extent the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) remains in effect. If the

crisis is resolved, Côte d’Ivoire is well-positioned to undertake a successful economic recovery,

and to reemerge as a regional economic hub. While the economy has suffered from some degree

of lack of investment due to the uncertain political situation, the cocoa economy has performed

well and the country has a fairly well developed infrastructure by regional standards. An end to

the crisis would also likely boost international political and investment confidence in West Africa

as a whole. In a proper observance of the role played by the Nigerian government led by the

Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Allasane Quattara, President of Côte d’ Ivoire and chairman of

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States, one of five regional blocs within the

AU), when he observed that Nigeria’s support for the restoration of the popular mandate in Côte

d’Ivoire had contributed immensely to peace, stability and reconstruction efforts in his country

and in West Africa (Quattara, 2012).

Beyond these, Nigeria has played prominent roles in the peaceful resolution of various conflicts,

including assisting in resolving the long-running conflicts in Sudan, as well as in Eritrea/Ethiopia

and Ethiopia/Somalia disputes. Nigerians were members of several OAU Commissions on

Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration charged with dealing with other disputes on the

continent of Africa. This was in pursuit of the dreams of the founding fathers of the OAU of the

need for Africans to play the major role in resolving conflicts on the continent. Nigeria's efforts in

the final restoration of peace and democracy to both Liberia and Sierra Leone have been

acknowledged internationally, especially the unrivalled enormous financial, material and human

sacrifices made by Nigeria in these countries (). The historic contributions of Nigeria to regional

peace missions in Liberia and Sierra-Leon cost the country the whooping sum US$ 10 billion, not

to mention the gallant men and women of Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice

99
in the cause of peace. In Cote d'Ivoire, our principled stand and dogged efforts under the leadership

provided by President Goodluck Jonathan, have no doubt led to the emergence of a democratic

government that is working to return the country to its enviable position as a haven of peace in the

sub-continent. Indeed, Ivoirians expressed the conviction that this dogged devotion to the

promotion of democracy has saved their country from bloodbath that would have flowed from that

crisis (Ashiru and George, 2013; Al-Hassan, 2008).

Recently, in the 2012 Mali crisis, the impact of encirclement of Nigeria by francophone countries

was revealed in the politics of intervention. For instance, francophone dominated and allowed

France to wield great influence among the conflict’s major players. Blaise Compaore, Burkinabe

leader who positioned himself as a key mediator in regional conflicts, it was argued, hosted French

gazelle helicopters in his country before they were deployed for military combat in Mali in January

2013. The Chairman of ECOWAS since February 2012 was Alassane Ouattara, leader of Cote

d’Ivoire, whose presidential mandate had been largely restored by the French army. The ECOWAS

president since February 2012 was former Burkinabe prime minister and a member of Compaore’s

Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) Party, Kadre Ouedrogo.

All three individuals were, in a sense, closely aligned with France and can be seen as French Trojan

horses within ECOWAS. This placed Nigeria in tight corner since it was diplomatically encircled

and linguistically different than its Francophone neighbors. Apart from the power play that has

always manifested between France and Nigeria in West Africa, Nigeria’s interest in intervening in

Mali was to curtail the perceived links between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda’s northern African

wing. In the words of President Goodluck Jonathan, “We believe that if we stabilize northern Mali,

not just Nigeria but other countries that are facing threats will be stabilized. The terrorists have no

boundaries. They don’t respect international boundaries” (Madike, 2013). Beyond this claim,

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however, has been Nigeria’s attempt in furthering her leadership position in Africa, to serve the

strategic best interest of the country (Oluwadare, 2014:113).

4.3 Nigerian Foreign Policy in Africa Under Jonathan’s Administration

Nigeria’s understanding of its status as Africa’s Big Brother is based on characteristics peculiar to

the country. Professor Gabriel Olusanya, former director general of Nigerian Institute of

International Affairs, captures these characteristics as follows:

Nigeria is a born leader. Nigeria’s credentials as the so called giant of Africa are credentials

inherent in the country itself. Nigeria is over 100 million people ... So by virtue of size and

population, Nigeria like America is in a situation where it cannot live outside her

geographical boundary ... Nature has so placed Nigeria in a situation where she has to be her

brother’s keeper. If your neighbours are hungry and unhappy, you can never be happy.

Nigeria’s neighbours are wretched and therefore we have to be our brother’s keeper

(Olusanya, 1988:27).

It is in recognition of the commitments and Nigeria’s remarkable credentials in Africa that her

current minister of foreign affairs, Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru, has reiterated that by her sheer

endowments, destiny and disposition, Nigeria has always used its strength responsibly in defence

or pursuit of peace, and in the interests and for the wellbeing of all people of African descent,

irrespective of geographic boundaries (Ashiru, 2012).

Table: 4.2 events and reaction of the Jonathan’s administration in Africa

Year Events/Reaction of the Jonathan’s Administration in Africa.

2010/2011 The AU was divided along several fault lines, most notably there was conflict
between Nigeria and South Africa regarding who should be the continent’s
leading actor in the Cote D’Ivoire crisis
2012 The BNC had not sat for four years when the relationship reached its lowest ebb –
the deportation of 125 Nigerians on one day in March 2012 over alleged yellow
fever certificate infractions. Abuja’s swift retaliation, including threats against

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 South African companies in Nigeria, led to an official apology from Pretoria for
the behaviour of its airport officials. The incident symbolised the frustration
Nigerians have had in securing visas to visit South Africa over the years, an issue
that has become a rallying point for anti-South African sentiment.
2010 Nigeria recalled its ambassador from Tripoli earlier this month, when Gadafi
proposed that Nigeria break for Christians. The Federal Government had said
Gaddafi‟s comments were insensitive and irresponsible and diminished his status
and credibility.
2011 The Moroccan government recalled its ambassador to Nigeria after officials of
the latter’s foreign ministry lied about a telephone conversation between Mr.
Jonathan and King Mohammed VI of Morocco.

2015 the South African government seized its $15 million arms money illegal brought
into South Africa in cash. At the twilight of Mr. Jonathan’s administration, the
South African government also ridiculed Nigeria’s shoddy recall of her
ambassador to South Africa following the xenophobic violence there.
2014 In 2014, there was the collapse of a portion of Synagogue Church building in
Lagos which killed 81 South Africans.

2011 The regime’s quick recognition of the National Transitional Council of Libya sent
a clear message to Muammar Gaddaffi to quit.
2010- Nigerians were elected into the following International Commissions: AU
2015 Commissioner for Political Affairs; Commissioner Political, Peace and Security at
the ECOWAS Commission. Vice Presidency of INTERPOL representing Africa.
Source: Field Survey, 2017

Table: 4.2 describes the major international events and reaction of the Jonathan’s administration

in Africa coupled with position acquired in the course of his administration it is important to state

here at this moment that foreign policy of South Africa and Nigeria went sour during the Jonathan’s

administration. Also, Nigeria was decisive and counter-productive in its foreign policy with the

South Africa and Libya government in every issues of diplomatic engagement. Although the image

of Nigeria was dented following the seizure of Fifteen Million Dollars suspected to be laundered

by the Nigerian government but the Jonathan’s administration efficiency in international affairs

and Africa in particular was highly praised and recommended by international community.

The 1999 Constitution, in Section 19, projects a dynamic foreign policy for Nigeria, through the

promotion of economic development, integration and unity, peace and security in Africa and the

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world. Accordingly, Nigeria’s involvement in West African security affairs and any role it might

have played in the past few decades have been the result of strongly help opinion by its successive

leaderships, generally a role about the nation􀀾s responsibility for Africa, and which the public has

come to accept, even though with reservation over the years. This was the basis for Babangida􀀾s

famous declaration in a 1985 speech, as quoted by Babalola (2009; 18) that Africas problems and

their solution, should constitute the premise of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This idea was also echoed

by President Jonathan, who, while declaring open a National Conference on the Review of

Nigerian Foreign Policy organized by the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) in August, 2011,

President Jonathan (2011) noted that:

In the era of globalization, at a time of grave challenges to national and international

security such as we face from terrorism and transnational criminal networks, our
commitment to regional and international peace and security must remain as strong
as ever. border crimes and general insecurity that could threaten other stable polities
and compromise national economies (Jonathan, 2011).

Thus, Nigeria could be appropriately considered a driver of security policy in West Africa. This is

because of, as argued by Adedeji (2007:198), the loosely structured defence system, for which

only Nigeria has the size, experience and logistic resources to serve as the core of an ECOWAS

rapid deployment force. The role in this regard is quite broad, including conflict resolution through

peace-keeping and peace support operations and mediation of political crises in the sub-region.

Personal diplomatic efforts of Nigeria􀀾s military Heads of State, particularly from Generals

Yakubu Gowon, Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha and Abubakar Abdusalam,

have been quite significant. As civilian President (1999-2007), Obasanjo was an activist in these

conflict resolution efforts. Presidents Umar Yar’Adua tried to remain visible on the African stage,

following Nigeria’s traditional role and at the same time, through what his Foreign Minister, Ojo

Maduekwe, called Citizen diplomacy, but with a more audacious rendition of the perspective,

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designed to bring the benefit of the nation’s international exertions on peace and security to the

average Nigerian citizen, guided by a diplomacy of consequence, which means reciprocity

(Akinterinwa, 2010).

President Goodluck Jonathan has also continued to shoulder this self-imposed responsibility for

the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa, but anchored on what his Foreign Minister

Olugbenga Ashiru described as Economic Diplomacy. Therefore, Nigeria under President

Jonathan is attempting a readjustment of foreign policy focus, and at the same time retaining

elements of its traditional commitment to West African solidarity and security. The general

direction of Nigerian involvement is informed by broadly defined foreign policy objectives, built

on a specific perception of its national role, as articulated and documented in the National Defence

Policy (2006), informed by conventional perspective about security threats, and by the capacity

for rapid response and deployment (Bamali, 2009: 96). On this basis, a national W.O. ALLi, Ph.D.

The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy that the armed forces possess the capability to

successfully defend Nigeria’s territory and people relying on military fire power to deter potential

adversaries (FGN, 2006: 24). As stated in the document, the specific objectives of the NNDP are:

a) protection of Nigeria’s sovereignty, citizens, values, culture, interests, resources and territory

against external threats;

b) provision of defence as well as strategic advice and information to government;

c) promotion of security consciousness among Nigerians;

d) response to requests for aid to civil authority;

e) participation in disaster operations both at home and abroad;

f) assistance to government agencies and levels of government in achieving national goals;

g) protection of Nigerians wherever they may reside;

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h) ensuring security and stability in the West African sub-region through collective security;

i) participation in bilateral and multi-lateral operations; and

j) contributing to international peace and security. (FGN, 1999 Constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria).

Items e, i, and j are clear indications about the nation’s commitment to sub-regional security and

peace, using the nation’s defence capabilities and considering that most of the concerns are security

and not defence related. But there is now only a military defence policy with an operational

structure designed in line with its objectives (Alli, 2012).

The Nigerian Constitution, in the Third Schedule (G) provides for an advisory body on defence,

the National Defence Council, made up of the President, Vice President and the Minister of

Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs and others with powers “to advise the

President on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria”.

The same Third Schedule of the Constitution, Section (K) provides for a National Security

Council, with powers “to advise the President on matters relating to public security including

matters relating to any organisation or agencies established by law for ensuring the security of the

Federation”.

4.4 Nigerian Foreign Policy on the Global Stage

Globally, Nigeria strives to deepen partnerships with other countries. This partnership for the

President must be anchored on mutual respect and responsiveness. In the absence of “mutual

respect and responsiveness” consequences would follow. This was exemplified in the “Iran arms

scandal”. To recall is that on the 26th October, 2010 Nigeria’s relations with Iran became turbulent

as a result of the discovery of thirteen containers arms and ammunitions surreptitiously shipped to

Nigeria from Iran. This was happening at a time of growing insecurity in Nigeria. Iranian Mission

105
not only got an immediate response, but Nigeria promptly reported the incident to the United

Nations. Perhaps where Nigeria exhibited courage and asserted the independence of her foreign

policy was at the United Nations General Assembly’s vote on admission of Palestine as Non-

member State of the body. Prior to the voting, most Third World countries were under immense

pressure from Israel and United States to vote no! Nigeria was among the majority that voted for

the admission of the State of Palestine in the UN (Nwankwo, 2013:218).

Similar to the above is the President’s position on the International Criminal Court vis-à-vis its

planned trial of the Kenyan President which clearly shows courage and independence in foreign

policy. Nigeria’s visibility on the globe outside the peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations

began picking up under the regime. Through lobbying and campaigning, Nigerian candidates got

into positions in international organizations: Presidency of the Executive Council of the

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) based in Montreal, Canada; member UN

Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); AU

Commissioner for Political Affairs; Commissioner Political, Peace and Security at the ECOWAS

Commission (Nwankwo, 2013:218).

In October 2011 Nigeria was also elected to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Vice

Presidency of INTERPOL representing Africa. In November the same year, Nigeria was elected

to the Executive Board of UNESCO for a term of four years while Nigeria’s Attorney General and

Minister of Justice, Hon. Mohammed Bello Adoke, was re-elected to the International Law

Commission. Others include the election of Dr. Chile Eboe-Osuji as one of the six judges of the

International Criminal Court (ICC) in a tightly contested election in New York in November, 2011

and the election of Nigeria as the first President of the Executive Board of the United Nations

Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: UN Women (Abati, 2012). Jonathan has also

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pursued Nigeria’s desire for permanent membership in a yet to be reformed UN Security Council

with proactive diplomacy. In May 2011 Nigeria discussed this with France, one of the key powers,

and received France’s promise of support in this regard (Ikuomola, 2011). Similar support came

from China during the historic visit of the President to that country. The recent election in 2013 of

Nigeria as non-permanent member of Security Council is an expression faith in Nigeria by the

international community.

Measured in terms of Nigeria’s visibility in the global community and the amount of foreign direct

investment and foreign trade inflow which are indices of effective engagement with outside world,

Nigeria under Jonathan has made significant progress touching all the objectives of the Vision

20:2020. It is perhaps these efforts that have earned the Nigerian President international

recognition of being among 100 most influential leaders of the world in 2012 by Times

International magazine. Challenges, however, still abound in all the spheres including the key

priorities in his transformation agenda. It is perhaps the enormity of these challenges that have

made scholars describe the Vision as myth (Itua, 2011) or over ambitious (Olutokun 2013).

Table: 4.3 the Nigeria foreign policy in the world stage

Year Events and Reactions of the Jonathan Administration on the International Stage

2009 A major setback in the relations between the US and Nigeria came in December
2009, when a young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was arrested during a
failed attempt to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253, flying into Detroit from
Amsterdam. The immediate reaction of the US was to place Nigeria on its ‘Terror
Watch List.’
2010 After several diplomatic appeals from Nigerian government, the US agreed to
remove Nigeria from the list in March 2010
2010 Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and French President Sarkozy seem to have
established a good friendship. This was reflected in the Nigerian leader’s invitation
to attend the 25th Africa-France Summit in Nice, in May 2010.
2010 Nigeria was made to Chair the UN Security Council between 2010 and 2011 during
which it addressed stringently threats to international peace and security not only
in Africa but also in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas.

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 2010 On the 26th October, 2010 Nigeria’s relations with Iran became turbulent as a
result of the discovery of thirteen containers arms and ammunitions
surreptitiously shipped to Nigeria from Iran.
2011 As of April 2011, bilateral trade between Nigeria and France had reached 5.5

billion euros.

2011 In October 2011 Nigeria was also elected to the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), Vice Presidency of INTERPOL representing Africa. Nigeria was
elected to the Executive Board of UNESCO for a term of four years while Nigeria’s
Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Hon. Mohammed Bello Adoke, Others
include the election. of Dr. Chile Eboe-Osuji as one of the six judges of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in a tightly contested election in New York in
November, 2011 and the election of Nigeria as the first President of the Executive
Board of the United Nations Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: UN
Women.
2013 The election in 2013 of Nigeria as non-permanent member of Security Council is
an expression faith in Nigeria by the international community.
2014 Nigeria was among the majority that voted for the admission of the State of
Palestine in the UN.
Source: Field Survey, 2017

Table 4.3 describes the events and reactions of Nigeria in the global stage under the Jonathan

administration for its activeness to Foreign Policy initiatives and formulations as regards the

Nigerian international relations. It is very important to state that in 2010 the Jonathan’s

administration was very active in the course of its international engagement. While the 2011 and

2013 have a lesser international engagement was recorded within this period. It also important to

state that the Jonathan administration recorded high of Nigerians elected or appointed into

leadership positions in international organisations.

4.5 Foreign Direct Investment and Nigerian Foreign Policy under Goodluck Jonathan

Significant scholarly efforts have been made to study the role of FDI in the Nigerian economy.

Adelegan (2000) explored the seemingly unrelated regression model to examine the impact of FDI

on economic growth in Nigeria and found out that FDI is pro-consumption and pro-import and

negatively related to gross domestic investment. Akinlo (2004) found out that foreign capital has

108
a small and no statistically significant effect on economic growth in Nigeria. However, these

studies do not control the fact that most of the FDI was concentrated in the extractive industry. In

other words, it can be pointed out that these works assessed the impact of investment in extractive

industry (oil and natural resources on Nigeria‟s economic growth). On firm level productivity spill

over, Ayanwale and Bamire (2001) assessed the influence of FDI and firm level productivity in

Nigeria and reported a positive spillover of foreign firms on domestic firm’s productivity. Much

of the other empirical work on FDI in Nigeria centered on examination of its nature, determinants

and potentials. For example, Odozi (1995) noted that foreign investment in Nigeria is made up of

mostly “Greenfield” investment.

That is, it is mostly utilized for the establishment of new enterprises and some through the existing

enterprises. Aremu (1997) categorized the various types of foreign investment in Nigeria into five:

Wholly foreign owned; joint ventures; special contract arrangements; technology management and

marketing arrangements; and sub-contract co-production and specialization. In his study of the

determinants of FDI in Nigeria, Anyanwu (1998) identified change in domestic investment, change

in domestic output or market size, indigenization policy, and change in openness of the economy

as major determinants of FDI inflow into Nigeria and that effort must be made to raise the nation’s

economic growth so as to be able to attract more FDI. Jerome and Ogunkola (2004) assessed the

magnitude, direction and prospects of FDI in Nigeria. They noted that while the FDI regime in

Nigeria was generally improving, some serious deficiencies remained. These deficiencies are

mainly in the area of the corporate environment (such as corporate law, bankruptcy, labour law,

etc) and institutional uncertainty, as well as the rule of law.

The establishment and the activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC),

the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Nigerian Investment Promotion

109
Commission (NIPC) are efforts to improve the corporate environment and uphold the rule of law.

The question to answer now is: Have there been any discernible change in the relationship between

FDI and economic growth in Nigeria in spite of these policy interventions? Akinlo (2004)

investigated the impact of FDI on economic growth in Nigeria using data from the period 1970 to

2001. His error correlation model (ECM) results showed that both private capital and lagged

foreign capital have small and insignificant impact on economic growth. This study however

established the positive and significant impact of export on growth. Financial development which

he measured as M2/GDP has significant negative impact on growth.

This he attributed to capital flight. On the other hand, labour force and human capital were found

to have significant positive effect on growth. However, an important fact about FDI and growth

debate is the endogeneity case in which FDI is theorized to impact positively on economic growth,

and consequently leading to greater market which in turn attracts further FDI as well (market size

hypothesis). Market size hypothesis states that markets with rapidly expanding economic growth

tend to give multinational firms more opportunities to make more sales and profits and therefore

become more attractive to FDI (Charkrabarti, 2001). This study will therefore make its

contribution by examining the benefits of adopting increased inflow of FDI in Nigeria as a major

pathway towards achieving the vision 2020 economic growth target.

Table 4.4 Describes the Foreign Capital Flow Resulting from Foreign Investment as
Against Nigeria Industrial Investment

Year

2010 133894.5 1510.8 2282516.64 20228710.60 1792778713

2011 212729.4 1666.1 2775889.21 354428453.30 4525378762

110
 2012 245763.3 1878.5 3528762.25 461666359.10 6039959963

2013 229246.4 2118.3 4487194.89 485612649.10 5255391191

2014 259362.5 2374.2 5636825.64 61577447.50 6726890641

2015 Σ1344778.1 Σ15185.1 Σ18711191.63 Σ2436372112 Σ3065444031

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2017

The results from Table 4.4 shows a positive relationship between FDI and industrial production.

The elasticity of the index of industrial production with respect to FDI of 2.636 indicates that 1%

increase in foreign direct investment will lead to %2.636 increase in the level of industrial output.

Also, the coefficient of determination (R²) with a value of 0.72 indicates high positive relationship

between foreign direct investment and index of industrial output.

4.5 Nigeria Foreign Policy Under Jonathan and the Challenges of Sustaining the Vision

More than external challenges, it is internal challenges that are the dampening factor in Nigeria’s

attainment of great power status which Vision 20:2020 envisages. Key internal challenges include

Poor governance, insecurity of lives and property, power supply (Olutokun, 2013), the quality of

the nation’s educational institutions; its capacity to innovate; the quality of its democracy and the

ability to build consensus and resolve conflicts (Okere, 2012). More specifically, the insurgency

in the North, the collapse of public education, growing unemployment, oil dependent economy,

dilapidated economic infrastructure among others are major issues that deserve attention if not

radical government intervention. In spite of these obvious challenges, the commitment of the

President to sustaining the policy objectives of the Vision is not in doubt. However, this sustaining

and attainment of the Vision even outside the scheduled timeframe requires addressing the

challenges in a more positive way.

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As is well known, for instance, education of the young ones is the bedrock of any nation. As the

heartbeat of any nation these youths are the hopes for the realization and sustenance of the vision.

Yet they constitute today the bulk of the neglected. The need, therefore, for Government to

comprehensively place this above all others (Itua, 2011) by addressing the issues of their

empowerment and job creation. This will stem the tide of their illegal emigration to countries

where they engage in activities that impinge on the nation’s image. Without doubt, this youth

related problematic lies even at the foundation of the nation’s security challenges and which,

currently, is sending wrong signals to major prospective foreign investors. It is also a fact that

because of the security challenges in addition to the general harsh operating business environment

even local investors are relocating to other countries like Ghana. Parts of this general harsh

business environment are mismanagement and corruption. How mismanagement and corruption

give the nation weak foundation for any robust international engagement is one of the most

discussed issues that it does not require any further discussion here.

Diversifying the economy which currently is driven by oil – a depleting resource – is critical to

sustaining the Vision. In this regard, there has been more words than action as, comparatively,

there has been not much investment in the non-oil sector. Yet Nigeria is richly endowed with

abundant raw materials that could support various areas of manufacturing begging for exploitation

(Okere, 2012). To address the issue, the current trend in the establishment of industrial parks need

to be stepped up and properly harnessed to attract foreign manufacturing firms to advantage the

manufacturing base of the country. But this assumes the availability of power which currently, in

spite some progress, still stands far below acceptable level. Official declaration of a State of

emergency on the power sector is not out of place as this will ginger adequate resource

mobilization for improvement.

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All the above are not only issues that directly affect the economy and the lives of the people, they

are also fundamental to constructing a nation that can command attention of the global community

and attaining the vision of great power status. Though mainly within the confines of domestic

policy action, the intermistic character of contemporary issues makes it near to impossible for any

nation to go it alone even in such domestic matters. This importance of the external environment

to the internal challenges must be comprehended and appreciated by all policy actors. It is this

comprehension that will enable the generation of compatible policy and effective diplomacy that

serve national interest. Consequent upon this nexus, key to continued progress in the direction of

that Vision is a continued focusing on foreign policy as the externalization of domestic priorities

and the aspirations of citizens.

As much as diplomacy cannot be effective under the current context of security challenges, decay

in the educational sector as well as weak economic base, yet Nigeria requires diplomacy and

official ingenuity to address these challenges. Such diplomacy requires formidable specialized

knowledge in many fields of intellectual endeavors with an overlay of generalized training in the

diplomacy of the respective issues for any diplomat to make meaningful impact and sell the agenda

of this country. In other words, Nigeria’s diplomacy requires high caliber professionals to drive

her contemporary diplomacy. Accordingly, capacity building for Nigerian diplomats should be

placed on the front burner.

The above requirement is however negated by the present practice of settling political friends with

diplomatic appointment by the President. To remain relevant in the world of today Nigeria must

jettison the politicization of Foreign Service and the Ministry of foreign affairs in general in its

recruitment and appointment exercises. This was clearly brought out by the 2010 Round Table on

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. The Round Table called on the Nigerian foreign policy establishment to

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stem the tide of eroding professionalism and decline in foreign service, to take advantage of the

prospects and opportunities presented by a changing domestic and external environment, and to

seek to confront and address the litany of known challenges in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(MFA) (This Day, October 9, 2010). Added to the above is the need to re-orientate Foreign Service

Officers in the direction of moral rectitude, of integrity, loyalty, good conduct and hard work. This

is critical in managing the nation’s foreign policies as a tool of development. This need arises from

the current perception of Nigeria’s diplomatic posts especially by Nigerians in the Diaspora as

“centres of officialdom managed by indolent officials who are generally too self-absorbed,

haughty, uncaring and-irresponsible”. As noted by Obijiofor, (2012) Nigerian diplomats serving

in overseas countries have been chastised publicly for their selfish behaviour and for their

contemptuous treatment of, or disregard for, citizens in need of consular services. The Foreign

Affairs Ministry must take responsibility for the scandalous conduct of diplomatic staff that has

sullied the image of the country at home and abroad.

This poor impression and lack of confidence by many Nigerians in the Diaspora in Nigeria’s

Foreign Service as a result of mediocre work ethic, and poor relationship with the public, is a major

challenge which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must take responsibility and squarely address.

Even the MFA as the coordinating Ministry requires re-positioning. In fact, any effective

repositioning of Nigeria’s diplomatic missions cannot be achieved without a thorough overhaul of

the Foreign Affairs Ministry. According to Obijiofor (2012), “it is this supervising ministry that

has contributed most appallingly – in directly and directly – to the ghastly image of Nigerian

diplomatic posts”. A major problem that has undermined the capacity of Nigerian diplomatic

missions to function effectively is adequate funding. The nation cannot maintain poorly funded

diplomatic missions and expect the diplomats to perform effectively.

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Besides the issue of finance, managing the multi-varied players in today’s diplomacy is a major

challenge. A key feature of today’s diplomacy is the involvement of myriads of actors and the

growth of multilateral diplomacy. Non-state actors have proliferated in number and types, ranging

from traditional economic interest groups, through to resource, environmental, humanitarian,

criminal and global governance interests. In some instances, non-governmental organizations are

closely linked to official administrations, while others are transnationally linked. If one juxtaposes

this fact with the original conception of Vision 20:2020 which is designed as bottom-top in

approach to allow the real stakeholders, (which are basically private entities and individuals) to be

its driving force, then effort must be intensified to maintain collaborative link between public and

private sector in the process of articulating and implementing the foreign policies related to the

Vision.

In consequence of the above and because of the vital role of the economy in the whole agenda,

regular dialogue with private sector operators playing active roles in economic planning, based on

market principles need be intensified. This is in addition to the formation of business

partnerships/linkages that engender learning and transfer of technology. While forming the said

partnership Nigeria must at the same time re-examine all existing partnerships, especially those

with the West to ensure that they can enable self-reliance not just for Nigeria but also for Africa

in general.

In addition, there has been a geometric growth in the involvement of a wider range of

ministries/departments in the nation’s external relations. Such ministries/departments as industry,

aviation, environment, shipping, customs, health, education and sports, which get involved in

Nigeria’s external relations, require coordination just as the non-state actors. This is particularly

necessary in matters relating to both formulation and implementation of international agreements.

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Coordinating these varied actors to ensure the nation acts in unison has become an important

distinguishing feature in modern diplomacy

Finally, it is important to note that several well-orchestrated projects have “waxed and crashed” in

Nigeria. The very reasons for such waxing and crashing are still with Nigeria today: indiscipline

and policy inconsistencies. As in the past, Nigeria fancies herself as an actoron the world stage but

refuses to muster the discipline, stamina and industry that can translate the potential conferred on

her by material endowments into achieved status (Olukotun, 2013). According to Onyenekenwa

(2011), Nigerian governments are plagued with institutional/structural inconsistencies and

discontinuity. The officials are not committed to the development of policies of their predecessors

hence the national landscape is littered with uncompleted projects (Okigbo, 1989; Oladapo, 2004).

Counting indiscipline and lack of political will in the formulation and implementation of policies

as constituting “the most serious defects in Nigeria”, Onyenekenwa opined that “a policy is only

as effective as the discipline and will that sustain it”. According to him, lack of discipline manifests

in the infusion of partisan and ethnic politics into the technology of data collection, in the location

of government projects and in the application of policies, while poor policy performance is largely

attributed to lack of commitment and political will on the part of the leadership. Managing the

Nigerian Vision to avoid crash requires, therefore, that the leadership commit to sufficient

discipline and political will to enforce policies. How well the leadership does just that as to respond

to the changes and challenges facing the Vision, will definitely determine its effectiveness,

relevance, and future.

HDI Rankings Country Per Capita

Income
Population

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 CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The Nigeria foreign policy in West African states under the Jonathan’s government was one which

had been a unifying factor and also promoting economic, security, progressive, democratic

principles. It had however recorded some major achievement such that governments in West

Africa within these period seen Nigeria as a major political and economic power to reckon with.

Notably of these admirations of the role Nigeria play to ensure democratic ethos and security

framework were the Nigerian participation in ending the Gbagbo-Ouatara’s political rift in Cote’D

Ivoire and also the Nigeria intervention against the Malian rebels.

In Africa, the administration of Jonathan had several issues with its counterparts and was criticized

for playing into the hands of the ‘West’, especially in the Libyan crisis which brought to an end

over thirty years’ rule of Muammar Gadhafi. Although the ousting of Gaddafi was mainly

orchestrated by Western propaganda but the Jonathan’s government was mainly for restoration of

democratic ethos in the continent. Nigeria foreign policy also engaged the South African

government with reciprocity when the South African government sacked Nigerians from their

country. Nigeria responded swiftly by deporting South Africans resident in the country, this made

South Africa to tender an apology to the Nigerian government.

In the world stage, the Nigerian foreign policy received a boost after Nigeria was removed from

the United State list of nations considered to be sponsoring terrorism, this was due mainly after

the Jonathan’s administration enter into series of diplomatic negotiation that now saw Nigeria off

the hook. The Nigerian image in the global world further received boost after series of

appointments and elections that saw Nigeria had a chunk of them above African nations. Notable

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was Olumiya Bernard Aliu who was voted as the first black President of the International Civil

Aviation Organisation in 2013. Also the government was also praised for its participation and

ending of the crisis in Mali, Libya, Cote D’Ivoire, among others. Importantly, the independent role

played by the Jonathan’s administration in the United Nations following the voting for Palestine

inclusion into the United Nations as against pressure from Europe, Israel and America that saw

every other African party chickened out. Also, the Nigerian government against Western pressure

signed into law anti-gay bill was another decisive step taking by the Jonathan’s administration.

5.2 Conclusion

Foreign policy not only shapes the country’s identity at large, but also determines its place and its

future in the world. It is within this framework that this paper examined Nigeria’s foreign policy

under the current administration of Jonathan vis-à-vis Nigeria’s aspiration of becoming an

important global player. Fully aware of the raging controversy over the attainability of the Vision

especially from the standpoint of time frame which we played down, evidence abound that the

regime of Jonathan is making positive effort in the direction of the vision with the instrumentality

of foreign policy. The administration is presently taking advantage of the international

environment, as is the case with other nations, in enhancing domestic development. Today, more

than ever before, Nigeria’s foreign policy is giving greater attention to her domestic priorities and

herein lies the paradigm shift.

The articulations in the foreign policy component of the Vision call for Nigeria’s foreign policy to

be great in focus, reciprocal in tactics, and beneficial to Nigerian citizens in outcome (This day,

2010). They can take care of today’s domestic needs identified as the economic well-being of

citizens, enhanced security and massive foreign investment inflow and are related to Nigeria’s

leadership role in the sub-region, in the continent as well as her global dream of great power. With

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the involvement of the people and various sectors in driving development process in a very

sustainable manner, the paradigm shifts give hope that “the promised land” that the Vision 20:2020

is pointing at may one day be attained subject, above all, to discipline and policy consistency

especially in the leadership.

For the avoidance of doubt, most of the ideas expressed in the recommendations of this paper may

not be too alien to the Jonathan administration as Nigeria has never lacked in good policies. In

fact, the various declaratory statements of the president bear testimony to this fact. For instance,

in line with the shift in paradigm the Foreign Affairs Minister was credited with declaring that

Nigeria’s foreign policy under the regime would be investment-driven and different from the

previous focus on Africa. According to him “Our foreign policy must now reflect the aspirations

of Nigerians, our collective dreams, the yearnings of our children, and the fulfilment of the

potential of our youths as well as the realization of the manifest destiny of this great country”

(Anyanwu & Uzoatu, 2011). The Minister even outlined ideas similar to some of the ideas

canvassed in this paper. The problem which has been the bane is the implementation. The

challenge is that of managing official pronouncements to ensure consistency between declaratory

and operational policies. This is a legacy which Goodluck Jonathan would have bequeathed to

Nigeria.

5.3 Recommendations

In line with the findings of this research, the following are the recommendations;

 All the institutions that are constitutionally empowered to take part in decision making should

be allowed to play their statutory roles, while the people themselves for whom these policies

are made should equally be allowed to contribute ideas.

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 Agencies that will be affected by any foreign policy decision should be aware of, and make

contributions towards the final decisions, even if they are not part of the foreign policy

machinery.

 Nigeria should match her foreign policy with realist status and not an imaginary one.

 Nigerian foreign policy should be made to reflect the realities on the ground. It should be clear

to all now that the idea of being a giant that should be spending so much on African issues is

no longer feasible.

 Nigerian foreign policy objectives should be based on the need to attract economic dividends

in order to develop the nation so as to be a real giants and not a giant with clay feet.

 Nigeria should always emphasize on a policy of quid pro quo (something for something) before

proceeding on any foreign mission i.e. the principle of reciprocity which form part of foreign

policy objectives must be adhered to by successive Nigerian government in their dealings with

any nation.

 Nigerian leaders should work seriously towards diversifying the nation’s economy, so as to

reduce over dependence on oil.

 Nigeria should adopt its own growth and development strategy not on the basis of ideology but

based on its own geographical, historical, economic, political and socio cultural realities.

 The Nigerian Government needs to embark on capital project, which will enhance the

infrastructural facilities with which foreign investors can build on.

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