Metaphor in Accounting Discourse

Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
Metaphor in accounting discourse

L. Melissa Walters-York
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Metaphor in
Metaphor in accounting accounting
discourse discourse
L. Melissa Walters-York
Drexel University, Philadelphia, USA 45
Introduction
Metaphor is generally considered one of a dizzying number of tropes or
figurative expressions. Figures, schemes, and tropes (of which metaphor may
be considered the archetype)[1] are part of what may collectively be referred to
as rhetorical or figurative language (Preminger and Brogan, 1993). Aristotle
heralded metaphor as the most significant feature of poetic composition,

claiming that it cannot be learned and praising the command of metaphor as
the “hallmark of genius” (Holman and Harmon, 1992; Preminger and Brogan,
1993). He saw metaphor as a product of the poet’s unique and heightened
emotions and keen insights which allowed him the eye for resemblances in
seemingly dissimilar things (Preminger and Brogan, 1993). In the Poetics,
Aristotle claimed that, for the poet, “the greatest thing by far is to be master of
metaphor” ( Johnson, 1980; Preminger and Brogan, 1993).
The past several decades have seen broad movements in the social sciences
characterized by an increased emphasis on language and meaning as a means
for understanding our social systems and structures (e.g. see Berman, 1988;
Palmer, 1994; Harland, 1987). Consequently, there has been a renewed surge of
interest in the role of metaphor in understanding language and communication
(Ortony 1993a, 1993b; Waggoner, 1990). Accounting and organizational studies
are no stranger to the study of metaphorical forms (e.g. Boland, 1986, 1989;
Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Davis et al., 1982; Heath, 1987; Meyer, 1984;
Morgan, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988; Thornton, 1988; Tinker, 1986; Tsoukas, 1993).
Most of these studies acknowledge well the powerful role of macroscopic
metaphorical models, paradigms, or images in shaping and constructing
accounting and organizational knowledge, practices, and structures. What
these studies fail to consider, is that even the driest of accounting textbooks and
ordinary accountants in their most mundane moments employ metaphor in
their texts[2] to “make the world mean”. As well, novel metaphors, rich in
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Tony Puxty. Although the author cannot say he would
have agreed with many of the things posited in this paper (or having known Tony, any of the
things intended to be posited), the author cannot deny his most profound influence on the
direction that her readings and thoughts have taken in months recently past. The author would
also like to thank the anonymous reviewer on the earlier draft of this paper for the helpful
comments and editorial remarks. A first and somewhat different draft of this paper was presented Accounting, Auditing &
at the Third Critical Perspectives on Accounting Symposium in New York City, 16-18 April 1993; Accountability Journal,
Vol. 9 No. 5, 1996, pp. 45-70
the author would like to thank Christine Cooper as well as the other participants at the conference . © MCB University Press, 0951-
for their insightful comments at that time. 3574
AAAJ background implications, may serve to defamiliarize accounting practices and
9,5 force us to reconceive that which the ordinary and routine would allow us to
pass over without question (Preminger and Brogan, 1993; Shklovsky, 1965).
However, the mainstream versions of our craft as well as other social sciences
are grounded in the common presupposition that science and philosophy should
be expounded by an especially true level of language characterized by precision
46 and absence of ambiguity – that is, in a word, literal (Arrington and Francis,
1989; Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Hoffman, 1980; Lakoff, 1993; Lavoie, 1987;
Levine, 1985; Ortony, 1993b). Tropological linguistic forms such as metaphor
have come to symbolize the creative, multivocal properties of language that
dreams of clean primitive concepts and dispositions towards theoretic rigour
seek to cleanse away (Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Levine, 1985; Ortony,
1993b). As such, metaphors are often held to be non-essential stylistic devices,
incompatible with serious thought, employed only for the pleasure of the reader
(Black, 1962; Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Gibbs, 1993; Heath, 1987; Lakoff,
1993; Ortony, 1975; Ortony, 1993b; Preminger and Brogan 1993; Tsoukas, 1993).
Metaphor, by these standards, is relegated to the realm of the poet, exclusive of
ordinary, scientific, and philosophical discourses. What, pray tell, presumably
separates the language of a poet from that of the common folk, the scientist, the
philosopher, or for that matter, the accountant? Indeed, Black (1962, p. 25), in his
now famous essay, states in bemusement that “To draw attention to a
philosopher’s metaphors is to belittle him…Yet the nature of the offense is
unclear”.
The nature of the offence

The general prejudice against the use of metaphor in philosophy and science is
an aspect of how rhetorical or figurative language as a whole has historically
been viewed (Johnson, 1980; Preminger and Brogan 1993). The characteristic
distrust of rhetorical or figurative language dates, in all likelihood, back to
Plato’s infamous bifurcation between philosophy and poetry and Aristotle’s
discussions of the role of metaphor in language and communication in the
Rhetoric and the Topica (see Johnson, 1980; Ortony, 1993b; Preminger and
Brogan, 1993; Soyland, 1994). Plato characterizes rhetoric as a ploy worthy only
of sophistry and treats figuration as one escapade of the sophists who care not
for the truth but “make trifles seem important and important points trifles by
the force of their language” ( Johnson, 1980; Soyland, 1994)[3]. Having
condemned the rhetoric of the sophists as distrustful, Plato was compelled to
ensure that philosophy was seen as engaging in some other more respectable
enterprise. Plato went to great lengths to distinguish between philosophy and
rhetoric, banishing poetry from the discipline of philosophy and arguing that
poets (not unlike the sophists) sway opinion through the seduction of their
eloquent language (Soyland, 1994). The fruits of philosophy, however, lay in the
dignified use of logic, reason and truth to enlighten[4].
Aristotle exhibited a considerably more positive sentiment towards
figurative forms in the Poetics but then later maintained Plato’s view of figures
as potentially less-than-philosophic in the Rhetoric and the Topica ( Johnson, Metaphor in
1980; Ortony, 1993b; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). In the Poetics, metaphor is accounting
portrayed as an enigma which lends dignity to poetic style and affords the poet discourse
the unique power to induce fresh insights through mimesis, revealing
resemblances, or naming that which had once been nameless ( Johnson, 1980;
Ortony, 1993b; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). In the Rhetoric however, metaphor
is characterized as a technique used in the art of persuasion which once again 47
associated figuration with the derogatory reputation of the sophists ( Johnson,
1980; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). In the Topica, Aristotle further contends
that metaphors may often masquerade as definitions and warns that one must
be careful to draw clear distinctions between “genuine definitions” and such
imitative metaphors (Ortony, 1993b; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). It is
presumably from Aristotle’s description of the imitative and persuasive
properties of metaphor that it eventually acquired its widespread and

unsavoury reputation for being a deviation from the truth.
Although Aristotle’s more favourable, poetic assessments of metaphor
carried over into the high middle ages[5], figurative forms soon fell into
disfavour again when advances in mathematics and science during the early
seventeenth century established a philosophical disposition towards symbolic
precision and theoretic rigour (Hollister, 1982; Johnson, 1980; Levine, 1985;
Palmer, 1994)[6]. Descartes, Leibniz, Hobbes and Bentham each sought the
certainty and rigour of mathematics for philosophy and science. Leibniz
envisioned an arithmetic technical language, Hobbes found comfort in
geometry, and Bentham’s ideal language mimicked algebra (Levine, 1985;
Palmer, 1994). Such high regard for mathematical expression led Lock, Hume
and Bentham as well as other enlightenment philosophers to castigate poetic
discourse for its allusions and vagaries. Locke (1690/1975), the first of the
classical British empiricists, is typical of this deep-rooted prejudice against the
use of figurative language in saying
…all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing
else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement; and
so indeed are perfect cheats; and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render
them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to
inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided…(p. 504)[7].
This desire to strip language of its poetic character, the desire to make language
a technical device for establishing singular stable meanings was also
characteristic of logical positivism during the early part of the twentieth
century[8]. The logical positivists, inspired by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico
Philosophicus, held that reality could and should be described in a manner
which was clear, precise, testable and veridical (Ortony, 1993b; Palmer, 1994).
The doctrine of logical positivism used formal logic and empiricist principles to
define the structure of legitimate or meaningful statements (statements which
could make valid claims to truth). Meaningful statements consisted of only
those clean primitive assertions which expressed raw verifiable facts with
complete simplicity (“the language of verification”) (Palmer, 1994)[9]. Other uses
AAAJ of language such as poetic figuration, violated the positivist’s empirical criteria
9,5 of meaning and were labelled nonsensical imaginative utterances which merely
give the illusion of knowledge (Palmer, 1994)[10]. Metaphor, which had come to
symbolize non-literal or supplementary uses of words and meanings, was thus
eliminated from serious consideration as an appropriate tool for scientific or
philosophical inquiry (Johnson, 1980). Although logical positivism eventually
48 retreated owing to a number of difficulties with its central doctrines (see Audi,
1996; Palmer, 1994; Phillips, 1992), the view of metaphor as incompatible with
serious thought and the postivistic belief in a pure, clear, or literal language is
still prevalent in the more mainstream versions of modern social science
(Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Ortony, 1993b)[11].
This belief in an especially true level of language which permits exposition
in strictly unambiguous, unproblematic terms, is also characteristic of
mainstream accounting thought. Mainstream accounting has traditionally

suppressed its conflicted nature and operated under the pretence that
accounting signification can and should operate as an objective, faithful, and
accurate characterization of reality (see Lavoie, 1987; Morgan, 1988; Solomons,
1978, 1991a,b; Sterling, 1988; Tinker, 1985, 1991; Tinker et al. 1982). The
legitimacy of orthodox accounting depends on the conceit which suggests that
its terms are objective (i.e., literal), uncontaminated by the ambiguity
historically attributed to poetic forms such as metaphor[12]. Having embraced
objectivity as its signature, mainstream accounting is obliged to ensure that
ambiguity is visibly absent from its terms and has thus gone out of its way to
establish the confines within which those terms should operate (e.g. Jensen,
1983; Solomons, 1978, 1986, 1991a,b; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 1979;
1990)[13]. The failure of the conceit would demystify accounting, revealing both
its rhetoric and its own embeddedness in the language which gives it
expression. It is not surprising then, that the view of metaphor as illicit would
eventually creep into mainstream discourses on accounting. On this point, it has
been argued that metaphorical expression in accounting discourse, when used
in lieu of more precise or objective language[14], often leads to misleading
reification of abstract concepts and problematic attributions of meaning (Heath,
1987; Thornton, 1988). Similarly, it has also been argued by some theorists that
metaphorical expression is a poor substitute for literal language in formulating
testable theories because theories can not be lucidly and unequivocally
formulated using figurative language (Bourgeois and Pinder, 1983; Mattessich,
1991; Pinder and Bourgeois, 1982; Tsoukas, 1993).
Challenging the classical wisdom

A belief in the privileged status of an objective or literal language is an
important assumption underlying the form in which philosophy, science and
accounting have traditionally been permitted to operate. This strong tradition,
dating back to Plato and Aristotle, in which knowledge is held as opposed to
rhetoric, literal is held as opposed to figurative, has historically served as a
referent for privileging science, philosophy and accounting relative to the
discourses of other disciplines (Finocchiaro, 1990; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Metaphor in
Soyland, 1994)[15]. The distinction, which unfortunately bifurcates language, accounting
making the literal the model of virtue while branding metaphor as some sort of discourse
supplementary linguistic aberration, has been taken for granted over the
centuries (Lakoff, 1993). While many contemporary theorists still accept the
literal-figurative distinction without question, many repudiate this classical
bifurcation of meaning arguing that its underlying assumptions are untenable 49
on both philosophical and pragmatic grounds (Ortony, 1993a,b).
First, note that the classical division between the literal and the figurative
must presuppose a “true” or “proper” (i.e., literal) meaning from which figures
can then diverge (Gibbs, 1993; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). There seems to be
an important mistake, perhaps doubly so in accounting (Cooper and Puxty,
1994; Puxty, 1993b; Sterling, 1988; Tinker, 1991), in seeking a true, objective or
unchallengeable meaning. Contemporary philosophy no longer assumes that a

text, any text, has a single essential centre on which meaning ought to converge
(Derrida, 1978; Eagleton, 1983; Harland, 1987). Meaning is not a fixed essence
defined by some positive or central feature inherent in the sign (Derrida, 1978;
also see Barthes, 1974). The meaning of words is not susceptible to such
determinacy; the meaning of a given sign may change with the speaker/writer,
the circumstances of its making (the history, the context, the speaking
community from which it derives), and the reader’s unique contribution to the
text. Accounting texts are no exception; they are subject to the same
multiplicity of meaning as other texts (Cooper and Puxty, 1994; 1996).
Unfortunately, mainstream accounting has yet to abandon the tacit belief in a
single objective centre towards which all accounting discourse should strive
(seeCooper and Puxty, 1994; Tinker, 1991). Nevertheless, once the idea of a
single unchallengeable meaning has been dissolved, it is difficult to sustain the
notion of literality as a central reference point from which metaphor then
diverges (Puxty, 1993b). This is, in fact, underscored by Gibbs’ (1993)
observation that there seems to be interminable dispute and confusion as to the
precise nature of the literal. He argues that the persistence of the literal as a
referent for defining figurative language is attributable to just this confusion.
Second, the classical distinction also assumes that there are some tenable
grounds for differentiating between the discourse of a poet and that of the
layman, the scientist, the philosopher, or for that matter, the accountant. On this
point, Lakoff (1993) contends that metaphor is not just a part of novel poetics
but very much a part of everyday, ordinary language. He argues that the literal-
figurative distinction has traditionally operated on the basis of a number of
untenable assumptions which, for the most part, suggest that conventional or
ordinary language operates exclusive of metaphor. He then repudiates these
assumptions by demonstrating that many mundane taken-for-granted
concepts, such as time, states, change and causation are represented and
discussed metaphorically. Lakoff argues that metaphor is not merely a matter of
language but a matter of thought; consequently, it is an inseparable part of the
manner in which the world is ordinarily conceptualized (also see Gibbs, 1993;
AAAJ Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Reddy, 1993; Schon, 1993). In fact, we understand
9,5 much of our experience in terms of metaphor; as such, it plays a central role in
the way we organize and construct our personal and social experiences.
Similarly in science (Boyd, 1993; Kuhn, 1993), psychology (Soyland, 1994),
philosophy (Derrida, 1982), and accounting (Boland, 1989; Boland and
Greenberg, 1992; Morgan, 1988).
50 The above points raise some challenging questions concerning the classical
distinction and thus make it difficult to support the classification of metaphor
as instances of linguistic deviation. Repudiation of the classical bifurcation of
meaning also dissolves the distinction between metaphor and ordinary
language and makes it difficult to sustain the claim that scientific,
philosophical, or for that matter, accounting discourses operate exclusive of
metaphorical forms (Lakoff, 1993; Ortony, 1993b)[16]. But how might metaphor
work in an accounting text? How, for instance, might mundane accounting

phrases such as “inventories are bulging” or “sunk cost” and less mundane
phrases such as “the birth of clinical accounting” (Preston, 1992, p. 63) or
“accounting magic” (Gambling, 1985 p. 416) construct meaning in an
accounting text?[17].
How does the metaphor work in accounting texts?

Metaphor has been described in general, as “all kinds of poetic linking of
images and ideas” (Scholes et al., 1986, p. 521). Metaphors may operate as
nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, or as longer idiomatic phrases (Baldick, 1990,
p. 134). There are three traditional theories of metaphor which Black (1962)
argues are more a categorization of metaphorical instances than mutually
exclusive definitions. The first two, substitution and comparison, appear to
derive from Aristotle’s discussions in the Poetics (see Preminger and Brogan
1993). The third, the interaction view, was originally suggested by Richards
(1936), developed and modified by Black (1962; 1978; 1993), and further
expanded on by Ricoeur (1973; 1977; 1978), Johnson (1980); and Hausman (1983;
1984; 1989). The interaction view of metaphor is now widely accepted, although
not without its critics and limitations (see Waggoner, 1990). Since the
interaction view has been developed using what have been considered the main
defects of the first two theories as a point of departure (Black, 1962), a brief
description of the substitution and comparison accounts will be provided first.
The substitution view of metaphor holds that a metaphorical expression is
used in place of another different but equivalent (in meaning) set of words
(Black, 1962). That is, this account treats a metaphor as a substitute for a
different expression which would have, had it been used instead, conveyed the
same meaning (Black, 1962). This view implies that a writer has intentionally
gone out of the way to say something other than what was meant in an attempt
to make the expression more colourful and appealing (Black, 1962; Preminger
and Brogan, 1993)[18]. According to the substitution view, the nature of
metaphor, except in the case where its use serves a genuine gap in the existing
lexis, is taken to be stylistic (Black, 1962). It is considered a deviation from
appropriate style presumably intended to give pleasure to the reader. For Metaphor in
instance, take the phrase “inventories are bulging”. One reading might take this accounting
to mean approximately the same as “large quantity of inventories”. The discourse
substitution view would thus suggest that the word “bulging” is merely being
substituted for the words “large quantity” for decorative purposes. Similarity,
consider the phrase “the birth of clinical accounting”. One reading might take
this phrase to mean the same as “the emergence of clinical accounting” whereby 51
the substitution view would suggest that the word “birth” is simply being
substituted for the word “emergence” for the pleasure of the reader.
Alternatively, the comparison view holds that metaphor is essentially a
condensed simile or implicit comparison (Black, 1962; Ortony, 1993b; Preminger
and Brogan, 1993). This account treats metaphor as the presentation of an
underlying analogy or similarity differing only in form from a simile; in a
simile, the comparison is stated (by using “as” or “like”) while in a metaphor, the
comparison is implied (Black, 1962, 1993; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). Black
(1962) notes that this view may be considered a special case of the substitution
view in that it suggests the metaphorical expression could be replaced by a
formal or explicit comparison which would convey the same meaning. Take
again, the stock example “inventories are bulging”. The comparison view might
take this to mean approximately the same as “inventories are like something
which bulges (in that there are large quantities involved)” where the added
words in brackets are implicitly understood but are not explicitly stated in the
text (Black, 1962). Take as another instance, the phrase “sunk cost”. A
comparison reading might take this to mean approximately the same as “costs
which are like something which has sunk (in that they can not be recovered)”.
Similarly with the phrase “the birth of clinical accounting”. The comparison
view might take this to mean approximately the same as “clinical accounting
can be likened to a birth (in that something new has emerged)”.
In contrast, the interaction view argues that metaphor cannot be reduced to
mere substitution or implied comparison. The interaction account holds that
metaphor creates a reciprocal transaction between two terms (called subjects)
creating properties, relations or connotations otherwise unattainable.
According to this view, a metaphorical expression has two terms or subjects
which Black (1993) calls the primary (the non-metaphorical term)[19] and the
secondary (the metaphorical term) subjects. The secondary subject presumably
evokes a system of associated implications (a system of attributes and relations
predicable of the secondary subject) which is then applied to the primary
subject. The secondary subject’s implicative complex structures the features of
the primary subject by suppressing some features and selecting and
emphasizing others (Black, 1962; 1993). As the term interaction implies, the
primary subject may, in turn, exert a parallel influence on the secondary
subject. That is, the terms of a metaphorical expression may act together to
exert a reciprocal influence on one another which results in changes in the
structure and content of both terms (Black, 1962, 1993; Hausman, 1983). For
example, consider again the phrase “the birth of clinical accounting”. The
AAAJ interaction account would suggest that the word “birth” (the secondary subject)
9,5 evokes a system of associated attributes and relations which might include
attributes such as conception, parenthood, a period of growth and development,
possibly accompanied by discomfort and frustration, after which something
new emerges from the parent, possibly with great difficulty and pain,
subsequently nurtured by the parent, and so on. The phenomenon of clinical
52 accounting is then seen through the birth-metaphor system of implications; that
is, the birth-metaphor system acts as a sort of filter which separates out some
features predicable of the phrase “clinical accounting” while at the same time
emphasizing others. In short, the birth-system of implications organizes our
view of “clinical accounting”. In turn, the system of implications evoked by
what the reader knows of clinical accounting may exert a similar, reciprocal
influence on the birth system. That is, the interaction of the terms is
multidirectional; either term may serve as an interpretive base for the other
(Hausman, 1983; 1989). Note that this does not imply that the reciprocity of
influence between the primary and secondary subject is necessarily equivalent,
only that some changes in both terms may be observed (Waggoner, 1990).
While the comparison and/or substitution views may be sufficient to account
for metaphor in its simplest formations such as in “inventories are bulging” and
“sunk cost”, these accounts are not sufficient to account for the rich systems of
associated implications and/or subordinate metaphors evoked by less trivial
formations such as “the birth of clinical accounting” or “accounting magic”. On
this, five points are worthy of special mention. First, the interaction view holds
that the system of implications evoked by the secondary subject is not a tightly
specified pattern with deterministic consequences; as such, it does not set hard
and fast boundaries on the admissible interpretations of the metaphorical
expression (Black, 1993). For that matter, we cannot set firm bounds on the
extent of implicative elaboration evoked by either term (Black, 1962; 1993). The
degree of implicative elaboration supported by a particular term in a
metaphorical expression is referred to as resonance (Black, 1993). Subjects
which support a high degree of resonance carry with them rich, complex,
vibrant, and/or mutable background implications (Black, 1993). The particular
implications evoked may depend on the maker of the metaphor, on the
particular circumstances of its making, the evoked relationships with other
texts (what Kristeva, 1980 refers to as intertextuality), the reader, and the
particular reading of the text. As an example, consider the resonant system of
background implications and potential interpretations evoked by the phrase
“accounting magic”. Alternatively, Boland and Greenberg (1992) found that
even the more frequently used macroscopic metaphors of “machines” and
“organisms” support a fair degree of implicative elaboration. Second, the
original metaphor may implicate subordinate metaphors which may in turn
evoke subordinate systems of attributes and relations (Black, 1993 calls this
phenomenon metaphorical coupling). For instance the birth-system metaphor
may implicate the subordinate metaphors of conception and parenthood. Even
the more trivial stock example “inventories are bulging” may evoke subordinate
metaphors such as (following Lakoff, 1993) bounded regions or containers Metaphor in
which allow us more easily to conceptualize inventories as “bulging”. Third, accounting
note that the interaction account does not suggest that the multiplicity made discourse
possible by the resonance of the implicative complexes and subordinate
metaphors is completely unbounded. The implicative complexes and
subordinate metaphors are still evoked within a (in the words of Cooper and
Puxty, 1994, p. 129) “culturally and historically derived language”. Black’s 53
(1962) discussion of the wolf-system complex (for the “man is a wolf” metaphor)
suggests that the implicative complex evoked is constrained by a socially
constructed understanding of what the word “wolf” means. He suggests that
these socially constructed meanings may change over time and may very well
differ markedly across different speaking communities. Black argues that the
variability across time and different societies influences the meaning derived
from the metaphor as well as the metaphor’s ultimate effectiveness; a metaphor

which works well within the context of one speaking community during one
period of time may very well become meaningless or nonsensical in another.
Fourth, it should be noted that similarity or analogy between the two terms
should only be construed as part of the basis for the interaction view (Black,
1962; Richards, 1936; Ricoeur, 1973). The disparities between the two terms
may be just as operative as the similarities in creating metaphorical meaning.
Fifth, note that both the substitution and the comparison views, in the classical
tradition, treat metaphor as expendable since they hold that the metaphorical
expression may be paraphrased by sacrificing nothing but the wit or charm of
the original expression. In contrast, the interaction view holds that metaphor is
not simply a stylistic emphasis on some aspect of meaning or similarity but the
creation of new and unique meaning, insights, similarity, relations, or
perspectives in which the evoked systems of associated implications play a
central role. As such, metaphors cannot be paraphrased without some loss of
content or meaning (owing to the loss of the associated implicative complexes
and subordinate metaphors). It has been argued that this emphasis on
metaphoric creativity is the most important feature of the interaction account of
metaphor (Waggoner, 1990). The remainder of this paper draws heavily on this
feature of the interaction theory as a basis for explicating the various roles that
metaphor plays in accounting discourse.
Metaphoric creativity in accounting texts: metaphor as poetics and

rhetoric
The remainder of this paper is organized around three primary propositions
concerning the poetic and rhetorical functions that metaphor serves in
accounting texts. It is proposed that metaphor in accounting texts is poetic in its
ability to enhance fluency, articulate experience, and defamiliarize ordinary
practices and rhetorical in its ability to situate and obscure the construction of
authenticity in the text[20]. The reader should note, however, that the
propositions put forth are not intended to be construed as mutually exclusive;
they overlap in many obvious ways. The discussion which follows is
AAAJ predominantly illustrative in that it looks to examples of metaphor in
9,5 accounting texts to explicate and support these propositions.
Metaphoric fluency
This proposition holds that metaphor contributes to the fluidity of meaning in
an accounting text by situating the text closer to experience aesthetically,
54 cognitively and pragmatically.
Aesthetic appeal. The aesthetic function of metaphor brings signification
closer to emotive or sensual experience. The implicative complexes of
metaphorical terms relying on this aspect tend to carry abstract emotive or
sensory characteristics which are attributed to concepts or physicalities in
order to enhance the vividness or keenness of the expression (also see Ortony,
1975). For instance, consider the phrase “representational faithfulness”. The
implicative complex evoked by a reading of the secondary subject

“faithfulness” might include attributes (some of which may constitute
subordinate metaphors) such as belief, religion, fidelity, loyalty, obedience,
honour, trust, observance of duty, firm adherence to promises, strong
conviction, or alternatively, blind belief in something for which there exists no
proof, fanaticism, hypocrisy and so on. Any attempt to paraphrase would not
have the same sensory or emotive power because it would lack the ambience
and suggestiveness that the word “faithfulness” projects on the concept of
accounting representation. The loss in this case would be a loss of sensory or
cognitive content created by the associated system of implications and relations
evoked by the word “faithfulness”, not merely a sacrifice of the wit or charm of
the expression (Black, 1962; 1993). On this point, consider other mundane
references such as calling accountants “numbers crunchers” or calling
accounting “dry” (as in “the driest of accounting textbooks” appearing in the
introduction section of this text)[21].
Cognitive conceptualization. The cognitive function of metaphor serves to
lend substance to abstract or elusive concepts. The implicative complexes of
metaphorical terms relying on this aspect often suggest concrete perceptual,
experiential or physical attributes which are projected on to concepts, ideas or
abstractions to concretize and elucidate their otherwise elusive properties
(Lakoff, 1993). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff (1993), we
conceptualize much of our everyday experience (which deals in abstractions
from physicalities) in terms of such metaphors. For instance, consider the
commonly used phrase, “product cost flows”. The implicative complex evoked
by one reading of the secondary subject “flows” might include physical or
experiential images such as that of a body or stream of water (or other fluid)
moving smoothly and readily along a course or path. The flow-system
metaphor may also implicate the subordinate metaphors of (following Lakoff,
1993) entities, paths, motion and location. That is, costs are entities (things,
objects, substances) which move (process, action, procedure or instance of
changing states or positions), along a path (course, route, or assumed, perhaps
sequential, series of positions or configurations) from one location (position,
site, station or situation which can be occupied) to another. The original Metaphor in
metaphor (“flows”) used to attribute substance to a particular aspect of the accounting
primary subject (“product costs”) has been analysed into a possible set of discourse
subordinate metaphors (which themselves have been used to attribute
substance to the original metaphor)[22]. Note again, that an attempt to
paraphrase would result in the loss or alteration of the cognitive content created
by the system of associated implications (and subordinate metaphors) evoked 55
by the word “flows”.
As another example, consider the manner in which we typically discuss
income or earnings. Accountants refer to “measuring”, “distributing”,
“retaining” and “distorting” it. Yet income does not exist in concrete, physical
form, it is an abstraction and as such cannot be measured or observed directly;
it cannot (in the physical sense) actually be distributed, retained or distorted.
Yet to speak of income in such a manner (as a thing) attributes to it a physical

system of associated implications and subordinate metaphors which serve to
concretize certain aspects of its elusive nature[23].
Pragmatic aspects. The pragmatic functions of metaphor serve to enhance
the continuity of accounting expression by closing the gaps in the existing
system of signification which disrupt the fluidity of the text. First, metaphor
affords conciseness of expression by allowing predication of the topic without
resorting to discrete enumeration of individual attributes or relations (Ortony,
1975); that is, metaphors supply the want for convenient abbreviations (Black,
1962). For instance, consider the breadth of the system of implications evoked
by the secondary subject “birth” in the aforementioned “birth of clinical
accounting” metaphor. Alternatively, consider the resonant suggestiveness of
the associated systems of implications and subordinate metaphors possibly
evoked by the secondary subject “commodities” in the phrase “women are also
commodities” (Burrell, 1987, p. 89). In each case, the metaphorical term
predicates entire systems of attributes and relations (as well as potential
subordinate metaphors) in a single lexia[24].
Second, metaphors also allow for expression of that which might otherwise
be inexpressible. There are instances where it would seem that there is no
possible way to signify that which is to be signified. Metaphors supply the want
for a means of expression by enabling predication (by transfer) of
characteristics which currently have no lexical items associated with them
(Black, 1962; Ortony, 1975; Rumelhart, 1993; Sternberg et al., 1993). In
expressing a new idea, thing, action or domain by using a word or expression
previously or conventionally associated with another idea, thing, action or
domain we engage in a kind of metaphorical transfer or extension (see Lakoff,
1993; Rumelhart, 1993). That is, the metaphorical use of some word in a new
sense or in referring to something new allows us to remedy a gap in the
currently existing lexis (Black, 1962; 1993). This is often the case when
discussing accounting abstractions or concepts as in the aforementioned
cognitive metaphors; metaphorical terms in these types of metaphor often rely
on concrete perceptual, experiential or physical attributes in referring for lack
AAAJ of a convenient or effective alternative. For instance, consider an alternative
9,5 manner of expressing what is meant by “financial leverage”, “capital
maintenance”, “working capital”, “cost accumulation”, or “cost behaviour”.
Alternatively, and perhaps more ambiguously, consider, in an accounting
context, a reference to “goodwill”[25]. What exactly does “goodwill” imply? The
implicative complex evoked by the word “goodwill” might commonly include
56 such attributes as benevolence, approval, support, custom, good terms, favour,
prestige, patronage and so on. Yet the word goodwill in an accounting context
commonly connotes the issue of valuing those peculiar intangible resources or
circumstances not considered separable from an organization and thus not
conventionally accounted for, but which make an organization worth more than
the value conventionally attributed to its identifiable net assets or the mere
value of what it sells (e.g. see Kieso and Weygandt, 1995). It appears that the
word “goodwill” serves the function of what Black (1962, 1993) refers to as a
catachresis. Black (1962; p. 33) states that “catachresis is the putting of new
senses into old words”[26]. It is “a striking case of the transformation of
meaning that is constantly occurring in any living language”[27]. In this case, a
word has been used in a different sense to remedy a gap in the accounting lexis;
in accounting discourse, the phrase “goodwill” exists because their exists no
brief form of words for otherwise expressing precisely what “goodwill” is.
The rhetoric of fluency. While aesthetic metaphor may enhance the sensory
and emotive appeal of accounting expression, this very quality may also serve
to gloss over the codes and conventions used in the production of authenticity
and authority in the text[28]. It may draw attention to how something is said
rather than to what is said[29]. The resulting text is regarded for its surface
beauty and literary elegance rather than being judged for its construction, in
effect, concealing the agents of persuasion. Similarly, the pragmatics of
metaphor may also obscure the processes of construction by closing the gaps in
the discrete system of signification which disrupt and reveal the logic of the
codes. The fluidity of the resulting text may seduce the reader into consuming
it without question (what Barthes, 1974 refers to as l isible text usually
translated as readerly text; Baldick, 1990; also see Cooper and Puxty, 1994).
In addition, by situating the text closer to the sensory and emotive aspects of
experience, aesthetic metaphor appeals to realism. Similarity, metaphoric
conceptualizations of the type mentioned above also attempt to bring
signification closer to experience and thought (and vice versa) by solidifying
elusive concepts; however, conceptualizations which lend substance may also
allude to a self-sufficient thingishness creating the pretence of naturalness or
realness. Such aesthetic and conceptual allusions to realism may suggest to the
reader that the text unproblematically mimics the real (Cooper and Puxty, 1994).
For instance, the manner in which earnings or income is ordinarily
conceptualized often times causes accountants (and non-accountants as well) to
unquestioningly afford it primary, objective and self-sufficient status exclusive
of its problematic pragmatic, social and political construction[30].
Metaphoric articulation Metaphor in
This proposition holds that metaphors may structure and change accounting accounting
properties and/or relations via metaphoric filtering and reciprocity. discourse
Filtering. The filtering function of metaphor serves to structure or organize
experience. The implicative complex evoked by a particular metaphorical term
organizes by selectively choosing, either emphasizing or suppressing, and
articulating the features of the primary subject (Black, 1962). Consider the 57
aforementioned phrase “accounting magic”. The implicative complex evoked
by the secondary subject “magic” could presumably include such attributes as
extraordinary powers, supernatural influence, witchcraft, primitiveness,
charms, spells, incantations, rites, ritual, ceremony, superstition, belief, illusion,
sleight of hand, charlatans and so on. The system of attributes and relations
predicable of the word “magic” leads the reader in the construction of a
congruous system of implications about the primary subject “accounting”

(Black, 1962; 1993). Those attributes and relations predicable of “accounting”
which can be conceptualized in terms of the magic-system of implications will
be rendered prominent, any that cannot will be pushed into a background role
(Black, 1962). Note that this is not to suggest a univocal restriction on the
interpretation of the metaphorical expression; on the contrary, the resonance
and mutability of the implicative complexes evoked preclude this, serving
instead to enhance the richness and multiplicity of possible meanings derived
from the metaphor. Rather, this is to suggest that the metaphorical term may
place a restriction on the interpretation of the primary subject by obscuring
from sight some of its defining features and altering the structure of other, still
visible features. That is, the magic-system implicative complex selectively
articulates a particular formation of the primary subject “accounting” by
leading the reader in a process of selecting and organizing its features (Black,
1993). A metaphor, in this sense, provides a narrative model for reading the
primary subject (Ricoeur, 1977, 1978). On that point, many studies have argued
the powerful role of macroscopic metaphorical models, paradigms and images
in articulating accounting and organizational theories, practices and structures
(e.g. Boland, 1986, 1989; Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Davis et al., 1982; Morgan,
1980, 1986, 1988; Tinker, 1986; Tsoukas, 1993).
Reciprocity. Recall that it would be a simplification to suggest that the
implicative complex of the secondary subject remains unaltered by the
metaphorical expression; the primary subject may to some extent also
articulate a view of the secondary subject. The term “magic” may place a
restriction on the interpretation of “accounting” by obscuring those features
which cannot be conceptualized in terms of the magic-system of implications;
but in turn, the term “accounting” may also obscure those features predicable of
the word “magic” which cannot be conceptualized in terms of the accounting-
system of implications (Black, 1962; 1993). Our conceptualizations of both
“accounting” and “magic” are altered by the metaphor. But this is still a
simplification. The co-presence of the two terms of a metaphor does not merely
articulate formations of the two subjects in isolation; it articulates an
AAAJ antecedently existing relationship between the primary and secondary terms, a
9,5 relationship in which the formation and relative positions of both terms change
(Black, 1993). Thus, the reciprocal interaction changes the position of subjects
in relation to each other in a manner which might be described as a meeting-in-
the-middle[31]. “Magic” and “accounting” seem to have more in common and be
situated closer to each other as a consequence of the metaphorical reference. On
58 this point, it has been argued that the similarity supposedly underlying the
copresence of the two terms in the metaphor is in fact created by the interaction
and relational reconciliation of the two implicative complexes (Ricoeur, 1973).
The rhetoric of articulation. A consequence of the reciprocal changes in the
formation and positions of the two subjects is that the resulting relationship
articulated by the metaphor seems natural, inevitable – in short, real. This
appeal to realism affords the metaphor claim to a unique authenticity by
suggesting that it reveals some universal structure naturally inherent in the

object of discussion (Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Derrida, 1982). This in turn,
implies that it is the object of discussion itself which actually constitutes the
agent of persuasion (Soyland, 1994). The pretence of a single universal structure
created by the metaphor allows the metaphorical expression to authoritatively
exclude by choice thus implying a single unambiguous intention. In social
contexts, this may result in a myopia whereby some social formations are
promoted by marginalizing others (e.g. see Morgan, 1986, 1988; Schon, 1993;
Tinker, 1986). When employed to understand or formulate problem settings or in
planning for the future, metaphors may take on a narrative quality by which
problem settings and planning are then mediated (Boland and Greenberg, 1992;
Schon, 1993). This narration may select and structure events and objects of
inquiry (the enigma or plot), trace processes and directions of change (courses of
action), emphasize cause and effect relationships to elicit responses in the reader
(e.g. empathy or suspense), create criteria to which events and objects must
succumb (the setting), and suggest a consummation (the ending or solution)
(Baldick, 1990; Preminger and Brogan, 1993; Scholes et al., 1986). The
metaphorical story told, weaves puzzles, assembles its own objects of inquiry,
and suggests its own resolutions in a seductively natural manner; in the process
the metaphor obscures the arbitrariness with which decisions and analyses must
be made (see Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Reddy, 1993; Schon, 1993; Tinker, 1986
for related arguments). Interestingly, Morgan (1988) argues that the accounting
model is itself metaphorical in the sense that it captures and highlights those
aspects of organizational experience and reality which are quantifiable and
allowed for by the existing lexias and associated conventions of construction but
excludes or obscures those aspects which are not congruous with the extant
model (such as the qualitative aspects or organizational experience, social-
historical-political context, social interests and partisan influences).
Metaphoric defamiliarization
This proposition holds that metaphor may extend accounting discourse by
engaging the process of defamiliarization.
Defamiliarization. Defamiliarization involves making the routine or ordinary Metaphor in
seem strange or different by presenting it in a novel light, by placing it in an accounting
unexpected context, or by articulating it an unusual manner (Preminger and discourse
Brogan, 1993; Shklovsky, 1965). An important consequence of metaphoric
defamiliarization is the generation of new knowledge, new relationships, and
new modes and objects of inquiry (Black, 1993; Boyd, 1993); metaphoric
defamiliarization thus provides epistemic access to alternative aspects of reality
59
(see Boyd, 1993). The defamiliarization of accounting concepts and practices
through metaphor may force us to reconceive and re-evaluate that which the
ordinary paradigms and received wisdom would allow us to pass over without
question. By reconceiving familiar accounting practices and concepts in terms
of new or unfamiliar metaphors we may engage in a sort of metaphorical
extension of accounting discourse. For example, accounting discourse has been

extended by articulating accounting practices and concepts in the terms of
ideology (Lehman, 1992; Lehman and Tinker, 1987; Tinker et al., 1982), ritual or
witchcraft (Gambling, 1977; 1987), communication (e.g. Arrington and Puxty,
1991; Laughlin, 1987; Wright, 1994), rhetoric (Arrington and Schweiker, 1992;
Thompson, 1991), and text (Arrington and Francis, 1989, 1993; Boland, 1989;
Cooper and Puxty, 1994; Francis, 1994; Lavoie, 1987; Morgan, 1988; Puxty,
1994). For instance, the metaphorical conceptualization of accounting as “text”
has revealed new sources of insight for accounting phenomena ( e.g. the
writings of Derrida), new modes of inquiry for accounting research (e.g.
deconstruction), as well as new problems or relations to address (e.g. the
problematic nature of determining or privileging meaning in an accounting
text, the role of authorial intent, the social-historical relativity of meaning in
accounting texts and the role of the reader’s interpretation of the text).
The rhetoric of defamiliarization. It is important to note that metaphoric
defamiliarization is not merely a new emphasis or novel perspective on some
pre-existing, but previously unnoticed aspect of reality; such metaphors are
constitutive of what they express not merely accentual or explicative (Black,
1993; Boland and Greenberg, 1992; Boyd, 1993; Morgan, 1986, 1988).
Metaphoric defamiliarization is also very much a matter of persuasion and
indoctrination; in order to translate the familiar into the terms of the unfamiliar
the metaphor must convincingly drive out the ordinary, the received, the
habitual. To accomplish this, the rhetoric of a novel metaphor must suspend
disbelief by creating a new narrative model compared to which the original
seems unnatural or unreal. The novel metaphor may assemble and name new
objects of inquiry, establish new criteria by which those objects may be studied
and evaluated, fabricate new problems, generate accompanying solutions and
establish new criteria by which the success of such resolutions are then judged.
Such metaphors are self-confirming, by constructing the very reality to which
they allude and on which they depend (Black, 1993).
AAAJ Summary conclusions
9,5 This paper has offered but a mere sampling of metaphor in accounting
discourse. There are many metaphors in accounting texts. I hope some of the
things presented in this paper show this to be the case. Yet the potential
contribution of this paper does not lie in the mere illustration of metaphorical
forms existing in accounting texts, nor does it lie in the provision of a definitive
60 answer to the proverbial philosophical question of what is metaphor (or
alternatively, what is not metaphor)[32]. The potential contribution of this
paper lies in the exposition of why metaphor exists in accounting texts, how it
works, and what it may create when it does work.
On that note, there were four points that I had most wanted to stress in this
paper so it may serve well to reiterate and summarize those points now. First,
there is no reason to suppose that ordinary, scientific, philosophical or
accounting discourses may operate exclusive of metaphor. Once the classical

distinction between the literal and the figurative has been dissolved, it makes it
difficult to sustain the claim that metaphor is some sort of deviation from or
mere supplement to plain, appropriate or ordinary language which can be
separated out and excluded at will. Metaphor is an inseparable component of all
discourses, accounting being no exception.
Second and related to the first, metaphor is not merely dispensable stylistics
employed solely for the pleasure of the reader. According to the interaction
view, the production of a metaphorical statement both discovers and creates
novel meaning, similarity, properties, and relations in which the evoked
implicative complexes play an important part. It follows then, that at least some
metaphors are indispensable in that they can not be paraphrased without losing
or altering the meaning content of the original phrase. On this point, the reader
is invited to consider as examples, attempts to rephrase some of the
aforementioned aesthetic or cognitive metaphors appearing in accounting texts.
In many cases, there may be no alternative manner of expressing what is to be
expressed or if a somewhat equivalent alternative does exist, it is likely to be
metaphorical as well. For instance, consider an attempt to rephrase the phrase
“product cost flows” in non-metaphorical terms. The analysis given above
suggested that not only is this phrase metaphorical in its attempt to solidify an
elusive abstraction, but also that it uses subordinate metaphors to elucidate and
conceptualize the primary metaphor. Consider as additional examples, attempts
to rephrase many of the previously mentioned cognitive metaphors in non-
metaphorical terms. Metaphor is a fundamental part of the manner in which we
ordinarily conceptualize such abstractions; employing some metaphor in
accounting texts (or any texts) is inescapable.
Third, metaphors may appear in different guises and serve different
functions. Metaphors may serve fluent (aesthetic, cognitive and/or pragmatic),
articulative or defamiliarizing functions in an accounting text, all of which were
considered poetic in this paper. At the same time, metaphorical forms may also
operate as rhetoric, serving to situate and obscure the agents of persuasion in a
text. Metaphors may be simple, occurring as a single isolated expression in a
single accounting text, or encompassing, serving as a controlling image of an Metaphor in
entire accounting text, situation or discourse (as in the macroscopic metaphors accounting
indicated earlier). In addition, metaphor may operate at the level of everyday, discourse
mundane accounting discourse or, alternatively, by playing a role in the
extension of accounting discourse. Metaphor may extend discursive practices
by allowing for novel macroscopic conceptualizations of accounting practices
or by simply affording the means to remedy a gap in the accounting lexis (via 61
catachresis).
Fourth and last, this paper sought to point out by explication and illustration
that metaphor is very much a part of the way in which accountants “make the
world mean”. The propositions and accompanying illustrations presented
suggest that metaphor is indeed actively involved in the creation and
dissemination of meaning in accounting texts. I would also encourage
accountants to read such metaphor not just as supplementary stylistics

employed merely for embellishment, but as an inseparable part of the central
text’s discursive arguments, an integral part of its claims to legitimacy. Each
poetic and rhetorical gesture of an accountant’s text is an intimate part of the
construction of its story, enigmas and resolutions. Accountants would do well
to acknowledge the metaphor of their own texts (and the power that it wields)
lest they fall prey to the worst sort of sophistry, that which ignores its own
rhetoric (Arrington and Francis, 1989, p. 25). In the final analysis, the reader
should not ignore the metaphor of this accounting text; this text has made
liberal use of metaphorical forms (as well as other linguistic forms and
rhetorical elements) in an attempt to enhance its literary appeal, establish its
claim to legitimacy, and persuade the reader that the views presented here are
plausible, if not convincing.
Notes
1. This may be due to the prominence given to metaphor in intellectual thought since
Aristotle (Gibbs, 1993) as evidenced by the massive amount of literature on metaphor (see
Johnson, 1981; Ortony, 1993a; Preminger and Brogan, 1993; Shibles, 1971; Van Noppen and
Hols, 1990). However, it also may be a consequence of the tendency to use metaphor
(following Aristotle) as an umbrella term to cover the finer distinctions between other
linguistic forms also known as tropes (see Cooper, 1986; Preminger and Brogan 1993). This
itself may be indicative of the interminable disputed attempts to clarify the distinctions
between individual types of tropes (Cooper, 1986; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). The most
commonly recognized (or referred to in the literature) figures or tropes are metaphor,
simile, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, personification, hyperbole, litotes (or meiosis),
periphrasis, and the closely related allegory and idiom. Despite the problematic nature of
collapsing all tropes into metaphor (see Gibbs 1993; Preminger and Brogan 1993), this
paper will opt for simplicity and treat metaphor as an umbrella term.
2 This paper (following Cooper and Puxty, 1994) considers all extant accounting as text and
takes the text to include (again, following Cooper and Puxty, 1994) the words, the numbers,
and the typography which constitute parts of financial statements, accounting textbooks,
and accounting standards as well as papers and articles about accounting appearing in
magazines, newspapers, and journals. In addition, although most of the metaphorical
instances used for illustration were drawn from written texts, I see no reason to privilege
written texts to the exclusion of voice in a discussion of metaphor in accounting discourse.
AAAJ 3. Plato’s condemnation of figurative forms is curious given that he is justly famous for his
profound albeit coy use of figuration in the “Myth of the cave” which appears in the
9,5 Republic ( Johnson, 1980; Palmer, 1994). In the same text, he establishes the “old quarrel
between philosophy and poetry” by defending philosophy against the figurative charms of
imitative poetry ( Johnson, 1980). This paradoxical prejudice against the use of figurative
language seems to derive from Plato’s extreme dislike for the sophists whose practices of
travelling about and charging admission to their lectures (which consisted primarily of
62 discourses on power, manipulation and persuasion) gained them the derogatory reputation
of a snake oil salesman (see Palmer, 1994).
4. Note that this distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of discourse may be
read as a rhetorical strategy employed on the part of Plato in order to legitimize and
privilege the position of philosophical discourse relative to other forms of discourse
(Derrida, 1982; Norris, 1982; Soyland, 1994). This is precisely the philosophical privilege
that Derrida’s deconstructive writings have sought to challenge (Norris, 1982; Palmer,
1994; also see Arrington and Francis, 1989 for a deconstructive reading of the privilege
enjoyed by positivism in mainstream accounting research).

5. Since most of Europe was illiterate, the discourse used to portray human affairs was that
of the court minstrel and the common bard (Hollister, 1982). The heroic moods of the
chansons de geste epics, the coy wit and passionate seriousness of the troubadour lyric, the
aristocratic ideology and powerful Christian sentiments of the idealized medieval romance,
the satire of the bourgeois fabliaux, and the parody of the urban fable made figurative
forms such as irony, allegory, and metaphor stock in trade for those who dealt in tales of
social affairs (Hollister, 1982).
6. It should be noted that the turn towards precision in expression which characterized the
rise of empiricism can not be attributed entirely to the accomplishments of the early
seventeenth century. During the latter part of the medieval era, Europe experienced a
substantial social and economic transformation which was characterized by an
intensification of commerce, an increased emphasis on the use of money in economic
transactions, a marked shift towards urbanization, greater social mobility, the increased
complexity of royal administrative systems, the systemization of jurisprudence, a gradual
ebbing of idealized Christian and courtly values, and an enormous proliferation of written
texts. The enormous increase of written documents in the form of scholarly treatises
(philosophy, theology and science), government documents, legal documents, and
especially financial records made reading, writing and mathematics skills desirable
because of the socio-economic power afforded to those who possessed them (Hollister,
1982). This age of social and economic transformation created a general disposition
towards logical systematic approaches in dealing with human experiences and established
the necessary preconditions for the developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries (Hollister, 1982).
7. Note the rhetoric of Locke’s distinction between legitimate and illegitimate terms for
expounding science. This distinction may be read as an attempt to legitimize the discourse
of science relative to other discourses (which, of course, are rendered problematic because
of their lack of mathematical precision). See Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) for a more detailed
discussion.
8. It should be noted that nineteenth-century Romanticism, which may be read (in part) as a
reaction against the ordered rationality and dispassionate science of the Enlightenment,
created a brief period of high praise for creative power of metaphorical forms (Baldick,
1990; Berman, 1988; Johnson, 1980; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). Although Romanticism
had a profound influence on western attitudes, art, and culture during the early part of the
nineteenth century, it did not alter the fundamental empiricist posture of orthodox science
and metaphor soon suffered under the attack of logical positivism (Baldick, 1990; Berman,
1988; Johnson, 1980).
9. It is interesting to note that the positivists, in their search for this especially true level of Metaphor in
language, eventually reduced themselves to pointing and grunting (Palmer, 1994). It is also
interesting to note that Wittgenstein (1972) later rejected his earlier belief in an especially accounting
pure language and came to see language as a rule-governed game. discourse
10. Note again the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of discourse. Here it
may be read as a rhetorical strategy on the part of the positivists employed in order to
privilege the position of empirical science and logical philosophy relative to metaphysics.
The logical positivists had no great admiration for metaphysics and sought clearly to 63
demarcate such speculative musings from philosophy and science (see Palmer, 1994;
Phillips, 1992). The positivist’s empirical criteria of meaning allowed them to devalue
metaphysics by labelling its speculative discourse “nonsense”.
11. The original group of logical positivists consisted of a number of Austrian intellectuals
centred on the University of Vienna during the 1920s (“the Vienna Circle”). The death of
Moritz Schlick, the movement’s founder, and threat of Nazi persecution eventually
disbanded the group and scattered them throughout British and American universities
where they exerted a pervasive and powerful influence on the English speaking world for
many years.
12. Derrida (1982) and Soyland (1994) address this “conceit” in the texts of philosophy.
13. There are many powerful constituencies (such as regulatory bodies and those who
influence them) who have a vested interest in just what those confines are, a vested interest
in establishing the “legitimate” meaning and in preventing the proliferation of
“illegitimate” meanings. The conceit protects such closure by denying the existence of the
very terms (the rhetoric) with which it is accomplished and by permitting the artifice that
these privileged meanings are grounded in some universally valid meaning or principle
inherent in the object of inquiry. Derrida (1976) calls this the “metaphysics of presence”.
14. Note again the rhetoric of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate terms. Gilbert
and Mulkay (1984) suggest that this form of rhetoric is often observed when scientists (of
positivistic origin) are reflecting on their own discourse relative to the discourses of other
disciplines (which of course, are rendered as problematic). It is interesting that it should
appear in the context of mainstream accounting which has historically fancied itself a sort
of science based on empirical or positivistic grounds (e.g. see Arrington and Francis, 1989;
Chua, 1986; Christenson, 1983; Jensen, 1983; Lavoie, 1987; Morgan and Smircich, 1980;
Puxty, 1993a; Tinker et al., 1982; for interesting debates).
15. The rhetoric of the distinction is labelled as the “rhetoric of anti-rhetoric” by Finocchiaro
(1990).
16. Note, however, that repudiating this distinction also begs the question of how to define
metaphor as a distinctive linguistic form (see Cooper, 1986; Ortony, 1993b; Preminger and
Brogan, 1993; Puxty, 1993b). On this point, Black (1993) argues that any search for an
infallible criteria of metaphorhood is doomed to failure; it is very much like trying to
distinguish a joke from a non-joke (also see Cooper, 1986 for a more detailed discussion).
“Every criterion for a metaphor’s presence, however plausible, is defeasible in special
circumstances” (Black, 1993 p. 35). For a metaphor’s being depends not simply on the
makers intentions, but on the particular circumstances of its making (e.g. the socio-
historical background, the context, and the codes and conventions of the speaking
community from which it derives), the associated system of implications evoked by the
expression itself, and the reader’s own unique contribution to the text. Because this is so, a
metaphor which works for one set of circumstances for one reader may seem preposterous
for another (Black, 1962, p. 40). That something is metaphor is just as much subject to
interpretation as the meaning of the metaphorical expression. Consequently, this paper,
(following the contemporary constructivist literature on metaphor such as Boyd, 1993;
Gibbs, 1993; Lakoff, 1993; Ortony 1993a,b; Reddy, 1993; Schon, 1993) has the nature of
metaphor as its consequences (what it does and how and why) for accounting discourse
AAAJ rather than as a unique explanation of something essential to a metaphor’s being. I hope
that illustrations subsequently provided will be accepted as instances of metaphor in
9,5 accounting texts whatever judgements may ultimately be made about the notion of
metaphor itself.
17. The reader should note that the metaphors chosen for illustrative purposes in this and the
following sections should not be construed as the result of a thorough or exhaustive search
of the accounting and organizational literature for tropological forms. Rather, the
64 metaphorical instances presented are those which caught my attention (and memory)
during my readings over the past several years and as such are very much the whim and
consequence of my fanciful preferences and particular interests. Many of the more
mundane metaphors are ones commonly appearing in financial or management
accounting textbooks, practioner-type journals (such as Management Accounting), and
newspaper articles. Most of the more novel metaphors chosen were taken from texts
constituting what may be broadly construed as critical accounting literature. This is due
in part to my obvious interests in this area but also because these texts tend to be rich in
novel or non-platitudinous metaphors as well as unabashedly rhetorical (Soyland, 1994

argues that most academic texts are structured so as to conceal attempts to persuade). It
was not intended that the selection of the particular metaphors or any of the metaphorical
analyses presented be construed as an acceptance or rejection of the positions put forth by
the texts from which they were taken. My apologies (in advance) to the authors of texts
from which I chose metaphorical instances for, in the interest of efficiency and space,
orphaning such instances from the rich and complex contexts in which they were
originally presented.
18. Black (1962) notes how this account of metaphor implies fault on the part of the metaphor’s
maker. “There is a strong suggestion that he really ought to have made up his mind as to
what he really wanted to say…” (p. 31).
19. This is not to suggest that the primary subject is always explicitly stated in the text; the
primary subject may in fact be implied by circumstances, grammatical form or context.
20. This is not to suggest that metaphor has exclusive province over these functions, only that,
because of its ability to situate texts in experience, it is particularly powerful in this
process. The different functions chosen for presentation are largely influenced by Black’s
(1962; 1978; 1993) essays on metaphor although the cognitive function as developed in this
paper draws heavily on the work of Lakoff (1993). It should be noted that the fluency
functions (aesthetic, cognitive and pragmatic) are somewhat Aristotelian in origin and
figure prominently in many traditional and contemporary accounts of metaphor (see
Ortony 1993a; Preminger and Brogan, 1993). The articulative functions (filtering and
reciprocity) are, however, peculiar to interaction accounts of metaphor (see Waggoner,
1990). Defamiliarization, while fitting nicely within an interaction account, is derived
primarily from the Russian Formalism of Shklosvky (1965).
21. The reader is also invited to consider a small sampling of some less mundane examples of
aesthetic metaphor appearing in accounting texts such as “the sins of capitalism”
(Solomons, 1991a, p. 288), “weapons of social conflict” (Solomons, 1991a, p. 288), “the
malign influence of accounting” (Solomons, 1991a, p. 289), “its guiding light must be
neutrality in financial reporting” (Solomons, 1991a, p. 294), “the integrity of financial
symbols” (Tinker, 1991, p. 298), references to the “greening of accounting” or “green
reporting” in the environmental accounting literature (e.g. see Gray, 1990; Owen, 1992),
“the myth of objectivity” (Morgan, 1988, p. 481), “cool medium” (Gambling, 1985, p. 418),
“warmer media” (Gambling, 1985, p. 418), “accounting magic” (Gambling, 1985, p. 416),
“accountant’s sets of concepts are so fuzzy” (Gambling, 1985, p. 419), “the sacramental
purpose of accounting and auditing” (Gambling, 1987, p. 326), “The silence of the sheep”
(Cooper and Puxty, 1993, p. 1), or “the realism, the mimesis constitutes the voice of
seduction” (Cooper and Puxty, 1994, p. 131).
22. Note that subordinate metaphors may also be analysed into subordinate metaphors and so Metaphor in
on. Black (1962) acknowledges as potentially problematic that substantially new
subordinate metaphors may lead to digression or confusion akin to that attributed to accounting
mixed metaphors. Note, however, that this metaphorical quality of referring is one which discourse
Derrida (1978; 1981) has claimed for all words. This quality (which Derrida, 1981 calls
dissemination) is an infinite proliferation of possible meanings wherein language takes on
its own energy and creativity exclusive of that of any individual reader or writer.
23. Similarly, the reader is invited to consider a small sampling of other metaphorical 65
conceptualizations which might appear as part of ordinary, everyday accounting
discourse. For instance consider, “going concern”, “economic unit”, “turnover ratio”,
“financial leverage”, “liquidating dividend”, “liquid assets”, “capital maintenance”,
“earnings streams”, “working capital”, “extinguishment of debt”, “profits went through the
roof”, “profits fell”, “expiration of costs”, “tracing costs to products”, “cost accumulation”,
“cost driver”, “cost behavior”, “sunk costs”, “inventories are bulging”, “backflush costing”,
“throughput accounting” (Macarthur, 1996 p. 30), “the declining credibility of conventional
accounting” (Gambling, 1985, p. 417), and “the capacity of conventional accounting”

(Gambling, 1985, p. 417). Also consider a few less mundane examples of such
conceptualizations appearing in accounting texts such as “visited on the heads of
accountants” (Solomons, 1991a, p. 288), “accounting is teleological action” (Arrington and
Puxty, 1991, p. 31), “accounting’s social roots” (Laughlin, 1987, p. 470), “organizational
pathology” (Gambling, 1985 p. 420), “the GAAP Hunters” (Gambling, 1985, p. 419),
“accounting systems grasp and shape important aspects of reality” (Morgan, 1988, p. 483),
“trespassing beyond the market realm” (Tinker, 1991, p. 297), “a nest of assumptions”
(Tinker, 1991, p. 298), “still in the grip of advanced capitalism” (Cooper and Puxty, 1992, p.
3), “the seeds of destruction of the positive accounting project” (Cooper and Puxty, 1992, p.
2), and “the text is not to be laid solely at the door of the named author” (Cooper and Puxty,
1994, p. 132).
24. As further examples, the reader is invited to consider the rich systems of associated
implications and subordinate metaphors evoked by many of the aforementioned aesthetic
and cognitive metaphors.
25. In this case the primary subject is not explicitly stated in the text but implied by the
context in which the word “goodwill” is used.
26. Note that Black intentionally avoids the derogatory connotations conventionally attributed
to the word catachresis.
27. Black (1962; 1993) suggests that when a catachresis serves a genuine need in the existing
lexis, the new or different sense will rapidly become a part of the word’s socially accepted
or conventional sense as for example, in the phrase “goodwill”. Under these circumstances,
the metaphor often becomes taken for granted, is often labelled as dead metaphor, and
subsequently goes unnoticed as metaphorical. This obviously begs the question of whether
a metaphor is still a metaphor when the metaphorical reference becomes part of the term’s
accepted sense. Black (1993) offers, in lieu of the trite (and, by the way, metaphorical)
opposition between “dead” and “live” metaphors, the more pragmatic distinctions between
extinct (metaphors for which the underlying reason or original sense is now lost, forgotten
or nonsensical), dormant (mundane metaphors which are not consciously acknowledged
and as such typically go unnoticed as metaphorical), and active (metaphors which are
consciously acknowledged and as such are noticed as metaphorical) metaphors.
Alternatively, Lakoff (1993) offers the distinction between the mundane (taken-for-granted
conceptualizations which are not consciously acknowledged as metaphorical and
consequently go unnoticed as such) and the novel (unusual or non-conventional metaphors
which are consciously acknowledged as metaphorical and are consequently noticed as
such). On this, it should be noted that the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1993),
Reddy (1993), and Gibbs (1993) which argues that metaphor is a matter of thought (not
language use), implies that a phrase does not have to be consciously acknowledged as
AAAJ metaphorical (by either its maker or the reader) in order to constitute metaphor. That is,
just because a phrase has been assimilated into ordinary or conventional language and
9,5 thus typically goes unnoticed as metaphorical does not render it inanimate.
28. See Barthes (1974) for a deconstructive unveiling of such codes. Also see Cooper and Puxty
(1994) for a deconstructive reading which reveals the use of such codes in an accounting
text.
29. This is somewhat akin to the concept of foregrounding in the literary theory of Russian
66 Formalism (see Baldick, 1990; Preminger and Brogan, 1993 for brief references).
30. Reddy (1993) makes a similar point concerning the way in which we talk about human
communication.
31. My understanding of Derrida’s (1978; 1981) differance and dissemination suggests that this
must by consequence alter the entire relational system of signification because every sign
necessarily includes (by non-identity) every other sign (whether explicitly appearing in the
text or not). Also see Harland (1987).
32. Herein lies the greatest limitation of this or any study concerning metaphorical forms. As
mentioned previously, I do not believe that there is an absolute or definitive answer to this
troublesome question (see Cooper, 1986; Derrida, 1982; and Ortony, 1993a for more detailed
discussions of this problematic issue). However, the difficulty of defining metaphor in
absolute terms does not by any means render a discussion of metaphor irrelevant to
accounting. At least no more than the inability of attributing a single meaning to one of
Shakespeare’s works renders a discussion of Shakespeare irrelevant to the study of
literature. For despite the problems of definition, it is difficult to deny (albeit problematic to
define in absolute terms) that metaphor has in some way, a special place in every
intellectual discourse concerned with language and meaning (see Cooper, 1986; Ortony,
1993a,b; Preminger and Brogan, 1993).
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Metaphor in Accounting Discourse

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Metaphor in Accounting Discourse

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Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal

Metaphor in accounting discourse

Journal, Vol. 20 Iss 6 pp. 805-824 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09513570710830254

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heralded metaphor as the most significant feature of poetic composition,

The nature of the offence

properties of metaphor that it eventually acquired its widespread and

mainstream accounting thought. Mainstream accounting has traditionally

Challenging the classical wisdom

unchallengeable meaning. Contemporary philosophy no longer assumes that a

work in an accounting text? How, for instance, might mundane accounting

How does the metaphor work in accounting texts?

from the metaphor as well as the metaphor’s ultimate effectiveness; a metaphor

Metaphoric creativity in accounting texts: metaphor as poetics and

implicative complex evoked by a reading of the secondary subject

Yet to speak of income in such a manner (as a thing) attributes to it a physical

congruous system of implications about the primary subject “accounting”

suggesting that it reveals some universal structure naturally inherent in the

extension of accounting discourse. For example, accounting discourse has been

accounting discourses may operate exclusive of metaphor. Once the classical

accountants to read such metaphor not just as supplementary stylistics

enjoyed by positivism in mainstream accounting research).

novel or non-platitudinous metaphors as well as unabashedly rhetorical (Soyland, 1994

accounting” (Gambling, 1985, p. 417), and “the capacity of conventional accounting”

No. 4, pp. 601-32.

Company, New York, NY.

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