II CASE DIGESTS

Co vs Rosario

FACTS:

Luis Co(petitioner) and Vicente Yu was appointed as special administrator by the

RTC of Makati City of the estate of the petitioners’ father, Co Bun Chun but the heirs
opposed the petitioners appointment as special administrator. So, the petitioner
nominated son, Alvin Milton Co for appointment as co-administrator of the estate.

The RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.

After 4 years, the RTC revoked and set aside the appointment of Alvin on the
basis that that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as
special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the
functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases
against him, which had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle
the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.

ISSUE:

Is the removal by the lower court of Alvin to be a special administrator proper?

RULING:

Yes. Even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court
finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence it is justified in withdrawing the
appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The special administrator is an officer of
the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for
the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth
administration and earliest settlement.

PRINCIPLE:

The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules

regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. The exercise of such discretion must be
based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.
 Tan vs Gedorio

Facts:

Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo
Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent
moved for the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special
administrator.

This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan,
claiming that none of the respondents can be appointed since they are not residing in
the country, that Romualdo does not have the same competence as Vilma Tan who was
already acting as the de facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin,
being the legitimate children, is preferred in the choice of administrator

However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the
income of thee state, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special
administrator. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and were denied, hence the
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection
of a special administrator?

Ruling:

No.

The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator,
as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference,
they should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the
delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator.

Principle:

The court was correct in granting the appointment of Romualdo as special

administrator since it was shown that Vilma was in remiss after failing to follow the
series of directives and extension given to her to account for the estate of the
deceased.
 Pijuan vs De Gurrea

Facts:

In 1932, appellant Mrs. Gurrea and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain, where
they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son
Teodoro, to the Philippines.

Here he lived with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two children. Carlos Gurrea
died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament,
in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and
their son, Teodoro.

Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, for the probate of said will. Pijuan was appointed special
administrator of the estate, without bond.

Mrs. Gurrea argued that the lower court erred in denying her petition for
appointment as administratrix, for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court correctly appointed Pijuan as special administrator?

Ruling:

Yes.

The preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court

to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or
administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the
latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.

Principle:

The argument of appellant is misplaced. It has been held by the Supreme court
in an array of cases that the order of preference for the appointment of administrator
as provided under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply exclusively to
special administrators. The appointment of a special administrator being merely
temporary in order to manage the estate of the deceased while an administrator is not
yet appointed.
 Marcelino vs. Antonio

Facts:

After the will of the late Arcadia Santos was legalized by the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, his heirs Felisa Antonio and others presented, on July 19,
1938, two motions asking one of them to order To the executors or administrators:

1. To submit an inventory of the property, real and personal, comprised in the

estate of the deceased Leocadia;
2. To separate from the property inventory, real and personal, pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of Leocadia Santos and Modesto Marcelino;
3. To render an accounting of said conjugal partnership from 1905, death of
Modesto Marcelino, to date, and liquidate the same;
4. To designate a day in court whereby petitioners may present evidence on the
existence of a conjugal partnership, the properties of which have been illegally included
and disposed in the will of Leocadia Santos, to the facts of non-liquidation, but of
disposal ;
5. And for such other remedies as this Honorable Court may grant in the
premises.

In the other motion, it was requested that the deceased's will be declared void in
respect of any legacy or interest given in said last will to Calixta Peralta, daughter of
Casimiro Peralta, one of the witnesses to the will. They also requested the partition of
the estate left by the late Leocadia Santos excluding certain properties that did not
belong to him.

The court, holding the opposition of Maximina Marcelino and Calixta Peralta,
dismissed the motions by order of January 31, 1939, on the grounds that they raised
questions to be addressed in separate ordinary action.

Issue:

Whether or not the court correctly dismissed the motions raised by the heirs?

Ruling:

No.

We are of opinion that the Court incurred in the errors indicated in the pleading
of the appellant motives, since once a testament is legalized, it is the duty of the
executor or administrator, unless it is legatee, to present to the Court, within the next 3
months of his appointment, an inventory of all assets, rights and credits that have come
into his hands. In the inventory must be included half of the property that corresponds
to the deceased. And in order to find that half of the profits, it must proceed before the
liquidation of the assets, rendering of accounts of the partnership, payment of debts,
etc.

As for the other motion, in which the will is declared void in relation to the legacy
made in favor of Calixta Peralta, and as to the memorandum of the movers with respect
to the exclusion of certain properties of the inventory of the testamentary, the Order
cannot be upheld either. After all the debts of a testamentary or intestation have been
paid, the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the participation and distribution of the
inheritance among the interested parties.

Principle:

As a general rule, that the court, in these proceedings, does not have the power
to decide matters of title to property, we have already stated, however, that it can do
so, On an interim basis, when the purpose is only to determine whether particular
properties should be excluded from the inventory

Lunsod vs Ortega

Facts:

The subject property was owned by Rufina Medel, as her inheritance from her
unmarried daughter, Anacleta Ortega, who inherited it from her father, Estanislao
Ortega. It turned out that on June 3, 1915, Rufina sold the property with right to
repurchase to Francisco Lunsod. Later, when Rufina died, Cipriano Medel, brother of
said deceased, was the appointment of an administrator of the property left by her.

On September 19, 1916, Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace court
of San Pablo a complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, the case being
docketed there as civil case No. 861. In said complaint the description of the parcels in
question was given and the plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of the three parcels
of land mentioned in the aforementioned document and that on or about June 4, 1916,
he was illegally, and by means of strategy and stealth, turned out of the possession
thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been collecting the fruits.
These said defendants are the uncles of Anacleta Ortega.

In the intestate proceeding of Rufina’s estate, the defendants asserted to

exclude the subject property from the estate of Rufina Medel because the said property
is considered as a reserved property for the relatives within the third degree of Anacleta
Ortgea.
Issue:

Whether or not the subject property may be excluded from the property of
Rufina Medel’s estate?

Ruling:

Yes.

It is settled that when the ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether
by the latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title
perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal, and recovery. This absolute
ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be
no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die
before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If
there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the
property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise.

Principle:

In this case, the questioned property was inherited by Rufina from her deceased
daughter. Clearly, by operation of law, the said property is reserve to the relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, who
happened to be the defendants in this case, Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga.
Therefore, the property must be excluded from the estate of Rufina Medel.

SANTERO vs. CFI OF CAVITE

Facts:

Petitioners are children of the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while
private Respondents are 4 of the 7 children by Pablo Santero with Anselmina. Both sets
of children are the natural children of the deceased, Pablo.

A Motion for allowance filed by Respondents through their guardian, wherein the
ground cited was for support which included educational expenses, clothing and
medical necessities, which was granted.
 Petitioners opposed and contended that the wards for which allowance is sought
are no longer schooling and have attained majority age and are no longer in
guardianship as provided under Rule 83, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in grating support and allowance to
respondents despite the fact that all of them are not minors?

Ruling:

Yes.

The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 but Arts. 290 and
188 of the New Civil Code. The fact that Respondents are of are, gainfully employed
and married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of
their right to allowance. While the Rules of Court limit the allowances to the widow
and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
surviving spouse and his or her children without distinction.

Principle:

Respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the

inheritance from their father Pablo. Since the provisions of the New Civil Code, a
substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive
support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be
impaired by Rule 83 which is a procedural rule.

Babao vs. Villavicencio

Facts:

In the proceedings of the intestate estate of Ignacio Trillanes,Maria Babao, the

herein appellee, petitioned the court that an additional inventory be made of certain
properties of the deceased and an allowance be made to her minor children for their
support, pending the distribution of the estate.

These minors are children of Jose Trillanes, son of the deceased Ignacio
Trillanes. The petition was opposed by the administrator of the estate on the ground
that the said minors are not entitled to support applied for because Sec.684 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides only for the support of the children of the deceased and not
of his grandchildren. The lower court however, hold otherwise and allowed P15 monthly
pension.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisional support granted by Sec. 684 of the Code of Civil
Procedure extends to the grandchildren?

Ruling:

The ordinary acceptation of the word hijo or child does not include nieto or
grandchildren. The reference made in the aforesaid section to allowances as are
provided by the law in force in the Philippine Islands does not have the effect of
extending the right to this provisional support to her petition, whose provision in this
point do not, in the opinion of the court, extend to the grandchildren of the deceased.
She cannot invoke the Code of Civil Procedure because the grandfather against whose
estate the allowance claimed is to be charged is now dead, and therefore the obligation
of such grandfather to give support was already extinguished.

Principle:

The reference made to Section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure to "allowances
as are provided by the law in force in the Philippine Islands on and immediately prior to
the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight," does not, in the
opinion of the court, have the effect of extending the right to this provisional support to
persons other than the children of the deceased.