Republic vs Tampus GR 214243

FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three
days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to
Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed
before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging
that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly
believes that he is already dead.

ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared presumptively dead

RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that
the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the
spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still
alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries
with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not
know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to
find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself
in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat
mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the
status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's
mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts
to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree
of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

Republic vs Jose Sarenogon

Case Digest GR 199194 Feb 10, 2016

Facts:

Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie. He
testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left
to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad,
he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned home after his contract expired, then
inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts. They also did not know where
she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the
Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt. These two witnesses
testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month prior to their
leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added that they had no information
regarding Netchie’s location. The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years,
reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.

The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation of
evidence. The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse
in elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the RTC.

Issue 1: W/N Rule 65 is the proper recourse to question the RTC ruling

Held:

Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the RTC’s decision in a
summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death.

Under Article 247 of the Family Code, the RTC’s decision on a petition pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice
of appeal pertaining to such judgment. However, an aggrieved party may file a certiorari under Rule
65 to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to SC via a petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue 2: W/N the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied with (CIVIL LAW)
Held:

No. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result
of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy required “well-founded belief”
standard.

Sarenogon’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the required
degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had
inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness
stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest
for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined
and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming
the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and
identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his search.

Santos vs. Santos

G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

Statement of the Case:

In his petition for certiorari, petitioner Celerina J. Santos assails the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

Facts of the Case:

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo
remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao,
Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from
other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12
years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had
passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in
court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she
was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension,
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since
1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any
notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.

Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never resided in Tarlac and
never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed that it was not true that she
had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon
City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina
referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false
allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's
petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the
proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground that the proper
remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance as stated in
Article 42 of the Family Code

Ruling:

Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to become a basis for
annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission
of the controversy.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions,
and conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled
with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that
constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. The Family
Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears. Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the
termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-
existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact
and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the
fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined. The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately
cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead
spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated
in the Family Code are present. Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has
been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil
registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4)
if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered
confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second
marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may
be considered valid when the following are present: (1) The prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years; (2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead; (3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and (4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The
first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent
marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage
void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage
still applies.

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing
other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also
be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.

Celerina seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its
effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by
mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still
be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited
or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to
her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit
of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.

Disposition:

The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity or annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.