THE CASE OF TUMBOKON VS. ATTY.

PEFIANCO
(AC No. 6116, August 1, 2012)

Atty. Pefianco undertook to give Engr. Tumbokon

10% of the attorney’s fees Atty. Pefianco would receive in

representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap, whom

Engr. Tumbokon has referred, in an action for partition of

the estate of the late Benjamin Yap. Their agreement was

reflected in a letter. Atty. Pefianco had already received

around P40 million attorney’s fees but ignored the said

agreement.
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law is

considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who

show that they possess and continue to possess the legal

qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are

expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal

proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing,

and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal

profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with

the values and norms embodied in the Code. Clearly, Atty.

Pefianco has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code

which prohibits lawyers from dividing or stipulating to

divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to

practice law. Atty. Pefianco was suspended from the active

practice of law for one year.

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 The issues to be resolved in this paper are:
(1) Whether or not Engr. Tumbokon will be

compensated per their agreement; and

(2) What are the legal remedies available for Engr.

Tumbokon?

The first issue is “whether or not Engr. Tumbokon will

be compensated per their agreement,” or stated

differently, “whether or not Atty. Pefianco has the

obligation to pay Engr. Tumbokon for the referral services

the latter had rendered to Atty. Pefianco per their

agreement.”
The Law of Obligations and Contracts (Book IV of the

New Civil Code), the body of rules which deals with the

nature and sources of obligations and the rights and duties

arising from agreements and particular contracts, shall be

enlightening in this paper. Article 1156 defines an

obligation as “a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to

do.” Article 1157 specifies the sources of obligations: laws,

contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by

law, and quasi-delicts.

In this case, it is by virtue of an agreement that

Engr. Tumbokon claims compensation. Article 1159

provides that “obligations arising from contracts have the

force of law between the contracting parties and should be

complied with in good faith.” In this regard, let me bring

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this question to the fore: Is the ‘agreement’ a valid

contract under the law? Article 1318 has an answer:

“There is no contract unless the following requisites

concur: (1) Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object

certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3)

Cause of the obligation which is established.” Consent, in

the subject agreement, is deemed undisputed. “In the

present case, respondent’s defense that forgery had

attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was

belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have

undertaken the payment of complainant’s commission but

passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.”

On the other hand, the object of the agreement is the

referral made by Engr. Tumbokon in favor of Atty.

Pefianco. Rule 2.03 of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility (CPR) will help us appreciate the ‘referral.’

It provides, “A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done

any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.” This

makes the object of the agreement fall under Article 1347,

third paragraph of the CC which states that “all services

which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,

public order, or public policy may likewise be the object of

a contract.” Apparently, the object of the agreement is

contrary to the CPR.

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 To continue with the requisites of a valid contract,

the cause or consideration is 10% of the attorney’s fees.

At this juncture, let me reiterate that the Supreme Court

in this case ruled that Atty. Pefianco violated Rule 9.02 of

Canon 9 of the CPR. Article 1352 will lead us to the right

path. It provides, “Contracts without cause, or with

unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The cause is

unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,

public order or public policy.”

Summarily, the agreement’s object and cause are

unlawful and/or contrary to public policy. Since Article

1409 tells us that “Those (contracts) whose cause, object

or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,

public order or public policy are inexistent and void from

the beginning,” the agreement between Engr. Tumbokon

and Atty. Pefianco produces no effect whatsoever either

against or in favor of anyone (Quod nullum est nullum

producit effectum). The agreement confers no right and

imposes no liability. Hence, Engr. Tumbokon will not be

compensated per their agreement.

And, the same discussion is sufficient to answer the

second issue: What are the legal remedies available

for Engr. Tumbokon? Based on the settled premise that

the agreement is void from the beginning, it is opined in

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this paper that there are no legal remedies that Engr.

Tumbokon may resort to to claim his so-called

compensation.
Lastly, on a personal note, Engr. Tumbokon’s only

recourse is a friendly appeal to Atty. Pefianco to fulfill their

agreement. Albeit, I should say, anything Atty. Pefianco

may give to Engr. Tumbokon by virtue of the said void

agreement is unbecoming of an attorney. It would,

nonetheless, redound to patent violation of Rule 9.02,

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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