ELENA PERALTA VDA. DE CAIÑA, ET AL.

, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GUSTAVO VICTORIANO, ET AL., respondents.

A. B. Encarnacion and Associates for petitioners.

Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr. for respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of respondent judge dated July
10, 1957 directing petitioners to surrender to the Register of deeds of Rizal their owner's
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51585 in order that the attorney's lien of their
former counsel Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr. may be annotated on the back thereof.

Petitioners are the widow and children of the late Valeriana Caiña who was the owner of a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21702. A portion of this property was
transferred to one Gavina Cierte de Andal and as a result said title was cancelled and a new one
issued in their names bearing No. 51585.

Respondent Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr. was the attorney of one of petitioners, Elena Peralta Vda. de
Caiña, in an action for ejectment filed before the Justice of the Peace of Caloocan, Rizal, against
one Ricardo Nabong, which was dismissed and appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
In the latter court, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3875, and because of the non-
appearance of defendant, the latter was declared in default and judgment was rendered in favor
of plaintiff. This judgment became final and executory for lack of appeal.

On June 26, 1957, respondent Dalisay filed a motion in the same ejectment case for annotation of
his attorney's lien on the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51585 claiming that,
notwithstanding the services he had rendered to the widow and her children who were presented
by him in said case, they have failed to pay him his attorney's fees which he fixed at P2,020. This
motion was set for hearing and thereafter the same was granted in an order entered on July 10,
1957 wherein the court ordered petitioners to surrender their duplicate copy of said certificate in
order that the annotation requested may be made. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they were never furnished with a copy of
respondent's motion, nor notified of the date of its hearing, for which reason they were not able
to appear to contest the same. This motion was opposed by respondent Dalisay who averred that
petitioners were furnished with a copy of his motion by registered mail three days before the
hearing as shown by the return card attached to his written opposition. And on August 27, 1957,
the court denied the motion. Hence the present petition for certiorari.

This issue to be determined is whether the attorney's lien of respondent Dalisay for services he
had rendered in the ejectment case can be ordered annotated on the back of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 51585.

An attorney's lien is of two kinds: one is called retaining alien and the other charging lien.
The retaining lien is the right of the attorney to retain the funds, documents, and papers of
his client which have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. The
charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in
litigation of his client (Section 33, Rule 127; Rustia vs. Abeto, 72 Phil., 133). Under this
rule, this lien, whether retaining or charging, takes legal effect only from and after, but not
before, notice of said lien has been entered in the record and served on the adverse party
(Macondray & Company, Inc. vs. Jose, 66 Phil., 590; Menzi and Company vs. Bastida, 63
Phil., 16).

It may therefore be seen that the right of a lawyer to insure the payment of his professional fee is
either to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his client which may have lawfully come into
his possession, or to enforce it upon any judgment for the payment of money he may secure in
favor of his client. And it has been held that the retaining lien is dependent upon possession and
does not attach to anything not in attorney's hands. The lien exists only so long as the attorney's
retains possession ends (Rustia vs. Abeto, supra).

In the instant case, the lien which respondent attorney tried to enforce for the satisfaction of his
professional fee is charging in the sense that his purpose is to make of record his claim in order
that it may be considered in the execution of the judgment that may be rendered in the case, and
this he has already done. Thus, he had already caused a statement of his claim to be entered in
the record of the ejectment case and that is all what the rule requires of him to do. Certainly, he
cannot go any further, such as what he led the trial court to do, that is, to have his lien annotated
on the back of the title of petitioners which is beyond the province of the court. The lien of
respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a personal
claim enforceable by a writ of execution. The respondent judge has therefore exceeded his
authority in issuing the order subject of the present petition for certiorari.

Petition is granted. The order of respondent judge dated July 10, 1957 is hereby set aside. Costs
against respondent Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr.
 Vda Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. BUS CO., INC.
DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal to the Supreme Court (lodged prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 5440)
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), in its Civil Case No. 8275,
sentencing the defendants-appellants, B. L. T. Bus Co., Inc., and its driver Sergio de Luna, to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, as damages arising from a vehicular accident, the
total amount of P240,905.72, with interest from the filing of the complaint.

Said Civil Case 8275 was filed pursuant to a reservation made by the plaintiffs to file a civil
action separately from the criminal case instituted against the B. L. T. B. bus driver Sergio de
Luna in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, for homicide and multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence, in connection with the same vehicular
accident. The Laguna Court had convicted de Luna of the criminal charge, but the judgment, was
appealed and is pending in the Court of Appeals.

Of the detailed findings of facts of the trial court, we affirm the following as either non-
controverted or preponderantly established by the evidence:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Before February 27, 1964, Jovito Bonifacio, Sr., together with his wife (plaintiff Rosario Santos
de Bonifacio) and neighbor Agustin Angeles, used to bathe in the Pansol hot springs at Los
Baños, Laguna, twice a week. They made such trips in his 1962 Mercedes Benz car with plaintiff
Alberto Concepcion as his driver, a duly licensed driver since 1946.

"About 4:00 o’clock in the morning of February 27, 1964, the four of them left Barrio Sumilang,
Pasig, bound for the Pansol hot springs in Los Baños, Laguna. Jovito, Sr. was seated beside his
driver Alberto Concepcion; while Agustin Angeles was seated on the left side of the rear seat
with plaintiff Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio to his right. Alberto Concepcion was driving the
car on the right lane facing Los Baños at the rate of 30 miles per hour because the concrete road
was slippery as it was then drizzling. After going down the overpass or bridge and negotiating
the curve after the said bridge at Barrio Landayan, San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, Alberto
Concepcion saw a cargo truck parked on the left portion of the concrete highway without any
parking lights. It was about 5:20 a.m., still dark and raining. While he was about 15 meters from
the said parked cargo truck, he saw for the first time the oncoming LTB passenger bus No. 136
bearing 1964 plate No. PUB-1276, about 200 meters away from him and about 185 meters
behind the parked cargo truck. Said bus was then driven at a very fast clip by the defendant
Sergio de Luna. Because he was on his right lane, Alberto Concepcion continued on his way at
the rate of 30 miles per hour. The parked truck was entirely on the left lane and about one (1)
meter from the center, of the concrete highway. His Mercedes Benz was passing alongside the
parked truck and about 70 cm. from the center of the road. Just as he was about to pass beyond
the parked truck, the oncoming LTB bus suddenly swerved to its left towards the right lane of the
Mercedes Benz and collided with the Mercedes Benz. The place of collision was about 10 meters
from the parked truck. The impact caused the Mercedes car to swerve to the right shoulder of the
road facing Los Baños, as Alberto slammed his brakes, and the Mercedes car stopped on the
right shoulder, which is about two meters wide: while the LTB bus made a complete U-turn and
finally stopped on the left lane of the concrete highway facing Los Baños or the direction where
it came from. It was filled with about 40 passengers then (see pictures Exhs. H, I, J, K, L, M, and
SS or 13 and 26, pp. 92-94, 391, 576, rec.). The left front part of the Mercedes Benz was
smashed (see pictures Exhs. H and I, p. 92, rec.). The violent impact threw Jovito Bonifacio, Sr.
out of the car onto the right shoulder of the road facing Los Baños, causing his instantaneous
death (Exhs. J. K. L and M, pp, 93-94, rec.) while the other passengers, the driving [sic] Alberto
Concepcion, Mrs. Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio, and Agustin Angeles, lost consciousness
and were seriously injured. They recovered consciousness in the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital
in Pasay City to where they were brought that same morning of the incident." (Decision, Rec. on
App., pp. 116-119)

As is usual in cases of this kind, three main issues arise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Who of the drivers of the colliding vehicles was at fault?

(2) Is the employer of the guilty driver responsible for the fault of the latter?

(3) Are the damages awarded reasonable?

Taking up the questions seriatim, we find that the court below correctly held that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the L.T.B. bus driver, de Luna, who failed to take the
necessary precautions demanded by the circumstances. He admitted that when the mishap
occurred, it was still dark, and as it was raining, requisite prudence required that de Luna should
be more careful than usual, and slacken his pace, for the wet highway could be expected to be
slippery. Even assuming that the presence of the parked cargo truck did constitute an emergency,
although it was in plain view, still, if de Luna had not been driving unreasonably fast, his bus
would not have skidded to the left and invaded the lane of the oncoming car when he applied his
brakes. His having failed to see the parked cargo truck until he was only 50 meters from it also
justifies the inference that he was inattentive to his responsibility as a driver. That he did not
know that anyone else was using the road is no defense to his negligent operation of his vehicle,
since he should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway;
and his failure to keep a proper lookout for persons and objects in the line to be traversed
constitutes negligence (7 Am. Jur. 2d 901). Furthermore, in intruding into the lane reserved for
vehicles coming from the opposite direction, it was incumbent upon the bus driver to make sure
that be could do so without danger.

Confirmatory of the foregoing considerations is the fact that de Luna himself admitted, in the
statement, Exhibit "A," taken by the chief of police, and subscribed and sworn to before the
Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, at 8:00 o’clock in the same morning of the accident, and while the
facts were fresh in his mind, that when he (de Luna) noticed the parked cargo truck he slammed
on his brakes and because of this, the bus skidded to the left and hit the Mercedes Benz car (." . .
ang ginawa ko po ay nagpreno ako ng aking sasakyang minamaneho at dahil po dito ay umislayd
ang aking trak na papuntang kaliwa, subalit siya po namang pagdaan ng isang awtong Mercedes
Benz na aking nabunggo . . .")

The version at the trial of defendant-appellant Sergio de Luna, and his witnesses, is that when the
former saw the parked cargo truck he slowed down, swerved a little to the left, then completely
stopped his vehicle; that right then, the Mercedes Benz car hit his bus, with such force that the
bus turned to the direction where it came from. Not only is this version belied by de Luna’s
original and spontaneous statement to the San Pedro Police, but it was infirmed by physical facts.

It is incredible, and contrary to common experience and observation, that the bus, admittedly
three (3) times bigger than the car, and loaded with about forty(40) passengers, could be turned
around while standing still by the impact of the much smaller car. Nor was his swerving to the
left justifiable if he were in control of his vehicle, since he had a clear view of the left lane and
the oncoming Mercedes Benz from the driver’s seat of the bus. Evidence, to be believed, must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself (People v.
Baquiran, L-20153, 29 June 1967, 20 SCRA 451).

There was no negligence on the part of the driver of the Mercedes car, Alberto Concepcion.

"A motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway, even after he sees an
approaching motorist coming toward him on the wrong side, is generally entitled to assume that
the other motorist will return to his proper lane of traffic, . . ." (8 Am. Jur. 2d 319)

That the L.T.B. bus was damaged near the front right wheel and fender proves that the Mercedes
was already very close to the place of collision when it occurred, so that the car driver had no
chance to evade it. Nor did said driver, Concepcion, possess any means of knowing that the bus
intruding into his line of travel was skidding out of control, and could not draw back to its proper
lane.

Appellants pretend that the Mercedes car was proceeding at reckless speed, but this charge rests
on nothing more substantial than an alleged statement by Mrs. Bonifacio at the hospital that her
driver was driving fast. The court below, in our opinion, correctly discredited this evidence, for
at the time it was supposedly made, Mrs. Bonifacio was still in a state of shock, with visitors
barred by doctor’s orders; and, moreover, defense witness, ex-Cpl. Casantusan, did not even take
down or report the pretended statement, notwithstanding its patent importance; there was no
corroboration thereof, and it was contradicted by the car driver and by Mrs. Bonifacio herself.
The rule, too well-known to require citation of authorities, is that in the absence of clear error
(and none is shown in the present instance) a trial court’s estimate on the credibility of witnesses,
whose demeanor it had unparalleled opportunity to observe, will not be disturbed on appeal.

At any rate, so long as the Mercedes car remained in its proper lane, its speed could not have
been the proximate cause of the mishap.

On the second issue posed, the rule under Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
makes an employer liable for damage caused by his employee in the discharge of his duties,
unless the former adequately proves having exercised due care in the selection and supervision of
the employee.
Appellant company defends that it had observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage, conformably to the last paragraph of said Article 2180. It adduced evidence to
show that in hiring driver de Luna, the latter was tested on his proficiency as a driver; that he
passed the test given by the company’s board of examiners, composed of the office manager, the
medical director, the chief of the legal department and the job superintendent, aside from the
orientation test given by experienced drivers along the different lines of the company; that the
company issued service manuals to its employees, aside from memorandum circulars and duty
orders to govern the conduct of its drivers; that it assigns inspectors interlinked with one another
along the different lines of the company to see to it that the rules and regulations are complied
with by all the drivers; that it metes out penalties, such as fines, to erring drivers; that it
maintains shops at different stations where several mechanics are assigned to see to it that no
truck leaves on the line without being thoroughly checked; that it keeps a summary of service
records of its drivers to help in determining their efficiency and fitness; that it conducts seminars
on safe-driving and prevention of accidents; that it had received an award of appreciation in 1963
by the National Traffic Safety Committee; that it used the best available brake lining on Bus No.
136 and that said bus was completely checked for road worthiness the day before the accident.

Yet the evidence of appellant company also established facts that demolished its very defense of
"diligence of a good father of a family," for it plainly shows inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its driver and in the maintenance of its vehicles. Salient among these facts are the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Defense witness Cuevas asserted that the brake lining of the bus was changed on 10 January
1964, over a month prior to the accident, although brake linings last about 30 days only. The
change in lining was overdue but the appellant bus company tried to hide this fact. Said the trial
court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The job sheet for the change of brake lining appears dated Jan. 10, 1964, in ink. There was
an attempt to change it by crossing out "Jan." and super-imposing the word "Feb." in pencil (see
page 598, rec.). There was an attempt to make "Feb. 10, 1964" as altered appear as the correct
date — instead of January 10, 1964 — by not arranging chronologically the various orders
and/or job sheets for said bus No. 136 in said folder, Exh. 27, and by placing the said small job
sheet as page 11 of the said folder, Exhibit 27, which has for its first page an order for bus No.
136 dated February 13, 1964 (p. 1 of Exhibit 27 or Exh. 25-B, p. 290, rec.)." (Rec. on Appeal, p.
132.)

By resorting to these documentary alterations, the company indicated its awareness that its case
is weak or unfounded and from that may be inferred that its case of appellant lacks truth and
merit. 1 The claim on appeal that the alteration in the writing was innocent, or that the company
should have been given an opportunity to explain because it was caught unaware that the court
below would take the incident against them as it did, is untenable. The rule requires that a party,
producing a writing as genuine but which as found altered after its execution, in a part material to
the question in dispute, should account for the alteration, and if "he do that, he may give the
writing in evidence, but not otherwise." (Section 32, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court.) In other
words, the company should have accounted for the alteration when it introduced the job sheet in
evidence, and not endeavor to explain the alteration afterwards.

(b) The record of driver de Luna shows that, on the average, he was at the wheel and on the road
for eleven (11) hours and thirty-five (35) minutes per day, from Paete to Manila and back, and
Paete to San Antonio and back, starting before dawn until the evening. He has been in the Paete-
Manila route for four (4) years (T.s.n., 22 November 1965, pages 38-39). He was paid by the
hour, so that the more time he drove, the greater compensation he received. That employer
company thus abetted, obviously for the sake of greater profit, the gruelling schedule, unmindful
of the harmful consequence that excessive working time would register upon the driver’s health,
and, particularly, on his reflexes. The pay-off came when driver de Luna, because of his
accumulated fatigue and inattentiveness failed to notice seasonably the presence of the parked
cargo truck upon his lane of traffic, impelling him to brake suddenly in an effort to avoid hitting
it, The braking made the bus slide and encroach upon the other lane, resulting in its collision
with the oncoming automobile.

(c) Sergio de Luna had repeatedly violated company rules. Despite his numerous infractions, 31
in all since 1951, and including a collision with a carretela, the company took no more drastic
action against him other than repeated warnings and imposing token fines, which on the whole
amounts to tolerance of the violations or laxity or negligence in the enforcement of the company
rules.

(d) On its bus involved in the accident (No. 136), the appellant company was also negligent. The
bus was last overhauled on 26 January 1963 but was usually overhauled every six months; its
overhauling therefore, was overdue by six months. In addition, as heretofore observed, its brake
linings were last changed on 10 January 1964, but were usually changed every 30 days; the
changing was therefore, overdue by one (1) month and seventeen (17) days at the time of the
mishap, and must have contributed to the driver’s inability to control the skidding that led to the
collision.

In the face of these plain instances of lax supervision, the trial court has aptly
remarked:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The mere issuance of numerous rules and regulations, without the corresponding periodic
checks as to whether such rules and regulations are being complied with, is not sufficient to
exempt the defendant bus firm from liability arising from the negligence of its employees.
Neither the establishment of maintenance and repair shops, which do not regularly service its
buses, would suffice to demonstrate the diligence of the employer in the selection and
supervision of its employees and in servicing and maintaining the buses in good running
condition."cralaw virtua1aw library

The minor errors charged against the appealed decision do not suffice to overrule the findings of
negligence of both the driver and the company, measured by the requirements of ordinary
diligence. Appellants’ complaint in their brief, that the lower court applied the law requiring
carriers to observe extraordinary diligence with respect to passengers, and not ordinary diligence
with respect to third parties as in the present case, is without basis.
On the question of damages, the trial court properly took into account that the late Jovito
Bonifacio, Sr., was already a successful businessman when his life was cut short, at the age of
49, by the highway accident. He was treasurer of Bonifacio Bros., Inc., a firm owned by himself
and his brother, and which is engaged in the business of repairing motor vehicles. The assets of
said firm in 1962 were worth P1,059,754.53; it had 102 employees receiving a salary of
P1,800.00 or more, per annum; in 1963, its assets were worth P995,885.78 (Exhibits "KK-2" &
"KK-3"). In April, 1963, the deceased founded J. Bonifacio Bros., Inc., which also engaged in
the same line of business, with principal office at 267 P. Casal, Manila, and of which he was
president at ,the time of his demise. The deceased had a net income of P33,738.62 and
P24,000.00 in 1962 and 1963, respectively. 2 The lower court, therefore, fairly assessed that, had
he lived to the age of 55, he would have earned a total net income of P144,000.00. The six-year
life expectancy allowed by the trial court is shorter than that shown by insurance mortality tables,
but the award was not appealed.

Bonifacio’s family incurred expenses of P13,764.05, as follows; coffin — P600.00; burial lot —
P90.00; cost of publication of death notices — P720.00; tomb — P4,850.00; food and gasoline
during vigil — P1,782.00; other expenses — P500.00; compensation to a private investigator to
look into the record of defendant driver Sergio de Luna — P222.05; and damage to Mercedes
Benz car, not covered by insurance — P5,000.00.

Defendants-appellants question the actual and litigation expenses because they were paid by the
firm J. Bonifacio Bros., Inc., arguing that said firm, not the plaintiffs, has the right to claim the
damages by virtue of subrogation, per Articles 1302 and 1303 of the Civil Code. This is a
defense that, even if true (which we need not rule upon) should have been invoked in the court
below, and its interposition comes too late on appeal. Moreover, such a technical defense
deserves scant consideration, because the firm is a family corporation and a subrogation of
parties will neither diminish the expenses nor exculpate defendants-appellants from liability
therefor.

Plaintiff-appellee Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio regained consciousness at the Manila

Sanitarium and Hospital. She suffered a lacerated wound in the frontal region of her head,
contusion on the left side of her face, fracture of the distal portion of her left ulna and dislocation
of the left femur. She was confined in the hospital from 27 February 1964 to 15 March 1964. Her
hospital bills and compensation for special nurses amounted to P1,658.48. During her
confinement, she failed to receive her salary, amounting to P608.00.

Driver Alberto Concepcion of the Mercedes Benz car, sustained compound fractures; his right
foot was in a plaster cast for six (6) months and one (1) week; his left leg was under traction and
hanging for two (2) weeks, his left hip-bone dislocated. He was confined in the hospital for one
(1) month and four (4) days. Up to the time the lower court rendered its decision on 30 July
1966, Concepcion had to go in crutches to the hospital, for treatment. His medical expenses
amounted to P1,777.21. As a driver of the deceased Jovito Bonifacio, Sr., he was paid a weekly
salary of P50.00, with free meals, which remuneration may be estimated to be P4,000.00 yearly
(T.s.n., 22 October 1964, page 10) . He was 40 years old at the time of the accident and there is
no indication as to when he would be able to drive again. If he would be permanently
incapacitated from driving again, he may, in the future, be able to find a different calling or
gainful occupation. The award of P15,000.00, as compensatory damages, is fair and reasonable.

Agustin Angeles suffered a broken right wrist, a crack in the top left part of his head, sunken left
eye, and a wound in the left cheek. He regained consciousness at the hospital only after 11 days
from the time of the accident. He was confined for 18 days, and billed for P1,097.98. Due to the
accident, his memory and vision were impaired; he now walks with a cane; his bowel movement
and urination are now abnormal and irregular; he cannot freely move his right arm. He was 76
years old at the time of the accident, but despite his age, he used to repair watches, with an
suffrage monthly income of P250.00. He cannot repair watches anymore. The lower court
granted him compensatory damages for P3,000.00.

For their shock, worry and anguish, the court below awarded moral damages to the plaintiffs-
members of the family of the deceased Jovito Bonifacio, Sr. in the sum of P20,000.00; to Rosaria
Santos Vda. de Bonifacio, the sum of P10,000.00; to Alberto Concepcion and Agustin Angeles,
the sum of P5,000.00 each. It also granted the family group and each of the aforenamed plaintiffs
P5,000.00, as exemplary damages. The quantum of moral and exemplary damages thus awarded
is not unconscionable, as appellants aver, but are justified, considering all the circumstances of
the case.

Interest on the various damages at 6% per annum since the filing of the suit was also awarded,
despite the lack of prayer for interest in the plaintiffs’ complaint. The grant of interest is not
necessarily error, for under the Civil Code —

"ART. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case,
be adjudicated in the discretion of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library

The findings and conclusions of negligence on the part of the defendants-appellants, and not on
the part of the plaintiffs-appellees, show the lack of merit of the last assignment of error about
the denial of appellants’ counterclaim for the fees of their own counsel.

Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified because the counsel for
plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal ground
for disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case
would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under the rule advocated, a judge
would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have
many) appeared. Nor have the appellants successfully shown here that bias distorted the
judgment or conduct of the challenged trier of the case. That he should question defense
witnesses more closely than those of the plaintiffs is but natural, since defendants’ evidence
varies from proof already on record. A desire to get at the truth is no proof of bias or prejudice.

FINDING NO REVERSIBLE ERROR, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs
against the appellants.
Catu vs Rellosa

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located

at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio

Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the

units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a

complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of

the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation

meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a

certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in

the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as

counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant

administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a

lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he

presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear

complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of

Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task

with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties,

however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request.
He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the

commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,

report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on

Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After

evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline

respondent.[7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided

over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against

Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the

ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and

signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and

notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section

7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
 xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach

of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY

THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the

practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act

will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of

Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as

the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government

service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG

v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03prohibits former government lawyers from

accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had

intervened while in said service.

 Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act

complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION

7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their

official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the
officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
 This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by

elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession

by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general

law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex

specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays

are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of

the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the

members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of

the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are

prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise

of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time

service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their

official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or

teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,

engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city

mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a

week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in
any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to
secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these

purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,

provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial

proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is

made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius

est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that

they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not

mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular

sessions only twice a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his

profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of

his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE
LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY
FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at

the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written

permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised

Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private

business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further,
 That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written

permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance

as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service

Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of

the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and

promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as

the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent

not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is

a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of

the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis
supplied)
 Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal

ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and

improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for

violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as

embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period

of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any

repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the

records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall

furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.