G.R. No.
74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA
UY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she
was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing
to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On
appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are
now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to
reinstate that of the trial court.
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the
petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos
Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated
for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies
vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted
one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the
child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to
them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente
Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite
Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. 5 It
found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also
held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent
thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the
Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical
and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the
house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there
are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister
living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is
one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is
the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless
of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of
the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and
his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from
causing injury to any one, including himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly
credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him
("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some
kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as
many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or another although
they did not appear to be close kin.8 She at least implied that they did not pay any rent,
presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she
herself did not seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders (or more of
boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and
accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as,
who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita,
who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were
maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog.10 Another witness,
Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining
the house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita denied paying the water bills for
the house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of her application
for water connection with the Cebu Water District, which strongly suggested that she was
administering the house in question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the
time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most
logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own
house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to
the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually
as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness
when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even
after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question
occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their
hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog
that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the
contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had
1
nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The
Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness
developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second,
that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the
dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the second admission?
A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred to Dr. Co earlier
in the morning and then the father, because the child was asking for water, the
father tried to give the child water and this child went under the bed, she did not
like to drink the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this reason, because I
was in danger there was rabies, I called Dr. Co.
Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?
A: Yes, sir. 18
As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the following to
say under oath:
A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from physical, chemical and
bacterial means. ... It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any other
disease which can lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of complication which is
broncho-pneumonia?
A: Yes.
Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the witness is know as
CURRENT DIANOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen
and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book
under the title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as a result of rabies and it
says: Once the symptoms, have appeared death inevitably occurs after 2-3 days as a
result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized paralysis. After a positive
diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected animal if the animal cannot be
observed or if the bite is on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you
believe in this statement?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of respiratory
failure which leave in the form of bronco-pneumonia?
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 19
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog
bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate
our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is
not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the
evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she
2
was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The
petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the
dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even
if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does
not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely
provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and
can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of
their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house
that bit Theness.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for
the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except
only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as
prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the
private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the
civil damages to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The petition is
DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Jose Dingcong vs Halim Kanaan
72 Phil 14 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Liability of proprietors
Jose Dingcong was the owner of a hotel in Iloilo. In 1933, a certain Francisco Echevarria
rented a room in the upper floor of the hotel. The room he rented was immediately above
the store occupied by the Kanaan brothers who are also tenants of the hotel. One night,
Echevarria carelessly left his faucet open thereby flooding his room and it caused water
to drip from his room to the store below. Because of this, the articles being sold by Kanaan
were damaged. Apparently also, the water pipes supposed to drain the water from
Echevarria’s room was defective hence the flooding and the dripping.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dingcong is liable to pay for the damages caused by Echevarria.
HELD: Yes. Dingcong as proprietor is liable for the negligent act of the guest of his hotel
(Echevarria). It was not shown that Dingcong exercised the diligence of a good father in
preventing the damage caused. The pipe should have been repaired prior and Echevarria
should have been provided with a container to catch the drip. Therefore, Dingcong is
liable to pay for damages by reason of his negligence.
TRANSLATED VERSION This is by Google Translate which is kind of messy still (as always).
According to the Court’s ruling of the Court of Appeals, brothers and Jose Loreto
Dingcong Dingcong are coarrentadarios of senior’s home located in Emilia Saenz Jose Ma
Basa Street in the City of Iloilo, where they established the Central Hotel, being the the
owner first and the last his manager. Francisco Echevarria occupy the defendant, on
payment of P30 per month, the fourth No. 10 of the hotel. The plaintiffs Acup turn the
bass of the hotel where they had established their “American Bazaar” dedicated to the
purchase and sale of articles and mencancias. About eleven o’clock the night of
September 19, 1933, Echevarria, when retiring to bed, carelessly left open the faucet was
on a basin without normal drainage. As the pipes of the hotel at that time was under
repair when midnight drew water from the pipes, spread the floor, pierced and wetting
articles and mencancias on low setting “American Bazaar,” causing a lost, the Court of
First Instance held at P1, 089.61.
This action was presented by Halim Kanaan, Kanaan and Michael Kanaan Nasri on behalf
of the name “American Bazaar” against Dingcong Loreto, and Francisco Jose Echevarria
Dingcong for damages caused to the plaintiffs.The Jusgado dismissed the case as to
Loreto Dingcong to have died, and condemn Francisco Echevarria, Jose Dingcong
acquitted. The plaintiffs appealed this decision in Dingcong Jose acquitted. The Court of
Appeals, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance declared Jose Dingcong
charge and sentenced him to pay the applicants the amount of damages the same as
assessed by the court. It will be presented to this Court by certiorari, appeal this decision
of the Court of Appeals.
As Jose Dingcong joint tenant and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the top of
the house, you must answer for damages caused by things that were thrown or fell from
it (Article 1910 Civil Code). Francisco Echevarria was a guest of the hotel was the one who
directly by their neglect, leaving open the tap, let the water pipe pull back on the ground
and seep into the low, dipping the articles and goods of the plaintiffs. Dingcong Jose, on
the other hand, do not practice the diligence of a good father to prevent this damage,
however they knew because they could cause then repair the pipes, then, must presume
that Echavarria could use the tap does not provided some container with adequate
drainage, and if you just put a pan under it that, when filled, the water was spread on the
ground.
Confirming the decision appealed, the costs to the appellant.
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down as a
consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign
substances in certain beverages sold by it. The interesting issue posed is whether the
subsequent action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or
merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner herein which must
therefore be filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article
3
1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can
be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was the
proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City,
an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other
goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12
August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite
soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or
particles; he then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of some
fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter
in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles to the Regional
Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, for examination;
subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of Health informing her that the
samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign
substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual
10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00 to
P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989; she
became jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages
but was rebuffed by it. She prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount equal to 30% of the damages
awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the petitioner argued
that since the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the said Code. In
her Comment 4 thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for damages
which does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of action is based on
an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article
1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent related
pleadings were thereafter filed by the parties. 5
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as the existing
administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the complaint is based on a
contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint
should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial court in
its Order of 17 April 1991, 7the private respondent came to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari which we referred to the public respondent "for proper determination
and disposition. 8 The public respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent annulled the
questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case
No. D-9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of warranty as
respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive period is four years.
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an
action or damages arising from respondent's act of "recklessly and negligently
manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold or public consumption" (p.
25, rollo). It is truism in legal procedure that what determines the nature of an action
are the facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as a defense in the defendant's
answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA
340).
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil code, the existence of
contractual relations between the parties does not absolutely preclude an action by
one against the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a
contract.
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:
It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent
recovery of damages therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that) although the relation
between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and in nature the act
that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales was taken,
the authorities are one in saying that he availability of an action or breach of
warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. 10
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public
respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL
PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASEDON BREACH OF A SELLER'S
IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
4
II.CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S
ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD
PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the primary
legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on
its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties
under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation between the
parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-
delicts and that since private respondent's cause of action arose from the breach of implied
warranties, the complaint should have been filed within six months room delivery of the
soft drinks pursuant to Article 171 of the Civil Code.
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the seller's
implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect between
withdrawing from the contract or demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with
damages in either case. She asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for
rescission nor for proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from
a quasi-delict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a
contract did not preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of prescription, the
private respondent insists that since her cause of action is based on quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period therefore is four (4) years in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil
Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said period.
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of
action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to
Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations
in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the
reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for
public consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden
defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in
Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may
elect between withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate
reduction of the price, with damages either case. 13
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud,
in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the law on
obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any
waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also
demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the
performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof are liable for damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the
pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of
the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise fromquasi-delict, i.e., the
acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France
vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take
a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the
air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation
between the passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the
act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing
products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds
such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-
contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical to tort under the common
law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. 27
It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent should
by no means be understood as suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral
damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SYNOPSIS
Tek Hua Enterprises is the lessee of Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. in the latters premises
in Binondo but it was So Ping Bun who was occupying the same for his Trendsetter
5
Marketing. Later, Mr. Manuel Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the premises but the
batter refused and entered into formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. In a suit for
injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts between
DCCSI and petitioner, and for damages. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondents and the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
There was tort interference in the case at bar as petitioner deprived respondent
corporation of the latters property right. However, nothing on record imputed malice on
petitioner; thus, precluding damages. But although the extent of damages was not
quantifiable, it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts
and causing breach of existing ones. Hence, the Court confirmed the permanent
injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter
Marketing.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; NONTRESPASSORY INVASION OF ANOTHERS
INTEREST IN THE PRIVATE USE AND ENJOYMENT OF ASSET; WHEN
PRESENT.- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has
property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with,
(b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the
invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or
unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules.
2. ID.; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; TORT INTERFERENCE; ELEMENTS;
PRESENT.- The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. A duty which
the law of torts is concerned with its respect for the property of others, and a cause
of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person
of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may pertain to a situation
where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under
a contract. In the case before us, petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to
execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent
corporation of the latters property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the
appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present
in the instant case.
3. ID.; ID.; JUSTIFICATION WHERE THE DEFENDANT ACTS FOR THE SOLE
PURPOSE OF FURTHERING HIS OWN FINANCIAL INTEREST;
DISCUSSED.- Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where
the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic
interest. One view is that, as a general rube, justification for interfering with the
business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself.
Such justification does not exists where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.
Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers
 interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual
acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that
wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.
Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position should not be made to
depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of
others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives. As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where
there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind ones
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party
cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially
interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an
officious or malicious intermeddler. In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So
Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the
expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property
of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes
deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
4. ID.; ID.; WHERE LIABILITY NOT QUANTIFIABLE.- Section 1314 of the Civil Code
categorically provides that, Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Here however,
the lower courts did not award damages because the extent of damages was not
quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where it was difficult or
impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on record to
serve as basis thereof In that case we refrained from awarding damages. We believe
the same conclusion applies in this case. While we do not encourage tort interferers
seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of
others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend
the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice.
The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting
parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of
existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent
injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter
Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from
further damage or injury caused by petitioners interference.
5. ID.; ACTUAL DAMAGES; ATTORNEYS FEES; WHERE PLAINTIFF COMPELLED
TO LITIGATE TO PROTECT HIS INTEREST; BASES OF AWARD
THEREOF.- The recovery of attorneys fees in the concept of actual or compensatory
damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code. One such occasion is when the defendants act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
But we consistently held that the award of considerable damages should have clear
factual and legal bases. In connection with attorneys fees, the award should be
commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived from a favorable
judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the trial court
calls for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced.
This ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorneys fees. In a long line of
6
cases we said, It is not sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To
compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent
would throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and his
counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions. Considering that the respondent
corporations lease contract, at the time when the cause of action accrued, ran only
on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even the
reduced amount of attorneys fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant
in the light of prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the amount of two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos awarded by respondent appellate court should be
reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award for
attorneys fees in favor of private respondent corporation.
[G.R. No. 120554. September 21, 1999]
SO PING BUN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISING
CORP. and MANUEL C. TIONG, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari challenges the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
October 10, 1994, and the Resolution[2] dated June 5, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784. The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
except for the award of attorneys fees, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appeal of respondent-appellant So Ping Bun
for lack of merit is DISMISSED. The appealed decision dated April 20, 1992 of the court
a quo is modified by reducing the attorney's fees awarded to plaintiff Tek Hua
Enterprising Corporation from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00." [3]
The facts are as follows:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered
into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4)
lease contracts were premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C, Soler Street,
Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had a
one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after
the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua
continued to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the
original members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua
Enterprising Corp., herein respondent corporation.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Gioks
grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business,
Trendsetter Marketing.
On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises,
informing the latter of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. The rent
increase was later on reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees
demand. Again on December 1, 1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent
increase. Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned
that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest on
the lessees part, and agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did
not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.
On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner, which reads
as follows:
March 1, 1991
Mr. So Ping Bun
930 Soler Street
Binondo, Manila
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your late
grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you
temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. for several years to
generate your personal business.
Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my
stocks. Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising
Corp. Warehouse. You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have
good reasons that you have the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take
measure to protect my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid inconvenience on
your part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong
MANUEL C. TIONG
President[4]
Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal contracts
of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the
death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his textile
business and religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioners request. The lease
contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed.
7
In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the
lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimed damages.
After trial, the trial court ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3, inclusive) all
dated March 11, 1991, between defendant So Ping Bun, doing business
under the name and style of Trendsetter Marketing, and defendant Dee C.
Chuan & Sons, Inc. over the premises located at Nos. 924-B, 924-C, 930 and
930, Int., respectively, Soler Street, Binondo Manila;
2. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court
on June 21, 1991;
3. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the aggrieved party, plaintiff Tek
Hua Enterprising Corporation, the sum of P500,000.00, for attorneys fees;
4. Dismissing the complaint, insofar as plaintiff Manuel C. Tiong is concerned,
and the respective counterclaims of the defendant;
5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the costs of this lawsuit;
This judgment is without prejudice to the rights of plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising
Corporation and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. to negotiate for the renewal of
their lease contracts over the premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C
Soler Street, Binondo, Manila, under such terms and conditions as they agree upon,
provided they are not contrary to law, public policy, public order, and morals.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied.
On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion
for reconsideration, the appellate court modified the decision by reducing the award of
attorneys fees from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred thousand
(P200,000.00) pesos.
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUS
INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT?
II. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEYS FEES OF P200,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
 The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct interpretation of the applicable
law on tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful interference with contract. We have to
begin, obviously, with certain fundamental principles on torts and damages.
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. [6] One becomes liable in
an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private
use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect
to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendants
conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. [7]
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge
on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third
person is without legal justification or excuse.[8]
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others,
and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one
person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. [9] This may pertain to a
situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking
under a contract. In the case before us, petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to
execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent
corporation of the latters property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the appellate
court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant
case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant
acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. [10] One view
is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another
exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where
his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that
it is not necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are
invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in
self-protection.[11] Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position should not
be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with
that of others.[12] It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives.[13]
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy,[14] we held that where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where
the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it
cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. [15]
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to
lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it,
nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
8
Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, Any third person
who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party. Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort
interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private
respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he
ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorneys fees.
It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because
the extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where
it was difficult or impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on
record to serve as basis thereof. In that case we refrained from awarding damages. We
believe the same conclusion applies in this case.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude
into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein
complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages
in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it
does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing
breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and
Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages.The injunction saved the respondents
from further damage or injury caused by petitioners interference.
Lastly, the recovery of attorneys fees in the concept of actual or compensatory
damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.[16] One such occasion is when the defendants act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. [17] But
we have consistently held that the award of considerable damages should have clear
factual and legal bases.[18] In connection with attorneys fees, the award should be
commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived from a favorable
judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the trial court calls
for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced.[19] This ruling
applies with equal force on the award of attorneys fees. In a long line of cases we said, It
is not sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party
to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide open the door
of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue
proportions.[20]
Considering that the respondent corporations lease contract, at the time when the
cause of action accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a
yearly basis, we find even the reduced amount of attorneys fees ordered by the Court of
Appeals still exorbitant in the light of prevailing jurisprudence. [21]Consequently, the
amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by respondent appellate court
should be reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award
for attorneys fees in favor of private respondent corporation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784 are hereby AFFIRMED, with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is reduced from two hundred thousand Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the
(P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in
costs. the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective
buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.[4]
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who
is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship,
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under G.R. No. 164703 Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by
the name and style ACG Express Liner, the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997.[5] Accordingly, the parties
Petitioner, executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25)
for the price of US$1,465,512.00.[6] Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the
- versus - latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price,
from the sale of each vessel.[7]
MORTIMER F. CORDERO,
Respondent. Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on one (1)
x-----------------------------------------x occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of
the building of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. No. 164747 accommodations, transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for
Petitioner, long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Present: Landicho.

- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he
CARPIO MORALES, was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first
BERSAMIN, and SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of
ALLAN C. GO, doing business VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then
underthe name and style ACG Express Liner, staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were
FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT D. Promulgated: nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately
TECSON, flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho
Respondents. May 4, 2010 were already there in Brisbanenegotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite
repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA
and ACG Express Liner.
DECISION In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing
directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship and demanded that they
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
respect the same, without prejudice to legal action against him and Robinson should they
For review is the Decision[1] dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the Resolution[2] dated
fail to heed the same.[8] Corderos lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of ACCRA law
July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113, which affirmed with
firm, also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and
modifications the Decision[3] dated May 31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
misrepresentations committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers (Landicho and
of Quezon City, Branch 85 in Civil Case No. 98-35332.
Tecson) in breach of Corderos exclusive distributorship appointment. [9]
The factual antecedents:
Having been apprised of Corderos demand letter, Thyne & Macartney, the lawyer of
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing
AFFA and Robinson, faxed a letter to ACCRA law firm asserting that the appointment of
Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger
Cordero as AFFAs distributor was for the purpose of one (1) transaction only, that is, the
vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the
purchase of a high-speed catamaran vessel by ACG Express Liner in August 1997. The
world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based
letter further stated that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship, the terms of
in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia
(AFFA).
9
which were contained in a draft agreement which Cordero allegedly failed to return to
AFFA within a reasonable time, and which offer is already being revoked by AFFA. [10]
As to the response of Go, Landicho and Tecson to his demand letter, Cordero testified
before the trial court that on the same day, Landicho, acting on behalf of Go, talked to him
over the telephone and offered to amicably settle their dispute. Tecson and Landicho
offered to convince Go to honor his exclusive distributorship with AFFA and to purchase
all vessels for ACG Express Liner through him for the next three (3) years. In an effort to
amicably settle the matter, Landicho, acting in behalf of Go, set up a meeting with Cordero
on June 29, 1998 between 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. at the Mactan Island Resort Hotel
lobby. On said date, however, only Landicho and Tecson came and no reason was given
for Gos absence. Tecson and Landicho proposed that they will convince Go to pay him
US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that they will get a cut of 20%. And so it was agreed
between him, Landicho and Tecson that the latter would give him a weekly status report
and that the matter will be settled in three (3) to four (4) weeks and neither party will file
an action against each other until a final report on the proposed settlement. No such
report was made by either Tecson or Landicho who, it turned out, had no intention to do
so and were just buying time as the catamaran vessel was due to arrive from
Australia. Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to prohibit
the entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on misdeclaration and
undervaluation. Consequently, an Alert Order was issued by Acting BOC Commissioner
Nelson Tan for the vessel which in fact arrived on July 17, 1998. Cordero claimed that Go
and Robinson had conspired to undervalue the vessel by around US$500,000.00. [11]
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson,
Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring
together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of
his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission
from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for
the sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual,
moral and exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane
travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of AFFAs
untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for
the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.[12]
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and
failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of
the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20,
1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the
period granted by the trial court.[13] As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based
on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26,
1999.[14]Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with
the termination by AFFA of Corderos authority as exclusive distributor in
the Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped
communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA
and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the clients
10
grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly
to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the
Philippines. As to the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for
AFFAs other on-going vessel construction, this was merely requested by Robinson but
which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that Go was buying a second
vessel.Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who
had no document to show any such shipbuilding contract. As to the supposed meeting to
settle their dispute, this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given
US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the alleged undervaluation of the
vessel with the BOC. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his
commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement
dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFAs lawyers
on June 26, 1998.[15]
Pre-trial was reset twice to afford the parties opportunity to reach a settlement. However,
on motion filed by Cordero through counsel, the trial court reconsidered the resetting of
the pre-trial to another date for the third time as requested by Go, Tecson and Landicho,
in view of the latters failure to appear at the pre-trial conference on January 7, 2000 despite
due notice. The trial court further confirmed that said defendants misled the trial court in
moving for continuance during the pre-trial conference held on December 10, 1999,
purportedly to go abroad for the holiday season when in truth a Hold-Departure Order
had been issued against them.[16] Accordingly, plaintiff Cordero was allowed to present
his evidence ex parte.
Corderos testimony regarding his transaction with defendants Go, Landicho and Tecson,
and the latters offer of settlement, was corroborated by his counsel who also took the
witness stand. Further, documentary evidence including photographs taken of the June
29, 1998 meeting with Landicho, Tecson and Atty. Tabujara at Shangri-las Mactan Island
Resort, photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go with his family, Robinson
and Landicho, and also various documents, communications, vouchers and bank
transmittals were presented to prove that: (1) Cordero was properly authorized and
actually transacted in behalf of AFFA as exclusive distributor in the Philippines; (2)
Cordero spent considerable sums of money in pursuance of the contract with Go and
ACG Express Liner; and (3) AFFA through Robinson paid Cordero his commissions from
each scheduled payment made by Go for the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA
pursuant to Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825.[17]
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony
Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. As prayed for,
defendants are hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily,
the following:
 1. On the First Cause of Action, the sum total of SIXTEEN
MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO AND FORTY THREE
CENTAVOS (P16,291,352.43) as actual damages with legal
interest from 25 June 1998 until fully paid;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
3. On the Third Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
4. On the Fourth Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fees;
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson filed a motion for new trial, claiming that they have
been unduly prejudiced by the negligence of their counsel who was allegedly unaware
that the pre-trial conference on January 28, 2000 did not push through for the reason that
Cordero was then allowed to present his evidence ex-parte, as he had assumed that the
said ex-partehearing was being conducted only against Robinson who was earlier
declared in default.[19]In its Order dated July 28, 2000, the trial court denied the motion
for new trial.[20] In the same order, Corderos motion for execution pending appeal was
granted. Defendants moved to reconsider the said order insofar as it granted the motion
for execution pending appeal.[21] On August 8, 2000, they filed a notice of appeal.[22]
On August 18, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and on August
21, 2000, the writ of execution pending appeal was issued. [23] Meanwhile, the notice of
appeal was denied for failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed
period.[24]Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and to transmit the case records
to the CA.[25]
On September 29, 2000, the CA issued a temporary restraining order at the instance of
defendants in the certiorari case they filed with said court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60354 questioning the execution orders issued by the trial court. Consequently, as
requested by the defendants, the trial court recalled and set aside its November 6, 2000
Order granting the ex-parte motion for release of garnished funds, cancelled the
scheduled public auction sale of levied real properties, and denied the ex-parte Motion for
Break-Open Order and Ex-Parte Motion for Encashment of Check filed by
Cordero.[26] On November 29, 2000, the trial court reconsidered its Order dated August
21, 2000 denying due course to the notice of appeal and forthwith directed the transmittal
of the records to the CA.[27]
On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending
appeal.Cordero appealed the said judgment in a petition for review filed with this Court
which was eventually denied under our Decision dated September 17, 2002.[28]
11
On March 16, 2004, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 affirmed the trial court
(1) in allowing Cordero to present his evidence ex-parte after the unjustified failure of
appellants (Go, Tecson and Landicho) to appear at the pre-trial conference despite due
notice; (2) in finding that it was Cordero and not Pamana who was appointed by AFFA
as the exclusive distributor in the Philippines of its SEACAT 25 and other fast ferry
vessels, which is not limited to the sale of one (1) such catamaran to Go on August 7, 1997;
and (3) in finding that Cordero is entitled to a commission per vessel sold for AFFA
through his efforts in the amount equivalent to 22.43% of the price of each vessel or
US$328,742.00, and with payments of US$297,219.91 having been made to Cordero, there
remained a balance of US$31,522.09 still due to him. The CA sustained the trial court in
ruling that Cordero is entitled to damages for the breach of his exclusive distributorship
agreement with AFFA.However, it held that Cordero is entitled only to commission for
the sale of the first catamaran obtained through his efforts with the remaining unpaid
sum of US$31,522.09 or P1,355,449.90 (on the basis of US$1.00=P43.00 rate) with interest
at 6% per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until the same is fully
paid. As to the P800,000.00 representing expenses incurred by Cordero for transportation,
phone bills, entertainment, food and lodging, the CA declared there was no basis for such
award, the same being the logical and necessary consequences of the exclusive
distributorship agreement which are normal in the field of sales and distribution, and the
expenditures having redounded to the benefit of the distributor (Cordero).
On the amounts awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees, the CA reduced the same to P500,000.00, P300,000.00
and P50,000.00, respectively. Appellants were held solidarily liable pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1207 in relation to Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the New Civil
Code. The CA further ruled that no error was committed by the trial court in denying
their motion for new trial, which said court found to be pro forma and did not raise any
substantial matter as to warrant the conduct of another trial.
By Resolution dated July 22, 2004, the CA denied the motions for reconsideration
respectively filed by the appellants and appellee, and affirmed the Decision dated March
16, 2004 with the sole modification that the legal interest of 6% per annum shall start to
run from June 24, 1998 until the finality of the decision, and the rate of 12% interest per
annum shall apply once the decision becomes final and executory until the judgment has
been satisfied.
The case before us is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule
45separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747) in which
petitioners raised the following arguments:
G.R. No. 164703
(Petitioner Go)
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE RULES
OF COURT AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST AND IN NOT
 DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN HOLDING HEREIN PETITIONER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREACH
IN THE ALLEGED EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT
WITH ALUMINIUM FAST FERRIES AUSTRALIA;
III. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW
AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE IN SOLIDUM WITH THE CO-DEFENDANTS
WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT;
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FOUND PETITIONER LIABLE FOR UNPAID COMMISSIONS,
DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES, AND LITIGATION EXPENSES; and
V. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HEREIN
PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURTS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL.[29]
G.R. No. 164747
(Petitioner Cordero)
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING PETITIONER ACTUAL
DAMAGES FOR HIS COMMISSION FOR THE SALE OF THE SECOND
VESSEL, SINCE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHICH
PROVES THAT THERE WAS A SECOND SALE OF A VESSEL.
A. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED 7 AUGUST
1997PROVIDES THAT RESPONDENT GO WAS
CONTRACTUALLY BOUND TO BUY TWO (2) VESSELS FROM
AFFA.
B. RESPONDENT GOS POSITION PAPER AND COUNTER-
AFFIDAVIT/POSITION PAPER THAT WERE FILED BEFORE
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT
HE HAD INDEED PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL FROM
AFFA.
12
C. RESPONDENTS ADMITTED IN THEIR PRE-TRIAL BRIEF
THAT THEY HAD PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS
NOT ENTITLED TO HIS COMMISSIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF A
SECOND VESSEL, SINCE IT WAS PETITIONERS EFFORTS WHICH
ACTUALLY FACILITATED AND SET-UP THE TRANSACTION FOR
RESPONDENTS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT IMPOSING THE PROPER
LEGAL INTEREST RATE ON RESPONDENTS UNPAID OBLIGATION
WHICH SHOULD BE TWELVE PERCENT (12%) FROM THE TIME OF THE
BREACH OF THE OBLIGATION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
AWARDED TO PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT
CONSIDERING THE BAD FAITH AND FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
OF RESPONDENTS IN MISAPPROPRIATING THE MONEY OF
PETITIONER.[30]
The controversy boils down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether petitioner Cordero has
the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of contract; and (2) whether the
respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and
termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.
I. Real Party-in-Interest
First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the real party-in-interest as
required by Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which defines such party as the one
(1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by
persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party
entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits;
and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound
public policy.[31] A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of
action.[32]
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not Pamana who is
the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines as shown by the Certification
dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson.[33] Petitioner Go mentions the following
documents also signed by respondent Robinson which state that Pamana Marketing
Corporation represented by Mr. Mortimer F. Cordero was actually the exclusive
distributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 1997[34]; (2) certification dated 5 August 1997[35]; and (3)
letter dated 5 August 1997 addressed to petitioner Cordero concerning commissions to be
paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation.[36] Such apparent inconsistency in naming
AFFAs exclusive distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. For all intents and
purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made decisions in the
performance of the exclusive distributorship, as with other clients to whom he had
similarly offered AFFAs fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the stipulated commissions from
each progress payments made by Go were directly paid by Robinson to
Cordero.[37] Respondents Landicho and Tecson were only too aware of Corderos
authority as the person who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA,
which can be gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank
transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson, who in turn transfers a portion
of funds received to the bank account of Cordero in the Philippines as his commission.
Out of these partial payments of his commission, Cordero would still give Landicho and
Tecson their respective commission, or cuts from his own commission. Respondents
Landicho and Tecson failed to refute the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of
receipts signed by them. Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered
by Cordero for Landichos airline tickets, transportation, food and hotel accommodations
for the trip to Australia.[38]
Moreover, petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised petitioner Corderos lack of
personality to sue on behalf of Pamana,[39] and did so only before the CA when they
contended that it is Pamana and not Cordero, who was appointed and acted as exclusive
distributor for AFFA.[40] It was Robinson who argued in support of his motion to dismiss
that as far as said defendant is concerned, the real party plaintiff appears to be Pamana,
against the real party defendant which is AFFA.[41] As already mentioned, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss filed by Robinson.
We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinsons objection
over the improper resort to summons by publication upon a foreign national like him and
in an action in personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance
specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them
in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority.[42] Aparty who makes a special appearance in court
challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. [43]
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson
specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of personal jurisdiction, it must be
13
noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive
pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication.[44] Such motion
did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the
service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the summons by publication issued by the court and praying for
additional time to file a responsive pleading.Consequently, Robinson having
acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of
the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively
submitted voluntarily to the trial courts jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting
otherwise, even before this Court.[45]
II. Breach of Exclusive Distributorship,
Contractual Interference and
Respondents Liability for Damages
In Yu v. Court of Appeals,[46] this Court ruled that the right to perform an
exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such
performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect. Thus, injunction is the
appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such
contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. In
that case, the former dealer of the same goods purchased the merchandise from the
manufacturer in England through a trading firm in West Germany and sold these in
the Philippines. We held that the rights granted to the petitioner under the exclusive
distributorship agreement may not be diminished nor rendered illusory by the expedient
act of utilizing or interposing a person or firm to obtain goods for which the exclusive
distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole authorized distributor. [47]
In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid the
balance of his commission by respondent Robinson. From the time petitioner Go and
respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased
communicating through petitioner Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the
Philippines, Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in
Brisbane. In other words, Cordero had clearly been cut off from the transaction until the
arrival of the first SEACAT 25 which was sold through his efforts. When Cordero
complained to Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts prejudicial to his
rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive distributorship, Go simply let his
lawyers led by Landicho and Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle it by promising
to pay a certain amount and to purchase high-speed catamarans through
Cordero. However, Cordero was not paid anything and worse, AFFA through its lawyer
in Australia even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting that his services were
engaged for only one (1) transaction, that is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in
August 1997.
Petitioner Go argues that unlike in Yu v. Court of Appeals[48] there is no conclusive
proof adduced by petitioner Cordero that they actually purchased a second SEACAT 25
directly from AFFA and hence there was no violation of the exclusive distributorship
agreement. Further, he contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in holding
them solidarily liable to Cordero, relying on Articles 1207, 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code despite absence of evidence, documentary or testimonial, showing that they
conspired to defeat the very purpose of the exclusive distributorship agreement.[49]
We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there was indeed no
sufficient evidence that respondents actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly
from AFFA. But this circumstance will not absolve respondents from liability for
invading Corderos rights under the exclusive distributorship. Respondents clearly acted
in bad faith in bypassing Cordero as they completed the remaining payments to AFFA
without advising him and furnishing him with copies of the bank transmittals as they
previously did, and directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson regarding arrangements
for the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the purchase of the
second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement which Cordero signed in
behalf of AFFA. As a result of respondents actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he was
not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his exclusive
distributorship revoked by AFFA.
Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in holding them
solidarily liable for Corderos unpaid commission, which is the sole obligation of the
principal AFFA. It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who, in the letter dated August 5,
1997 addressed to Cordero, undertook to pay commission payments to Pamana on a
staggered progress payment plan in the form of percentage of the commission per
payment. AFFA explicitly committed that it will, upon receipt of progress payments, pay
to Pamana their full commission by telegraphic transfer to an account nominated by
Pamana within one to two days of [AFFA] receiving such payments. [50] Petitioner Go
further maintains that he had not in any way violated or caused the termination of the
exclusive distributorship agreement between Cordero and AFFA; he had also paid in full
the first and only vessel he purchased from AFFA.[51]
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract
because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a
third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach.
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate
his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on
the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third
person is without legal justification.[52]
14
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued
by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented
by Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in
the Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf
of AFFA.
As to the third element, our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of
Appeals[53] is instructive, to wit:
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an
unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his
private property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces
a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the case
before us, petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease
contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent
corporation of the latters property right.Clearly, and as correctly viewed by
the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned
are present in the instant case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the
defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic
interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the
business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit
himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm
to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that
the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded,
and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived,
for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones
financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the
impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives.
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no
malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind ones
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a
party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is
financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said
that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon
DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent
 corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice in him.
xxx
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic
interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we
find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits
forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting
parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach
of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI
and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved
the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners
interference.[54] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.[55] In
the case of Lagon v. Court of Appeals,[56] we held that to sustain a case for tortuous
interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by
purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference cannot
be justified. We further explained that the word induce refers to situations where a person
causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. As to the
allegation of private respondent in said case that petitioner induced the heirs of the late
Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to petitioner despite an alleged renewal of the original
lease contract with the deceased landowner, we ruled as follows:
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract,
such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. x x x
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private
respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes
another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The
records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell
the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did
absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself
did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai
Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part
of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference
was never established.[57]
15
In their Answer, respondents denied having anything to do with the unpaid balance of
the commission due to Cordero and the eventual termination of his exclusive
distributorship by AFFA. They gave a different version of the events that transpired
following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825. According to them, several
builder-competitors still entered the picture after the said contract for the purchase of
one (1) SEACAT 25 was sent to Brisbane in July 1997 for authentication, adding that the
contract was to be effective on August 7, 1997, the time when their funds was to become
available. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it can compete with the prices of
other builders, and upon mutual agreement, AFFA agreed to give them a discounted price
under the following terms and conditions: (1) that the contract price be lowered; (2) that
Go will obtain another vessel; (3) that to secure compliance of such conditions, Go must
make an advance payment for the building of the second vessel; and (4) that the payment
scheme formerly agreed upon as stipulated in the first contract shall still be the basis and
used as the guiding factor in remitting money for the building of the first vessel. This led
to the signing of another contract superseding the first one (1), still to be dated 07 August
1997. Attached to the answer were photocopies of the second contract stating a lower
purchase price (US$1,150,000.00) and facsimile transmission of AFFA to Go confirming
the transaction.[58]
As to the cessation of communication with Cordero, Go averred it was Cordero who was
nowhere to be contacted at the time the shipbuilding progress did not turn good as
promised, and it was always Landicho and Tecson who, after several attempts, were able
to locate him only to obtain unsatisfactory reports such that it was Go who would still
call up Robinson regarding any progress status report, lacking documents for MARINA,
etc., and go to Australia for ocular inspection. Hence, in May 1998 on the scheduled
launching of the ship in Australia, Go engaged the services of Landicho who went to
Australia to see to it that all documents needed for the shipment of the vessel to the
Philippines would be in order. It was also during this time that Robinsons request for
inquiry on the Philippine price of a Wartsila engine for AFFAs then on-going vessel
construction, was misinterpreted by Cordero as indicating that Go was buying a second
vessel.[59]
We find these allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought as these were the very
same averments contained in the Position Paper for the Importer dated October 9, 1998,
which was submitted by Go on behalf of ACG Express Liner in connection with the
complaint-affidavit filed by Cordero before the BOC-SGS Appeals Committee relative
to the shipment valuation of the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA. [60] It appears
that the purported second contract superseding the original Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825 and stating a lower price of US$1,150,000.00 (not US$1,465,512.00) was only
presented before the BOC to show that the vessel imported into the Philippines was not
undervalued by almost US$500,000.00. Cordero vehemently denied there was such
modification of the contract and accused respondents of resorting to falsified documents,
including the facsimile transmission of AFFA supposedly confirming the said sale for
only US$1,150,000.00. Incidentally, another document filed in said BOC case, the
Counter-Affidavit/Position Paper for the Importer dated November 16, 1998, [61] states
in paragraph 8 under the Antecedent facts thereof, that --
 8. As elsewhere stated, the total remittances made by
herein Importer to AFFA does not alone
represent the purchase price for Seacat 25. It
includes advance payment for the acquisition
of another vessel as part of the deal due to the
discounted price.[62]
which even gives credence to the claim of Cordero that respondents negotiated for the
sale of the second vessel and that the nonpayment of the remaining two (2) instalments
of his commission for the sale of the first SEACAT 25 was a result of Go and Landichos
directly dealing with Robinson, obviously to obtain a lower price for the second vessel
at the expense of Cordero.
The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter
into another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for the
second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full the
commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of Corderos appointment
as exclusive distributor. Following our pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra), such
act may not be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than
in wrongful motives. The attendant circumstances, however, demonstrated that
respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit
themselves at the expense of Cordero.Respondents furtively went directly to
Robinson after Cordero had worked hard to close the deal for them to purchase from
AFFA two (2) SEACAT 25, closely monitored the progress of building the first vessel
sold, attended to their concerns and spent no measly sum for the trip to Australia with
Go, Landicho and Gos family members. But what is appalling is the fact that even as Go,
Landicho and Tecson secretly negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second
vessel, Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and receive from Cordero their
commission or cut from Corderos earned commission from the sale of the first SEACAT
25.
Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go, Robinson,
Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased communicating with him, without giving him
any explanation.While there was nothing objectionable in negotiating for a lower price
in the second purchase of SEACAT 25, which is not prohibited by the Memorandum of
Agreement, Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho clearly connived not only in ensuring
that Cordero would have no participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT
25, but also that Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the sale of
the first SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge that it was commission already
earned by and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that
the actuations of Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho were without legal justification
and intended solely to prejudice Cordero.
The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule,
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive
16
on this Court.[63]We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the
CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in utter disregard of the rights of Cordero
under the exclusive distributorship agreement.
The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty
and good faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from
AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed exclusive distributor, is further
proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
As we have expounded in another case:
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the
performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis,
necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19
is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law x x x.
Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.[64]
Petitioner Gos argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held liable
solidarily with Robinson for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys
fees awarded to Cordero since no law or contract provided for solidary obligation in
these cases, is equally bereft of merit. Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code,
the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is
solidary.[65] In Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation,[66] we held:
 [O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always
solidary. We have assiduously maintained this legal principle as early as
1912 in Worcester v. Ocampo, in which we held:
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that
they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is tort. They
fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is
not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but
is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all
the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or
who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are
each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. x
xx
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort
which they commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any
number less than all.Each is liable for the whole damages caused by
all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no
defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any
excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not
be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They
cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the
whole amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort
feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against the
others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint
tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x
Of course, the court during trial may find that some of the
alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable. The
courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning
others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they
are charged jointly and severally.[67] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual
relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was
inducted to break the contract can be held liable.[68] Respondents Go, Landicho and
17
Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Corderos
commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its
peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive
distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998
until the same is fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[69] On the other hand, the requirements of an award
of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established;
(2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending
upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and
(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or malevolent manner.[70] The award of exemplary damages is thus in order. However,
we find the sums awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as
reduced by the CA, still excessive under the circumstances.
Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted.Moral damages are not punitive in nature and
were never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no
hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral
damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are
given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive. Indeed, it must be commensurate to the loss or
injury suffered.[71]
We believe that the amounts of P300,000.00 and P200,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively, would be sufficient and reasonable. Because
exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance
with Article 2208 (1).[72] We affirm the appellate courts award of attorneys fees in the
amount of P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated March 16, 2004
as modified by the Resolution dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69113 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the awards of
moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced to P300,000.00 and P200,000.00,
respectively.
With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No. 164703.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5932 February 27, 1912
DEAN C. WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M.
KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS, FIDEL A. REYES, FAUSTINO AGUILAR, ET
AL.,defendants-appellants.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff commenced an action against the
defendants in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, for the purpose of
recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. The complaint was in
the following language:
COMPLAINT.
I. That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands.
II. That for a long time before the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants, Martin Ocampo,
Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete
, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores)
and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," which newspaper during all the time mentioned in this complaint was
published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila,
having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.
III.That for a long time the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking
the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last on the 30th of October, 1908, with the
malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was, and still is a member
of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in the
Government of the Philippines, they attacked the honesty and reviled the fame of the
plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an official of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and
ridicule of the public, printed, wrote (redactaron), and published in said newspaper in its
ordinary number of the 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false libel
which was injurious (injurioso) to the plaintiff, said libel reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten
and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against
an order of things which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity
18
of the former. At times they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and
devourers, but in the majority of cases they did not obtain but a change of name
or plumage.
"The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the relation between the
ones and the others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at
the fellow-creatures' expense.
"Among men it is very easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon.
And for some psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful
have taken the fiercest and most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion,
or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have done so by a secret impulse of affinity and
others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated vanity, making themselves appear
that which they are not nor ever can be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most
adepts. And men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate
the most rapacious bird in order to triumph in the plundering of their fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture,
the owl and the vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the
Igorots and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight, with the eye of the
bird of prey, where are the large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amidst the
lonely mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal
facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal slaughtering of diseased
cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself
was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who
consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole
scientific labor is confined o dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the
fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and less savory, so as to make it
worth the while replacing them with species coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindoro, in
Mindanao, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the
people, and under the pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth,
the object is to possess all the data and the key to the national wealth for his
essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties
registered under he names of others.
 "Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of worthless
land at fabulous prices which the city fathers dare not refuse, from fear of
displeasing the one who is behind the motion, and which they do not refuse for
their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the prospects of
enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who
surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid
meats, an owl who affects a petulent omniscience and a vampire who silently
sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and their aim are never
thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the booty and the plunder. Others are too weak to raise a voice of
protest. And others die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and
interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
IV.That the plaintiff was, on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the
officials of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands, and to public in general, personally as well as a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior, and the defamation and
libel, and the words, terms and language used in said defamation and libel were
employed by the said defendants with the intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and
that should be understood, as in effect they were understood, by the public officials of the
Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the
plaintiff, by reason of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff in compliance with his
duties in his position as such member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as
such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, ascended on a previous occasion
the mountains of the Province of Benguet to study the native tribe known as Igorot,
residing in said region; by reason of the publicly known fact that in the said mountains of
Benguet there exist large deposits of gold, and for the reason that, as member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines, which is the legislative body of the Philippine Islands, the
plaintiff takes part in the enactment and repealing of laws in said Islands; by reason
furthermore of the fact, publicly known, that the plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior
of the Philippine Islands, has had under his direction and control the enforcement of the
laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila relating to the
19
slaughtering of cattle; by reason furthermore of the fact, publicly known that said
plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had under his direction
and control the Bureau of Science of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and he is
generally known as a man devoted to the study of science; by reason furthermore of the
publicly known fact that the said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, at a previous time, caused the importation into the Philippine Islands
of fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the mountain streams of the Philippine Islands
with fish-hatcheries; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff,
as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has journeyed to and explored
the Islands of Mindoro, Mindanao, and other regions of the Philippine Archipelago; by
reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as such Secretary of the
Interior of the Philippine Islands, at one time investigated and prepared a report for the
Civil Commission of the Philippines in regard to a certain proposition for the purchase of
a parcel of land for the city of Manila; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact
that said plaintiff, as member of said Civil Commission of the Philippines together with
the other members of said legislative body, once opened negotiations with a certain firm
engaged in the hotel business in regard to the location of a prospective hotel on one of the
filled-in lands of the city of Manila.
That said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the
Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting public funds for the
purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the laws of the
Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in
illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object of
gain for himself and for others; and lastly with being "a bird of prey;" and that
said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood, by the
public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in
general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above
specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the
said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any foundation
whatsoever.
That said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a
heading in large and showy type, and every effort made by said defendants to
see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public and
be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.
V.Besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said
defendants, in publishing the said libel, did so with the malicious intention of inciting the
Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person,
unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose his administration
of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to
create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and to make
him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.
 In fact said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in said
mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence
of the public in the plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in his
way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which the
plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great
extent his labors as a public official in every one of the Departments.
VI. And for all these reasons the plaintiff alleges: That he has been damaged and is entitled
to an indemnity for the additional work to which he has been put, by the said defendants,
in the compliance of his duties, both in the past and the future, as well as for the injuries
to his reputation and feelings, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine
currency, and besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the
additional sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, in the way of
punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants.
Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:
(1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.
(2) That judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the damages as
above stated, and the costs of the action.
On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants presented the following demurrer to the
said complaint:
DEMURRER.
Now come the defendants, through their undersigned attorney, and demur to
the complaint filed herein, upon the following grounds:
First, That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.
Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause or right
of action.
Third. That there is another action pending between the plaintiff and several of
the defendants for the same cause; and
Fourth. That some of the defendants have been erroneously included therein.
Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss the complaint, with costs
against the plaintiff.
20
On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, overruled said
demurrer in the following decision, to which the defendants duly excepted:
ORDER.
The defendant demur upon several grounds:
(1) The first ground is that the complaint is vague and unintelligible and this is
directed principally to paragraph 2, in which it is alleged that the defendants
were "dueños, directores, redactores", etc., but it is not alleged that they were such
simultaneously. If this were the sole averment of the defendants' connection
with the alleged libel, the objection might be well taken, but paragraph 3 of the
complaint alleges that the defendants "imprimieron, redactaron y publicaron", etc.,
the article complained of. Under section 2 of Act 277 "every person" who
"publishes or procures to be published any belief is made responsible. (Cf.
U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 752.) We think, therefore, that the connection of the
defendants with the publication complained of is sufficiently charged.
(2) It is also claimed that the facts alleged are not sufficient to state a cause of
action and it is urged in support of this that the article complained of and which
is copied in the complaint, fails to mention the plaintiff or to show on its face
that it refers to him. It is, however, specifically alleged in paragraph 4 that the
article was intended to refer to the plaintiff and was so understood by the public,
and this allegation is admitted by the demurrer. Under the rule announced
in Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155), where the words complained of do refer
to the plaintiff "an action for libel may be maintained even though the
defamatory publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."
(3) It is further argued that there is another action pending between the parties
for the same cause. This, it is true, is made a ground for demurrer by the Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 91 (3), but like all grounds therein mentioned, it must
"appear upon the face" of the pleading objected to, and where it does not so
appear "the objection can only be taken by answer." (Code C. P., sec. 92.) There
is no averment in the complaint which indicates that there is no another action
pending.
The fourth ground of the demurrer is not one recognized by law (Code C. P., sec.
91) nor do we find anything in Sanidad vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) which
would necessitate any change in the views already expressed.
The demurrer is, therefore, overruled and defendants are given the usual five
days to answer.
On the 15th day of November, 1909, the defendants presented their amended answer,
which was as follows:
ANSWER.
The defendants in the above-entitled cause, through their undersigned attorney,
by their answer to the complaint, state:
That the defendants deny generally the allegation of the complaint.
As a special defense, the defendants allege:
First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this action, as it clearly
appears from the allegations of the complaint and which the defendants hereby
deny.
Second. That the facts are set out as constituting cause of action in the
complaint, are insufficient to constitute such cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants.
Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the reason that there
is now pending in the Court of First Instance of this city a criminal cause, No.
4295, for the crime of libel against the defendants herein, Martin Ocampo,
Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, both actions, criminal and civil, being
based upon the same facts which the plaintiffs herein, who is also a party to the
said criminal action, now alleges as the basis of his action.
Fourth. That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been extinguished
for the reason that plaintiff did not expressly reserve the right to enforce the
same in the aforesaid cause 4295, for the crime of libel, after the said criminal
cause had been finally disposed of.
Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G.
Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were erroneously included in the
complaint for the simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said
criminal cause No. 4295, for libel, the third was used as a witness for the
prosecution in the said criminal cause, and the others have no interest, either
directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El Renacimiento" in which it is alleged
by the plaintiff the editorial, which is the basis of the complaint, and which it is
claimed to be libelous, was published.
Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the complaint, with
the costs against the plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the arguments if the
respective attorneys, the Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January,
1910, rendered the following decision:
21
DECISION.
This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of P100,000 for an
alleged libel of the plaintiff by the defendants.
The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of Insular
Government. The defendants are twelve persons designated by name in the
complaint and alleged therein to be the owners, directors, writers (redactores),
editors (editores), and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which defendants, as well as the
plaintiff, are residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to the 30th of
October, 1908, the defendants were the owners, directors, writers, editors, and
administrators of said daily newspaper, and that said newspaper, during all
the time mentioned in the complaint, was published and circulated daily in the
Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila, having a large circulation
throughout the Philippine Islands.
It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously
persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until at last, on said
date, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff who then was still is
a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the integrity and
reviled the reputation of the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as
an official of the Government of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of
exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote,
printed, and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of the said
30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false libel, which was
injurious to the plaintiff, said libel, as translated from the Spanish, reading as
follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and devour, others to be eaten
and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves, endeavoring to rebel against
an order of things which makes them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity
of the former. At times they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters and
devourers, but in a majority of cases they do not obtain anything but a change of
name or plumage.
 "The situation is the same in all spheres of creation; the relation between the ones
and the others is that dictated by the appetite and the power to satisfy it at the
fellow-creature's expense.
"Among men it is easy to observe the development of this daily phenomenon.
And for some psychological reason the nations who believe themselves powerful
have taken the fiercest and most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the
lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have done so by a secret impulse of
affinity and others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated vanity, making
themselves appear that which they are not nor ever will be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that has found the most
adepts. And men, collectively and individually, have desired to copy and imitate
the most rapacious bird in order to triumph in the plundering if their fellow-
men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the characteristics of the vulture, the
owl and the vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots
and study and civilize them, and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey,
where are the large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amongst the lonely
mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards, thanks to legal facilities made
and unmade at will, but always for his own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances an illegal slaughtering of diseased cattle in
order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meat which he himself was
obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who
consumes his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, when his whole
scientific labor is confined to dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the fish
eggs of this country were less nourishing and savory, so as to make it worth the while
replacing them with species coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao, in
Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the archipelago, with the money of the people,
and under the pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the object
is to possess all the data and the key to the national wealth for his essentially personal
benefit, as is shown by the acquisition of immense properties registered under the
names of others.
"Promoting through secret agents and partners, the sale of the city worthless land at
fabulous prices which the city fathers dare not refuse from fear of displeasing the one
who is behind the motion, and which they do not refuse to their own good.
22
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in lands, with the prospects of enormous
profits, at the expense of the blood of the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises
and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who
affects a petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the
victim until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and aim are never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the body and plunder, Others are too weak to raise a voice to protest.
And others die in the disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the complaint, that the plaintiff was
on the date of said publication, and still is, well known to the officials of the Government
of the Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, and to the public
generally, personally as well as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and
as a Secretary of the Interior; and the defamation and libel, and the words, terms, and
language used in said defamation and libel were employed by the said defendants with
the intention of indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should be understood, as in fact
they were understood, by the public officials of the Government and the inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff. (Here follow the reasons for
saying the editorial referred to plaintiff and why the public understood it as referring to
him.)
The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as a member of
the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands,
for personal ends; with wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his personal
welfare; and with the violation of the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances
of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal combination of the purpose of robbing the
people, with the object of gain for himself and for others; and lastly, with being a bird of
prey, and that said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood by
the public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general,
as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above specified; all of
which allegations relating to the character and conduct of the said plaintiff, as above
stated, were and are false and without any foundation whatever. That said defamation
and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and showy type,
and every effort was made by said defendant to see that said defamation and libel should
attract the attention of the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and
the readers of the same.
In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that, besides assailing the integrity
and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing said libel, did
so with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino to believe that the plaintiff was a
vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this
reason to oppose of his administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the
Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the
performance of his official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to
resign his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of
the Interior. In fact, said defendants, by means of said libel and other false statements in
said mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the
public in the plaintiff, and to in incite the people to place obstacles in his way in the
performance of his official duties, in consequence of which said plaintiff has met with a
great many difficulties which have increased to a great extent his labors as a public official
in every one of the Departments.
And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the plaintiff states that for all these
reasons has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to
which he has been put by said defendants in compliance with his duties, both in the past
and in the future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum, of
P50,000, and that besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the
additional sum of fifty thousand pesos in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to
the defendants.
The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things, that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendants to pay the damages as above stated and the costs of the action;
and is dated and signed, Manila, P.I., January 23, 1909, Hartigan and Rohde, Kincaid and
Hurd, attorneys for plaintiff.
A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defendants, through their attorney, Sr.
Felipe Agoncillo, which demurrer was heretofore heard and overruled by the Court, and
the defendants required to answer. Accordingly, the defendants within the prescribed
time, filed their answer; and on November 16, 1909, through their attorney, filed and
amended answer, which is as follows (after stating the case):
The defendants in the above-entitled action, through their undersigned
attorney, answering the complaint, state: That they make a general
denial of the allegations in the complaint, and as a special defense
allege:
"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to institute the complaint in
question, as evidently appears from the allegations in the same, and which the defendants
deny;
23
"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the complaint are insufficient to
constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
"(3) That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to law, criminal case No. 4295, for
libel, against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, in
the Court of First Instance of this city, being still pending, inasmuch as both causes,
criminal and civil, are based upon the same facts which the plaintiff, who is also interested
in said criminal cause, considers a cause of action;
"(4) That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been destroyed as a consequence
of the fact that the plaintiff did not expressly reserve his right to the same in the said
mentioned cause No. 4295 for libel, in order to exercise it after the termination of said
criminal cause:
"(5) That the defendants Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit have been erroneously included in the complaint, for the simple reason that the
first two were acquitted in said cause No. 4295 for libel, the third was used as a witness
by the prosecution in the same cause, and the latter ones have no interest, directly or
indirectly, in the newspaper "El Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff presumes, was
published the editorial which forms the basis of the complaint, and which is said to be
libelous; and concluding with a prayer to the court to dismiss the case, with cost against
the plaintiff."
The second paragraph of this "special defense" is nothing other than a general demurrer
to the complaint, which has been overruled, as already stated.
The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court construes it as meaning a simple
denial that the plaintiff is the person referred to in the alleged libelous article "Birds of
Prey," which issue is sufficiently raised by the general denial of the allegations in the
complaint.
The third paragraph is not a valid defense in law, for the simple reason that section 11 of
Act 277 of the Philippine Commission, under which this suit is brought, especially
provides for a separate civil action for damages, as well as for a criminal prosecution. (See
Mr. Justice Johnson's recent decision.) This third paragraph is therefore without merit;
and the same may be said of the fourth paragraph thereof. As to paragraph five, it
contains no material averment which could not have been set up and insisted upon under
the general issue.
One part if this so-called special defense is therefore a demurrer already and adjudicated,
another part is covered by the general issue, and the residue is without merit as a legal
defense, and might have been stricken out. The defense is therefore tantamount to the
general issue only, there being no special plea that these charges are true, nor any plea of
justification.
The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and ended December 10, 1909, and
the proceedings and evidence introduced are to be found in the exhibits and stenographic
notes taken by the court's official reporter. At the trial Judge Kincaid said Major Hartigan
appeared for the plaintiff and Señores Agoncillo, Cruz Herrera, and Ferrer for the
defendants.
After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel and a due consideration of the
case, the court finds the following facts established by the admissions and a decided
preponderance of the evidence:
That the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo
Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven in number, are the proprietors
and owners of the said daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," and that "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," are one and the same
newspaper, owned, managed, printed and published by the same persons; that Teodoro
M. Kalaw and Lope K. Santos were the editors in chief of directors of this paper on the
30th of October, 1908, and that said nine defendants named were the owners, editors,
proprietors, managers and publishers of said newspaper on said 30th of October, 1908,
for a long time prior thereto, and during all the time mentioned in the complaint.
As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear from the evidence to have
been editors of said paper, but in subordinate position to the chief editors or directors,
Kalaw and Santos, and to have acted under the direction of their latter two defendants.
The court further finds that every essential or material allegation of the complaint is true
substantially as therein stated, with the exception noted to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino
Aguilar, and Leoncio G. Liquete, and as may be hereinafter indicated. The case is
therefore dismissed as to these three defendants.
The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the editorial "Birds of Prey" does not
refer to a determinate person; and (2) that, conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff,
none of the defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible for the writing, printing,
or publication of the alleged libelous article of the damages to the plaintiff resulting
therefrom.
In the opinion of the court this article so indubitably refers to the plaintiff, and was so
easily and well understood by the readers of said paper as indicating the plaintiff, that it
would be an act of superrogation to elaborately discuss the evidence adduced in support
of or against the proposition. It is as clear to the court from the evidence adduced as the
noonday sun, that the plaintiff is the identical and only person meant and referred to in
said article "Birds and Prey;" and it requires no argument to prove that it does mean and
refer to him and was so intended by the writer, and therefore by said nine defendants,
and could not have been otherwise understood by any intelligent reader or subscriber of
said paper, in view of the reasons assigned in the complaint, which reasons are clearly
disclosed and fully established by the evidence. And it may be added that much valuable
time was needlessly consumed by the defense at trial in an effort to establish the contrary.
24
It seems to the court a reflection upon the intelligence of the subscribers and readers of
"El Renacimiento" to contend that this editorial was not well understood by them as
referring to the plaintiff, and as fully as if his name had been mentioned in every
paragraph thereof. And assuredly the omission of his name from the editorial has made
the libel less hurtful and disastrous in its results to the reputation and feelings of the
plaintiff.
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the twelve
defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of
them had originally contributed their money as a partriotic donation to the Filipino
people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the money and property of the paper as
trustees for this people, and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to philanthropic
and patriotic ends, and that Galo and Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends,
but had not done so.
This proposition in the light of evidence is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any,
serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to
stultify reason and common sense. That those seven defendants named contributed their
respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper
in 1901 for their own personal benefit and profit is fully and unmistakably established. It
is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but
that he has been and is still the administrator or business manager of said newspaper,
and that the other six persons named are shareholders, part owners and proprietors
thereof, and were such on said 30th of October, 1908.
Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was one of the seven founders,
and that Lichauco contributed P1,000. Martin Ocampo testified that Galo Lichauco
promised to contribute an amount which he (the witness) did not remember but that
Lichauco did not keep his promise. (See pp. 107, 108, and 231 of the evidence.)
The other evidence and circumstances strongly corroborate Arcadio Arellano, and the
court is constrained to believe that Arellano told the truth and Ocampo did not. See
Exhibit B-J, a copy of "El Renacimiento" containing the article "Infamy Among Comrades,"
page 87 of the evidence, in which there was published that these seven persons named
are the shareholders of the paper.
Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as to enlighten the court as to
which witness, Arellano or Ocampo, told the truth, or whether chief editor Kalaw had his
authority to publish in said paper, as he did in November 22, 1907, that he, Galo Lichauco,
was one of the shareholders. The presumptions are therefore against Galo Lichauco. See
S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-Whitney Co. (36 C. C. A., 136 and 153).
It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was the chief editor or director
of the Spanish section of said paper, and that Lope K. Santos was the chief editor or
director of the Tagalog section on said 30th of October, 1908, and that the Spanish and
Tagalog sections are, and then were, one and the same newspaper, but printed and
published in different languages.
It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands,
and was published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city
of Manila. Not only are these allegations true, but it is also true that said newspaper has
a daily circulation and subscribers in other parts of the world, notably in the United States
and Spain; and it has subscribers numbering in toto not less than 5,200, and a daily issue
of 6,000 copies.
It is also true as alleged, and the court so finds that since the year 1906 to said 30th of
October, 1908, these nine defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the
plaintiff in their said newspapers, until at last, on said 30th of October, 1908 with the
malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was and still is a member
of the Civil Commission and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippine
Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the
public, they wrote, printed, and published in their said newspaper, in its ordinary number
of said 30th of October, 1908, the malicious defamation and false libel of and concerning
the plaintiff, entitled and herein alluded to as the editorial "Birds of Prey," which libel was
and is highly injurious to the plaintiff and from which the plaintiff has sustained serious
damage.
This editorial, when properly interpreted and read between the lines, means, besides
other things, and was intended by the writer to mean and be understood by the readers
thereof as meaning substantially the following:
That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface of the globe to eat and
devour, like a bird of prey, and that others, born to be eaten and devoured, are the prey
and the food of the insatiable voracity of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff had a desire to
copy and imitate the most rapacious bird, the eagle, in order to triumph in plundering his
fellowman; that the plaintiff besides being an eagle, has the characteristics of the vulture,
the owl, and the vampire.
That the plaintiff ascended the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure the skulls
of the Igorots, and study and civilize them and to espy in his flight with the eye of the
bird of prey the large deposits of gold-the prey concealed amidst the mountains-and to
appropriate them to himself afterwards, and that to this end the plaintiff had the legal
facilities, made and unmade at his own will, and that this is always done for his own benefit.
That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of laws and ordinances, the illegal slaughtering is
diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from the infected and putrid meant which he
himself was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position; that while the plaintiff
presents himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes
his life in the mysteries of the laboratory of science, his whole scientific labor is confined
to dissecting insects and importing fish eggs.
25
That although the plaintiff gave an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes
in Mindanao and Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the
money of the people, under the pretext of the public good, as a strict matter of truth his
object was to possess all the data and the key to the national wealth for his essentially
personal benefit, and that this is shown by his acquisition of immense properties registered
under the names of others.
That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the city of
Manila of worthless land at fabulous prices, which the city fathers dared not refuse from
fear of displeasing the plaintiff, who was behind the project, and which they did not
refuse for their own good; that the plaintiff favored concessions for hotels in Manila on
filled-in land; with the prospect of enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of the
people.
That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the same time an eagle that
surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges his self on deed and rotten meats, an owl
that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until
he leaves it bloodless. And this libelous article concludes with the asseveration in
substance that the plaintiff has been "weighed in the balance and found wanting" —
"Mane, Tecel, Phares."
That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without saying. Almost every line
thereof teems with malevolence, ill will, and wanton and reckless disregard of the rights
and feelings of the plaintiff; and from the very nature and the number of the charges
therein contained the editorial is necessarily very damaging to the plaintiff.
That this editorial, published as it was by the nine defendants, tends to impeach the
honesty and reputation of the plaintiff and publishes his alleged defects, and thereby
exposes him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule is clearly seen by a bare reading of
the editorial.
It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the evidence in support of these
malicious, defamatory and injurious charges against the plaintiff; and there was at the
trial no pretense whatever by the defendants that any of them are true, nor the slightest
evidence introduced to show the truth of a solitary charge; nor is there any plea of
justification or that the charges are true, much less evidence to sustain a plea.
In the opinion of the court "Birds of Prey," when read and considered in its relation to and
connection with the other articles libelous and defamatory in nature, published of and
concerning the plaintiff by these nine defendants anterior and subsequent to the
publication of this article, and having reference to the same subject matter as shown by
the evidence, is one of the worst libels of record. It is safe to say that in all the court reports
to the Philippine Islands, or of Spain, or the United States, there is not to be found a libel
case in which there is a more striking exemplification of the spirit of hatred, bad faith, evil
motive, mischievous intent, actual malice, nefarious purpose, base malignity, or gross
malevolence.
It is proper to observe also that since the beginning of this attack on the plaintiff in the
year 1906 down almost to the present time, so far from there being any apology,
retraction, or effort to repair the injury already done as far as lay in the power of the
defendants, the persecution, wrong, and tortious injury to the plaintiff had been steadily
kept up and persisted in, without the slightest abatement of the malevolent spirit.
There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation; per contra, the libel has been
repeated, reiterated, and accentuated, and widely and extensively propagated by these
nine defendants through the columns of their said paper and otherwise; and it appears
from the evidence that especial effort has been made by these same defendants to give as
much publicity as possible to the libelous and defamatory words used of and concerning
the plaintiff in said editorial.
Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and reasserting its truth, this
diabolical libel has been spread broadcast over the Philippine Islands and to other parts
of the world. In said criminal case No. 4295 some of these nine defendants pleaded the
truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-Q is to be found this language: "The defense will
adduce its evidence demonstrating the truth of every one of the facts published."
In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909, there is published statement:
"The brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request of the counsel, to gather
evidence which we are to adduce in our effort to demonstrate the truth of the accusation
that we have formulated in the article which is the subject of the agitation against us,
having expired, the trial of the case against our director had been resumed." (See pp. 63
and 67 of the evidence.)
And about the same time they also declared in their said paper that "there is
more graft than fish in the rivers of Benguet." And this in the year of our Lord 1909! the
persecution having begun in 1905; thus indicating that there is to be no "let-up" or
cessation of the hostile attitude toward the plaintiff or the vilification of his name and
assaults upon his character, much less a retraction or an apology, unless drastic means
and measures are made use of to the end that there may be no further propagation of the
libel, or asseveration, or reiteration of its truth.
This article "Birds of Prey" charges the plaintiff with malfeasance in office and criminal
acts, and is therefore libelous per se. It in substance charges the plaintiff with the
prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands
and Secretary of the Interior of said Islands for personal ends. It is charged also
substantially that plaintiff in his official capacity wasted the public funds for the purpose
of promoting his own personal welfare, and that he violated the laws of the Philippine
Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila.
In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of
robbing the people with the object of gain for himself and for others; with being a bird of
prey, a vulture (buzzard), an owl, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim
26
(meaning the people) until he leaves it bloodless, that is to say, robs the people, until he
leaves them wretched and poverty-stricken, deprived of all worldly possessions; and
lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like Belshazzar, has been weighed in the balance and found
wanting as a high Government functionary; all of which charges are false and malicious
and without and foundation whatever in fact, as the evidence fully demonstrates.
It is also a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said defamation was written and
published that it might be understood, and it was understood, by the public officials of
the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in general, and wherever else
said newspaper may have circulated and been read, as charging the plaintiff with the
tortious and criminal acts and conduct charged in said editorial as hereinbefore specified
and interpreted.
The court finds it also true that, besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation
of the plaintiff, said nine defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious
intention of inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was despotic and
corrupt and unworthy of the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose his
administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they
endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his official
duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member
of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.
It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said libel, and other like false
statements in their said newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy the
confidence of the public in the plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in his
way in the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which the plaintiff has
met with many difficulties which have greatly increased his labors as a public official.
It further appears from the evidence that not only has an effort been made by these nine
defendants to give as much publicity as possible to the charges, but in order that said
defamation should attract the attention of the public, they published the same under a
heading in large, bold and showy type, so that it might be easily seen and read by all the
subscribers and readers of said paper.
In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that every essential allegation
of the complaint is true substantially as therein claimed, and that the whole of the said
editorial relating to the misconduct and bad character of the plaintiff is false and without
the slightest foundation in fact. Not a scintilla of evidence was introduced in support of
any injurious charge made therein against the plaintiff, to say nothing of the plaintiff's
evidence that each and every charge of malfeasance therein contained is false, and
without reference to whether a failure to plead the truth admits the falsity of the charge.
The evidence shows no "special" or "actual pecuniary damage," and none is alleged in the
complaint. Two other kinds of damages, however are claimed, to wit, general damages
for injuries to the feelings and reputation of the plaintiff and additional work to which he
has been put by the conduct of the defendants, which are laid in the sum of P50,000, and
"punitive," exemplary, or vindictive damages, "as a warning to the defendants," or as
expressed in Act 277 of the Philippine Commission, as a just punishment to the libelers
and an example to others," which are laid in the same sum of P50,000.
The nine defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages, the next question to be
decided is what amount of damages should be awarded the plaintiff for the injury to his
reputation and feelings and his being a proper case for punitive damages, the further
question is, what sum shall be awarded as a just punishment to these nine libelers and as
an example to others. In neither of these cases is there any precise measure of damages.
Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent witness for the defense, in his testimony (p. 240) when
asked the question, Do you know Mr. Worcester?" he answers, "Yes, sir: I know him as
an honorable man. I also know him as an honest, honorable public official." In answer to
another question he says, "As I have said, I know Mr. Worcester as a private citizen and
as a public official, and my opinion of him is that of honorable man and an upright
official." And no other witness testified anything to the contrary.
"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and loving favor rather than silver
of gold."

In determining the amount to be awarded in the first instance it is proper to consider the "Who steals my purse steals trash;
previous character, influence, reputation, standing, official position, hope of
advancement, prospect of promotion, and social status of the plaintiff and his family, and xxx xxx xxx
all the circumstances connected with the case.
But he that filches from me my good name,
The plaintiff is a man in the prime of life, holding, as he has held for the last ten years an Robs me of that which not enriches him
important, responsible, lucrative, high and exalted position of trust and honor in the And makes me poor indeed."
service of the Government of the United States, in the Philippine Islands, without a blotch
on his family escutcheon, so far as the evidence shows, and with an untarnished
The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession
reputation as a man, as a citizen, and as a Government official.
of life, liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society that
underlie the whole scheme of human civilization.
He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high social position; a man of learning, famous as
a scientist, and scientific achievements and scholarly attainments, a man of industrious
"The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a well-spent life
habits, genuine worth, and intellectual force. He has read, studied, traveled and learned
vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth, and their
much, and is an author of merit and distinction. He was for a long while a professor in
possession the solace of later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who has been seen
one of the largest and most renowned institutions of learning in the world; he is a man of
and known of his fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has
vast experience, broad and liberal views, and an extensive acquaintanceship, not only in
developed a great character and an unblemished reputation, has secured a possession
the Philippine Islands, but in the United States and other countries of the world. He was
more useful, and more valuable than lands, or houses, or silver, or gold . . .
well and favorably received by the people wherever he journeyed previous to this
atrocious libel upon his integrity and reputation.
"The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and constantly strives to give redress
for its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words, or libelous
He has discharged the duties of his lofty official position in a manner that reflects credit
publication, a liability to make full compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the
upon himself as well as the Government which he represents, and apparently with entire
shame and obloquy, and for the injury to the feelings of the owner, which are caused by
satisfaction to all of his superiors in office and the people generally; and but for this
the publication of the slander or the libel.
pernicious, outrageous, and highly reprehensible assault upon his good name, fame and
reputation, there were prospects of promotion to higher honors. And so far as his personal
and private record is concerned it was without a blemish anterior to the time when these "It goes further. If the words are spoken, or the publication is made, with the intent to
unfounded and dastardly aspersions were cast upon it by these nine defendants. injure the victim, or with the criminal indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such
damages as a jury (in this case the judge), in view of all the circumstances of the particular
case adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public, to deter others
Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to the testimony of the defense itself to ascertain that
from committing like offenses, and as a punishment for the infliction of the injury.
the plaintiff is an honorable man, and without a stain upon his character, officially or
otherwise. It would be interesting to note here in parallel columns and compare the
charges made in "Birds of Prey" and the testimony of one of the witnesses for the "In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will, evil intent, or hatred,
defendants. while it is legal signification is defined to be "a wrongful act done intentionally, without
legal justification." (36 C. C. A., 475.)

27
Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious act done intentionally and
without the semblance of justification or excuse, or proof that the libelous charges against
the plaintiff were "published and good motives and justifiable ends."
But the Legislature and the highest judicial authority of these Islands have spoken in no
uncertain words with regard to the rights of the plaintiff in this case; and we need not
necessarily turn to the law of libel elsewhere, or the decision of the courts in other
jurisdictions to ascertain or determine his rights.
In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277, Philippine Commission) is to be
found the law of these Islands especially applicable to this case. Section 1 thereof defines
libel. Section 2 provides that every person who willfully and with a malicious intent to
injure another publishes, or procures to be published, any libel shall be punished as
therein provided. Section 3 provides that an injurious publication is presumed to have
been malicious if no justifiable motive for making it is shown. Section 4 provides, among
other things, that in all criminal prosecutions the truth may be given in evidence; but to
establish this defense, not only must the truth of the matter charged as libelous be proven,
but also that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends; and the
presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses are equally applicable in civil and
criminal actions, according to section 11 of said Act.
Section 6 is as follows:
"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is
chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of such book or
number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."
And section 11 provides as follows:
"In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as hereinbefore set forth shall have
a right to a civil action against the person libeling him for damages sustained by reason
of such libel, and the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover in such civil action not
only the actual pecuniary damages sustained by him, but also damages for injury to his
feelings and reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the court may think
will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others. Suit may be brought in
any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties. The presumptions, rules or
evidence and special defenses provided for in this chapter for criminal prosecutions shall
be equally applicable in civil actions under this section."
"The proprietor of a printing plant is responsible for publishing a libel. According to the
legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication
containing libelous matter is liable for the same." (Mr. Justice Torres, in U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8
Phil. Rep., 757.) But said section 6 plainly fixes the liability of editors and proprietors of
newspapers, and is clear enough for all the purposes of this case.
28
Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551), speaking for our Supreme Court, says:
"When there is an averment in the complaint that the defamatory words used refer to the
plaintiff, and it is proven that the words do in fact refer to him and are capable of bearing
such special application, an action for libel may be maintained even though the
defamatory publication does not refer to the plaintiff by name."
And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 4282), for the same high authority, says:
"In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and reputation may be recovered
though no actual pecuniary damages are proven.
"Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the tort is aggravated by evil motive,
actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression."
That is to say, if there is evil motive, or actual malice or deliberate violence, or oppression
then punitive damages, or "smart money," may be recovered.
And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14 Phil., Rep., 338), also says:
"Actual or express malice of an alleged libelous publication may be inferred from
the style and tone of the publication.
"The publication of falsehood and calumny against public officers and candidates for
public office is specially reprehensible and is an offense most dangerous to the people
and to the public welfare.
"The interest of society require that immunity should be granted to the discussion of
public affairs, and that all acts and matters of a public nature may be freely published
with fitting comments and strictures; but they do not require that the right to criticise
public officers shall embrace the right to base such criticism under false statements of fact,
or attack the private character of the officer, or to falsely impute to
him malfeasance or misconduct in office."
And there are almost numberless English and American authorities in perfect harmony
with these decisions of our Supreme Court too numerous indeed to be cited here; and it
is not necessary.
Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, is that of Scott vs. Donald (165
U.S., 58) and cases therein cited. In this case the court says: "Damages have been defined
to be the compensation which law will allow for an injury done, and are said to be
exemplary and allowable in excess of the actual loss when the tort is aggravated by evil
motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression," which is in entire harmony with
Justice Willard's decision hereinbefore cited.
And quoting from the decision in Day vs. Woodworth (13 Howard, 371) the same high
court says:
"In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious, or gross or
outrageous, courts permit juries (here the court) to add to the measured compensation of
the plaintiff which he would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted
without design or intention, something further by way of punishment or example, which
has sometimes been called "smart money." "
It thus clearly appears that the facts established in the case at bar are more than sufficient
to bring it within the rule of law here laid down by the highest judicial authority.
Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly allows general damages; and Mr. Justice Willard,
in Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing Company,3 says:
"The general damages which are allowed in actions of libel are not for mental suffering
alone, but they are allowed for injury to the standing and reputation of the person libeled,
and the common law of England and America presumed that such damages
existed without proof thereof from the mere fact of publication of the libel."
In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the power of a
jury in certain actions in tort to assess against the tort feasor punitive damages. Where the
injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely,
or indignity, the judge or jury, as the case may be, is not limited to the ascertainment of a
simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person.
"The public position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the Government, and the evil example
of libels, are considerations with the jury (here the judge) for increasing damages."
(Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3 Johns, 56.)
"The character, condition and influence of the plaintiff are relevant on the matter of the
extent of damages." (Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How. Prac., 345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41, 311.)
"Where the publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was made with malice —
technical, legal malice, but not malice in fact — and the amount of damages depends in a
large degree upon the motives which actuated the defendants in its publication; and in
such cases the law leaves it to the jury (here the judge) to find a return such damages as
they think right and just, by a sound, temperate, deliberate, and reasonable exercise of
their functions as jurymen." (Erber vs. Dun. (C. C.) 12 Fed., 526.)
"Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary damages, and the law of
principal and agent, are controlled by the same rules as are other actions of tort. The right
of a plaintiff to recover exemplary damages exists wherever a tortious injury has been
inflicted recklessly or wantonly, and it is not limited to cases where the injury resulted
from personal malice or recklessness of the defendant. It follows that the owner of a
29
newspaper is as responsible for all the acts of omission and commission of those he
employs to edit it and manage its affairs, as he would be if personally managing the same.'
(Malloy vs. Bennett, (C. C.) 15 Fed., 371.)
"The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without any attempt to ascertain its
correctness is sufficient to justify a finding that defendant committed libel client with a
wanton indifference, and with actual malice sufficient to sustain exemplary damages."
(Van Ingen vs. Star Co., 1 App. Div., 429, 37 N.Y., 114.)
"The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000 in an action for libel, where
it appears that plaintiff was persistently persecuted in the columns of defendant's
newspaper, and that he and his family were held up to public contempt and ridicule, and
defendants withdraw from the case after failing to establish a plea of justification."
(Smith vs. Times Co., (Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 399.)
"In considering the amount with the defendant shall pay, on this account (exemplary
damages) the turpitude of his conduct and his financial ability are only considered; and
such consideration is not in view of the injury or distress of the plaintiff, but in behalf of
the public; the wrongful act is regarded as an indication of the actor's vicious mind — an
overt deed of vindictive or wanton wrong, offensive and dangerous to the public good.
This is the view of those damages which generally prevails." (Sutherland on Damages,
vol. 2, p. 1092. title Exemplary Damages.)
"Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the plaintiff, but solely to punish
the defendant. This legal motive would suffer defeat if punitive damages could not be
given for a malicious attack on a reputation too well established to receive substantial
injury at the hands of a libeler." (Judge Bond in Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App., 462.)
It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this case is too well established
to be seriously affected by the defamatory words used of and concerning him in "Birds of
Prey," but it would not be proper to gravely consider this suggestion.
The conditions in these Islands are peculiar. The minds, thoughts, and opinions of the
people are easily molded, and the public is credulous and perhaps frequently too ready
to believe anything that may be said in derogation of an American official, especially
when it is published and vouched for by the editorial and business management and
proprietors if a newspaper of the prominence, pretensions, circulation and influence if "El
Renacimiento," which paper is everlastingly proclaiming in its columns that it is being
conducted and published solely in the interests of the Filipino people — pro bono publico.
There is stronger disposition to give credence to what is said in a newspaper here in the
Islands the elsewhere, and when abuse, vilification, and defamation are persistently
practiced for a period of several years, without modification or retraction, but with
renewed emphasis, the people naturally come to believe in its verity and authenticity.
It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the persecution of the plaintiff by "El
Renacimiento" and the libel published in its columns, the minds of the major part of the
Filipino people have been poisoned and prejudiced against the plaintiff to such an extent
that he is regarded by these people as odious, dishonest, unscrupulous and tyrannical.
It may be that his reputation has not suffered so severely with those of his own race, but
when it is considered that his vocation has tenfold more to do with the Filipinos than with
his own people, that his official duties place him in constant contact with them, and that
his success in his chosen career is largely dependent upon their good will and support, it
is manifest that the damage to his reputation has been very great and that a large sum of
money should be awarded to indemnify him, as far as money can indemnify, for the loss
of his good name with the Filipino people.
The plaintiff came to the Philippine Islands when a young man, full of hope and ambition.
Since his arrival he has devoted himself incessantly and indefatigably to the uplifting of
the inhabitants of the Archipelago and to the faithful performance, as far as he was able,
of the pledges and promises of the Government to the Filipino people. The duties of his
particular office were such as brought him in more immediate and constant contract with
the people than any other official of the same category in these Islands.
It is clearly shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to perform, and did efficiently
perform, all of these duties, doing everything that he could in an unselfish and
disinterested manner of the welfare and development of the country and its people,
knowing full well that his career, as well as his advancement, depended largely upon the
good will of these people, and that by incurring their censure or displeasure he would
have little hope of success in his chosen work.
Imagine, therefore, the chagrin, disappointment, mortification, mental suffering, and
distress, and perturbation of spirit that would necessarily be occasioned him when he
discovered that through the nefarious, studied, and practiced persecution of the paper in
question, these high hopes were blasted, and that, instead of having gained the respect
and gratitude of the people for the assiduous labors devoted to their uplifting, they had
been made to believe that, instead of being a benefactor, he was a vampire that was
sucking their life blood, a corrupt politician who was squandering the money wrung from
the people by means of taxation, in schemes for his own personal aggrandizement and
enrichment.
That instead of developing the mineral wealth of the Islands he was taking up all the rich
veins and appropriating them in the names of subservient tools, to his own personal use,
benefit and profit. That instead of protecting the people from disease, he was, by means
of infected meat and for his own personal gain, spreading contagion among them.
That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture, the eagle, and the vampire;
that, in short, he was a "bird of prey," with all that is implied in that term in its worst
acceptation; that he was a corrupt tyrant, who never lost an opportunity to do the people
hurt; that instead of wishing them well and seeking their advancement, he was their
enemy, who never lost an opportunity to degrade and humiliate them; that instead of
30
preferring them for office and positions of official trust, he treated them with all sorts of
contempt and indifference.
It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its contemplation of a result so
disastrous, so unjust, and so unmerited.
It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these Islands a young scientist he
had already won fame in his own country; that he is a fellow of the important scientific
associations in the world. His election as a fellow or member of these scientific bodies
shows that his labors in the Philippines were the object of solicitude by the prominent
scientific and learned men not only of his own race, but in many other civilized countries
of the world. Important results were evidently expected of him by them, and it can not be
doubted that they expected of him of life honestly devoted to the conscientious discharge
of his duties as a trusted public functionary of the American Government in the
Philippine Islands.
And yet he is falsely denounced in the columns of said newspaper to his fellows of these
societies as a man who is so absolutely corrupt, so inordinately selfish and avaricious that
he has not considered for a moment the duties incumbent upon him; that he has been
oblivious to every obligation of trust and confidence, and that he is unworthy of the
respect of honest men.
One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library of the city of Boston. It is
furthermore shown that copies of this paper went to Spain, England, and to different parts
of the United States; and inasmuch as the plaintiff is a man of prominence in the scientific
world, it is to be inferred that his fellows became more or less aware of these heinous
charges.
Thus we find that the plaintiff is here confronted with disappointed ambition and
frustrated hopes, and placed in the humiliating attitude of having to explain to his fellows
that the charges are untrue, of adducing evidence to clear himself, perhaps never with
complete success, of the stain that has been cast upon his reputation by the libelous and
defamatory declarations contained in "Birds of Prey."
In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of the case and the law
applicable thereto,
It is the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the plaintiff has sustained
damages on account of wounded feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his
standing and reputation in the sum of thirty-five thousand (P35,000) pesos, and that he is
entitled to recover this sum of the nine defendants named, as being responsible for having
written, printed, and published said libel; and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover of
them the further sum of twenty-five thousand (P25,000) pesos, as punitive damages,
which the court thinks will be a just punishment to these nine libelers and an example to
others.
Wherefore, it is so ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, have and
recover of the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, jointly and severally, the sum of sixty thousand (P60,000) pesos, and the costs
of suit, for which execution may issue.
It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th day of January , 1910.
From said decision the defendants appealed and made the following assignments of error
in this court:
I.The court erred in overruling our motions for suspension of this case, in its present state,
until final judgment should be rendered in criminal case No. 4295 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, pending appeal in the Honorable Supreme Court, for libel based also
on the editorial, "Birds of Prey."
II.The court erred in admitting as evidence mere opinion adduced by counsel for the
plaintiff with the intention of demonstrating to whom the editorial, alleged to the libelous,
refers.
III.The court erred in giving greater preponderance to the opinions of the witnesses for
the plaintiff than to the expert testimony of the defense.
IV.The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the complaint is based to be libelous
per se and to refer necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester.
V.The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco to be
owners of "El Renacimiento."
VI.The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented by counsel for the
defendants.
VII.The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendants.
VIII.The court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly "and severally" to pay to the
plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, the sum of P60,000.
IX.The court erred in not ordering that execution of the judgment to be confined to the
business known as "El Renacimiento" and to the defendant Teodoro M. Kalaw, without
extending to property of the alleged owners of said newspaper which was not invested
therein by them at its establishment.
31
X.The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue of the judgment rendered
against the defendants.
XI.The court, finally, erred in granting to the plaintiff punitive damages against the
alleged owners of "El Renacimiento," admitting the hypothesis that said editorial is
libelous per se and refers to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester.
The theory of the defendants, under the first assignment of error, is that the civil action
could not proceed until the termination of the criminal action, relying upon the provisions
of the Penal Code in support of such theory. This court, however, has decided in the case
of Ocampo et al. vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a criminal prosecution
for libel, under the provisions of Act 277 of the Civil commission, constitutes no bar or
estoppel in a civil action based upon the same acts or transactions. The reason most often
given for this doctrine is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties.
Different rule as to the competency of witnesses and the weight of evidence necessary to
the findings in the two proceedings always exist. As between civil and criminal actions
under said Act (No. 277) a judgment in one is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the
other. A judgment in a criminal cause, under said Act, can not be pleaded as res
adjudicata in a civil action. (Stone vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 178; Boyd vs. U.S., 616 U. S., 616, 634;
Lee vs. U.S., 150 U.S., 476, 480; U.S. vs. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. Rep., 100; U.S. vs.Schneider, 35
Fed. Rep., 107; Chamberlain vs. Pierson, 87 Fed. Rep., 420; Steel vs. Cazeaux, 8 Martin
(La.), 318, 13 American Decisions, 288; Betts vs. New Hartford, 25 Conn., 185.)
In a criminal action for libel the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the
guilt of the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient
for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by a preponderance of evidence only.
(Ocampo vs. Jenkins (supra); Reilly vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 27
American decisions, 708; Cooley on Torts, sec. 208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426; Wigmore
on Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)
With reference to the second assignment of error above noted, we find that this court has
already decided the question raised thereby, in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil.
Rep., 1).
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several witnesses for the purpose of
showing that the statements made in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to
apply to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior. The defendants duly
objected to these questions and excepted to the ruling of the court admitting them.
In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same question was raised and the
court, in its decision, said:
The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the application of the
slanderous words to the plaintiff and the extrinsic matters alleged in the
declaration may be shown by the testimony of witnesses who knew the parties
and circumstances and who can state their judgment and opinion upon the
 application and meaning of the terms used by the defendant. It is said that where
the words are ambiguous on the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be
applied, the judgment and opinion of witnesses, who from their knowledge of
the parties and circumstances are able to form a conclusion as to the defendant's
intention and application of the libel is evidence for the information of the jury.
Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:
The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with the
circumstances, to state that, in reading the libel, they at once concluded it was
aimed at the plaintiff. It is not necessary that all the world should understand
the libel. It is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he is
the person meant. (See also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and Slander, 4th English
edition, 589.)
The correctness of this rule is not only established by the weight of authority but is
supported by every consideration of justice and sound policy. The lower court committed
no error in admitting the opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the cause. One's
reputation is the sum or composite of the impressions spontaneously made by him from
time to time, and in one way or another, upon his neighbors and acquaintances. The effect
of a libelous publication upon the understanding of such persons, involving necessarily
the identity of the person libeled is of the very essence of the wrong. The issue in a libel
case concerns not only the sense of the publication, but, in a measure its effect upon a
reader acquainted with the person referred to. The correctness of the opinion of the
witnesses as to the identity of the person meant in the libelous publication may always
be tested by cross-examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep., 443; 2nd
Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52 Ill., 236; Smith vs.Miles, 15 Vt., 245;
Miller vs. Butler, 6 Cushing (Mass.), 71.)
It is true that some of the courts have established a different rule. We think, however, that
a large preponderance of the decisions of the supreme courts of the different States is in
favor of the doctrine which we have announced here.
We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and 7 may fairly be considered
together, the question being whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause in the lower court shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the said editorial
was libelous in its character. Here again we find that this question has been passed upon
by this court in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep., 1), and we deem it
unnecessary to discuss this question again, for the reason that the evidence adduced in
the present cause was practically the same, or at least to the same effect, as the evidence
adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et al. It is sufficient here to say that the evidence
adduced during the trial of the present cause shows, by a large preponderance of the evidence, that
said editorial was one of the most pernicious and malicious libels upon a just, upright and
honorable official, which the courts have ever been called upon to consider. There is not a scintilla
of evidence in the entire record, notwithstanding the fact that the defendants from time to time
attempted to make a show of proving the truthfulness of the statements made in said editorial,
32
which in any way reflects upon the character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C. Worcester, in the
administration of his department of the Government.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the court erred in holding that
the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe
Barretto, Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors of "El
Renacimiento," the lower court said:
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show that none of the
twelve defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," but that six of them had originally contributed their money as a
patriotic donation to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held
the money and property of the paper as trustee for this people, and that the
paper was being devoted exclusively to philanthropic and patriotic ends, and
that Galo Lichauco had agreed to contribute to the same ends but had not done
so.
"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the evidence, is so preposterous
as to entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is
tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common sense. That those seven
defendants named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence,
to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901, for their own personal benefit and profit, is
fully and unmistakably established. It is equally well established that Martin Ocampo is
and was, not only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the administrator or
business manager of said newspaper, and that the other six persons named are
shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof and were such on the said 30th of
October, 1908."
Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower court, we find, sometime
before the commencement of the present action and before any question was raised with
reference to who were the owners of the said newspaper, that the defendant, Arcadio
Arellano, in the case of United States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338), testified upon
that question as follows:
Q. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?
A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr. Barretto, and Galo
Lichauco.
Q. Who else?
A. No one else.
Q. And Rafael Palma — is not so?
 A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.
During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified that his declarations in
other cause were true.
It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month of November, 1907, long
before the commencement of the present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article
which was published in "El Comercio," published the following statement:
They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the publication of "El
Renacimiento") "is sustained by Federal money; that we are inspired by Federal
personages. We declare that this, besides being false, is calumnious. The
shareholders of this company are persons well known by the public, and never at
any moment of their lives have they acted with masks on--those masks for which
"El Comercio" seems to have so great an affection. They are, as the public knows:
Señores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit.
Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present cause that he contributed
P750 to the establishment of "El Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum
of P500; that Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose contributed the sum of
P250 or P500 each; that Galo Lichauco contributed the sum of P1,000 and that Manuel
Palma contributed P3,000.
During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin Ocampo, and Angel Jose
testified as witnesses, relating to the ownership of the newspaper called "El
Renacimiento." They testified that whatever money they gave for the purpose of
establishing said newspaper, was given as a donation, and that they were neither the
owners nor coowners of said periodical. The defendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as witnesses during the trial of the
cause in the lower court. No reason is given for their failure to appear and give testimony
in their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not the declarations of
Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U. S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time they were
made, were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to "El Comercio," above noted. Proof of said
declarations and publication was adduced during the trial of the cause in the present case,
and the attorney of these particular defendants well knew the purpose and effect of such
evidence, if not disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that said declarations and
publication were presented in evidence, and notwithstanding the fact that the attorney
for the defendants knew of the purpose of such proof, the defendants, Palma, Lichauco,
Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called as witnesses for the purpose of rebutting the
same. It is a well settled rule of evidence, that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut
the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof,
the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the
inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. (Railway
33
Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454; Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush.
(Mass.), 295; People vs.McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)
Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63, 65) said:
It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed according to the
proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power
of the other side to have contradicted.
Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64), lays down the rule that:
The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in elucidation of the
subject matter in dispute, which is within his power and which rests peculiarly
within his own knowledge, frequently offers occasion for presumptions against
him, since it raises the strong suspicion that such evidence, if adduced, would
operate to his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al. Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C.
C. A. Reports, 136, 153.)
At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the case of Sedano and at the
time of the said publication in reply to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating
anything except the truth: neither does there seem to have been any reason for publishing the
fact that the defendants were the owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear that they were donors and
public benefactors only. They seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners.
The editors, publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento," at the time the reply to "El
Comercio" was published, seemed to be anxious to announce to the public who its owners
were. It ("El Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no one; that it had
been born into the community without percentage; that it had been created a terrible
machine for the purpose of destroying the good character and reputation of men without
having any one to respond for its malicious damage occasioned to honorable men; that it
was a cast-off, without a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be kicked and
buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed without any one to protect it; that its former
friends and creators had scattered hither and thither and had disappeared like feathers
before a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they did not know their offspring and were
not willing to recognize it in public. It seems to have been a Moses found in the bulrushes,
destined by its creators to be a great good among the Filipino people, in teaching them to
respect the rights of persons and property; but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it became, by
reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of destruction let loose in the State, to enter the
private abode of lawabiding citizens and to take from them their honor and reputation,
which neither it nor the State could restore. To rob a man of his wealth is to rob him of
trash, but to take from him his good name and reputation is to rob him of that which does
not make the robber richer and leaves the person robbed poor indeed.
The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which they gave for the
establishment of "El Renacimiento" was a pure donation. They claim that it was a
donation to the Filipino people. They do not state, however, or attempt to show what
particular persons were to manage, control, and direct the enterprise for which the
donation was made. A donation must be made to definite persons or associations. A
donation to an indefinite person or association is an anomaly in law, and we do not
believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact made. A donation must be made to
some definite person or association and the donee must be some ascertained or
ascertainable person or association.
A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it must be made, in the very
nature of things, to some definite person or association. A donation made to no person or
association could not be regarded as a donation in law. It could not be more than an
abandonment of property. Of course where a donation is in fact made, without reservation
to a particular person or association, the donor is no longer the owner of the thing donated
nor responsible, in any way, for its use, provided that the object, for which the donation
was made, was legal. A person does not become an owner or part owner of a church, for
example, to the construction of which he has made a donation; neither is he responsible
for the use to which said edifice may be applied. No one disputes the fact that donations
may be made for the public use, but they must be made to definite persons or associations,
to be administered in accordance with the purpose of the gift.
We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the defendants and appellants, at the
time they presented the defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had a reasonable
hope that their declarations as to said donation, given in the manner alleged, would be believed
by the court.
After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this court and taking into
consideration the failure of the other defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a
preponderance of such evidence shows that the defendants, Martin Ocampo, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, were the coowners of the newspaper known as "El Renacimiento," at the time
of the publication of the said alleged libel.
With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the lower court
committed an error in not admitting in evidence the judgment of acquittal of the
defendant, Lope K. Santos, rendered in the criminal cause, we are of the opinion that the
refusal to admit said evidence in the civil cause was not an error. The fact that the
evidence in the criminal cause was insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was guilty of
the crime charged, in no way barred the right of the person injured by said alleged libel
to maintain the present civil action against him. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.)
The criminal action had to be sustained by evidence showing the culpability of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil action it is sufficient to show that
the defendants injured the plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication, by a
preponderance of the evidence only. (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426; Cooley on Torts,
208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec., 708.)
34
In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La., 318; 13 American Decisions, 288), the
supreme court of Louisiana said:
A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution can not be given in evidence
in a civil action.
In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25 Conn., 180) Mr. Justice Ellsworth said (in a
case where a judgment in a criminal case was offered in evidence):
A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon which the judgment
was rendered, when those facts come up in a civil case, for this evidence would
not be material; and so the law is perfectly well settled. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence,
secs. 536, 524; 1 Phillips on Evidence, 231; Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41
Pa. St., 42; Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543; McDonald vs. Stark, 176 Ill.,
456, 468.)
While we believe that the lower court committed no error in refusing to admit the
sentence acquitting Lope K. Santos in the criminal case, we are of the opinion, after a
careful examination of the record brought to this court, that it is insufficient to show that
Lope K. Santos was responsible, in any way, for the publication of the alleged libel, and
without discussing the question whether or not the so-called Tagalog edition of "El
Renacimiento" and "El Renacimiento" constituted one and the same newspaper, we find
that the evidence is insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos is responsible in damages, in
any way, for the publication of the said alleged libel.
The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim
that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and
severally against the defendants and in allowing an execution against the individual
property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in
support of their contention. The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they
fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the
universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in
which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants might
have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have been sued
jointly and severally, as they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law
Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has
his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the
tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law Pleadings,
86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give
an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the
common law all are principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any
way he commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or
counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who
inflicted or committed the actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)
It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet
the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they
had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16
Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312 and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7
Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N. Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90;
Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The
person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the
whole damage caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is
no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are
not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in
the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1
Campbell (English Reports), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6
Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1;
Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9
Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of
each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
(Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark.,
337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)
A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies
any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The
release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates to discharge all.
(Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290;
Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt.,
387; Turner vs.Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)
Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tort feasors
are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence
while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they
are charged jointly and severally. (Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 382;
Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3 Ill., 126.)
This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6
provides that:
Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any
words in any part . . . or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the
author of the same.
35
In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several
judgment against the defendants and allowing an execution against their individual
property. The provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the defendants and
appellants have no application whatever to the question presented in the present case.
The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the amount of damages
suffered on account of wounded feelings, mental suffering and injury to the good name
and reputation of Mr. Worcester, by reason of the alleged libelous publication. The lower
court found that the damages thus suffered by Mr. Worcester amounted to P35,000. This
assignment of error presents a most difficult question. The amount of damages resulting
from a libelous publication to a man's good name and reputation is difficult of
ascertainment. It is nor difficult to realize that the damage thus done is great and almost
immeasurable. The specific amount the damages to be awarded must depend upon the
facts in each case and the sound discretion of the court. No fixed or precise rules can be
laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is difficult to include all
of the facts and conditions which enter into the measure of such damages. A man's good
name and reputation are worth more to him than all the wealth which he can accumulate during a
lifetime of industrious labor. To have them destroyed may be eminently of more damage to him
personally than the destruction of his physical wealth. The loss is immeasurable. No amount
of money can compensate him for his loss. Notwithstanding the great loss which he, from
his standpoint, sustains, the courts must have some tangible basis upon which to estimate
such damages.
In discussing the elements of damages in a case of libel, the Honorable James C. Jenkins,
who tried the present case in the court below, correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private
reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property. It is one
of those rights necessary to human society, that underlie the whole scheme of human
civilization. The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest rewards of a
wellspent life vouchsafed to man in this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of
youth and its possession is a solace in later years. A man of affairs, a business man, who
has been seen known by his fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and
who has developed a great character and an unblemished reputation, has secured a
possession more useful and more valuable than lands or houses or silver or gold. The law
recognizes the value of such a reputation and constantly strives to give redress for its
injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous words or libelous publications,
the liability to make full compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame,
obloquy and for the injury to the feelings of its owner, which are caused by the publication
of the slander or libel. The law goes further. If the words are spoken or the publication is
made with the intent to injure the victim or with criminal indifference to civil obligation,
it imposes such damages as the jury, in view of all the circumstances of the particular
case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the public and to deter
others from doing likewise, and for punishment for the infliction of the injury."
As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr. Worcester to his good name and
reputation are most difficult of ascertainment. The attorney for the appellants, in his brief,
lends the court but little assistance in reaching a conclusion upon this question. The
appellants leaves the whole question to the discretion of the court, without any argument
whatever.
After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that part of the judgment of the lower
court relating to the damages suffered by the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be
modified, and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Mr. Dean C. Worcester and
against the defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of P15,000, with interest at 6 per
cent from the 23d of January, 1909.
With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above noted, to wit: That the court
erred in imposing punitive damages upon the defendants, we are of the opinion, after a
careful examination of the evidence, and in view of all of the facts and circumstances and
the malice connected with the publication of said editorial and the subsequent
publications with relation to said editorial, that the lower court, by virtue of the
provisions of Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, was justified in imposing
punitive damages upon the defendants.
Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to render a judgment for
punitive damages, in an amount which the court may think will be a just punishment to
the libeler and an example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be recovered if the defendant or
defendants are actuated by malice. In the present case there was not the slightest effort
on the part of the defendants to show the existence of probable cause or foundation
whatever for the facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will against the
plaintiff are seen throughout the record. The said editorial not only attempted to paint
the plaintiff as a villain, but upon every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of
the severest kind.
Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating to the damages which
should be imposed upon the defendants for the purpose of punishment. Upon this
question the courts must be governed in each case by the evidence, the circumstances and
their sound discretion. Taking into consideration the fact that some of the defendants
have been prosecuted criminally and have been sentenced, and considering that fact as a
part of the punitive damages, we have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of the
lower court should be modified, and that a judgment should be rendered against the
defendants, jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the Honorable Dean C.
Worcester, in the sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6 per cent from
the 23d day of January, 1909.
Therefore, after a full consideration of all the facts contained in the record and the errors
assigned by the appellants in this court, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the
lower court should be modified and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of Dean
C. Worcester and against the defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, jointly and severally, for the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the
36
23d of January, 1909, with costs, and that a judgment should be entered absolving Lope
K. Santos from any liability under said complaint. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-9010 March 28, 1914
J. H. CHAPMAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs.bJAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-
appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this action, there was a single-
track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to
meet and pass each other. One of these switches was located at the scene of the accident.
The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of Creveling, in front of
whose house the accident happened. He desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car
coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was
approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed from the gate into the
street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the
entrance being from the front or the rear flatform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front
platform but, seeing that he could not reached it without extra exertion, stopped beside
the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in order
to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the
defendant's automobile.
The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by his
chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being
immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene
of the accident the street car which was following took the switch — that is, went off the
main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the
defendant no longer followed that the street car nor went to the left, but either kept
straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff
intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in
which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the
plaintiff attempted to board, was almost in front of the defendant's automobile,
defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff, as
above described.
The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's driver
was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an
oncoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was
not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a car was coming upon him from
his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that,
according to the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left
should pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his
right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the
street car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the
facts and circumstances of this case. As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5
Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil
Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the
alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the
owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of
time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his
driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an
automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of
60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable
opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the
results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden
act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile
took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened
to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears
with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street
car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge
defendant with the negligence of the driver.
Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, would be
responsible, whether present or not, for the negligent acts of his driver when the
automobile was a part of a business enterprise, and was being driven at the time of the
accident in furtherance of the owner's business, we do not now decide.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM
CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father,
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.YU KHE THAI
and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.
37
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members
of his family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the
defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February
26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo,
jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of
P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the
defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby
ordered dismissed, for lack of merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of
P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of
the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the
accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu
Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael
Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now
E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his
Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son
Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs.
Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu
Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his
Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling
at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic
— the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to
35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance.
Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain
Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled
around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son,
Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him,
only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence.
The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should have given
him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice
the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible
to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights
for a considerable while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that
lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's
right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and
carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the
oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened
his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac
would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to
the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in
any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite
obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles
according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw
the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite
of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo
gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the
wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected
situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but
was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his
car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's
negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The
next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable
with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the
owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented
the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as
law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood
(1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of
the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits
his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that
38
the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The
owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for
example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although
he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both
criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On
the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the
owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance,
injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile,
although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible,
either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in
the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe
Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware
Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation
of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be
imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the
immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The
car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide
and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner
to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his
driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve
meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he
was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not
have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite
of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said,
was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and
make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that
due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of
diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own
cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not
trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to
appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on
the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall,
vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not anterior;
similarly equipped. B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a
double fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis,
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.
he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:
do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to A. Abrasions, multiple:
one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law (1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.
to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.
effectively proscribed. D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, F. Concussion, cerebral.
is an error. The next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages.
The award of P48,000 by way of moral damages is itemized as follows: EPHRAIM CAEDO:

1. Marcial Caedo P 20,000.00 A. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital
2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00
EILEEN CAEDO:
3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00
A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.
4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior,
5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00
bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.
6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them
also actual or compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they
sustained. Defendants, on the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral
damages are excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for either side. The
amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries,
other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual
damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable of
pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual,
damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:
MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3)
nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third, anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third
C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right.
(See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries,
the amounts of moral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.

39
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring
defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with
respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985
FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS
DELA ROSA, respondents.
Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners.
David M. Castro for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals. The petitioners are
the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took
place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive,
and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis dela Rosa and
his father Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078,
rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendants
Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the
plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto
Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss
of his companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision;
plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.
(Record on Appeal, p. 35.)
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a decision dated May
22, 1979, affirmed in totothat of the trial court. (Rollo, p. 48.) However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution
dated June 19, 1981, modified its judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in this case is hereby modified
insofar as the judgment ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and
40
severally, the sum of P 1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with legal interest from
July 5, 1973, is concerned. In lieu thereof, defendants are hereby
ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Four
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings
of Roberto R. Luna, with legal interest thereon from the date of the
filing of the complaint until the whole amount shall have been totally
paid.
The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo stand. (Rollo,
pp. 33-34.)
Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's decision.
In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose and Luis dela Rosa was denied for lack
of merit on October 5, 1981. Subsequently, they informed that the decision sought to be
reviewed was not yet final because the Lunas had a pending motion for reconsideration.
For prematurity, this Court set aside all previous resolutions. On February 16, 1983, acting
upon the motion and manifestation of the petitioners, they were required to file an
amended petition within thirty days from notice. On June 20, 1983, this Court resolved:
"For failure of the petitioners to file an amended petition as required, this case is hereby
DISMISSED and the dismissal is final."
The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the separate appeal of the Lunas. Their petition
contains the following prayer:
1. That the petition be given due course;
2. That after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered, setting aside or
modifying the RESOLUTION of respondent Court of Appeals dated
June 19, 1981, attached as Annex "A" to the petition, only insofar as it
reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, s• as to affirm the
trial court's finding as to the unearned net earnings of the deceased in
the amount of P1,650,000.00;
3. Ordering that the award of attorney's fees shall also be with interest,
at the legal rate. (Rollo, p. 27.)
On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. (Rollo, pp. 122-123.)
In the light of the foregoing, the resolution stated:
It thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect to the award
for unearned net earnings — should the award be P450,000.00 only or
should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged; and whether the
award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate.
 The Court takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as early as
January 18, 1970, and that until now the process of litigation is not yet
over. In the meantime the value of the Philippine peso has been
seriously eroded so that the heirs of the deceased may ultimately have
a greatly depreciated judgment. In the interest of justice, the private
respondents are hereby ordered to PAY to the petitioners within thirty
(30) days from notice the following amounts adjudged against them:
P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased; (P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship
with legal interest from July 3, 1973; and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award for
unearned net earnings shall be increased to P1,650,000.00; and whether
the award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate.
The costs will be adjudged as a matter of course. (Rollo, p. 123.)
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they
said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue
a writ of execution but the attempt of the special sheriff to enter the private respondent's
premises so that he could make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by
guards and this Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in
enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal amount. In the
meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children, and living in Madrid,
Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly
enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)
1. On the amount of the award.
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased
Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income
was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual
personal expenses.
This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the
life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years, and under the
Commissioner Standard Ordinary, used by our domestic insurance
companies since 1968 for policies above P5,000.00 his life expectancy
was 38.51 years. Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of San Miguel
Corporation, testified that he was the regular physician of Roberto
Luna since his marriage to Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He said that
except for a slight anemia which he had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna
was of good health. Allowing for this condition, he could reasonably
expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years. (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
41
The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion said:
We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion that the
deceased had a life expectancy of thirty years. At the time of Luna's
death, he was only thirty-three years old and in the best of health. With
his almost perfect physical condition and his sound mind, the
expectation that he could have lived for another thirty years is
reasonable, considering that with his educational attainment, his social
and financial standing, he had the means of staying fit and preserving
his health and well-being. That he could have lived at least until the
age of sixty-three years is an assessment which is more on the
conservative side in view of the testimony of Dr. Vicente Campa that
the general life expectancy nowadays had gone up to seventy years.
(Rollo, p. 45.)
The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in respect of Luna's annual income
and expense. This is what the trial court said:
Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was survived by his
wife Felina Rodriguez-Luna, and two children, Roberto Jr., 13 years,
and Jose, 12 years. His wife was 35 years old at the time. He declared a
gross income of P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I), P29,700,000 for 1968
(Exhibit H) and P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit G). He had investments in
various corporations amounting to P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M, M-1, N,
N-1 to N-3, O, O-1, P, Q and R) and was the president and general
manager of Rodlum Inc.; general manager of Esso Greenhills Service
Center; Assistant manager of Jose Rodriguez Lanuza Sons; director of
Steadfast Investment Corporation; chairman and treasurer of
Greenhills Industrial Corporation; vice-president of Oasis, Inc.;
director of Nation Savings Association; director of Arlun Taxi; and
treasurer of National Association of Retired Civil Employees.
... . His income tax returns show an increase in his income in the short
period of three years. It is reasonable to expect that it would still go
higher for the next fifteen years and reach a minimum of P75,000.00 a
year. The potential increase in the earning capacity of a deceased
person is recognized by the Supreme Court. ... the court believes that
the expected gross earnings of Roberto Luna should be fixed in the sum
of P75,000.00 a year for the period of his life expectancy of 30 years, but
deducting his personal expenses which, because of his business and
social standing the court in the amount of P20,000.00 a year, in
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court. (Record on Appeal,
pp. 32-34.)
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court of Appeals took
into account the fact "that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing
as a sport, having participated in tournaments both here and abroad;" it said that Luna's
habit and manner of life should be "one of the factors affecting the value of mortality table
in actions for damages;" and, consequently, concluded that Luna could not have lived
beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced to
10 years only.
Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's
annual personal expenses:
... . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas which is a key
expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing, We should increase
that amount to P30,000.00 as the would be personal expenses of the
deceased per annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual
gross income less P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10
years of life expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its resolution of June 19,
1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 Years and increased his annual
personal expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We sustain the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years said that his
habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in
car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to
shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any
evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but
then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely
low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled
conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to have disturbed the
determination of the trial court which it had previously affirmed.
Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the
deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same time
increasing his annual gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal
expenses should increase because of the "escalating price of gas which is a key
expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete
basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase
considering the manifold sources thereof.
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.
2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.
42
The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the sum of P50,000.00. This
award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of May 22, 1979. The
resolution of June 19, 1981, reaffirmed the award. The two decisions as well as the
resolution do not provide for interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the award.
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with interest at the legal rate
from the date of the filing of the complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The attorney's
fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the
circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
(See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest should
accrue only from the date of the trial court's decision.
The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26,1977; 77 SCRA 98, where
it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since
Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become
merely subsidiary to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married
and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should be
subsidiary only.
We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will
not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine
courts. Moreover, he does not have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere.
In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981, is hereby set
aside; its decision dated May 22, 1979, is reinstated with the sole modification that the
award for attorney's fees shall earn interest at the legal rate from July 5, 1973, the date of
the trial court's decision. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L.
RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA
BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for
damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
[Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was
acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was
grunted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the
15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January
1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said
notice shall state the time and place of hearing — both motions were denied by the trial
court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this
time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending
22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987
and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent
spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts
of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following
issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may
still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of
43
the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or
not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual
custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of
Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period
to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and
place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the
reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the
service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition, and in order
that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the
application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of
appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on
their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176
of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who
lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where
a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing,
controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability
was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether
of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our
Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person
upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard
to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence
of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own
acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's
agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy
a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil
Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child
living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental
authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed
and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof
44
that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of
the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual
custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental
authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition
for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc
spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency
and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that
the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests
of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall
be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The
decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be
known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the
time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and
the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise
supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance
with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of
the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall
be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their companyand
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been
retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at
the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may
be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally
granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts a
supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their
adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the
period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
45
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such
trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad
already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of
Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents,
were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the
dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R.
No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before
the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for
further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc
spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA,
ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,vs. ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the
Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at
the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned
them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental
object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she
had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at
her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit
her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with
some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl
related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She
underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and
stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent
the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra
completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter
against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to
pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child
which causes damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law
simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to
determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been
prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the
act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send
her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned,
it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against.
Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that
befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of
good conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
AQUINAS SCHOOL, G.R. No. 184202
father of a family to prevent damage.
Petitioner,
Present:
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause - versus - NACHURA,
damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is PERALTA,
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different ABAD, and
cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances MENDOZA, JJ.
above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA
fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or S. INTON, on their behalf and on
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS
the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA Promulgated:
which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons YAMYAMIN, OP,
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family Respondents. January 26, 2011
to prevent damage." x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof DECISION
necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated,
and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor ABAD, J.:
child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company?

46
 This case is about the private schools liability for the outside catechists act of
shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to
remain in his seat and not move around the classroom.
The Facts and the Case
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a
religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose
Luis grade three religion class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left
his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin
noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and
went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the childs behavior,
Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also
pulled and shoved his head on the classmates seat. Finally, she told the child to stay
where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard
while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed
an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also
filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual,
moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and
his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal claims but ruled in
Jose Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.[1]
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). [2] They
asked the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin.Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and
Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined
to increase the award of damages.[3] Jose Luis moved for partial reconsideration but this
was denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in
holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
The Courts Ruling
47
The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code
upon the CAs belief that the school was Yamyamins employer. Aquinas contests this.
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the existence
of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the
employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his
work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the
employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as
well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same. [4]
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with
a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas
insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for
the task of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops
designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the
circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins
teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this
regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it
cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct
towards the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that
she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from
a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the
school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty
Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a
teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998. [5]
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach[6] to
ensure that she was really catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation.[7] Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year,
Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted
promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the
incident. [8] It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the
Court finds no justification for this since they did not appeal from the decision of the
CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the petition. They thus
cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than those that the CA already
granted them in its decision.[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008, and HOLDS petitioner
Aquinas School not liable in damages to respondent Jose Luis Inton.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA
A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A.
AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A.
AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A.
AMADORA, petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE
SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO
DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural
guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru
his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his
relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled
on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school,
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally
hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen
years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants
liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of
earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees .3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision
was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school
at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
48
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the
necessary diligence in preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on
April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a
classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply
disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment
as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the
school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in
their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider
important because of an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of
the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents
that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban
an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal
or taking any further action .6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when
the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same
pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been
killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is
no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180
which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions.
The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices
so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted
provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v.
Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the
case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and
a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor.
After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly
that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty
of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action flied against
them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now
Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated
the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was
riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla
and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who
should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in
general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of
establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a
classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon
City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice
Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued
that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades.
Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation
where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take
part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May
30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a
classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in the school, the head thereof
and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared
through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their
custody" — means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the
tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age were
covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and subject
to its discipline. Dissenting with three others,11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining the
custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply only to torts
committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde
Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the
question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will
have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
49
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly
impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is
not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein
have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the
offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion
that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case
it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers
of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their
pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from
the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third
Persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision
over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and
trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The phrase
is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used
in the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of
Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to
have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the
parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and
not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under
his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with
the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado
Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts
and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort
were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the
school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the
academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-
academic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and
trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem
to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic.
Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself
nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated
may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher
certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an
academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school
were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held
answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the
case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head
thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school
of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a
master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision and
influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his
students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now)
only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be
directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of
the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the
50
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision
must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit
to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive
with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term,
as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of
the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in
the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the
view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only
upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered
and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended
upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to
be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers,
clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary
authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance
of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed,
even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the
company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities
under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his
students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child
when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time
of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody
does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus,
for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when
its authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to
fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the
school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts
of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat
superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which
also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when
he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of
minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the
teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of
the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head
of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his
dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under
this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause
violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that
will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case
it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the
teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers
and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils
pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In
almost all cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an
adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the
51
students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to
hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are
in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is
disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on
the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent
can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is
greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the teacher's influence, besides
being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the
students' desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child
than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the
tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less tractable than the minor —
then there should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is then all the
more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts of the
student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes
had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that
he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of
the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would
have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was
exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus
immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora
had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily
make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's
killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon
was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of
the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the
offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was
caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be
held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was
clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does
not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he
confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held
directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private
respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with
such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted
by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the
auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply
sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances
here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a
balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND
ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO
VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
52
This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following
modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby
awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral
damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded to
plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High School, represented by
the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin, are
hereby held jointly and severally liable with defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de
Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of the
abovementioned actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are
hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them, together with their
respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at
the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and
Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr.
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son
to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the
directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of
the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of
the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned.
His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a
certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where
he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834, in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City, against the St. Francis High School,
represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin
(its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida
Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly
incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the
death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence
of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents prayed of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio,
de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to
pay respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the
defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro,
Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required of them
by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen. (pp.
2930, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the
picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot
excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were
remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted to the
sea without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders
allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard
required by law under the circumstances. While the defendants-teachers admitted
that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep, the supposed lifeguards
of the children did not even actually go to the water to test the depth of the particular
area where the children would swim. And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the
picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by the fact that three persons during the
picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and
physical observation of the water before they allowed the students to swim, they
could have found out that the area where the children were swimming was indeed
dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers
were there to supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even at the area
where the children were swimming. They were somewhere and as testified to by
plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School,
Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence
showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has
been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna
responsible for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant
teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not
consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand,
defendant Aurora Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she
was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to
supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
53
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-spouses
assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School
and its administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for
its approved co-curricular activities but also for those which they unreasonably
failed to exercise control and supervision like the holding of picnic in the
dangerous water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and
principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their co-
defendants-teachers Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand
Castillo in a picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral
damages for the untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of
plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored
activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the
supervision of the teachers employed by the said school, particularly the teacher
in charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited
to help her in supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that the
court a quo found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who, as
such, were charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic, the
St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable
under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article
2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the
picnic was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School." We
find from the evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school
principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even
been invited to attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition
against undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures
to be adopted during the picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and
the responsible school officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had
acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal
must be found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the
damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the
rule that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application, the
negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a
 presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the
establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and
while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear
and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the
employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the
defendants-teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence as would serve
to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School
and its principal from liability under the above-cited provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We
cannot but commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the
untimely death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering
as parents, especially the victim's mother who, according to appellants, suffered
a nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed
by the court a quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which are sustained by the
evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by
way of example of correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the
Civil Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by the
trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito Vinas,
Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and
severally liable for damages such finding not being supported by facts and
evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of
the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they
did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree
with the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim's parents had
given such permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the
existence of liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by
the plaintiffs-appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to
such a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of
defendants vis-a-visthe supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and,
54
as correctly found by the trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has
been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed out.
However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-
teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial court
found:
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones
arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred,
such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact,
it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to
safeguard the students.
The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why
they were late in going to the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the
entrance examination being conducted by the school which is part of their duty
as teachers thereof. Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence
in question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence
attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in
the supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in
the drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission
to the two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the
injury caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his
drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.
As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with
the court a quo that the counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-
60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which
will warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under
the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or the
negligence of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be shown
hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the
negligence of those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they
cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores
Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not
ask him where he will bring this?
A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the
picnic, and when I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was
drowned in the picnic came to you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March
20, 1982, you did not know that your son join the picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your son during that time?
A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire
whether your son have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing
where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
55
Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?
A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt guilty
about the death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he could join the
excursion where her son died of drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the
one who personally cooked the adobo for her son?
A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient
herself. She was very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the
excursion her son would have not drowned. I don't know if she actually
permitted her son although she said she cooked adobo so he could join.
(Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro
— witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil
Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must
have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private
affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some
members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach.
This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because
this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular
activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin
of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in
any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application
therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to
answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act or omission he
committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the
award of damages to the respondents-spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged,
did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward
incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and
swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the
defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the defendants in
case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and
Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached
the boy and claim also having applied first aid on him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children
were covering you up or were surrounding you?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your
application of first aid?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your
application of the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid
that we were doing, sir.
Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you
claimed the boy did not respond, were you not disturb anyway?
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back
pressure?
A From 9 to 11 times, sir.
Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body
on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
56
Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to
back pressure?
A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then
the face was a little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the back
of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the
child?
A Myself, sir.
Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?
A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I
applied back to back pressure and took notice of the condition of the
child. We placed the feet in a higher position, that of the head of the
child, sir.
Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the
feet were on a higher level than that of the head, what did you do
next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after
putting the child in that position, I applied the back to back pressure
and started to massage from the waistline up, but I noticed that the
boy was not responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you
do?
A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the
position of the boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on the
sand then we applied the mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-
93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of
respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant
moral damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or
negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the
picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to
observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the
children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the
required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding
petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein
are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there
being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S.
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL,
SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals as well
as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising
from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to
visit the public schools inDipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and
his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva
and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court ofDipolog City.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
57
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs
William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss
of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages
incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral
damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel
are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the
event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and
who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is
ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His
counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision, is hereby
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St.
Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day,
Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned
by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. [2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the
actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
 On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral
damages against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that
petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus,
such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. [11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
58
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what
it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel
II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was
not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased
Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator
who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving
of James Daniel II.Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that
those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep
at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned
on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.[13]
 Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause
of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. [14] In this case,
the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of
the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent
Carpitanos must be deleted.Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is
the exception rather than the rule.[15]The power of the court to award attorneys fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification.[16] Thus,
the grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that
the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.[17] Hence, with the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident
occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals[18]and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and
FERNANDO PINEDA, defendants-appellees.
59
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of
law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint
against Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for
damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of an
establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24,
1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven
by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the
bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used
for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51.
Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was
not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus
company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. As already stated, the
lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the terms "employers"
and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores de un
establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the
old Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation
of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It
may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the
Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower court.
The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it
was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct
from that of the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is one which
was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues framed by the parties (Sec.
18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that
theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal because,
to permit him to do so, could be unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the
plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can
be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with
the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria

establecida en el num 3.0 del (art.) 1903, el director de un periodico explotado por una
sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y aunque Ileve la direccion de
determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior
autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision of Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6, 1912
cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica
Española 992).

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue
which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders,
Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par
value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on
their subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano
Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.

That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the
same civil personality.

60