Republic of the Philippines of real estate located in another
SUPREME COURT province.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911
THE MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
representing the Insular Government,
et al., defendants-appellants.
W. A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan,
for appellant.
Antonio Constantino, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tarlac dismissing the action before it on
motion of the plaintiff upon the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter of the controversy.
The question for our consideration and
decision is the power and authority of a
Court of First Instance of one province to
take cognizance of an action by a
railroad company for the condemnation
appraise the value of the lands was duly
appointed, which, after taking oral
In the month of December, 1907, the
plaintiff began an action in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Tarlac
for the condemnation of certain real
estate, stated by the plaintiff in his
complaint to be located in the Province
of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint
that the plaintiff is authorized by law to
construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to
Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is
for the purpose of condemning lands for
the construction of such line that this
action is brought. The land sought to be
condemned is 69,910 square meters in
area. The complaint states that before
beginning the action the plaintiff had
caused to be made a thorough search in
the office of the registry of property and
of the tax where the lands sought to be
condemned were located and to whom
they belonged. As a result of such
investigations the plaintiff alleged that
the lands in question were located in the
Province of Tarlac. The defendants in
one action all of the different owners of
or persons otherwise interested in the
69,910 square meters of land to be
condemned. After filing and duly serving
the complaint the plaintiff, pursuant to
law and pending final determination of
the action, took possession of and
occupied the lands described in the
complaint, building its line and putting
the same in operation. During the
progress of the action a commission to
testimony, amounting to 140 typewritten
pages when transcribed, and after much
labor and prolonged consideration, made
a report consisting of about 55
typewritten pages, resolving the question
submitted to it. On the coming in of this
report the court, by order entered the
27th of September, 1909, set the 11th
day of October following for the hearing
thereon.
On the 4th day of October the plaintiff
gave notice to the defendants that on the
9th day of October a motion would be
made to the court to dismiss the action
upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, it
having just been ascertained by the
plaintiff that the land sought to be
condemned was situated in the Province
of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province
of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint.
This motion was heard and, after due
consideration, the trial court dismissed
the action upon the ground presented by
the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from
said judgment of dismissal.
The decision of the learned trial court
was based entirely upon the proposition,
already referred to, that in condemnation
proceedings, and in all other
proceedings affecting title to land, the
Court of First Instance of a given
province has no jurisdiction, power or
authority where the land is located in
another province, and that no such
power, authority, or jurisdiction can be
conferred by the parties.
Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the
Philippine Commission confer jurisdiction
upon the Courts of First Instance of
these Islands with respect to real estate
in the following words: 1awphi 1.net
SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of
First Instance. — The jurisdiction
of Courts of First Instance shall
be of two kinds:
1. Original; and
2. Appellate.
SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction.
— Courts of First Instance shall
have original jurisdiction: .
xxx xxx xxx
2. In all civil actions which involve
the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein,
or the legality of any tax, impost,
or assessment, except actions of
forcible entry into, and detainer of
lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is by this Act
conferred upon courts of justice
of the peace.
It is apparent from the wording of these
sections that it was the intention of the
Philippine Commission to give to the
Courts of First Instance the most perfect
and complete jurisdiction possible over
the subject matters mentioned in
connection therewith. Such jurisdiction is
not made to depend upon locality. There
is no suggestion of limitation. The
jurisdiction is universal. Nor do the
provisions of sections 48, 49, 50, 51, and
52 at all militate against the universality
of that jurisdiction. Those provisions
simply arrange for the convenient and
effective transaction of business in the
courts and do not relate to their power,
authority, or jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action. While it is provided
in these sections that a particular court
shall hold its sessions in any other
province (except under certain specified
conditions), the assertions is
nevertheless true that the jurisdiction of a
particular court is in no wise and in no
sense limited; and it is nowhere
suggested, much less provided, that a
Court of First Instance of one province,
regularly sitting in said province, may not
under certain conditions take cognizance
of an action arising in another province
or of an action relating to real estate
located outside of the boundaries of the
province to which it may at the time be
assigned.
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction,
power, or authority. Other provide for the
procedure by which that power or
authority is projected into judgment. The
one class deals with the powers of the
Court in the real and substantive sense;
the other with the procedure by which
such powers are put into action. The one
is the thing itself; the other is the vehicle
by which the thing is transferred from the
court to the parties. The whole purpose
and object of procedure is to make the
powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice. The most perfect
procedure that can be devised is that
which gives opportunity for the most
complete and perfect exercise of the
powers of the court within the limitations
set by natural justice. It is that one which,
in other words, gives the most perfect
opportunity for the powers of the courts
to transmute themselves into concrete
acts of justice between the parties before
it. The purpose of such a procedure is
not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter, but to give it
effective facility in righteous action. It
may be said in passing that the most
salient objection which can be urged
against procedure to-day is that it so
restricts the exercise of the court's
powers by technicalities that the part of
its authority effective for justice between
the parties is many times an
inconsiderable portion of the whole. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart
justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. It was created not to
hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It
does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means
best adopted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is a means to an end. It is the
means by which the powers of the court
are made effective in just judgments.
When it loses the character of the one
and takes on that of the other the
administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays
itself open to grave criticism.
The proper result of a system of
procedure is to insure a fair and
convenient hearing to the parties with
complete justice between them as a
result. While a fair hearing is as essential
as the substantive power of the court to
administer justice in the premises, and
while the one is the natural result o the
other, it is different in its nature and
relates to a different thing. The power or
authority of the court over the subject
matter existed and was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began.
Procedure does not alter or change that
power or authority; it simply directs the
manner in which it shall be fully and
justly exercised. To be sure, in certain
cases, if that power is not exercised in
conformity with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power
to exercise it legally. This does not mean
that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
matter. It means simply that he may
thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or
that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. There is, of
course, an important distinction between
person and subject matter are both
conferred by law. As to the subject
matter, nothing can change the
jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or
dictate when it shall attach or when it
shall be removed. That is a matter of
legislative enactment which none but the
legislature may change. On the other
hand, the jurisdiction of the court over
the person is, in some instances, made
to defend on the consent or objection, on
the acts or omissions of the parties or
any of them. Jurisdiction over the
person, however, may be conferred by
consent, expressly or impliedly given, or
it may, by an objection, be prevented
from attaching or removed after it has
attached.
In the light of these observations, we
proceed to a consideration of those
provisions of the law which the plaintiff
claims are decisive of his contention that
a Court of First Instance of one province
has no jurisdiction of the subject matter
of an action by a railroad company to
condemn lands located in another
province. The plaintiff relies for the
success of its cause upon section 377 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and upon
the special laws relating to the
condemnation of lands railroad
corporations. We take up first the section
of the Code of Civil Procedure referred
to.
The fact that such a provision appears in
the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to
do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. It becomes merely a
matter of method, of convenience to the
parties litigant. If their interests are best
subserved by bringing in the Court
Instance of the city of Manila an action
affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos
Norte, there is no controlling reason why
such a course should not be followed.
The matter is, under the law, entirely
within the control of either party. The
plaintiff's interests select the venue. If
such selection is not in accordance with
section 377, the defendant may make
timely objection and, as a result, the
venue is changed to meet the
requirements of the law. It is true that
this court has more than once held than
an agreement to submit a controversy to
a court which, under the procedural law,
has not been selected as the appropriate
court, generally speaking, to hear such
controversy, can not be enforced. This
means simply that either party to such a
contract may ignore it at pleasure. The
law will not compel the fulfillment of an
agreement which deprives one of the
parties to it of the right to present his
cause to that court which the law
designates as the most appropriate. But
the principle asserted in the cases which
hold thus is no authority for the
proposition that two persons having a
controversy which they desire to have
decided by a competent tribunal may
not, by appropriate procedure, submit it t
any court having jurisdiction in the
premises. In the one case the relation is
contractual to be enforced over the
objection of one of the contracting
parties. In the other relation is not
contractual because not between the
parties; but, rather, between the parties
and the court. In the one case it is a
contract to be enforced; in the other, a
condition to be met.
This being so, we say again, even
though it be repetition, that after
jurisdiction over real property in the
Islands has been conferred so generally
and fully by Act No. 136, it is not to
be presumed or construed that the
legislature intended
to modify or restrict that jurisdiction when
it came to frame a Code of Civil
Procedure the object of which is to make
that jurisdiction effective. Such
modification or restriction should be held
only by virtue of the clearest and most
express provisions.
The wording of that section should be
carefully examined. It reads as follows:
SEC. 377. Venue of actions. —
Actions to confirm title to real
estate, or to secure a partition of
real estate, or to cancel clouds,
or remove doubts from the title to
real estate, or to obtain
possession of real estate, or to
recover damages for injuries to
real estate, or to establish any
interest, right, or title in or to real
estate, or actions for the
condemnation of real estate for
public use, shall be brought in
the province were the lands, or
some part thereof, is situated;
actions against executors,
administrators, and guardians
touching the performance of their
official duties, and actions for
account and settlement by them,
and actions for the distribution of
the estates of deceased persons
among the heirs and distributes,
and actions for the payment of
legacies, shall be brought in the
province in which the will was
admitted to probate, or letters of
administration were granted, or
the guardian was appointed. And
all actions not herein otherwise
provided for may be brought in
any province where the
defendant or any necessary party
defendant may reside or be
found, or in any province where
the plaintiff, except in cases were
other special provision is made in
this Code. In case neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant resides
within the Philippine Islands and
the action is brought to seize or
obtain title to property of the
defendant within the Philippine
Islands and the action is brought
to seize or obtain title to property
of the defendant within the
Philippine Islands, the action
shall be brought in the province
where the property which the
plaintiff seeks to seize or to
obtain title to is situated or is
found: Provided, that in an action
for the foreclosure of a mortgage
upon real estate, when the
service upon the defendant is not
personal, but is by publication, in
accordance with law, the action
must be brought in the province
where the land lies. And in all
cases process may issue from
the court in which an action or
special proceeding is pending, to
be enforced in any province to
bring in defendants and to
enforce all orders and decrees of
the court. The failure of a
defendant to object t the venue of
the action at the time of entering
his appearance in the action shall
be deemed a waiver on his part
of all objection to the place or
tribunal in which the action is
brought, except in the actions
referred to in the first sixteen
lines of this section relating to
real estate, and actions against
executors, administrators, and
guardians, and for the distribution
of estates and payment of
legacies.
Leaving out of discussion for the moment
actions and proceedings affecting
estates of deceased persons, they
resting upon a different footing being
governed by special laws, it is to be
observed that the section contains no
express inhibition against the court. It
provides simply that certain actions
affecting real estate "shall be brought in
the province where the land, or some
part thereof, is situated." The prohibition
here is clearly directed against the one
who begins the action and lays the
venue. The court, before the action is
commenced, has nothing to do with
either. The plaintiff does both. Only when
that is done does the section begin to
operate effectively so far as the court is
concerned. The prohibition is nor a
limitation on the power of the court but
on the rights of the plaintiff. It is not to
take something from the court but to
grant something to the defendant. Its
wording clearly deprives the court of
nothing which it had, but gives the
defendant, as against the plaintiff, certain
rights which he did not have. It
establishes a relation not between the
court and the subject ,after, but between
the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates
not to jurisdiction but to trial. It touches
convenience, not substance. It simply
gives to defendant the unqualified right, if
he desires it, to have the trial take place
where his land lies and where, probably,
all of his witnesses live. Its object is to
secure to him a convenient trial. If it had
been the intention of the law-makers by
section 377 to put a limitation to the
jurisdiction of the court, how easy it
would have been to say so squarely. "No
Court of First Instance shall have or take
jurisdiction of an action touching title to
or interest in real property lying wholly in
a province other than that in which such
court is authorized to hold sessions," or a
similar provision, would have been
sufficient. This would have been clearly a
limitation on the court rather than the
party. There would have been no room
for doubt. The legislature, however, did
not do so. It, rather, chose to use
language which imposes a limitation on
the rights of the plaintiff.
In saying this we do not desire to force
construction. Courts should give to
1awphil.net
language its plain meaning, leaving the
legislature to take care of the
consequences. The Philippine
Commission having, in fullest phrase,
given the Courts of First Instance
unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate
in the Islands by Act No. 136, we are of
the opinion that the jurisdiction ought not
to be held to be withdrawn except by
virtue of an Act equally express, or so
clearly inconsistent as to amount to the
same thing. The fact that section 377 is
not such Act, that it is found in code of
Procedure rather than in the substantive
law, that it deals with the relative
procedural rights of parties rather than
the power of the court, that it relates to
the place rather than to the thing, that it
composes the whole of a chapter
headed simply "Venue," lead us to hold
that the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
had full jurisdiction of the subject matter
of this action at the time when it was
dismissed.
That it had jurisdiction of the persons of
all the parties is indisputable. That
jurisdiction was obtained not only by the
usual course of practice — that is, by the
process of the court — but also by
consent expressly given, is apparent.
The plaintiff submitted itself to the
jurisdiction by beginning the action.
(Ayers vs. Watson, 113 U.S., 594;
Fisher vs. Shropshire, 147 U.S., 133.)
The defendants are now in this court
asking that the action be not dismissed
but continued. They are not only nor
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court
but, rather, are here on this appeal for
the purpose of maintaining that very
jurisdiction over them.
Nor is the plaintiff in any position to
asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of
gross negligence in the allegations of its
complaint, if the land does not lie in
Tarlac as it now asserts. It alleged in its
complaint:
4. That, according to the
information secured after a
minute investigation in the offices
of the land registry and of the
land-tax record of the
municipalities within whose
jurisdiction lie all the parcels
 composing the tract of land in
question, the owners and
occupants of the same, with their
names as they appear on the
plan, are as follows.
At the time it commenced the action it
was possessed of every fact which a
complete knowledge of the location of
the lands sought to be condemned
required. It had the map of its entire line
from Paniqui to Tayug, showing
the provinces and the various
municipalities through which it runs. Not
only that: Before beginning its action it
had to know the name of every
necessary defendant, the land he
owned, and the extent of that portion to
be condemned. The investigation
required to ascertain these facts would of
necessity force into plaintiff's mind the
knowledge required to bring the action in
the proper court. That the plaintiff at the
time it commenced this action did not
know in what province its proposed
stations and terminals were is difficult to
believe. That it did not know in what
province the land lay which it was about
to make the subject of so important a
proceeding is still more difficult to
believe. In spite of all this, however, it
deliberately laid the venue in a province
where no part of the land lay, took
possession of the land in controversy,
constructed its line, switches, and
stations, and after nearly two years of
litigation, accompanied with great trouble
to the court and trouble and expense to
the parties, calmly asks the dismissal of
the case for the reason that it did not
know where its own railroad was located.
Under such circumstances a dismissal of
the action over the objection of the
defendants ought not to be permitted
expect upon absolute necessity and then
only on payment of the costs and
expenses of the defendants and of the
actin. (Ayers vs. Watson and
Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)
There is no equitable ground, then, upon
which the plaintiff may claim that it has
not yielded itself to the jurisdiction of the
court. Nor, as we have seen, is there a
legal ground. As we have already said,
the plaintiff, having brought the action, of
necessity submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage
of the situation it itself created to take
possession of the lands described in the
complaint, construct its lines, switches,
stations, yards and terminals, and to
carry the cause through two years of
expensive litigation. It now attempts to
make all this go for naught alleging its
own negligence as a reason for such
attempt. (Ayers vs. Watson and
Fisher vs. Shropshire, supra.)
While the latter part of section 377
provides that "the failure of a defendant
to object to the venue of the action at the
time of entering his appearance in the
action shall be deemed a waiver on his
part of all objection to the place or
tribunal in which the action is brought,"
except, a month other things, in actions
affecting real estate, we apprehend that
it was not intended that a defendant can
not waive such objection in such
excepted cases. Nor we do believe that
such provision is controlling in this case.
In the first place, the application is
restricted to "the time of entering his
appearance in the action." It might well
have been in the mind of the lawmakers
that, at the time of entering his
appearance in the action, the defendant
would not ordinarily be fully informed of
all the facts of the case, at least not
sufficiently to warrant his being held to a
waiver of important rights; whereas, later
in the cause, as when he files his answer
or goes to trial, being fully informed, he
might justly be held to have waived his
right to make such objection. for this
reason it might well be that the
Legislature purposely refrained from
extending the time for his protection
beyond the "time of entering his
appearance in the action." Moreover,
there is, in said clause, no prohibition
against an express waiver of his rights
by the defendant. The general rule of law
is that a person may renounce any right
which the law gives unless such
renunciation is expressly prohibited or
the right conferred is of such a nature
that its renunciation would be against
public policy. This right of renunciation is
so thoroughly established, and was at
the time of the enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure, that its exercise by a
defendant in relation to the venue of the
action will not be held to have been
abridged by section 377 without very
clear provision therein to that effect.
There is no part of that section clear
enough to warrant such a holding. Even
though the terms of said section were
much clearer than they are in this
respect, we should still hold, if they were
much short of express, that the right of
renunciation is not abridged, founding
ourselves not only upon the principles
already laid down but also upon the
proposition of general law embodied in
section 294 of the code of Civil
Procedure which provides that:
When a statute or instrument is
equally susceptible of two
interpretations, one in favor of
natural right and the other
against it, the former is to be
adopted. itc-alf
Moreover, it should be noted that this
prohibition, if it be such, against waiver
refers exclusively to the defendant. The
plaintiff is given no rights respecting it.
Yet it is the plaintiff who is here calling
for the application of the provision even
against the declared will of the person
who is expressly named as the sole
beneficiary. We will not by interpretation
extend this provision so as to contravene
the principles of natural rights. We will
not construed it so as to included in its
terms nor named as its beneficiary. But
even if the plaintiff were entitled to
invoke the aid of the provision he is
estopped from so doing.
(Wanzer vs. Howland, 10 Wis., 7;
Babcock vs. Farewell, 146 Ill. App., 307;
White vs. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4
Dill (U.S.), 183; Shuttle vs. Thompson,
15 Wall., 159; Beecher vs. Mill Co., 45
Mich., 103; Tomb vs. Rochester R. R.
Co., 18 Barb., 585;
Ferguson vs. Landram, 5 Bush (Ky.),
230; State vs. Mitchell, 31 Ohio State,
592; Counterman vs. Dublin, 38 Ohio
State, 515; McCarthy vs. Lavasche, 89
Ill., 270; Ricketts vs. Spraker, 77 Ind.,
371; Strosser vs. City of Fort Wayne, 100
Ind., 443). Section 333 of the Code of
Civil Procedure reads:
Conclusive presumptions. — The
following presumptions or
deductions, which the law
expressly directs to be made
from particular facts, are deemed
conclusive:
1. Whenever a party has, by his
own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he can not, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration,
act, or omission, be permitted to
falsity it.
(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. Rep., 67;
69; Municipality of Oas vs. Roa, 7 Phil.
Rep., 20, 22; Trinidad vs. Ricafort et al.,
7 Phil. Rep., 449, 453; Macke et
al vs. Camps, 7 Phil. Rep., 553, 555.)
The fact is, there are very few rights
which may not be renounced, expressly
or impliedly. (Christenson vs. Charleton,
34 Atl., 226, 227, 69 Vt., 91;
Donahue vs. Windsor County Ins. Co.,
56 Vt., 91; Donahaue vs. Windsor Ins.
co., 33 Atl., 902, 904, 66 Conn., 21, 40;
Fitzpatrick vs. Hartford Life & Annuity
Ins. Co., 56 Conn., 116, 134, 17 Atl.,
411, 7 Am. St. Rep., 288;
Lewis vs. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 44
Conn., 72, 91; State vs. Hartley, 52 Atl.,
615, 617, 75 Conn., 104; First Nat.
Bank vs. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45
Conn., 22, 44; Johnson vs. Schar, 70
N.W., 838, 839, 9 S. D., 536;
Corey vs. Bolton, 63 N.Y., Supp., 915,
917, 31 Misc. Rep., 138; Mason's Supply
Co. vs. Jones, 68 N. Y. Supp., 806, 809,
58 App. Div., 231; Monroe Waterworks
Co. vs. City of Monroe, 85 N.W., 685,
688, 100 Wis., 11; Fraser vs. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 90 N.W., 476, 481, 114 Wis.,
510; Cedar Rapids Water Co. vs. Cedat
Rapids, 90 N.W., 746, 749, 117 Iowa,
250; Kennedy vs. Roberts, 75 N.W., 363,
366, 105 Iowa, 521; Shaw vs. Spencer,
100 Mass., 382, 395, 97 Am. Dec., 107,
1 Am. Rep., 115; West vs. Platt, 127
Mass., 367, 367, 372;
Fulkerson vs. Lynn, 64 Mo. App., 649,
653; Michigan Savings & Loan
Ass'n. vs. Missouri, K & T. Trust Co., 73
Mo. App., 161, 165; Perin vs. Parker, 18
N. E., 747, 748, 126 Ill., 201, 2 L.R.A.,
336, 9 Am. St. Rep., 571;
Keller vs. Robinson & Co., 38 N. E.,
1072, 1075, 152 Ull. 458; Star Brewery
Co. vs. Primas, 45 N.E., 145, 148, 163
Ill., 652; United Firemen's Ins.
Co. vs. Thomas (U.S.), 82 Fed., 406,
408, 27 C.C. A., 42, 47 L.R.A., 450;
Rice vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (U.S.),
103 Fed., 427, 43 C.C.A., 270;
Sidway vs. Missouri Land & Live Stock
Co. (U.S.), 116 Fed., 381, 395;
able vs. United States Life Ins. Co.
(U.S.), 111 Fed., 19, 31, 49 C.C.A., 216L
Peninsular Land Transp., etc.,
Co. vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va., 666,
676, 14 S.E., 237; Dey vs. Martin, 78
Va., 1, 7; Liverpool & L.& G. Ins.
Co. vs. T.M. Richardson Lumber Co., 69
Pac., 938, 951, 11 Okl., 585;
Livesey vs. Omaha Hotel, 5 Neb., 50, 69;
Cutler vs. Roberts, 7 Nebr., 4, 14, 29
Am. Rep., 371; Warren vs. Crane, 50
Mich., 300, 301, 15 N.W., 465; Portland
& R.R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Oreg., 587,
592, 32 Pac., 688, 689; First Nat.
Bank vs. Maxwell, 55 Pac., 980, 982,
123 Cal., 360, 69 Am. St. Rep., 64;
Robinson vs. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co.,
38 Atl., 320, 322, 90 Me., 385;
Reed vs. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61
Pac., 21, 21 Utah, 295;
Dale vs. Continental Ins. Co., 31 S.W.,
266, 269, 95 Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge
K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 829, 95
Tenn., 38; Supreme Lodge
K.P. vs. Quinn, 29 South., 826, 827, 78
Miss., 525; Bucklen vs. Johnson, 49
N.E., 612, 617, 19 Ind. App., 406.)
We have delayed until this moment the
citation of authorities relative to the
proposition that venue is not
jurisdictional as to subject matter and
that defendant's rights in respect thereto
are such that they may be waived,
expressly or by implication, for the
reason that we desired that the principles
which rule the case should first be
discussed and presented in the abstract
form. In the case of First National Bank
of Charlotte vs. Morgan (132 U.S., 141),
it was held that the exemption of national
banks from suits in State courts in
counties other than the county or city in
which the association was located was a
personal privilege which could be waived
was located was a personal privilege
which could be waived by appearing in
such brought in another county, but in a
court of the same dignity, and making a
defense without claiming the immunity
granted by Congress. the court said:
This exemption of national
banking associations from suits
in State courts, established
elsewhere than in the county or
city in which such associations
were located, was, we do not
doubt, prescribed for the
convenience of those institutions,
and prevent interruption in their
business that might result from
their books being sent to distant
counties in obedience to process
from State courts. (First Nat.
Bank of Bethel vs. National
Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall., 383,
394; Croker vs. Marine Nat.
Bank, 101 Mass., 240.) But,
without indulging in conjecture as
to the object of the exemption in
question, it is sufficient that it was
granted by Congress, and, if it
had been claimed by the
defendant when appearing in the
superior court of Cleveland
County, must have been
recognized. The defendant did
not, however, choose to claim
immunity from suit in that court. It
made defense upon the merits,
and, having been unsuccessful,
prosecuted a writ of error to the
supreme court of the State, and
in the latter tribunal, for the first
time, claimed the immunity
granted to it by Congress. This
was too late. Considering the
object as well as the words of the
statute authorizing suit against a
national banking association to
be brought in the proper State
court of the county where it is
located, we are of opinion that its
exemption from suits in other
courts of the same State was a
personal privilege that it would
waive, and, which, in this case,
the defendant did waive, and,
which, in this case, the defendant
did waive, by appearing and
making defense without claiming
the immunity granted by
Congress. No reason can be
 suggested why one court of a
State, rather than another, both
being of the same dignity, should
take cognizance of a suit against
a national bank, except the
convenience of the bank. And
this consideration supports the
view that the exemption of a
national bank from suit in any
State court except one of the
county or city in which it is
located is a personal privilege,
which it could claim or not, as it
deemed necessary.
In the case of Ex parte Schollenberger
(96 U.S., 369), the court said:
The Act of Congress prescribing
the place where a person may be
sued is not one affecting the
general jurisdiction of the courts.
It is rather in the nature of a
personal exemption in favor of a
defendant, and it is one which he
may waive. If the citizenship of
the parties is sufficient, a
defendant may consent to be
sued anywhere he pleases, and
certainly jurisdiction will not be
ousted because he has
consented. Here, the defendant
companies have provided that
they can be found in a district
other than that in which they
reside, if a particular mode of
proceeding is adopted, and they
have been so found. In our
opinion, therefore, the circuit
court has jurisdiction of the
causes, and should proceed to
hear and decide them.
In the case of St. Louis and San
Francisco Railway Co. vs. McBride (141
U.S., 127), the court used the following
language:
The first part of section 1 of the
Act of 1887, as amended in
1888, gives, generally, to the
circuit courts of the United States
jurisdiction of controversies
between citizens of different
States where the matter in
dispute exceeds the sum of two
thousand dollars exclusive of
interest and costs. Such a
controversy was presented in this
complaint. It was therefore a
controversy of which the circuit
courts of the United States have
jurisdiction. Assume that it is true
as defendant alleges, that this is
not a case in which jurisdiction is
founded only on the fact that the
controversy is between citizens
of different States, but that it
comes within the scope of that
other clause, which provides that
"no civil sit shall be brought
before either of said courts,
against any person, by any
original process or proceeding, in
any other district than that
whereof he is inhabitant," still the
right to insist upon suit only in the
one district is a personal privilege
which he may waive, and he
does waive it by pleading to the
merits. In Ex parte
Schollenberger (96 U.S., 369,
378), Chief Justice Waite said:
"The Act of Congress prescribing
the place where a person may be
sued is not one affecting the
general jurisdiction of the courts.
It is rather in the nature of a
personal exemption in favor of a
defendant, and it is one which he
may waive." The Judiciary Act of
1789 (sec. 11, Stat., 79), besides
giving general jurisdiction to
circuit courts over suits between
citizens of different States,
further provided, generally, that
no civil suit should be brought
before either of said courts,
against an inhabitant of the
United States, by any original
process, in any other district than
that of which he was an
inhabitant, or in which he should
be found. In the case of Toland
vs. Sprague (12 Pet., 300, 330),
it appeared that the defendant
was not an inhabitant of the State
in which the suit was brought, nor
found therein. In that case the
court observed: "It appears that
the party appeared and pleaded
to issue. Now, if the case were
one of the want of jurisdiction in
the court, it would not, according
to well-established principles, be
competent for the parties by any
acts of theirs to give it. But that is
not the case. The court had
jurisdiction over the parties and
the matter in dispute; the
objection was that the party
defendant, not being an
inhabitant of Pennsylvania, nor
found therein, personal privilege
or exemption, which it was
competent for the party to waive.
The cases of Pollard vs.
Dwight (4 Cranch., 421)
and Barry vs. Foyles (1 Pt., 311)
are decisive to show that, after
appearance and plea, the case
stands as if the suit were brought
that exemption from liability to
process and that in case of
foreign attachment, too, is a
personal privilege, which may be
waived, and that appearing and
pleading will produce that
waiver." In (14 Wal., 282), the
jurisdiction of the circuit court
over a controversy between
citizens of different States was
sustained in a case removed
from the State court, although it
was conceded that the suit could
not have been commenced in the
first instance in the circuit court.
See also Claflin vs.
Commonwealth Ins. Co. (110
U.S., 81 [28:76].) Without
multiplying authorities on this
question, it is obvious that the
party who in the first instance
appears and pleads to the merits
waives any right to challenge
thereafter the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that the suit
has been brought in the wrong
district. (Charlotte Nat.
Bank vs. Morgan, 132 U.S., 141;
Fitzgerald E. M. Const.
Co. vs. Fitzergerald, 137 U.S.,
98.)
In the case of the Interior Construction
and Improvement Co. vs. Gibney (160
U.S., 217), the court held as follows:
The circuit courts of the United
States are thus vested with
general jurisdiction of civil
actions, involving the requisite
pecuniary value, between
citizens of different States.
Diversity of citizenship is a
condition of jurisdiction, and,
when that does not appear upon
the record, the court, of its own
motion, will order the action to be
dismissed. But The provision as
to the particular district in which
the action shall be brought does
not touch the general jurisdiction
of the court over such a cause
between such parties; but affects
only the proceedings taken to
bring the defendant within such
jurisdiction, and is matter of
personal privilege, which the
defendant may insist upon, or
may waive, at his election; and
the defendant's right to object
that an action within the general
jurisdiction of the court is brought
in the wrong district, is waived by
entering a general appearance,
without taking the objection.
(Gracie vs. Palmer, 8 Wheat,
699; Toland vs. Sprague, 12
Pet., 300, 330; Ex
parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S.,
369, 378; St. Louis & S. F. R.
Co. vs. McBride, 141 U.S., 127;
Southern Pacific Co. vs. Dento,
146 U.S., 202, 206; Texas &
Pacific Railway
Co. vs. Saunders, 151 U.S., 105;
Central Trust Co. vs. McGeorge,
151 U.S., 129; Southern Express
Co. vs. Todd, 12 U.S. app., 351.)
In the case of Central Trust Co. vs.
McGeorge (151 U.S., 129), the court
disposed of the case as follows:
The court below, in holding that it
did not have jurisdiction of the
cause, and in dismissing the bill
of complaint for the reason, acted
in view of that clause of the Act
of March 3, 1887, as amended in
August, 1888, which provides
that "no suit shall be brought in
the circuit courts of the United
States against any person, by
any original process or
proceeding, in any other district
than that whereof he is an
 inhabitant;" and, undoubtedly, if
the defendant company, which
was sued in another district than
that in which it had its domicile,
had, by a proper plea or motion,
sought to avail itself of the
statutory exemption, the action of
the court would have been right.
But the defendant company did
not choose to plead that
provision of the statute, but
entered a general appearance,
and joined with the complainant
in its prayer for the appointment
of a receiver, and thus was
brought within the ruling of this
court, so frequently made, that
the exemption from being such
out of the district of its domicile is
a personal privilege which may
be waive and which is waived by
pleading to the merits.
(Improvement Co. vs. Gibney, 16 Sup.
Ct., 272, 160 U.S., 217; 40 L. ed., 401;
Walker vs. Windsor Nat. Bank, 5 C. C.
A., 421, 56 Fed., 76, 5 U.S. App., 423;
Von Auw. vs. Chicago Toy & Fancy
Goods Co., 69 Fed., 448
McBride vs. Grand de Tour Plow Co., 40
Fed., 162; Black vs. Thorne, Fed. Cas.
No. 1, 495 (10 Blatchf., 66, 5 Fish. Pat.
Cas., 550); Norris vs. Atlas Steamship
Co., 37 Fed., 279; Hoover & Allen
Co. vs. Columbia Straw Paper Co., 68
Fed., 945; Blackburn vs. Railroad Co.,
Fed., Fed., Cas. No. 1, 467 (2 Flip., 525);
Vermont Farm Mach. Co. vs. Gibson, 50
Fed., 423.)
In the case of Security Loan and Trust
Co. vs. Kauffman (108 Cal., 214), the
court said:
The constitution, Article VI,
section 5, declares that, "All
actions for the enforcement of
liens" shall be commenced in the
county in which the real estate or
some portion thereof is situated;
and at the time this action was
"commenced" the property was
situate within the boundaries of
San Diego. The constitution does
not, however, require property is
situated, and the statutory
provision in section 392 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, that
actions 'for the foreclosure of
liens and mortgages on real
property' must be tried in the
county in which the subject of the
action, or some part thereof, is
situated, "subject to the power of
the court to change the place of
trial," shows that "the place of
trial" is not an element going to
the jurisdiction of the court, but is
a matter of legislative regulation.
The provision for the transfer of
certain actions to the superior
court of the county of Riverside,
which is contained in section 12
of the act providing for the
organization of that county,
shows the extent of this
regulation which the legislature
deemed necessary, and implies
that only the actions there
designated were to be
transferred for trial.
In the case of Chouteau vs. Allen (70
Mo., 290), the court held as follows:
The statutory provision in respect
to personal actions is more
emphatic, requiring that "suits
instituted by summons, shall,
except as otherwise provided by
law, be brought: First, when the
defendant is a resident of the
State, either in the county within
which the defendant resides, or
in the county within which the
plaintiff resides, and the
defendant may be found," and
yet it was held in reference to this
statute in the case of Hembree
vs. Campbell (8 Mo., 572), that
though the suit was brought in
the county in which the plaintiff
resided, and service had upon
the defendant in the county of his
residence, unless a plea in
abatement to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the
defendant, was interposed in the
first instance, the objection on
the score of lack of jurisdiction
could not subsequently be
successfully raised. And this,
upon the generally recognized
ground that the court had
jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit, and that the
defendant's plea to the merits
acknowledged jurisdiction over
his person, and precluded
objection on account of absence
of regularity in the instituting of
the action. So also, in Ulrici vs.
Papin (11 Mo.., 42), where the
then existing statute required
"suits in equity concerning real
estate, or whereby the same may
be affected, shall be brought in
the county within which such real
estate or greater part thereof is
situate," and by demurrer to the
bill it was objected that the suit
was not brought in the proper
county in conformity with the
statutory provision, Judge Scott
remarked: "That it does not
clearly appear where the greater
part of the lands lie. This
objection, if tenable, should have
been raised by a plea to the
jurisdiction." And the same
learned judge remarks,
in Hembree vs. Campbell, supra,
"No principle is better established
than that a plea in bar is a waiver
of all dilatory matter of defense.
That the matter of abatement
was apparent upon the writ can
make no difference. Such
matters are and should be
pleaded." And pleas to the
jurisdiction are as necessary in
local as in transitory actions. (1
Tidd. Prac., 630.)
It is not meant to convey the idea
that the mere failure to plead to
the jurisdiction of the court would
have the effect to confer
jurisdiction where none existed
before; for it is well settled that
even consent of parties can not
confer jurisdiction.
(Stone vs. Corbett, 20 Mo., 350.)
But all circuit courts have a
general jurisdiction over the
foreclosure of mortgages.
In the case of Armendiaz vs. Stillman (54
Texas, 623), the court disposed of the
question involved in the following words:
In our opinion, however, these
common law rules respecting
local and transitory actions have
no more to do in determining with
us where a suit can be brought
and maintained, than the like
rules in respect to the form and
names of actions; but this is
solely regulated by and
dependent upon the proper
construction of the constitution
and statutes of the State. In the
first, it is emphatically declared in
the bill of rights as a fundamental
principle of government, "All
courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law." Now a party
may not have an action in rem for
or concerning land in foreign
jurisdiction, because redress can
not be given or had by such
proceeding in due course of law;
but personal damages may be
given for such injury and
enforced by due process of law
within the State. "And it would
seem if the State failed to give to
one of its citizens a remedy
against others for injuries of this
kind, it would fail in the pledge
made in the constitution as
plainly as if the injury had been in
a foreign jurisdiction to one's
goods or person."
There is, as Judge Marshall
himself says, no difference in
principle in giving redress for
injuries to land in the jurisdiction
where the defendant is found,
which may not be equally
applicable in other cases. He
says, speaking of the fiction upon
which transitory actions are
sustained, where the cause of
action occurred out of the
jurisdiction where they are
brought: "They have" (i. e., the
courts), "without legislative aid,
applied this fiction to all personal
torts, wherever the wrong may
have been committed, and to all
contracts wherever executed. To
this general rule contracts
respecting lands from no
exception. It is admitted that on a
contract respecting lands, an
action is sustainable wherever
the defendant may be found. Yet
in such case every difficulty may
occur that present itself in an
action of trespass. An
investigation of title may become
necessary, a question of
boundary may arise, and a
survey may be essential to the
full merits of the case. Yet these
difficulties have not prevailed
against the jurisdiction of the
court. They are countervailed by
the opposing consideration, that
if the action be disallowed, the
injured party may have a clear
right without a remedy in a case
where a person who has done
the wrong, and who ought to
make the compensation, is within
the power of the court. That this
consideration loses its influence
where the action pursues
anything not in the reach of the
court is inevitably necessary, but
for the loss of its influence, where
the remedy is against the person,
and is within the power of the
court, I have not yet discovered a
reason, other than a technical
one, which can satisfy my
judgment.'
In the case of De La Vega vs.
Keague (64 Texas, 205), the court said:
Our statutes in force at the time
the reconvention was filed
provided that suits for the
recovery of land should be
brought in the county where the
land or a part thereof is situated.
This is one of the exceptions to
the general rule requiring suits to
be brought in the county of the
defendant's residence. This
requirement is not a matter that
affects the jurisdiction of the
district courts over the subject
matter of controversies about the
title or possession of lands.
Every district court in the State
has cognizance of such suits; the
requirement as to the county in
which the suit may be brought is
a mere personal privilege
granted to the parties, which may
be waived like any other privilege
of this character.
(Ryan vs. Jackson, 11 Tex., 391;
Morris vs. Runnells, 12 Tex.,
176.) A judgment rendered by
the district court of Galveston
County, when the parties had
submitted to the jurisdiction,
would settle the title to land in
McLennan County as effectually
as if rendered in its own district
curt. Jurisdiction of causes may
be obtained by defendants in
counties other than those in
which the statute requires them
to be brought, in other ways than
by express consent or by failure
to claim the personal privilege
accorded by law. A suit upon a
monied demand, brought in the
county of a defendant's
residence by a resident of
another county, may be met with
a counter demand against the
plaintiff, and a recovery may be
had upon the counter demand,
though if suit had been originally
commenced upon it, the county
of the plaintiff's residence would
have had exclusive jurisdiction.
And so with other cases that
might be supposed. A plaintiff
calling a defendant into court for
the purpose of obtaining relief
against him invites him to set up
all defenses which may defeat
the cause of action sued on, or
any other appropriate and
germane to the subject matter of
the suit, which should be settled
between the parties before a
proper adjudication of the merits
of the cause can be obtained. He
grants him the privilege of setting
up all such counterclaims and
cross actions as he holds against
the plaintiff which may legally be
pleaded in such a suit.
This is particularly the case in our
State, where a multiplicity of suit
is abhorred, and a leading object
is to settle all disputes between
the parties pertinent to the cause
of action in the same suit. The
question of the original right to
bring the cross action in the
county where the suit is pending
can not be raised; otherwise this
design would, in a large number
of cases, be defeated, and the
various matters which could well
be settled in the cause might
have to seek a number of
different counties, and be
asserted in a number of different
suits, before the controversy
between the parties could be
settled. The plaintiff must be
considered as waiving any
privilege to plead to the
jurisdiction in such cross actions,
and as consenting that the
defendant may assert in the suit
any demands which he could
plead were it commenced in the
county where such demands
were properly usable. The
question then is, La Vega have
set up the matters pleaded in his
answer in reconvention had the
land sought to be partitioned
been situated in Galveston
County? This question must be
determined by the solution of
another, viz, can a defendant to a
partition suit who claims through
the title under which the partition
is sought set up a superior title to
the whole land? "It is doubtless
true that, in a partition suit, a
court of equity will not entertain
any controversy as to the legal
title, whether it arises between
the part owners as to their
respective interests, or by reason
of a claim set up by one or more
of them to the entire land by title
superior to the one under which
the partition is asked to be
decreed. In our State, where
there is no distinction between
law and equity in the
determination of causes, an
action to settle disputed titles,
whether legal or equitable, may
be combined with one to partition
the land between the plaintiff and
defendant. Hence there can be
no objection to determining any
questions as to title between the
coowners in a partition suit in our
State, and the strict rules of
chancery do not prevail.
In the case of Kipp vs. Cook (46 Minn.,
535), the court made use of the following
language:
1. The appellant contends that
the district court for the county of
Sibley, and of the eighth judicial
district, was without jurisdiction,
and could not properly determine
the rights or interests of either
litigant to lands located in
Sherburne County, which is in
the seventh judicial district; but
this question was passed upon
many years since, in the case
of Gill vs. Bradley (21 Minn., 15),
wherein it was held that, although
the proper place for the trial of an
action to recover real property, or
for the determination, in any
form, of a right or interest therein,
was, by virtue of an existing
statute — now found as Gen. St.
1878, c. 66, par. 47 — in the
county wherein the lands were
situated, the district court of the
county designated in the
complaint had jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and had
power to before the time for
answering expired, in
accordance with the express
provisions of another section —
now section 51 — of the same
chapter, and the place of trial had
actually been changed by order
of the court or by consent of
parties.
In the case of the west Point Iron Co. vs.
Reymert (45 N.Y., 703), the court said:
The action was tried in the
county of Dutches, and by the
court without a jury, without
objection on the part of the
defendants. If the trial should
have been in Putnam, and by a
jury, it was for the defendants to
assert their rights at the trial; and
by not them claiming them, they
 waived them, and must be
regarded as having assented to
the place and mode of trial.
We transcribe the following from
decisions of the supreme court of Spain:
Considering, further, that
Pedrosa, instead of immediately
objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court and asking for a change of
venue, sued for recovery of title,
thereby submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the court of first
instance, which reserved its
decision thereon until plaintiff had
presented the petition in due
form. (Judgment of May 30,
1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)
Considering that although other
proceedings were had in the first
court (Salvador de Granada) and
in the courts of first instance of
Sagrario and Guerra of said city
subsequent to the death of the
count, the truth of the matter is
that his daughter, the countess,
the only party now claiming relief,
not only had the proceedings
taken in the first of said courts
dismissed but asked the court of
first instance of Castilla de la
Nueva to accept, and the court
accepted, her express
submission to its jurisdiction:
Considering that far from
objecting, as she might have
objected, to the jurisdiction of the
court, the countess
acknowledged such jurisdiction
as did the other coheirs when
thru asked the court to proceed
with the testamentary
proceedings, thus creating a
jurisdictional situation perfectly in
harmony with the respective
claims of the parties and so
binding upon them that they are
now absolutely estopped from
denying its importance or legal
force. (Judgment of May 30,
1860, 5 Civ. Jur., 465.)
He who by his own acts submits
himself to the jurisdiction of a
court shall not thereafter be
permitted to question such
jurisdiction. (Judgment of
December 30, 1893, 29 Civ. Jur.,
64.)
According to article 305 (of the
Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) the
plaintiff shall be presumed to
have tacitly submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by the
mere act of filing his complaint
therein, and in the case of the
defendant where the latter after
appearing in the action takes any
step therein other than to object
to such jurisdiction. (Judgment of
September 21, 1878, 40 Civ.
Jur., 232.)
Plaintiff and defendant are
presumed to have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court, the former by the mere
act of filing his complaint therein
and the latter by his answering
the same and taking any step
other than demurring to such
jurisdiction as provided in articles
56 to 58 of the Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil. (Judgment
of July 27, 1883, 52 Civ. Jur.,
511.)
In order that a tacit submission
based upon the mere act filing
the complaint may be valid the
court must be one of ordinary
jurisdiction as provided in article
4 of the Ley de Ebjuiciamiento
Civil. (Judgment of August 27,
1864, 10 Civ. Jur., 14.)
The following language is taken from
The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England
(vol. 1, p. 50):
The old distinction between 'local'
and 'transitory' actions, though of
far less importance than it was
before the passing of the
judicature acts, must still be
borne in mind in connection with
actions relating to land situate
outside the local jurisdiction of
our courts. 'Transitory' actions
were those in which the facts in
issue between the parties had no
necessary connection with a
particular locality, e.g., contract,
etc.; whilst "local" actions were
those in which there was such a
connection, e.g., disputes as to
the title to, or trespasses to, land.
One importance of this distinction
lay in the fact that in the case of
local actions the plaintiff was
bound to lay the venue truly, i.e.,
in the county (originally in the
actual hundred) in which the land
in question lay. In the case,
however of a transitory action, he
might lay it wherever he pleased,
subject to the power of the court
to alter it in a proper case. Local
venues have now been
abolished, and, therefore, so far
as actions relating to land in
England are concerned, the
distinction may be disregarded.
It is, however, important from
another point of view, viz, that of
jurisdiction as distinct from
procedure. In the case of real
actions relating to land in the
colonies or foreign countries the
English relating courts had, even
before the judicature acts, no
jurisdiction; and, therefore, the
removal by those acts of a
difficulty of procedure — viz, the
rule as to local venue — which
might have stood in the way, if
they had and wished to exercise
jurisdiction, did not in any way
confer jurisdiction in such cases.
The lack of jurisdiction still exists,
and our courts refuse to
adjudicate upon claims of title to
foreign land in proceedings
founded on an alleged invasion
of the proprietary rights attached
thereto, and to award damages
founded on that adjudication; in
other words, an action for
trespass to, or for recovery
of, foreign land can not be
maintained in England, at any
rate if the defendant chooses to
put in issue the ownership of
such land.
There is no decision of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands in conflict
with the principles laid down in this
opinion. In the case of Serrano vs.
Chanco (5 Phil. Rep., 431), the matter
before the court was the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance over the
actions and proceedings relating to the
settlement of the estates of deceased
persons. The determination of that
question required the consideration of
section 602 of the code of Civil
Procedure rather than section 377 of that
code. The argument of the court
touching the last-named section, is
inapplicable to the case at bar and would
not affect it if it were. The reference to
the jurisdiction of the court made in that
argument based on section 377 was
unnecessary to a decision of the case.
The case of Molina vs. De la Riva (6 Phil.
Rep., 12), presented simply the question
whether or not an agreement between
parties to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of a particular court to the
exclusion of the court provided by law as
the appropriate court in the premises
could be enforced. As we have before
intimated, it touched no question
involved in the litigation at bar.
In the case of Molina vs. De la Riva (7
Phil. Rep., 302), the action was one to
foreclose a mortgage upon a real and
personal property. In discussing the
matter before it the court said:
The demurrer was also based
upon the ground that this was an
action to foreclose a mortgage
and by the provisions of sections
254 and 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure it should have been
brought in the Province of Albay
where the property was situated.
The action is clearly an action to
foreclose a mortgage, lien, or
incumbrance upon property, but
it will be noticed that section 254
relates only to mortgages on real
estate. This contract covered
both real and personal property,
and while, perhaps, an action
could not be maintained in the
 Court of First Instance of Manila
for the foreclosure of the alleged
mortgage upon the real estate
situated in Albay, yet so far as
the personal property was
concerned, we know of no law
which would deprive that court of
jurisdiction.
As will readily be observed, the court in
the remarks above quoted was not
discussing or deciding the question
whether or not an action could be
maintained in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila to foreclose a
mortgage on real estate located in Albay;
but, rather, whether or not an action
could be maintained in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to foreclose
a mortgate on personal property located
in the Province of Albay. The remark of
the court that perhaps the former action
could not be maintained was not
intended to be decisive and was not
thought at the time to be an indication of
what the decision of the court might be if
that precise case were presented to it
with full argument and citation of
authorities.
The case of Castano vs. Lobingier (9
Phil. Rep., 310), involved the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance to issue a
writ of prohibition against a justice of the
peace holding his court outside the
province in which the Court of First
Instance was sitting at the time of issuing
the writ. The determination of the
question presented different
considerations and different provisions of
law from those which rule the decision of
the case at bar.
We, therefore, hold that the terms of
section 377 providing that actions
affecting real property shall be brought in
the province where the land involved in
the suit, or some part thereof, is located,
do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of
First Instance over the land itself but
relate simply to the personal rights of
parties as to the place of trial.
We come, now, to a consideration of the
special laws relating to the
condemnation of land by railroad
companies upon which also plaintiff
relies. Of those laws only one is of
importance in the decision of this case.
That is Act No. 1258. In it are found
these provisions:
SECTION 1. In addition to the
method of procedure authorized
for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by sections two
hundred and forty-one to two
hundred and fifty-three, inclusive,
of Act Numbered One hundred
and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in
civil actions and special
proceedings in the Philippine
Islands," the procedure in this
Act provided may be adopted
whenever a railroad corporation
seeks to appropriate land for the
construction, extension, or
operation of its railroad line.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Whenever a railroad
corporation is authorized by its
charter, or by general law, to
exercise the power of eminent
domain in the city of Manila or in
any province, and has not
obtained by agreement with the
owners thereof the lands
necessary for its purposes as
authorized by law, it may in its
complaint, which in each case
shall be instituted in the Court of
First Instance of the city of
Manila if the land is situated in
the city of Manila, or in the Court
of First Instance of the province
where the lands is situated, join
as defendants all persons owing
or claiming to own, or occupying,
any of the lands sought to be
condemned, or any interest
therein, within the city or
province, respectively, showing,
so far as practicable, the interest
of each defendant and stating
with certainty the right of
condemnation, and describing
the property sought to be
condemned. Process requiring
the defendants to appear in
answer to the complaint shall be
served upon all occupants of the
lands sought to be condemned,
and upon the owners and all
persons claiming interest therein,
so far as known. If the title to ant
lands sought to be condemned
appears to be in the Insular
Government, although the lands
are occupied by private
individuals, or if it is uncertain
whether the title is in the Insular
Government or in private
individuals, or if the title is
otherwise so obscure or doubtful
that the company can not with
accuracy or certainty specify who
are the real owners, averment
may be made by the company in
its complaint to that effect.
Process shall be served upon
resident and no residents in the
same manner as provided
therefor in Act Numbered One
hundred and ninety, and the
rights of minors and persons of
unsound mind shall be
safeguarded in the manner in
such cases provided in said Act.
The court may order additional
and special notice in any case
where such additional or special
notice is, in its opinion, required.
SEC. 4. Commissioners
appointed in pursuance of such
complaint, in accordance with
section two hundred and forty-
three of Act Numbered One
hundred ad ninety, shall have
jurisdiction over all the lands
included in the complaint,
situated within the city of Manila
or within the province, as the
case may be, and shall be
governed in the performance of
their duties by the provisions of
sections two hundred and forty-
four and two hundred and forty-
five, and the action of the court
upon the report of the
commissioners shall be governed
by section two hundred and forty-
six of Act Numbered One
hundred and ninety.
The provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referred to in these sections
are, so far as material here, the
following:
SEC. 241. How the right of
eminent domain may be
exercised. — The Government of
the Philippine Islands, or of any
province or department thereof,
or of any municipality, and any
person, or public or private
corporation having by law the
right to condemn private property
for public use, shall exercise that
right in the manner hereinafter
prescribed.
SEC. 242. The complaint. — The
complaint in condemnation
proceedings shall state with
certainty the right of
condemnation, and describe the
property sought to be
condemned, showing the interest
of each defendant separately.
SEC. 243. Appointment of
Commissioners. — If the
defendant concede that the right
of condemnation exists on the
part of the plaintiff, or if, upon
trial, the court finds that such
right exists, the court shall
appoint three judicious and
disinterested landowners of the
province in which the land to be
condemned, or some portion of
the same, is situated, to be
commissioners to hear the
parties and view the premises,
and assess damages to be paid
for the condemnation, and to
report their proceedings in full to
the court, and shall issue a
commission under the seal of the
court to the commissioners
authorizing the performance of
the duties herein prescribed.
We are of the opinion that what we have
said in the discussion of the effect of
section 377 relative to the jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance over lands is
applicable generally to the sections of
law just quoted. The provisions regarding
the place and method of trial are
procedural. They touched not the
authority of the court over the land but,
rather, the powers which it may exercise
over the parties. They relate not to the
jurisdictional power of the court over the
subject matter but to the place
where that jurisdiction is to be exercised.
In other words, the jurisdiction is
assured, whatever the place of its
exercise. The jurisdiction is the thing; the
place of exercise its incident.
These special laws contain nothing
which in any way indicates an intention
of the legislature to alter the nature or
extent of the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance granted by Act No. 136. As we
said in discussing the provisions of
section 277 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, we can not hold that
jurisdiction to be limited unless by
express provision or clear intendment.
We have thus far drawn an analogy
between section 377 of the code of Civil
Procedure and section 3 of Act No.
1258, asserting that neither the one nor
the other was intended to restrict, much
less deprive, the Courts of First Instance
of the jurisdiction over lands in the
Philippine Islands conferred upon them
by Act No. 136. We have extended that
analogy to include the proposition that
the question of venue as presented in
the Acts mentioned does not relate to
jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter, it simply granting to the
defendant certain rights and privileges as
against the plaintiff relative to the place
of trial, which rights and privileges he
might waive expressly or by implication.
We do not, however, extend that analogy
further. On reading and comparing
section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure with section 3 of Act No.
1258. both of which are hearing set forth,
a difference is at once apparent in the
wording of the provisions relating to the
place of trial. Section 277 stipulates that
all actions affecting real estate "shall be
brought in the province where the
land, or some part thereof, is situated."
Section 3 of Act No. 1258 provides that
in an action brought by a railroad
corporation to condemn land for its uses
the plaintiff "may in its complaint, which
in each case shall be instituted . . . in the
Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is situated, join as
defendants all persons owning, etc . . .
land within the city or province . . ."
Section 1 of that Act, as we have already
seen, says that: "In addition to the
method of procedure authorized for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain
by sections two hundred and forty-one to
two hundred and fifty-three" of the Code
of Civil Procedure, "the procedure in this
Act may be adopted whenever a railroad
corporation seeks to appropriate land . . .
."
From these provisions we note, first, that
the procedure expressly made applicable
to actions for the condemnation of land
by railroad corporations is not that
contained in section 377 but that found in
sections 241 to 253 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Section 377 is nowhere
expressly mentioned in Act No. 1258 nor
is it anywhere touched or referred to by
implication. The procedure embodied in
that Act to consummate the purposes of
its creation is complete of itself, rendered
so either by provisions contained in the
Act itself, rendered so either by
provisions contained in the Act itself or
by reference to specific sections of the
Code of Civil Procedure which by such
reference are made a part thereof.
In the second place, we observe that, so
far as venue is concerned, Act No. 1258
and section 377 are quite different in
their wording. While the latter provides
that the actions of which it treats shall be
commenced in the province where the
land, or some part thereof, lies, Act No.
1258, section 3, stipulates that the
actions embraced in its terms shall be
brought only in the province where the
land lies. This does not mean, of course,
that if a single parcel of land under the
same ownership, lying party in one
province and partly in another, is the
subject of condemnation proceedings
begun by a railroad corporation, a
separate action must be commenced in
each province. Nor does it mean that the
aid of section 377 is required to obviate
such necessity. The situation would be
met and solved by the general principles
of law and application of which to every
situation is an inherent or implied power
of every court. Such, for example, are
the prohibition against multiplicity of
actions, the rules against division of
actions into parts, and the general
principle that jurisdiction over a subject
matter singly owned will not be divided
among different courts, the one in which
the action is first brought having
exclusive jurisdiction of the whole. The
provisions of these two laws, section 377
and Act No. 1258, differ in the manner
indicated because they refer to subjects
requiring inherently different treatment,
so different, in fact, as to be in some
respects quite opposite. While it is true
that section 377 speaks of action for the
condemnation of real estate,
nevertheless it was intended to cover
simply the ordinary action affecting title
to or interest in real estate, where the
land involved is comparatively speaking,
compact together. Its provisions were not
intended to meet a situation presented
by an action to condemn lands extending
contiguously from one end of the country
to the other. Act No. 1258 is a special
law, enacted for a particular purpose,
and to meet a particular exigency. The
conditions found in an action for the
condemnation of real estate by a railroad
company might and generally would be
so different that the application of the
provisions of section 377 permitting the
venue to be laid in any province
where any part of the land lies would
work a very great hardship to many
defendants in such an action. To hold
that a railroad company desiring to build
a line from Ilocos Norte to Batangas,
through substantially the whole of the
Island of Luzon, might lay the venue in
Batangas, it being a province in which a
part of the land described in the
complaint was located, would be to
require all the parties defendant in Ilocos
Norte and intervening provinces, with
their witnesses, to go to Batangas, with
all the inconvenience and expense which
the journey would entail, and submit the
valuation of their lands into only to the
Court of First Instance of Batangas but to
a commission appointed in that province.
The hardship to such defendants under
such a holding is so manifest that we are
of the opinion that it was not intended
that section 377 of the code of Civil
Procedure should apply to actions for
condemnation. Under the provisions of
that section, the defendant has no right
to ask for a change of venue if the land
involved in the litigation, or any part
thereof, is located in the province where
the court sits before which the action has
been commenced. When, therefore, an
action such as is detailed above is begun
by a railroad company in Batangas
against persons whose lands lie in Ilocos
Norte, there being also involved lands
lying in Batangas, such defendants
would have no right under section 377, if
it were applicable, to demand that the
trial as to their lands take place in the
Province of Ilocos Norte. We do not
believe that this was intended. We
believe, rather, that under the provisions
of the special laws relating to the
condemnation of real estate by railroad
companies, the defendants in the various
provinces through which the line runs
may compel, if they wish, a separate
action to be commenced in each
province in order that they may have a
fair and convenient trial not only before
the court but also before commissioner
of their province who are not only before
commissioners of their province who are
not only conveniently at hand, but who
are best able to judge of the weight of
testimony relative to the value of land in
that province.
We, therefore, hold that section 377 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is not
applicable to actions by railroad
corporations to condemn lands; and that,
while with the consent of defendants
express or implied the venue may be laid
and the action tried in any province
selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the
defendants whose lands lie in one
province, or any one of such defendants,
may, by timely application to the court,
require the venue as to their, or, if one
defendant, his, lands to be changed to
the province where their or his lands lie.
In such case the action as to all of the
defendants not objecting would continue
in the province where originally begun. It
would be severed as to the objecting
defendants and ordered continued
before the court of the appropriate
province or provinces. While we are of
that opinion and so hold it can not affect
the decision in the case before us for the
reason that the defendants are not
objecting to the venue and are not
asking for a change thereof. They have
not only expressly submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the court but are
here asking that that jurisdiction be
maintained against the efforts of the
plaintiff to remove it.

The principles which we have herein laid

down we do not apply to criminal cases.
They seem to rest on a different footing.
There the people of the state is a party.
The interests of the public require that, to
secure the best results and effects in the
punishment of crime, it is necessary to
prosecute and punish the criminal in the
very place, as near as may be, where he
committed his crime. As a result it has
been the uniform legislation, both in
statutes and in constitutions, that the
venue of a criminal action must be laid in
the place where the crime was
committed. While the laws here do not
specifically and in terms require it, we
believe it is the established custom and
the uniform holding that criminal
prosecutions must be brought and
conducted, except in cases especially
provided by law, in the province where
the crime is committed.

For these reasons the judgment below

must be reversed and the cause
remanded to the trial court with direction
to proceed with the action according to
law. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ.,

concur.
G.R. No. 136368 January 16,
2002
JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial
Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Jaime C. Tan, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth
Special Div.) and JOSE A.
MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA
MAGDANGAL, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 15, 19981 and its Resolution dated
November 9, 19982 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R.
SP-41738.
The facts are as stated in the impugned
Decision, viz:
"Involved in this case is a parcel
of land, designated as Lot No.
645-C, with an area of 34,829
square meters, more or less,
situated in Bunawan, Davao City.
The lot was once covered by
TCT No. T-72067 of the Registry
of Deeds of Davao City in the
name of the late Jaime C. Tan
(Tan, for short) married to
Praxedes V. Tan.
From the petition, the motion to
dismiss petition, their respective
annexes and other pleadings, we
gather the following factual
antecedents:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a
consideration of P59,200.00,
executed a deed of absolute sale
over the property in question in
favor of spouses Jose
Magdangal and Estrella
Magdangal. Simultaneous with
the execution of this deed, the
same contracting parties entered
into another agreement
whereunder Tan given one (1)
year within which to redeem or
repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities
and/or extensions to exercise the
option, Tan failed to redeem the
property until his death on
January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed
before the Regional Trial Court at
Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of
instrument. Docketed as CIVIL
CASE NO. 19049-88, the
complaint alleged that, while Tan
and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as
deed of absolute sale, their real
intention was to conclude an
equitable mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint
was stamped 'received,' the
Magdangals were able to have
Tan's title over the lot in question
canceled and to secure in their
names TCT No. T-134470. This
development prompted the heirs
of Tan, who were to be later
substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr.
(Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a
supplemental complaint.
The intervening legal tussles are
not essential to this narration.
What is material is that on June
4, 1991, Branch 11 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao
City rendered judgment finding
for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff therein.
The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:.
'WHEREFORE, judgment
is rendered:
1. The Deed of Absolute
Sale (Exhibits B, B-1) is,
in accordance with the
true intention of the
parties, hereby declared
and reformed an
equitable mortgage;
2. The plaintiff is ordered
to pay the
defendants within 120
days after the finality of
this decision P59,200
 plus interest at the rate of
12% per annum from
May 2, 1988, the date the
complaint was filed, until
paid;
3. In order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to
fully give effect to the true
intention of the parties,
upon the payment of the
aforesaid amount, TCT
No. T-134470 in the
name of defendants Jose
Magdangal and Estrella
Magdangal (Exh. 13) and
shall be deemed
canceled and null and
void and TCT No. T-
72067 in the name of
Jaime C. Tan and
Praxedes Valles Tan
(Exh. A) be reinstated).
No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. (Annex
'B', Petition; Emphasis
added).'
From the above, the Magdangals
appealed to this Court in CA-
G.R. CV No. 33657.
In a decision promulgated on
September 28, 1995, this Court,
thru its then Special Third
Division, affirmed in toto the
appealed decision of the lower
court. Copy of this affirmatory
judgment was each received by
the Magdangals and Tan, Jr. on
October 5, 1995.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of
this Court entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgment the Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and
issued the corresponding Entry
of Judgment which, on its face,
stated that the said Decision 'has
on October 21, 1995 become
final and executory' (Annex 'L',
Petition; Emphasis added).
On March 21, 1996, the
Magdangals filed in the lower
court a MOTION FOR
CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT
OF POSSESSION, therein
alleging that they did not appeal
from the aforesaid decision of
this Court, adding '[T]hat the
appealed judgment of the Court
of Appeals has become final and
executory 15 days from October
5, 1995 or up to October 20,
1995, which the 120 days
redemption period commences.
And noting that the redemption
period has expired without Tan,
Jr. exercising his option, the
Magdangals thus prayed that the
title 'in the name of Jaime C. Tan
and Praxedes Tan be
consolidated and confirmed in
the name of the (Magdangals) x
x x and pending such issuance, a
writ of possession be ordered
issued (Annex "C", Petition). 1âw phi1.nêt
In opposition to this motion
(Annex 'F', Petition), Tan, Jr.
alleged, among other things, that
until an entry of judgment has
been issued by the Court of
Appeals and copy thereof
furnished the parties, the
appealed decision of the court
a quo in this case cannot be
considered final and executory.
Pressing the point, Tan, Jr.,
citing Cueto vs. Collantes, infra.,
would then assert that the period
of redemption on his part
commenced to run from receipt
of entry of judgment in CA-G.R.
CV No. 33657.
Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion
for execution dated March 27,
1996, which he filed directly with
this court, prayed this court to
direct the court a quo to issue the
corresponding writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 19049-88. In a
related move, Tan, Jr. filed on
April 16, 1996, a
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION
therein advising the court
a quo of his intention to redeem
the property in question and of
the fact that, on such date, he
has deposited with its clerk of
court the repurchase price, plus
interest, as required by its
original decision. By way of relief,
Tan, Jr. prayed that the
Magdangals be ordered to claim
the amount thus deposited and
the Register of Deeds of Davao
City, to reinstate the title of Jaime
Tan and Praxedes Tan.
Jointly acting on the
aforementioned MOTON FOR
CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT
OF POSSESION of the
Magdangals (Annex 'C', Petition),
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION
of Tan, Jr. (Annex 'I', Petition),
the court a quo presided by the
respondent judge, came out with
the first challenged order of June
10, 1996 (Annex 'N', Petition)
dispositively reading, as follows:
'WHEREFORE, x x x the
Motion for Consolidation
and a Writ of Possession
is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
The deposit of the
amount of P116,032.00
made by plaintiff with the
Office of Court x x x on
April 17, 1996 is hereby
considered full payment
of the redemption price
and the Clerk of Court is
hereby ordered to deliver
said amount to herein
defendants.
The Register of Deeds of
Davao City x x x is
hereby directed to cancel
TCT No. T-134470 in the
name of Jose Magdangal
and Estrella Magdangal
and, thereafter, to
reinstate TCT No. 72067
in the name of Jaime C.
Tan and Praxedes Valles
Tan and to submit her
compliance thereto within
ten (10) days from receipt
of this Order.
SO ORDERED.'
Explaining her action, the
respondent judge wrote in the
same order:
'Following the ruling of
the Supreme Court in
Cueto vs. Collantes, et
al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120
days period for plaintiff to
pay the amount of
P59,200.00 plus interest
x x x should be reckoned
from the date of Entry of
Judgment x x x which
was March 13, 1996. The
plaintiff made a deposit
on April 17, 1996 well
within the 120-day period
mandated by the decision
of this Court.'
In due time, the Magdangals
moved for a reconsideration.
However, in her next assailed
order of July 24, 1996 (Annex 'R',
Petition), the respondent judge
denied the motion for being
proforma and fatally defective."3
Petitioner assails the aforequoted
Decision as follows:
"I. Petitioner's right to due
process was violated when the
Court of Appeals rendered a
judgment on the merits of private
respondents' petition without
granting to petitioner the
opportunity to controvert the
same.
II. Appeal not certiorari was the
appropriate remedy of private
respondents as there was no
grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial
judge. Neither is delay in
resolving the main case a ground
for giving due course to the
petition.
 III. Cueto vs. Collantes, 97 Phil.
325, was disregarded by the
Court of Appeals in resolving the
petition of private respondents. It
is still good case law and was in
effect made a part of section 2 of
Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on Foreclosure of
Mortgage.
IV. The St. Dominic vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,
138 SCRA 242 case is not
applicable to the case at bar; on
the other hand the ruling
in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. de La
Riva, 46 Phil. 827, applies.
V. Equity considerations justify
giving due course to this
petition."4 (emphasis ours)
We will immediately resolve the key
issue of what rule should govern the
finality of judgment favorably obtained in
the trial court by the petitioner.
The operative facts show that in its
Decision of June 4, 1991, the trial court
held that: (1) the contract between the
parties is not an absolute sale but an
equitable mortgage; and (2) petitioner
Tan should pay to the respondents
Magdangal "within 120 days after the
finality of this decision P59,200.00 plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint
was filed, until paid."5
On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 33657, the Special Third Division of
the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto. Both
parties received the decision of the
appellate court on October 5, 1995. On
March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the
appellate court entered in the Book of
Entries of Judgement the decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the
corresponding Entry of Judgment which,
on its face, stated that the said decision
"has on October 21, 1995 become final
and executory."6
The respondents Magdangal filed in the
trial court a Motion for Consolidation and
Writ of Possession.7 They alleged that the
120-day period of redemption of the
petitioner has expired. They reckoned
that the said period began 15 days after
October 5, 1995, the date when the
finality of the judgment of the trial court
as affirmed by the appellate court
commenced to run.
On the other hand, petitioner filed on
March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in
the appellate court praying that it "direct
the court a quo to issue the
corresponding writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 19049-88."8 On April 17, 1996,
petitioner deposited with the clerk of
court the repurchase price of the lot plus
interest as ordered by the decision.
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed
the petitioner to redeem the lot in
question. It ruled that the 120-day
redemption period should be reckoned
from the date of Entry of Judgment in the
appellate court or from March 13,
1996.9 The redemption price was
deposited on April 17, 1996. As
aforestated, the Court of Appeals set
aside the ruling of the trial court.
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to
the case at bar, the rule that governs
finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10
and 11 provide:
"SEC. 10. Entry of judgments
and final resolutions. - If no
appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the
time provided in these Rules, the
judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk
in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the
judgment or final resolution
becomes executory shall be
deemed as the date of its entry.
The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment
or final resolution and shall be
signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that such judgment or
final resolution has become final
and executory. (2a, R36)
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment.
- Except where the judgment or
final order or resolution, or a
 portion thereof, is ordered to be
immediately executory, the
motion for its execution may only
be filed in the proper court after
its entry.
In original actions in the Court of
Appeals, its writ of execution
shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the entry of
judgment or final resolution and
addressed to any appropriate
officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the
motion for execution pending
appeal is filed in the Court of
Appeals at a time that it is in
possession of the original record
or the record on appeal, the
resolution granting such motion
shall be transmitted to the lower
court from which the case
originated, together with a
certified true copy of the
judgment or final order to be
executed, with a directive for
such court of origin to issue the
proper writ for its enforcement."
This rule has been interpreted by this
Court in Cueto vs. Collantes as
follows:10
"The only error assigned by
appellants refer to the finding of
the lower court that plaintiff can
still exercise his right of
redemption notwithstanding the
expiration of the 90-day period
fixed in the original decision and,
therefore, defendants should
execute the deed of
reconveyance required in said
decision. Appellants contend
that, the final judgment of the
Court of Appeals having been
entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-
day period for the exercise of the
right of redemption has long
expired, it appearing that plaintiff
deposited the redemption money
with the clerk of court only on
October 17, 1953, or, after the
expiration of 101 days. Appellee
brands this computation as
erroneous, or one not in
accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the rules of court.
Appellee's contention should be
sustained. The original decision
provides that appellee may
exercise his right of redemption
within the period of 90 days from
the date the judgment has
become final. It should be noted
that appellee had appealed from
this decision. This decision was
affirmed by the court of appeals
and final judgment was entered
on July 8, 1953. Does this mean
that the judgment became final
on that date?
Let us make a little digression for
purposes of clarification. Once a
decision is rendered by the Court
of Appeals a party may appeal
therefrom by certiorari by filing
with the Supreme Court a petition
within 10 days from the date of
entry of such decision (Section 1,
Rule 46). The entry of judgment
is made after it has become final,
i.e., upon the expiration of 15
days after notice thereof to the
parties (Section 8, Rule 53, as
modified by a resolution of the
Supreme Court dated October 1,
1945). But, as Chief Justice
Moran has said, 'such finality ***
is subject to the aggrieved party's
right of filing a petition for
certiorari under this section,'
which means that 'the Court of
Appeals shall remand the case to
the lower court for the execution
of its judgment, only after the
expiration of ten (10) days from
the date of such judgment, if no
petition for certiorari is filed within
that period.' (1 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court,
1952 ed., p. 950) It would
therefore appear that the date of
entry of judgment of the Court
of Appeals is suspended when a
petition for review is filed to await
the final entry of the resolution or
decision of the Supreme Court.
 Since in the present case
appellee has filed a petition for
review within the reglementary
period, which was dismissed by
resolution of July 6, 1953, and for
lack of a motion for
reconsideration the entry of final
judgment was made on August
7, 1953, it follows that the 90-day
period within which appellee may
exercise his right of redemption
should be counted from said
date, August 7, 1953. And
appellee having exercised such
right on October 17, 1953 by
depositing the redemption money
with the clerk of court, it is
likewise clear that the motion be
filed for the exercise of such right
is well taken and is within the
purview of the decision of the
lower court."11
On April 18, 1994, this Court issued
Circular No. 24-94, viz:
"TO: COURT OF
APPEALS,
SANDIGANBAYAN,
COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS, AND
ALL MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT:
RESOLUTION OF THE
COURT EN
BANC APPROVING AND
PROMULGATING THE
REVISED PROVISION
ON EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENTS.
SPECIFICALLY IN
APPEALED CASES,
AND AMENDING
SECTION 1, RULE 39
OF THE RULES OF
COURT
It appears that in a number of
instances, the execution of
judgments in appealed cases
cannot be promptly enforced
because of undue administrative
delay in the remand of the
records to the court of origin,
aggravated at times by
misplacement or misdelivery of
said records. The Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court has drafted
proposals including a provision
which can remedy the procedural
impasse created by said
contingencies.
Accordingly, pending approval by
the Court of the revised rules on
Civil Procedure, and to provide a
solution to the aforestated
problems, the Court Resolved to
approve and promulgate the
following section thereof on
execution of judgments,
amending Section 1, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Execution upon
judgments or final orders. -
Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes
of the action or proceeding upon
expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been
duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly
perfected and finally resolved,
such execution may forthwith be
applied for in the lower court from
which the action originated, on
motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true
copies of the judgment or
judgments or the final order or
orders sought to be enforced and
of the entry thereof, with notice to
the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on
motion in the same case, when
the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue
the writ of execution.
 This resolution shall be published
in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect
on June 1, 1994.
April 18, 1994.
"(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA
Chief Justice"
The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, amended the rule
on finality of judgment by providing in
section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon
judgments or final orders. -
Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes
of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal
has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly
perfected and finally resolved,
the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin,
on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, 2. On the aspect of appealability,
with notice to the adverse party. these revised Rules use the
adjective 'final' with respect to
The appellate court may, on orders and resolutions, since to
motion in the same case, when terminate a case the trial courts
the interest of justice so requires, issue orders while the appellate
direct the court of origin to issue courts and most of the quasi-
the writ of execution." judicial agencies issue
resolutions. Judgment are not so
qualified since the use of the so-
The rationale of the new rule is explained
by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as called interlocutory judgments is
follows:12 not favored in this jurisdiction,
while the categorization of an
order or a resolution for purposes
"1. The term 'final order' is used
of denoting that it is appealable is
in two senses depending on
to distinguish them from
whether it is used on the issue of
interlocutory orders or
appealability or on the issue of
resolutions. However, by force of
binding effect. For purposes of
extended usage the phrase 'final
appeal, an order is "final" if it
and executory judgment' is
disposes of the action, as
sometimes used and tolerated,
distinguished from an
although the use of 'executory'
interlocutory order which leaves
alone would suffice. These
something to be done in the trial
observations also apply to the
court with respect to the merits of
several and separate judgments
the case (De la Cruz, et al. vs.
contemplated in Rule 36, or
Paras, et al., L-41053, Feb. 27,
partial judgments which totally
1976). For purposes of binding
dispose of a particular claim or
effect or whether it can be
severable part of the case,
subject of execution, an order is
subject to the power of the court
'final' or executory after the lapse
to suspend or defer action on an
of the reglementary period to
appeal from or further
appeal and no appeal has been
proceedings in such special
perfected (see Perez, et al. vs.
judgment, or as provided by Rule
Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30,
35 on the matter of partial
1959; cf. Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs.
summary judgments which are
IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb.
not considered as appealable
27, 1987; Montilla vs. CA, et al.,
L-47968, May 9, 1988).
(see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the
explanation therein).
The second paragraph of this
section is an innovation in
response to complaints over the
delay caused by the former
procedure in obtaining a writ of
execution of a judgment, which
has already been affirmed on
appeal, with notice to the parties.
As things then stood, after the
entry of judgment in the appellate
court, the prevailing party had to
wait for the records of the case to
be remanded to the court of
origin when and where he could
then move for the issuance of a
writ of execution. The intervening
time could sometimes be
substantial, especially if the
court a quo is in a remote
province, and could also be
availed of by the losing party to
delay or thwart actual execution.
On these considerations, the
Supreme Court issued Circular
No. 24-94, dated April 18, 1994,
approving and promulgating in
advance this amended Section 1
of Rule 39 and declaring the
same effective as of June 1,
1994.
Under the present procedure, the
prevailing party can secure
certified true copies of the
judgment or final order of the
appellate court and the entry
thereof, and submit the same to
the court of origin with and to
justify his motion for a writ of
execution, without waiting for its
receipt of the records from the
appellate court. That motion must
be with notice to the adverse
party, with a hearing when the
circumstances so require, to
enable him to file any objection
thereto or bring to the attention of
said court matters which may
have transpired during the
pendency of the appeal and
which may have a bearing on the
execution sought to enforce the
judgment.
The third paragraph of this
section, likewise a new provision,
is due to the experience of the
appellate courts wherein the trial
court, for reasons of its own or
other unjustifiable circumstances,
unduly delays or unreasonably
refuses to act on the motion for
execution or issue the writ
therefor. On motion in the same
case while the records are still
with the appellate court, or even
after the same have been
remanded to the lower court, the
appellate court can direct the
issuance of the writ of execution
since such act is merely in the
enforcement of its judgment and
which it has the power to
require."
It is evident that if we apply the old rule
on finality of judgment, petitioner
redeemed the subject property within the
120-day period of redemption reckoned
from the appellate court's entry of
judgment. The appellate court, however,
did not apply the old rule but the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine,
it applied the new rule retroactively and
we hold that given the facts of the case
at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of
procedure can be given retroactive
effect. This general rule, however, has
well-delineated exceptions. We quote
author Agpalo:13
"9.17. Procedural laws.
Procedural laws are adjective
laws which prescribe rules and
forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion; they refer to rules
of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. They
include rules of pleadings,
practice and evidence. As
applied to criminal law, they
provide or regulate the steps by
which one who commits a crime
is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are
prospective and not retroactive
does not ordinarily apply to
procedural laws. It has been held
that "a retroactive law, in a legal
sense, is one which takes away
or impairs vested rights acquired
under laws, or creates a new
obligation and imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability,
in respect of transactions or
considerations already past.
Hence, remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do
not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already
existing, do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against
the retroactive operation of
statutes." The general rule
against giving statutes retroactive
operation whose effect is to
impair the obligations of contract
or to disturb vested rights does
not prevent the application of
statutes to proceedings pending
at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new
nor take away vested rights. A
new statute which deals with
procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions - those
which have accrued or are
pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The fact that
procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of
procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is that as a general
rule no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural
laws. It has been held that "a
person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to
the trial of his case, whether civil
or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure."
Thus, the provision of Batas
Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof
prescribing that "no record on
appeal shall be required to take
an appeal" is procedural in
nature and should therefore be
applied retroactively to pending
actions. Hence, the question as
to whether an appeal from an
adverse judgment should be
dismissed for failure of appellant
to file a record on appeal within
thirty days as required under the
old rules, which question is
pending resolution at the time
Batas Bilang 129 took effect,
became academic upon the
effectivity of said law because
the law no longer requires the
filing of a record on appeal and
its retroactive application
removed the legal obstacle to
giving due course to the appeal.
A statute which transfers the
jurisdiction to try certain cases
from a court to a quasi-judicial
tribunal is a remedial statute that
is applicable to claims that
accrued before its enactment but
formulated and filed after it took
effect, for it does not create new
nor take away vested rights. The
court that has jurisdiction over a
claim at the time it accrued
cannot validly try the claim where
at the time the claim is
formulated and filed the
jurisdiction to try it has been
transferred by law to a quasi-
judicial tribunal, for even actions
pending in one court may be
validly taken away and
transferred to another and no
litigant can acquire a vested right
to be heard by one particular
court.
 9.18. Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are
applicable to pending actions or
proceedings admits certain
exceptions. The rule does not
apply where the statute itself
expressly or by necessary
implication provides that pending
actions are excepted from its
operation, or where to apply it to
pending proceedings would
impair vested rights. Under
appropriate circumstances,
courts may deny the retroactive
application of procedural laws in
the event that to do so would not
be feasible or would work
injustice. Nor may procedural
laws be applied retroactively to
pending actions if to do so would
involve intricate problems of due
process or impair the
independence of the courts."
We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should
not be given retroactive effect in this
case as it would result in great injustice
to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner
has the right to redeem the subject lot
and this right is a substantive right.
Petitioner followed the procedural rule
then existing as well as the decisions of
this Court governing the reckoning date
of the period of redemption when he
redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the rule was changed by
the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure
which if applied retroactively would result
in his losing the right to redeem the
subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the
retroactive application of this procedural
rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner
cannot be penalized with the loss of the
subject lot when he faithfully followed the
laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the
redemption. The subject lot may only be
34,829 square meters but as petitioner
claims, "it is the only property left behind
by their father, a private law practitioner
who was felled by an assassin's bullet."14
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from
1988. To lose it because of a change of
procedure on the date of reckoning of
the period of redemption is inequitous.
The manner of exercising the right
cannot be changed and the change
applied retroactively if to do so will defeat
the right of redemption of the petitioner
which is already vested.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998
and its Resolution dated November 9,
1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled
and set aside. The Orders dated June
10, 1996 and July 24, 1996 of the RTC
of Davao City, 11th Judicial Region,
Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88
are reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201601 March 12,
2014
MARYLOU CABRERA, Petitioner,
vs.
FELIX NG, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision2 dated October 21, 2009
and the Resolution3 dated March 26,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 03392. The CA denied the
petition for certiorari filed by Marylou
Cabrera (petitioner), which assailed the
Order4 dated December 19, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, in Civil Case No. MAN-
4773.
The Facts
On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng
(respondent) filed a complaint for sum of
money with the RTC against the
petitioner and her husband Marionilo
Cabrera (spouses Cabrera), alleging that
the latter issued to him the following: (1)
Metrobank Check No. 0244694 dated
June 30, 2002 for the amount of Thirty-
One Thousand Pesos (₱31,000.00); (2)
Metrobank Check No. 0244674 dated
August 9, 2002 for the amount of Thirty-
Eight Thousand Seventy-Four Pesos
and Seventy-Six Centavos (₱38,074.76);
and (3) Metrobank Check No. 0244745
dated August 15, 2005 for Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱2,500,000.00). That when presented
for payment, the said checks were all
dishonored as the accounts from which
they had been drawn were already
closed.
The spouses Cabrera admitted that they
issued Metrobank Check No. 0244694
and Metrobank Check No. 0244674 to
the respondent and that the same were
dishonored when presented for payment.
However, they claimed that they paid the
respondent the amount represented by
the said checks through the latter’s son
Richard Ng. Further, they deny having
issued Metrobank Check No. 0244745 to
the respondent, alleging that the said
check was forcibly taken from them by
Richard Ng.
On August 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a
Decision,5 which ordered the spouses
Cabrera to pay the respondent the
following: (1) Two Million Five Hundred
Sixty-Nine Thousand Seventy-Four
Pesos (₱2,569,074.00) plus legal
interest from inception of the obligation
until fully paid; (2) moral damages in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00); (3) attorney’s fees of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00);
and (4) litigation expenses in the amount
of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00).
On August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera
received a copy of the RTC Decision
dated August 7, 2007. On August 14,
2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the
RTC a motion for reconsideration,6 which
they set for hearing on August 17, 2007.
On even date, the spouses Cabrera sent
a copy of their motion for reconsideration
to the respondent thru registered mail; it
was actually received by the respondent
on August 21, 2007.
The said motion for reconsideration,
however, was not heard on August 17,
2007 as the new acting presiding judge
of the said court had just assumed office.
On August 28, 2007, the RTC issued a
notice,7 which set the said motion for
reconsideration for hearing on
September 25, 2007.
On September 20, 2007, the respondent
filed an opposition8 to the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera. The respondent alleged that
the said motion for reconsideration is a
mere scrap of paper since it violated the
three-day notice requirement. The
respondent pointed out that the spouses
Cabrera sent to him a copy of their
motion for reconsideration, which was
set for hearing on August 17, 2007, via
registered mail on August 14, 2007; that
he actually received a copy thereof only
on August 21, 2007 – four days after the
scheduled hearing thereon.
It appears that the scheduled hearing of
the spouses Cabrera’s motion for
reconsideration on September 25, 2007
did not push through. Consequently, on
September 26, 2007, the RTC issued
another notice,9 which set the said
motion for reconsideration for hearing on
October 26, 2007.
On October 26, 2007, the RTC issued an
Order,10 which directed the parties to file
their additional pleadings, after which the
motion for reconsideration filed by the
spouses Cabrera would be deemed
submitted for resolution.
On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued
an Order11 which denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera. The RTC pointed out that the
spouses Cabrera violated Section 4,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which
mandates that every motion required to
be heard should be served by the
movant in such a manner as to ensure
its receipt by the other party at least
three days before the date of hearing.
Thus:
After a meticulous scrutiny of the records
of this case, the court opines that the
motion was filed beyond the
reglementary three (3)[-]day period.
As the records bear out, the instant
motion was mailed to the plaintiff’s
counsel on August 14[, 2007] and was
set for hearing on August 17, 2007.
However, the copy of said motion had
reached plaintiff’s side and a copy of
which was received by plaintiff’s counsel
only on August 17, 2007[,] four (4) days
late after it was supposed to be heard.
Hence, a clear blatant violations [sic] of
the rule on notice and hearing.12
The RTC further opined that a motion,
which fails to comply with the three-day
notice requirement is a mere scrap of
paper; it is not entitled to judicial
cognizance and would not toll the
running of the reglementary period for
filing the requisite pleadings.
Accordingly, the RTC held, its Decision
dated August 7, 2007 had already
become final for failure of the spouses
Cabrera to comply with the three-day
notice requirement.
The petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari13 with the CA, alleging that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying her motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner pointed out that the RTC
did not actually conduct a hearing on her
motion for reconsideration on August 17,
2007;
that her motion for reconsideration was
actually heard on October 26, 2007, after
the respondent had already filed his
opposition thereto. Thus, the petitioner
claimed, the issue of her failure to
comply with the three-day notice
requirement had already been rendered
moot. In any case, the petitioner
asserted, the RTC should have resolved
her motion for reconsideration on its
merits rather than simply denying it on
mere technicality.
On October 21, 2009, the CA, by way of
the assailed Decision,14 denied the
petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner. The CA opined that the RTC
did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by
the spouses Cabrera since it merely
applied the three-day notice requirement
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court. Thus:
It appears that petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was set for hearing on
17 August 2007. A copy thereof was
mailed to private respondent on 14
August 2007, and private respondent
actually received his copy only on 21
August 2007 or four (4) days after the set
date of hearing; and thus, depriving him
of the opportunity to oppose the motion.
Respondent court, therefore, correctly
held that such motion violated the three
(3)-day notice rule; the essence of due
process. Respondent court had applied
said rule to the given situation, and of no
doubt, mere adherence to the rules
cannot be considered grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent
court. x x x.15 (Citation omitted)
The petitioner sought a reconsideration
of the Decision dated October 21, 2009
but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution16 dated March 26, 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the
Court is whether the CA erred in
affirming the RTC Order dated
December 19, 2007, which denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the
spouses Cabrera.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court provide that:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for
motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be
heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner
as to ensure its receipt by the other party
at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of
hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing which must not
be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion. (Emphasis ours)
The general rule is that the three-day
notice requirement in motions under
Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory. It is an integral component of
procedural due process.17 "The purpose
of the three-day notice requirement,
which was established not for the benefit
of the movant but rather for the adverse
party, is to avoid surprises upon the
latter and to grant it sufficient time to
study the motion and to enable it to meet
the arguments interposed therein."18
"A motion that does not comply with the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless
piece of paper which the clerk of court
has no right to receive and which the
court has no authority to act
upon."19 "Being a fatal defect, in cases of
motions to reconsider a decision, the
running of the period to appeal is not
tolled by their filing or pendency."20
Nevertheless, the three-day notice
requirement is not a hard and fast rule.
When the adverse party had been
afforded the opportunity to be heard, and
has been indeed heard through the
pleadings filed in opposition to the
motion, the purpose behind the three-
day notice requirement is deemed
realized. In such case, the requirements
of procedural due process are
substantially complied with. Thus, in
Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast
Development Corporation,21 the Court
ruled that:
The three-day notice rule is not absolute.
A liberal construction of the procedural
rules is proper where the lapse in the
literal observance of a rule of procedure
has not prejudiced the adverse party and
has not deprived the court of its
authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court provides that the
Rules should be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and
proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, and courts must avoid their strict
and rigid application which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice.
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro,
the Court held that there was substantial
compliance of the rule on notice of
motions even if the first notice was
irregular because no prejudice was
caused the adverse party since the
motion was not considered and resolved
until after several postponements of
which the parties were duly notified.
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation
v. National Food Authority, the Court
held that despite the lack of notice of
hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration,
there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of due process where
the adverse party actually had the
opportunity to be heard and had filed
pleadings in opposition to the motion.
The Court held:
This Court has indeed held time and
again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory
is the requirement in a motion, which is
rendered defective by failure to comply
with the requirement. As a rule, a motion
without a notice of hearing is considered
pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the
filing of the requisite pleading.
As an integral component of the
procedural due process, the three-day
notice required by the Rules is not
intended for the benefit of the movant.
Rather, the requirement is for the
purpose of avoiding surprises that may
be sprung upon the adverse party, who
must be given time to study and meet
the arguments in the motion before a
resolution of the court. Principles of
1âw phi 1
natural justice demand that the right of a
party should not be affected without based merely on their failure to comply
giving it an opportunity to be heard. with the three-day notice requirement.
The test is the presence of opportunity to WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
be heard, as well as to have time to foregoing disquisitions, the instant
study the motion and meaningfully petition is GRANTED. The Decision
oppose or controvert the grounds upon dated October 21, 2009 and the
which it is based. x x x22 Resolution dated March 26, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
(Emphasis supplied and citations 03392, are hereby REVERSED and SET
omitted) ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
It is undisputed that the hearing on the City, Branch 56, to resolve the Motion for
motion for reconsideration filed by the Reconsideration filed by the spouses
spouses Cabrera was reset by the RTC Cabrera on the merits within five (5) days
twice with due notice to the parties; it from the finality of this Decision.
was only on October 26, 2007 that the
motion was actually heard by the RTC. SO ORDERED.
At that time, more than two months had
passed since the respondent received a
copy of the said motion for
reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The
respondent was thus given sufficient
time to study the motion and to enable
him to meet the arguments interposed
therein. Indeed, the respondent was able
to file his opposition thereto on
September 20, 2007.
Notwithstanding that the respondent
received a copy of the said motion for
reconsideration four days after the date
set by the spouses Cabrera for the
hearing thereof, his right to due process
was not impinged as he was afforded the
chance to argue his position. Thus, the R
TC erred in denying the spouses
Cabrera's motion for reconsideration
G.R. No. 141116 February 17,
2003
DAMASO SEBASTIAN and TOMASA
CARDENAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HORACIO R. MORALES,
Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, LEONILA
SARENAS1 , JOSEPHINE SARENAS-
DAYRIT, EVANGELINE SARENAS,
ESTRELITA SARENAS TAN, CECILIO
MARCOS SARENAS, MANUEL DEL
SARENAS, DAISY RITA SARENAS,
and JOY SARENAS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal by certiorari is the decision2 of
the Court of Appeals dated March 9,
1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51288, which
dismissed petitioners’ special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition on the
ground that petitioners pursued the
wrong mode of appeal. Equally assailed
is the resolution3 of the appellate court
dated December 10, 1999, which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as gleaned from the record,
are as follows:
Private respondents Leonila Sarenas,
Josephine Sarenas-Dayrit, Evangeline
Sarenas, Estrellita Sarenas Tan, Cecilio
Marcos Sarenas, Manuel Gil Sarenas,
Daisy Rita Sarenas, and Joy Sarenas
are the heirs of the late Guillermo
Sarenas, who died intestate on June 27,
1986. During his lifetime, Guillermo
owned the following agricultural
landholdings, all located in Samon and
Mayapyap Sur, Cabanatuan City:
1. Agricultural lot with an area of
1.6947 hectares covered by TCT
No. NT-8607 and tenanted by
Juanito Gonzales;
2. Agricultural lot with an area of
3.1663 hectares covered by TCT
No. NT-8608, with petitioner
Damaso Sebastian as the tenant;
and
3. Agricultural lot with an area of
2.2723 hectares registered under
TCT No. NT-8609, with Perfecto
Mana as the tenant.
In addition to the foregoing properties,
Guillermo was also the registered owner
of a parcel of agricultural land located at
San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, with
a total area of 4.9993 hectares, under
TCT No. NT-143564. This property was,
in turn, tenanted by Manuel Valentin and
Wenceslao Peneyra.
The tenants tilling the farm lots covered
by TCT Nos. NT-8607, 8608, and 8609
had already been issued emancipation
patents pursuant to P.D. No. 27.4
On July 14, 1993, private respondents
filed an application with the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional
Office in San Fernando, Pampanga,
docketed as No. A-0303-1219-96, for
retention of over five hectares of the late
Guillermo’s landholdings. Among the lots
which private respondents sought to
retain under Section 6 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(R.A. No. 6657)5 were those covered by
TCT Nos. NT-8608 and 8609.
On June 6, 1997, the DAR Regional
Office in San Fernando, Pampanga
granted private respondents’ application,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, an
ORDER is hereby issued:
1. GRANTING the Application for
Retention of not more than five
(5) hectares of the Heirs of the
late Guillermo Sarenas on their
agricultural landholdings covered
by TCT Nos. NT-TCT-8608 and
TCT-8609 situated at Samon and
Mayapyap Sur, Cabanatuan City,
and which area must be compact
and contiguous and least
prejudicial to the entire
landholdings and majority of the
farmers therein;
 2. DIRECTING the Heirs of the
late Guillermo Sarenas o[r] their
duly authorized representative to
coordinate with the MARO
concerned for the segregation of
their retained area at their own
expense and to submit a copy of
the segregation plan within thirty
(30) days from approval thereof;
3. MAINTAINING the tenants in
the retained areas as lessees
thereof pursuant to RA 3844 as
amended; and
4. ACQUIRING the other
agricultural landholdings in
excess of the retained area, and
to distribute the same to
identified qualified farmer-
beneficiaries pursuant to RA
6657.
SO ORDERED.6
On June 16, 1997, petitioner Sebastian
moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing order before the DAR Regional
Director, Region III, which docketed the
case as A.R. Case No. LSD 1083-97.
The DAR Regional Director found that
the order dated June 6, 1997 in Docket
No. A-0303-1219-96 was contrary to law
for violating Section 6 of RA No.
66577 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. He then issued a new order
dated October 23, 1997, which instead
allowed private respondents to retain a
parcel of land with an area of 4.9993
hectares, covered by TCT No. 143564,
located at San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija.
Private respondents then appealed the
order of October 23, 1997 to the DAR
Secretary.
On June 18, 1998, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform set aside the order
dated October 23, 1997, and in lieu
thereof issued a new one the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
23 October 1997 Order of RD Herrera is
hereby SET ASIDE and a new one
issued:
1. GRANTING the heirs of
Guillermo Sarenas the right to
retain 2.8032 has. of the
landholding covered by TCT No.
8608 located at Cabanatuan City;
2. AFFIRMING the validity of the
coverage of the landholdings
covered by TCT Nos. 8607, 8609
and 143564 located at
Cabanatuan City and Talavera,
Nueva Ecija respectively;
3. MAINTAINING the tenants
affected in the retained area as
leaseholders thereof pursuant to
RA 3844;
4. DIRECTING the MARO/PARO
to determine the qualification
status of the FB whose
respective tillage is embraced
under TCT No. 8608, subject of
the pending controversy with the
DARAB; and
5. DIRECTING the Heirs of the
late Guillermo Sarenas or their
duly authorized representative to
coordinate with the MARO
concerned for the segregation of
their retained area at their own
expense and to submit a copy of
the segregation plan within 30
days from approval thereof.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner Sebastian then filed a motion
for reconsideration, but this motion was
denied by the DAR Secretary in an order
dated January 26, 1999, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
Order is hereby issued DENYING the
instant Motion for Reconsideration for
utter lack of merit. Accordingly, as far as
this Office is concerned, this case is
considered closed. Further, all persons,
other than the recognized tenant-
farmers, are hereby ordered to cease
and desist from further entering and
undertaking any activity on the subject
landholdings.
SO ORDERED.9
The Secretary also found that petitioners
appeared to have waived their rights
over the tenanted land in favor of
Clemente Bobares and Luzviminda
Domingo-Villaroman, and had allowed
cultivation of the landholding by a certain
Ricardo Dela Paz. He ruled that it was
"unlawful/illegal to allow other persons
than the tenant-farmers themselves to
work on the land except if they are only
working as an aide of the latter
otherwise, landowners shall have the
recourse against the tenant-farmers."10
Consequently, on February 22, 1999,
petitioners filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 51288.
On March 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals,
without going into the merits of the case,
dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 after
finding that "petitioners pursued the
wrong mode of appeal."11 It found that the
orders of the DAR Secretary sought to
be reviewed were final orders for they
finally disposed of the agrarian case and
left nothing more to be decided on the
merits. Hence, the proper remedy
available to petitioners was a petition for
review pursuant to Rule 43, Section 1 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,12 and
not a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals
also ruled that petitioners failed to attach
a certified true copy or duplicate original
of the assailed order of June 18, 1998 as
required by Rule 46, Section 3,13 and
hence, it had no alternative but to
dismiss the action pursuant to said
Section 3.
Petitioners then timely moved for
reconsideration, but the appellate court
in its resolution of December 10, 1999
denied their motion.
Hence, the instant case anchored on the
following sole assigned error:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR (A)
IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION
FILED BY PETITIONERS AS A
PETITION FOR REVIEW; AND (B) IN
NOT RESOLVING THE CASE ON THE
MERITS.14
Petitioners submit that the sole issue
before us is whether or not the dismissal
by the Court of Appeals of the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 is valid and
proper.
Petitioners admit that there was error in
the remedy resorted to before the Court
of Appeals. They insist, however, that a
perusal of their initiatory pleading in CA-
G.R. SP No. 51288 would show that said
pleading contained all the features and
contents for a petition for review under
Rule 43, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.15Hence, the court a quo
should have treated their special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 as a petition for review under
Rule 43, since dismissals based on
technicalities are frowned upon.
Petitioners contend that procedural rules
are but a means to an end and should be
liberally construed to effect substantial
justice.
Private respondents, on the other hand,
claim that the Court of Appeals did not
commit any reversible error in dismissing
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 51288, for
it simply applied the express and
categorical mandate of this Court that a
petition shall be dismissed if the wrong
remedy is availed of. Private
respondents argue that while it is true
that the Rules of Court should be
liberally construed, it is also equally true
that the Rules cannot be ignored, since
strict observance thereof is
indispensable to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business.
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure,16 liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling
principle to effect substantial
justice. Thus, litigations should, as
1a\^/phi 1.net
much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on technicalities. This
does not mean, however, that procedural
rules are to be ignored or disdained at
will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in
the orderly administration of justice,
namely, to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by
providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and
procedural law are contradictory to each
other, or as often suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it would result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities,
but every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed
procedure so that issues may be
properly presented and justly resolved.
Hence, rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed except only when for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure.
Concomitant to a liberal application of
the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to explain his failure to abide by
the rules.17
In the instant case, petitioners failed to
show any compelling reason for not
resorting to the proper remedy. Instead,
we find from our perusal of their
pleadings before the appellate court that
they stoutly and persistently insisted that
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
was their correct remedy. First, in
instituting CA-G.R. SP No. 51288,
petitioners categorically invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
have the questioned orders of the DAR
Secretary declared null and void for
having "been issued and promulgated
with grave abuse of discretion . . . a
mounting to lack of jurisdiction."18 Note
that it is precisely the office of an action
for certiorari under Rule 65 to correct
errors of jurisdiction. Second, after the
appellate court dismissed their petition
on the ground that the proper remedy
was a petition for review, petitioners
continued to insist in their motion for
reconsideration that under Section 54 of
R.A. No. 6657,19 a petition for certiorari is
both adequate and proper in CA-G.R. SP
No. 51288. It was only as an afterthought
that they asked the appellate court to
treat their special civil action for certiorari
as a petition for review, after a belated
and grudging admission that their
reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657
was an honest mistake or excusable
error.
We agree with the appellate court that
petitioners’ reliance on Section 54 of
R.A. No. 6657 "is not merely a mistake in
the designation of the mode of appeal,
but clearly an erroneous appeal from the
assailed Orders."20For in relying solely on
Section 54, petitioners patently ignored
or conveniently overlooked Section 60 of
R.A. No. 6657, the pertinent portion of
which provides that:
An appeal from the decision of the Court
of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or
decision of the DAR, as the case may
be, shall be by a petition for review with
the Supreme Court, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy of said decision.
(Emphasis supplied.) 1awphi1.nét
Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 should be
read in relation to R.A. No. 7902
expanding the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to include:
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or
commissions…except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.21
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902,
this Court issued Circular 1-95 dated
May 16, 1995 governing appeals from all
quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of
Appeals by petition for review,
regardless of the nature of the question
raised. Said circular was incorporated in
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Section 61 of R.A. No. 665722 clearly
mandates that judicial review of DAR
orders or decisions are governed by the
Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it
1a\^/phi1.net
is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for
judicial review of decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By
pursuing a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the
mandatory petition for review under Rule
43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode
of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth
paragraph of Supreme Court Circular
No. 2-90,23 "an appeal taken to the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall
be dismissed." Therefore, we hold that
the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R.
SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to
pursue the proper mode of appeal.
But should the appellate court have
treated the petition for the extraordinary
writs of certiorari and prohibition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 51288 as a petition for
review as petitioners insist?
That a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 should pro forma satisfy the
requirements for the contents of a
petition for review under Rule 43 does
not necessarily mean that one is the
same as the other. Or that one may be
treated as the other, for that matter. A
petition for review is a mode of appeal,
while a special civil action for certiorari is
an extraordinary process for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is
basic remedial law that the two remedies
are distinct, mutually exclusive,24 and
antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is proper if the tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions acted without or in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is
no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in law.25 A petition for
review, on the other hand, seeks to
correct errors of judgment committed by
the court, tribunal, or officer. In the
instant case, petitioners failed to show
any grave abuse of discretion amounting
to want of jurisdiction on the part of the
DAR Secretary. When a court, tribunal,
or officer has jurisdiction over the person
and the subject matter of the dispute, the
decision on all other questions arising in
the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors
committed in the exercise of said
jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment. Under prevailing procedural
rules and jurisprudence, errors of
judgment are not proper subjects of a
special civil action for certiorari.26 For if
every error committed by the trial court or
quasi-judicial agency were to be the
proper subject of review by certiorari,
then trial would never end and the
dockets of appellate courts would be
clogged beyond measure. Hence, no
error may be attributed to the appellate
court in refusing to grant petitioners’
request that their petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 be treated as a petition for
review under Rule 43.
As a final salvo, petitioners urge us to
review the factual findings of the DAR
Secretary. Settled is the rule that factual
questions are not the proper subject of
an appeal by certiorari, as a petition for
review under Rule 45 is limited only to
questions of law.27 Moreover, it is doctrine
that the "errors" which may be reviewed
by this Court in a petition for certiorari
are those of the Court of Appeals,28 and
not directly those of the trial court or the
quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer
which rendered the decision in the first
instance. Finally, it is settled that factual
findings of administrative agencies are
generally accorded respect and even
finality by this Court, if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence,29 a
situation that obtains in this case. The
factual findings of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his
official position, has acquired expertise in
specific matters within his jurisdiction,
deserve full respect and, without
justifiable reason, ought not to be
altered, modified or reversed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51288 dated March 4, 1999, as well as
the resolution of the appellate court
dated December 10, 1999, is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G.
TOLEDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside: (1) the Decision,1 dated 28
February 2006 and (2) the
Resolution,2 dated 1 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88586. The challenged decision granted
herein respondent's petition for certiorari
upon a finding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondent's motion to dismiss
the complaint against her.3Based on this
finding, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the Orders, dated 8
November 20044 and 22 December
2004,5 respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24.
The Facts
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a
complaint for sum of money with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the spouses Manuel
and Lolita Toledo.6 Herein respondent
filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but
on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Answer7 in
which she alleged, among others, that
her husband and co-defendant, Manuel
Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.8 The
death certificate9 of Manuel states "13
July 1995" as the date of death. As a
result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5
August 1999, to require respondent to
disclose the heirs of Manuel.10 In
compliance with the verbal order of the
court during the 11 October 1999
hearing of the case, respondent
submitted the required names and
addresses of the heirs.11 Petitioner then
filed a Motion for Substitution,12 dated 18
January 2000, praying that Manuel be
substituted by his children as party-
defendants. It appears that this motion
was granted by the trial court in an Order
dated 9 October 2000.13
Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18
July 2001, the trial court issued its pre-
trial order containing, among others, the
dates of hearing of the case.14
The trial of the case then proceeded.
Herein petitioner, as plaintiff, presented
its evidence and its exhibits were
thereafter admitted.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of
evidence for herein respondent was
cancelled upon agreement of the parties.
On 24 September 2004, counsel for
herein respondent was given a period of
fifteen days within which to file a
demurrer to evidence.15 However, on 7
October 2004, respondent instead filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint, citing
the following as grounds: (1) that the
complaint failed to implead an
indispensable party or a real party in
interest; hence, the case must be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action; (2) that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the
trial court erred in ordering the
substitution of the deceased Manuel by
his heirs; and (4) that the court must also
dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court.16
The trial court, in an Order dated 8
November 2004, denied the motion to
dismiss for having been filed out of time,
citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Court which states that: "Within
the time for but before filing the answer
to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made
x x x."17Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial
was likewise denied on the ground that
"defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of
this Court is now barred by estoppel by
laches" since respondent failed to raise
the issue despite several chances to do
so.18
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging that the trial court seriously
erred and gravely abused its discretion in
denying her motion to dismiss despite
discovery, during the trial of the case, of
evidence that would constitute a ground
for dismissal of the case.19
The Court of Appeals granted the
petition based on the following grounds:
It is elementary that courts acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant x x x only when the latter
voluntarily appeared or submitted to the
court or by coercive process issued by
the court to him, x x x. In this case, it is
undisputed that when petitioner Boston
filed the complaint on December 24,
1997, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was
already dead, x x x. Such being the
case, the court a quo could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Manuel S. Toledo.
x x x the court a quo’s denial of
respondent’s motion to dismiss was
based on its finding that respondent’s
attack on the jurisdiction of the court was
already barred by laches as respondent
failed to raise the said ground in its [sic]
amended answer and during the pre-
trial, despite her active participation in
the proceedings.
However, x x x it is well-settled that issue
on jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding, even for the first
time on appeal. By timely raising the
issue on jurisdiction in her motion to
dismiss x x x respondent is not estopped
from raising the question on jurisdiction.
Moreover, when issue on jurisdiction was
raised by respondent, the court a quo
had not yet decided the case, hence,
there is no basis for the court a quo to
invoke estoppel to justify its denial of the
motion for reconsideration;
It should be stressed that when the
complaint was filed, defendant Manuel S.
Toledo was already dead. The complaint
should have impleaded the estate of
Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only
the wife, considering that the estate of
Manuel S. Toledo is an indispensable
party, which stands to be benefited or be
injured in the outcome of the case. x x x
xxxx
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the
complaint should have been granted by
public respondent judge as the same
was in order. Considering that the
obligation of Manuel S. Toledo is solidary
with another debtor, x x x, the claim x x x
should be filed against the estate of
Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with the
provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, x x x.20
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
The Issues
Petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals erred in not holding that:
1. Respondent is already
estopped from questioning the
trial court’s jurisdiction;
2. Petitioner never failed to
implead an indispensable party
as the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party;
3. The inclusion of Manuel as
party-defendant is a mere
misjoinder of party not warranting
the dismissal of the case before
the lower court; and
4. Since the estate of Manuel is
not an indispensable party, it is
not necessary that petitioner file
its claim against the estate of
Manuel.
In essence, what is at issue here is the
correctness of the trial court’s orders
denying respondent’s motion to dismiss.
The Ruling of the Court
We find merit in the petition.
Motion to dismiss filed out of time
To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred
in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of
respondent. Well settled is the rule that
the special civil action for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to assail the denial by
the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The
order of the trial court denying a motion
to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it
neither terminates nor finally disposes of
a case and still leaves something to be
done by the court before a case is finally
decided on the merits.21 Therefore, "the
proper remedy in such a case is to
appeal after a decision has been
rendered."22
As the Supreme Court held in Indiana
Aerospace University v. Comm. on
Higher Education:23
A writ of certiorari is not intended to
correct every controversial interlocutory
ruling; it is resorted only to correct a
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to
keeping an inferior court within its
jurisdiction and to relieve persons from
arbitrary acts – acts which courts or
judges have no power or authority in law
to perform. It is not designed to correct
erroneous findings and conclusions
made by the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming that certiorari is the
proper remedy, the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondent’s motion to dismiss.
It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued
the questioned orders as respondent’s
motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS
AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED
HER AMENDED ANSWER. This
circumstance alone already warranted
the outright dismissal of the motion for
having been filed in clear contravention
of the express mandate of Section 1,
Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under this provision, a motion to dismiss
shall be filed within the time for but
before the filing of an answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim.24
More importantly, respondent’s motion to
dismiss was filed after petitioner has
completed the presentation of its
evidence in the trial court, giving
credence to petitioner’s and the trial
court’s conclusion that the filing of the
motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on
the part of respondent to delay the
prompt resolution of the case against
her.
Also worth mentioning is the fact that
respondent’s motion to dismiss under
consideration herein is not the first
motion to dismiss she filed in the trial
court. It appears that she had filed an
earlier motion to dismiss26 on the sole
ground of the unenforceability of
petitioner’s claim under the Statute of
Frauds, which motion was denied by the
trial court. More telling is the following
narration of the trial court in its Order
denying respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of the denial of her
motion to dismiss:
As can be gleaned from the records, with
the admission of plaintiff’s exhibits,
reception of defendants’ evidence was
set on March 31, and April 23, 2004 x x x
. On motion of the defendants, the
hearing on March 31, 2004 was
cancelled.
On April 14, 2004, defendants sought the
issuance of subpoena ad testificandum
and duces tecum to one Gina M.
Madulid, to appear and testify for the
defendants on April 23, 2004. Reception
of defendants’ evidence was again
deferred to May 26, June 2 and June 30,
2004, x x x.
On May 13, 2004, defendants sought
again the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum to the said
Gina Madulid. On May 26, 2004,
reception of defendants [sic] evidence
was cancelled upon the agreement of
the parties. On July 28, 2004, in the
absence of defendants’ witness, hearing
was reset to September 24 and October
8, 2004 x x x.
On September 24, 2004, counsel for
defendants was given a period of fifteen
(15) days to file a demurrer to evidence.
On October 7, 2004, defendants filed
instead a Motion to Dismiss x x x.27
Respondent’s act of filing multiple
motions, such as the first and earlier
motion to dismiss and then the motion to
dismiss at issue here, as well as several
motions for postponement, lends
credibility to the position taken by
petitioner, which is shared by the trial
court, that respondent is
deliberately impeding the early
disposition of this case. The filing of the
second motion to dismiss was, therefore,
"not only improper but also
dilatory."28 Thus, the trial court, "far from
deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on the matter,
x x x had in fact faithfully observed the
law and legal precedents in this
case."29 The Court of Appeals, therefore,
erred not only in entertaining
respondent’s petition for certiorari, it
likewise erred in ruling that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied respondent’s motion to
dismiss.
On whether or not respondent is
estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court
At the outset, it must be here stated that,
as the succeeding discussions will
demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel should not be an issue in this
case. A protracted discourse on
jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded
by the fact that jurisdiction has been
raised as an issue from the lower court,
to the Court of Appeals and, finally,
before this Court. For the sake of clarity,
and in order to finally settle the
controversy and fully dispose of all the
issues in this case, it was deemed
imperative to resolve the issue of
jurisdiction.
1. Aspects of Jurisdiction
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that
respondent’s motion to dismiss
questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction
was filed more than six years after her
amended answer was filed. According to
petitioner, respondent had several
opportunities, at various stages of the
proceedings, to assail the trial court’s
jurisdiction but never did so for six
straight years. Citing the doctrine laid
down in the case of Tijam, et al. v.
Sibonghanoy, et al.30 petitioner claimed
that respondent’s failure to raise the
question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage
bars her from later questioning it,
especially since she actively participated
in the proceedings conducted by the trial
court.
Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in
that, it failed to consider that the concept
of jurisdiction has several aspects,
namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties;
(3) jurisdiction over the issues of the
case; and (4) in cases involving property,
jurisdiction over the res or the thing
which is the subject of the litigation.31
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be
barred from being assailed as a result of
estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case
relied upon by petitioner, the issue
involved was the authority of the then
Court of First Instance to hear a case for
the collection of a sum of money in the
amount of ₱1,908.00 which amount was,
at that time, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
In subsequent cases citing the ruling of
the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at
issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject matter of the case.
Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals,32 the issue for
consideration was the authority of the
regional trial court to hear and decide an
action for reformation of contract and
damages involving a subdivision lot, it
being argued therein that jurisdiction is
vested in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board pursuant to PD 957
(The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v.
Presiding Judge, MTC, Legaspi
City,33 petitioners argued that the
respondent municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint for
ejectment because the issue of
ownership was raised in the pleadings.
Finally, in People v. Casuga,34 accused-
appellant claimed that the crime of grave
slander, of which she was charged, falls
within the concurrent jurisdiction of
municipal courts or city courts and the
then courts of first instance, and that the
judgment of the court of first instance, to
which she had appealed the municipal
court's conviction, should be deemed null
and void for want of jurisdiction as her
appeal should have been filed with the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court
barred the attack on the jurisdiction of
the respective courts concerned over the
subject matter of the case based on
estoppel by laches, declaring that parties
cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.35
Here, what respondent was questioning
in her motion to dismiss before the trial
court was that court’s jurisdiction over
the person of defendant Manuel. Thus,
the principle of estoppel by laches finds
no application in this case. Instead, the
principles relating to jurisdiction over the
person of the parties are pertinent
herein.
The Rules of Court provide:
RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not
pleaded. – Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that
the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute
of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
RULE 15
MOTIONS
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a
motion attacking a pleading, order,
judgment, or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.
Based on the foregoing provisions, the
"objection on jurisdictional grounds which
is not waived even if not alleged in a
motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter can always be raised anytime,
even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x
x subject, however, to the principle of
estoppel by laches."36
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of a party to a case is
not one of those defenses which are not
deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule
9, such defense must be invoked when
an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed
in order to prevent a waiver of the
defense.37 If the objection is not raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, the objection to the jurisdiction
over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived by virtue of
the first sentence of the above-quoted
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court.38
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred
when it made a sweeping
pronouncement in its questioned
decision, stating that "issue on
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceeding, even for the first time on
appeal" and that, therefore, respondent
timely raised the issue in her motion to
dismiss and is, consequently, not
estopped from raising the question of
jurisdiction. As the question of
jurisdiction involved here is that over the
person of the defendant Manuel, the
same is deemed waived if not raised in
the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any
case, respondent cannot claim the
defense since "lack of jurisdiction over
the person, being subject to waiver, is a
personal defense which can only be
asserted by the party who can thereby
waive it by silence."39
2. Jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant is acquired through a valid
service of summons; trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel Toledo
In the first place, jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel was never acquired by
the trial court. A defendant is informed of
a case against him when he receives
summons. "Summons is a writ by which
the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him. Service of such writ
is the means by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person."40
In the case at bar, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel since there was no valid service
of summons upon him, precisely
because he was already dead even
before the complaint against him and his
wife was filed in the trial court. The
issues presented in this case are similar
to those in the case of Sarsaba v. Vda.
de Te.41
In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a
decision declaring that Patricio Sereno
was illegally dismissed from employment
and ordering the payment of his
monetary claims. To satisfy the claim, a
truck in the possession of Sereno’s
employer was levied upon by a sheriff of
the NLRC, accompanied by Sereno and
his lawyer, Rogelio Sarsaba, the
petitioner in that case. A complaint for
recovery of motor vehicle and damages,
with prayer for the delivery of the truck
pendente lite was eventually filed against
Sarsaba, Sereno, the NLRC sheriff and
the NLRC by the registered owner of the
truck. After his motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court, petitioner
Sarsaba filed his answer. Later on,
however, he filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss citing, as one of the grounds,
lack of jurisdiction over one of the
principal defendants, in view of the fact
that Sereno was already dead when the
complaint for recovery of possession was
filed.
Although the factual milieu of the present
case is not exactly similar to that of
Sarsaba, one of the issues submitted for
resolution in both cases is similar:
whether or not a case, where one of the
named defendants was already dead at
the time of its filing, should be dismissed
so that the claim may be pursued instead
in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased defendant.
The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case
claimed, as did respondent herein, that
since one of the defendants died before
summons was served on him, the trial
court should have dismissed the
complaint against all the defendants and
the claim should be filed against the
estate of the deceased defendant. The
petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed
that the complaint be dismissed, not only
against Sereno, but as to all the
defendants, considering that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Sereno.42 This is exactly the same
prayer made by respondent herein in her
motion to dismiss.
The Court, in the Sarsaba Case,
resolved the issue in this wise:
x x x We cannot countenance petitioner’s
argument that the complaint against the
other defendants should have been
dismissed, considering that the RTC
never acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Sereno. The court’s failure to
acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is
a defense which is personal to the
person claiming it. Obviously, it is now
impossible for Sereno to invoke the
same in view of his death. Neither can
petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf
of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of
having the case dismissed against all of
the defendants. Failure to serve
summons on Sereno’s person will not be
a cause for the dismissal of the
complaint against the other defendants,
considering that they have been served
with copies of the summons and
complaints and have long submitted their
respective responsive pleadings. In fact,
the other defendants in the complaint
were given the chance to raise all
possible defenses and objections
personal to them in their respective
motions to dismiss and their subsequent
answers.43 (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal by the trial court of the
complaint against Sereno only.
Based on the foregoing
pronouncements, there is no basis for
dismissing the complaint against
respondent herein. Thus, as already
emphasized above, the trial court
correctly denied her motion to dismiss.
On whether or not the estate of Manuel
Toledo is an indispensable party
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Court states:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties. – Parties-in-
interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has
such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter of a case that a final
adjudication cannot be made in his or
her absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest. He or she is a party who
has not only an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but "an
interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting that
interest or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. It has
also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose
absence there cannot be a determination
between the parties already before the
court which is effective, complete or
equitable." Further, an indispensable
party is one who must be included in an
action before it may properly proceed.44
On the other hand, a "person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is
separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a
decree which does complete justice
between them. Also, a person is not an
indispensable party if his presence would
merely permit complete relief between
him or her and those already parties to
the action, or if he or she has no interest
in the subject matter of the action." It is
not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party
simply because his or her presence will
avoid multiple litigations.45
Applying the foregoing pronouncements
to the case at bar, it is clear that the
estate of Manuel is not an indispensable
party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of
Manuel and his wife, respondent herein,
is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the
one hand and respondent and
respondent’s husband, on the other,
states:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly
and severally46 (in solemn) promise to
pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES,
INC. x x x the sum of PESOS: [ONE
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
(₱1,400,000.00)] x x x.47
The provisions and stipulations of the
contract were then followed by the
respective signatures of respondent as
"MAKER" and her husband as "CO-
MAKER."48 Thus, pursuant to Article
1216 of the Civil Code, petitioner may
collect the entire amount of the obligation
from respondent only. The
aforementioned provision states: "The
creditor may proceed against any one of
the solidary debtors or some or all of
them simultaneously. The demand made
against one of them shall not be an
obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the
others, so long as the debt has not been
fully collected."
In other words, the collection case can
proceed and the demands of petitioner
can be satisfied by respondent only,
even without impleading the estate of
Manuel. Consequently, the estate of
Manuel is not an indispensable party to
petitioner’s complaint for sum of money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing
with the contention of respondent, held
that the claim of petitioner should have
been filed against the estate of Manuel in
accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The
aforementioned provisions provide:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed
under the notice. If not filed, barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against
the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise, they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. x x x.
SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent.
Where the obligation of the decedent is
solidary with another debtor, the claim
shall be filed against the decedent as if
he were the only debtor, without
prejudice to the right of the estate to
recover contribution from the other
debtor. x x x.
The Court of Appeals erred in its
interpretation of the above-quoted
provisions.
In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the
old Rules of Court, the precursor of
Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which latter provision has been
retained in the present Rules of Court
without any revisions, the Supreme
Court, in the case of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama, et.
al.,49 held:50
Construing Section 698 of the Code of
Civil Procedure from whence [Section 6,
Rule 87] was taken, this Court held that
where two persons are bound in solidum
for the same debt and one of them dies,
the whole indebtedness can be proved
against the estate of the latter, the
decedent’s liability being absolute and
primary; x x x. It is evident from the
foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87
provides the procedure should the
creditor desire to go against the
deceased debtor, but there is certainly
nothing in the said provision making
compliance with such procedure a
condition precedent before an ordinary
action against the surviving solidary
debtors, should the creditor choose to
demand payment from the latter, could
be entertained to the extent that failure to
observe the same would deprive the
court jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the action against the surviving debtors.
Upon the other hand, the Civil Code
expressly allows the creditor to proceed
against any one of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously.
There is, therefore, nothing improper in
the creditor’s filing of an action against
the surviving solidary debtors alone,
instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased
debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and
expounded in the later case of Philippine
National Bank v. Asuncion51where the
Supreme Court pronounced:
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86
of the Revised Rules of Court reveals
that nothing therein prevents a creditor
from proceeding against the surviving
solidary debtors. Said provision merely
sets up the procedure in enforcing
collection in case a creditor chooses to
pursue his claim against the estate of the
deceased solidary debtor. The rule has
been set forth that a creditor (in a
solidary obligation) has the option
whether to file or not to file a claim
against the estate of the solidary debtor.
xxx
xxxx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the
New Civil Code is the applicable
provision in this matter. Said provision
gives the creditor the right to "proceed
against anyone of the solidary debtors or
some or all of them simultaneously." The
choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary
creditor to determine against whom he
will enforce collection. In case of the
death of one of the solidary debtors, he
(the creditor) may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary
debtors without necessity of filing a claim
in the estate of the deceased debtors. It
is not mandatory for him to have the
case dismissed as against the surviving
debtors and file its claim against the
estate of the deceased solidary debtor, x
x x. For to require the creditor to proceed
against the estate, making it a condition
precedent for any collection action
against the surviving debtors to prosper,
would deprive him of his substantive
rightsprovided by Article 1216 of the New
Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly argued by petitioner, if
Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court were applied literally, Article
1216 of the New Civil Code would, in
effect, be repealed since under the Rules
of Court, petitioner has no choice but to
proceed against the estate of [the
deceased debtor] only. Obviously, this
provision diminishes the [creditor’s] right
under the New Civil Code to proceed
against any one, some or all of the
solidary debtors. Such a construction is
not sanctioned by principle, which is too
well settled to require citation, that a
substantive law cannot be amended by a
procedural rule. Otherwise stated,
Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court cannot be made to prevail over
Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the
former being merely procedural, while
the latter, substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of
Manuel is not an indispensable party and
the case can proceed as against
respondent only. That petitioner opted to
collect from respondent and not from the
estate of Manuel is evidenced by its
opposition to respondent’s motion to
dismiss asserting that the case, as
against her, should be dismissed so that
petitioner can proceed against the estate
of Manuel.
On whether or not the inclusion of
Manuel as
party defendant is a misjoinder of party
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court states that "neither misjoinder nor
non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately."
Based on the last sentence of the afore-
quoted provision of law, a misjoined
party must have the capacity to sue or
be sued in the event that the claim by or
against the misjoined party is pursued in
a separate case. In this case, therefore,
the inclusion of Manuel in the complaint
cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in
fact, the action would have proceeded
against him had he been alive at the time
the collection case was filed by
petitioner. This being the case, the
remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3
does not obtain here. The name of
Manuel as party-defendant cannot
simply be dropped from the case.
Instead, the procedure taken by the
Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te,52 whose
facts, as mentioned earlier, resemble
those of this case, should be followed
herein. There, the Supreme Court
agreed with the trial court when it
resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the
person of the deceased Sereno in this
wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the
Honorable Court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Patricio
Sereno since there was indeed no valid
service of summons insofar as Patricio
Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno
died before the summons, together with
a copy of the complaint and its annexes,
could be served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of
summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of
the defendants herein, does not render
the action DISMISSIBLE, considering
that the three (3) other defendants, x x x,
were validly served with summons and
the case with respect to the answering
defendants may still proceed
independently. Be it recalled that the
three (3) answering defendants have
previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint which was denied by the
Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio
Sereno will be DISMISSED and the
same may be filed as a claim against the
estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case
with respect to the three (3) other
accused [sic] will proceed. (Emphasis
supplied.)53
As a result, the case, as against Manuel,
must be dismissed.
In addition, the dismissal of the case
against Manuel is further warranted by
Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
which states that: only natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action." Applying
this provision of law, the Court, in the
case of Ventura v. Militante,54 held:
Parties may be either plaintiffs or
defendants. x x x. In order to maintain an
action in a court of justice, the plaintiff
must have an actual legal existence, that
is, he, she or it must be a person in law
and possessed of a legal entity as either
a natural or an artificial person, and no
suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in
the name of such a person.
The rule is no different as regards party
defendants. It is incumbent upon a
plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial
proceeding, to name the proper party
defendant to his cause of action. In a suit
or proceeding in personam of an
adversary character, the court can
acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of
trial or judgment until a party defendant
who actually or legally exists and is
legally capable of being sued, is brought
before it. It has even been held that the
question of the legal personality of a
party defendant is a question of
substance going to the jurisdiction of the
court and not one of procedure.
The original complaint of petitioner
named the "estate of Carlos Ngo as
represented by surviving spouse Ms.
Sulpicia Ventura" as the
defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss
1âw phi 1
the same on the ground that the
defendant as named in the complaint
had no legal personality. We agree.
x x x. Considering that capacity to be
sued is a correlative of the capacity to
sue, to the same extent, a decedent
does not have the capacity to be sued
and may not be named a party
defendant in a court action. (Emphases
supplied.)
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a
natural nor a juridical person or an entity
authorized by law, the complaint may be
dismissed on the ground that the
pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action or for failure to state a
cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g)
of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
because a complaint cannot possibly
state a cause of action against one who
cannot be a party to a civil action.55
Since the proper course of action against
the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as
party-defendant is the dismissal of the
case as against him, thus did the trial
court err when it ordered the substitution
of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is
proper only where the party to be
substituted died during the pendency of
the case, as expressly provided for by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
Death of party;duty of counsel. –
Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or
representatives. x x x
The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or
administrator x x x.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Here, since Manuel was already dead at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the
court never acquired jurisdiction over his
person and, in effect, there was no party
to be substituted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is

GRANTED. The Decision dated 28
February 2006 and the Resolution dated
1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 88586 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court dated 8 November
2004 and 22 December 2004,
respectively, in Civil Case No. 97-86672,
are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Manila is hereby
DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of
Civil Case No. 97-86672 against
respondent Lolita G. Toledo only, in
accordance with the above
pronouncements of the Court, and to
decide the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140746 March 16,
2005
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC.,
and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, Petitioner,
vs.
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., and MARTINA
GICALE, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated July 23 1999 and
Resolution2 dated November 4, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
38453, entitled "Standard Insurance
Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale vs.
PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and
Alexander Buncan."
In the afternoon of October 28, 1984,
Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger
jeepney owned by his mother Martina
Gicale, respondent herein. It was then
raining. While driving north bound along
the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by
Pantranco North Express, Inc.,
petitioner, driven by Alexander Buncan,
also a petitioner, was trailing behind.
When the two vehicles were negotiating
a curve along the highway, the
passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In
so doing, the passenger bus hit the left
rear side of the jeepney and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to the
Talavera Police Station and respondent
Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard),
insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of
the repair was P21,415.00, but
respondent Standard paid
only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale
shouldered the balance of P13,415.00.
Thereafter, Standard and Martina,
respondents, demanded reimbursement
from petitioners Pantranco and its driver
Alexander Buncan, but they refused.
This prompted respondents to file with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
94, Manila, a complaint for sum of
money.
In their answer, both petitioners
specifically denied the allegations in the
complaint and averred that it is the
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a
Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC,
Decision4 dated July 23, 1999, affirmed
which has jurisdiction over the case.
the trial court’s ruling, holding that:
On June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered
a Decision3 in favor of respondents
Standard and Martina, thus:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of
the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs, Standard
Insurance Company and Martina
Gicale, and against defendants
Pantranco Bus Company and
Alexander Buncan, ordering the
latter to pay as follows:
(1) to pay plaintiff Standard
Insurance the amount
of P8,000.00 with interest due
thereon from November 27, 1984
until fully paid;
(2) to pay plaintiff Martina Gicale
the amount of P13,415.00 with
interest due thereon from
October 22, 1984 until fully paid;
(3) to pay the sum of P10,000.00
for attorney’s fees;
(4) to pay the expenses of
litigation and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED."
"The appellants argue that
appellee Gicale’s claim
of P13,415.00 and appellee
insurance company’s claim
of P8,000.00 individually fell
under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the municipal trial
court. This is not correct because
under the Totality Rule provided
for under Sec. 19, Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the
sum of the two claims that
determines the jurisdictional
amount.
xxx
In the case at bench, the total of
the two claims is definitely more
than P20,000.00 which at the
time of the incident in question
was the jurisdictional amount of
the Regional Trial Court.
Appellants contend that there
was a misjoinder of parties.
Assuming that there was, under
the Rules of Court (Sec. 11, Rule
7) as well as under the Rules of
Civil Procedure (ditto), the same
does not affect the jurisdiction of
the court nor is it a ground to
dismiss the complaint.
xxx
It does not need perspicacity in
logic to see that appellees
Gicale’s and insurance
company’s individual claims
against appellees (sic) arose
from the same vehicular accident
on October 28, 1984 involving
appellant Pantranco’s bus and
appellee Gicale’s jeepney. That
being the case, there was a
question of fact common to all
the parties: Whose fault or established their liability for
negligence caused the damage quasi-delict under Article 2176 of
to the jeepney? the Civil Code."
Appellants submit that they were Petitioners filed a motion for
denied their day in court because reconsideration but was denied by the
the case was deemed submitted Appellate Court in a Resolution dated
for decision "without even November 4, 1999.
declaring defendants in default or
to have waived the presentation Hence, this petition for review
of evidence." This is incorrect. Of on certiorari raising the following
course, the court did not declare assignments of error:
defendants in default because
that is done only when the "I
defendant fails to tender an
answer within the reglementary
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL
period. When the lower court
COURT HAS JURISDICTION
ordered that the case is deemed
OVER THE SUBJECT OF THE
submitted for decision that meant
ACTION CONSIDERING THAT
that the defendants were
RESPONDENTS’ RESPECTIVE
deemed to have waived their
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
right to present evidence. If they
PETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE
failed to adduce their evidence,
OUT OF THE SAME
they should blame nobody but
TRANSACTION NOR ARE
themselves. They failed to be
THERE QUESTIONS OF LAW
present during the scheduled
AND FACTS COMMON TO
hearing for the reception of their
BOTH PETITIONERS AND
evidence despite notice and
RESPONDENTS.
without any motion or
explanation. They did not even
file any motion for II
reconsideration of the order
considering the case submitted WHETHER OR NOT
for decision. PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO
RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THAT BASED
Finally, contrary to the assertion
ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
of the defendant-appellants, the
AND LAW APPLICABLE IN THE
evidence preponderantly
 CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENTS
HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY
RIGHT TO THE RELIEF
PRAYED FOR.
III
WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONERS WERE
DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS."
For their part, respondents contend that
their individual claims arose out of the
same vehicular accident and involve a
common question of fact and law.
Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case.
I
Petitioners insist that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the case since the
cause of action of each respondent did
not arise from the same transaction and
that there are no common questions of
law and fact common to both parties.
Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court,5 provides:
"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of
parties. – All persons in whom or
against whom any right to relief
in respect to or arising out of the
same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in
the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these
Rules, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of
law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants
may arise in the action; but the
court may make such orders as
may be just to prevent any
plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense
in connection with any
proceedings in which he may
have no interest."
Permissive joinder of parties requires
that: (a) the right to relief arises out of
the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of
law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
defendants; and (c) such joinder is not
otherwise proscribed by the provisions of
the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.6
In this case, there is a single transaction
common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus
hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There
is also a common question of fact, that
is, whether petitioners are negligent.
There being a single transaction
common to both respondents,
consequently, they have the same cause
of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action,
it must be ascertained whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain
the second cause of action would have
been sufficient to authorize a recovery in
the first.7 Here, had respondents filed
separate suits against petitioners, the
same evidence would have been
presented to sustain the same cause of
action. Thus, the filing by both
respondents of the complaint with the
court below is in order. Such joinder of
parties avoids multiplicity of suit and
ensures the convenient, speedy and
orderly administration of justice.
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the
same Rules provides:
"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of
action. – A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against
an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the
causes of action are principally
for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction."
The above provision presupposes that
the different causes of action which are
joined accrue in favor of the same
plaintiff/s and against the same
defendant/s and that no misjoinder of
parties is involved.8 The issue of whether
respondents’ claims shall be lumped
together is determined by paragraph (d)
of the above provision. This paragraph
embodies the "totality rule" as
exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg.
1299 which states, among others, that
"where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the
same or different transactions."
As previously stated, respondents’ cause
of action against petitioners arose out of
the same transaction. Thus, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims.
Respondent Standard’s claim
is P8,000.00, while that of respondent
Martina Gicale is P13,415.00, or a total
of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg.
129 provides that the RTC has
"exclusive original jurisdiction over all
other cases, in which the demand,
exclusive of interest and cost or the
value of the property in controversy,
amounts to more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00)." Clearly, it is the
RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant
case. It bears emphasis that when the
complaint was filed, R.A. 7691
expanding the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken
effect. It became effective on April 15,
1994.
II
The finding of the trial court, affirmed by
the Appellate Court, that petitioners are
negligent and thus liable to respondents,
is a factual finding which is binding upon
us, a rule well-established in our
jurisprudence. It has been repeatedly
held that the trial court's factual findings,
when affirmed by the Appellate Court,
are conclusive and binding upon this
Court, if they are not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of significance and
influence. Petitioners have not presented
sufficient ground to warrant a deviation
from this rule.10
III
There is no merit in petitioners’
contention that they were denied due
process. Records show that during the
hearing, petitioner Pantranco’s counsel
filed two motions for resetting of trial
which were granted by the trial court.
Subsequently, said counsel filed a notice
to withdraw. After respondents had
presented their evidence, the trial court,
upon petitioners’ motion, reset the
hearing to another date. On this date,
Pantranco failed to appear. Thus, the
trial court warned Pantranco that should
it fail to appear during the next hearing,
the case will be submitted for resolution
on the basis of the evidence presented.
Subsequently, Pantranco’s new counsel
manifested that his client is willing to
settle the case amicably and moved for
another postponement. The trial court
granted the motion. On the date of the
hearing, the new counsel manifested that
Pantranco’s employees are on strike and
moved for another postponement. On
the next hearing, said counsel still failed
to appear. Hence, the trial court
considered the case submitted for
decision.
We have consistently held that the
essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.11
Petitioner Pantranco filed an answer and
participated during the trial and
presentation of respondents’ evidence. It
was apprised of the notices of hearing
issued by the trial court. Indeed, it was
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain its side of the controversy.
Clearly, it was not denied of its right to
due process. What is frowned upon is
the absolute lack of notice and hearing
which is not present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated July 23
1999 and Resolution dated November 4,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 38453 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias
GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO.,
INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding
company and defendant-appellant.
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-
appellees.
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office,
Pages and Soberano for defendant-
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity
Company, Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month
after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948
— the spouses Serafin Tijam and
Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case
No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00,
with legal interest thereon from the date
of the filing of the complaint until the
whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As
prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the
same was soon dissolved upon the filing
of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on
the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons
the defendants filed their answer in
which, after making some admissions
and denials of the material averments of
the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was
answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined,
the Court rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon
motion of the latter, the Court issued a
writ of execution against the defendants.
The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against
the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp.
46-49), against which the Surety filed a
written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two
grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand
upon the Surety for the payment of the
amount due under the judgment. Upon
these grounds the Surety prayed the
Court not only to deny the motion for
execution against its counter-bond but
also the following affirmative relief : "to
relieve the herein bonding company of its
liability, if any, under the bond in
question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied
this motion on the ground solely that no
previous demand had been made on the
Surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment. Thereafter the necessary
demand was made, and upon failure of
the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a second motion for
execution against the counterbond. On
the date set for the hearing thereon, the
Court, upon motion of the Surety's
counsel, granted the latter a period of
five days within which to answer the
motion. Upon its failure to file such
answer, the Court granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ
was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to
quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section
17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As
the Court denied the motion, the Surety
appealed to the Court of Appeals from
such order of denial and from the one
denying its motion for reconsideration
(Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then
printed as required by the Rules, and in
due time it filed its brief raising therein no
other question but the ones covered by
the following assignment of errors:
 I. That the Honorable Court a
quo erred in issuing its order
dated November 2, 1957, by
holding the incident as submitted
for resolution, without a summary
hearing and compliance with the
other mandatory requirements
provided for in Section 17, Rule
59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a
quo erred in ordering the
issuance of execution against the
herein bonding company-
appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a
quo erred in denying the motion
to quash the writ of execution
filed by the herein bonding
company-appellant as well as its
subsequent motion for
reconsideration, and/or in not
quashing or setting aside the writ
of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it
is obvious — raises the question of lack
of jurisdiction, neither directly nor
indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their
brief, the Court of Appeals, on December
11, 1962, decided the case affirming the
orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the
Surety received notice of the decision, it
filed a motion asking for extension of
time within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in its resolution of
January 10 of the same year. Two days
later the Surety filed a pleading entitled
MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that appellees action was
filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery
of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a
month before that date Republic Act No.
296, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948, had already become
effective, Section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount
of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and
costs; that the Court of First Instance
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. Upon these premises
the Surety's motion prayed the Court of
Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of
January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals
required the appellees to answer the
motion to dismiss, but they failed to do
so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same
year, the Court resolved to set aside its
decision and to certify the case to Us.
The pertinent portions of its resolution
read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the
record that the action at bar,
which is a suit for collection of
money in the sum of exactly
P1,908.00 exclusive of interest,
was originally instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu
on July 19, 1948. But about a
month prior to the filing of the
complaint, more specifically on
June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 took effect, depriving the
Court of First Instance of original
jurisdiction over cases in which
the demand, exclusive of
interest, is not more than
P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and
86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the
point raised in appellant's motion
is an important one which merits
serious consideration. As stated,
the complaint was filed on July
19, 1948. This case therefore
has been pending now for almost
15 years, and throughout the
entire proceeding appellant never
raised the question of jurisdiction
until after receipt of this Court's
adverse decision.
There are three cases decided
by the Honorable Supreme Court
which may be worthy of
consideration in connection with
this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et
al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de
 Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-
10096, March 23, 1956;
Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc.
vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. L-14591, September
26, 1962; and Alfredo
Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No.
L-15092, September 29, 1962,
wherein the Honorable Supreme
Court frowned upon the
'undesirable practice' of
appellants submitting their case
for decision and then accepting
the judgment, if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction
when adverse.
Considering, however, that the
Supreme Court has the
"exclusive" appellate jurisdiction
over "all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court is
in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3],
Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended), we have no choice
but to certify, as we hereby do
certify, this case to the Supreme
Court.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to
Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 as amended, let the record
of this case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action
commenced by appellees in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against the
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only —
an amount within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in
accordance with the provisions of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken
effect about a month prior to the date
when the action was commenced. True
also is the rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack
of it affects the very authority of the court
to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However, considering
the facts and circumstances of the
present case — which shall forthwith be
set forth — We are of the opinion that
the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annuling everything done
heretofore in the case with its active
participation.
As already stated, the action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is,
almost fifteen years before the Surety
filed its motion to dismiss on January 12,
1963 raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the
action, originally, was exclusively against
the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety
became a quasi-party therein since July
31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for
the dissolution of the writ of attachment
issued by the court of origin (Record on
Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it
acquired certain rights and assumed
specific obligations in connection with
the pending case, in accordance with
sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of
Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885;
Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for
execution against the counter-bond the
Surety not only filed a written opposition
thereto praying for its denial but also
asked for an additional affirmative
relief — that it be relieved of its liability
under the counter-bond upon the
grounds relied upon in support of its
opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the
court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second
motion for execution against the counter-
bond, the Surety appeared, through
counsel, to ask for time within which to
file an answer or opposition thereto. This
motion was granted, but instead of such
answer or opposition, the Surety filed the
motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale
demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of
stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136
Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it
was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject-matter of the action or of
the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that
after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc.,
243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct.
283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S.
127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs.
Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that
it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in
a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said
in the three cases mentioned in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of May
20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we
frown upon the "undesirable practice" of
a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as
in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R.
L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-
15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs.
The Court of Industrial Relation et al.,
G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia
vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the
time the Surety became a quasi-party on
July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force,
was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to
do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as
in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case
for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect
be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case
since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors
to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal:
after going over the entire record, We
have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with
approval, the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962
as follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu,
which was a suit for collection of
a sum of money, a writ of
attachment was issued against
defendants' properties. The
attachment, however, was
subsequently discharged under
Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the
filing by defendants of a bond
subscribed by Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against
defendants having been returned
totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs
moved, under Section 17 of Rule
59, for issuance of writ of
execution against Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the
obligation of the bond. But the
motion was, upon the surety's
opposition, denied on the ground
that there was "no showing that a
demand had been made, by the
plaintiffs to the bonding company
for payment of the amount due
under the judgment" (Record on
Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the
necessary demand upon the
surety for satisfaction of the
judgment, and upon the latter's
failure to pay the amount due,
plaintiffs again filed a motion
dated October 31, 1957, for
issuance of writ of execution
against the surety, with notice of
hearing on November 2, 1957.
On October 31, 1957, the surety
received copy of said motion and
notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion
was called on November 2, 1957,
the surety's counsel asked that
he be given time within which to
answer the motion, and so an
order was issued in open court,
as follows:
1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose
P. Soberano, Jr., counsel
for the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu
Branch, is given until
Wednesday,
November 6, 1957, to file
his answer to the motion
for the issuance of a writ
of execution dated
October 30, 1957 of the
plaintiffs, after which this
incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this
2nd day of November,
1957, at Cebu City,
Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE M.
MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on
Appeal, pp.
64-65, emphasis
ours)
Since the surety's counsel failed
to file any answer or objection
within the period given him, the
court, on December 7, 1957,
issued an order granting
plaintiffs' motion for execution
against the surety; and on
December 12, 1957, the
corresponding writ of execution
was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the
surety filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution on the ground
that the same was "issued
without the requirements of
Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules
of Court having been complied
with," more specifically, that the
same was issued without the
required "summary hearing". This
motion was denied by order of
February 10, 1958.
On February 25, 1958, the surety
filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above-stated order of
denial; which motion was
likewise denied by order of
March 26, 1958.
From the above-stated orders of
February 10, 1958 and March 26,
1958 — denying the surety's Summary hearing is "not
motion to quash the writ of intended to be carried on in the
execution and motion for formal manner in which ordinary
reconsideration, respectively — actions are prosecuted" (83
the surety has interposed the C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a
appeal on hand. procedure by which a question is
resolved "with dispatch, with the
The surety insists that the lower least possible delay, and in
court should have granted its preference to ordinary legal and
motion to quash the writ of regular judicial proceedings"
execution because the same was (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is
issued without the summary that "the defendant is notified or
hearing required by Section 17 of summoned to appear and is
Rule 59, which reads; given an opportunity to hear what
is urged upon him, and to
"Sec. 17. When interpose a defense, after which
execution returned follows an adjudication of the
unsatisfied, recovery had rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp.
upon bond. — If the 793-794); and as to the extent
execution be returned and latitude of the hearing, the
unsatisfied in whole or in same will naturally lie upon the
part, the surety or discretion of the court, depending
sureties on any bond upon the attending
given pursuant to the circumstances and the nature of
provisions of this role to the incident up for consideration.
secure the payment of
the judgment shall In the case at bar, the surety had
become finally charged been notified of the plaintiffs'
on such bond, and bound motion for execution and of the
to pay to the plaintiff date when the same would be
upon demand the amount submitted for consideration. In
due under the judgment, fact, the surety's counsel was
which amount may be present in court when the motion
recovered from such was called, and it was upon his
surety or sureties after request that the court a quo gave
notice and summary him a period of four days within
hearing in the same which to file an answer. Yet he
action." (Emphasis ours) allowed that period to lapse
without filing an answer or
objection. The surety cannot
now, therefore, complain that it
was deprived of its day in court.
It is argued that the surety's
counsel did not file an answer to
the motion "for the simple reason
that all its defenses can be set up
during the hearing of the motion
even if the same are not reduced
to writing" (Appellant's brief, p.
4). There is obviously no merit in
this pretense because, as stated
above, the record will show that
when the motion was called,
what the surety's counsel did
was to ask that he be allowed
and given time to file an answer.
Moreover, it was stated in the
order given in open court upon
request of the surety's counsel
that after the four-day period
within which to file an answer,
"the incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution"; and
counsel apparently agreed, as
the order was issued upon his
instance and he interposed no
objection thereto.
It is also urged that although
according to Section 17 of Rule
59, supra, there is no need for a
separate action, there must,
however, be a separate judgment
against the surety in order to hold
it liable on the bond (Appellant's
 Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our
opinion. A bond filed for
discharge of attachment is, per
Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure
the payment to the plaintiff of any
judgment he may recover in the
action," and stands "in place of
the property so released".
Hence, after the judgment for the
plaintiff has become executory
and the execution is "returned
unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59),
as in this case, the liability of the
bond automatically attaches and,
in failure of the surety to satisfy
the judgment against the
defendant despite demand
therefor, writ of execution may
issue against the surety to
enforce the obligation of the
bond.

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the

orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant
Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,

Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y
CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches
from assailing the jurisdiction of a
tribunal? This is the paramount issue
raised in this petition for review of the
February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent
facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for
reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide was filed against the petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-
94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on
August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted
the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal
before the CA, the petitioner questioned,
among others, for the first time, the trial
court’s jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the
challenged decision, considered the
petitioner to have actively participated in
the trial and to have belatedly attacked
the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was
already estopped by laches from
asserting the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to
reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA
affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but
modified the penalty imposed and the
damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari
raising the following issues for our
resolution:
a. Does the fact that the
petitioner failed to raise the issue
of jurisdiction during the trial of
this case, which was initiated and
filed by the public prosecutor
before the wrong court, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine
laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding
the fact that said issue was
immediately raised in petitioner’s
appeal to the Honorable Court of
Appeals? Conversely, does the
active participation of the
petitioner in the trial of his case,
which is initiated and filed not by
him but by the public prosecutor,
amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the
petitioner that it is difficult
to immediately stop a bus while it
is running at 40 kilometers per
hour for the purpose of avoiding
a person who unexpectedly
crossed the road, constitute
enough incriminating evidence to
warrant his conviction for the
crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of
Appeals justified in considering
the place of accident as falling
within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of
the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, and subsequently
ruling that the speed limit thereto
is only 20 kilometers per hour,
when no evidence whatsoever to
that effect was ever presented by
the prosecution during the trial of
this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of
Appeals justified in convicting the
petitioner for homicide through
reckless imprudence (the legally
correct designation is "reckless
imprudence resulting to
homicide") with violation of the
Land Transportation and Traffic
Code when the prosecution did
not prove this during the trial and,
more importantly, the information
filed against the petitioner does
not contain an allegation to that
effect?
 e. Does the uncontroverted
testimony of the defense witness
Leonardo Hernal that the victim
unexpectedly crossed the road
resulting in him getting hit by the
bus driven by the petitioner not
enough evidence to acquit him of
the crime charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that
the jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof.10 In this
case, at the time the criminal information
for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile
Law (now Land Transportation and
Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had
already been amended by Republic Act
No. 7691.12 The said provision thus
reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases.—Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective
of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime
charged herein is prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods or
imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and
1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear
and try the same is conferred on the
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly,
therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not
have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the
Solicitor General acknowledge this fact,
they nevertheless are of the position that
the principle of estoppel by laches has
already precluded the petitioner from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—
the trial went on for 4 years with the
petitioner actively participating therein
and without him ever raising the
jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for
his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter may be raised at any time even
for the first time on appeal. As undue
delay is further absent herein, the
principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of
jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches,
which continuously confounds the bench
and the bar, we shall analyze the various
Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has
declared that unless jurisdiction has
been conferred by some legislative act,
no court or tribunal can act on a matter
submitted to it.14 We went on to state in
U.S. v. De La Santa15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
fatal, and subject to objection at any
stage of the proceedings, either in the
court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. &
Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of
cases there cited), and indeed, where
the subject-matter is not within the
jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the
proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133;
190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59
Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a
judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the
court; it is given only by law and in the
manner prescribed by law and an
objection based on the lack of such
jurisdiction can not be waived by the
parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court
explained:
4. The operation of the principle of
estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the
lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case
was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a
matter of law, and may not be conferred
by consent of the parties or by estoppel"
(5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the
lower court had jurisdiction, and the case
was heard and decided upon a given
theory, such, for instance, as that the
court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not
be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position—that the lower
court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle
of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does
not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus
Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision
that the indictment is void, or has been
granted an instruction based on its
defective character directing the jury to
acquit, he is estopped, when
subsequently indicted, to assert that the
former indictment was valid. In such
case, there may be a new prosecution
whether the indictment in the former
prosecution was good or bad. Similarly,
where, after the jury was impaneled and
sworn, the court on accused's motion
quashed the information on the
erroneous assumption that the court had
no jurisdiction, accused cannot
successfully plead former jeopardy to a
new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec.
252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior
conviction to be set aside on the ground
that the court was without jurisdiction, he
is estopped subsequently to assert, in
support of a defense of previous
jeopardy, that such court had
jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v.
Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the
plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-
appellee therein, made the following
observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after
the decision has been rendered, that the
plaintiff-appellee presents the question of
this Court’s jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on
August 1, 1959. This case was argued
on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding
this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was
never impugned until the adverse
decision of this Court was handed down.
The conduct of counsel leads us to
believe that they must have always been
of the belief that notwithstanding said
enactment of Republic Act 2613 this
Court has jurisdiction of the case, such
conduct being born out of a conviction
that the actual real value of the
properties in question actually exceeds
the jurisdictional amount of this Court
(over ₱200,000). Our minute resolution
in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al.
vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al.,
of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is
applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-
appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief
and submits his case to the Court of
Appeals for decision, without questioning
the latter’s jurisdiction until decision is
rendered therein, should be considered
as having voluntarily waived so much of
his claim as would exceed the
jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for
the reason that a contrary rule would
encourage the undesirable practice of
appellants submitting their cases for
decision to the Court of Appeals in
expectation of favorable judgment, but
with intent of attacking its jurisdiction
should the decision be unfavorable: x x
x20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be
barred by laches from invoking lack of
jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose
of annulling everything done in the case
with the active participation of said party
invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus, we speak of
estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale
demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of
stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean,
136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it
was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject matter of the action or of
the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from
such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice cannot be
tolerated—obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that
after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the
court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc.,
243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct.
283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S.
127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs.
Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that
it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in
a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said
in the three cases mentioned in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of May
20, 1963 (supra)—to the effect that we
frown upon the "undesirable practice" of
a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-
14591, September 26, 1962;
Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young
Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307,
Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100
Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the
time the Surety became a quasi-party on
July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force,
was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to
do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo, as well
as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case
for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect
be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case
since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors
to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this
pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts
and tribunals, in resolving issues that
involve the belated invocation of lack of
jurisdiction, have applied the principle of
estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v.
Ramirez,23 we pointed out that
Sibonghanoy was developing into a
general rule rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by
unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted concept
of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general
rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred
by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that
the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years
after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be
raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is "failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one
who benefited from the plea of lack of
jurisdiction was the one who invoked the
court’s jurisdiction, and who later
obtained an adverse judgment therein,
we refused to apply the ruling in
Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded
supremacy to the time-honored principle
that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after
Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too
plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy
doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became
the rule rather than the exception. As
such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines,
Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, "this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not
supervened." In the instant case,
respondent actively participated in all
stages of the proceedings before the trial
court and invoked its authority by asking
for an affirmative relief. Clearly,
respondent is estopped from challenging
the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially
when an adverse judgment has been
rendered. In PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not
question at all the jurisdiction of the
lower court x x x in its answers to both
the amended complaint and the second
amended complaint. It did so only in its
motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the lower court after it had
received an adverse decision. As this
Court held in Pantranco North Express,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477,
491), participation in all stages of the
case before the trial court, that included
invoking its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively barred
petitioner by estoppel from challenging
the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the
time it filed its answer to the second
amended complaint on April 16, 1985,
petitioner did not question the lower
court’s jurisdiction. It was only on
December 29, 1989 when it filed its
motion for reconsideration of the lower
court’s decision that petitioner raised the
question of the lower court’s lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by
its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs.
Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the
trial court in its 30 September 1996
decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93)
that private respondents (who filed the
petition for reconstitution of titles) failed
to comply with both sections 12 and 13
of RA 26 and therefore, it had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. However, private respondents
never questioned the trial court’s
jurisdiction over its petition for
reconstitution throughout the duration of
LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the
contrary, private respondents actively
participated in the reconstitution
proceedings by filing pleadings and
presenting its evidence. They invoked
the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to
obtain affirmative relief – the
reconstitution of their titles. Private
respondents have thus foreclosed their
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by
their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the
doctrine that while jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a litigant’s
participation in all stages of the case
before the trial court, including the
invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction
(PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297
SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization
Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA
579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs.
Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442
[1998]). The Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and
submitting his case for decision and then
accepting judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse (Producers Bank of the
Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517
[1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric
Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA
36 [1995]). (italics ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005
case of Metromedia Times Corporation
v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of
jurisdiction was raised only in the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after
examining the doctrines of jurisdiction
vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in
Sibonghanoy stands as an exception,
rather than the general rule. Metromedia,
thus, was not estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before
the NLRC on appeal.28 1avvphi1
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v.
Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:
Petitioner argues that the CA’s
affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of
its case was erroneous, considering that
a full-blown trial had already been
conducted. In effect, it contends that lack
of jurisdiction could no longer be used as
a ground for dismissal after trial had
ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on
estoppel by laches, which has been used
quite successfully in a number of cases
to thwart dismissals based on lack of
jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in
which this doctrine was espoused, held
that a party may be barred from
questioning a court’s jurisdiction after
being invoked to secure affirmative relief
against its opponent. In fine, laches
prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction
from being raised for the first time on
appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to
annul everything done in a trial in which
it has actively participated.
Laches is defined as the "failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter
of jurisdiction is, however, the exception
rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches
1avv phi1
may be invoked to bar the issue of lack
of jurisdiction only in cases in which the
factual milieu is analogous to that in the
cited case. In such controversies, laches
should be clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it. That
Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v.
Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by
unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted concept
of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general
rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a
court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is
determined by the averments of the
complaint, not by the defenses contained
in the answer.30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-
Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of
jurisdiction actively took part in the trial
proceedings by presenting a witness to
seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating
the doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the
defense of lack of jurisdiction may be
waived by estoppel through active
participation in the trial. Such, however,
is not the general rule but an exception,
best characterized by the peculiar
circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack
of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen
years and at a stage when the
proceedings had already been elevated
to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the
presence of laches, which was defined
therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.32
And in the more recent Regalado v.
Go,33 the Court again emphasized that
laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,
thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier, it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that
was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on
the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is
the exception rather than the
rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked
to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only
in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In
such controversies, laches should have
been clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction was raised for the first time in
a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety
almost 15 years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered. At several
stages of the proceedings, in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals,
the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for final adjudication
on the merits. It was only when the
adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant
in Sibonghanoy are not present in the
case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado,
after the receipt of the Court of Appeals
resolution finding her guilty of contempt,
promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the said
court’s jurisdiction based on procedural
infirmity in initiating the action. Her
compliance with the appellate court’s
directive to show cause why she should
not be cited for contempt and filing a
single piece of pleading to that effect
could not be considered as an active
participation in the judicial proceedings
so as to take the case within the milieu
of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural
fear to disobey the mandate of the court
that could lead to dire consequences that
impelled her to comply.34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to
apply the exceptional circumstance in
Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the
general rule enunciated as early as in De
La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should,
however, be, as it has always been, that
the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a
litigant from asserting the court’s
absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar
to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a
person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him
from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction
over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by
mere consent of the parties. This is
especially true where the person seeking
to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the
court does not thereby secure any
advantage or the adverse party does not
suffer any harm.35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant
case, the petitioner is in no way
estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that
he raised the lack thereof in his appeal
before the appellate court. At that time,
no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach. True, delay alone,
though unreasonable, will not sustain the
defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it
further appears that the party, knowing
his rights, has not sought to enforce
them until the condition of the party
pleading laches has in good faith
become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights
be then enforced, due to loss of
evidence, change of title, intervention of
equities, and other causes.36 In applying
the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the
Court therein considered the patent and
revolting inequity and unfairness of
having the judgment creditors go up their
Calvary once more after more or less 15
years.37 The same, however, does not
obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being
in the nature of a forfeiture, is not
favored by law. It is to be applied
rarely—only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The
doctrine must be applied with great care
and the equity must be strong in its
favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of
injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment respondent in his answer or motion to
rendered without jurisdiction over the dismiss. Jurisdiction should be
subject matter is void.40 Hence, the determined by considering not only the
Revised Rules of Court provides for status or the relationship of the parties
remedies in attacking judgments but also the nature of the issues or
rendered by courts or tribunals that have questions that is the subject of the
no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. controversy. x x x x The proceedings
No laches will even attach when the before a court or tribunal without
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction, including its decision, are
jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs null and void, hence, susceptible to
of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro direct and collateral attacks.43
v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42
With the above considerations, we find it
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a unnecessary to resolve the other issues
tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer raised in the petition.
or government agency, over the nature
and subject matter of a petition or WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
complaint is determined by the material petition for review on certiorari is
allegations therein and the character of GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-
the relief prayed for, irrespective of 94 is hereby DISMISSED without
whether the petitioner or complainant is prejudice.
entitled to any or all such reliefs.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject SO ORDERED.
matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the
consent or waiver of the parties where
the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the nature or subject
matter of the action. Nor can it be
acquired through, or waived by, any act
or omission of the parties. Moreover,
estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none
over the cause of action. x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or

tribunal is not affected by the defenses
or theories set up by the defendant or
G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
MODESTA CALIMLIM AND
LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and
FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.
Eugenio Ramos for petitioners.
Rogelio P. Closa for respondents.
VASQUEZ, J.:
The dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180
filed by the herein petitioners in the
respondent Court against the private
respondent is sought to be annulled and
set aside by this Petition For Review On
Certiorari.
The antecedent material facts are not
disputed. Sometime in 1961, a judgment
for a sum of money was rendered in
favor of Independent Mercantile
Corporation against a certain Manuel
Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila
in Civil Case No. 85136. After said
judgment became final, a writ of
execution was issued on July 31, 1961.
The Notice of Levy made on September
21, 1961 on a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138
registered in the name of "Domingo
Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim",
specified that the said levy was only
against "all rights, title, action, interest
and participation of the defendant
Manuel Magali over the parcel of land
described in this title. " The Certificate of
Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor
of Independent Mercantile Corporation
also stated that the sale referred only to
the rights and interest of Manuel Magali
over the land described in TCT No.
9138. Manuel Magali is one of the
several children of Domingo Magali who
had died in 1940 and herein petitioner
Modesta Calimlim.
However, when the Sheriff issued the
final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963,
it was erroneously stated therein that the
sale was with respect to "the parcel of
land described in this title" (referring to
TCT No. 9138) and not only over the
rights and interest of Manuel Magali in
the same. The execution of the said final
Deed of Sale was annotated at the back
of said title.
On February 23, 1967, Independent
Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in
the respondent Court to compel Manuel
Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate
of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same
may be cancelled and a new one issued
in the name of the said corporation. Not
being the registered owner and the title
not being in his possession, Manuel
Magali failed to comply with the order of
the Court directing him to surrender the
said title. On June 20, 1967,
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed
an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No.
9138 as cancelled and to issue a new
title in its name. The said petition was
granted by the respondent Court and in
its Order dated July 13, 1967, it directed
the issuance of a new certificate of title in
the name of the Independent Mercantile
Corporation and the cancellation of TCT
No. 9138. By virtue of said Order, the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued
a new title in the name of the
corporation, Identified as TCT No.
68568.
On November 21, 1967, petitioner
Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of
Domingo Magali, upon learning that her
husband's title over the parcel of land
had been cancelled, filed a petition with
the respondent Court, sitting as a
cadastral court, praying for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An
opposition to the said petition was filed
by Independent Mercantile Corporation.
After the parties submitted their
respective Memoranda, the respondent
Court issued an Order dated June 3,
1968 dismissing the petition. (Rollo, pp.
31-38.)
The herein petitioners did not appeal the
dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC
Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of
TCT No. 68568. Instead, on January 11,
1971, they filed the complaint in Civil
Case No. SCC-180 praying for the
cancellation of the conveyances and
sales that had been made with respect to
the property, covered by TCT No. 9138
previously registered in the name of
Domingo Magali, married to Modesta
Calimlim. Named as defendant in said
civil case was herein private respondent
Francisco Ramos who claimed to have
bought the property from Independent
Mercantile Corporation on July 25, 1967.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos,
however, failed to obtain a title over the
property in his name in view of the
existence of an adverse claim annotated
on the title thereof at the instance of the
herein petitioners.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos
filed a Motion To Dismiss Civil Case No.
SCC-180 on the ground that the same is
barred by prior judgement or by statute
of limitations (Rollo. pp. 42-45).
Resolving the said Motion, the
respondent Court, in its Order dated April
21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case No. SCC-
180 on the ground of estoppel by prior
judgment. (Ibid., pp, 10-13.) A Motion
For Reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied by the respondent
Judge in his Order of September 2,
1971. (Ibid., pp. 13-15.) A second Motion
For Reconsideration was similarly denied
in the Order dated September 29, 197 1.
(Rollo, pp. 16-17.) Hence, this Petition.
We find merit in this appeal.
It is error to consider the dismissal of the
petition filed by the herein petitioner in
LRC Record No. 39492 for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar
by prior judgment against the filing of
Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail
of the defense of res judicata, it must be
shown, among others, that the judgment
in the prior action must have been
rendered by a court with the proper
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proceeding in which the prior judgment
or order was rendered. If there is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
suit or of the parties, the judgment or
order cannot operate as an adjudication
of the controversy. (2 Moran Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p.
364.) This essential element of the
defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case
presently considered.
The petition filed by the herein
petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492
was an apparent invocation of the
authority of the respondent Court sitting
as a land registration court, Although the
said petition did not so state, that
reliance was apparently placed on
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.
It has been settled by consistent rulings
of this Court that a court of first instance,
acting as a land registration court, is a
court of limited and special jurisdiction.
As such, its proceedings are not
adequate for the litigation of issues
pertaining to an ordinary civil action,
such as, questions involving ownership
or title to real property. (Bareng vs.
Shintoist Shrine and Japanese Charity
Bureau, 83 SCRA 418; Manalo vs.
Mariano, 69 SCRA 80; In re: Nicanor T
Santos, 102 SCRA 747; Santos vs.
Aquino, 101 SCRA 377.) In Hu chon
Sunpongco vs. Heirs of Nicolas
Ronquillo, L- 27040, December 19,
1970, 36 SCRA 395, we have held that:
Section 112 of Act 496
confers authority upon
the land registration court
to order the cancellation,
alteration or amendment
of a certificate of title but
withdraws from the Court
the power to pass upon
any question concerning
ownership of the
registered property, or
any incident where the
issues involved have
become controversial.
It may hardly be questioned that the
issues raised by the petitioners in their
petition to cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to
the ownership or title over the property
covered thereby. The said petition
presented before the respondent Court
in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction
as a cadastral court, the question of who
should be considered the true and lawful
owner of the parcel of land embraced in
said title. The petitioners alleged therein
that they are the true owners of the
property, and that TCT No. 68568 which
they sought to cancel was issued as a
result of the errors which were not of
their own making. In short, the petition
raised a highly controversial matter
which is beyond the judicial competence
of a cadastral court to pass upon or to
adjudicate.
It may neither be claimed that the parties
have mutually agreed to submit the
aforesaid issues for the determination by
the court, it being a fact that herein
private respondent was not a party in the
petition in LRC Record No. 39492.
Incidentally, although the said petition
was filed by the herein petitioners on
November 21, 1967, the Opposition filed
by Independent Mercantile Corporation
to the said petition made no mention of
the alleged sale of the property in
question in favor of private respondent
Francisco Ramos on July 5, 1967. This
circumstance places in grave doubt the
sincerity of said sale and the claim that
the private respondent was an innocent
purchaser for value of the property in
question.
In the order of the respondent Judge
dated September 29, 1971 denying the
second motion for reconsideration, he
cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29, to uphold the view that the
petitioners are deemed estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court in having taken
cognizance of the petition for
cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they
being the ones who invoked the
jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the
affirmative relief prayed for therein. We
are of the opinion that the ruling laid
down in Sibonghanoy may not be
applied herein. Neither its factual
backdrop nor the philosophy of the
doctrine therein expounded fits the case
at bar.
A rule that had been settled by
unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted concept
of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general
rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred
by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that
the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years
after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be
raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is "failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it."
The petitioners in the instant case may
not be faulted with laches. When they
learned that the title to the property
owned by them had erroneously and
illegally been cancelled and registered in
the name of another entity or person who
had no right to the same, they filed a
petition to cancel the latter's title. It is
unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy,
their counsel had to invoke the authority
of the respondent Court as a cadastral
court, instead of its capacity as a court of
general jurisdiction. Their petition to
cancel the title in the name of
Independent Mercantile Corporation was
dismissed upon a finding by the
respondent Court that the same was
"without merit." No explanation was
given for such dismissal nor why the
petition lacked merit. There was no
hearing, and the petition was resolved
solely on the basis of memoranda filed
by the parties which do not appear of
record. It is even a possibility that such
dismissal was in view of the realization of
the respondent Court that, sitting as a
cadastral court, it lacked the authority to
entertain the petition involving as it does
a highly controversial issue. Upon such
petition being dismissed, the petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180 on
January 1, 1971, or only two and one-
half years after the dismissal of their
petition in LRC Record No. 39492.
Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in
the assertion by the petitioners of their
right to claim the property which rightfully
belongs to them. They can hardly be
presumed to have abandoned or waived
such right by inaction within an
unreasonable length of time or
inexcusable negligence. In short, their
filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in
itself is an implied non-acceptance of the
validity of the proceedings had in LRC
Record No. 39492 may not be deemed
barred by estoppel by laches.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party
by the result of a suit or proceeding
which was taken cognizance of in a court
which lacks jurisdiction over the same
irrespective of the attendant
circumstances. The equitable defense of
estoppel requires knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it
is based. The same thing is true with
estoppel by conduct which may be
asserted only when it is shown, among
others, that the representation must have
been made with knowledge of the facts
and that the party to whom it was made
is ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De
Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The
filing of an action or suit in a court that
does not possess jurisdiction to entertain
the same may not be presumed to be
deliberate and intended to secure a
ruling which could later be annulled if not
favorable to the party who filed such suit
or proceeding. Instituting such an action
is not a one-sided affair. It can just as
well be prejudicial to the one who filed
the action or suit in the event that he
obtains a favorable judgment therein
which could also be attacked for having
been rendered without jurisdiction. The
determination of the correct jurisdiction
of a court is not a simple matter. It can
raise highly debatable issues of such
importance that the highest tribunal of
the land is given the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to entertain the same. The
point simply is that when a party commits
error in filing his suit or proceeding in a
court that lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same, such act may
not at once be deemed sufficient basis of
estoppel. It could have been the result of
an honest mistake, or of divergent
interpretations of doubtful legal
provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to
a party taking such course of action, part
of the blame should be placed on the
court which shall entertain the suit,
thereby lulling the parties into believing
that they pursued their remedies in the
correct forum. Under the rules, it is the
duty of the court to dismiss an action
"whenever it appears that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter."
(Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should
the court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of
jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid),
within ten (10) years from the finality of
the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
The inequity of barring the petitioners
from vindicating their right over their
property in Civil Case No. SCC-180 is
rendered more acute in the face of the
undisputed fact that the property in
question admittedly belonged to the
petitioners, and that the title in the name
of the private respondent was the result
of an error committed by the Provincial
Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the
execution proceeding. The justness of
the relief sought by herein petitioners
may not be ignored or rendered futile by
reason of a doctrine which is of highly
doubtful applicability herein.
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed
from are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Motion To Dismiss filed by
the private respondent in Civil Case No.
SCC-180 shall be deemed denied and
the respondent Court is ordered to
conduct further proceedings in the case.
With costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143951 October 25, 2005
Norma Mangaliag and Narciso
Solano, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral,
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 1st
Judicial Region, San Carlos City,
(Pangasinan), Branch 56 and
Apolinario Serquina, Jr., Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari, with
a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, to set aside the Order
dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 56, San Carlos City
in Civil Case No. SCC-2240, which
denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss;
and the Order dated June 13, 2000,
which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as
follows:
On May 10, 1999, private respondent
Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the
RTC a complaint for damages against
petitioners Norma Mangaliag and
Narciso Solano. The complaint alleges
that: on January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to
10:00 a.m., private respondent, together
with Marco de Leon, Abner Mandapat
and Manuel de Guzman, was on board a
tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte; while in
Pagal, San Carlos City, a dump truck
owned by petitioner Mangaliag and
driven by her employee, petitioner
Solano, coming from the opposite
direction, tried to overtake and bypass a
tricycle in front of it and thereby
encroached the left lane and sideswiped
the tricycle ridden by private respondent;
due to the gross negligence,
carelessness and imprudence of
petitioner Solano in driving the truck,
private respondent and his co-
passengers sustained serious injuries
and permanent deformities; petitioner
Mangaliag failed to exercise due
diligence required by law in the selection
and supervision of her employee; private
respondent was hospitalized and spent
₱71,392.00 as medical expenses;
private respondent sustained a
permanent facial deformity due to a
fractured nose and suffers from severe
depression as a result thereof, for which
he should be compensated in the
amount of ₱500,000.00 by way of moral
damages; as a further result of his
hospitalization, private respondent lost
income of ₱25,000.00; private
respondent engaged the services of
counsel on a contingent basis equal to
25% of the total award.1
On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their
answer with counterclaim denying that
private respondent has a cause of action
against them. They attributed fault or
negligence in the vehicular accident on
the tricycle driver, Jayson Laforte, who
was allegedly driving without license.2
Following pre-trial conference, trial on
the merits ensued. When private
respondent rested his case, petitioner
Solano testified in his defense.
Subsequently, on March 8, 2000,
petitioners, assisted by a new counsel,
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim, alleging that the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has
jurisdiction over the case since the
principal amount prayed for, in the
amount of ₱71,392.00, falls within its
jurisdiction.3 Private respondent opposed
petitioners’ motion to dismiss.4 On March
24, 2000, petitioners filed a supplement
in support of their motion to dismiss.5
On April 17, 2000, the respondent RTC
Judge, Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral,
issued the first assailed Order denying
petitioners’ motion to dismiss,6 relying
upon the mandate of Administrative
Circular No. 09-94, paragraph 2 of which
reads:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of
whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19
(8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied
to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.
The respondent RTC Judge also cited
the 1999 case of Ong vs. Court of
Appeals,7 where an action for damages
due to a vehicular accident, with prayer
for actual damages of ₱10,000.00 and
moral damages of ₱1,000,000.00, was
tried in a RTC.
On May 19, 2000, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration8 but it was
denied by the respondent RTC Judge in
her second assailed Order, dated June
13, 2000.9
Hence, the present petition
for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order.10
On August 9, 2000, the Court resolved to
issue the temporary restraining order
prayed for by petitioners. Consequently,
the respondent RTC Judge desisted
from hearing further Civil Case No. SCC-
2240.11
Petitioners propound this issue for
consideration: In an action for recovery
of damages, does the amount of actual
damages prayed for in the complaint
provide the sole test for determining the
court’s jurisdiction, or is the total amount
of all the damages claimed, regardless of
kind and nature, such as moral,
exemplary, nominal damages, and
attorney’s fees, etc., to be computed
collectively with the actual damages to
determine what court – whether the MTC
or the RTC – has jurisdiction over the
action?
Petitioners maintain that the court’s
jurisdiction should be based exclusively
on the amount of actual damages,
excluding therefrom the amounts
claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal
damages and attorney’s fee, etc. They
submit that the specification in
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that "in
cases where the claim for damages is
the main cause of action. . . the amount
of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the
court" signifies that the court’s
jurisdiction must be tested solely by the
amount of that damage which is
principally and primarily demanded, and
not the totality of all the damages sought
to be recovered.
Petitioners insist that private
respondent’s claim for actual damages in
the amount of ₱71,392.00 is the principal
and primary demand, the same being the
direct result of the alleged negligence of
petitioners, while the moral damages for
₱500,000.00 and attorney’s fee, being
the consequent effects thereof, may
prosper only upon a prior finding by the
court of the existence of petitioners’
negligence that caused the actual
damages. Considering that the amount
of actual damages claimed by private
respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-2240
does not exceed ₱200,000.00, which
was then the jurisdictional amount of the
MTC, the jurisdiction over the case
clearly pertains to the MTC, and not to
the RTC. Therefore, the RTC should
have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners cite as relevant
the case of Movers-Baseco Integrated
Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing
Corporation12 wherein the Court, in
disposing of the jurisdictional issue,
limited its consideration only to the actual
or compensatory damages.
Furthermore, while admitting that the
defense of lack of jurisdiction was only
raised during the trial, petitioners
nevertheless contend that jurisdiction
may be raised anytime, even after
judgment, but before it is barred by
laches or estoppel. They submit that they
seasonably presented the objection to
the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction, i.e., during
the trial stage where no decision had as
yet been rendered, must less one
unfavorable to them.
At any rate, they argue that when the
jurisdictional flaw is evident from the
record of the case, the court may, even
without the urgings of the parties, take
judicial notice of such fact, and
thereupon dismiss the case motu
proprio. Thus, even if lack of jurisdiction
was not initially raised in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, no waiver may
be imputed to them.
Private respondent, on the other hand,
submits that in an action for recovery of
damages arising from a tortious act, the
claim of moral damages is not merely an
incidental or consequential claim but
must be considered in the amount of
demand which will determine the court’s
jurisdiction. He argues that the position
taken by petitioners is a misreading of
paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular
No. 09-94. The clear and explicit
language of said circular leaves no room
for doubt; hence, needs no
interpretation.
He further submits that petitioners’
reliance on Movers-Baseco Integrated
Port Services, Inc. is misplaced since
that case is for recovery of the value of
vehicle and unpaid rentals on the lease
of the same. He contends that Section
18, paragraph 8 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, upon which petitioners anchor
their stand, refers to all the demands
involving collection of sums of money
based on obligations arising from
contract, express or implied, where the
claim for damages is just incidental
thereto and it does not apply to actions
for damages based on obligations arising
from quasi-delict where the claim for
damages of whatever kind is the main
action.
Private respondent also contends that,
being incapable of pecuniary
computation, the amount of moral
damages that he may be awarded
depends on the sound discretion of the
trial court, not restrained by the limitation
of the jurisdictional amount. Should the
Court follow petitioners’ line of
reasoning, private respondent argues
that it will result in an absurd situation
where he can only be awarded moral
damages of not more than ₱200,000.00
although he deserves more than this
amount, taking into consideration his
physical suffering, as well as social and
financial standing, simply because his
claim for actual damages does not
exceed ₱200,000.00 which amount falls
under the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Lastly, he asserts that it is too late in the
day for petitioners to question the
jurisdiction of the RTC since they are
estopped from invoking this ground. He
contends that after actively taking part in
the trial proceedings and presenting a
witness to seek exoneration, it would be
unfair and legally improper for petitioners
to seek the dismissal of the case.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress
that generally a direct recourse to this
Court is highly improper, for it violates
the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts. Although this Court, the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals (CA) have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum. This Court is a court of
last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition.13
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as
cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction.14 Such exceptional
and compelling circumstances were
present in the following cases:
(a) Chavez vs. Romulo15 on the citizens’
right to bear arms; (b) Government of the
United States of America vs.
Purganan16 on bail in extradition
proceedings; (c) Commission on
Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla17 on a
government contract on the
modernization and computerization of
the voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora[18] on the
status and existence of a public office;
and (e) Fortich vs. Corona19 on the so-
called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office
of the President which modified the
approval of the conversion to agro-
industrial area of a 144-hectare land.
Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of
courts is not an iron-clad rule. It
generally applies to cases involving
warring factual allegations. For this
reason, litigants are required to repair to
the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these
contending allegations on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Cases which
depend on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before
appellate courts as they are not triers of
facts.20 Therefore, a strict application of
the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought
before the appellate courts do not
involve factual but legal questions.
In the present case, petitioners submit a
pure question of law involving the
interpretation and application of
paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular
No. 09-94. This legal question and in
order to avoid further delay are
compelling enough reasons to allow
petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction in the first instance.
Before resolving this issue, the Court
shall deal first on the question of
estoppel posed by private respondent.
Private respondent argues that the
defense of lack of jurisdiction may be
waived by estoppel through active
participation in the trial. Such, however,
is not the general rule but an exception,
best characterized by the peculiar
circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy.21 In Sibonghanoy, the
party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so
only after fifteen years and at a stage
when the proceedings had already been
elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the
presence of laches, which was defined
therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.22
As enunciated in Calimlim vs.
Ramirez,23 this Court held:
A rule that had been settled by
unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstances
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted concept
of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general
rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
...
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party
by the result of a suit or proceeding
which was taken cognizance of in a court
which lacks jurisdiction over the same
irrespective of the attendant
circumstances. The equitable defense of
estoppel requires knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it
is based. The same thing is true with
estoppel by conduct which may be
asserted only when it is shown, among
others, that the representation must have
been made with knowledge of the facts
and that the party to whom it was made
is ignorant of the truth of the matter (De
Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623). The
filing of an action or suit in a court that
does not possess jurisdiction to entertain
the same may not be presumed to be
deliberate and intended to secure a
ruling which could later be annulled if not
favorable to the party who filed such suit
or proceeding. Instituting such an action
is not a one-sided affair. It can just as
well be prejudicial to the one who file the
action or suit in the event that he obtains
a favorable judgment therein which could
also be attacked for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. The
determination of the correct jurisdiction
of a court is not a simple matter. It can
raise highly debatable issues of such
importance that the highest tribunal of
the land is given the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to entertain the same. The
point simply is that when a party commits
error in filing his suit or proceeding in a
court that lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same, such act may
not at once be deemed sufficient basis of
estoppel. It could have been the result of
an honest mistake or of divergent
interpretations of doubtful legal
provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to
a party taking such course of action, part
of the blame should be placed on the
court which shall entertain the suit,
thereby lulling the parties into believing
that they pursued their remedies in the
correct forum. Under the rules, it is the
duty of the court to dismiss an action
"whenever it appears that court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter."
(Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court)
Should the Court render a judgment
without jurisdiction, such judgment may
be impeached or annulled for lack of
jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid),
within ten (10) years from the finality of
the same (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code).24
In the present case, no judgment has yet
been rendered by the RTC.25 As a matter
of fact, as soon as the petitioners
discovered the alleged jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or neglect to file
the appropriate motion to dismiss.
Hence, finding the pivotal element of
laches to be absent,
the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not
control the present controversy. Instead,
the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings must apply.
Therefore, petitioners are not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
In any event, the petition for certiorari is
bereft of merit.
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691, which took effect on April 15,
1994, provides inter alia that where the
amount of the demand in civil cases
exceeds ₱100,000.00,26 exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is
lodged with in the RTC. Under Section 3
of the same law, where the amount of
the demand in the complaint does not
exceed ₱100,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the
same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial
Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court. The jurisdictional amount was
increased to ₱200,000.00,27 effective
March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section
528 of R.A. No. 7691 and Administrative
Circular No. 21-99.
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94
dated March 14, 1994, the Court
specified the guidelines in the
implementation of R.A. No. 7691.
Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of
whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19
(8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied
to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the
court. (Emphasis supplied)
The well-entrenched principle is that the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and
the law, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or
some of the claims or reliefs sought
therein.29 In the present case, the
allegations in the complaint plainly show
that private respondent seeks to recover
not only his medical expenses, lost
income but also damages for physical
suffering and mental anguish due to
permanent facial deformity from injuries
sustained in the vehicular accident.
Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the
present case falls squarely within the
purview of Article 2219 (2),30 which
provides for the payment of moral
damages in cases of quasi-delict causing
physical injuries.
Private respondent’s claim for moral
damages of ₱500,000.00 cannot be
considered as merely incidental to or a
consequence of the claim for actual
damages. It is a separate and distinct
cause of action or an independent
actionable tort. It springs from the right of
a person to the physical integrity of his or
her body, and if that integrity is violated,
damages are due and
assessable.31 Hence, the demand for
moral damages must be considered as a
separate cause of action, independent of
the claim for actual damages and must
be included in determining the
jurisdictional amount, in clear
consonance with paragraph 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s
jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict
causing physical injuries would only be
based on the claim for actual damages
and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it
can only award moral damages in an breach of contract in view of the
amount within its jurisdictional limitations, provisions of Article 222035 of the Civil
a situation not intended by the framers of Code.
the law.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is
It must be remembered that moral convinced that the respondent RTC
damages, though incapable of pecuniary Judge committed no grave abuse of
estimation, are designed to compensate discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
and alleviate in some way the physical dated April 17, 2000 and June 13, 2000.
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded WHEREFORE, the instant petition
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
and similar injury unjustly caused a merit. The temporary restraining order
person.32 Moral damages are awarded to issued by this Court on August 9, 2000 is
enable the injured party to obtain means, LIFTED.
diversions or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he/she The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56,
has undergone, by reason of the San Carlos City is DIRECTED to
defendant’s culpable action. Its award is continue with the trial proceedings in
aimed at restoration, as much as Civil Case No. SCC-2240 and resolve
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; the case with dispatch.
thus, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Since each case must
Costs against petitioners.
be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances, there is no hard and fast
rule in determining the proper amount.33 SO ORDERED.
The petitioners’ reliance in the case
of Movers-Baseco Integrated Port
Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing
Corporation34 is misplaced. The claim for
damages therein was based on a breach
of a contract of lease, not a quasi-delict
causing physical injuries, as in this case.
Besides, there was no claim therein for
moral damages. Furthermore, moral
damages are generally not recoverable
in damage actions predicated on a
G.R. No. 169700 July 30, 2009
APOLONIA BANAYAD
FRIANELA, Petitioner,
vs.
SERVILLANO BANAYAD,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the June 17, 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 53929, and the August
17, 2005 Resolution2denying the motion
for partial reconsideration thereof.
Narrated in brief are the antecedent facts
and proceedings, to wit:
Following the death of her uncle, the
testator Moises F. Banayad, petitioner,
who was named as devisee in the will,
filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, on June 3, 1991,
Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P3 for the allowance
of the November 18, 1985 holographic
will of the decedent. Petitioner alleged
that Moises died without issue and left to
her the following properties, namely: (1)
a parcel of land situated in Pasay City
and described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 9741; (2) images of Oracion del
Huerto and Pieta including the crown;
and (3) all personal belongings.4
Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner,
filed his opposition and counter-
petitioned for the allowance of two other
holographic wills of the decedent, one
dated September 27, 1989 and another
dated September 28, 1989.5
After trial on the merits, the RTC, on
September 29, 1995, rendered its
Decision6 declaring the September 27,
1989 holographic will as having revoked
the November 18, 1985 will, allowing the
former, and appointing respondent as
administrator of Moises’s estate.7
On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June
17, 2005 Decision,8 modified the decision
of the trial court and ruled that the
September 27, 1989 holographic will had
only revoked the November 18, 1985 will
insofar as the testamentary disposition of
Moises’s real property was concerned.9
With the denial of her motion for
reconsideration in the further assailed
August 17, 2005 Resolution,10 petitioner
elevated the case before us via the
instant petition.11
The Court notes that the trial court
focused all of its attention on the merits
of the case without first determining
whether it could have validly exercised
jurisdiction to hear and decide Sp. Proc.
No. 3664-P. On appeal, the appellate
court also overlooked the issue on the
jurisdictional competence of the trial
court over the said case. This Court,
after a meticulous review of the records,
finds that the RTC of Pasay City had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter in Sp.
Proc. No. 3664-P.
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the
action unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application
thereof.12 Jurisdiction is moreover
determined by the allegations or
averments in the complaint or petition.13
In this case, at the time the petition for
the allowance of Moises’s holographic
will was instituted, the then Sections 19
and 3314 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
12915 were in force, thus—
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
— Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate
and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds twenty thousand
pesos (₱20,000.00);
xxxx
SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil
cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate, including the grant
of provisional remedies in proper cases,
where the demand does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos exclusive of
interest and costs but inclusive of
damages of whatever kind, the amount
of which must be specifically alleged:
Provided, That where there are several
claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims
in all the causes of action irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out
of the same or different transactions; and
xxxx
The applicable law, therefore, confers
jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over
probate proceedings depending on the
gross value of the estate,16 which value
must be alleged in the complaint or
petition to be filed. Significantly, in this
1avv phi 1
case, the original petition docketed
before the trial court contains only the
following averments:
xxxx
1. That Petitioner is of legal age,
married, Filipino and residing at
2237 P. Burgos St., Pasay City
who is named devisee in the Last
Will and Testament of MOISES
BANAYAD, deceased who died
in Pasay City General Hospital
on March 27, 1991 xerox copy of
his death certificate is herewith
attached as Annex "A" to form
integral part hereof;
2. That the said Last Will and
Testament is herewith (sic)
attached as Annex "B" and made
an integral part of this Petition,
the original thereof will be
presented to this Honorable
Court at the time of probate;
3. That the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines and
residing at 2237 P. Burgos St.,
Pasay City at the time of his
death;
4. That the properties left by the
decedent consist of real and
personal properties particularly
described herein below, which
decedent all bequeathed to
petitioner;
A. A parcel of land
described under TCT No.
9741 xerox copy of which
is herewith (sic) attached
as Annex "C".
B. Imahen ng Oracion del
Huerto at Pieta, kasama
and korona.
C. All personal
belongings.
5. That the testator at the time of
the execution of the said Will was
of sound and disposing mind.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully
prayed of the Honorable Court that:
a. Upon proper notice and
hearing, the above mentioned
Will be admitted to probate;
b. That letters testamentary or
administration be issued to
herein petitioner without bond;
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs just
and equitable in (sic) the premises.
x x x x17
Nowhere in the petition is there a
statement of the gross value of Moises’s
estate. Thus, from a reading of the
original petition filed, it cannot be
determined which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the
proceedings.18 The RTC therefore
committed gross error when it had
perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction
despite the fact that the initiatory
pleading filed before it did not call for the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC
should have, at the outset, dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted
that the dismissal on the said ground
may be ordered motu proprio by the
courts.19 Further, the CA, on appeal,
should have dismissed the case on the
same ground. Settled is the doctrine that
the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by
any of the parties or may be reckoned by
the court, at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not
lost by waiver or by estoppel.20
Despite the pendency of this case for
around 18 years, the exception laid down
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 and clarified
recently in Figueroa v. People22 cannot
be applied. First, because, as a general
rule, the principle of estoppel by laches
cannot lie against the government.23 No
injustice to the parties or to any third
person will be wrought by the ruling that
the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
instituted probate proceedings.
Second and most important, because in
Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of
jurisdiction has been made during the
execution stage of a final and executory
ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the Court
has emphasized that estoppel by laches
only supervenes in exceptional cases
similar to the factual milieu in Tijam. It is
well to note the following factual setting
of Tijam:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month
after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948
— the spouses Serafin Tijam and
Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case
No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00,
with legal interest thereon from the date
of the filing of the complaint until the
whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As
prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the
same was soon dissolved upon the filing
of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on
the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons
the defendants filed their answer in
which, after making some admissions
and denials of the material averments of
the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was
answered by the plaintiffs.
1avvphi1
After trial upon the issues thus joined,
the Court rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, upon
motion of the latter, the Court issued a
writ of execution against the defendants.
The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against
the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal pp.
46-49), against which the Surety filed a
written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two
grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand
upon the Surety for the payment of the
amount due under the judgment. Upon
these grounds the Surety prayed the
Court not only to deny the motion for
execution against its counter-bond but
also the following affirmative relief: "to
relieve the herein bonding company of its
liability, if any, under the bond in
question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied
this motion on the ground solely that no
previous demand had been made on the
Surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment. Thereafter the necessary
demand was made, and upon failure of
the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a second motion for
execution against the counter-bond. On
the date set for the hearing thereon, the
Court, upon motion of the Surety's
counsel, granted the latter a period of
five days within which to answer the
motion. Upon its failure to file such
answer, the Court granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ
was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to
quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section
17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As
the Court denied the motion, the Surety
appealed to the Court of Appeals from
such order of denial and from the one
denying its motion for reconsideration
(Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then
printed as required by the Rules, and in
due time it filed its brief raising therein no
other question but the ones covered by
the following assignment of errors:
"I. That the Honorable Court a
quo erred in issuing its order
dated November 2, 1957, by
holding the incident as submitted
for resolution, without a summary
hearing and compliance with the
other mandatory requirements
provided for in Section 17, Rule
59 of the Rules of Court.
"II. That the Honorable Court a
quo erred in ordering the
issuance of execution against the
herein bonding company-
appellant.
"III. That the Honorable Court a
quo erred in denying the motion
to quash the writ of execution
filed by the herein bonding
company- appellant as well as its
subsequent motion for
reconsideration, and/or in not
quashing or setting aside the writ
of execution."
Not one of the assignment of errors — it
is obvious raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their
brief, the Court of Appeals, on December
11, 1962, decided the case affirming the
orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the
Surety received notice of the decision, it
filed a motion asking for extension of
time within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in its resolution of
January 10 of the same year. Two days
later the Surety filed a pleading entitled
MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that appellees' action was
filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery
of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a
month before that date Republic Act No.
296, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948, had already become
effective, Section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the
value of the subject-matter or the amount
of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and
costs; that the Court of First Instance
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. Upon these premises
the Surety's motion prayed the Court of
Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of
January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals
required the appellees to answer the
motion to dismiss, but they failed to do
so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same
year, the Court resolved to set aside its
decision and to certify the case to Us.
x x x x24
Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack
of jurisdiction has only been raised
during the execution stage, specifically
when the matter of the trial court’s denial
of the surety’s motion to quash the writ of
execution has been brought to the
appellate court for review. Here, the trial
court’s assumption of unauthorized
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings
has been discovered by the Court during
the appeal stage of the main case, not
during the execution stage of a final and
executory decision. Thus, the
exceptional rule laid down in Tijam
cannot apply.
Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the action, all the proceedings therein,
including the decision rendered, are null
and void.25 With the above disquisition,
the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss
and resolve the other issues raised in the
petition.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING,
Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204444 January 14,
2015
VIRGILIO C. BRIONES, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CASH ASIA
CREDIT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are
the Decision2 dated March 5, 2012 and
the Resolution3 dated October 4, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 117474, which annulled the Orders
dated September 20, 20104 and October
22, 20105 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 173 (RTC) in Civil Case
No. 10-124040, denying private
respondent Cash Asia Credit
Corporation's (Cash Asia) motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper
venue.
The Facts
The instant case arose from a
Complaint6 dated August 2, 2010 filed by
Virgilio C. Briones (Briones) for Nullity of
Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note,
Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of
Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 290846,
and Damages against Cash Asia before
the RTC.7 In his complaint, Briones
alleged that he is the owner of a property
covered by TCT No. 160689 (subject
property), and that, on July 15, 2010, his
sister informed him that his property had
been foreclosed and a writ of possession
had already been issued in favor of Cash
Asia.8 Upon investigation, Briones
discovered that: (a) on December 6,
2007, he purportedly executed a
promissory note,9 loan agreement,10 and
deed of real estate mortgage11 covering
the subject property (subject contracts)
in favor of Cash Asia in order to obtain a
loan in the amount of ₱3,500,000.00
from the latter;12 and (b) since the said
loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia
proceeded to foreclose his property.13 In
this relation, Briones claimed that he
never contracted any loans from Cash
Asia as he has been living and working
in Vietnam since October 31, 2007. He
further claimed that he only went back to
the Philippines on December 28, 2007
until January 3, 2008 to spend the
holidays with his family, and that during
his brief stay in the Philippines, nobody
informed him of any loan agreement
entered into with Cash Asia. Essentially,
Briones assailed the validity of the
foregoing contracts claiming his
signature to be forged.14
For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to
Dismiss15 dated August 25, 2010, praying
for the outright dismissal of Briones’s
complaint on the ground of improper
venue.16 In this regard, Cash Asia pointed
out the venue stipulation in the subject
contracts stating that "all legal actions
arising out of this notice in connection
with the Real Estate Mortgage subject
hereof shall only be brought in or
submitted tothe jurisdiction of the proper
court of Makati City."17 In view thereof, it
contended that all actions arising out of
the subject contracts may only be
exclusively brought in the courts of
Makati City, and as such, Briones’s
complaint should be dismissed for
having been filed in the City of Manila.18
In response, Briones filed an
opposition,19 asserting, inter alia, that he
should not be covered by the venue
stipulation in the subject contracts as he
was never a party therein. He also
reiterated that his signatures on the said
contracts were forgeries.20
The RTC Ruling
In an Order21 dated September 20, 2010,
the RTC denied Cash Asia’s motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. In denying the
motion, the RTC opined that the parties
must be afforded the right to be heard in
view of the substance of Briones’s cause
of action against Cash Asia as stated in
the complaint.22
Cash Asia moved for
reconsideration23 which was, however,
denied in an Order24 dated October 22,
2010. Aggrieved, it filed a petition for
certiorari25 before the CA.
 The CA Ruling
In a Decision26 dated March 5, 2012, the
CA annulled the RTC Orders, and
accordingly, dismissed Briones’s
complaint without prejudice to the filing
of the same before the proper court in
Makati City.27 It held that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying Cash
Asia’s motion to dismiss, considering that
the subject contracts clearly provide that
actions arising therefrom should be
exclusively filed before the courts of
Makati City only.28 As such, the CA
concluded that Briones’s complaint
should have been dismissed outright on
the ground of improper venue,29 this,
notwithstanding Briones’s claim of
forgery.
Dissatisfied, Briones moved for
reconsideration,30 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution31 dated October 4,
2012, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s
resolution is whether or not the CA
gravely abused its discretion in ordering
the outright dismissal of Briones’s
complaint on the ground of improper
venue.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court stresses that "[t]o
justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner] must
satisfactorily show that the court or
quasi-judicial authority gravely abused
the discretion conferred upon it. Grave
abuse of discretion connotes judgment
exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’
discretion must be exercised in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law."32 Guided by
the foregoing considerations, the Court
finds that the CA gravely abused its
discretion in ordering the outright
dismissal of Briones’s complaint against
Cash Asia, without prejudice to its re-
filing before the proper court in Makati
City.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the
rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. —
Actions affecting title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall
be commenced and tried in the municipal
trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All
other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.
SEC. 3. Venue of actions against
nonresidents. — If any of the defendants
does not resideand is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff, or any
property of said defendant located in the
Philippines,the action may be
commenced and tried in the court of the
place where the plaintiff resides, or
where the property or any portion thereof
is situated or found.
SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable. —
This Rule shall not apply –
(a) In those cases where a
specific rule or law provides
otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have
validly agreed in writing before
 the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.
Based therefrom, the general rule is that
the venue of real actions is the court
which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated; while the
venue of personal actions is the court
which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff
or the defendant resides, at the election
of the plaintiff. As an exception,
jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the
Phils.33 instructs that the parties, thru a
written instrument, may either introduce
another venue where actions arising
from such instrument may be filed, or
restrict the filing of said actions in a
certain exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded
from agreeing in writing on an exclusive
venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the
same rule. Written stipulations as to
venue may be restrictive in the sense
that the suit may be filed only in the
place agreed upon, or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suitnot
only in the place agreed upon but also in
the places fixed by law. As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the
parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on
venue, jurisprudence instructs that it
must be shown thatsuch stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying
1âw phi1
or restrictive words, such as
"exclusively," "waiving for this purpose
any other venue," "shall only" preceding
the designation of venue, "to the
exclusion of the other courts," or words
of similar import, the stipulation should
be deemed as merely an agreement on
an additional forum,not as limiting venue
to the specified place.34 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this relation, case law likewise
provides that in cases where the
complaint assails only the terms,
conditions, and/or coverage of a written
instrument and not its validity, the
exclusive venue stipulation contained
therein shall still be binding on the
parties, and thus, the complaint may be
properly dismissed on the ground of
improper venue.35 Conversely, therefore,
a complaint directly assailing the validity
of the written instrument itself should not
be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should
be filed in accordance with the general
rules on venue. To be sure, it would be
inherently consistent for a complaint of
this nature to recognize the exclusive
venue stipulation when it, in fact,
precisely assails the validity of the
instrument in which such stipulation is
contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found
in the subject contracts is indeed
restrictive in nature, considering that it
effectively limits the venue of the actions
arising therefrom to the courts of Makati
City. However, it must be emphasized
that Briones' s complaint directly assails
the validity of the subject contracts,
claiming forgery in their execution. Given
this circumstance, Briones cannot be
expected to comply with the aforesaid
venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit
recognition of their validity. Hence,
pursuant to the general rules on venue,
Briones properly filed his complaint
before a court in the City of Manila where
the subject property is located.
In conclusion, the CA patently erred and
hence committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Briones's
complaint on the ground of improper
venue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated March 5, 2012 and the Resolution
dated October 4, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117474 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Orders dated September 20, 2010
and October 22, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 173 in Civil
Case No. 10-124040 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.