CASE #3

Suntay vs. Suntay

Facts:
Jose Suntay, a Filipino resident citizen, died in Amoy, China. He entered into a contract
of marriage twice in his lifetime. He had children by his first marriage with Manuela Cruz,
including appellee Federico. He also had a son, appellant Silvino, by his second marriage
with Maria Natividad, who survived him. Intestate proceedings were
instituted in CFI Bulacan. On October 15, 1934, his widow filed a petition in CFI Bulacan
for the probate of his last will and testament, claimed to have been executed and signed
in the Philippines in November 1929. Said petition was denied because of the
loss of the will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof.
The probate court dismissed the petition. In the meantime, the Pacificwar supervened. After l
iberation, Silvino filed a petition in the intestate proceedings prayingfor the probate of the will
executed in the Philippines in November 1929 or of the will executedin Amoy, China in Janu
ary 1931. He claimed that he had found among the files, records anddocuments of his late fa
ther, a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed bythe deceased in Jan
uary 1931, and that the same was filed, recorded, and probated in theAmoy District Court in
China. The CFI disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in
November 1929 and the alleged last will and testament executed in Amoy, China.
Issue:
Whether or not the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China should be allowed.
Held:
No, it should not be allowed because certain facts as to the due execution of the China
will were not established. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Rule 78 provide that wills proved
and allowed in a foreign country according to the laws of such country maybe allowed,
filed, and recorded by the proper CFI in the Philippines provided that a copy
of such will and the allowance thereof be duly authenticated and filed with a petition
for allowance in the Philippines in the court having jurisdiction. Such court shall fix a time
and place for the hearing and cause the notice thereof to be given. If it appears at the
hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a
certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court,
to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk.
Thus, the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
In the case at bar, the fact that the court in Amoy, China is a probate court must be
proved. The law in China on the procedure for the allowance of wills must also be
proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 must also
be established by competent evidence. The case does not present proof on these
points. Hence, the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China should not be allowed
in Philippine jurisdiction.

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CASE #11
Tumang vs. Laguio (G.R. No. L-50277 February 14, 1980)

Facts: The widow of the deceased Dominador Tumang, Magdalena A. Tumang,

administratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings
definitely terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her children. The petition
was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs had already acknowledged receipt of the
properties adjudicated to them, and in order for such properties to be transferred in their
names, there was need for an order of the court declaring the proceedings closed with respect
to the aforesaid heirs. The petition was opposed by appellee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio and
her children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix and executrix, had not yet delivered
all properties adjudicated to them and that there could be no partial termination of the
proceedings.
Tumang, as required by the court, filed a "Compliance", alleging that the estate and
inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that as certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court, no claim
has been presented that has not already delivered all the properties and dividends of the
shares of stock adjudicated to her and her minor children since the approval of the original
and amendatory projects of partition; and that with such admission, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to entertain the motion under consideration.
In view thereof, the opposition and the motion for reconsideration was denied, the court
ratiocinating that counter-petitioner's receipt of the cash dividends in question without first
requiring the administratrix the accounting being sought to be rendered for purposes of
determining the correctness of the cash dividends, constituted a waiver to question its
correctness.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have waived the right to demand accounting.
Ruling:
No, the right to demand accounting have not been waived.
The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of
an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that has to be
performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed
and terminated, to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The
fact that the final accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to
require supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that
"he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly
settled.

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CASE #15
AUGUSTO COSIO and BEATRIZ COSIO DE RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
CHERIE PALILEO, respondent.

G.R. No. L-18452 May 31, 1965

FACTS

Respondent Cherie Palileo bought a two-story building from Felicisima Vda. de Barza who
paid part of the purchase price and mortgaged the house to secure the payment of the
balance. Palileo defaulted in her obligation, because of which the mortgage was foreclosed
and the house was advertised for sale. However, respondent Palileo was able to raise money
before the house could be sold at public auction. On this date, respondent Palileo received
from petitioner Beatriz Cosio de Rama the sum of P12,000 in consideration of which she
signed a document entitled "Conditional Sale of Residential Building," purporting to convey to
petitioner Cosio de Rama the, house in question. Under this document, the right to repurchase
the house within one year was reserved to respondent Palileo the same day, the parties
entered into an agreement by respondent Palileo remained in possession of the house as
tenant, paying petitioner Cosio de Rama a monthly rental of P250.
Petitioner Cosio de Rama subsequently insured the house against fire. fire broke out in the
house and partly destroyed the same. For the loss, petitioner Cosio de Rama was paid
P13,107 by the insurance company.
At the instance of his sister, petitioner Cosio de Rama, the other
petitioner Augusto Cosio entered the premises and began the repair of the house. Soon after
an action was filed by respondent Palileo against Cosio de Rama for the reformation of the
deed of pacto de retro sale into a loan with an equitable mortgage. This case was filed in. the
Court of First Instance of Rizal on December 4, 1952. One week after (December 11),
respondent Palileo filed another action in the Municipal Court of Pasay City, this time seeking
the ejectment of petitioner Cosio who, it was alleged, had entered and occupied the house
without the knowledge and consent of respondent Palileo. Just the same, however, repair
work went on and although at times interrupted it was finally completed in 1953 at a cost of
P12,000.
Meanwhile the ejectment suit was dismissed by the Municipal Court.
Respondent Palileo appealed to the Court of First Instance of Pasig, but the case was again
dismissed, this time for failure of respondent Palileo to prosecute. The dismissal of the case
was subsequently made "without Prejudice."
In the other case, respondent Palileo was successful. Both the lower court and this Court
declared the transaction of the parties to be a loan with an equitable mortgage and not a
conditional sale. It was found that the amount of P12,000, which purported to be the price,
was in fact a loan; that the amount of P250 paid every month as rent w in reality interest; and
that the house allegedly sold was intended to be a security for the loan. Accordingly, this Court
directed petitioner Cosio de Rama to return to respondent Palileo the sum of P810 which she
had collected as interest in excess of that allowed by law. This Court likewise ruled that
petitioner Cosio de Rama could keep the proceeds of the fire insurance but that her claim
against respondent Palileo under the loan was to be deemed assigned to the insurance
company.
Thereafter the lower court rendered judgment finding petitioner Cosio de Rama to be a
possessor in good faith with a right to retain possession until reimbursed for her expenses in
repairing the house.
Not satisfied, respondent Palileo appealed to the Com of Appeals and succeeded in having
the lower court's decision modified.

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 Cherie Palileo is hereby declared the lawful owner of the house known as No.
25 Antipolo Street, Pasay City, and entitled to the possession thereof, without
reimbursing intervenor-appellee (Beatriz Cosio de Rama) the sum of P12,000 allegedly spent
for the reconstruction of the same, and appellee (Augusto Cosio) and intervenor-
appellee (Cosiode llama are hereby ordered to pay appellant a monthly rental of P300 during
the time they actually occupied the house just mentioned as possessors in bad faith, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects.

ISSUE:
1. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode
of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; and
2. present action is barred by the judgment of the Municipal Court which dismissed
the ejectment case filed by respondent Palileo against petitioner Cosio.

HELD:
We believe that both the petitioners and the Court of Appeals are in error in saying that the
former had a right to the possession of the house under the deed of pacto de retro sale.
Petitioners did not have such a right at any time and they knew this.
If that was the intention of the parties (to conform to which their written instrument was
reformed) then petitioner Cosio de Rama knew from the beginning that was a mere
mortgagee. For the same reason, she could not have been mistaken as to the true nature of
their agreement. Hence, in bidding her brother, petitioner Cosio enter the premises and make
repairs and in later occupying the house herself, petitioner Cosio de Rama with this
knowledge.
As possessors in bad faith, petitioners are jointly liable for the payment of rental, the
reasonable value of was found by the appellate court is P300 a month. (Art. 549.
See Lerma vs. de la Cruz, 7 Phil. 581). This finding is supported by the evidence and we find
no reason to disturb it.
But even as we hold petitioner Cosio de Rama to be a possessor in bad faith we nevertheless
believe that she is entitled to be reimbursed for her expenses in restoring the house to its
original condition after it had been partly damaged by fire, because such expenses are
necessary (Angeles vs. Lozada, 54 Phil. 184) and, under Article 546, are to be refunded even
to possessors in bad faith. As already stated, petitioner Cosio de Rama spent P12,000 for the
repair work.
And now we come to the last point in petitioners' assignment of errors. It is contended that the
present action is barred by the judgment of the Municipal Court which dismissed
the ejectment case filed by respondent Palileo against petitioner Cosio.
We believe that this action is not barred by the prior judgment in the ejectment case. The
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court state:
"Effect of appeals. A perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the judgment of the justice of
the peace or the municipal court and the action when duly docketed in the Court of First
Instance, shall stand for trial de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular procedure
in that court, as though the same had never been tried before and had been originally there
commenced. the appeal is withdrawn, or dismissed for failure to prosecute, the judgment shall
be deemed revived and shall forthwith remanded to the justice of the peace or municipal court
for executive
Here the dismissal of the ejectment case for failure of respondent Palileo to prosecute was
expressly made to be without prejudice. That judgment, therefore, cannot be a bar to the filing
of another action like the present.
Wherefore, with the modification that petitioner Cosio de Rama should be reimbursed her
necessary expenses »ft the amount of P12,000 by respondent Palileo, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

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CASE #24
Solivio vs CA
FACTS:
Esteban Javellana Jr., died without any descendants. His only relatives where his
aunts, Celedonio Solivio and Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. During his lifetime he
mentioned his wish to put up a foundation in honor of his mother snd help poor and deserving
students. Upon his death Celedonia and Concordia agreed to put up the foundation Esteban
failed to fulfill using the latter's estate. Pursuant to their agreement, Celedonia, in goodfaith,
petitioned for letters of administration and declaration as sole heir of Esteban which was
granted by the CFI. Concordia filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied. She then
filed a civil action in another court for partition instead of appealing the denial. The trial court
granted the partition. Celedonia appealed but the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision hence
this petition for review.
ISSUES:
WON THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION WON CONCORDIA WAS DULY NOTIFIED WON
THEIR IS FRAUD
HELD:
(1) The trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and recovery of
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased person, while the probate proceedings for
the settlement of said estate are still pending in another branch of the same court.
(2) Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Publication of the notice of proceedings is a
constructive notice to the whole world.
(3) Failure to disclose to the adverse party or to the court matters which will defeat owns own
claim or defense does not constitute fraud that will justify vaction of judgment.
CASE #34
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appear as
if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing
of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002,
she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle
was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months
old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption
executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt?

HELD:

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 Petition was denied. At the time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present
in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopt, they shall jointly exercise parental
authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses
to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications
set forth in Sec. 7 of RA 8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for
civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical
character and well-being.

CASE #39
BARREDO VS VINARAO
FACTS:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Two criminal cases
rendered to petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani guilty for carnapping and for illegal possession
of firearms in Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and committed to the custody of the Quezon
City Jail as detention prisoner. After conviction he was transferred to and confined at the
maximum security compound of the New Bilibid in Prison in Muntinlupa on July 23, 1994 where
he is now still detained.
Petitioner prays for his release on the ground that he already served the sentence
imposed on him that as of October 9, 2001, where the Board of Pardons and Parole passed
a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years.
He further points out that, based on the Bureau of Corrections revised computation table for
determining the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence, he
should only serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days. He also posits that as of August 2, 2004,
he already served a total of 18 years. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner entitled to writ of habeas corpus
HELD:
No, Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner is detained
pursuant to a final judgment of the Quezon City RTC for the crimes of carnapping and illegal
possession of firearms..
As a rule, if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.Thus, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the

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order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
Even petitioner already served 18 years, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the
illegal possession of firearms case. Commutation of sentence is a prerogative of the Chief
Executive. Hence, even if petitioners claim were true, the recommendation of the Bureau of
Pardons and Parole was just that, a mere recommendation. Until and unless approved by
the President, there is no commutation to speak of.