CHAPTER - THREE
3.1 : INTRODUCTION
are not unanimous in their interpretation of quantification theory, yet they all
adhere to the view that existence is not a logical predicate. To understand the
the views of some modem thinkers. And in this respect the obvious choice is
Gottlob Frege. He is one of the founders of modem logic and the most
extensive and fruitful discussions on existence in the 20th century have been
initiated by him.
cation it is essential to understand his view regarding some key notions such
a) Sense and Reference and b) Concept and Object. Whereas other philoso
theory of sense and reference was expounded for the first time in his famous
essay 'Ober Sinn Und Bedeutung' (translated as Sense and Reference ).’
Initially, Frege introduced this distinction between the sense and the
statements of identity (" = "): if it is true that 'a = b', how can there be any
difference between 'a = a' and 'a = b' ? Yet, whereas the first is merely analytic,
the second can be informative. In the very opening paragraph of the classic
essay 'Uber Sinn Und Bedeutung', Frege makes it clear that his initial motive
for introducting the distinction between sense and reference is that he might
'a = b', which can be read as 'a is the same as b', or, 'a and b coincide'.
Now the first question that may be asked is - what is the role of
the identity or equality sign, '=', which is translated as 'is the same as', or,
'coincides with'? The identity sign obviously expresses a relation of some sort,
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but the question arises - between what does the relation hold ? The question
Frege considers is this : If the identity sign' =' has to do with a special relation
of some sort, then we must ask about what, between what, or as holding for
what, does the identity relation have to do ? Thus, Frege opens his essay with
" Identity gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy
question, we get two different theories about what identity relation is all about.
same as itself.
theory. However, Frege rejects this theory on the ground that the interpretation
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object to itself, a true identity judgement of the form 'a = b' will express the
same relation of identity as the judgement of the form 'a = a'. The two judge
ments will not differ in cognitive value in direct contradiction to the occur
rence of judgements of the form 'a is b' which can not be established a priori
between names or signs for objects. Given this interpretation 'a = b' would say
that the name 'a' and name V were names for the same thing. For example, an
identity sentence like 'The morning star is the evening star* can be regarded
as saying that the two names 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' refer to
Frege rejects this theory in his later article 'Uber Sinn Und
statements we are not really talking about the world, but about language, and
so the view could not explain our ability to use such statements to express
proper knowledge of the world ('In that case the sentence 'a = b' would no
longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would
about names are arbitrary; it is just a matter of convention that we use 'the
morning star' and the 'evening star* to refer to the same thing, but it is not a
offers in 'Uber Sinn Und Bedeutung'. Here he points out that the signs 'a'
and 'b' do not differ simply as 'objects', but there is another factor involved
in the use of the signs 'a' and 'b' which has been overlooked in the above meta
can yield knowledge about the object to which each sign refers. In his ■' '
theory Frege makes this missing element explicit and calls it the sense con
nected with the use of the sign in an identity statement. It is the presence of
the sense component, however, that explains the fact that some identity state
ments mark discoveries, and thereby add to our store of knowledge. If one
assumes ’a = b' to be true, then 'a = a' and 'a = b' can have different cognitive
values only if'a' is distinguished from h' not only in form but also in the way
" A difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corre
designated."4
Thus he says that the signs 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' both denote
37
the same referent, the planet Venus, but the two expressions differ in sense
and hence, it is possible for 'The evening star is identical with the morning star'
to convey information, even though both the expressions have the same ref
erent. Thus we find that in Frege's mature account of meaning there are items
at three levels : signs, their senses and their references. Signs express their
sense, and stand for, or denote, their references. By using signs we express
these two intimately related semantic properties viz., sense and reference.
Expressions
meaningful and therefore can be said to have both sense and reference. But
since the discussion of sense and reference of each and every class of expres
sion in detail is not relevant to the Fregean view regarding existence and
Let us start with proper names. Frege never troubled to give any
precise characterization of'proper name'. But from his writings it appears that
in this world into functions and objects and holds that every entity is either
functions are function names. Words which are ordinarily regarded as proper
name, e.g. 'Socrates', 'Caesar', etc., as well as descriptive phrases like, 'The
morning star', 'The author of the Iliad and the odyssey' etc. are included by
Frege, under the category of proper names. Thus, in his article 'On sense and
"It is clear from the context that by "sign" and "name" I have here under
a simple object can also consist of several words or other signs. For
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or the sense of a proper name we thereby really mean the reference and sense
necessary to deal with the question : what does Frege mean by the reference
that expression. Since a proper name is the name of an object, the reference
of a proper name is the object named by it. Thus Frege says, "Proper names
are meant to designate objects, and we call the object designated by a proper
name its reference."7 Objects which constitute the reference of proper names,
may be of the most varied types — human beings, heavenly bodies, points in
space, proofs of a theorem, directions and even numbers. For example,... the
reference of 'Socrates' is that object which bears the name Socrates. Similar
consideration will also apply to the expression The morning star1 which, being
a proper name, has a particular object (planet) as its reference. That is to say,
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the planet designated by the expression 'the morning star' is the reference of
that expression.
The semse of a proper name is different from it's referent for it is possible
for two expressions to have the same referent but different sense. E.g., 'the
morning star', and 'the evening star' both refer to the planet venus, yet the two
expressions do not have the same meaning. Moreover, if the sense of a name
was merely comprised of it's having a certain reference, them anyone who
understood the name would also know the object it stood for. Besides, anyone
who understood two names which had the same reference would also know that
they stood for the same object, and hence would know the truth of the statement
Dummett points out that the assumption behind this argument is the "compel
"If someone knows the senses of two words, and the two words have the
same sense, he must know that they have the same sense : hence, if the
two names having the same referent must know that they have the same
referent."8
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Therefore, the sense of a name is different from its reference. Thus grasping
the sense of a proper name not merely includes the awareness that the name
connecting the name with a particular way of identifying the object as its
referent. The sense of a proper name provides us accordingly with what may
the senses of their own, we have different criteria of identification for the same
object. Thus to exemplify the sense of a proper name like 'Socrates', we can
rr^nKwThe teacher of Plato', 'The husband of Xanthippe 'etc. which would serve
criteria help us to pick out a referent, yet they are not sufficient. There may
but this serves only to illuminate only a single aspect of the referent,
Frege, speaks not only of the sense and reference of a subject term
thing, if we attach it to another expression that stands for what we are making
the assertion about'!" This statement implies that what is called a predicate
wise' - 'is wise' is attached to 'Socrates' about whom the assertion is made. And
complete expression to make a complete sentence. And herein lies the simple
distinction between the subject which is a complete expression and the predi
does not use the word ’concept' in the psychological sense but in the logical
predicate 'is wise' in the sentence 'Socrates is wise' is the concept - being wise.
Let us now turn to Frege's assertion that a predicate has also sense
name;is not the mode of presentation of its referent. It is, however, not to
expression. The sense of a predicate is that which provides us with the means
clear and determinate sense. The sense of a sentence is, as Frege says, 'the
thought1. For Frege every declarative sentence contains a thought This thought,
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something objective, uniform and public. Frege's use of the expression 'the
thought' very much corresponds to what others intend by the word 'proposi
tion'.12
the assumption that thought is the reference of a sentence and then rejects this
possibility on the ground that two sentences which have the same referent may
in the sentence is replaced by another word having the same referent but a
different sense, then the reference of the sentence remains unaffected, for, the
reference of the whole depends upon that of its parts. However, in such a case
in the sentence, 'The morning star1 is a body illuminated by the sun', we replace
the phrase 'the morning star1 by 'the evening star', the reference of the sentence
remains exactly the same for both the words have the same referent, viz., the
followingfaet, "Anybody who did not know that the evening star is the
morning star might hold the one thought to he true, the other false." 13 If
thought had been the referent of a sentence then it should not vary in a
the referent
the sentence? It is quite conceivable that sentences have only sense but no
type. Frege, illustrates this with a line from Homer's Odyssey: "Odysseus was
set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep." Since it is doubtful whether an ordinary
proper name like Odysseus' has reference, it is, therefore, also doubtful whether
the sentence containing it has one. Similar consideration will also apply to
the sentence containing non-referential proper names like 'The celestial body
most distant from the Earth' or 'the least convergent series--' etc. But the fact
is that we are not always satisfied with the sense of the sentence; we are also
interested in knowing its truth-value. And "it is the striving for truth-value that
always drives us to advance from the sense to the reference of the sentence."14
Thus Frege concludes that we are driven into accepting the truth-value of a
Since a sentence can only be either true or false (Frege does not admit
46
any third value), there are only two truth-values. Frege calls this the 'True' and
the 'False'. Every true sentence has the same reference called the true and
every false sentence has the same reference called the false. This seems odd
at the first glance, but this is exactly what modem logic seems specially
sentence is replaced by another sentence having the same truth-value, the value
of the compound sentence that results is the same as the truth-value of the
original sentence.
object - as expounded in one of his most celebrated paper 'On Concept and
tinction, Frege thinks, is responsible for many of our confusions and errors
helps us to understand the entire bent of Frege's philosophical logic and to this
designate some part of the content of our mind, an image or any other type
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according to Frege?
Frege uses the term 'concept1 both in a narrower sense and a broader
sense. In its narrower sense, 'concept' is synonymous with one place predicate
two place) predicate. In a broader use of the term 'concept' we could say that
objects, as distinguished from concepts, are whatever we can talk about. Thus
in the sentence 'Socrates is wise' - Socrates 'shfiosdtb- ^ran object, while 'is wise'
’ £cmv£vp a concept. Here 'is wise' is a concept word which is used to describe
or talk about an object - Socrates that he has the property of 'being wise'.
Concepts are thus somehow incomplete. 'Socrates' can stand by itself as a name
in a way that 'is wise' can not. Frege expresses this by calling objects saturated
Due to the radical difference between them, concept and object can
not be substituted for one another. The nature of concepts -yi can be well
described by the fact that they are said to have essentially a predicative nature.
can never be the whole reference of a predicate but can be the reference
concept but never by an object. Thus the assertion that is made about a
then we are not predicating Venus, but coinciding with Venus. He says that
more generally called a singular term. There is no implication, for Frege, that
a proper name should be logically simple and thus what Russell distinguished
names. Frege says in his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' that with a concept the
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question is always whether anything, and if so what falls under it. While with
a proper name such questions simply do not arise. Frege also maintains that
we should not be deceived by the fact that language makes use of proper names,
e.g. 'moon' as concept-word and vice-versa; but this does not affect the dis
the two. For him, "As soon as a word is used with the indefinite article or in
the plural without any article, it is a concept word."16 It, therefore, entails that
And this is regarded as one of the reasons behind Frege's view that The concept
horse' is not a concept but designates an object that falls under the concept
horse.
regarding the relation between function and concept as elucidated in his another
2. I3 + 1
2. 23 + 2
2. 33 + 3
Here the first expression designates the number 3, the second the
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number 18 and the third designates the number 57. Though each of the expres
sion designates a different number from the other, yet a close look will reveal
the fact that they have a common pattern or form viz. 2. (x)3 + (x) and it is
a function should be filled by the same numerals. That is, the numeral that fills
the first blank space will also fill the second one. And the placement of a
that in which it is used in deductive and inductive logic). And the point to
remember is that arguments may vary from one example to another, the pattern
which is definite and complete in itself. Moreover, the same function may
stand for different numbers (eg. '2. 23 + 2' and '2. 33 + 3' express the same
function but they designate the numbers 18 and 57 respectively) and different
functions may stand for the same number (eg. '2. 23 + 2' and TO + 8' express
tween the notion of function and that of concept. Frege now extends the notion
function is used. Frege holds that in mathematics there are various examples
in which we see that functions are sometimes supplemented with numbers and
some time with other functions. In the former case, the function is called a
gously in logic, concepts can be divided into first-level (or order) and second-
level (or order). The first-level concepts are those which are directly applicable
to individual objects, while the second-level concepts are those which are
objects. Thus for example, in the sentence 'Arkle is a horse'- 'is a horse' is
'Arkle.' Or, to put it in other words, the object Arkle falls under the concept
'is a horse.' An object's falling under the concept is the essential character
istic of a first-level concept. What is meant by the use of the phrase 'to fall
under a concept' is that it holds for the relation between an individual object
and a concept. We can not say that something or other falls under an object.
It is only of concepts (as for example 'is wise') that one can say (truly or falsely)
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that some individual object falls under that concept. It may be mentioned in
the concept mammal, but it is not a property of it. However both animal
and mammal are properties of, say,, Lord Emsworth's pig, the impress
concepts.17
concept that takes as its argument first-level concepts. For example, let us
take the sentence "There are animals which are horses." The intended meaning
of this sentence is that the concept 'is horse' is one that has instances. And
here the concept 'has instances' is a second-level concept whifh takes as its
should say that the second-level predicative statement is true for this argument.
To make the distinction clear he says, "An object falls under a first-level
sophical logic because the light that he subsequently throws on the concept
of existence is originally reflected from this particular notion. And this is clear
give answers to the question of the form "How m^y ...."? Or, as Frege puts
it, "What answe^the question, How many ? is number."20 Frege maintains that
any answer to the number question of the above form (e.g. 'there are twelve
signs of the zodiac' or 'there are seven wise apostles' etc.) may suggest that
But a close look will reveal the fact that numbers are not actually
numerical adjectives side by side with others misleads us into treating numbers
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"There are twelve signs of the zodietz" we see that each of the twelve signs
analysing the statement 'There are seven apostles' we can see that each of the
substantiate his view he argues that if we consider (for the sake of argumen
numbers greater than 1 as properties ascribable to more than one object i.e.
collection of objects, then on the same ground the number nought (i.e. 'O') will
which are regarded as properites of external things (like hard, heavy, white etc.)
cannot be altered in the slightest way at our will by mere thinking of that object.
to show that number cannot enjoy the same status as other properties of the
horses or four horses as we speak of black horses and white horses, and this
may suggest that number is a property of things in the way that colour is. Again,
what is that of which we assert something? Or, in short, what is the content
"If I say 'venus has O moons', there simply does not exist any moon or
including nothing under it."25 If I say 'the King's carriage is drawn by four
horses' then I assign the number four to the concept 'horse that draws the
King's carriage'.
can speak of'three barrel' so in German we speak generally often man", 'four
mark' and so on. The use of the singular here may indicate that the concept
is intended, not the thing. And the number here functions as the property of
that concept ; it is a propetrty of that triangles that fall under it. But the
proposition that there are no equilateral right angled triangles does state a
number zero.
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lays much emphasis on the notion of number because the light he subsequently
questions of the form 'How many A's are there?' are 'a lot' which is equivalent
to saying that 'The number of A's is not small1, or 'A few', which is the same
as saying '|he number of A's is not large.' If we say there are some A's hhis
is tantamount to saying that *The number of A's is not O'. Instead of sayingfthere
are some A 's' one may say A’s exist/ All these statements are nothing but
statements of number.'27
concept, not of objects. By 'the properties of a concept' Frege does not mean
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'the characteristics which make up the concept. The latter are properties of
things or objects which fall under the concept, not of the concept.'28
the sentence 'There is at least one square root 4' is the same as that of the
the former is, according to Frege, an assertion not about 2, nor about -2; but
about a concept 'the square root of 4.’ The Sentence assigns the property viz.
'that it is not empty* (expressed by the words 'There is at least one') to a concept
viz. 'The square root of 4'. On the other hand, in the latter sentence the
expression 'The concept s^qare root of 4' does not stand for concept (just as,
for Frege, 'The concept horse' is not a concept) because, for him, no concept
can be referred to or picked out by a form of words which begins with 'The
of-
concept...' It (the concept square root^.4) is to be regarded as a proper name
referred to by the proper name 'The concept square root of 4.' Again the
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expression 'is realized' does not also stand for the same concept as the expres
sion 'There is at least one' stands for in (a). In the second sentence, the
expression 'is realized' stands for a concept under which falls an object
•f*
referred to by the proper name 'The concept square root4.' Concepts of such
type (like 'is realized') are called by Frege 'first-level concept' ; while the
expression 'There is at least one' in the first sentence, stands for a concept
within which falls another concept viz. that for which the expression the
of-
'square root 4' stands. Such concepts (like 'there is at least one') Frege calls
difference between statement (a) and (b) mentioned above. The former is about
whereas the latter is about an object assigning the property of actuality to that
object.
Mars, but we are saying about the concept 'Satellites of Mars'. that there are
On what grounds does Frege reject the view that existence can
or 'There are so many F's) then on the same ground 'existence' in the sentence
'There are no F' s' will have to be taken as a property of some non-existent
existence (in all the above mentioned sentences) as a predication about what
the predicate '.......is an F' stands for. That is, we must treat existence as a
second-level predicate.
is treated as a first-level predicate like 'mortal' in the sentence Men are mortal.'
Now we ordinarily take the former to mean that all satellites of Mam have the
of Mar's then it will have the property' of existence -and this intended meaning
i tauYfVj
is quite compatible with T MarsAno satellite , at all. But the original
Thirdly, even if it is taken for granted that Mars has some satellites,
whether some of them have existence or not. This is not because no objects
difference between two different objects. But actually it does not help us to
The above considerations lead us to say that Frege perhaps does not
concept; whereas, the use of'is' in the sense of the existence expressed in terms
proper second-level concept. Frege holds that the use of existence as a first-
falls under a concept. In the sentence 'Scott exists' the subject 'Scott' refers
meaningless.
But it may be said that if the statement 'Scott exists' means the same
as The word 'Scott' is non-empty1 then the statement "Scott exists' can well
be meaningful and significant as its negation 'Scott does not exist' is.
Frege does not, however, deny that 'Scott exists' in the sense The
word 'Scott' is non-empty' is significant but be remarks that we do not use such
a sentence in our language because it does neither play the role of a premise
It can be said that to say about any kind of subject that 'it exists'
kind about the subject or its connection with any other entities of any kind.
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that, to which the property is ascribed, must exist, otherwise the property can
not be ascribed to it. So to say 'A exists' and to (treat) 'exists' as a first-level
predicate is really uninformative, because its very form guarantees its truth.
it would not be out of place to give an exposition of the Fregean view regarding
the status of empty singular term. What does Frege say about the sense of a
that has no reference; how can there be a mode of presentation associated with
referent. But Frege himself allows a sense to an empty singular term. He also
holds that even a sentence containing a name which lacks any bearer does not
fail to say anything in the sense of failing to express a thought, because it must
thoughts'.
terms like The golden mountain does not exist' in the following way:
but this does not make the sentence meaningless because the proper name29
(i.e. 'The golden mountain') that we use in the sentence has a sense and the
sentence itself has a perfectly good sense, though it does not have a reference.
Frege holds that a sentence can have reference only if its components have
reference. If any component fails to have it, then the whole sentence lacks
reference. On this interpretation 'the golden mountain does not exist' would
lack reference i.e. it would be neither true nor false since one of its compo
nents i.e. 'the golden mountain' lacks a reference. But in natural language the
sentence 'the golden mountain does not exist' is not taken to be truth-valueless.
It is obviously true. Thus the oddity of the sentence is this : The sentence is
sense. Let us consider the sentence: T)r Velikovsky believed that planet Venus
once collided with the planet Earth'. Here the entire sentence contains, as a
subordinate part, the sentence 'The planet Venus once collided with the planet
either true or false. But in the present case, it follows the words 'Dr Velikovsky
believes....'. Whether, in fact, the constituent sentence 'The planet venus once
collided with the planet Earth' is false rather than true, is irrelevent to estab
lishing the truth of the entire sentence 'Dr Velikovsky believes that the planet
Venus once collided with the planet Earth.' To determine the truth of this entire
and that in fact he does believe the quoted constituent sentence. The quoted
sentence The planet Venus once collided with the planet Earth' occurs here
quoted sentence (The planet Venus once collided with the planet Earth) is one
proper name such as 'The golden mountain does not exist' do have truth values,
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the proper name denotes its customary sense rather than its customary referent.