ARTICLE XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS Impeachment as “political justice”
SECTION 01: Public office is a public trust
“Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.”
Sums up the high sense of idealism that is expected of every
officer of the government
 The basic idea of government in the Philippines is that
of a representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not rulers of the people; where every officer
accepts office pursuant to the provisions of law and
holds the office as trust for the people whom he
represents.
The notion of a public trust connotes accountability.
• “lead modest lives” – to live within one’s means, and if
one’s means are generous, not to flaunt them in
conspicuous display
Abakada Guro v Purisima
 R.A. 9335 or the Attrition Act was being assailed as
unconstitutional. It authorized the BIR and the BOC to
give awards to those who surpass the BIR and BOC
targets and impose sanctions on those who fall short.
 It was challenged on the ground that it transformed
officials into mercenaries and bounty hunters, contrary
to the concept of office as a trust thus encouraging
corruption
 The Court upheld its validity, ruling that although public
service is its own reward, nevertheless, public officers
may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional
performance.
 A system of incentives is not anathema to public
accountability. In fact, the law recognized and
reinforced dedication to duty, industry and loyalty to
public service.
SECTION 02: Impeachable officers and grounds for
impeachment
“The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of:
1. culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. treason;
3. bribery;
4. graft and corruption;
5. other high crimes; or
6. betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.”
Corrollary to the principle of judicial independence is the
claim that courts must have a monopoly of the exercise of
judicial functions.
 Such monopoly is in fact ordained by the Constitution
with only two exceptions:
judicial independence admits of two exceptions
1.) power of COMELEC and Electoral Tribunals to be
judges of election contests
2) power of impeachment of Congress (also called “political
justice” by the French
Impeachment – a proceeding, purely of a political nature, is
not so much designed to punish an offender as to secure the
state against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither
his person nor his property but simply divests him of his
political capacity
 removal and disqualification are the only punishments
that can be imposed upon the conviction on
impeachment
 Criminal and civil liability may follow after the officer
has been removed by impeachment
 Prosecution after impeachment does not constitute
double jeopardy
In prohibiting the legislature from increasing the number of
impeachable officers, the intention was to prevent the
creation of a special class of statutorily protected officials.
 The right to be removed only by impeachment is the
strongest guarantee of security of tenure.
 The guarantee effectively blocks the use of other legal
ways of ousting an officer
In Re Gonzales
 Object of the petition was to subject a Supreme Court
justice to disbarment proceedings
 Case was dismissed by the Court ruling that a public
officer who under the Constitution is required to be a
Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the
office held by him and who may be removed from office
only by impeachment cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer
 Further, during his incumbency, he cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court
with any offense which carries with it the penalty of
removal from office, or any penalty service of which
would amount to removal from office.
 The Court clarified that it is not saying that its Members
or other constitutional officers removable my
impeachment are entitled to immunity from liability for
possibly criminal acts or other liabilities. What the Court
is saying is that there must be a fundamental procedural
requirement that must be observed before such liability
may be determined and enforced.
The resignation of an impeachable officer does not place him
beyond the reach of impeachment for offenses committed
during his tenure.
 This is because one of the two penalties which may be
imposed by Congress includes “disqualification to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines.”
Grounds for impeachment:
1.) Culpable violation of the Constitution
- willful and intentional violation and not those committed
unintentionally or involuntarily or in good faith or through
honest mistake or judgment 

2.) Treason
RPC ART. 114, Treason
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender owes allegiance to the Government
of the Philippines
2. That there is a war in which the Philippines is
involved
3. That the offender either (modes of committing)
a.) levies war against the government; or
b.) adheres to the enemies, giving them aid or comfort.
3.) Bribery
RPC Art. 210, Direct Bribery
ELEMENTS OF DIRECT BRIBERY:
1. That the offender be a public officer
2. That the offender accepts an offer
or a promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another
3. That such offer or promise be accepted, or gift or
present received by the public officer-
a) with a view to committing some
crime; or
b) in consideration of the execution
of an act which does not constitute a crime, but the act
must be unjust; or
c) to refrain from doing something which it is his official
duty to do.
4. That the act which the offender
agrees to perform or which he executes be connected
with the performance of his official duties

RPC Art 211, Indirect Bribery
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender is a public officer. 2. That he accepts
gifts
3. That the said gifts are offered to him
by reason of his office
4) Graft and corruption
5) Other high crimes
- offenses, which, like treason and bribery, are indictable
offenses and are 
 of such enormous gravity that they strike
at the very life or orderly working of the government
 the word “other” is significant.

 Under the ejusdem generis rule, when the law makes an
enumeration of specific objects, and follows it with
“other” unspecified objects, those unspecified objects
must be of the same nature as those specified 

 Thus, for graft and corruption and betrayal of public
trust to be grounds for impeachment, their concrete
manner of commission must be of the same severity as
treason and bribery, offenses that strike at the very heart
of the life of the nation/
6.) Betrayal of public trust
- all acts, even if not punishable by statute as penal offenses,
which would render the officer unfit to continue in office
 Intended to be a catch-all phrase to cover any violation
of the oath of office
 Includes betrayal of public trust, Inexcusable negligence
of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official
duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism,
favoritism, to the prejudice of public interest, and
obstruction of justice (Commissioner de los Reyes) 

 NOT included: profanity, obscenity, habitual
drunkenness while performing official duty
“All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.”
 Grants authority to Congress to provide for the manner
and cause of removal of all other public officers and
employees, except for impeachable officers. The
Congress also cannot enlarge the scope of impeachable
officers
 While Congress has the power to determine modes of
removal of other officers, this does not mean that
Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts
established by the Constitution
 Thus, in Gonzales v Office of the President, the Court
ruled as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
which granted the President disciplinary authority over
the Deputy Ombudsman for being violative of the
constitutionally mandated independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
SECTION 03: Impeachment process
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one- third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose,
the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according
to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.
Impeachment Proceeding
a.) begins with a complaint filed with the House of
Representative either by:
1. a member of the House; or
2. any citizen supported by a resolution or endorsement
by any member
b.) the complaint is thereafter referred to the proper
Committee which prepares a report for the House.
 Whichever may be the tenor of the Committee report,
the House by a vote of 1/3 of all its members decides
whether the complaint should be given due course
 Referral to the Committee, however, and decision by the
House need not be resorted to if the complaint is filed by
at least one-third of all the members of the House.
o Either a favorable recommendation of 1/3 of all the
members of the House or a complaint filed by 1/3
of all the members of the House sends the complaint
to the Senate for trial
Impeachment proceeding has 2 phases:
1. the House of Representatives Phase
 The responsibility of the House is to “initiate”
impeachment
 “initiation” of impeachment is governed by the rules of
the House
2. Senate Phase
 the responsibility of the Senate is to try “try the case”
 “trial” is governed by the rules of the Senate for the
purpose
NOTE: an impeachment trial is NOT an ordinary trial. What
is sought to be discovered is not just guilt or innocence in the
criminal sense but a public official’s worthiness or
unworthiness of the solemn trust that has been conferred
upon him.
The Constitution prohibits the initiation of more than one
impeachment proceeding within one year.
 Purpose: to prevent impeachment from becoming an
instrument of mere harassment
But when is an impeachment proceeding deemed to be
initiated?
 The proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action (Francisco v HOR; Impeachment case
against CJ Hilario Davide, Jr)
 The impeachment proceeding is NOT initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that it the end of the House proceeding and the beginning
of another proceeding, namely the trial
 Neither is the impeachment proceeding initiated when
the House deliberates on the resolution passed on it by
the Committee because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a
further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning.
 For the proceeding to be deemed initiated and fall under
the one-year prohibition, the complaint must have been
filed AND referred to the Committee on Justice for
action.
o If it has only been filed but not referred to the
Committee, the impeachment proceeding is not
deemed initiated and the one-year bar does not
 apply. (Gutierrez v HoR; Impeachment case against
Ombudsman Gutierrez)
Trial and Penalties
The Senate tries the impeachment case and can convict only
by a vote of 2/3 of ALL its members.
 The penalty which the Senate may impose shall be
limited to:
1. Removal from office; and
2. Disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines.
This penalty is beyond the reach of the President’s power of
executive clemency but does not place the officer beyond
liability to criminal prosecution for the same offenses.
Prosecution after impeachment (Estrada v Desierto)
When criminal cases were filed against Estrada after his
resignation, he contended that since impeachment was not
terminated, he still enjoyed immunity of a President. Thus
he contends that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceeding.
HELD:
A plain reading of Art. 11 sec 3 of the 1987 Constitution does
not yield Erap’s argument that he must be first convicted in
the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally
prosecuted.
 There is no requirement that conviction in the
impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to
prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses
committed.
 The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better situation
than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected
to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object
of a criminal prosecution.
 When impeachment proceedings have become moot due
to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal
and civil cases may already be filed against him.
The incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency
and tenure, but not beyond.
SECTION 4: The Sandiganbayan
“The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by
law.”
The Sandiganbayan was created by virtue of PD No. 1606,
pursuant to Art 13, Sec 05 of the 1973 Constitution
commanding the Batasang Pambansa to create a special
court to be known as Sandiganbayan
 Has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving
graft and corrupt practices
 Created as a constitutional recognition of the continuing
need to combat graft and corruption already recognized
in earlier anti-graft laws
Congress has the authority to fix the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 Generally, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is over
public officers.
 However, in case private individuals are charged as con-
principals, accomplices, or accessories with the public
officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees. (Sec 04, PD No.
1606)
o Ratio: to avoid repeated and unnecessary
presentation of witnesses and exhibits against
conspirators in different venues, especially if the
issues involved are the same.
MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ v.
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 56384 ||March 22, 1984 || RELOVA, J.:
Facts:
1980, Mayor Lecaroz was charged with the crime of grave
coercion in an information filed before the Sandiganbayan
for ordering his policemen companions take over the
operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro
Par, sell the gasoline therein to the public issuing the
invoices of said gasoline station and some pieces of yellow
pad paper for the purpose, and padlock dispensing pump
thereof without authority of law.
Petitioner then filed the instant case, arguing that on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction to entertain
the case because the offense for which he was charged is not
related to his office as mayor and that it should have been
filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque where the
alleged crime was committed.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the case
Ruling: YES
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdictional competence not only
over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices committed by public officers and employees but
also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their
office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices
In the instant case, if petitioner were not the mayor he would
not have allegedly directed the policeman and the latter
would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell
Pedro Par’s gasoline and padlocked the station. The fact that
he is the mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take
over the operations and control of complainant’s gasoline
station and padlock the same without observing due process.
Respondent court, pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, has concurrent
jurisdiction with the regular courts. Well established is the
rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where
said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must
continue exercising the same to the exclusion of all other
courts.
The Constitution vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over "public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations." There are
exceptions, however, like constitutional officers declared to
be removable by impeachment, namely the President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position
and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or
profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party
thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter
punished in accordance with law, after conviction in the
impeachment proceeding.
SECTION 5: Independent Body
“There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known
as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one
Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A
separate Deputy for the military establishment may
likewise be appointed.”
SECTION 6: Officials and Employees
“The officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed
by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.”
Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent body.
 As a guarantee of this independence, the Ombudsman
has the power to appoint all officials and employees of
the Office of the Ombudsman, EXCEPT his deputies
which are appointed by the President along with him.
 This power necessarily includes the power of setting,
prescribing, and administering the standards for the
officials and personnel of the Office.
To further its independence, the Ombudsman has been
vested with the power of administrative control and
supervision of the Office.
 This includes the authority to:
1. organize such directorates for administration and
allied services as may be necessary for the effective
discharge of the functions of the Office
2. prescribe and approve position structure and staffing
pattern
3. determine and establish qualifications, duties,
functions, and responsibilities of the various directorates
and allied services of the Office.
 The Civil Service Commission has no power over this.
The concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3)
things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the
office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified
functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by
law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment
thereto is made;
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may
not be obstructed from its freedom to use or dispose of its
funds for purposes germane to its functions; hence, its
budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the
political branches of government so as to impair said
functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and
control, which means that those within the ranks of the
office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect
the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment
and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of
politics."
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman
independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the
Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested
unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice
to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt
from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ
of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly
strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office
from political harassment or pressure. (Carpio-Morales v
CA)
SECTION 7: The Special Prosecutor
“The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as
the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to
function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may
be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office
of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.”
Before the 1987 Constitution, the Tanodbayan was both the
prosecutor and Ombudsman. Now, the intention was that the
(former) Tanodbayan would be essentially the prosecutor
arm whereas the Ombudsman would be the champion of the
citizen and would not be bound by legal technicalities.
Sice Section 13 (8) says that the Ombudsman shall also
exercise “such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law”, the Ombudsman Act of
1989 has also given prosecutorial functions to the
Ombudsman.
 The Special Prosecutor could neither investigate nor
prosecute unless authorized by the Ombudsman.
Gonzales III v Office of the President
In terms of appointment, the law gave the President the
authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the
Special Prosecutor, from a list of nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these
positions, the law requires that the vacancy be filled within
three (3) months from occurrence.
The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same
qualifications it imposes on the Ombudsman himself/herself
and his/her deputies. Their terms of office, prohibitions and
qualifications, rank and salary are likewise the same. The
requirement on disclosure is imposed on the Ombudsman,
the Deputies and the Special Prosecutor as well. In case of
vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall
Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman; the
President may designate any of the Deputies or the Special
Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman. The power of the
Ombudsman and his or her deputies to require other
government agencies to render assistance to the Office of the
Ombudsman is likewise enjoyed by the Special Prosecutor.
Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor
handles the prosecution of criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial
authority includes high-ranking executive officials
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 || April 27, 1988 || PER CURIAM
Facts:
Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique,
sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul
Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing
of several Criminal Cases on the ground thatsaid cases were
filed by Tanodbayan Raul Gonzels without legal and
constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution
which took effect on February 2, 1987, it is only the
Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan)
who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan.
He also prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from
conducting preliminary investigations and similar cases with
the Sandiganbayan and to annul, for absolute want of
jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation already
conducted, and the Resolution rendered, by Gonzales.
Issue: Whether or not the incumbent
Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor has the authority to file
the criminal cases and conduct a preliminary
investigation
Ruling: NO
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as
distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged
with the duty to:
“Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or commission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.”” (Sec. 13, par. 1)
The Constitution likewise provides that:
“The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the
office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function
and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided
by law, except those conferred on the office of the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution.” (Art. XI,
Section 7)
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to
the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (caged Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed
to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the
Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February
2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such
authority.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul
Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan
Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only
upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor
cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct
the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman.
It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor
remains the Ombudsman as long as he has not been replaced,
for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The
Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI
of the Constitution different from the Office of the
Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although concededly
some of the powers of the two offices are Identical or similar.
The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to
hold over the position of Ombudsman as he has never held it
in the first place.
Thus, the criminal information filed against Zaldivar were
nullified.
SECTION 8: Qualifications
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be:
1. natural-born citizens of the Philippines; and
2. at the time of their appointment, at least forty years
old;
3. of recognized probity and independence;
4. members of the Philippine Bar; and
5. must not have been candidates for any elective office
in the immediately preceding election.
The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been
a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in
Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.”
The Constitution does not prescribe the qualifications for the
Special Prosecutor.
*Art IX-A, Section 2: No Member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any
profession or in the active management or control of any
business which in any way be affected by the functions of
his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
SECTION 9: Appointment
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least six nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list
of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such
appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they
occur.”
SECTION 10: Salary
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank
of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the
same salary, which shall not be decreased during their
term of office.”
SECTION 11: Term
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term
of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be
qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.”
SECTION 12: Procedure
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.”
There is no constitutionally prescribed form for complaints
before the Ombudsman can act.
ALMONTE v VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 95367 || May 23, 1995 || MENDOZA, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of
the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's
Budget and Fiscal Management Division. An anonymous
letter was sent by an EIIB employee to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed.
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office,
Jose F. Saño then issued a subpoena duces tecum 5 to the
Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to
bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for
the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."
In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records
a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce
before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel
Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary
vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
Petitioners then filed the instant case contending that under
Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law" and that because the complaint in this case
is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate
one.
Issue: whether the Ombudsman can act on an unsigned and
unverified complaint
Ruling: YES
As already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the
Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or
manner" concerning official acts or omissions.
Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore,
the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, § 12 means
any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged
to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The phrase
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law"
refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress
or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be
imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera,
with the public excluded, as exception to the general nature
of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Even if anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation
before the Office of the Ombudsman, there can be no
objection to this procedure because it is provided in the
Constitution itself. Further, it is apparent that in permitting
the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to
point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the
other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are
public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
On the other hand, complainants are more often than not
poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
*Petitioners further contend that the documents sought to be
produced are classified.
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure
is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic
secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's
function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting
the national economy. Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from
the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
without compelling production, 19 no similar excuse can be
made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation
which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
information.
The statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in
support of their contention that the documents sought in the
subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified
merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB's
functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to
account for its funds to the proper authorities.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a
complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by
fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in
1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other
personnel records are relevant to his investigation. He and
his Deputies are designated by the Constitution "protectors
of the people" and as such they are required by it "to act
promptly on complaints in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation." 22
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of
confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there
might have been compelling reasons for the claim of
privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by petitioners, now,
seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if
they have not in fact ceased. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that there
were in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which
continued funding was received by its officials and put to
illegal use, remains.
Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as
presumptively privileged, this decision would only justify
ordering their inspection in camera but not their
nonproduction.
GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196231-2 || September 4, 2012 || PERLAS-
BERNABE, J
Facts:
PSI Rolando Mendoza and four policemen were investigated
by the Ombudsman involving a case for alleged robbery
(extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to
grave misconduct allegedly committed against a certain
Christian Kalaw. After serving preventive suspension
Mendoza, was adjudged liable for grave misconduct by
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales based on the sole and
uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw.
From the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely
motion for reconsideration. Despite the pending and
unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of
dismissal was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza's
30 years of service in the PNP with forfeiture of all his
benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief by
sending several hand-written letter-requests to Ombudsman
Gutierrez for immediate resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. But his requests fell on deaf ears.
Thus, on August 23, 2010 P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-
load of foreign tourists in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended
in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals,
the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, the Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC) was created, tasked to determine accountability for
the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions.
The IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be
among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report, the
IIRC found that Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed
serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of
their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion
for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months
without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no
opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking.
The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to
petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the President
(OP) for further determination of possible administrative
offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative
proceedings.
The OP rendered the assailed Decision dismissing Gonzales
from service.
G.R. No. 196232
In 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
his wife, their sons and several unknown persons with
Plunder (and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit
("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought the
Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement
entered into with the accused which the Sandiganbayan
granted.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major
General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on
the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong
evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the
House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted
public hearings on the PLEBARA.
Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee
Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the
dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service for
having committed acts tantamount to culpable violations of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-
003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her written
explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity
and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the
administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP,
however, still proceeded with the case, setting it for
preliminary investigation
In both cases, the petitioners contend that the Office of the
President has no jurisdiction to exercise disciplinary powers
over them since, being a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, it is only the Ombudsman that can exercise such
power pursuant to the Ombudsman’s independence under
the Constitution.
Issue: whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to
exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman
Ruling: YES
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline
administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception
only of those officials removable by impeachment, the
members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by
no means exclusive.
 While Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over
all government officials, Section 8(2) of the same act, on
the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor
Thus, Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction
over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively.
 Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check
and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and
valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may
try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also
expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by
impeachment, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter.
 By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply
filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes.
 Further, the Constitution vests the appointment of the
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman to the Preisdent
and under the doctrine of implication, the power to
appoint carries with it the power to remove.
 As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by him. The exception to
this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that
is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an
office or authority other than the appointing power.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the
President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from
office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous.
 The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman
is vested with was intended to free it from political
considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to
be a protector of the people.
 What the Constitution secures for the Office of the
Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This
means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons
under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the
whims of politicians.
 It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings
and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape
administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the
Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the
discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two
restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely:
(1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for
any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman; and
(2) that there must be observance of due process.
The Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for
the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust."
Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise
the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where
the questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards,
do not constitute betrayal of public trust.
 acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to
warrant removal from office may be less than criminal
but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity
and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment
 The failure to immediately act upon a party's requests
for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross
neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust.
 Records show that petitioner took considerably less time
to act upon the draft resolution after the same was
submitted for his appropriate action compared to the
length of time that said draft remained pending and
unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman Merceditas
N. Gutierrez.
 He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned
from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him
on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his
recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez
on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action.
 Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no
longer in his hands.
 Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of
P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained failure
on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its
prompt disposition, the same cannot be considered a
vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for
betrayal of public trust.
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative
accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon
him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be
reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or
misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public
trust.
 Hence, the President, while he may be vested with
authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as
Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional
wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to
a betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been
resisting the President's authority to remove her from office
upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final
approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it
would be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions
"tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust,"
 The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the
Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an
administrative finding of liability against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit.
 While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea
bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution
evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's
determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability
is based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with
the conscientious consideration of the government's best
interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the
prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes
against the State.
 Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of
ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the
prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special
Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a
strong case for the government or, in this case, entering
into an agreement which the government finds "grossly
disadvantageous," could result in administrative
liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea
bargaining agreement entered into.
 The Court need not touch further upon the substantial
matters that are the subject of the pending administrative
proceeding against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are,
thus, better left to the complete and effective resolution
of the administrative case before the Office of the
President
GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196231-2 || January 28, 2014 || BRION, J.
Facts:
The case involves a motion for reconsideration filed by the
Office of the President of the 2012 Decision where the Court
ruled on the the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled
that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however,
reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty
of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply
sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings against her,
solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to
disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the
continuation of the proceedings against her after upholding
the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
Issue: whether such statutory grant violates the Constitution,
particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 which
grants concurrent disciplinary authority to the President
violates the core constitutional principle of the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5,
Art. XI of the Constitution.
RULING: YES. On motion for reconsideration and further
reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’ petition and to
declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with
respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. This conclusion
does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely
with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not
include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Constitution.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials
in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously
place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself.
 The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional
mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to
support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-
granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 exactly did.
 By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and
necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete
trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent
as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
controls external to her Office.
impeachable offense) and that the President’s power of
removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally
inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle
of independence.
 The mere filing of an administrative case against the
Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor
before the OP can already result in their suspension
and can interrupt the performance of their functions,
in violation of Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution.
 With only one term allowed under Section 11, a
Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if
removable by the President, can be reduced to the
very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman
that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried to
avoid by making these offices independent
constitutional bodies.
At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman, its decision finding
Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave
Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust is patently
erroneous. The OP’s decision perfectly illustrates why the
requirement of impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 cannot be considered, even at a minimum, a
measure of protection of the independence of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to
maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar
as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office
of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment

under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is intended as a measure
of protection for the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor – since these grounds are not intended to cover
all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment
- this argument seriously overlooks the erosion of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman that it
creates. The fear of external reprisal from the very office he
is to check for excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose
of granting independence to the Office of the Ombudsman.

That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals

that do not conform to the high standard required in
determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an
SECTION 13: Powers and Responsibilities
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
“(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as
of any government-owned or controlled corporation with
original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office
involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may
be provided by law.”
SECTION 14: Fiscal Autonomy
“The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.”
Powers and Responsibilities in General
They function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.
 An office which can act in a quick, inexpensive and
effective manner on complaints against administrative
inaction, abuse, and arbitrariness of government
officials and employees in dealing with the people.
Power to Investigate
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 authorized the Ombudsman,
among others, to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute.
 They can commence an investigation without having to
wait for a formal complaint.
 He can investigate any illegal act or omission of any
public official even if the offense committed by the
official is not related to the performance of his functions
 While the Ombudsman’s power to investigate is
primary, it is not exclusive and under the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, he may delegate it to others who have
power to investigate and take it back any time he wants
to. (Natividad v Felix)
Even the claim of confidentiality will not prevent the
Ombudsman from demanding the production of documents
needed for the investigation (Almonte v Vasquez)
 Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the
need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on general public interest in
preserving confidentiality, the courts have declined to
find in the Constitution an absolute privilege even for
the President.
 Even in cases where matters are really confidential,
inspection can be done in camera.
Note: however, under the Bank Secrecy Law, before an in
camera inspection may be allowed, the following
requirements must be complied with:
1. there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction
2. the account must be clearly identified
3. the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending
case
3. the bank personnel and the account holder must be notified
to be present during the inspection
4. such inspection may cover only the account identified in
the pending case.
Otherwise, the Ombudsman is bereft of authority.
Where the Ombudsman has the power to investigate a
complain, he also has the authority to dismiss the complaint.
 In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the Court
will not interfere with the action of the Ombudsman
 In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a
complaint outright without going through a preliminary
investigation (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact finding
Committee v Desierto)
Broad as the Ombudsman’s power is to look into every form
of malfeasance, mis-feasance or non-feasance, he has no
authority to substitute his judgment for the discretion of an
agency which has the expertise on a subject matter.
*malfeasance: no authority; misfeasance: erroneous act;
nonfeasance: failure to act
 Nor may he dismiss an erring official. All he can do is
recommend dismissal to the appropriate officer.
(Tapidor v Ombudsman)
The power to investigate also includes the power to impose
preventive suspension.
 This is different from the suspension referred to in
Section 13(3). This latter is suspension as a penalty,
which the Ombudsman can only recommend, while
preventive suspension is not a penalty.
Scope of the Powers of the Ombudsman (according to
jurisprudence)
1. The Ombudsman can investigate only officers of GOCCs
with original charter
 PAL, even if government owner, has no original charter
2. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary
cases involving public teachers has been modified by the
Magna Carte for Public Teachers (RA 4670)
 Such cases must first go to a committee appointed by the
Secretary of Education (Ombudsman v Estandarte)
3. The Ombudsman Act authorizes the Ombudsman to
impose penalties in administrative cases
 Section 25 of RA No 6770, the Ombudsman may
impose in administrative proceedings the “penalty
ranging from suspension without pay for one year to
dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging
from Php 5,000 to twice the amount malversed, illegally
taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman. (Ombudsman v CA, GR No. 168079)
 Note however, that according to the LGC, elective
officials may be dismissed only by the proper curt
4. The Special Prosecutor may not file an information
without authority from the Ombudsman.
 A delegated authority to prosecute was also given to the
Deputy Ombudsman, but no such delegation exists to
the Special Prosecutor.
5. The Ombudsman has been conferred rule making power
to govern procedures under it.
 One who is answering an administrative complaint filed
before the Ombudsman may not appeal to the procedural
rules under the Civil Service Commission.
6. The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary
investigation on any Ombudsman Case may be exercised by:
a. an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman; or
b. by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance
either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors.
7. A preventive suspension will only last 90 days (Sec 52,
RAC)
 Applies only to cases where the law is either silent or
expressly limits the period of suspension to ninety (90)
days.
 §24 of the Ombudsman Act expressly provides that "the
preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
more than six months, without pay (Lastimosa v
Vasquez)
ROMAN CRUZ, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 94595 || February 26, 1991 || GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts:
On January 10, 1989, an information was filed by the PCGG
Chairman, Mateo Caparas, with the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
The information, as amended, alleged that Cruz, a
subordinate and close associate of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the President and General
Manager of the GSIS. entered into a contract with Cor-Asia
whereby GSIS, sold to Cor-Asia 7% 20-year CCP bonds
with a total face value of P11,440,266.20 at about forty
(40%) percent discount or at a lower price of only about
P7,203,000.00 thereby giving Cor-Asia unwarranted
benefits and advantages, to the damage and prejudice of the
Philippine Government.
Cruz, however, alleges that with the effectivity of the 1987
constitution, respondent PCGG no longer had any authority
to prosecute cases, such jurisdiction being solely vested in
the office of the ombudsman, specially since the crime
alleged to be committed was not “crony-related”. Hence, all
proceedings thereafter were null and void.
Issue: whether or not the respondent Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the
information with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by alleged cronies or
associates of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Ruling: YES
After the ratification of the 1987 Constitution whereby the
office of the Ombudsman was created under Article XI, the
said authority of respondent PCGG was maintained.
As ruled in previous cases, the Constitution does not show
that the power of investigation including preliminary
investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive. Rather,
it concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government Hence, the Constitution did not repeal or
remove the power to conduct an investigation, including the
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation, vested on
the PCGG by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 14.
HOWEVER, for a penal violation to fall under the
jurisdiction of the respondent PCGG under Section 2(a) of
Executive Order No. 1, the following elements must concur:
 (1) It must relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth;
(2) Of the late President Marcos, his immediate family
relatives, subordinates and close associates;
(3) Who took undue advantage of their public office
and/or used their power, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
A reading of the information and the amended information
that was filed by the PCGG in this case shows that petitioner
is charged only with a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
There is no allegation that, President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinate or close associate, as
petitioner, thereby acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, all that
the information and its amendment allege is that damage was
thereby caused to the Philippine government.
Consequently, all the actions respondent PCGG had taken in
this case including the filing of the information and amended
information with the respondent court should be struck
down.
SALVADOR v. MAPA
G.R. No. 135080 || November 28, 2007 || NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
In 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans to facilitate
the collection and recovery of defaulted loans owing
government-owned and controlled banking and/or financing
institutions. Thereafter Ramos issued Memorandum Order
No.61 providing for the criteria that may be utilized as a
frame of reference in determining a behest loan
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for
investigation, including the loan transactions between
Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle
Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for the release of a foreign currency loan
to PEMI despite its non-compliance with the conditions set
by DBP.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the
Fact-Finding Committee, and representing PCGG, filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
However, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, ruling
that the offenses charged had already prescribed. It further
ruled that the subject financial accommodations were
entered into during the period of 1978 to 1981, while AO No.
13 and MO No. 61 were promulgated in 1992. Accordingly,
if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging
respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become
ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex-post facto
laws
Ruling: NO.
We cannot sustain the Ombudsmans declaration that
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for
ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act
done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when
done.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
 Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly
do not come within the shadow of this definition.
Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides
for its composition and functions. It does not mete out
penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum
Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for
determining behest loans.
Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex
post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the
Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.
Furthermore, the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to
entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. The
Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
declaring unconstitutional the subject administrative and
memorandum orders.
HERNANDEZ v OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 197307 || February 26, 2014 || VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
In June 2003, the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) conducted
an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged nefarious
activities of certain personnel of the Bureau of Customs,
among them petitioners Aguilar then Chief of the
Miscellaneous Division, and Hernandez, a Customs Officer
III.
Following weeks of surveillance and lifestyle probe, the
PNP-CIDG investigating team, executed on Joint-Affidavit,
depicting Aguilar as owning properties not declared or
properly identified in her SALNs.
The PNP-CIDG filed a letter-complaint against Aguilar
before the Ombudsman for grave misconduct and
dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the same
offenses.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo issued a
decision finding Aguilar and Hernandez guilty of the charges
and were dismissed fro service.
Petitioners then filed the instant case, arguing that the
Ombudsman’s decisions are only recommendatory and, at
any event, not immediately executory for the reason that the
PNP-CIDG filed the basic complaint on August 20,
2003 when the ruling in Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman had still controlling sway.
To petitioners, Tapiador enunciated the dictum that the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary power is only to recommend, the
power to suspend and dismiss erring personnel being vested
in the head of the office concerned.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman is
only recommendatory and not immediately executory.
Ruling: No. The Decision of the Ombudsman is mandatory
and immediately executory
Administrative disciplinary authority of the OMB does not
end with a recommendation to punish.
The statement in Tapiador that the Ombudsman is without
authority to directly dismiss an erring public official as its
mandate is only to recommend was mere obiter dictum, and
cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme
Court.
The terse obiter in Tapiador should be compared with the
holding in Ombudsman v. De Leon which illustrated that, as
early as 2000, rules were already enforced by the OMB that
provide for the immediate execution of judgments pending
appeal.
Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that all
provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
On August 17, 2000, AO 14-A was issued amending Sec. 7,
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the OMB. It essentially
provided that where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final
and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be
appealed.
It further provided that even an appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory.
Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14-A
was issued, the OMB-imposed penalties in administrative
disciplinary cases were already immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal timely filed. In this case, it must
be noted that the complaint was filed on August 20, 2003 or
after the AO 14-A has come into effect. Thus, the penalties
imposed by the Ombudsman against petitioners are
immediately executory. Immediate execution argues against
the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only
recommend disciplinary sanctions.
CARPIO MORALES v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 217126-27 || November 10, 2015 || PERLAS-
BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati, accusing them
of Plunder1 and violation of "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building
The Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the
2nd Special Panel, the subject preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not
more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency
of the OMB Cases.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order,
and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin
its implementation.
Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous activity
attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking
Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken
before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b)
Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his
re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor,
in view of the condonation doctrine.
the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the
final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation
doctrine. Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can
hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati
condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
project from 2007 to 2013.
Hence, the instant petition. The Ombudsman argues that the
CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive
writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension
orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence
under the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the WPI enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine
Ruling: NO
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "a
victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense,
especially by treating the offender as if there had been no
offense.
The condonation doctrine is not based on statutory law. It is
a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,
which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3)
parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond
the term in which the public officer was elected for each term
is separate and distinct. The underlying theory is that each
term is separate from other terms
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the
right to remove him therefor; and
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of candidates,
of their right to elect officers.
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in
1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the
1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public
trust. Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on
public accountability, there was no glaring objection
confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation
doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that
time.
However, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified
what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the
people at all times.
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to
discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official
from office are stated in Section 60 of the Local
Government Code.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which
states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides
that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
holding public office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited
legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that
the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust
and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution,
is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official
elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during
a prior term.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that
the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot
anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold
him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In
fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since
in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with
the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective
local position due to a direct disqualification from running
for such post.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate,
when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done
so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.
Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the
electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's
misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality
that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct
committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is
almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast
their votes. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes
that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act
that is unknown.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's
abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the
condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly
issued.
BUENASEDA v FLAVIER
G.R. No. 106719 || September 21, 1993 || QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed with the Ombudsman
by respondent NCMH Nurses Association against the
petitioners, as officials and employees of of the National
Center for Mental Health for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued on Order directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners
In the instant petition, the petitioners are seeking the
nullification of the said Order, arguing that under Sec 13(3)
the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend
to the heads of the departments and other agencies the
preventive suspension of officials and employees facing
administrative investigation conducted by his office. Hence,
he cannot order the preventive suspension himself
On the other hand, respondents respondents argue that the
power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman
under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by
Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other
power or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law."
Issue: whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend
government officials and employees, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against
said officials and employees.
Ruling: YES
It should be noted that what the Ombudsman imposed on
petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive
suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power
"to recommend the suspension" of a public official or
employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a
punitive measure.
On the other hand, a preventive suspension is not a penalty.
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed.
This is the penalty.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly
authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the
discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or
employees. In order to make an intelligent determination
whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to
conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct
such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he
may need to suspend the respondent.
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman
such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task
committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case,
said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with
procedure, should be given such interpretation that will
effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution.
Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the
Ombudsman should be avoided.
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned
order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a
full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence
by the parties.
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770,
the Ombudsman cannot order the preventive suspension of a
respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and
(1) the charges against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty;
(2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of
preventive suspension only after:
(a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative
complaint and the "Motion for the Preventive Suspension"
of petitioners, which incorporated the charges in the criminal
complaint against them
(b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of
petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by petitioners
of the members of the private respondent; and
(c) a preliminary conference wherein the complainant and
the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit
their list of witnesses and documentary evidence.
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director
Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted
with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the
suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the
Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
acting favorably on their recommendation.
 OMBUDSMAN v APOLONIO
G.R. No. 165132 || March 7, 2012 || BRION, J.:
Facts:
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive Officer of the National
Book Development Board (NBDB). In 200, the NBDBs
Governing Board approved the conduct of a Team Building
Seminar Workshop for its officers and employees. The
NBDB disbursed the amount of P108,000.00 to cover
the P1,800.00 allowance of the 60 employees for the two-day
event.[7]
Prior to the conduct of the workshop, some of the
employees/participants approached Dr. Apolonio to ask
whether a part of their allowance, instead of spending the
entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them as
cash. Dr. Apolonio consulted then Finance and
Administrative Chief of NBDB, about the proposal and the
possible legal repercussions of the proposal, which the latter
said was legal. Thus, after the end of the workshop, SM gift
cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a
portion of their approved allowance.
Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint
against Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto before the
Ombudsman for grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the
unauthorized purchase and disbursement of the gift
cheques. He alleged that the NBDBs Governing Board never
authorized the disbursement of the funds for the purchase of
the gift cheques and that the purchases were never stated in
Dr. Apolonios liquidation report.
In her response, Dr. Apolonio invoked good faith in the
purchase of the gift cheques, having in mind the best welfare
of the employees who, in the first place, requested the use of
part of the budget for distribution to the employees.
On August 21, 2002, the Acting Ombudsman found Dr.
Apolonio and Mr. Montealto guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonestly, in addition to the charge of conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service thereby imposing
the penalty of removal against Dr. Apolonio.
This prompted Dr. Apolonio to file a petition for review
on certiorari in the CA which it granted in Dr. Apolonios
favor. It ruled that the Ombudsman does not possess the
power to directly impose the penalty of removal against a
public official. In reaching this conclusion, the CA cited
Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which shows
that the Ombudsman only possesses recommendatory
functions in the removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure
or prosecution of erring government officials and employees.
Thus, the Ombudsman filed the instant petition, citing RA
6770 which gives it the authority to assess and impose
commensurate administrative penalties.
Issue: whether or not the Ombudsman have the power
to directly impose the penalty of removal from office
against public officials?
Ruling: YES. The Ombudsman has the power to directly
impose administrative penalties, including removal from
office.
The word recommend in Art XI Sec 13 par 03 must be taken
in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance
therewith.
 The Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of a public official or employee
at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or
agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed.
Under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the
Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure
that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of
the people against inept and corrupt government officers and
employees.
The Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government and it can preventively suspend any officer
under its authority pending an investigation when the case so
warrants.
Thus, the Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the right
to impose administrative penalties on erring public
officials. The indication a recommendatory power in the text
of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution did not
deprive Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the
Ombudsman powers beyond those stated, as evidenced by
Constitutional deliberations on the matter.
.
Contrary to the Ombudsman’s submissions, however, Dr
Apolonio is guilty of simple misconduct, not grave
misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
Dr. Apolonios actions were not attended by a willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules. Dr. Apolonio
merely responded to the employees clamor to utilize a portion
of the workshop budget as a form of Christmas allowance.
LASTIMOSA vs. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 116801 || April 6, 1995 || MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
In 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of
Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape
and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor
of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas.
The Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, directed that
Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the
Regional Trial Court. The case was eventually assigned to
herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Lastimosa.
Lastimosa conducted a preliminary investigation on the
basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had
been committed. Thus, an information for acts of
lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo was filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe.
Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken
on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the
directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo
with attempted rape.
As no case for attempted rape had been filed, two cases had
been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Visayas were based on the alleged refusal
of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the
Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted
rape, in violation of the for violation of the Civil Service Law
and the Revised Penal Code, among others.
Deputy Ombudsman Mojica also issued an order placing
petitioner Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months,
petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman. She contends that the Office of
the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the
mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed
in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that
the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them
for indirect contempt for such refusal.
She further contended that the Office of the Ombudsman and
the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to
investigate public officers or employees and that when the
former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor
Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then
became the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to
petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by filing
the information in court instead of asking the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to do so.
Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in
the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against
Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Ruling: YES
The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate
and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient."
This power has been held to include the investigation and
prosecution of any crime committed by a public official
regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of
are related to the performance of his official duty.
It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a
public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by
a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized
to call on prosecutors for assistance based on §31 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) which also
provides that when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes
under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman
which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify
his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on
her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as
directed by the Ombudsman.
It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman
Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C.
Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an
information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrismo.
Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to
the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of
the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject
to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act likewise gives the Office of
the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for
contempt because their refusal arose out of an
administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the
Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in
another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of
which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial
in character.
PRESIDENTIAL v DESIERTO
July 24, 2007 || AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
In 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13, which created herein
petitioner Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans (Committee).
In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST
LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, 5 the
COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine, Seeds, Inc.,
(hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were the Directors, was one of the twenty- one corporations
which obtained behest loans.
Thus, complaints were with the Office of the Ombudsman
against the directors of the PSI for alleged violation of the
provisions of as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
alleging that as a private entity, Philippine Seeds, Inc., did
not deserve the concessions given it without
sufficientcollateral for the loan and adequate capital to
ensure not only the viability of its operations but its ability
to repay all its loans.”
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaints and ruled that all
the offenses alleged by the Committee as having been
committed by herein respondents had already prescribed
since the prescriptive period commenced to run from the
time of the commission of the crime, not from the discovery
thereof. Reckoning the prescriptive period from 1969, 1970,
1975, and 1978, when the disputed transactions were entered
into, the OMBUDSMAN ruled that the offenses with which
respondents were charged had already prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in
dismissing the complaints
RULING: YES
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs
(e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a
special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (also a
special law), as amended, provides that: (1) Prescription
shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (2) The
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State,
the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A.
No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived
or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we
agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for
the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.
The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a
criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be
filed or not. It is basically his call.
As a rule, therefore, the Court shall not unduly interfere in
the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers without good and compelling
reasons to indicate otherwise.
Thus, the Court may interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, since the computation of the prescriptive
period for the filing of the criminal action should commence
from the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN
clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
outright Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have first
received the evidence from the complainant and the
respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue
of the date of discovery of the offense.
SECTION 15: Imprescriptibility
“The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred
by prescription, laches, or estoppel.”
The provision applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases
 Prescription of criminal cases is governed by special
laws on prescription (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v Desierto)
SECTION 16: Financial Accommodations
“No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial
accommodation for any business purpose may be
granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-
owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any
firm or entity in which they have controlling interest,
during their tenure.”
Provision covers only those of high rank.
 The intention is to prevent such officials from making
use of their positions for purposes of obtaining financial
accommodations from government institutions and from
firms wherein they have a controlling interest.
 Excluded from its application are judges of lower courts
SECTION 17: Disclosure of Assets
“A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities,
and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed
forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.”
The legislature may also require public disclosure of the
assets and liabilities of other officials.
SECTION 18: Public Officer’s Allegiance
“Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship
or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country
during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.”
Ratio: public officers are expected to set the example or
standard of single-minded allegiance to the nation and to the
public interest.
 Where they are seen as already preparing refuge or
safety outside their own country because of lack of faith
in the stability of their government and of their own
society, te effect on citizens is demoralizing and
unsettling.
Caasi v. CA
G.R. No. 88831 | November 8, 1990 | Grino-Aquino, J
FACTS:
These petition seeks the disqualification of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in
the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he
is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the
United States of America
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by
the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the United States.
He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience so that
he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there.
He alleges that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including
the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May
18,1987.
ISSUE: 1. W/N Section 18, Art XI is applicable to Merito
Miguel – NO
2. W/N Miguel is deemed qualified to run for an elective
position - NO
RATIO:
In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" which Miguel filled in his own handwriting
and submitted to the US Embassy before his departure for
the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No.
21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay,” Miguel's
answer was, "Permanently."
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
Government the requisite green card or authority to reside
there permanently
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by
the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and
Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel
identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN
His immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an
immigrant of the United States
before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure"
as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan.
• The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code,
which provides: “Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.”
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines,
the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder
must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country."
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some
act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. His act of filing
a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for
any elective office"
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the
COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551,
87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent
Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said
respondent.