3&aJfeoMpR,0nfl.
Tiie Pheromenali^ti c Interpretation in the
Ligfeit pi.the.fcito&a*.
In the previous chapter we have traced out,with
special reference to Ka1havatthu,,the phenomenal istic inter-
pretation of the dhawia theory as established by the earlier
form of Theravadaand developed by Sunyavgda.
Here we propose to examine ag to how far this inter
pretation is true to the Nikayas themselves which record the
direct teaching of the Buddha*
Before coming to &ks dea|with the subject matter
under discussion it i©^necessary to have a clear conception of
1; S-No.l
2i Vide-page 24
S. S.K.111,P.132.
4. P*154
so
In Parihreyya siittoA in the list of the dkanmas to
•be known only the five khandhas have been included, lb on asair*
in Ananda suita khandhas alone have been referred to aa
3
dhaeauas* In expressions like Unattached to all dhanmaa* ,
’one comes to the end. of all dhaffiaas*^, tbs teasa has been
used. in the same sense, Thus in the Mkayas dhantnas.aa a
mfl.e,haa been used for sankharas and for that matter khan-
dhafulo fact jit may be said that iiWis been used as a genera*
5
term for all that constitute the phenomenal existence.
The author of Kathavatthu does not format to make use of the
£
term in ibis original cense. In the present discussion we
use the teira in this sense only.
1. S.K.111, p.36
2. S.N.HijP.33
3. 113.1, P.171; Ihammapada^St3o.353
4. £3*1, P.162; Sn.t S3o.l2
5. Five khandhas ? eighteen dhatus, twelve ayatanaa and
twenty two Indriyae are generally introduced by this*
tern.
* "
6* Fathavatthu, PP.il“14,
81.
AsaMft.Tfr.ctrine nn<L thaJ^iddhist Schools.
inaita doctrine is among the fundamental
doctrines common to all the schools of Buddhism.^ So in one
» *
94..
..SefiMfiP.. .JMt .
97,
knowledge and the third is absolute knowledge .The first and
the second may he compared with the tathya and the m ithya
samvriti of ^ntidem.Yijna'Dsimatratasiddhi makes these
* v
sphere of paramartha.
realities (bhava) .
If so what does the term paramattha mean here ? It
has to be understood in a sense different from that which
id usually accepted* In the first place, as already explain
ed in the first chapter, paramattha, in the present context,
may be taken to mean terras with reference to which the
phenomenal existence has to be explained. This is the sen
se in which dhammas have been used as .paramattha In the
Abhidharsna pitaka. In the second place there is another
explanation which is even more to the point. According to
it dhammas are paramattha since they a re the terms with
„
ana, Sven where Nibbana 'is classified with other dharanas
A'K^n under the common Category of paramattha it takes care to
lr~
rl 'V-'- .
' L' ^ r W
\ - r keen the distinction and -the other as asamkhata or the
<■ ,J%c ,. •
-2
unconsiditionsd. But in the case of Neo-theravada they havi
VW''v>-<"r •fee opposite course. Wherever possible they have tried
• , cJ
^ O'-
foil owed^thei r level best to classify Nib Dana with other
,dhaianas so as to support their realistic interpretation.
Thus the phenomenal! stic ineterpretation pf the earlier
form of Therarada stands*
1. S.N., 1, p. 1S4*
106
1
Parinneyya sutta sheds more light on this point. In
this discourse the Blessed One speaks of knower (paiinri’aia'ri
the known (parinneyya) and knowledge (parinna). Arahat or
the perfect saint is the knower, five aggregates are the
known and the cessation of defilements is the knowledge.
Here too, as in the above case, the terms have been used in
a relative sense. All the three are interrelated. Hone can
stand by itself. So all the three expressions are equally
conventional. Mth his wonderful dialectic Nagarjuna has
-2
brought out this aspect-of the matter."
Section Three
Pahnatti
1. S.N., 111,P.140
2. Pancappakarapatthakatha (H.), P.18$
Abhidhammattha Sangaha, Chapter viii.
118.
phenomenal world in terns of concepts and the other repre
sents language-our medium of expression and communication.
Both indicate our conventional usage or samouti sacca.So
it is alright.But then Neo-theravadins do not stop here.
They make another classification with reference to pahnatti
as term: 1. Vijjamana pannatti or a term which is expressive
of a thing that is truly real.
(2) Avijjamaha pahnatti or a term which is expressiv*
of a thing that is not a true reality.
(3) Vijjamanena avijjaraana pannatti or a compound
term of which the first part is a true reality,hut not the
second one.
(4) Avijjamanena vijjamana pahnatti or a compound
term of which the first part is not a reality,hut the second
one is.
(5) Vijjamanena vijjamana pannatti or a compound
term of which both the parts are expressive of true realities *
(6) Avij jamanena avijjamana pahnatti or a compound!
term of which both the parts are devoid of true reality. 1
Here we are concerned with Vijjamana pahhatti.lt
means a term which is expressive of a thing that i3 really
existent .Here among others they include Hibbana in this
classification .In the first classification we have seen that
pannatti is either concept or tem.Now Nibbaha ijjtaofc some
thing to be conceived of and as such it is beyond all concepts.
So it cannot be pahhapiyatta pahnatti.
1. S.N.UL1, P.44.
122.
"And what9brethren, is that world condition in the
world which th9 Ifethagata haj^thoroughly penetrated and
realised, and,having thoroughly penetrated and realised
it,what does he declare,teach, open up and analyse ?
"Hatter, brethren, is that world condition in the
world which the Tathagata analyses.And whoever brethren,
understands not and sees not when the Tathagata declares,
teaches, defines,opens up and analyses,him, brethren, do
I set at naught as a foKLish worldling, blind,without
vision, unknown, unseeing." 1
1* SJM.il, P.139
123.
Here the question say be raised as to why does the
Buddha speak about them at all when they are loka dhammas ?
Well, the Buddha does not speak about them as the unenlightened
people of the world do.For the people of the world these
dhammas are real .They take them as suchJ^Pasp then and try
to hold fast to them .They live for them*figfct for them and .
die for them.
The Buddha has realised their unsubstantial nature.
So he is unaffected by the.As such he is said to be above the
world. The world as ajrf matter of discourse and dispute does
not exist for him.
Madhyamikikarikas choirs' more light on this point
when it says that the world as a subject of discourse and
dispute does not exist for the Tajfeg^ata.Then the Tathagata
speaks about- them he does so out of compassion for the
A
beings to enlighten them on the real state of affairs.
So when the Buddha teaches ale at the truth he does so with
reference to the worldJle begins Ms inquiry with the
world of phenomena. That is to sgy paremattha is reached
a3 o result of investigating into the n^nre of saranmti,
The realisation of the truth means the realisation of the
truth of the world . The transcendental truth is not
realised apart from the empirical world. It is realised
now and here each by himself (ehipassiko,opanayiko,
paccattam vedit&abbo vinnuhi). It is a revaluation of
facts and as such the change brought about ia one of prospec
tive only.
MKV., P.370
134.
Na^rjuna refers to this fact when he says that
the ultimate truth is not taugfct without reference to the
conventional truth.Without the realization of the ultimate.
_ A
truth Nibbana cannot be attained. So paramartha is realised
with reference to dhamraas such as khandhas,but then this
should not be taken to mean that the realization consists
in accepting the dhansnas as accepted by the ananlightened
people of the world. In fact,as already shown, this
realization consists in understanding the true nature,the
unsubstantial nature of the dharamas.
It follows from thiB that all dharamas are
a&atta. The descriptions of elements,aggregp.tes and all the
rest of dhaaszsas as given by the Buddha are all from the
conventional point of view (lokadh&mma). Madhyamika, like
Sarmstivada and the allied schools, accepts these descriptions
of the dhammas as found in the Nikayas, nay in Abhidhansna itself
as the word ofthe Buddha. Their criticism, which is based
on very good reasons, is against taking then as ultimate
facte ?
Section Four •
the same.
128
1. S.N.,P. 327
2. S.N.,P. 328
3. This is the world and that is the self, and I shall
contine to be in the future permanent, immutable,
eternal, of a nature that knows no change. Tea, I shall
abide to eternity M.N., 1, P. 138
129
151
1. Wide P. 81
132
' \
and sensed to refute their own theory,. So they deleted it
fro® the list of the paramattha dhammas. Thus although in th€
beginning time played a very important part in fee building
up of their system yet we find it missing from the list of
ft
the ultirn&te principles* But then time, as ksana, had alrepd]
£ ’
Ibis would not save their position** Wim the Buddha chars-
racterised matter, feelings, perceptions, formations and con-
1
sciousness as irnwermansnt he made a universal application
of it* ISThen this fact was pointed out to the Sarvastivadina
they could net deny it* Aeeredingj.y they had 'to show the
relation of samkhata lakkhanas or the character! stiea cf
0
1. svalaksana.
2. S.N.,ilijP.202
3. Yogi pratyaksa.
139*
in the whole phenomenal existence which is not subject to
the law of change. In fact,change is the inherent nature
of things. Hence there is no room for any suhstance.lt follows
from this that all tilings are impermanent and as such
unsubstantial .This is the reason why on most occasions
while explaining the anatta nature of things, the Buddha
refers to their anicca Mature also .This may be made (dear
with reference to the Anatfcalakfchana Sutta itself.* In this
discourse the Buddha says that body and other aggregates are
subject to change because they ar9 without self-nature .The
conclusion is that all impermanent things are unsubstantial.
Is such *1* and •mine* representing a permanent ago and
substance cannot be applied to them.
When we say anicca,it must not be taken as some
change here and there is form or position.lt is a change
2
overtaking the supposed substance of things.Channa Sutta
may be given as a case to illustrate this point.Although
Channa inderstood what he thought to be the doctrine of
Anicca yet he was working under the illusion of the belief
in an atta or self.So he felt that there was something
wrong with his understanding of the matter.At last He requested
Ananda to enlighten Mm on the point .Thereupon Ananda
pointed out to him that Ms understanding of the doctrine
•7
1. S.N.111.P66
2. S.I., 111, P.132
3. S.N., 11, P.16.In tMs sutta the Buddha explained to KaccSha
his middle doctrine of anatta wMch avoids the two extremes
of eternal ism and niMlism.
140.
lakkhanas.
l*MKT.Chaptsr saiv
2. m.. , P.517
3. Pahcavimsati, PP. 43FP,
4. S .N.t 111, P.89.
. 150.
And why , brethren, do ye say body ? One is affected,
brethren, that is -why the word "body" is used. Affected by
what ? affected by touch of cold and heat, of hunger and
thirst,of gp&tg. and mosquitoes, wind, the sun and the
anakes.On© is affected, brethren,that is why ye say°body".
"tod why,thethren, do ye say "feeling" ?
"One feels, brethren,that is why the word"feelingf
is used.Peals what ? feels pleasure^ and pains,feels neutral
feelings .One feels, brethren, that is why the word^feeling"
is used.
"tod why , brethren, do you sayHperception" ?
"One perceives, brethren,that is wiry the word "
perception"^ used .Perceives what ? perceives blue,greesa,
perceives yellowsor red,or white.
"One p arc elves s brethren, that is why the word
"perception" is used,..
"tod why, brethren,do you sayMthe activities
conditioned ?"
"Because they give rise to the conditioned,that
is why, brethren.the word"act!vies conditioned" is used
tod what condition do they give rise to ?
"It is the condition cf body that they give
rise to,It is the condition of feeLing that they give rise to.
It is the condition of perceiiion that they give rise to.It is
the condition of activities that they give rise to.It is the
condition of consciousness that they give rise to.
"tod why,brethren,do ye say consciousness ?"
"One is conscious,brethren,therefore the word
l
"consciou3neBsBis used,consciousness of what ? of favour,
sour or bitter,acid or sweet, alkaline or non-alkaline,
saline or non-saline .One is conscious,brethren, that is why
ihe wore#" consciousness" is used.
, 151
"Ihen , brethren, the well-taught Aryan disciple thus
reflects:
" I am the prey of body now.Xn the past likewise I
was the prey of the body giuet as I em the prey of thi3
present body .Moreover, if in future time I should be enamoured*
of body,in future time also even thus should I be the prey
of bbdy^
"!3nis refleGtdag, he is freed from desire for a past-
body, he is not enamoured of a future body, he is apt for
disgust at the present body,for the turning away from it,
for the ceasing of it.
"(He thus reflects):”-! am the pray of fooling now.
In the past likewise I was the prey of feeling,just as
now I am the prey of -this present feeling* Moreover,If in
future time I should be enamoured of feeling, in future'
time also even thus should I be the prey of feeling,jnst as
I am now the prey of this present feeling.”
“Thus Reflecting,he is freed from desire for
.feeling of -fee past.,he is not enamoured of theSiture feeling;
he is apt for disgust at present feeling, for turning away
from it, for the ceasing from it.
So also with perception,the activities and
conciousness.
"that think ye, brethren” is body permanent or
impermanent *?«
"Impermanent, Lord."
"And what is impermanent, is that woe or weal ?
"foe, Lord."
"Then what is impermanent,woeful,unstable in