1
[G.R. No. 144412. November 18, 2003]
ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and POTENCIANO L.
GALANIDA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for
review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of 27 April
2000 and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The
Court of Appeals upheld the Decision[3] of 18
September 1998 and the Resolution of 24
December 1998 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-
000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision
dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter
Dominador A. Almirante (Labor Arbiter) in NLRC
Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding that
Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank) illegally
dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida (Galanida).
The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay,
backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and
other amounts totaling P1,264,933.33.
Antecedent Facts
For a background of this case, we quote in part
from the Decision of the Court of Appeals:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was
hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation
on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-
book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His
appointment was covered by a Notice of
Personnel Action which provides as one of the
conditions of employment the provision on
petitioners right to transfer employees:
REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood
that the bank reserves the right to transfer or
assign you to other departments or branches of
the bank as the need arises and in the interest
of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service
to the public.
Private respondent was promoted several times
and was transferred to several branches as
follows:
a) January, 1978 to March, 1982
Tagbilaran City Branch
b) April, 1982 to May, 1984
Lapulapu City Branch
c) June, 1984
Mandaue City Branch
d) July, 1984 to April, 1986
Tagbilaran City Branch
e) May, 1986 to May, 1987
Dumaguete City Branch
f) June, 1987 to August, 1987
Carbon Branch, Cebu City
g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989
Lapulapu City Branch, Cebu
h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992
Carbon Branch, Cebu City
i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994
Jakosalem Regional Branch,
Cebu City (Rollo, p. 47)
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers
assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner
listed respondent as second in the order of
priority of assistant managers to be assigned
outside of Cebu City having been stationed
in Cebu for seven years already. Private
respondent manifested his refusal to be
transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19
April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations,
expenses, and the anguish that would result if he
is away from his family. He then filed a complaint
before the Labor Arbiter for constructive
dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private
respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to
the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May
1994. Private respondent refused. In a letter

dated 13 June 1994, petitioner warned and
required of private respondent as follows:
There is no discrimination in your transfer. In
fact, among the officers mentioned, only you
have refused the new assignment citing difficulty
of working away from your family as if the other
officers concerned do not suffer the same
predicament. To exempt you from the officer
transfer would result in favoritism in your favor
and discrimination as against the other officers
concerned.
In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public, and in
accordance with the Banks order of priority of
rotating its accountants places of assignments,
you are well aware that Roberto Isla,
AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for more than
ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994,
reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to
Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8,
1994. Hence, your objection on the ground of
your length of service is without merit.
xxx
As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction
concerning your transfer and reassignment to
Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized
under Article XII of the Banks Employee
Discipline Policy and Procedure [which]
provides:
XII Transfer and Reassignment
Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers
and reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses
The penalty may range from suspension to
dismissal as determined by management. The
employee shall be required to comply with the
order of transfer and reassignment, if the penalty
is not termination of employment.
In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing
within three (3) days from receipt hereof why no
disciplinary action should be meted against you
for your having refused to follow instructions
concerning the foregoing transfer and
reassignment. xxx[4]
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that
(w)hether the banks penalty for my refusal be
Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the more
2
establish and fortify my complaint now pending
at NLRC, RAB 7.[5] In the same letter, he
charged Allied Bank with discrimination and
favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the
headship of Mr. Olveda is managements
discriminatory act of transferring only the long
staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its
exercise of management prerogative when in
truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to
accommodate some new officers who happen to
enjoy favorable connection with
management. How can the bank ever justify the
transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new officer who had
experienced being assigned outside of Cebu for
more than a year only to Tabunok Branch? If the
purpose is for check and balance, is
management implying that Melinda Co can
better carry out such function over Mr. Larry
Sabelino, who is a seasoned and experienced
accountant or any of the Metro Cebu
accountants for that matter? Isnt this act of
management an obvious display of favoritism?
xxx[6]
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-
office communication[7] (Memo) dated 8
September 1994 from Allied Banks Vice-
President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe. The
Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had
terminated his services effective 1 September
1994. The reasons given for the dismissal
were: (1) Galanidas continued refusal to be
transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal
to report for work despite the denial of his
application for additional vacation leave. The
salient portion of the Memo reads:
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction
concerning your transfer and reassignment
to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without
any justifiable reason and constituted violations
of Article XII of the Banks EDPP xxx
In view of the foregoing, please be informed
that the Bank has terminated your services
effective September 1, 1994 and considered
whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled as
forfeited in accordance with 04, V Administrative
Penalties, page 6 of the Banks EDPP which
provides as follows:
04. Dismissal.

Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause
xxx
Notice of termination shall be issued by the
Investigation Committee subject to the
confirmation of the President or his authorized
representative as officer/employee who is
terminated for cause shall not be eligible to
receive any benefit arising from her/his
employment with the Bank or to termination pay.
It is understood that the termination of your
service shall be without prejudice to whatever
legal remedies which the Bank may have
already undertaken and/or will undertake
against you.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis
supplied)[8]
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held
that Allied Bank had abused its management
prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida
to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling
that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount
to insubordination, the Labor
Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision
in Dosch v. NLRC,[9] thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign
an employee is recognized as an employers
exclusive right and the prerogative of
management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC,
154 SCRA 713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however,
absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in
Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296
(1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
While it may be true that the right to transfer or
reassign an employee is an employers exclusive
right and the prerogative of management, such
right is not absolute. The right of an employer to
freely select or discharge his employee is limited
by the paramount police power xxx for the
relations between capital and labor are not
merely contractual but impressed with public
interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall
act oppressively against each other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where employee
cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of
3
being away from the family.[10] (Underscoring
supplied by the Labor Arbiter)
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas
transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial
because Galanida would have to incur additional
expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the
other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied
Bank failed to show any business urgency that
would justify the transfer.
The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to
Galanidas claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co
special treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated that
Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms. Cos name
from the list of accountants transferred
to Cebu as contained in Allied Banks letter
dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr. Regidor
Olveda, Allied Banks Vice President for
Operations Accounting, testified that the bank
transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok, Cebu branch
within the first half of 1994.
Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award
Galanida back wages because he was not
entirely free from blame. Since another bank had
already employed Galanida, the Labor Arbiter
granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the
Labor Arbiters Decision of 23 December
1997 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering respondent Allied
Banking Corporation to pay complainant the
aggregate total amount of Three Hundred
Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P324,000.00)
representing the following awards:
a) Separation pay for P272,000.00;
b) Quarter bonus for 1994 P16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay for 1994 P16,000.00;
d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund
- P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Ruling of the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied
Bank terminated Galanida without just
cause. The NLRC agreed that the transfer order
was unreasonable and unjustified, considering
 4
the family considerations mentioned by c) P 5,333.23 representing proportional 1994
Galanida. The NLRC characterized the transfer 13th month pay
as a demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran
branches were smaller than the Jakosalem d) P 20,000.00 representing refund of Provident
branch, a regional office, and because the bank Fund Contribution
wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to
replace an assistant accountant in the e) P 50,000.00 representing moral damages
Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful
discrimination since Allied Bank did not transfer f) P 20,000.00 representing exemplary damages
several junior accountants in Cebu. The NLRC
also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special ===========
treatment by assigning her to Cebu even though
she had worked for the bank for less than two P1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD
years.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of
The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was basis. The other respondents are dropped for
illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC stated lack of sufficient basis that they acted in excess
that Allied Bank did not conduct any of their corporate powers.
hearing. The NLRC declared that Allied Bank
failed to send a termination notice, as required SO ORDERED.[12]
by law for a valid termination. The Memo merely
stated that Allied Bank would issue a notice of Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration
termination, but the bank did not issue any which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24
notice. December 1998.[13]
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for
Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair review questioning the Decision and Resolution
labor practice as the dismissal undermined of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.
Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal
protection of the laws. On these grounds, the
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
NLRC promulgated its Decision of 18
September 1998, the relevant portion of which
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,[14] the Court of Appeals
states:
held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the
transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal. The
In this particular case, We view as impractical,
appellate court ruled that the transfer from a
unrealistic and no longer advantageous to both
regional office to the smaller Bacolod or
parties to order reinstatement of the
Tagbilaran branches was effectively a
complainant. xxx For lack of sufficient basis, We
demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied
deny the claim for 1994 quarter bonus. Likewise,
Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due
no attorneys fees is awarded as counsels for
process because there was no hearing and no
complainant-appellee are from the City
notice of termination. The Memo merely stated
Prosecutors Office of Cebu.
that the bank would issue a notice of termination
but there was no such notice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
23, 1997 is hereby MODIFIED by increasing the
NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:
award of separation pay and granting in addition
thereto backwages, moral and exemplary
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of public
BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to
respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.
pay to herein complainant-appellee,
POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following
amounts: SO ORDERED. [15]

a) P336,000.00, representing separation pay Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration
which the appellate court denied in its
Resolution of 8 August 2000.[16]
b) P833,600.00, representing backwages

On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the
appellate courts decision and resolution to the
Supreme Court. Allied Bank prayed that the
Supreme Court: (1) issue a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation
or execution of the questioned Decision and
Resolution; (2) declare Galanidas termination as
valid and legal; (3) set aside the Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution; (4) make
permanent the restraining order or preliminary
injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay the costs;
and (6) order other equitable reliefs.
The Issues
Allied Bank raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS
PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN
PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES
CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE
PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS
PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO
HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED
DUE PROCESS.
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS
LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY
MONETARY AWARD.[17]
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of
Galanida was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative. Allied Bank contends
that Galanidas continued refusal to obey the
transfer orders constituted willful disobedience
or insubordination, which is a just cause for
termination under the Labor Code.
On the other hand, Galanida defended his right
to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum
for Galanida filed with this Court, prepared by
Atty. Loreto M. Durano, again misquotedthe
Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well
within the ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut
Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983)
quoted as follows:
5
xxx
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where employee
cited reason for said refusal, such as that of
being away from the family.[18]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of
the Supreme Court
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano
and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Courts
ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held
in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwests submission that
petitioner was guilty of disobedience and
insubordination which respondent Commission
sustained. The only piece of evidence on which
Northwest bases the charge of contumacious
refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28,
1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner
acknowledged receipt of the formers
memorandum dated August 18, 1975,
appreciated his promotion to Director of
International Sales but at the same time
regretted that at this time for personal reasons
and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept
the transfer from the Philippines and thereafter
expressed his preference to remain in his
position, saying: I would, therefore, prefer to
remain in my position of Manager-Philippines
until such time that my services in that capacity
are no longer required by Northwest
Airlines. From this evidence, We cannot discern
even the slightest hint of defiance, much less
imply insubordination on the part of petitioner.[19]
The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order
cannot be considered insubordination where
employee cited reason for said refusal, such as
that of being away from the family does not
appear anywhere in
the Dosch decision. Galanidas counsel lifted the
erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines
in the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial
reports of Supreme Court decisions or
resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does
it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is

simply the work of the reporter who gives his
understanding of the decision. The reporter
writes the syllabus for the convenience of
lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not
a part of the courts decision.[20] A counsel should
not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully
considered text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and
Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but
substituted a portion of the decision with a
headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they
even underscored. In short, they deliberately
made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear
as the words of the Supreme Court. We
admonish them for what is at the least patent
carelessness, if not an outright attempt to
mislead the parties and the courts taking
cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision
or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the
court to cite the rulings and decisions of the
Supreme Court accurately.[21]
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just
cause
We accord great weight and even finality to the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
particularly when they affirm the findings of the
NLRC or the lower courts. However, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule. These
exceptions are: (1) when the findings are
grounded on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts are
conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, has gone beyond the issues
of the case and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6)
when the judgment of the appellate court is
premised on a misapprehension of facts or when
it has failed to consider certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and (8) when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[22] After
a scrutiny of the records, we find that some of
these exceptions obtain in the present case.
6
The rule is that the transfer of an employee
ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers
prerogatives.[23] The employer exercises the
prerogative to transfer an employee for valid
reasons and according to the requirement of its
business, provided the transfer does not result in
demotion in rank or diminution of the employees
salary, benefits and other privileges.[24] In illegal
dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
showing that the transfer is not unnecessary,
inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced
employee.[25]
The constant transfer of bank officers and
personnel with accounting responsibilities from
one branch to another is a standard practice of
Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred
branches throughout the country.[26] Allied Bank
does this primarily for internal control. It also
enables bank employees to gain the necessary
experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations
for Banks and Other Financial
Intermediaries,[27] requires the rotation of these
personnel. The Manual directs that the duties of
personnel handling cash, securities and
bookkeeping records should be rotated and that
such rotation should be irregular, unannounced
and long enough to permit disclosure of any
irregularities or manipulations.[28]
Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy
of periodically transferring personnel to different
branches. As the Court of Appeals found,
assignment to the different branches of Allied
Bank was a condition of Galanidas
employment. Galanida consented to this
condition when he signed the Notice of
Personnel Action.[29]
The evidence on record contradicts the charge
that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida
and was in bad faith when it ordered his
transfer. Allied Banks letter of 13 June
1994[30]showed that at least 14 accounting
officers and personnel from various branches,
including Galanida, were transferred to other
branches. Allied Bank did not single out
Galanida. The same letter explained that
Galanida was second in line for assignment
outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for
seven years already. The person first in line,
Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been
in Cebu for more than ten years, had already
transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro
City. We note that none of the other transferees
joined Galanida in his complaint or corroborated

his allegations of widespread discrimination and
favoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June
1994 itself showed that her assignment
to Cebu was not in any way related to Galanidas
transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to replace a
certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok
branch. The employer has the prerogative,
based on its assessment of the employees
qualifications and competence, to rotate them in
the various areas of its business operations to
ascertain where they will function with maximum
benefit to the company.[31]
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of
a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence
showing that the transfer would diminish his
salary, benefits or other privileges. Instead,
Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994 assured
Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction
in rank or grade, and that the transfer would
involve the same rank, duties and
obligations. Mr. Olveda explained this further in
the affidavit he submitted to the Labor Arbiter,
thus:
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or
diminution of complainants salary, benefits and
other privileges as the transfer/assignment of
branch officers is premised on the role/functions
that they will assume in the management and
operations of the branch, as shown below:
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the
branch is responsible for the proper discharge of
the functions of the accounting section of the
branch, review of documentation/proper
accounting and control of transaction. As such,
the accounting functions in the branch can be
assumed by any of the following officers with the
rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/
Acctg.; Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst.
Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst.
Accountant.
xxx
20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer
from one branch, to another branch/office is
lateral in nature and carries with it the same
position/rank, salary, benefits and other
privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the
officer to assume the functions relative to his job
and NOT the position/rank of the officer to be
replaced.
7
There is also no basis for the finding that Allied
Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in
dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices
relate only to violations of the constitutional right
of workers and employees to self-
[32]
organization and are limited to the acts
enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code,
none of which applies to the present case. There
is no evidence that Galanida took part in forming
a union, or even that a union existed in Allied
Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could
validly refuse the transfer orders on the ground
of parental obligations, additional expenses, and
the anguish he would suffer if assigned away
from his family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the
case of Homeowners Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. v. NLRC,[33] we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that transfer
made by an employer for an illicit or
underhanded purpose i.e., to defeat an
employees right to self-organization, to rid
himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize
an employee for union activities cannot be
upheld is self-evident and cannot be
gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where
no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose
can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to
the transfer being grounded solely upon the
personal inconvenience or hardship that will be
caused to the employee by reason of the
transfer. What then?
This was the very same situation we faced
in Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v.
Laplana. In that case, the employee, Alicia
Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City
Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to
the companys branch office at Laoag City. In
refusing the transfer, the employee averred that
she had established Baguio City as her
permanent residence and that such transfer will
involve additional expenses on her part, plus the
fact that an assignment to a far place will be a
big sacrifice for her as she will be kept away from
her family which might adversely affect her
efficiency. In ruling for the employer, the Court
upheld the transfer from one city to another
within the country as valid as long as there is no
bad faith on the part of the employer. We held
then:

Certainly the Court cannot accept the
proposition that when an employee opposes his
employers decision to transfer him to another
work place, there being no bad faith or
underhanded motives on the part of either party,
it is the employees wishes that should be made
to prevail.
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts
ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.[34] Dosch, however, is
not applicable to the present case. Helmut
Dosch refused a transfer consequential to a
promotion. We upheld the refusal because no
law compels an employee to accept a
promotion, and because the position Dosch was
supposed to be promoted to did not even exist
at that time.[35] This left as the only basis for the
charge of insubordination a letter from Dosch in
which the Court found not even the slightest hint
of defiance, much less xxx insubordination.[36]
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an
overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot be
likened to a transfer from one city to another
within the country,[37] which is the situation in the
present case. The distance
from Cebu City to Bacolod City or
from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does not
exceed the distance
from Baguio City to Laoag City or
from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court
considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v.
Laplana.[38]
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order
constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order
of an employer.[39] Employees may object to,
negotiate and seek redress against employers
for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or
illegal. However, until and unless these rules or
orders are declared illegal or improper by
competent authority, the employees ignore or
disobey them at their
peril.[40] For Galanidas continued refusal to obey
Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that the
bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in
accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor
Code.[41] Galanida is thus not entitled to
reinstatement or to separation pay.
Whether Galanidas dismissal violated the
requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with
Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus
8
Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus
Rules), which provides:
For termination of employment based on just
causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor
Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds of termination,
and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration
of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied
Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice
required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him for his refusal
to comply with the transfer orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has
held that the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard.[42] An actual hearing
is not necessary. The exchange of several
letters, in which Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the
City Prosecutors Office, assisted him, gave
Galanida an opportunity to respond to the
charges against him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo
dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida
constitutes the written notice of termination
required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding that it
did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited
Allied Banks rule on dismissals, quoted in the
Memo, that, Notice of termination shall be issued
by the Investigation Committee subject to the
confirmation of the President or his authorized
representative.[43] The appellate court and NLRC
held that Allied Bank did not send any notice of
termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the
heading Transfer and Reassignment, was not
the termination notice required by law.
We do not agree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show
that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied

Banks decision to dismiss him. The statement,
please be informed that the Bank has
terminated your services effective September
1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any,
that you are entitled [to] as forfeited xxx[44] is
plainly worded and needs no interpretation.The
Memo also discussed the findings of the
Investigation Committee that served as grounds
for Galanidas dismissal. The Memo referred to
Galanidas open defiance and refusal to transfer
first to the Bacolod City branch and then to
the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also
mentioned his continued refusal to report for
work despite the denial of his application for
additional vacation leave.[45] The Memo also
refuted Galanidas charges of discrimination and
demotion, and concluded that he had violated
Article XII of the banks Employee Discipline
Policy and Procedure.
The Memo, although captioned Transfer and
Reassignment, did not preclude it from being a
notice of termination. The Court has held that the
nature of an instrument is characterized not by
the title given to it but by its body and
contents.[46] Moreover, it appears that Galanida
himself regarded the Memo as a notice of
termination. We quote from the Memorandum
for Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows:
The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:
1. On March 13, 1994[47] Private Respondent-
Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration
Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal.
A copy of the Complaint is attached to the
Petition as Annex H;
xxx
5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-
Appellant issued him a Letter of
Termination. A copy of said letter is attached to
the Petition as Annex N;
6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an
Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein he
alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached
to the Petition as Annex O; xxx [48] (Emphasis
supplied)
The Memorandum for Private Respondent-
Appellee refers to the Memo as a Letter of
Termination. Further, Galanida amended his
complaint for constructive dismissal[49] to one for
illegal dismissal[50] after he received the
9
Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the
Memo to mean that Allied Bank had terminated
his services.
The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal
rules which required the banks President or his
authorized representative to confirm the notice
of termination. The banks Vice-President for
Personnel, as the head of the department that
handles the movement of personnel within Allied
Bank, can certainly represent the bank president
in cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered
from certain errors. Although the Memo stated
that Allied Bank terminated Galanidas services
as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the
date 8 September 1994. More importantly,
Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on 5
October 1994, or more than a month after the
supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective,
a written notice of termination must
be served on the employee.[51] Allied Bank could
not terminate Galanida on 1 September
1994 because he had not received as of that
date the notice of Allied Banks decision to
dismiss him. Galanidas dismissal could only
take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt
of the Memo. For this reason, Galanida is
entitled to backwages for the period from 1
September 1994 to 4 October 1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award
of P10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts
award nominal damages to recognize or
vindicate the right of a person that another has
violated.[52] The law entitles Galanida to receive
timely notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss
him. Allied Bank should have exercised more
care in issuing the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451
upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of
the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98
is AFFIRMED, with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The awards of separation pay, moral
damages and exemplary damages are hereby
deleted for lack of basis;
2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover
only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
October 1994; and
 10
3) Awarding nominal damages to private
respondent for P10,000.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for

the computation, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Decision, of the backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due
to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his
dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September
1994 until 4 October 1994.

Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty.

Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more
careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the future.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481,
390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it
from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for
confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land
Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment
sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire
real properties pursuant to the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration
proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,
1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;
11
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land
from generation to generation until the same
came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and
tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said
land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession
is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a
private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian
Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public
domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements,
said improvements were seen by the Court
during its ocular investigation of the land sought
to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the
land sought to be registered by the applicant was
duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by
the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15,
1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela
(Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of
these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on
July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution
had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly
applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article

XIV prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the
1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open.
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed,
in view of the quoted findings of the trial court
which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer
controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano
and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the
lands in question on October 29, 1962, are
members of the national cultural minorities who
had, by themselves and through their
progenitors, possessed and occupied those
12
lands since time immemorial, or for more than
the required 30-year period and were, by reason
thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in
Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their
title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any
pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-
interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire
and register ownership of said lands under any
provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than
Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this
Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels
had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings
instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the
character of the lands at the time of institution of
the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were
then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand,
they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition
by private corporations or associations obviously
does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited
to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts
prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
Company, a domestic corporation more than
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-
owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay,
Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
been possessed by the vendors and, before
them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia
Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific
War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco
applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said
lots. The court, assuming that the lots were
public land, dismissed the application on the
ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only
Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public
land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease
to be public land only upon the issuance of the

certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming
it under section 48(b). Because it is still public
land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be
given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on the
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as
to which no occupant has an imperfect title and
(on the other hand) alienable lands of the public
domain as to which an occupant has on
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction
or qualification. The prohibition applies to
alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title
may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes
that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641,
644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous
dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed
and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive
and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That
said dissent expressed what is the better — and,
indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from
a consideration of some of the principal rulings
cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak,
in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of
June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and
5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that
an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot
chief the notion that ancient family possessions
13
were in danger, if he had read every word of it.
The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character
because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover,
the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with
a right to a certificate of title to said land under
the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,
in selling the land in question of Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and
the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be
mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac
vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have
firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely
affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held
to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with
the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and
by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the
land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under
the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the
conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the
logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an
express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... "
No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the
required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm
such a conversion already affected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well
put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
14
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was
already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme
had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then
in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
Constitution which came into effect later)
prohibiting corporations from acquiring and
owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained
technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land
Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes
right to acquire the land at the time it did, there
also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that
might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land
to which the vendor had already acquired that
type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares. The purely accidental circumstance
that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which
forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already
vested before that law came into effect, or
invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
proper. This Court has already held, in
analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional
prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to
the sales application of Binan Development Co.,
Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could
not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition
action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights
in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the
annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by
the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior
to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right
of the corporation to purchase the land in
question had become fixed and established and
was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the
Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had
the effect of segregating the said land from the
public domain. The corporation's right to obtain
a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot
be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation
proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise
affecting the substance and merits of the right of
ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable
that in the light of the undisputed facts, the
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny
the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-
interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the
view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct
rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by
a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
15
jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal
was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the
time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection
that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified
to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
rather than substantial and, again, finds its
answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of
Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against
their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the
great cost of refiling of all such applications in
their names and adding to the overcrowded
court dockets when the Court can after all these
years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco
vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served,
therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act
and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from
reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter

from themselves applying for confirmation of title
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in
their names, deeding the lands back to Acme.
But this would be merely indulging in empty
charades, whereas the same result is more
efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no
prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of
the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier
ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms
and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past
cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority
opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of
Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad
Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential
limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion,
and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in
the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed,
without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and
Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
16
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar
that my dissenting opinion in the June,
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine.......
that an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the
period provided in the Public Land Act provision
in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was
reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land
of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are
reverting to the old above-cited established
doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which
departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited
Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the
presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for
the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be
issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his
authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the
pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909
case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have
been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration)
which reversed the dismissal of the registration
court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and
adopted the liberal view that under the decree
and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words
'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not
to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly
overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to
1909 and was consistently applied up to June
29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated). We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of
alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by
operation of law without the necessity of a prior
issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully
sold to and acquired by qualified corporations
such as respondent corporation. (As stressed
in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation
is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property
of public lands publicly held under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the
public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated
therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition
against corporations holding or acquiring title to
lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation
purchased the land from the Infiels on October
16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition
17
against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute
prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption
that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from
time immemorial, respondent corporation's
lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962
and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the
community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of
the land for the townsite created a vested right
which could not be impaired by the prohibition
adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a
legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of
the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title
proceedings for formalization and issuance of
the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act
extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect
and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
public lands expressly reiterate that it has
always been the "policy of the State to hasten
the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles
to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize
that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and
record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing
of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was
successively extended to December 31, 1941,
then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural
persons may apply thereunder for confirmation
of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
not of substance. My submittal in Meralco,
mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The
ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
by considering the applications for confirmation
as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for

formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations
(both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title
to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along
the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the
Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-
transferors, under the particular circumstances
of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to
the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the
approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead
of being deferred and possibly taken up in
another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and
in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel
that the realistic solution would be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b)
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in
the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the
question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered
have ceased to be lands of the public domain at
the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is
needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the
filing of such applications to natural citizens who
may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required
statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical
persons such as corporations, can actually,
physically and in reality possess public lands for
the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of
18
possession, the Act confers on them a legally
sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title
to the land. But such procedural failure cannot
and should not defeat the substance of the law,
as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
lands are already private lands because
of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be
to consider the application for confirmation as
filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
to the private lands so converted by operation of
law and lawfully transferred by them to the
corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land
to the corporation. It should not be necessary to
go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land
to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying
on paper with the technicality of having natural
persons file the application for confirmation of
title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part,
provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are

the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution,
in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five
hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law
and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts
for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to
lands of the public domain (Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449;
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in
simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an
application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title,
they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate
of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to
the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that
the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for
the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the
following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114
SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of
Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
19
actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the
rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can
after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion
now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for
certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention
of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of
Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688,
93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US
680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am
Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start
with the assumption that the legislature intended
to enact an effective law, and the legislature is
not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it
efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided,
under which the statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,

repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the
act, while the other will defeat it, the former
construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another
part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the
enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be
extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a
law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the
provision of a statute is general everything which
is necessary to make such provision effectual is
supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47;
cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional
prohibition express a public policy. The proper
course for the Court to take is to promote in the
fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of
this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar
that my dissenting opinion in the June,
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine.......
20
that an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the
period provided in the Public Land Act provision
in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was
reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land
of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are
reverting to the old above-cited established
doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which
departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited
Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the
presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for
the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be
issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his
authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the
pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909
case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have
been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration)
which reversed the dismissal of the registration
court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and
adopted the liberal view that under the decree

and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words
'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not
to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly
overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the
aforecited established doctrine dating back to
1909 and was consistently applied up to June
29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the
established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place
ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of
title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public
domain and becomes private property, which
may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified
corporations such as respondent corporation.
(As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property
of public lands publicly held under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the
public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated
therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition
against corporations holding or acquiring title to
lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation
purchased the land from the Infiels on October
16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935
Constitution which contained no prohibition
against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute
prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption
that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from
time immemorial, respondent corporation's
lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962
21
and P 45million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the
community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of
the land for the townsite created a vested right
which could not be impaired by the prohibition
adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a
legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of
the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title
proceedings for formalization and issuance of
the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act
extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect
and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
public lands expressly reiterate that it has
always been the "policy of the State to hasten
the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles
to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize
that such lands publicly and notoriously
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and
record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing
of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was
successively extended to December 31, 1941,
then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural
persons may apply thereunder for confirmation
of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
not of substance. My submittal in Meralco,
mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The
ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
by considering the applications for confirmation
as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations
(both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title
to the private lands so acquired and sold or

exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along
the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the
Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-
transferors, under the particular circumstances
of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to
the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the
approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead
of being deferred and possibly taken up in
another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and
in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel
that the realistic solution would be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b)
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in
the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the
question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered
have ceased to be lands of the public domain at
the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is
needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the
filing of such applications to natural citizens who
may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required
statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical
persons such as corporations, can actually,
physically and in reality possess public lands for
the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of
possession, the Act confers on them a legally
sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title
to the land. But such procedural failure cannot
and should not defeat the substance of the law,
as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
22
lands are already private lands because
of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be
to consider the application for confirmation as
filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
to the private lands so converted by operation of
law and lawfully transferred by them to the
corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land
to the corporation. It should not be necessary to
go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land
to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying
on paper with the technicality of having natural
persons file the application for confirmation of
title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part,
provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are
the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution,
in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five
hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law
and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts
for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to
lands of the public domain (Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875;
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449;
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in
simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an
application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title,
they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate
of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to
the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that
the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for
the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the
following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114
SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of
Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco
23
and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in
the name of the original owners and vendors (as
such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the
rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can
after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion
now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for
certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention
of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of
Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688,
93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US
680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am
Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start
with the assumption that the legislature intended
to enact an effective law, and the legislature is
not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it
efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided,
under which the statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the
act, while the other will defeat it, the former
construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another
part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the
 24
enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be
extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a
law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the
provision of a statute is general everything which
is necessary to make such provision effectual is
supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47;
cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional

prohibition express a public policy. The proper
course for the Court to take is to promote in the
fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of

this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome,
114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
LEON GAW, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law
Offices for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of
Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with
Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same
corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in
Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-
signed a postdated check payable to private
respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of
P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for
lack of sufficient funds.
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court
convicted the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction
over the person of Pascual, who had thoughtfully
fled the country, had not been obtained.
Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of one (1) year of prision correccional and
to pay a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioner
was also required to reimburse respondent Gaw
the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial
court was read to him, petitioner through counsel
orally manifested that he was taking an appeal.
Having been so notified, the trial court on the
same day ordered the forwarding of the records
of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July
1987, petitioner through his counsel received
from the Court of Appeals a notice to file his
Appellant's Brief within thirty (30) days.
Petitioner managed to secure several
extensions of time within which to file his brief,
the last extension expiring on 18 November
1987. 1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's
Brief was being finalized by his then counsel of
record, sought advice from another counselor.
On 30 November 1987, petitioner, with the
assistance of his new counsel, filed in the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation
invoking Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. The Petition was not, however,
25
accepted by the lower court, since the records of
the case had already been forwarded to the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals
Manifestation and Petition for Probation" dated
16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the
Petition for Probation that he had submitted to
the trial court. Petitioner asked the Court of
Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in
the alternative, to remand the Petition back to
the trial court, together with the records of the
criminal case, for consideration and approval
under P.D. No. 968, as amended. At the same
time, petitioner prayed that the running of the
period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be
held in abeyance until after the Court of Appeals
shall have acted on his Petition for Probation.
In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March
1988 and filed with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner formally withdrew his appeal
conditioned, however, on the approval of his
Petition for Probation. 2
Complying with a Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
a Comment stating that it had no objection to
petitioner Llamado's application for probation.
Private respondent-complainant, upon the other
hand, sought and obtained leave to file a
Comment on petitioner Llamado's application for
probation, to which Comment, petitioner filed a
Reply. Private respondent then filed his
"Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor
General's Comment of 18 March 1988.
In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of
Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied
the Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion
was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr.
Justice Santiago submitted a concurring opinion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which
Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on
23 August 1988, with another, briefer, dissenting
opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.
Petitioner now asks this Court to review and
reverse the opinion of the majority in the Court
of Appeals and, in effect, to accept and adopt the
dissenting opinion as its own.
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not
petitioner's application for probation which was
filed after a notice of appeal had been filed with
the trial court, after the records of the case had
been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the

Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file
Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of time
to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from
and granted by the Court of Appeals but before
actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D.
No. 968, as amended.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of
1976, was promulgated on 24 July 1976. Section
4 of this statute provided as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and upon application at any time of
said defendant, suspend the execution of said
sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only.
An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not
be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No.
968, the trial court could grant an application for
probation "at any time" "after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant" and
certainly after "an appeal has been taken from
the sentence of conviction." Thus, the filing of
the application for probation was "deemed [to
constitute] automatic withdrawal of
a pending appeal."
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968
was amended by P.D. No. 1257 so as to read as
follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the court may,
senteafter it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant but before he begins to serve his
sentence and upon his application, suspend the
execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be
notified by the court of the filing of the application
26
for probation and he may submit his comment on
such application within ten days from receipt of
the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or
the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. In
the latter case, however, if the application is filed
on or after the date of the judgment of the
appellate court, said application shall be acted
upon by the trial court on the basis of the
judgment of the appellate court. (Emphasis
supplied)
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment
by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had established
a prolonged but definite period during which an
application for probation may be granted by the
trial court. That period was: 'After [the trial court]
shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his
sentence." Clearly, the cut-off time-
commencement of service of sentence-takes
place not only after an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction, but
even after judgement has been rendered by
the appellate court and after judgment has
become final. Indeed, in this last situation,
Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257
provides that "the application [for probation] shall
be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of
the judgment of the appellate court"; for the
appellate court might have increased or reduced
the original penalty imposed by the trial court. It
would seem beyond dispute then that had the
present case arisen while Section 4 of the
statute as amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in
effect, petitioner Llamado's application for
probation would have had to be granted. Mr.
Llamado's application for probation was filed
well before the cut-off time established by
Section 4 as then amended by P.D. No. 1257.
On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the
Probation Law of 1976 was once again
amended. This time by P.D. No. 1990. As so
amended and in its present form, Section 4
reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the trial court

may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it
may deem best; Provided, That no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only
An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not
be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by
PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4
establishes a much narrower period during
which an application for probation may be filed
with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
— within the period for perfecting an appeal —
." As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was
appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that
expressly prohibits the grant of an application for
probation "if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is
worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present
form has dropped the phrase which said that the
filing of an application for probation means "the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The
deletion is quite logical since an application for
probation can no longer be filed once an appeal
is perfected; there can, therefore, be
no pending appeal that would have to be
withdrawn.
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today
(and at the time petitioner Llamado was
convicted by the trial court), to the instant case,
we must then inquire whether petitioner Llamado
had submitted his application for probation
"within the period for perfecting an appeal." Put
a little differently, the question is whether by the
time petitioner Llamado's application was filed,
he had already "perfected an appeal" from the
judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
The period for perfecting an appeal from a
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
27
Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 and
under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Court, is fifteen (15)
days from the promulgation or notice of the
judgment appealed from. It is also clear from
Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that such appeal is
taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of
appeal with the Regional Trial Court which
rendered the judgment appealed from and by
serving a copy thereof upon the People of the
Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado
had manifested orally and in open court his
intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of
the judgment of conviction, a manifestation at
least equivalent to a written notice of appeal and
treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase
"period for perfecting an appeal" and the clause
"if the defendant has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in
its current form, should not be interpreted to refer
to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; and
that the "whereas" or preambulatory clauses of
P.D. No. 1990 did not specify a period of fifteen
(15) days for perfecting an appeal. 3 It is also
urged that "the true legislative intent of the
amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not apply to
petitioner who filed his Petition for probation at
the earliest opportunity then prevailing and
withdrew his appeal." 4
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion
rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo in the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner then asks us to have
recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory
construction" that "penal laws [should]
be liberally construed in favor of the accused,"
and to avoid "a too literal and strict application of
the proviso in P.D. No. 1990" which would
"defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which
the [probation law] was enacted-."
We find ourselves unable to accept the
eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's
counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are
unable to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as
it now stands, in authorizing the trial court to
grant probation "upon application by [the]
defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal" and in reiterating in the proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction.

did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day
period established, as indicated above, by B.P.
Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some vague
and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest
opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal.
The whereas clauses invoked by petitioner did
not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day period.
There was absolutely no reason why they should
have so referred to that period for the operative
words of Section 4 already do refer, in our view,
to such fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do
not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they
are not part of the operative language of the
statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be
helpful to the extent they articulate
the general purpose or reason underlying a new
enactment, in the present case, an enactment
which drastically but clearly changed the
substantive content of Section 4 existing before
the promulgation of P.D. No.
1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot
control the specific terms of the statute; in the
instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No.
1990 do not purport to control or modify the
terms of Section 4 as amended. Upon the other
hand, the term "period for perfecting an appeal"
used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish
specification for the loose language "first
opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas
clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course, a
term of art but it is a term of art widely
understood by lawyers and judges and Section
4 of the Probation Law addresses itself
essentially to judges and lawyers. "Perfecting an
appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the
meaning given to those words in our procedural
law and so the law-making agency could only
have intended to refer to the meaning of those
words in the context of procedural law.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal
interpretation" of penal statutes, we note at the
outset that the Probation Law is not a penal
statute. We, however, understand petitioner's
argument to be really that any statutory
language that appears to favor the accused in a
criminal case should be given a "liberal
interpretation." Courts, however, have no
authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the
spirit of the law" where the words of the statute
themselves, and as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit
of law" may legitimately be invoked to set at
naught words which have a clear and definite
28
meaning imparted to them by our procedural
law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously
be given effect by judges and all others who are
charged with the application and implementation
of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in
mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the
intent that is to be given effect are to be derived
from the words actually used by the law-maker,
and not from some external, mystical or
metajuridical source independent of and
transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving
a "strict interpretation rather than a "liberal" one
to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as
amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal"
are adjectives which too frequently impede a
disciplined and principled search for the
meaning which the law-making authority
projected when it promulgated the language
which we must apply. That meaning is clearly
visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and
unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The
Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact
written. There is no need for the involved
process of construction that petitioner invites us
to engage in, a process made necessary only
because petitioner rejects the conclusion or
meaning which shines through the words of the
statute. The first duty of a judge is to take and
apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like
it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v.
Court of First Instance of Manila warned,
confusion and uncertainty in application will
surely follow, making, we might add, stability and
continuity in the law much more difficult to
achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements
which tinge words so as to give them the color of
a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which
has caused so much confusion in the law, which
has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with
respect to a given matter, is in considerable
measure the unwarranted interference by
judicial tribunals with the English language as
found in statutes and contracts, cutting the
words here and inserting them there, making
them fit personal ideas of what the legislature
ought to have done or what parties should have
agreed upon, giving them meanings which they
do not ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting,
changing and coloring until lawyers themselves
are unable to advise their clients as to the
meaning of a given statute or contract until it has
 29
been submitted to some court for its creation. He must not read out except to avoid
interpretation and construction. 6 patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7

The point in this warning may be expected to
become sharper as our people's grasp of
English is steadily attenuated.
There is another and more fundamental reason
why a judge must read a statute as the
legislative authority wrote it, not as he would
prefer it to have been written. The words to be
given meaning whether they be found in the
Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore
limit the authority and discretion of the judges
who must apply those words. If judges may,
under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real
intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact
used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively
escape the constitutional and statutory
limitations on their authority and discretion.
Once a judge goes beyond the clear and
ordinary import of the words of the legislative
authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas. In
a polity like ours which enshrines the
fundamental notion of limiting power through the
separation and distribution of powers, judges
have to be particularly careful lest they substitute
their conceptions or preferences of policy for that
actually projected by the legislative agency.
Where a judge believes passionately that he
knows what the legislative agency should have
said on the particular matter dealt with by a
statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the
conclusion that therefore that was what the law-
making authority was really saying or trying to
say, if somewhat ineptly As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter explained:
Petitioner finally argues that since under Section
4 of Probation Law as amended has vested in
the trial court the authority to grant the
application for probation, the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and
should have (as he had prayed in the alternative)
remanded instead the records to the lower court.
Once more, we are not persuaded. The trial
court lost jurisdiction over the case when
petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of
Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to
remand the case except for execution of
judgment. Moreover, having invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is
not at liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction
when exercised adversely to him. In any case,
the argument is mooted by the conclusion that
we have reached, that is, that petitioner's right to
apply for probation was lost when he perfected
his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CAGR No. 04678 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Even within their area of choice the courts are

not at large. They are confined by the nature and
scope of the judicial function in its particular
exercise in the field of interpretation. They are
under the constraints imposed by the judicial
function in our democratic society. As a matter
of verbal recognition certainly, no one will
gainsay that the function in construing a statute
is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected
legislature. The great judges have constantly
admonished their brethren of the need for
discipline in observing the limitations A judge
must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor
to contract it. Whatever temptations the
statesmanship of policy-making might wisely
suggest, construction must eschew interpolation
and evisceration He must not read in by way of
 30
-versus-
PROSECUTOR A.M. No. MTJ-06-
ROMANA R. REYES, 1623 JUDGE JULIA A.
Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI REYES, Presiding
No. 04-1635-MTJ] Judge Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch A.M. No. MTJ-06-
Present: 69, Pasig City, 1627
-versus- Respondent. [Formerly OCA IPI
PUNO, C.J., x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No. 04-1661-MTJ]
QUISUMBING,* ---------x
YNARES-
JUDGE JULIA A. SANTIAGO, ANDREE K.
REYES, Metropolitan CARPIO,** LAGDAMEO,
Trial Court, Branch CORONA, Complainant,
69, Pasig City, CARPIO MORALES,
Respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, -versus-
VELASCO, JR.,***
NACHURA, JUDGE JULIA A.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - LEONARDO-DE REYES, Metropolitan
--------x CASTRO, Trial Court, Branch A.M. No. P-09-2693
BRION, 69, Pasig City, [Formerly OCA IPI
PERALTA, Respondent. No. 04-2048-P]
BERSAMIN, x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DEL CASTILLO, and ---------x
ABAD, JJ.
TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO,
Promulgated: Branch Clerk of
September 18, 2009 Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch
TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO 69, Pasig City,
and DOMINGO S. A.M. No. MTJ-06- Complainant,
CRUZ, 1624 A.M. No. MTJ-06-
Complainants, [Formerly OCA IPI -versus- 1638
No. 04-1636-MTJ] [Formerly OCA IPI
-versus- JUDGE JULIA A. No. 05-1746-MTJ]
REYES,
JUDGE JULIA A. Respondent.
REYES, Presiding x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge of the ---------x
Metropolitan Trial
Court in Pasig City, FLORENCIO
Branch 69, SEBASTIAN, JR.,
Respondent. Complainant,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
---------x A.M. No. MTJ-06- -versus-
1625
ARMI M. [Formerly OCA IPI HON. JULIA A.
FLORDELIZA, No. 04-1630-MTJ] REYES, Presiding
JULIET C. VILLAR Judge, Metropolitan
and MA. Trial
CONCEPCION Court, Pasig City,
LUCERO, all of the Branch 69,
Metropolitan Trial Respondent.
Court, Branch 69, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Pasig City,
Complainants,

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Professionalism, respect for the rights of others,
good manners and right conduct are expected of
all judicial officers and employees, because the
image of the judiciary is necessarily mirrored in
their actions.[1]
Five administrative cases against Judge Julia A.
Reyes (Judge Reyes), Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 69 and one administrative case which
Judge Reyes filed against her Branch Clerk of
Court Timoteo Migrio were consolidated and
referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo,
consultant of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), for investigation, report
and recommendation, by this Courts
[2]
Resolutions of September 28, 2005 and
December 12, 2007.[3]
Earlier, the Court preventively suspended Judge
Reyes effective immediately and until further
orders, by Resolution of December 14, 2004 in
A.M. No. 04-12-335-MeTC, Re: Problem
Besetting MeTC, Branch 69, Pasig City.
Records show that Judge Reyes whereabouts
have remained unknown. She was issued an
Authority to Travel to the United States for the
period from November 16 to 30, 2004. She
appears to have left the country in December
2004 but there is no record showing that she
sought the Courts permission therefor or filed
any leave of absence for December 2004.[4]
From an August 17, 2005 Certification from the
Bureau of Immigration, the only entry in its
database relative to the travel of Judge Reyes
was her departure to an unknown destination
through Korean Air Flight No. KE622
on December 28, 2004.[5]
Due to her absence, the Court declared Judge
Reyes as having waived her right to answer or
comment on the allegations against her and to
adduce evidence.
I. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-
1623 (PROSECUTOR ROMANA R. REYES v.
JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
By letter-complaint of October 26,
2004,[6] Assistant City Prosecutor Romana
31
Reyes (Prosecutor Reyes), the public
prosecutor assigned to Branch 69, charged
Judge Reyes with grave abuse of authority
and/or grave misconduct, the details of which
follow:
On October 1, 2004 at past 6:00 p.m.,
Prosecutor Reyes accidentally met Judge Reyes
at the office of Police Inspector Jovita V. Icuin
(Inspector Icuin), the Chief of the Criminal
Investigation Branch of the Pasig City Police
Station. Judge Reyes was there to inquire about
her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migrio
(Migrio)[7] who was earlier arrested for alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 or the
Anti-Gambling Law. When Judge Reyes was
informed that Migrio was already released on
orders of Judge Jose Morallos, Judge Reyes
asked Prosecutor Reyes to conduct an inquest
against Migrio for malversation on the basis of a
photocopy of an affidavit of a certain Ariel
Nuestro, purportedly executed and sworn to
before Judge Reyes on September 15, 2004.[8]
Prosecutor Reyes informed Judge Reyes that
the case of malversation may not necessarily fall
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court[9] on Arrest without Warrant and thus
cannot be the subject of inquest. Prosecutor
Reyes explained that inquest could not be
conducted as it was already past 6:00
p.m. whereas inquest proceedings could be
conducted only until 6:00 p.m. unless authorized
by the City Prosecutor. She added that since the
crime was allegedly committed in 2003, Migrio
would have to undergo preliminary
investigation.[10] Prosecutor Reyes continued:
When she heard that if inquest is conducted he
will be released for preliminary investigation, she
was fuming mad and directed me to conduct the
preliminary investigation right then and there.It
was really a surprise that a judge, a former
prosecutor at the Rizal Provincial Prosecution
Office, would direct me to conduct preliminary
investigation at the station without giving the
respondent (Mr. Migrino), at least the mandatory
10-day period within which to prepare for an
intelligent answer/counter-affidavit.
She insisted that Mr. Migrino be detained on the
weekend and the police detained him. He was
the subject of inquest on October 4, 2004,
Monday and was ordered release for preliminary
investigation by the City Prosecutor.
xxxx

On October 5 and 6, 2004 I was not able to
appear during the hearing of criminal cases in
her sala but I made it a point to inform the Court
by calling, through cellphone, one of her staff on
the mornings of October 5 and 6. I was having
severe headache and chest discomfort.
On October 11, 2004, I appeared at her sala to
discharge my official function as public
prosecutor assigned in her Court. Before the
hearing started, she asked for my Medical
Certificate and I explained that to be candid, I did
not personally see a doctor but called [the
doctor] to inform him of my condition and I was
advised to rest and take my regular medication.
Surprisingly, and to my embarrassment, without
any case for contempt filed and without
being included in the days calendar, she
brought up the incident of October 1, 2004. I
explained to her that unless I had been
authorized by the City Prosecutor or Chief-
Inquest, I could not conduct inquest and inquest
proceedings are being held in my position as a
Prosecutor under the Department of Justice.
She insisted that I was there as the Prosecutor
assigned to this Court and who is assigned at
the same sala and you refused to conduct an
inquest forgetting her constitutional law that
there is separation of powers among the three
branches of government legislative, executive
and the judiciary.
She issued in open court an order requiring me
to explain in writing within twenty-four (24) hours
why I should not be cited for contempt for my
refusal to conduct the inquest on October 1,
2004. I was all the more surprised when she
gave the following sweeping statement in open
court:
Dont worry Prosec, I will not order your
arrest today, because I know that the Pasig
City Police Officer at the Pasig Police Station,
because your house is located in front of the
Pasig City Station, there is no one who will
arrest you. I will still coordinate with the
office of Gen. Aglipay to send me a police
officer who will take custody of you pending
contempt proceedings.
The above-quoted statement, lifted from the
transcript of stenographic notes of October 11,
2004 which is hereto attached as Annex A to A-
5, only shows that she has already a pre-
judgment of the contempt charge and no
explanation, even if submitted, will convince her
to stop from declaring me with contempt.
32
I was hospitalized at the Medical City on the
night of October 11, 2004 until October 14,
2004 due to chest pain and the Court was
informed of this fact. However[,] on October 13,
2004 when I was still confined, respondent
issued an Order in open court stating:
x x x without any valid explanation except for
the word that she is presently confined at the
hospital, which is hearsay at the moment, in
which case the same is just noted by the court.
So for her failure to attend todays proceedings,
despite notice, as well as for her failure to attend
the proceedings yesterday as well as on October
5 and 6 without any valid explanation, and for her
failure to give any explanation after the lapse of
24 hours from the time she was ordered to show
cause why she should not be cited in contempt
in open court last October 11, 2004, let warrant
of arrest issue against the said Public
Prosecutor. x x x Bail is set at P1,000.00 per
case in which there is a total of 119 cases
delayed as a result of her absence since
October 5 and October 6 as well as
yesterday, October 12 and today, October
13. That means a bail of P119,000.00 as well
as for two (2) counts of apparent
contempt which consist of misbehavior of an
officer of the Court in the performance of her
official duties as well as for improper
conduct tending directly or indirectly to
impede, obstruct, and degrade the
administration of justice to which bail is set
at P25,000.00 each, to set an example to the
public especially, since she is actually the
Public Prosecutor presently assigned to this
Court who committed such apparent act of
indirect contempt.[11] (Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
In another letter dated October 29,
2004,[12] Prosecutor Reyes informed the OCA
that during the October 27, 2004 hearing for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order in
connection with her petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus docketed as SCA-
2732 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, four police officers served a warrant of
arrest[13] purportedly issued on October 11, 2004
by Judge Reyes pertaining to Criminal Case
Nos. 02164-02173, all entitled People v.
Prosecutor Romana R. Reyes.
Verification from the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the MeTC of Pasig City revealed, however,

that there was no pending case against
Prosecutor Reyes and that the particular case
numbers pertained to cases against 10
individuals for offenses ranging from violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 6 to Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property.[14]
Prosecutor Reyes travails did not stop there,
however. On October 27, 2004, at around 10:30
a.m., she received copies of two Orders of
October 11 and 13, 2004 of Judge Reyes
directing Prosecutor Reyes in the later Order, to
x x x show cause within 24 hours from receipt of
this Order why she should not be cited in
contempt for her failure to submit her
explanation to date and for her failure to attend
the proceedings of this Court without any
explanation.
Considering the gravity of her responsibility as a
Public Prosecutor, let warrant issue for her
arrest. Bail is set at P2,000.00 per case, or a
total of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS ONLY
[15]
(P238,000.00). (Emphasis and capitalization
in the original; underscoring supplied)
On December 13, 2004, Prosecutor Reyes
wrote another letter[16] to the OCA charging
Judge Reyes with Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, Knowingly Rendering an
Unjust Judgment or Order, and Gross Ignorance
of the Law or Procedure, as follows:
On December 7, 2004, I arrived at the court
room of MTC-Pasig City Branch 69 at about 8:30
a.m. to discharge my duties as the trial
prosecutor of the Branch. The hearing has not
started, the Presiding Judge was not there yet
and the litigants have not been allowed to enter
the courtroom. Hearing of cases on the Court
does not promptly start at 8:30 a.m. but always
been the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. as the
Presiding Judge, Julia A. Reyes, usually arrive
past 8:30 a.m. and when she arrive[s], she still
order[s] the installation of her microphone and
computer. In the meantime, litigants are not
allowed to enter the courtroom but have to wait
outside until they are allowed entry by the staff.
I reviewed the court records to know if the parties
had been notified of the scheduled hearings.
After the recitation of the Centennial Prayer and
before the calendar of cases were called, Judge
Julia Reyes called my attention and said that
33
there was an Order of the Court for me to explain
my failure to appear on October 5, 6, 12, 13, 18,
19, 20, 25, 26 and 27 and up to now, I have not
submitted my explanation. I stood up and politely
explained to her that the incidents she was
referring to was the subject of the case I filed
against her for Certiorari, Prohibition &
Mandamus, before the Regional Trial Court
Pasig City and there was an Order issued, a
copy of the Order had been served on her, that
any and all warrant of arrest issued by her would
not be enforced and/or implemented by the
police agencies. She did not hear my reason and
said that this is a new order and is not covered
by the Order of Hon. Celso Lavina and she
ordered that I be detained for one (1) day at
the Pasig City Police Headquarters. I moved for
a five (5) minute recess to make a call to my
lawyer and to fix myself as I was having
palpitation then. She denied my motion and
ordered the start of the scheduled hearing of
cases. She ordered the police officers to lock the
door of the courtroom and not to let anyone go
out or come in. This was the first time, during my
assignment at her branch, that the door of the
court was locked and nobody is allowed to leave
the room or go inside. Though not convenient,
as I was thinking of my health then, and the
humiliation I felt in, again, being declared in
contempt in open court and ordered detained, I
continued to discharge my duties as a trial
prosecutor of the branch until after the more than
40 cases had been called.
After the hearing of criminal cases and the case
of contempt was called against Max Soliven et
al., I was informed by PO1 Sandy Galino, her
security escort, that the police officers whom
they have called for assistance were already
outside the courtoom and will be bringing me to
the police station. They would not allow me to
leave the place unless I go with them at the
Headquarters. When I was about to be escorted
out of the court room, my lawyer, Atty. Hans
Santos and my sister, Asst. Pros. Paz Yson,
came and was bringing with them a certified
copy of the Order of Hon. Celso Lavina dated
November 22, 2004 stating that any and all
warrants issued by Judge Julia Reyes will not be
enforced by any police agencies. My lawyer
showed the Order to PO1 Sandy Galino and a
certain PO1 Villarosa and they said that they are
getting orders from Judge Julia Reyes. My
lawyer then asked them if they have a written
Order from the Court, or a Warrant for my Arrest
or a Commitment Order but they replied in the

negative. My lawyer further asked them if they
are detaining me and they said no.
xxxx
On or about 12:00 noon of December 9, 2004, I
have just alighted from a car and she was
standing infront of the building when she saw
me. She immediately followed me and shouted
Arrest her! Arrest her! To the guards on duty at
the entrance of the building. In the presence of
so many persons in the lobby and in high pitch
she made calls, through her cell phone, to
several police officers telling them that she
caught an escaped convict, a fugitive from
justice and needs a battery of police officers to
make the arrest. I warned her to be careful with
her language considering that I did not escape
but was released by Hon. Executive Judge Jose
Morallos upon presentation of the Order
dated November 22, 2004 of Hon. Judge Celso
Lavina, RTC-Pasig Br.71. She continued, in the
presence of people in the Lobby who had
converged to see what was causing the
commotion, that I am an escaped convict and
should be detained at the Pasig CityPolice
Headquarters. She further said that it was Judge
Jose Morallos who facilitated my escape last
Tuesday, December 7, 2004.
xxxx
While questioning the propriety of the order of
Direct Contempt, considering that there is an
order of November 22, 2004 stating that any and
all warrants she issued will not be enforced or
implemented, and that she has to issue the
necessary Commitment Order for my detention,
she slapped with me another seven (7) days of
detention for Direct Contempt.
xxxx
At about 6:00 p.m., the Sheriff of Regional Trial
Court-Pasig City, Branch 71 arrived and served
a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction with an attached Order
dated December 9, 2004 issued by Hon Judge
Celso Lavina declaring my detention illegal but
the Headquarters would not release me until
after they have conferred with their superior
officers. After conferring with the higher officials,
I was finally released, over the written objection
of Judge Julia Reyes in the copy of the Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory Mandatory Injunction
and Court Order dated December 9, 2004, from
34
the Pasig City Police Headquarters at about 7:00
p.m.
x x x x[17] (Underscoring supplied)
II. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-
1624 (TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO AND DOMINGO S
. CRUZ v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
By Complaint of October 16, 2004,[18] Migrio and
Domingo S. Cruz charged Judge Reyes with
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Oppression, Abuse
of Authority, and Illegal Arrest and Detention, the
details of which follow:
In July 2003, not long after her appointment as
Presiding Judge, Judge Reyes began to exhibit
unexplained prejudice and hostility towards
Migrio. In fact, without any reason at all, Judge
Reyes told Atty. Reynaldo Bautista, the MeTC
Clerk of Court, that Migrio would be detailed at
the Office of the Clerk of Court.[19]
On several occasions, the latest of which was on
August 24, 2004, she barred Migrio from
entering the court premises and the staff room.
During lunch break on October 1, 2004, Migrio,
Deputy Sheriff Joel K. Agliam and Dandy T.
Liwag were arrested without warrant upon
orders of Judge Reyes as they were allegedly
caught in flagrante delictoplaying tong-its. Police
Officer 1 Sandy Galino (PO1 Galino), the
security officer of Judge Reyes, arrested them
and brought them to the Pasig City Police
Station where they were detained by virtue of the
affidavits[20] of PO1 Galino and Judge Reyes.[21]
When an Order of Release[22] was issued by
Judge Morallos after the three posted bail,
Judge Reyes tried to prevent their release and
insisted that she had a complaint against Migrio
for malversation of public funds, infidelity in the
custody of document and/or qualified theft and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act[23] allegedly committed in November 2002,
and presented the Affidavit[24] of Ariel Nuestro
and the Joint Affidavit[25] she executed with court
employees Remedios Diaz (Remedios) and
Alma Santiano.
Complainant Atty. Domingo S. Cruz (Atty. Cruz),
counsel of Migrio, et al., intervened and
demanded from Inspector Icuin the immediate
release of his clients since there was already an
Order of Release. Atty. Cruz and Prosecutor
Reyes also explained to Judge Reyes that

Migrio could not be detained on the basis of an
alleged offense that occurred in 2002 yet, and
that the alleged offense was not covered by the
rule on warrantless arrest.[26] Migrio and Atty.
Cruz continued:
15. Judge [Reyes] insisted that complainant
Migrio must not be released as the case is
covered by the rule on warrantless arrest, the
alleged offense of malversation having been
allegedly discovered only recently by
respondent Judge and staff, specifically at 4:30
P.M. of 01 October 2004. She then told Pros.
Reyes to conduct an immediate
Inquest/preliminary investigation.
16. It must be noted and emphasized that
Nuestro subscribed and swore to his
Sinumpaang Salaysay before respondent Judge
way back on September 15, 2004, and it could
not be said that the alleged offense of
malversation of public funds was discovered
only at 4:30 P.M. of October 01, 2004. What is
certain is that respondent Judge timed the
alleged discovery to suit her
purpose[27] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Unable to convince Judge Reyes, Atty. Cruz left
the office of Inspector Icuin, but returned shortly
with a warning that he would hold them
responsible for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention
and abuse of authority unless Migrio was
immediately released. Inspector Icuin finally
ordered the release of Migrio.
Migrio stayed in jail from October 1, 2004, a
Friday, until he was released on October 4,
2004. Judge Reyes was determined to send
Migrio back to jail, however, by means of her
contempt powers. In her October 4, 2004 Order,
she stated:
x x x Timoteo Migrino, Clerk of Court, Branch 69,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City, is hereby
ordered to show cause within twelve (12) hours
from receipt of this order why he should not be
cited in contempt for the following acts: (1) illegal
gambling during office hours within the Court
premises (2) infidelity in the custody of
documents, (3) qualified theft and/or
malversation for misappropriation of the amount
of PHP10,000.00 entrusted to him for deposit by
one Ariel Nuestro in a criminal case filed before
this Court, (4) for violation of R.A. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, among
others. He is likewise ordered to show cause
35
why he should not be cited in contempt for
openly defying to submit to undersigned with
respect to her complaint before the police
authorities for the said crimes and/or offenses
which defiance appear to be improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice under
Rule 71, Sec. 3(d) of the Rules of Court.
Set the hearing of this case on October 8,
2004 at 2:30 P.M. and said respondent is
directed to make his explanation on said date
and time in open court with warning that should
he fail to attend said hearing despite due notice
a warrant for arrest shall be issued.
The Process Server of this Court with the
assistance of a Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, is directed to send a copy of
this Order by personal service to respondent
TIMOTEO A. MIGRINO. Any officer of the law is
likewise directed to assist said Process Server in
the service of this Order to said respondent and
is specifically directed to take custody of said
respondent should he refuse to receive this
Order and bring the same to this Court on
October 8, 2004 at 2:00 P.M.[28] (Capitalization
in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Significantly, while in the said Order of October
4, 2004, Judge Reyes found Atty. Cruz,
Prosecutor Reyes, Inspector Icuin and PO3
Jimenez to have also committed contumacious
acts, she singled out Migrio and directed him to
explain why he should not be declared in
contempt of court.
On October 8, 2004, Judge Reyes issued
another Order[29] giving her process server, the
MeTC sheriff and any officer of the law blanket
authority to take custody of [Migrio] should he
refuse to receive this Order and bring him to this
Court on October 11, 13, 14 & 15, 2004 at 2:00
P.M. Complainants further narrated:
41. To show that the respondent judge is using
her contempt powers as a bludgeon to clobber
her perceived enemies, instead of using the
same as a necessary tool for preserving the
integrity of the court, the respondent issued
another Order dated October 14, 2004 ordering
complainant Migrio to show cause why he
should not be cited for at least 2,330 acts of
indirect contempt.Repeat, two thousand

three hundred thirty. A copy of this Order is
attached hereto as Annex J.
The tyranny and despotism of the respondent
judge is crystal clear in the following statements
in said Order of October 14, 2004 (Annex J):
Moreover, respondent committed at least 1,510
acts of indirect contempt with respect to the case
of People vs. Marcos Rivera (Crim. Case No.
36172) which remains pending in the docket of
this court to date, when he failed to act on or set
for arraignment to date, the said case filed herein
on April 29, 1998. Considering that a total of
around 1,510 working days has lapsed from the
said date of filing of said case up to the time that
said respondent was barred from entering the
court premises and the staff room on August 24,
2004, herein respondent is hereby ordered to
show cause why he should not be cited for 1,510
acts of indirect contempt for all the working days
that he failed to act on said case which appears
to remain pending in the docket of this court to
date.
Even assuming for purposes of argument that
the failure of the respondent to set for
arraignment the aforementioned case is
contumacious, it was one continuing act of
omission, not 1,510 separate acts of
commission.[30] (Emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
III. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-
1625 (ARMI M. FLORDELIZA, JULIET C. VILL
AR AND MA. CONCEPCION LUCERO v. JUD
GE JULIA A. REYES)
By verified[31] letter-complaint of March 11,
2004,[32] Judge Reyes was charged by
complainants Armi M. Flordelisa et al. who are
court employees at Branch 69, with the following
acts: (1) residing in chambers; (2) borrowing
money from staff; (3) instructing the
stenographer to collect a minimum amount
for ex-parte cases; (4) frequently bringing some
of her staff to her nighttime gimmick; (5)
unethical conduct; (6) conduct unbecoming a
lady judge; (7) unfriendliness to litigants; (8) anti-
public service; (9) inability to control emotions
during hearing; (10) uttering invectives in front of
staff and lawyers; (11) conducting staff meeting
in an unsightly attire; and (12) gross
inefficiency/laziness.
36
According to complainants, it was of public
knowledge at the Pasig City Hall of Justice that
Judge Reyes was residing in her chambers
where a big aparador she had placed therein
was eventually removed after three Supreme
Court lawyers investigated the matter. She
continued to sleep in the chambers after going
out for evening gimmicks with some members of
her staff. She would usually be fetched by a
certain Col. Miranda at 12 midnight and would
return at 4:00 a.m.[33]
On two separate occasions in May 2003, Judge
Reyes instructed complainant Juliet Villar
(Juliet), branch legal researcher, to act as her
co-maker in her loan applications. Within the
same period, Judge Reyes, who allegedly
needed money for an ID picture, borrowed P500
from Juliet who was forced to borrow the amount
from Miguelito Limpo (Limpo), branch process
server, which amount remained unpaid as of the
filing of their complaint.[34] Judge Reyes also
borrowed P20,000 from the branch process
server who, however, did not execute any
affidavit out of fear,[35] as relayed by Maria
Concepcion Lucero (Maria Concepcion), branch
in-charge of civil cases.[36] When Juliet informed
Limpo of the plan of some staff members to
petition for the removal of Judge Reyes, Limpo
remarked, Bago nyo ipatanggal yun, hintayin
nyo munang bayaran ako. Inutangan ako nyan
ng P20,000.00, isinanla ko pa yung alahas para
lang may maipautang sa kanya.[37]
In her other affidavit,[38] Juliet claimed that in
October 2003, Judge Reyes stepped out of the
chambers and told complainant Armi Flordeliza
(Armie),[39] Court Stenographer I, Armie, ang
hina mo naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si
Leah. Dapat pag tinanong ka kung magkano,
sabihin mo at least P2,000.00 Since then all ex-
parte cases were assigned to court
stenographer Leah Palaspas (Leah). Judge
Reyes further remarked, Sino pa ba ibang
pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw
Oswald, sheriff. The sheriff only smiled.
Complainants stated that Judge Reyes
habitually invited her staff to go with her in night
gimmicks from 10:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. the
following day, without regard to working days.
This practice hampered the delivery of judicial
services, as the employees who went out with
her the previous night either went on leave or
arrived late the following day.[40]

On December 23, 2003, upon the persistent
request of Judge Reyes, Juliet joined her and
company in a comedy bar in Quezon City and
stayed there until 4:00 a.m. of December 24,
2003. Judge Reyes brought her employees to
their respective homes and then went to sleep in
her chambers.[41]
Maria Concepcion, in another affidavit, stated
that on January 2, 2004, Judge Reyes
repeatedly invited the staff for lunch at her
residence. While inside her house, Judge Reyes
insistently gave her a glass of red wine, from
which she pretended to take a sip, after which
Judge Reyes consumed the remainder. Judge
Reyes joined the rest of the staff at the sala
where they consumed gin pomelo.[42]
Complainants depicted Judge Reyes as very
unethical. One time, in the presence of a
stranger, Judge Reyes uttered, Ano kaya kung
mag-hearing ako ng hubot hubad tapos naka-
robe lang, pwede kaya?[43] At one time, Armie
overheard Judge Reyes utter over the
phone Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko na
siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha![44]
Judge Reyes exhibited conduct unbecoming a
judge for repeatedly inviting her staff and other
court employees to join her to a drinking spree
in the courtroom after office hours on three
consecutive Fridays in February 2004.
On March 2, 2004, Juliet arrived at the office at
around 7:00 a.m. and saw Judge Reyes about to
leave the office. Juliet was later informed by the
guards and janitors that they saw an inebriated
Judge Reyes sleeping on the bench outside the
office and found empty bottles of alcoholic drinks
in the garbage can.[45]
Judge Reyes was also unfriendly to litigants.
On January 23, 2004 during the inventory of
cases, as a litigant attempted to verify the status
of his case, Judge Reyes suddenly
remarked, Nag-iimbentaryo kami, bawal mag-
verify. Pag hindi ka umalis, iko-
contempt kita! However, when an employee
from another branch referred a couple to Judge
Reyes for solemnization of marriage, Judge
Reyes ordered the stopping of the inventory to
give way to it. On March 4, 2004, Judge Reyes
sent Leah a text message advising her to reset
the hearings as she was unavailable, but upon
being informed by Remedios that there was a
marriage to be solemnized that day, Judge
Reyes immediately arrived and even attended
the wedding reception. In the months of
37
December 2003 and January 2004, Judge
Reyes was able to solemnize 16[46] and
14[47] marriages, respectively.
Complainants claimed that Judge Reyes was
anti-public service. She instructed the staff to
lock the door entrance to the room occupied by
the staff and not to answer phone calls during
court hearings even if there were employees in
the staff room to attend to calls and queries.[48]
Judge Reyes lacked the ability to control her
emotions during hearings. In one hearing, she
failed to maintain her composure and stormed
out of the room while Assistant City Prosecutor
Fernando Dumpit was still talking.[49] Judge
Reyes hurled invectives in front of the staff and
lawyers. On October 2, 2003, while with a lawyer
friend from the Office of the Solicitor General,
she remarked in front of her staff, Alam mo na
ang dami intriga dito; nireport ba naman na
nakatira ako dito, ano kaya masama dun? Alam
ko staff ko rin nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA
NILA, PUTANG INA TALAGA NILA![50]
Several times, Judge Reyes conducted staff
meetings wearing T-shirt, slippers and
faded maong folded a little below the knee, as if
she was in her house. Oftentimes, she would
wear the same clothes she wore the previous
day, which showed that she resided in the
chambers.[51]
Judge Reyes was lazy and inefficient, as she
delegated decision-writing to Juliet. Since her
appointment, she was able to promulgate only
three or four decisions of her own writing.
Complainants thus requested the conduct of
judicial audit to determine her work output.[52]
By Supplemental Complaint[53] of January 28,
2005, Armie added:
1. I was jailed on the strength of a warrant of
arrest dated October 8, 2004 issued by Judge
Julia A. Reyes in connection with the ten (10)
counts of Indirect Contempt of Court charges
which she had initiated against me for gross
misconduct in office and insubordination;
2. The warrant of arrest of October 8, 2004
stemmed from my failure to attend the hearing of
an Indirect Contempt of Court charge she filed
against me, then about to be heard on October
8, 2004 at 2:30 oclock in the afternoon where I
am supposed to explain my side;

xxxx
5. I was served with a copy of the show cause
Order dated October 4, 2004 signed by Judge
Reyes where I was informed that I committed
acts constituting contempt of court as defined by
Rule 71, Section 3 (a) and (b) of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. On the basis of said show
cause order, I was also directed by Judge Reyes
to appear on October 8, 2040 at 2:30 pm in court
and to make further explanation with warning
that should I fail to attend the hearing on said
date despite due notice, a warrant for my arrest
shall be issued by the court. Plain copy of
the Order dated October 4, 2004 is herewith
attached and duly marked as Annex A;
6. For fear of being arrested, I did not attend
the hearing of October 8, 2004, despite notice,
and hence, as earlier stated, a warrant of arrest
dated October 8, 2004 was issued by Judge
Reyes against me;
7. I was apprehended and confined at the
Pasig City Police Station, at Pariancillo,
Kapasigan, Pasig City to my great damage and
prejudice and that of my family;
xxxx
11. What is worse is that Judge Reyes fixed the
bail for my temporary liberty at two hundred
thousand (P250,000.00) pesos which to my
mind is quite excessive and violative of my
constitutional right to bail;
xxxx
14. Surprisingly, the warrant of arrest dated
October 8, 2004 issued by Judge
Reyes supposedly carries a docket number
starting from Case Number 02154 up to and
including 02163 which correspond to ten (10)
counts of Indirect Contempt of Court. However,
the said case numbers does not pertain to a
person of Armie M. Flordeliza, nor with a case of
Contempt of Court.Please
see Certification signed by Atty. Reynaldo V.
Bautista, Clerk of Court IV of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig
City Annex B, and a copy of the Warrant of
Arrest dated October 8, 2004 Annex C;
xxxx
38
21. Be it noted that in November 8, 2004, herein
complainant filed a Motion for Reduction of
Bail (Annex D) from P250,000.00 to P50,000.00
in cash which was not acted upon; the reason
why the herein complainant suffered for a longer
period inside the detention cell;
22. On the same date (November 8, 2004),
a Subpoena (Annex D-1) was served upon the
herein complainant alleging that a hearing will be
held in November 9, 10, 11 and 12. However,
Judge Reyes never conduct[ed] the hearings in
November 10, 11 and 12, 2004 which constitute
an oppression and violation of human rights and
grave misconduct;
23. In November 16, 2004, the 12th day the
herein complainant was under the detention cell,
was the day that I was released by posting a
cash bond of P50,000.00 granted by Hon. Divina
Gracia Lopez-Pelio, Pairing Judge of Branch 69,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 21065408
(Annex E); Order dated November 16, 2004
(Annex F); and Order of Release (Annex
G)[.] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)[54]
IV. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-
1627 (ANDREE K. LAGDAMEO v. JUDGE JU
LIA A. REYES)
Complainant Andree Lagdameo (Andree) is the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 42030
for physical injuries pending before Branch 69.
The case was originally set for promulgation of
judgment on May 19, 2004 but was cancelled
and repeatedly reset to July 13,
2004, September 14, 2004 and November 23,
2004. Andree thus filed an Urgent Motion to Set
Promulgation of Judgment,[55] furnishing the
OCA a copy thereof, which step, Andree
believed, must have courted [the judges] ire.
Judge Reyes moved the promulgation date
from November 23, 2004 to October 20, 2004,
only to reset the same to October 16, 2004. After
eight postponements,[56] the judgment was
finally promulgated on December 7, 2004 during
which Criminal Case No. 42030 was first in the
calendar of cases. Andree narrated:
xxxx

However, before the start of court proceedings
that day, there was a courtroom drama which
unfolded before the surprised eyes of all persons
then inside the courtroom. The Honorable Judge
Julia A. Reyes ordered the arrest and detention
of Prosecutor Romana Reyes. Judge Reyes
ordered her personal close-in-security, whom I
later came to know to be PO1 Sandy Galino, and
PO2 Rolando Lavadia, to implement her order. I
was seated on the first bench and I had a clear
view and could clearly hear the proceedings. I
heard Judge Reyes forbid Prosecutor Reyes
from calling her lawyer under pain of another day
of detention. I heard Judge Reyes further order
PO1 Galino and PO2 Lavadia to close the doors
of the courtroom and to prevent Prosecutor
Reyes from leaving the same.
6. Judge Reyes then proceeded to order Leah
Palaspas to promulgate judgment in my case,
Criminal Case No. 42030. I was so shocked by
the intemperate and derogatory words Judge
Reyes used to describe my person in the
aforesaid judgment, so much so that I left the
courtroom immediately after the reading
because I was so afraid that my face would
mirror my emotions and I might be cited for
contempt, especially after witnessing Judge
Reyes actions toward Prosecutor Romana
Reyes. I am a mere layman and I must indeed
look puny to the high and mighty Judge Julia A.
Reyes.
I was the complainant, not the accused, in the
case and I cannot understand why the judge
exhibited such kind of hostility against me in the
judgment just promulgated.
7. I then waited for the termination of the court
proceedings, to request for a copy of the
decision since I wanted to consult a lawyer
regarding Judge Reyes affront on my person. I
was barred from re-entering the court room by
PO1 Sandy Galino, the armed personal security
of Judge Reyes, pursuant to her orders.
xxxx
9. I then went back to the courtroom of Branch
69, and found Leah Palaspas and Alma
Santiano, both employees of MTC Branch 69,
together with PO1 Galino and PO2 Lavadia,
sitting in the now empty courtroom. I could hear
the raised voice of Judge Reyes emanating from
her chambers. I asked Leah Palaspas for a copy
of the decision, and to examine and photocopy
some documents in the file folder of Criminal
39
Case No. 42030. She told me to wait as the
folder was in the chamber of Judge Reyes. I
pointed to her that the decision in this case had
just been promulgated this morning and
logically, the folder would be in the pile in front of
her. She insisted that it was in the judges
chambers, and for me to wait.
10. I then stood and waited for about another
half hour in the corridor fronting the courtroom of
Branch 69 after which, I again approached Leah
Palaspas regarding my request. She called a co-
employee, whom I later came to know to be Ms.
Josefina Catacutan to accompany me to the
photocopying machine. While waiting in line, I
noticed that the decision promulgated that
morning was not in the file. I pointed this out to
Ms. Catacutan who proposed that we return to
Ms. Palaspas and ask for a copy.
11. Accompanied by Ms. Catacutan, I returned
to the Branch 69 courtroom where we found Ms.
Palaspas standing in the corridor. I pointed out
to her that a copy of the decision was not in the
file. She protested that it was almost noontime
and that I should just come back in the
afternoon. I pointed out to her that it was still ten
minutes to twelve and it was just a matter of
handing a copy of the decision to Ms. Catacutan,
and besides, I had been waiting since early
morning.
12. Ms. Leah Palaspas turned her back on me
and stepped into the courtroom where Judge
Reyes was sitting with Alma Santino, PO1
Galino and PO2 Lavadia and declared Eto ho
Judge, las doce na ho e.
13. I followed Ms. Palaspas inside the
courtroom but had hardly stepped inside when I
stopped in my tracks as Judge Reyes
shouted Dont try me, come back at 1:00 PM,
GET OUT! I was so shocked at the arrogance of
Judge Reyes and the way she shouted at me
that I turned on my heels and left.
14. On my way out probably out of sheer
frustration at the way the judge treats people
who happened to have business in her court I
commented to Ms. Palaspas who was standing
beside me:O baka ma contempt pa ako and
continued walking away.
15. Either Ms. Palaspas told the respondent
judge about my comment, or the judge herself
overheard me, when I reached the area in front
of the door of the staff room PO1 Sandy Galino

suddenly grabbed my arm and prevented me
from moving. When I turned my head, I saw
Judge Julia Reyes in the lobby fronting her
courtroom wagging her finger in the air and
shouting, HULIHIN NIYO YAN, IKULONG
NINYO YAN! thus letting loose her armed gorilla
on a hapless victim like me.
16. I instinctively struggled to free myself from
the grip of PO1 Sandy Galino, all the while
asking Judge Julia Reyes, Bakit, hindi naman
kita sinagot ah who all the while was viewing the
scene with a smirk of satisfaction on her face.
17. I was able to momentarily free my hand and
was able to call a lawyer friend on my mobile
phone who then advised me to demand for any
sort of written order to justify my arrest and
detention. I was also advised to demand that the
arresting officers identify themselves and the
unit to which they belong. PO1 Galino replied A
wala, basta utos ni Judge ito doon ka na
magpaliwanag at magtanong!
18. A uniformed police officer carrying an
armalite rifle, whose name I was not able to get,
then arrived. PO1 Sandy Galino addressed the
latter: Pare, pag pumalag, barilin mo. I never
imagined that I a simply citizen without any clout;
a weak, educated, woman who merely sought
the assistance of our courts to redress a
perceived grievance would be treated like a
common criminal in this fair Republic of ours!
I then continued to demand a written order
regarding my arrest but Galino repeated, Hindi
na raw kailangan, sabe ni Judge and proceeded
to forcibly bring me out of the Justice Hall. When
we reached the lobby I tried to go up to the office
of Executive Judge Morallos but PO1 Galino
pulled me down the stairs.
xxxx
The fact of my arrest was then entered into the
Blotter of the Pasig Station on Page 0393, Entry
No. 1781, Date: Dec. 7, 2004 Time 12:30 PM
which reads as follows:
Brought-in
PO1 Sandy Galino y Abuyog, 33 years old,
married of this station brought in one Andree
Lagdameo y Kirkwood, legal age, widow, res
of 237 Marne St. San Juan Metro Mla. for
direct contempt of court issued by Hon.
Judge Julia Reyes of MTC
B69 Pasig City. Order will follow.
40
(Attached as Annex B)
xxxx
20. At 5:00 PM of December 7, 2004, Atty.
Atencia again demanded my release from
detention since it was now the close of office
hours and Judge Julia Reyes had not issued any
commitment order. Col. Galvan again refused
and insisted that he was following the orders of
Judge Julia Reyes.
xxxx
22. I was finally released from detention after 24
hours. My release is entered on Page 0397 of
the Pasig Police Blotter under Entry No. 1799,
Date: December 08, 2004, Time: 12:30PM
which reads as follows:
Released
In relation to Entry 1781 dated Dec. 7,
2004 one Andree Lagdameo was released
from the custody of this station physically
and financially unmolested as attested by
her signature below.
Note: Detained w/o written commitment
order and released w/o written released
order.
(signature)
Andree Lagdameo
(Attached as Annex C)
x x x x[57] (Emphasis, capitalization and italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)
Andree supplemented[58] her December 22,
2004 Complaint[59] to allege that she finally
received a copy of the Decision[60] in Criminal
Case No. 42030 on December 16, 2004, several
days after she was illegally detained, and only
after she wrote a letter to Judge Reyes,
furnishing then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. and the OCA a copy thereof.[61]
When she read the Decision, she was shocked
on noting that Judge Reyes used very insulting
language in referring to her as the therein private
complainant. Judge Reyes wrote that [j]udging
from the demeanor and character of the accused
who appears to be a quiet man with a pleasant
disposition and that of the private complainant
who looks loud, rash and even vulgar in
language in her dealings with the court
personnel herein, this Court finds the version of

the accused to be more credible.[62] Judge
Reyes made a misrepresentation for she merely
relied on the records in writing the decision as
she never had the chance to hear the
testimonies of the parties since Judge Alex
Quiroz was the presiding judge when the case
was tried.
V. A.M. NO. P-09-2693 (TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO
v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
In an undated letter[63] received by the OCA
on October 4, 2004, Judge Reyes
recommended that Migrio be separated from the
service on charges of illegal gambling during
office hours, qualified theft and/or infidelity in the
custody of documents, and violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Upon the recommendation of the OCA, it
appearing that this case emanated from the
same incident of illegal gambling obtaining in
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624, the Court, by Resolution
of September 28, 2005,[64] ordered the
consolidation of the two cases. Hence, the
factual background of this case is reflected in the
earlier discussed A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624.
VI. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1638 (FLORENCIO
SEBASTIAN, JR. v. HON. JULIA A. REYES)
By verified Complaint-Affidavit of April 22,
2005,[65] complainant Florencio Sebastian, Jr.
(Sebastian) charged Judge Reyes with Grave
Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Incompetence and Inefficiency arising from the
procedings in Criminal Case No. 19110, People
v. Florencio Sebastian, Jr., Alicia Ty Sebastian
and Justo Uy, for falsification of public document
pending before Branch 69.
On February 18, 2004 at around 5:00 p.m.,
police officers arrived at Sebastians residence
and served on him and his wife Alicia (the
couple) warrants of arrest[66] issued by Judge
Reyes on October 28, 2003. After an overnight
detention at Camp Caringal in Quezon City, the
couple was presented to the branch clerk of
court, and learned that the warrants of arrest
were issued due to their failure to appear in court
on October 28, 2003 as directed in an August
15, 2003 Order[67] which was not received by
them or their counsel, Atty. Jaime Vibar.
41
A perusal of the August 15, 2003 Order reveals
that the same suffers from grave infirmity. It
reads:
The unsigned Order dated May 9, 2000 is
reiterated as follows:
Accused through counsel, having been [sic] filed
a Manifestation and Request for Remarking and
Formal Offer of Exhibits. The Prosecution is
given five (5) days from receipt thereof within
which to make its comment thereto.
Set the same for hearing on October 28, 2003,
at 8:130 [sic] A.M.
Send copies of this Order to the parties.
(Emphasis supplied)
The prior Order being unsigned, there was no
factual or legal reason for Judge Reyes to
reiterate the same and set the case for further
hearing, notably since the case had long been
submitted for decision.
Judge Reyes did not lift the warrant of arrest,
even after Atty. Vibar filed, pursuant to the
October 28, 2003 Order, a Motion for
Reconsideration, Compliance and Entry of
Appearance.[68]
At the promulgation of judgment on September
7, 2004, the branch clerk of court read only the
decretal portion of the decision convicting the
couple. Atty. Vibar requested a copy of the
decision but Judge Reyes replied that the
decision had not yet been printed but she could
give him a diskette which Atty. Vibar
refused. After declaring that she would later re-
promulgate the judgment and that the couple
should stay in court, Judge Reyes started calling
out the other cases. Not wanting to be part of the
irregularity and due to other pressing
commitments, Atty. Vibar left. At around 11:40
a.m. inside the chambers, Judge Reyes read the
judgment from a computer screen without giving
the couple a written copy[69] or computer print-
out.
The couple raised on appeal that the trial court
failed to comply with the mandate of Rule
120[70] of the Rules of Court and Section 14[71] of
Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that the
decision must be written and signed by the judge

with a clear statement of the facts and the law on
which the decision is based.[72]
THE EVALUATION OF JUSTICE ROMULO S.
QUIMBO
By Consolidated Report of June 27,
2004,[73] Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo
evaluated the first five administrative cases, viz:
Migrino presented a certificate that there is no
case against him pending with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. He
admits, however, that a case for illegal gambling
was filed against him. That the same may have
been dismissed does not totally exempt him
from administrative liability considering that
gambling within the courts premises is
proscribed by Administrative Circular No. 1-
99[74] issued by the Supreme Court. His act of
playing tong-its with two others within the court
premises makes him punishable under said
circular.
xxxx
The acts which appear to have been committed
by respondent Judge against Asst. City
Prosecutor R[o]m[a]na A. Reyes and Andree K.
Lagdameo were clearly unjustified and
unwarranted. The respondent Judges orders to
declare them in contempt and issuing warrants
for their arrest betray an abysmal lack of
knowledge of the rules governing
contempt. Her fixing an atrociously excessive
bail is a clear manifestation that respondent
Judge wanted to exhibit her authority and fixing
such a ridiculous amount of bail was designed to
prevent the complainants from obtaining
temporary release. Her obvious ignorance of the
rule governing contempt and the jurisprudence
that mandates that it be exercised as a
protective not a vindictive power makes us
wonder how, despite the rigorous screening of
candidates by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), a lemon such as the respondent Judge
managed to be nominated for appointment to
such exalted position. How she was able to
elude the psychiatric and psychological tests
under which she went is remarkable for it
resulted in the appointment of one grossly
ignorant of the law and more importantly devoid
of the temperament required of a judicial arbiter.
In the two cases mentioned above (A.M. No.
MTJ-06-1623 and A.M. No. 06-1627), the acts of
respondent Judge reveal a flaw in her
42
psychological makeup that disqualifies her
from holding the position of Judge. She appears
to be unaware of the jurisprudence that has
given meaning to the power of contempt.
xxxx
The Order dated 13 October 2004 (Exhibit G,
Rollo, p. 27, A.M. MTJ-06-1623), betrays not
only her gross ignorance as regards the Rule on
Contempt of Court, but it also shows her
capricious arrogance and despotic nature, the
antithesis of an ideal arbiter. It betrays a flaw in
her psychological makeup that disqualifies her
from presiding a court and dispensing justice.
Respondent inofficiously demanded that
complainant conduct an inquest at the police
station for the purpose of preventing the release
of Timoteo Migrino who had earlier been
arrested while allegedly engaged in illegal
gambling and had posted the required bail.
Notwithstanding the explanation of complainant
Reyes that she was not authorized to conduct
said inquest outside her office and the crime of
malversation allegedly committed two years
earlier could not be the proper subject of an
inquest, respondent could not be denied. She
demanded and the police acquiesced to hold
Migrino in jail over the weekend.
The prosecution of Prosecutor Reyes was not
based on any law or rule but was purely the
whim and caprice of the respondent. After
respondent Judge has held Prosecutor Reyes in
contempt and ordered her arrest (Exhibit [F],
A[.]M[.] No. MTJ-06-1623, p. 24.) she required
an unconscionable amount of Php236,000.00 as
bail knowing that it was practically impossible to
meet.
Complainant R[o]m[a]na R. Reyes charges
respondent Judge with falsification of public
documents. It appears that respondent Judge
issued a warrant for the arrest of
complainant. Since no case had been filed
against complainant, respondent Judge
conveniently issued the warrant under Criminal
Cases Nos. 02164 to 02173 (10 counts) which
pertained to cases filed against various persons
during the year 1985. The Order of 13 October
2004 (Exhibit [G], Rollo, A.M. MTJ-06-1623)
conveniently omitted to show any case numbers.
The travails suffered by complainant Lagdameo
likewise prove that respondent Judge was not
guided by law or rule but rather by whim and
caprice. The record does not show any reason
why respondent Judge could order the arrest of

complainant. Assuming that she had uttered the
words I am going because I may be declared in
contempt, this could not be the basis for
declaring her in direct contempt because the
court was no longer in session and she ma[d]e
the remark outside the courtroom. It was not
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before
the same. Neither could it be considered
disrespect towards the court. It is probably for
this reason that respondent Judge did not issue
any commitment order but orally commanded
the police to arrest Lagdameo. As can be seen
from excerpts from the police blotter (Rollo, A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1627, p. 9) Lagdameo was brought
in on December 7, 2004 at 12:30 P.M. and was
released on December 8, 2004, at 11[:]50 AM
(ibid. p. 10). The same blotter states: Note:
Detained w/o written commitment order &
released w/o written released. [sic] (Emphasis
and italics in the Report)
Respondents verbal order directed to members
of the PNP to arrest and jail Lagdameo who
languished in said jail for a day is clearly a
violation of Article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code and respondent Judge is a principal by
inducement.
The complaint filed by three personnel of Br. 69
charges respondent Judge with conduct
unbecoming a judge which could be considered
pecadillos and are covered by circulars and
other issuances of the Court and are punished
by either fines or suspensions or admonitions.
Considering respondent Judges acts
complained of by complainants R[o]mana R.
Reyes and Andree K. Lagdameo, together with
the acts committed by respondent Judge and
subject of other administrative cases assigned to
the undersigned, there can only be one
conclusion that respondent Judge is suffering
from some undiagnosed mental aberration that
makes her totally unfit to hold the position she
now occupies. Not only was her gross
ignorance established but her resort to
falsification was also proved.
The records show that respondent Judge was
suspended and has abandoned her office of
presiding Judge. She did this probably because
she felt guilty and could not find any justification
for her actions so she fled.
In A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624, the harassment and
ill treatment of complainant Migrino was clearly
43
established. The fact that respondent Judge
followed Migrino to the police station and
demanded that he be kept in custody despite the
Order of Release issued by Judge Morallos
upon Migrinos filing his bail both clearly shows
her to be whimsical and capricious. The
continued detention of Migrino after he was
ordered released under bond is likewise
arbitrary and in violation of Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code and respondent Judge is a
principal by inducement.
In OCA-IPI No. 04-2048-P, the record reveals
that the respondent Migrino was indicted for
illegal gambling having been allegedly caught en
flagrante by complainant Judge Julia A. Reyes.
The record also reveals that a certificate was
issued by the Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City that
there is no pending case against Migrino. Even
if we assume that the illegal gambling case
which was filed against Migrino and for which he
had to file his bond was dismissed, it still remains
that Migrino was seen gambling within the court
premises, an act which is proscribed by
Administrative Circular No. 1-99[75] earlier
mentioned.[76] (Emphasis partly in the original
and partly supplied; italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Justice
Quimbo thereupon RECOMMENDED that
Judge Reyes be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all her retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
and that Migrio be fined in an amount equivalent
to his one month salary.
Meanwhile, in A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638, Justice
Quimbo, by Report of September 25,
2006,[77] reiterated his recommendation after
coming up with the following evaluation:
The complaint mentions acts of respondent
Judge which are similar, if not identical to those
complained of in the following cases, to wit: A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1623 (Prosecutor Romana R.
Reyes vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-
06-1624 (Timeteo A. Migrino, et al. vs. Judge
Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625 (Armi
Flordeliza, et al. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1627 (Andree Lagdameo vs. Judge
Julia A. Reyes) which the undersigned had
earlier investigated and reported on. Our
conclusion remains firm that respondent

Judge is unfit to hold the position of
Presiding Judge of a Metropolitan Trial
Court.
In the present case, she is charged with
ignorance because she had issued a bench
warrant against the complainant and his wife for
their failure to appear on a date that respondent
Judge fixed for the continuation of the trial. While
she may be correct in assuming that she had the
authority to issue such warrant, said act was
clearly unjustified. Firstly, it does not appear in
the record of the case that complainant or his
wife received notice of said hearing. Neither
does it appear that their counsel received a copy
of the Order of 15 August 2003 which contained
the said setting. Secondly, there was no longer
any trial to speak of because the case had
already been submitted for decision and the
complainant (accused therein) had no longer
any need for appearing.[78] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
THIS COURTS RULING
The Court finds that Judge Julia Reyes should
indeed be dismissed from the service.
As early as 1949, this Court emphasized that the
administration of justice is a lofty function.
The administration of justice is a lofty function
and is no less sacred than a religious mission
itself. Those who are called upon to render
service in it must follow that norm of conduct
compatible only with public faith and trust in their
impartiality, sense of responsibility, exercising
the same devotion to duty and unction done by
a priest in the performance of the most sacred
ceremonies of a religious liturgy.[79]
By judges appointment to the office, the people
have laid on them their confidence that they are
mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits
of their varied contentions. For this reason,
members of the judiciary are expected to be
fearless in their pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power, and to be equipped with a moral fiber
strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in
their office.[80] Unfortunately, respondent Judge
failed to resist the temptations of power which
eventually led her to transgress the very law she
swore to protect and uphold.
44
To constitute gross ignorance of the law or
procedure, the subject decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of
official duties should be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. Most importantly, the judge
must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
or corruption.[81]
Judge Reyes bad faith is clearly apparent from
the above-related facts and circumstances in the
consolidated cases. This Court cannot shrug off
her failure to exercise that degree of care and
temperance required of a judge in the correct
and prompt administration of justice, more so in
these cases where her exercise of the power of
contempt resulted in the detention and
deprivation of liberty of Migrio, Andree,
Sebastian and Alicia, and endangered the
freedom of the other complainants. Tiongco v.
Salao[82] is instructive:
Thus, the carelessness and lack of
circumspection on respondent Judges part,
to say the least, in peremptorily ordering the
arrest and detention of complainant, warrant
the imposition of a penalty on respondent
Judge as a corrective measure, so that she
and others may be properly warned about
carelessness in the application of the proper law
and undue severity in ordering the detention of
complainant immediately and depriving him of
the opportunity to seek recourse from higher
courts against the summary penalty of
imprisonment imposed by respondent Judge.
It is also well-settled that the power to declare a
person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as
to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to
uphold the administration of justice. Judges,
however, are enjoined to exercise such
power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end view of utilizing
the same for correction and preservation of
the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation
or vindication. The salutary rule is that the
power to punish for contempt for purposes that
are impersonal, because that power is intended
as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but
for the functions that they exercise. Only
occasionally should the court invoke the inherent
power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or
fail.[83] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a dispenser of justice, Judge Reyes, a
lady judge at that, should have demonstrated
finesse in her choice of words. In this case, the
words used by her was hardly the kind of

circumspect language expected of a magistrate.
The use of vulgar and curt language does not
befit the person of a judge who is viewed by the
public as a person of wisdom and
scruples.[84] Remarks such as Ano kaya kung
mag-hearing ako ng hubot hubad tapos naka-
robe lang, pwede kaya?; Hayaan mo, Farah,
pag natikman ko na siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha
ha ha!; and Alam mo na ang dami intriga dito;
nireport ba naman na nakatira ako dito, ano kaya
masama dun? Alam ko staff ko rin nagsumbong
eh, PUTANG INA NILA, PUTANG INA TALAGA
NILA! have no place in the judiciary.
Those who don the judicial robe must observe
judicial decorum which requires magistrates to
be at all times temperate in their language,
refraining from inflammatory or excessive
rhetoric or from resorting to the language of
vilification.[85]
Judge Reyes failed to heed this injunction,
however. Her inability to control her emotions
her act of walking out of the courtroom during
hearings, and her shouting invectives at her staff
and lawyers indicate her unfitness to sit on the
bench. They betray her failure to exercise
judicial temperament at all times, and maintain
composure and equanimity.[86]
Judge Reyes questioned actions reflect her lack
of patience, an essential part of dispensing
justice; and of courtesy, a mark of culture and
good breeding. Her demonstrated belligerence
and lack of self-restraint and civility have no
place in the government service.[87]
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary (New Code of Judicial
Conduct), which took effect on June 1,
2004, mandates:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.[88]
Respecting Judge Reyes frequent nocturnal
gimmicks, suffice it to state that her presence in
the above-mentioned places impairs the respect
due her, which in turn necessarily affects the
image of the judiciary. A judge is a visible
representation of the judiciary and, more often
than not, the public cannot separate the judge
from the judiciary. Moreover, her act of bringing
some of her staff to her weekday gimmicks, that
45
causes them to be absent or late for work
disrupts the speedy administration of
service. She thus also failed to heed the
mandate of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, viz:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny,
judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a
way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.[89]
As for Judge Reyes act of borrowing money from
her staff, the same constitutes conduct
unbecoming a judge. While there is nothing
wrong per se with borrowing money, it must be
borne in mind that she exerted moral
ascendancy over her staff, who may not have
had the means but may have been forced to find
a way in order not to displease her.
Judge Reyes comments like Armie, ang hina mo
naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si Leah.
Dapat pag tinanong ka kung magkano, sabihin
mo at least P2,000.00 and Sino pa ba ibang
pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw
Oswald, sheriff smack of commercialism. This is
not expected of a judge, knowing that the aim of
the judiciary is to deliver speedy and
inexpensive justice.[90]
Respecting Judge Reyes failure to put into
writing her judgment, she having merely
required the accused to read it from the
computer screen in camera without the
presence of counsel, she violated the
Constitution. She could have simply printed and
signed the decision. Offering to a partys counsel
a diskette containing the decision when such
counsel demands a written copy thereof is
unheard of in the judiciary. A verbal judgment is,
in contemplation of law, in esse, ineffective.[91] If
Judge Reyes was not yet prepared to
promulgate the decision as it was not yet printed,
she could have called the case later and have it
printed first. A party should not be left in the dark
on what issues to raise before the appellate
court.
 46
It is a requirement of due process that the parties
to a litigation be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The court cannot simply say that judgment
is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe
that the decision should be reversed. A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and
is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who
is unable to in point the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal.[92]

If judges were allowed to roam unrestricted

beyond the boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their
office, then the law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws excludes the exercise of
broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority.[93]

IN FINE, this Court finds Judge Reyes unfit to

discharge her functions as judge.

WHEREFORE, Judge Julia A. Reyes, Presiding

Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
69, Pasig City, is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch of the
government including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo A. Migrio is, for

violation of Administrative Circular No. 1-99, by
gambling in the court premises, FINED in the
amount equivalent to his one-month salary. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same act or
the commission of a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in
demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the
decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of
some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this
time to move for reconsideration/clarification of
that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the
following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or
"general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of
general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
47
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners
suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor
General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should
therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always
imperative; that publication, when necessary,
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette;
and that in any case the subject decision was
concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a
Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the
February Revolution and the Court required the
new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view
of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section
18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the
internal administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to be
'Published; that publication when necessary
must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and
that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it was
not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil
Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the
arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come
to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but
the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened

or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette
but "one year after such publication." The
general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed
clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly
provide that a law e effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with but simply because they
did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is
not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption
that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern," and this certainly
applies to, among others, and indeed especially,
the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship
to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such
a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of
public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice.
In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
48
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and t to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directly
affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of the
instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this
rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations
Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest,
was "published" by the Marcos
7
administration. The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this
vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that
only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six
others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the
need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this
Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this
matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come
out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this
kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know,
no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the
Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed
to such a law, and we have no information that it
exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been
published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify
it if we find it impractical. That is not our function.
That function belongs to the legislature. Our task
is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance
49
with the prescribed procedure. Consequently,
we have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazett and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity
after fifteen days from such publication or after a
different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made
forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.
There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this
time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General
that the instant motion is a request for an
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least,
and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished
decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government
subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with
sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of
legislation, they retain the authority to review the
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it
according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light
of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut
unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws
as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after fifteen days from

their publication, or on another date specified by
the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and
Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned
by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few
observations. Even as a Member of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand
against the insidious manner by which the
previous dispensation had promulgated and
made effective thousands of decrees, executive
orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the
law-making power which traditionally belongs to
the legislature been used and abused to satisfy
the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative
mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the
sad spectacle of two presidential decrees
bearing the same number, although covering
two different subject matters. In point is the case
of two presidential decrees bearing number
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the
then President's nephew and the other imposing
a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by
the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March
19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis
George Still
The categorical statement by this Court on the
need for publication before any law may be
made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part
of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures
to the people their constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public
concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so
eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
At the same time, I wish to add a few statements
50
to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its
coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into
effect immediately upon publication thereof in
the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should
not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or
enactment and without need of publication. For
so to interpret such statute would be to collide
with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due
process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute,
has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of
the fundamental principle of legality in the
relations between a government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement
of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette,
as distinguished from any other medium such as
a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied
in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article
2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A specification of the
Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of
publication may therefore be changed. Article 2
of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a
subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country.
Until such an amendatory statute is in fact
enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be
obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned
by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few
observations. Even as a Member of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand
against the insidious manner by which the

previous dispensation had promulgated and
made effective thousands of decrees, executive
orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the
law-making power which traditionally belongs to
the legislature been used and abused to satisfy
the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative
mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the
sad spectacle of two presidential decrees
bearing the same number, although covering
two different subject matters. In point is the case
of two presidential decrees bearing number
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the
then President's nephew and the other imposing
a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by
the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March
19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis
George Still
51
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement
of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette,
as distinguished from any other medium such as
a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied
in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article
2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
Administrative Code. A specification of the
Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of
publication may therefore be changed. Article 2
of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a
subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country.
Until such an amendatory statute is in fact
enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be
obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.

The categorical statement by this Court on the

need for publication before any law may be
made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part
of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures
to the people their constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public
concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so

eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
At the same time, I wish to add a few statements
to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its

coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into
effect immediately upon publication thereof in
the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should
not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or
enactment and without need of publication. For
so to interpret such statute would be to collide
with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due
process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute,
has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of
the fundamental principle of legality in the
relations between a government and its people.

G.R. No. L-17938 April 30, 1963
ESPERIDION TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADELA ONGSIAKO, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
Esperidion Tolentino for and in his own behalf as
plaintiff-appellant.
Edmundo M. Reyes and Senen Ceniza for
defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its Civil Case
No. 3197.
The plaintiff-appellant, Esperidion Tolentino,
prays in the complaint that he filed with the lower
court on 20 May 1959, for the enforcement of the
dissenting opinion rendered in the case entitled
"Severo Domingo, et al. vs. Santos Ongsiako, et
al., G.R. No. 32776."
The decision in said case (in favor of appellees'
predecessors, and adverse to those of
appellant) was promulgated by this Court on 4
December 1930, and, together with the
dissenting opinion, appears in Volume 55 of the
Philippine Reports, starting on page 361.
Unfortunately, the records of said case were
lost, or destroyed, during the war.
The plaintiff-appellant claims to be the
successor-interest of the late Severo Domingo,
who died without having received a copy of the
decision, and alleges that plaintiff-appellant
learned of the decision, only about a week
before he filed the aforementioned complaint;
that the decision of the majority of the Court was
erroneous and unjust; that the dissenting opinion
is the correct view of the case, and should be
enforced. The court below, on motion of one of
the several defendants, dismissed the case, for
lack of cause of action.
Not satisfied, the plaintiff-appellant interposed
the present appeal, and urges that the failure of
service of a copy of the decision upon the late
Severo Domingo was a denial of due process,
which invalidates the decision, and asks that, on
equitable grounds, the present case be heard as
a proceeding coram nobis.
Assuming the truth of the allegation that Severo
Domingo, appellant's predecessor-in-interest,
52
was never furnished a copy of the decision in
G.R. No. L-32776, it appears in the printed report
of the case (55 Phil. 361) that he was
represented by Atty. Ramon Diokno. Being
represented by counsel, service of the decision
is made upon the latter by the clerk of the
Supreme Court (Sec. 250, Act 190), and not
upon the client (Palad vs. Cui, 28 Phil. 44); and
the unrebutted presumption is that the said
official of this Court had regularly performed his
duty (No. 14, Sec. 334, Act 190; Sec. 69 [m],
Rule 123, Rules of Court). Appellant's alleged
predecessor-in-interest was not, therefore,
denied due process of law.
Appellant's position that the decision was
erroneous and unjust is entirely untenable,
because the issue sought to be reopened is res
judicata, aside from its having stood
unchallenged for 30 years. The ridiculous prayer
to enforce a dissenting opinion requires no
discussion, it being sufficient to state that there
is nothing to enforce in a dissenting opinion,
since it affirms or overrules no claim, right, or
obligation, and neither disposes of, nor awards,
anything; it merely expresses the views of the
dissenter.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation
of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Lastly, the appellant's claim that "the lower court
erred in not allowing plaintiff-appellant's cause
as a proceeding coram nobis", is devoid of merit.
The ancient common law writ of error coram
nobis, now substantially obsolete even in
common law jurisdictions (49 CJS 561), does
not lie after affirmance of a judgment on writ of
error on appeal (49 CJS 562); nor can it be
grounded on facts already in issue and
adjudicated on the trial (49 CJS 567). Moreover,
the jurisdiction of a writ of error coram nobis lies
exclusively in the court which rendered the
judgment sought to be corrected (49 CJS 568),
so that it should have been sought by appellants,
if at all, in the Supreme Court, and not in the
Court of First Instance.
In the Philippines, no court appears to have ever
recognized such writ, the rule in this jurisdiction
being that public policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and
 53
irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law.1 Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.

The order of dismissal appealed from is

affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992
REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of
Finance, and HON. JOSE U. ONG,
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, respondents.
G.R. No. 104069 May 29, 1992
RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON,
MANUEL M. SUNGA, PAUL D. UNGOS,
BIENVENIDO T. JAMORALIN, JR., JOSE D.
FLORES, JR., EVELYN G. VILLEGAS,
DOMINGO T. LIGOT, HENRY E. LARON,
PASTOR M. DALMACION, JR., and, JULIUS
NORMAN C. CERRADA, petitioners,
vs
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondent.
Rene B. Gorospe, Leighton R. Siazon, Manuel
M. Sunga, Bienvinido T. Jamoralin, Jr and Paul
D. Ungos for petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
These consolidated cases are petitions
for mandamus and prohibition, premised upon
the following undisputed facts:
Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN
ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL
AND ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS
ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME
TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY
THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L),
ITEMS (1) AND (2) (A) OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It provides as
follows:
Sec. (1). The first paragraph of item (1),
paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
(1) Personal Exemptions allowable to individuals
–– (1) Basic personal exemption as follows:
54
For single individual or married individual
judicially decreed as legally separated with no
qualified dependents P9,000
For head of a family P12,000
For married individual P18,000
Provided, That husband and wife electing to
compute their income tax separately shall be
entitled to a personal exemption of P9,000 each.
Sec. 2. The first paragraph of item (2) (A),
paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the same Code,
as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
(2) Additional exemption.
(a) Taxpayers with dependents. –– A married
individual or a head of family shall be allowed an
additional exemption of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the
total number of dependents for which additional
exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed
four dependents: Provided, further, That an
additional exemption of One Thousand Pesos
(1,000) shall be allowed for each child who
otherwise qualified as dependent prior to
January 1, 1980: Provided, finally, That the
additional exemption for dependents shall be
claimed by only one of the spouses in case of
married individuals electing to compute their
income tax liabilities separately.
Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Approved. 1
The said act was signed and approved by the
President on 19 December 1991 and published
on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of
general circulation.
On 26 December 1991, respondents
promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Sec. 1. SCOPE –– Pursuant to Sections 245 and
72 of the National Internal Revenue Code in
relation to Republic Act No. 7167, these
Regulations are hereby promulgated prescribing
the collection at source of income tax on
compensation income paid on or after January
1, 1992 under the Revised Withholding Tax

Tables (ANNEX "A") which take into account the
increase of personal and additional exemptions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-
82 is amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-
86 is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 8. –– Right to claim the following
exemptions. . . .
Each employee shall be allowed to claim the
following amount of exemption with respect to
compensation paid on or after January 1, 1992.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. EFFECTIVITY. –– These regulations
shall take effect on compensation income from
January 1, 1992.
On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No.
104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang
Bayan Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a
petition for mandamus for himself and in behalf
all individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL the
respondents to implement Rep. Act 7167 with
respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers
earned or received on or after 1 January 1991 or
as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.
On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No.
104069 likewise filed a petition
for mandamus and prohibition on their behalf as
well as for those other individual taxpayers who
might be similarly situated, to compel the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to implement
the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the
personal and additional exemptions allowable to
individuals for income tax purposes in regard to
income earned or received in 1991, and to enjoin
the respondents from implementing Revenue
Regulations No. 1-92.
In the Court's resolution of 10 March 1992, these
two (2) cases were consolidated. Respondents
were required to comment on the petitions,
which they did within the prescribed period.
The principal issues to be resolved in these
cases are: (1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took
effect upon its approval by the President on 19
December 1991, or on 30 January
1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its
publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya"
a newspaper of general circulation; and (2)
55
assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30
January 1992, whether or not the said law
nonetheless covers or applies to compensation
income earned or received during calendar year
1991.
In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that
the Court in its resolution in Caltex (Phils.),
Inc. vs. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 97282, 26 June 1991 –– which is on all
fours with this case as to the first issue –– held:
The central issue presented in the instant
petition is the effectivity of R.A. 6965 entitled "An
Act Revising The Form of Taxation on Petroleum
Products from Ad Valorem to Specific,
Amending For the Purpose Section 145 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, As amended
by Republic Act Numbered Sixty Seven Hundred
Sixty Seven."
Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity
clause which provides. "This Act shall take effect
upon its approval"
R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19,
1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal,
a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to
the Act, an implementing regulation was issued
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Revenue Memorandum Circular 85-90, stating
that R.A. 6965 took effect on October 5, 1990.
Petitioner took exception thereof and argued
that the law took effect on September 20, 1990
instead.
Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as
amended by Executive Order No. 200) which
provides:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication
either in the official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. . . .
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915,
December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452) we
construed Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid
down the rule:
. . .: the) clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law

effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but
the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened
or extended. . . .
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for
its effectivity and neither can it become effective
upon its approval notwithstanding its express
statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code
and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra,
R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after
September 20, 1990, or specifically, on October
5, 1990.
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167
took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after
fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14
January 1992 in the "Malaya."
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of
the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should
cover or extend to compensation income earned
or received during calendar year 1991.
Sec. 29, par. (L), Item No. 4 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, the President shall automatically adjust
not more often than once every three years, the
personal and additional exemptions taking into
account, among others, the movement in
consumer price indices, levels of minimum
wages, and bare subsistence levels.
As the personal and additional exemptions of
individual taxpayers were last adjusted in 1986,
the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, could have adjusted the
personal and additional exemptions in 1989 by
increasing the same even without any legislation
providing for such adjustment. But the President
did not.
However, House Bill 28970, which was
subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act
7167, was introduced in the House of
Representatives in 1989 although its passage
was delayed and it did not become effective law
until 30 January 1992. A perusal, however, of the
sponsorship remarks of Congressman
Hernando B. Perez, Chairman of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill
28970, provides an indication of the intent of
56
Congress in enacting Rep. Act 7167. The
pertinent legislative journal contains the
following:
At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill
Provides for increased personal additional
exemptions to individuals in view of the higher
standard of living.
The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income
of individuals subject to income tax to enable
them to spend for basic necessities and have
more disposable income.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the
basic necessities and that it had been three
years since the last exemption adjustment in
1986.
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity
of passing the measure to mitigate the effects of
the current inflation and of the implementation of
the salary standardization law. Stating that it is
imperative for the government to take measures
to ease the burden of the individual income tax
filers, Mr. Perez then cited specific examples of
how the measure can help assuage the burden
to the taxpayers.
He then reiterated that the increase in the prices
of commodities has eroded the purchasing
power of the peso despite the recent salary
increases and emphasized that the Bill will serve
to compensate the adverse effects of inflation on
the taxpayers. . . . (Journal of the House of
Representatives, May 23, 1990, pp. 32-33).
It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167
speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as
adjustments "to the poverty threshold level."
Certainly, "the poverty threshold level" is the
poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167
was enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold
levels in futuro, at which time there may be need
of further adjustments in personal exemptions.
Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of the fact
that these personal and additional exemptions
are fixed amounts to which an individual
taxpayer is entitled, as a means to cushion the
devastating effects of high prices and a
depreciated purchasing power of the currency.
In the end, it is the lower-income and the middle-
income groups of taxpayers (not the high-

income taxpayers) who stand to benefit most
from the increase of personal and additional
exemptions provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To
that extent, the act is a social legislation intended
to alleviate in part the present economic plight of
the lower income taxpayers. It is intended to
remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore
existing personal and additional exemptions for
individual taxpayers.
And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased
personal exemptions that it provides for shall be
available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167
shall have become effective. In other words,
these exemptions are available upon the filing of
personal income tax returns which is, under the
National Internal Revenue Code, done not later
than the 15th day of April after the end of a
calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167,
which became effective, as aforestated, on 30
January 1992, the increased exemptions are
literally available on or before 15 April
1992 (though not before 30 January 1992). But
these increased exemptions can be available on
15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation
income earned or received during the calendar
year 1991.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep.
Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available in
respect of compensation income received during
the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of
said income had already accrued, and been
presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15
July 1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not
been enacted. To make Rep. Act 7167 refer
back to income received during 1990 would
require language explicitly retroactive in purport
and effect, language that would have to
authorize the payment of refunds of taxes paid
on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991: such
language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep.
Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available only in
respect of compensation income received
during 1992, as the implementing Revenue
Regulations No. 1-92 purport to provide.
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 would in effect
postpone the availability of the increased
exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993, and thus
literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1
January 1993. Thus, the implementing
regulations collide frontally with Section 3 of
Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall
take effect upon its approval." The objective of
the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner
57
of Internal Revenue in postponing through
Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 the legal
effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 is, of course, entirely
understandable –– to defer to 1993 the reduction
of governmental tax revenues which irresistibly
follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167.
But the law-making authority has spoken and the
Court can not refuse to apply the law-maker's
words. Whether or not the government can
afford the drop in tax revenues resulting from
such increased exemptions was for Congress
(not this Court) to decide.
WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue
Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the
regulations shall take effect on compensation
income earned or received from 1 January 1992
are hereby SET ASIDE. They should take effect
on compensation income earned or received
from 1 January 1991.
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April
1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the
increased exemptions on compensation income
earned during calendar year 1991 who may
have filed their income tax returns on or before
15 April 1992 (later extended to 24 April 1992)
without the benefit of such increased
exemptions, are entitled to the corresponding
tax refunds and/or credits, and respondents are
ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned
in this case by Justice Teodoro Padilla, because
I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in
the law should be effective already with respect
to the income earned for the year 1991. After all,
even if We say that the law became effective
only in 1992, still this can refer only to the income
obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be
filed in 1992 is the income tax return of the
income earned in 1991.
However, I wish to dissent from the part of the
decision which affirms the obiter
dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada

vs.Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect that
a law becomes effective not on the date
expressly provided for in said law, but on the
date after fifteen (15) days from the publication
in the Official Gazette or any national newspaper
of general circulation. I say obiter
dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not
the actual issue in the case of Tanada
vs. Tuvera(supra). In that case, several
presidential decrees of President Marcos were
issued, but they were never published in the
Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of
general circulation. The real issue therefore in
said case was whether or not said presidential
decrees ever became effective. The Court ruled
with respect to this issue (and not any other
issue –– since there was no other issue
whatsoever), that said presidential decrees
never became effective. In other words, the ratio
decidendi in that case was the ruling that without
publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the
statement as to which should be applied ––
"after fifteen (15) days from publication" or
"unless otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2, Civil
Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling
in the resolution dated June 26, 1991 in Caltex,
Inc. vs. Com. of Internal Revenue cannot
likewise apply because it was based on the
aforesaid obiter in Tanada v. Tuvera (supra). In
the instant tax exemptions case, the law
says effective upon approval, therefore, since
this law was approved by the President in
December, 1991, its subsequent publication in
the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is
actually immaterial.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
It is very clear and needs no interpretation or
construction.
CRUZ. J., concurring:
As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446, I should like to make these brief
observations on my brother Paras's separate
opinion. He says that "the ratio decidendi in that
case was the ruling that without publication,
there can be no effectivity." Yet, while accepting
this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A.
7167 became effective upon approval (i.e., even
58
without publication). He adds that "since this law
was approved by the President in December,
1991, its subsequent publication in the January
1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually
immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned
in this case by Justice Teodoro Padilla, because
I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in
the law should be effective already with respect
to the income earned for the year 1991. After all,
even if We say that the law became effective
only in 1992, still this can refer only to the income
obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be
filed in 1992 is the income tax return of the
income earned in 1991.
However, I wish to dissent from the part of the
decision which affirms the obiter
dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada
vs.Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect that
a law becomes effective not on the date
expressly provided for in said law, but on the
date after fifteen (15) days from the publication
in the Official Gazette or any national newspaper
of general circulation. I say obiter
dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not
the actual issue in the case of Tanada
vs. Tuvera(supra). In that case, several
presidential decrees of President Marcos were
issued, but they were never published in the
Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of
general circulation. The real issue therefore in
said case was whether or not said presidential
decrees ever became effective. The Court ruled
with respect to this issue (and not any other
issue –– since there was no other issue
whatsoever), that said presidential decrees
never became effective. In other words, the ratio
decidendi in that case was the ruling that without
publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the
statement as to which should be applied ––
"after fifteen (15) days from publication" or
"unless otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2, Civil
Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling
in the resolution dated June 26, 1991 in Caltex,
Inc. vs. Com. of Internal Revenue cannot
likewise apply because it was based on the
aforesaid obiter in Tanada v. Tuvera (supra). In
the instant tax exemptions case, the law
says effective upon approval, therefore, since
 59
this law was approved by the President in
December, 1991, its subsequent publication in
the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is
actually immaterial.

Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following

the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

It is very clear and needs no interpretation or

construction.

CRUZ. J., concurring:

As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA

446, I should like to make these brief
observations on my brother Paras's separate
opinion. He says that "the ratio decidendi in that
case was the ruling that without publication,
there can be no effectivity." Yet, while accepting
this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A.
7167 became effective upon approval (i.e., even
without publication). He adds that "since this law
was approved by the President in December,
1991, its subsequent publication in the January
1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually
immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.

G.R. No. 171469 August 11, 2008
V.C. PONCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO REYES, JOSE MONASTERIAL,
JR., BENJAMIN PENARANDA, JOSE
SAMBO, TEOFILO VIRAY, ANTONIO
ALFONSO, CEFERINO ARICHEA, DAVID
BAQUIRIN, JUANITO BEO, ADMIRADO
COMERTA, ALBERTO CORVERA, ROMEO
MAPILE, CRESANCIO MARQUEZ, JR.,
ALEJANDRO ASANGA, ROSAURO UMALI,
CONRADO VILLAFRANCA (N. LACAMBRA)
and HONESTO VITUG, respondents.**
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner V.C. Ponce
Company, Inc. assails the October 27, 2005
decision1 and February 3, 2006 resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 97084
and the issuance of individual titles in favor of
respondents by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 109.
This case traces its history to a complaint filed
by Eusebia de Leon vda. de Rodriquez against
petitioner in the then Court of First Instance of
Pasay City on January 3, 1963 docketed as Civil
Case No. 455-R. It sought the annulment of the
sale of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
97084 she had previously sold to petitioner. The
subject property was already subdivided into
smaller lots for which individual TCTs were
issued in petitioner's name.
On October 22, 1971, respondents filed a
complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 455-
R. Respondents executed contracts to sell with
petitioner over individual lots comprising the
area covered by TCT No. 97084 prior to the
institution of the case. Their complaint-in-
intervention was allowed.
On July 17, 1989, Corazon Rodriguez (as
administratrix of the estate of de Leon) and
petitioner entered into a compromise
agreement. Petitioner paid
Rodriguez P3,500,000 in exchange for the
release of the lis pendens annotation on the
individual titles of the properties involved in Civil
Case No. 455-R, and the dismissal of the case
without costs. The court approved the
60
compromise agreement, thereby terminating the
case between petitioner and Rodriguez.
Respondents, however, refused to compromise
and the complaint-in-intervention was tried on
the merits. In a decision3 dated December 6,
1989, the Pasay City RTC ruled in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
is hereby denied and accordingly, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors
herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.,
Inc. The Court hereby orders and declares:
1. The individual Contracts to Sell entered into
between the intervenors and the defendant are
hereby declared valid, subsisting and binding on
both parties, particularly the defendant V.C.
Ponce & Co., Inc. and the latter is hereby
enjoined to abide by the terms and conditions
thereof subject to the modifications as
[hereinafter] provided and under the same price
originally stated therein;
2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered
to pay defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. the
balance of the purchase price within a period of
twelve (12) months from finality of this decision
to be paid in twelve (12) equal monthly
amortizations;
3. The defendant V.C Ponce & Co., Inc. is
hereby given one (1) year from finality of this
decision within which to complete the
construction of the enumerated items in
paragraph 5 of the Contracts to Sell;
4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. is ordered
to deliver clean titles to the individual intervenors
upon full payment of the purchase price;
5. xxx
SO ORDERED.
The Pasay City RTC's December 6, 1989
decision was appealed by petitioner and it
eventually reached the Supreme Court. In a
resolution dated October 21, 1991, respondents'
claims were affirmed when we ruled in their
favor.4 Entry of judgment was made on
December 9, 1991.

It was at this point that respondents commenced
the tedious process of trying to execute the
Pasay City RTC's December 6, 1989 decision.
On October 2, 1992, the Pasay City RTC issued
a writ of execution. Respondents consigned to
the court their payments to petitioner under their
respective contracts to sell, pursuant to the
December 6, 1989 decision. But in view of
petitioner's obstinate refusal to comply with the
October 2, 1992 writ of execution, the RTC again
directed petitioner to deliver clean titles to
respondents after payment and
consignation.5 Petitioner was likewise ordered to
strictly obey the terms and conditions of the
December 6, 1989 decision with a stern warning
that repeated non-compliance would be dealt
with severely. The RTC also ordered its clerk of
court to receive respondents' cash payments.
On August 5, 1993, the clerk of court was
ordered to receive from respondents' counsel
their cash payments to petitioner and deposit
them in the Philippine National Bank. Petitioner
was (again) ordered to comply with the
December 6, 1989 decision within ten days from
receipt of the order.
Petitioner (once more) sought a deferment of the
enforcement of the March 8, 1993 and August 5,
1993 orders but the same was denied. In an
order dated August 3, 1994, the Pasay City RTC
cited petitioner in contempt for its refusal to
abide by the March 8, 1993 order. The Registrar
of Deeds of Parañaque was likewise directed to
cancel petitioner's TCTs over the properties
which were already paid in full and to issue new
titles in favor of respondents.
Because of petitioner's continued inaction, an
alias writ of execution dated August 7, 1995 was
issued by the Pasay City RTC to enforce the
December 6, 1989 decision.
Respondents then filed an ex-parte motion for
entry of judgment, praying that the Registrar of
Deeds of Parañaque be directed to divest
petitioner of its titles and to issue new ones to
them. The court ordered its clerk of court and ex-
officio sheriff to execute deeds of conveyance in
favor of respondents. The Registrar of Deeds of
Parañaque, however, refused to register
respondents' deeds of conveyance because
petitioner adamantly refused to surrender its
owner's duplicate TCTs. So, on January 11,
2002, the Pasay City RTC ordered the Registrar
of Deeds of Parañaque to cancel petitioner's
61
duplicate TCTs. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration but the same was denied in an
order dated September 13, 2002.
Respondents filed a manifestation and motion
seeking a court order annulling the titles of
petitioner over the properties involved in the
case. In response, the Pasay City RTC issued
the assailed order dated January 23, 2003
nullifying and canceling this time TCT No. 97084
(the mother title) and mandating the issuance of
individual titles to respondents. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner questioned the January 23, 2003
order (and that denying the motion for
reconsideration) in the CA via a petition for
certiorari. In denying relief to petitioner, the CA
held that the cancellation of TCT No. 97084 (the
mother title) was necessary to the execution of
the trial court's decision, considering the refusal
of the Registrar of Deeds to register the deeds
of sale and issue clean individual titles to
respondents.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the January 23, 2003 order
for the nullification and cancellation of TCT No.
97084 completely changed the tenor of the
December 6, 1989 decision.
We deny the petition.
In general, the essential parts of a decision or
order consist of the following: (1) a statement of
the case; (2) a statement of the facts; (3) the
issues or assignment of errors; (4) the court
ruling; and (5) the dispositive portion.6 In a civil
case such as this, the dispositive portion should
state whether the complaint or petition is granted
or denied, the specific relief granted and the
costs.7
The order of execution must substantially
conform to the dispositive portion of the decision
sought to be executed.8 In the event of variance,
the dispositive portion of the final and executory
decision prevails.
The dispositive portion of the December 6, 1989
decision read in part:
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
is hereby denied and accordingly, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors
herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce &

Co.[,] Inc. The Court hereby orders and
declares:
1. xxx
2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered
to pay defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Ince. the
balance of the purchase price within a period of
twelve (12) equal monthly amortizations;
3. xxx
4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Inc. is ordered
to deliver clean titles to the individual intervenors
upon full payment of the purchase price; xxx
while the order dated January 23, 2003 stated in
part:
C]onsidering the affirmance of the decision of this Court dated December
6, 1989 by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, for full
satisfaction of the decision, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 97084,
Register of Deeds, Rizal, the original of which is presently on file with the
Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, is hereby NULLIFIED and
CANCELLED and considered of no value and effect conformably with
Section 107 of PD 1529 xxx
In view of the foregoing, the Register of Deeds
of Parañaque City is hereby directed to issue
individual titles to the Intervenors to complete
the satisfaction of judgment/decision of this
Court already partially executed.
The Intervenors are directed to coordinate with
the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City to
further hasten the issuance of their individual
titles.
SO ORDERED.
The variance claimed by petitioner allegedly lies
in the directive to the Register of Deeds of
Parañaque City to nullify and cancel TCT No.
97084. Petitioner insists that there was no such
order in the dispositive portion of the December
6, 1989 decision.
Petitioner is wrong.
It is a cardinal rule that the dispositive portion of
an order or judgment prevails over the
discussion or the body of the said decision or
order. In this case, the dispositive portion of the
January 23, 2003 order merely reiterated the
directive for the issuance of individual titles to
respondents by the Registrar of Deeds.
62
Nevertheless, even if we analyze and compare
the body of the January 23, 2003 order and that
of the December 6, 1989 decision, no
substantial variance exists between them. On its
face, the January 23, 2003 order is in harmony
with the dispositive portion of the December 6,
1989 decision. The Registrar of Deeds of
Parañaque City is being directed to issue
individual titles to respondents to complete the
satisfaction of judgment/decision of th[e] [c]ourt
partially executed. Reference to the "partially
executed decision" simply stresses that the
execution must conform to the December 6,
1989 decision.
Petitioner admits that TCT No. 97084 is the
mother title of the individual titles of
respondents.9However, it claims for the first
time that TCT No. 97084 was the subject of
another case and that it was already cancelled
by virtue of another court order or
judgment.10 Furthermore, TCT No. 97084
allegedly subsists only with respect to areas
which are not involved in this case.
Petitioner's claims are not only immaterial and
undeserving of favorable consideration; they
were also never established with evidence of
such alleged court order or judgment. Thus,
there is no way by which these allegations can
be verified. Given petitioner's propensity to
manipulate legal procedures to defeat the just
claims against it, such lapse is fatal to its cause.
The Pasay City RTC was well within its powers
when it issued the January 23, 2003 order. It is
the ministerial duty of the court to order the
execution of its final judgment. It has the inherent
power to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial offices, and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a case
before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.11
Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court12 and
Section 107 of PD 152913 provide the procedure
to be followed in case of a refusal by the owner
to surrender the duplicate copy of his TCT.
A considerable length of time has passed. It is
time to end this litigation and write finis to this
case. Enough is enough.
We remind petitioner's counsel, Atty. Candice
Marie T. Bandong, that she is an officer of the
court who must see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must never be unduly
impeded, not even by her client. Her oath to
 63
uphold the cause of justice is superior to her duty
to her client; its primacy is indisputable.14 In this
light, we are sternly warning her (or any other
counsel who might take over this case) of
disciplinary action for any further delay in the
execution of the decision of the Pasay City RTC.

That TCT No. 97084 has been subdivided into

smaller lots and that derivative titles have been
issued therefor are of no moment. The fact
remains that, for more than 15 years, petitioner
has been consistently refusing to surrender its
owner's duplicate originals of the derivative
TCTs, contrary to lawful orders and in evident
bad faith. We are therefore ordering the
cancellation and nullification of TCT No. 97084
and its derivative titles. Let new certificates of
title be issued (a) in the name of the individual
respondents for the lots covered by their
respective fully-paid contracts to sell and (b) in
the name of petitioner for those portions not
covered by the claims of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The October 27, 2005 decision and February 3,
2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 77783 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

The Registrar of Deeds of Parañaque City is

ordered to cancel TCT No. 97084 and the
derivative titles of the lots covered by
respondents' respective contracts to sell (with
petitioner) and issue clean individual titles to
them.

Treble costs against petitioner.


G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004
Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z.
VELARDE, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A decision that does not conform to the form and
substance required by the Constitution and the
law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be
valid, decisions should comply with the form, the
procedure and the substantive requirements laid
out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and
relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the
Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures
and requirements.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12,
2003 Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch
49).4
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a
Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the
RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social
Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner
Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive
Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie
Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-
respondents. The Petition prayed for the
resolution of the question "whether or not the act
of a religious leader like any of herein
respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a
candidate for elective office or in urging or
requiring the members of his flock to vote for a
specified candidate, is violative of the letter or
spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."6
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not
contain a statement of facts and a dispositive
portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory
Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before
the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent,
similarly filed a separate Motion for
Reconsideration. In response, the trial court
issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:
64
"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because
what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a
Constitutional provision and to declare whether
acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not
make a dispositive portion because a dispositive
portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where
a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit
that the prevailing party wronged should get.
The step that these movants have to take, is
direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the
Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court."7
The Antecedent Proceedings
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the
RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid
co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party,
sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions,8 specifically on the separation of
church and state; and a declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of the acts of religious
leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
office, or urging or requiring the members of their
flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in
the challenged Decision in these words:
"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within
the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion
to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their
Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime
Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli
Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended
period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of
the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the
Petition on the common grounds that it does not
state a cause of action and that there is no
justiciable controversy. They were ordered to
submit a pleading by way of advisement, which
was closely followed by another Order denying
all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde,
Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the denial.
His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for
extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli
Soriano complied with the first Order by
submitting his Memorandum. x x x.
"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss,
and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro.
Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised

no new arguments other than those already
considered in the motions to dismiss x x x."9
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court
said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition,
because "in praying for a determination as to
whether the actions imputed to the respondents
are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only
a question of law."10 It then proceeded to a
lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the
Petition – the separation of church and state –
even tracing, to some extent, the historical
background of the principle. Through its
discourse, the court a quo opined at some point
that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in
an election to any public office is a clear violation
of the separation clause."11
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the
trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in
its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration
which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the
lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review.12
This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2,
2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to submit their respective
comments. In the same Resolution, the Court
gave the other parties -- impleaded as
respondents in the original case below --the
opportunity to comment, if they so desired.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted
an Oral Argument.14
The Issues
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the
following issues for this Court’s resolution:
"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June
2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper
and valid;
"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable
controversy in herein respondent’s Petition for
declaratory relief;
"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal
interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
65
"4. Whether or not the constitutional question
sought to be resolved by herein respondent is
ripe for judicial determination;
"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy
other than the declaratory relief; and,
"6. Whether or not the court a quo has
jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief
of herein respondent."15
During the Oral Argument, the issues were
narrowed down and classified as follows:
"A. Procedural Issues
"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of
action? Did respondent have any legal standing
to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
"B. Substantive Issues
"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form
and substance required by the Constitution, the
law and the Rules of Court?
"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner,
Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing
candidates for public office? Corollarily, may
they be banned from campaigning against said
candidates?"
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is
meritorious.
Procedural Issues:
Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief
Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which
deals with petitions for declaratory relief,
provides in part:
"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by
a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights
or duties thereunder."

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory
relief should be filed by a person interested
under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the written
instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of
the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.16 The
essential requisites of the action are as follows:
(1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy is between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has
a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.17
Justiciable Controversy
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS
Petition failed to allege, much less establish
before the trial court, that there existed a
justiciable controversy or an adverse legal
interest between them; and that SJS had a legal
right that was being violated or threatened to be
violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde
alleges that SJS premised its action on mere
speculations, contingent events, and
hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into
an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for
Declaratory Relief must fail.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural
or merely anticipatory.18 The SJS Petition for
Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It
miserably failed to allege an existing controversy
or dispute between the petitioner and the named
respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not
sufficiently state what specific legal right of the
petitioner was violated by the respondents
therein; and what particular act or acts of the
latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the
Constitution.
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in
his Comment,19 what exactly has he done that
merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that
he does not know the answer, because the SJS
Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the
RTC) "yields nothing in this respect." His
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the
time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003,
the election season had not even started yet;
and that, in any event, he has not been actively
involved in partisan politics.
66
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the
trial court should contain "a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
the party pleading relies for his claim x x
x."20 Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate
facts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated
without factual moorings that, as religious
leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents
below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a
candidate or candidates for elective offices; and
that such actual or threatened endorsement "will
enable [them] to elect men to public office who
[would] in turn be forever beholden to their
leaders, enabling them to control the
government"[;]21 and "pos[ing] a clear and
present danger of serious erosion of the
people’s faith in the electoral process[;] and
reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders
determine the ultimate result of
22
elections," which would then be violative of the
separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely
theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not
suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy.
The Petition does not even allege any indication
or manifest intent on the part of any of the
respondents below to champion an electoral
candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote
for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is
a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does
not give rise to an actionable right.
Obviously, there is no factual allegation that
SJS’ rights are being subjected to any
threatened, imminent and inevitable violation
that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the
courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable23 cannot be exercised when there is
no actual or threatened violation of a legal right.
All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was
"that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof
be resolved."24 In other words, it merely sought
an opinion of the trial court on whether the
speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing
elective candidates for political offices violated
the constitutional principle on the separation of
church and state. SJS did not ask for a
declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it
pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation
of its declared rights. Courts, however, are
proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.25

Cause of Action
Respondent SJS asserts that in order to
maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause
of action need not be alleged or proven.
Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there
need not be any violation of a right, breach of
duty or actual wrong committed by one party
against the other.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the
subject matter of an action for declaratory relief
should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other
written instrument), a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the
subject matter of the SJS Petition is "the
constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to
endorse the candidacy of a candidate for
elective office or to urge or require the members
of the flock to vote for a specified
candidate."26According to petitioner, this subject
matter is "beyond the realm of an action for
declaratory relief."27 Petitioner avers that in the
absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition
fails to state a cause of action and, hence,
should have been dismissed outright by the
court a quo.
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of
another, causing injury to the latter.28 Its
essential elements are the following: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act
or omission that is violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the former to the latter.29
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of
action is a ground for its outright
dismissal.30 However, in special civil actions for
declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of
action under ordinary civil actions does not
strictly apply. The reason for this exception is
that an action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder.31 Nevertheless, a breach or violation
should be impending, imminent or at least
threatened.
A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the
RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the
former had any legal right in its favor that it
sought to protect. We can only infer the interest,
supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation
67
that it "has thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who
are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of
the constitutionality of the partisan participation
of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in
the process to insure adherence to the
Constitution by everyone x x x."32
Such general averment does not, however,
suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not
only is the presumed interest not personal in
character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain.33 The Rules require
that the interest must be material to the issue
and affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from simple
curiosity or incidental interest in the question
raised.34
To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris
Secundum and submits that the "[p]laintiff in a
declaratory judgment action does not seek to
enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but
seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the
parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future
conduct, and the essential distinction between a
‘declaratory judgment action’ and the usual
‘action’ is that no actual wrong need have been
committed or loss have occurred in order to
sustain the declaratory judgment action,
although there must be no uncertainty that the
loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be
invaded."35
SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its
own reference – that there must be no
uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the
asserted rights will be invaded. Precisely, as
discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that
herein petitioner (and his co-respondents
below) might actively participate in partisan
politics, use "the awesome voting strength of its
faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public
office x x x, enabling [it] to control the
government."36
During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner
Velarde and his co-respondents below all
strongly asserted that they had not in any way
engaged or intended to participate in partisan
politics. They all firmly assured this Court that
they had not done anything to trigger the issue
raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact
upon which SJS could base a right of relief from

the named respondents. In any event, even
granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right
it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be invaded by the
said respondents. Not even the alleged
proximity of the elections to the time the Petition
was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that
would be jeopardized or violated by any of those
respondents.
Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined
as a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
act.37 Interest means a material interest in issue
that is affected by the questioned act or
instrument, as distinguished from a mere
incidental interest in the question involved.38
Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory
relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a
religious leader to endorse, or require the
members of the religious flock to vote for a
specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has
no legal interest in the controversy";39 it has
failed to establish how the resolution of the
proffered question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the
constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must
show "not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but
also that [they have] sustained or [are] in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some
indefinite way."40 They must demonstrate that
they have been, or are about to be, denied some
right or privilege to which they are lawfully
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the
statute or act complained of.41
First, parties suing as taxpayers must
specifically prove that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation.42 A taxpayer’s action
may be properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power.43 In the present case, there is no
allegation, whether express or implied, that
taxpayers’ money is being illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or
68
its members as registered voters would be
adversely affected by the alleged acts of the
respondents below, if the question at issue was
not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS
had suffered or would be deprived of votes due
to the acts imputed to the said respondents.
Neither did it allege that any of its members
would be denied the right of suffrage or the
privilege to be voted for a public office they are
seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its
"thousands of members who are citizens-
taxpayers-registered voters" is too general44 and
beyond the contemplation of the standards set
by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed
interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too
vague, highly speculative and uncertain to
satisfy the requirement of standing.45
Transcendental Importance
In any event, SJS urges the Court to take
cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal
standing, considering that "the issues raised are
of paramount public interest."
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the
locus standi requirement when a petition raises
an issue of transcendental significance or
paramount importance to the people.46 Recently,
after holding that the IBP had no locus standi to
bring the suit, the Court in IBP v.
Zamora47 nevertheless entertained the Petition
therein. It noted that "the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents."48
Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed
the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition
to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people.
The issue did not simply concern a delineation
of the separation between church and state, but
ran smack into the governance of our country.
The issue was both transcendental in
importance and novel in nature, since it had
never been decided before.
The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to
determine with certainty whether it could resolve
the constitutional issue despite the barren
allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the
abbreviated proceedings in the court below.
Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the
parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS --
made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications

that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove
discussed. Hence, even if the Court would
exempt this case from the stringent locus
standi requirement, such heroic effort would be
futile because the transcendental issue cannot
be resolved anyway.
Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court
To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious
judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of
the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates
the elementary procedure49 that must be
followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil
cases.50
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or
upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a
complaint51 (or petition, in a special civil action)
that does not allege the plaintiff’s (or petitioner’s)
cause or causes of action.52 A complaint or
petition should contain "a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense."53 It should likewise clearly specify the
relief sought.54
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the
payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of
court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
summons to the defendants or the respondents,
with a directive that the defendant
55
answer within 15 days, unless a different
period is fixed by the court.56 The summons shall
also contain a notice that if such answer is not
filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a
judgment by default and may be granted the
relief applied for.57 The court, however, may --
upon such terms as may be just -- allow an
answer to be filed after the time fixed by the
Rules.58
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-
claim, it must be answered within ten (10) days
from service.59 A reply may be filed within ten
(10) days from service of the pleading
responded to.60
When an answer fails to tender an issue or
admits the material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading (except
in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage or for legal
separation).61 Meanwhile, a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or
crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief --
69
may, at any time after the answer thereto has
been served, move for a summary judgment in
its favor.62 Similarly, a party against whom a
claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -
- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any
time, move for a summary judgment in its
favor.63 After the motion is heard, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a
showing that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact; and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.64
Within the time for -- but before -- filing the
answer to the complaint or petition, the
defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on
any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16
of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the
motion, the parties shall submit their arguments
on the questions of law, and their evidence on
the questions of fact.65 After the hearing, the
court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the
motion, or order the amendment of the
pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the
motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution
shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor.66
If the motion is denied, the movant may file an
answer within the balance of the period originally
prescribed to file an answer, but not less than
five (5) days in any event, computed from the
receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading
is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall
file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted
from the service of the amended pleading,
unless the court provides a longer period.67
After the last pleading has been served and filed,
the case shall be set for pretrial,68 which is a
mandatory proceeding.69 A plaintiff’s/ petitioner’s
(or its duly authorized representative’s) non-
appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause,
shall result in the dismissal of the action with
prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A
similar failure on the part of the defendant shall
be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to
present evidence ex parte, and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.70
The parties are required to file their pretrial
briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect
as failure to appear at the pretrial.71 Upon the
termination thereof, the court shall issue an
order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the
conference; the action taken on them, the

amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the
agreements or admissions, if any, made by the
parties regarding any of the matters
considered.72 The parties may further avail
themselves of any of the modes of discovery,73 if
they so wish.
Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74 in
which the parties shall adduce their respective
evidence in support of their claims and/or
defenses. By their written consent or upon the
application of either party, or on its own motion,
the court may also order any or all of the issues
to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be
appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the
parties.75 The trial or hearing before the
commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it
would if held before the court.76
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the
commissioner shall file with the court a written
report on the matters referred by the
parties.77 The report shall be set for hearing,
after which the court shall issue an order
adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in
part; or recommitting it with instructions; or
requiring the parties to present further evidence
before the commissioner or the court.78
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be rendered. The
decision shall be in writing, personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and
filed with the clerk of court.79
Based on these elementary guidelines, let us
examine the proceedings before the trial court in
the instant case.
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the
SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition
immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It
contained no statement of ultimate facts upon
which the petitioner relied for its claim.
Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought
from the court, but merely asked it to answer a
hypothetical question.
Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers
to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a
result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a
petitioner.80 As already discussed earlier, the
Petition before the trial court had no allegations
of fact81 or of any specific violation of the
petitioner’s rights, which the respondents had a
70
duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to a
failure to state a cause of action; hence, no
coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated.
The Petition evidently lacked substantive
requirements and, we repeat, should have been
dismissed at the outset.
Second, with respect to the trial court
proceedings. Within the period set to file their
respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde,
Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss;
Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a
priorly granted extended period, an Answer in
which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the
Petition.82 SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of
Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-
Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were "several
scheduled settings, in which the "[c]ourt was
apprised of the respective positions of the
parties."83 The nature of such settings -- whether
pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in
the records. Before ruling on the Motions to
Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order84 dated
May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their
memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was
another Order85 dated May 14, 2003, denying all
the Motions to Dismiss.
In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily
ruled:
"The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to
Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are
submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as
submitted for resolution."86
Apparently, contrary to the requirement of
Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the
Motions were not heard. Worse, the Order
purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did
not state any reason at all for their denial, in
contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16.
There was not even any statement of the
grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less,
of the legal findings and conclusions of the trial
court.
Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved
for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of
these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva
filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties’
memoranda. But instead of separately resolving
the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial
court again transgressed the Rules of Court
when it immediately proceeded to issue its
Decision, even before tackling the issues raised
in those Motions.

Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision"
without allowing the parties to file their answers.
For this reason, there was no joinder of the
issues. If only it had allowed the filing of those
answers, the trial court would have known, as
the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner
and his co-respondents below had not
committed or threatened to commit the act
attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the
act that was supposedly the factual basis of the
suit.
Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to
give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, which
was entitled to be heard upon questions
involving the constitutionality or validity of
statutes and other measures.87
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail,
the questioned Decision of the trial court was
utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated
proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed
acted with inexplicable haste, with total
ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier
disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with
grave abuse of discretion.
Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and
of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must
still follow the process described above -- the
petition must state a cause of action; the
proceedings must undergo the procedure
outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision
must adhere to constitutional and legal
requirements.
First Substantive Issue:
Fundamental Requirements of a Decision
The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision
shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. No petition for
review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the basis therefor."88
Consistent with this constitutional mandate,
Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure similarly provides:
"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.
– A judgment or final order determining the
71
merits of the case shall be in writing personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him and filed with
the clerk of court."
In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as
follows:
"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The
judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law
upon which the judgment is based.
"x x x xxx x x x."
Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also
issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative
Circular No. 1, prompting all judges "to make
complete findings of facts in their decisions, and
scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in
the light of the evidence presented. They should
avoid the tendency to generalize and form
conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced."
In many cases,89 this Court has time and time
again reminded "magistrates to heed the
demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution." The Court, through Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of
Appeals,90discussed at length the implications of
this provision and strongly exhorted thus:
"Faithful adherence to the requirements of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due
process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached
and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party,

who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal. More
than that, the requirement is an assurance to the
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did
so through the processes of legal reasoning. It
is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of
the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless
vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing
judgment on the life, liberty or property of his
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on
the power of reason for sustained public
confidence in the justness of his decision."
In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained:
"The requirement that the decisions of courts
must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which they are based serves many functions. It
is intended, among other things, to inform the
parties of the reason or reasons for the decision
so that if any of them appeals, he can point out
to the appellate court the finding of facts or the
rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.
More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. x x x."
Indeed, elementary due process demands that
the parties to a litigation be given information on
how the case was decided, as well as an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the court.92
In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had
instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure
that their decisions would present a
comprehensive analysis or account of the
factual and legal findings that would
substantially address the issues raised by the
parties.
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the
assailed Decision contains no statement of facts
-- much less an assessment or analysis thereof
-- or of the court’s findings as to the probable
facts. The assailed Decision begins with a
statement of the nature of the action and the
question or issue presented. Then follows a brief
explanation of the constitutional provisions
involved, and what the Petition sought to
achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural
incidents before the trial court are tracked. The
Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the
72
nature and the extent of the separation of church
and state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying the
relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her
"Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated
the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the
distinct facts that gave rise to the question
sought to be resolved by SJS? More important,
what were the factual findings and analysis on
which the trial court based its legal findings and
conclusions? None were stated or implied.
Indeed, the RTC’s Decision cannot be upheld for
its failure to express clearly and distinctly the
facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court
clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the
value of the decision as a precedent. How can it
be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar
circumstances, simply because such
circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated,
how will the ruling be applied in the future, if
there is no point of factual comparison?
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a
resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called
Decision. The importance of such portion was
explained in the early case Manalang v. Tuason
de Rickards,94 from which we quote:
"The resolution of the Court on a given issue as
embodied in the dispositive part of the decision
or order is the investitive or controlling factor that
determines and settles the rights of the parties
and the questions presented therein,
notwithstanding the existence of statements or
declaration in the body of said order that may be
confusing."
The assailed Decision in the present case
leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of
the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was
for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial
court grant or deny? What rights of the parties
did it conclusively declare? Its final statement
says, "SO ORDERED." But what exactly did the
court order? It had the temerity to label its
issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact
decided.
Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive
portion can be found in the body of the assailed
Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of
and the Petition finally resolved by the statement
of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page

Decision, which reads: "Endorsement of specific
candidates in an election to any public office is a
clear violation of the separation clause."95
We cannot agree.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the
obligation of the party imposed by the Court was
allegedly contained in the text of the original
Decision. The Court, however, held:
"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court
cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive
portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the
rule is settled that where there is a conflict
between the dispositive part and the opinion, the
former must prevail over the latter on the theory
that the dispositive portion is the final order while
the opinion is merely a statement ordering
nothing." (Italics in the original)
Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed
to be the statement quoted by SJS and
embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of
the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, that
statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical
legal question and just a part of the opinion of
the trial court. It does not conclusively declare
the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the
Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less,
the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as
required of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional
injunction is a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard
of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity
and must be struck down as void.97
Parts of a Decision
In general, the essential parts of a good decision
consist of the following: (1) statement of the
case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or
assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which
each issue is, as a rule, separately considered
and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion.
The ponente may also opt to include an
introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue,
especially in cases in which controversial or
novel issues are involved.98
An introduction may consist of a concise but
comprehensive statement of the principal factual
or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases --
particularly those concerning public interest; or
73
involving complicated commercial, scientific,
technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a
longer introduction or prologue may serve to
acquaint readers with the specific nature of the
controversy and the issues involved. An
epilogue may be a summation of the important
principles applied to the resolution of the issues
of paramount public interest or significance. It
may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law
or guiding principle.
Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench
and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good
decision.
1. Statement of the Case
The Statement of the Case consists of a legal
definition of the nature of the action. At the first
instance, this part states whether the action is a
civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of
title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it
is a criminal case, this part describes the specific
charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory
portion of the information -- and the plea of the
accused. Also mentioned here are whether the
case is being decided on appeal or on a petition
for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number
in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of
the assailed decision.
In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of
the criminal information serves as a guide in
determining the nature and the gravity of the
offense for which the accused may be found
culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime different from or graver than
that charged.
Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information
is especially important when there is a question
on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether
qualifying and modifying circumstances have
been adequately alleged therein.
To ensure that due process is accorded, it is
important to give a short description of the
proceedings regarding the plea of the accused.
Absence of an arraignment, or a serious
irregularity therein, may render the judgment
void, and further consideration by the appellate
court would be futile. In some instances,
especially in appealed cases, it would also be
useful to mention the fact of the appellants’
detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary
query -- whether or not they have abandoned
their appeal by absconding or jumping bail.

Mentioning the court of origin and the case
number originally assigned helps in facilitating
the consolidation of the records of the case in
both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry
of final judgment.
Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion
of the assailed decision informs the reader of
how the appealed case was decided by the court
a quo.
2. Statement of Facts
There are different ways of relating the facts of
the case. First, under the objective or reportorial
method, the judge summarizes -- without
comment -- the testimony of each witness and
the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the
synthesis method, the factual theory of the
plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the
defendant or defense is summarized according
to the judge’s best light. Third, in the subjective
method, the version of the facts accepted by the
judge is simply narrated without explaining what
the parties’ versions are. Finally, through a
combination of objective and subjective means,
the testimony of each witness is reported and the
judge then formulates his or her own version of
the facts.
In criminal cases, it is better to present both the
version of the prosecution and that of the
defense, in the interest of fairness and due
process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions
of the parties must follow. The resolution of most
criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases,
depends to a large extent on the factual issues
and the appreciation of the evidence. The
plausibility or the implausibility of each version
can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading
of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in
arriving at its findings and conclusions should be
explained.
On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of
the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly
resolved all factual and legal issues involved
may partly explain why the reviewing court finds
no reason to reverse the findings and
conclusions of the former. Conversely, the lower
court’s patent misappreciation of the facts or
misapplication of the law would aid in a better
understanding of why its ruling is reversed or
modified.
In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of
facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for
74
resolution usually involve questions of law,
grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction;
hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed
by the parties. With few exceptions, factual
issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases.
Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower
court, if exhaustive and clear, may be
reproduced; otherwise, the material factual
antecedents should be restated in the words of
the reviewing magistrate.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or
body whose decision is under review should be
laid out, in order that the parties may clearly
understand why the lower court ruled in a certain
way, and why the reviewing court either finds no
reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.
3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
Both factual and legal issues should be stated.
On appeal, the assignment of errors, as
mentioned in the appellant’s brief, may be
reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to
avoid motions for reconsideration of the final
decision on the ground that the court failed to
consider all assigned errors that could affect the
outcome of the case. But when the appellant
presents repetitive issues or when the assigned
errors do not strike at the main issue, these may
be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.
Though not specifically questioned by the
parties, additional issues may also be included,
if deemed important for substantial justice to be
rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are
given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal
cases in which the reviewing court is generally
limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal.
The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction;
questions not raised but necessary in arriving at
a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors
that are closely related to those properly
assigned, or upon which depends the
determination of the question properly raised.
4. The Court’s Ruling
This part contains a full discussion of the specific
errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition
or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of
other issues the court deems essential to a just
disposition of the case. Where there are several
issues, each one of them should be separately
addressed, as much as practicable. The
respective contentions of the parties should also
be mentioned here. When procedural questions

are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is
better to resolve the former preliminarily.
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
In a criminal case, the disposition should include
a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime
committed, the penalty imposed, the
participation of the accused, the modifying
circumstances if any, and the civil liability and
costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the court
must order the immediate release of the
accused, if detained, (unless they are being held
for another cause) and order the director of the
Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused
is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten
(10) days from notice, the exact date when the
accused were set free.
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action,
the disposition should state whether the
complaint or petition is granted or denied, the
specific relief granted, and the costs. The
following test of completeness may be
applied. First, the parties should know their
rights and obligations. Second, they should
know how to execute the decision under
alternative contingencies. Third, there should be
no need for further proceedings to dispose of the
issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by
according the proper relief. The "proper relief"
usually depends upon what the parties seek in
their pleadings. It may declare their rights and
duties, command the performance of positive
prestations, or order them to abstain from
specific acts. The disposition must also
adjudicate costs.
The foregoing parts need not always be
discussed in sequence. But they should all be
present and plainly identifiable in the decision.
Depending on the writer’s character, genre and
style, the language should be fresh and free-
flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed
form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and
pretentious. At all times, however, the decision
must be clear, concise, complete and correct.
Second Substantive Issue:
Religious Leaders’ Endorsement
of Candidates for Public Office
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition --
WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
75
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves
serious consideration. As stated earlier, the
Court deems this constitutional issue to be of
paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it
concerns the governance of our country and its
people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural
transgressions by both SJS and the trial court,
this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not
to leave any doubt that there might be room to
entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the
merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to
convince the Court that there are enough factual
and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General has sided with petitioner insofar as
there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition
and the assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state
directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for
its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for
SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual
allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief.
Neither were there factual findings in the
assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked
the trial court to answer a hypothetical question.
In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion,
the rendition of which was beyond the court’s
constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.99
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in
clear violation of the Constitution, because it
made no findings of facts and final disposition.
Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent.
Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to
review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court
to take up, on the merits, the paramount
question involving a constitutional principle. It is
a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality of
a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and
to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned."100
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of
Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The
assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29,
2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for
Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to
state a cause of action.
 76
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and
recommend whether the trial judge may, after
observing due process, be held administratively
liable for rendering a decision violative of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars of this Court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131502 June 8, 2000
WILSON ONG CHING KIAN CHUNG and THE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
LIBRARY, petitioners,
vs.
CHINA NATIONAL CEREALS OIL AND
FOODSTUFFS IMPORT AND EXPORT
CORP., CEROILFOOD SHANDONG CEREAL
AND OILS and BENJAMIN IRAO,
JR., respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure of the Decision 1 in Civil Case
No. 94-68836 dated November 20, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila, which
rendered a judgment on the pleadings against
herein petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs, and against defendant:
1. Decreeing the cancellation or annulment of
the Copyrighted Registration No. 0-93-491 of
defendant WILSON ONG;
2. Directing defendant Director of the National
Library to effect the cancellation or annulment of
the Copyrighted Registration No. 0-93-491 of
defendant WILSON ONG; and
Damages cannot be awarded to Plaintiffs as no
evidence was presented to substantiate their
claims.
With costs against defendant WILSON ONG.
SO ORDERED. 2
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On September 16, 1993, petitioner Wilson Ong
Ching Kian Chuan, doing business under the
firm name of C.K.C. Trading, filed a Complaint
for Infringement of Copyright with prayer for writ
of injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 94 of Quezon City (hereinafter Quezon
City Court) against Lorenzo Tan, doing business
under the firm name Mcmaster International
Sales, and docketed as Q-93-17628. On the
same day, said court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the defendant, his
77
distributors and retailers from selling vermicelli
(sotanghon) "using the plaintiffs copyrighted
cellophane wrapper with the two-dragons
designed label, and setting the hearing of the
injunctive relief for September 21,
1993".1âwphi1.nêt
On October 13, 1993, the Quezon City Court
issued a Resolution which granted a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of the petitioner,
denied therein defendant's application for a writ
of preliminary injunction and, issues having been
joined, set the case for pre-trial on November 12,
1993. On December 15, 1993, the Quezon City
Court denied defendant's motion for dissolution
of the writ off preliminary injunction.
On January 5, 1994, the China National Cereals
Oils & Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation
(CEROILFOOD SHANDONG), and Benjamin
Irao, Jr., as representative and attorney-in-fact
of CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, herein
respondents, filed a complaint 3 for
Annulment/Cancellation of Copyrighted
Certificate No. Q-93-491 and damages with
prayer for restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, (hereinafter Manila Court) against
Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan, doing business
under the firm name and style C.K.C. Trading
and the Director of the National Library,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-68836.
On January 7, 1994, judge Rodolfo G. Palattao
of the Manila Court issued a temporary
restraining order 4 enjoining petitioner from using
his copyrighted labels and selling his vermicelli
products which is similar to that of respondents'.
On January 14, 1994, petitioner filed a motion to
dissolve temporary restraining order 5 praying
that the complaint be dismissed on the following
grounds: 1) litis pendentia, 2.) the issue involved
is one of copyright under PD No. 49 and does
not involve trademarks under Republic Act 166,
3.) courts of co-equal and coordinate jurisdiction
cannot interfere with the orders of other courts
having the same power and jurisdiction, 4.)
plaintiff CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, being a
foreign corporation and with no license to do
business in the Philippines, has no legal
capacity to sue, and 5.) courts should not issue
injunctions which would in effect dispose of the
main case without trial.
On January 27, 1994, the Manila Court issued
an Order 6 granting a writ of preliminary

injunction in favor of respondents and denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss.
On January 31, 1994, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari docketed as CA - G.R. SP No.
33178, seeking for the annulment of the January
27, 1994 Order of the Manila Court.
On July 22, 1994, after the parties have
expounded their respective positions by way of
their comment, reply and rejoinder, the Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision, 7 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED, and as prayed for by petitioner, the
Order dated January 27, 1994 issued in Civil
Case 94-68836 by Branch 33, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila,
is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, although
the prayer for dismissal of the complaint in
Manila may be pursued before said court during
the proceedings.
In the same Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the case was dismissible on grounds of litis
pendentia, multiplicity of suits, and forum
shopping.
On September 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals
denied respondents' motion for
reconsideration. 8 The Court of Appeals'
Decision became final on October 3, 1994. Entry
of Judgment 9 was made on November 15, 1994.
On November 21, 1994, petitioner filed a
motion 10 praying for the dismissal of the Manila
case on the strength of the findings of the Court
of Appeals, particularly on "forum shopping." In
an Order 11 dated March 8, 1995, the Manila
Court held in abeyance the resolution of the
motion to dismiss until further reception of
evidence, stating therein that the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals Decision did not
order the dismissal of the case. In the meantime,
respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners
in default for failing to file an Answer despite the
March 8 Order, which motion was opposed by
petitioners, there being at that time a pending
motion to dismiss which the court a quo refused
to resolve on the merits.
In an Order 12 dated July 19, 1996, the Manila
court denied the motion to declare petitioners in
default, admitted motu proprio the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioner as its answer, and
78
directed the parties to submit their respective
pre-trial briefs.
On September 17, 1996, petitioner filed a
"Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution" 1 praying that a motion for execution
dismissing the Manila case be issued, and citing
Atty. Benjamin Irao, Jr., counsel of
CEROILFOOD SHANDONG and his co-
counsel, Atty. Antonio Albano, guilty of forum
shopping, pursuant to the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 33178.
On January 23, 1997, respondents filed before
the Manila court a Supplement To Motion For
Judgment On The Pleadings, claiming that
petitioner failed to tender an issue. 14
On November 20, 1997, Judge Rodolfo G.
Palattao of the Manila Court rendered a
Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of
respondents, and ruled that litis pendentia,
multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping were not
present in the case.
Hence, the present appeal on pure questions of
law.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I
Whether or not the legal pronouncements of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33178 that
the Manila case is dismissible on grounds of litis
pendentia, multiplicity of suits and forum
shopping constitute the "Law of the Case."
II
Whether or not the Regional Trial Judge of
Branch 33, Manila erred in not applying the law
of the case.
III
Whether or not the court a quo can review the
legal conclusions of an appellate court in the
same case, on issues squarely submitted to and
passed upon by the appellate court under
identical set of facts and circumstances
obtaining in the court a quo.
IV

Whether or not the court a quo erred in motu
proprio considering a motion to dismiss as the
answer to the complaint and, thereafter, render
a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the motion to dismiss did not tender an issue. 15
In support thereof, petitioners quote the ruling of
the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether
there was litis pendentia and multiplicity of suits
in the present case, as follows:
The Manila court should have considered also
that Civil Case Q-93-17628 involves practically
the same parties, same subject-matter and
same relief as in Civil Case 0-94-68836.
Petitioner filed the first case on September 16,
1993, for INFRINGEMENT OF HIS
REGISTERED COPYRIGHT, which covers the
cellophane wrapper that he uses in packaging
the vermicelli which he imports from the CHINA
NATIONAL CEREALS OILS & FOODSTUFFS
IMPORT AND EXPORT CORPORATION
BASED IN BEIJING, CHINA, the main or the
principal of private respondent CEROILFOOD
SHANDONG, the latter being the "branch" of
CEROILFOOD in Quingdao, China, and of
which in Civil Case Q-93-17628, LORENZO
TAN avers in his answer he is the "exclusive and
sole distributor." In Civil Case 94-68836
subsequently filed in Manila, on January 5,
1994, LORENZO TAN admitted that he is the
"sole distributor" of plaintiff China National
Cereals Oil and Foodstuffs Import and Export
Corporation of the latter's PAGODA BRAND
vermicelli products. Atty. Benjamin Irao, Jr., the
attorney of private respondents, also the
attorney-in-fact of Ceroilfood Shandong,
admitted that his principal "does not do business
in the Philippines," and named LORENZO TAN
as his principal's "exclusive distributor" of said
product in the Philippines. Thus, Lorenzo Tan in
both Civil Cases Q-93-17628 and 94-68836
appears as principal defendant in the first, and
as sole distributor of Cereal Food Shandong, in
the second. Indicatively, he is defending and
complaining substantively the same rights and
interests in both cases, and in effect there is
identity of parties representing the same
interests. While it is against TAN with whom the
QC RTC issued an injunction, that writ should
also apply to CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, as
Tan is its exclusive and sole distributor in the
Philippines, as private respondent corporation
does business in the Philippines through TAN
who imports his vermicelli wholly from said
foreign corporation. And most importantly, TAN
asserts rights to the trademark PAGODA, also
79
allegedly owned by CEROILFOOD between
TAN and CEROILFOOD SHANDONG that he is
its corporate distributor. Also in 93-17628,
petitioner's prayer for injunction is based on his
registered copyright certificate, while TAN
averred in his answer thereon that petitioner's
copyright should be annulled and cancelled, and
also prayed for injunction. In 94-68836, private
respondent CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, as
plaintiff, also prayed for "ANNULMENT AND
CANCELLATION OF COPYRIGHT
CERTIFICATE No. 0-93-491 WITH DAMAGES
AND PRAYER FOR RESTRAINING
ORDER/WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION." As can well be seen from those
pertinent allegations/averments/prayers in both
cases, they are identical with each other. They
involved one and the same CERTIFICATE OF
COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION. Though the first
case is for INFRINGEMENT of copyright
registration, while the second is for
ANNULMENT AND CANCELLATION of the
same copyright, since the first involves a breach,
infraction, transgression, and the second for
invalidation, discontinuance, termination and
suppression of the same copyright certificate,
what the first seeks to preserve is the exclusive
use of the copyright, and the second seeks to
terminate the very use of the same copyright by
the registrant/owner. Though the quest of
petitioner and private respondents in the two
cases are aimed towards different ends — the
first to uphold the validity and effectiveness of
the same copyright, the second is merely a
consequence of the first, — the real matter in
controversy can be fully determined and
resolved before the Quezon City court, and
would render the Manila case a surplus age and
also constitutes multiplicity of suits and
dismissible on that ground, although such
dismissal should be considered as without
prejudice to the continuance of the proceedings
before the Quezon City court. (pp. 8-10, CA
Decision, Annex "B" of the Petition)
On the issue of forum shopping, the Court of
Appeals ruled further, thus:
Finally, the Manila court should also have
considered forum shopping as a third drawback
to private respondent's cause. It is a term
originally used to denominate a litigant's
privilege of choosing the venue of his action
where the law allows him to do so, or of an
"election of remedies" of one of two or more co-
existing rights. In either of which situations, the
litigant actually shops for a forum of his action.

However, instead of making a choice of the
forum of their actions, litigants through the
encouragement of their lawyers, file their actions
on all available courts, or invoke irrelevant
remedies simultaneously, or even file actions
one after the other, a practice which had not only
resulted conflicting adjudications among
different courts, confusion inimical to an orderly
administration of justice and created extreme
inconvenience to some of the parties to the
action. And thus it has been held in Villanueva
vs. Andres, 172 SCRA 876, that forum shopping
applies whenever as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari), in
another forum. . . .
Observedly, Attys. IRAO and ALBANO, who are
TAN's lawyers in Quezon City, are also private
respondents' lawyers in Manila. ATTY. IRAO
who entered his appearance as counsel for
private respondents in the Manila case, is also
the "authorized representative and attorney-in-
fact" of private respondent corporation in the
Manila case. While Atty. Irao "withdrew" as
counsel of TAN in the Quezon City, that did not
remove the case filed in Manila outside the
sphere of the rule on "forum shopping." (pp. 10-
11, CA Decision, Annex "B" of the Petition).
Petitioners contend that the foregoing
conclusions of fact and law of the Court of
Appeals are correct and should not be disturbed,
especially since the decision of the Court of
Appeals had already become final and entered
in the Books of Judgment; that the parties to the
case and the Regional Trial Judge in Branch 33,
Manila are bound by the said conclusions of fact
and law and the same should not be reopened
on remand of the case; and that it is not within
the Trial Judge's discretion to take exception to,
much less overturn, any factual or legal
conclusions laid down by the Court of Appeals in
its verdict and to dispose of the case in a manner
diametrically opposed thereto, citing the case
of PNB vs. Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery, 226
SCRA 36, 48.
Petitioners further allege that the acts of the trial
judge suffer from procedural infirmity: and that it
makes no sense for the trial judge to refuse to
resolve the motion to dismiss on the merits;
to motu proprio consider the motion to dismiss
as the answer to the complaint; and to later rule
that the motion to dismiss did not tender an issue
and, therefore, a judgment on the pleadings is in
order. Petitioners also aver that a motion to
80
dismiss is not a responsive pleading (citing
Prudence Realty Development Corporation vs.
CA, 231 SCRA 379); that at the time the trial
judge considered the motion to dismiss to be the
answer to the complaint, he knew very well, or at
least should have known that the motion to
dismiss did not tender an issue for indeed, it is
not within the province of the motion to admit or
deny the allegations of the complaint, and there
being no legitimate answer and no real joinder of
issues, the rendition of the subject Judgment on
the Pleadings becomes suspect. According to
petitioners, in deviating from the usual
procedure, the court a quo gave undue benefit
and advantage to the respondents at the
expense of herein petitioners; and that the
explanation given by the trial judge that the
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
decision did not expressly order him to dismiss
the case is flimsy and untenable.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the
doctrine of law of the case is not applicable to
the present case because the Court of Appeals
never ordered the dismissal of the case and that
the Order of the Manila Court dated January 27,
1994 was annulled and set aside only insofar as
the preliminary injunction is concerned.
Respondents cite the case of Magdalena Estate,
Inc. vs. Caluag, 11 SCRA 333 which ruled that
the deficiencies in the dispositive part of the
decision cannot be supplied by any finding or
opinion found in the body of the decision.
Respondents also allege that while petitioner
Wilson Ong had belatedly faulted the Court
below in considering his motion to dismiss as his
answer, he never questioned the correctness of
the findings of the court a quo in the assailed
decision.
After a review of the records of the case and an
examination of the pleadings filed by the parties,
the Court finds the petition to be meritorious.
Being interrelated, the first, second and third
issues shall be discussed jointly.1awphil
Indeed, the court a quo erred in not resolving the
petitioner's motion to dismiss in accordance with
the decision of the Court of Appeals which found
that "The Manila court should have considered
also that Civil Case Q-93-17628 involves
practically the same parties, same subject-
matter and same relief as in Civil Case 94-
68836"; that "the real matter in controversy can
be fully determined and resolved before the
Quezon City court and would render the Manila

case a surplusage and also constitutes
multiplicity of suits and dismissible on that
ground, although such dismissal should be
considered as without prejudice to the
continuance of the proceedings before the
Quezon City court"; and that "the Manila court
should also have considered forum shopping as
a third drawback to private respondents' cause."
While the Court of Appeals stated in the
dispositive portion of its decision that "the prayer
for dismissal of the complaint in Manila may be
pursued before said court during the
proceedings," it is clear from the body of the
Court of Appeals Decision that the case before
the Manila court should be dismissed on
grounds of litis pendentia, and forum shopping.
While the general rule is that the portion of a
decision that becomes the subject of execution
is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part
thereof, there are exceptions to this rule.
The exceptions where the dispositive part of the
judgment does not always prevail over the body
of the opinion are:
(a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the
body of the opinion may be referred to for
purposes of construing the judgment because
the dispositive part of a decision must find
support from the decision's ratio decidendi; 16
(b) where extensive and explicit discussion and
settlement of the issue is found in the body of the
decision. 17
Considering the circumstances of the instant
case, the Court finds that the exception to the
general rule applies to the instant case. Since
the statement of the Court of Appeals regarding
the prayer for the dismissal of the case
seemingly gave the Manila court the discretion
to dismiss not to dismiss Civil Case No. 94-
68836, the Manila court should have referred to
the body of the decision for purposes of
construing the issue of whether or not the
complaint should be dismissed, because the
dispositive part of a decision must find support
from the decision's ratio decidendi. Findings of
the court are to be considered in the
interpretation of the dispositive portion of the
judgment. 18 Moreover, extensive and explicit
discussion and settlement of the issues are
found in the body of the Court of Appeals
decision so that it is grave error for the court a
quo to rule again, as it did, on the issues of litis
81
pendentia and forum shopping in its decision,
and to overturn that of the Court of Appeals,
thus:
The argument of Defendant Ong in his motion
for execution that the case at bench should now
be dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping
and litis pendentia as allegedly ruled by the
Court of Appeals, does not impress this Court.
For while the appellate court urged this Court to
consider litis pendentia and forum shopping in
the trial resolution of the case at bench, nowhere
in its (CA) decision could it be deduced that this
Court is mandated to dismiss the case on these
precise grounds. The dispositive portion of the
decision does not contain such a mandate. 19
In Viva Productions, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 20 this Court set aside the decision of
the Makati court and declared null and void all
orders of the RTC of Makati after ruling that:
Thus we find grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Makati court, being a mere co-equal
of the Parañaque court, in not giving due
deference to the latter before which the issue of
the alleged violation of the sub-judice rule had
already been raised and submitted. In such
instance, the Makati court, if it was wary of
dismissing the action outrightly under
administrative Circular No. 04-94, should have,
at least ordered the consolidation of its case with
that of the Parañaque court, which had first
acquired 31 of the Revised Rules of Court.
(emphasis ours.)
The Quezon City court and the Manila court
have concurrent jurisdiction over the case.
However, when the Quezon City court acquired
jurisdiction over the case, it excluded all other
courts of concurrent jurisdiction from acquiring
jurisdiction over the same. The Manila court is,
therefore, devoid of jurisdiction over the
complaint filed resulting in the herein assailed
decision which must perforce be declared null
and void. To hold otherwise would be to risk
instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction
might have conflicting orders. 21
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 in Civil
Case No. 94-68836 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Said case is ordered dismissed without
prejudice to the continuance of the proceedings
before the Quezon City court where Civil Case
No. Q-93-17628 is pending. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161629 July 29, 2005
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,
HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in his
capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, and
Ombudsman’s Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau, represented by Director AGAPITO
ROSALES,Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the decision1 dated
August 28, 2003 and the resolution2 dated
January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 58264 which affirmed with
modification public respondents’ (1) Joint
Resolution dated January 22, 1999, which
ordered, among other things, petitioner’s
suspension for one (1) year for conduct
prejudicial to the service; and (2) Order dated
February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a
Memorandum dated March 17, 2000, which
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
but reduced his suspension to nine (9) months
without pay. The Court of Appeals modified the
above issuances by further reducing petitioner’s
suspension from nine (9) months to six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay.4
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the
Chairman of the First Division of the Board of
Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-
complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact
Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the
Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was
requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the
extension of the Temporary Resident Visas
(TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB
investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of
TRV extensions tainted with similar
irregularities.
As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant,
filed before the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a
formal complaint against herein petitioner. Also
charged administratively were Atty. Arthel
Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board
Member and Executive Assistant, respectively,
in petitioner’s division. With respect to petitioner,
82
the complaint was treated as both a criminal and
an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-
0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for nine (9) counts
of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and for falsification of public
documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038
(administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of
Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan
and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a)
irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed
period; and (b) using "recycled" or photocopied
applications for a TRV extension without the
applicants affixing their signatures anew to
validate the correctness and truthfulness of the
information previously stated therein.
Specifically, petitioner and Caronongan
allegedly signed the Memorandum of
Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC)
of the BID, forwarding the applications for TRV
extension of several aliens whose papers were
questionable.
In a Joint Resolution5 dated January 22, 1999,
Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes
resolved the administrative cases filed against
petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is
respectfully recommended that:
1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA
be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1)
year for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Service;
2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B.
CARONONGAN be DISMISSED, the same
having been rendered moot and academic; and
3. The instant case against respondent MA.
ELENA P. ANG be DISMISSED for lack of
sufficient evidence.
SO RESOLVED.6
Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution
which was approved by respondent
Ombudsman Desierto on December 29, 1999.7
In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent
Ombudsman approved a Resolution8 dated
June 22, 1999 of Graft Investigation Officer
Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing
 83
the criminal charges against petitioner for CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE
insufficiency of evidence.9 DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration10 in III.

the administrative case alleging that the BOC
which reviews all applications for TRVs RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
extension, approved the TRVs in question, FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
hence, petitioner argued that it effectively OMBUDSMAN’S RESOLUTION FINDING
declared the applications for extension regular PETITIONER ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
and in order and waived any infirmity thereon. CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT
ENCROACHMENT INTO THE POWER OF THE
In an Order11 dated February 8, 2000, Graft BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION OVER
Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the IMMIGRATION MATTERS.13
motion for reconsideration which was approved
by respondent Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 The petition lacks merit.
but reduced the period of suspension from one
(1) year to nine (9) months without pay. Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which
approved the questioned applications for the
On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for extension of the TRVs. He denies that he misled
review with the Court of Appeals, which included or deceived the BOC into approving these
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary applications and argues that the BOC effectively
prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct
temporary restraining order to enjoin public when it approved the subject applications.
respondents from implementing the order of Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and
suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the the government did not suffer any damage as a
TRO on April 19, 2000. result of his alleged administrative lapse.

In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape
of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s suspension but liability, petitioner undermines his position in the
reduced the period from nine (9) months to six BID and his role in the processing of the subject
(6) months and one (1) day without pay.12 applications. But by his own admission,14 it
appears that the BSI not only transmits the
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, applications for TRV extension and its
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on supporting documents, but more importantly, it
the following grounds: interviews the applicants and evaluates their
papers before making a recommendation to the
I. BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and
when it finds them in order, it executes a
IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC
DECISION, RESPONDENT COURT OF certifying to the regularity and propriety of the
APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE applications.
FOLLOWING RELEVANT FACTS AND
MATTERS WHICH, IF PROPERLY In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,15 we stated that all
CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN FAVOR OF extent on their subordinates. Practicality and
PETITIONER: efficiency in the conduct of government business
dictate that the gritty details be sifted and
... reviewed by the time it reaches the final
approving authority. In the case at bar, it is not
II. unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the
evaluation and recommendation of the BSI as it
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT cannot be expected to review every detail of
COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE FINDING OF each application transmitted for its approval.
THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY Petitioner being the Chairman of the First
ADVISORY ON THE BUREAU OF Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its
IMMIGRATION (BI) IS CONTRARY TO THE proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or
PERTINENT PROVISION OF THE 1987 good faith when the irregularities in the TRV

extension applications are so patently clear on
its face. He is principally accountable for
certifying the regularity and propriety of the
applications which he knew were defective.
Petitioner could not validly claim that he was
singled out for prosecution. It is of record that
administrative cases were also filed against
Caronongan and Ang, but extraneous
circumstances rendered the case against
Caronongan moot while the case against Ang
was dismissed because it was proven that she
merely implemented the approved decision of
the BOC.
Equally untenable is the contention that the
BOC’s approval of the defective applications for
TRV extension cured any infirmities therein and
effectively absolved petitioner’s administrative
lapse. The instant administrative case pertains
to the acts of petitioner as Chairman of the First
Division of the BSI in processing nine (9)
defective applications, independent of and
without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It
does not impugn the validity of the TRV
extensions as to encroach upon the authority of
the BID on immigration matters. The main thrust
of the case is to determine whether petitioner
committed any misconduct, nonfeasance,
misfeasance or malfeasance in the performance
of his duties.
Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner
essentially puts in issue the import of the
Ombudsman’s findings. Petitioner questions the
Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that the
findings of the Ombudsman "may not be said to
be merely recommendatory" upon the
Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to
uphold the appellate court’s ruling expands the
authority granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter to
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,
particularly Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman.16 Petitioner submits that the
Ombudsman’s findings that the TRV
applications were illegal constitutes an indirect
interference by the Ombudsman into the powers
of the BOC over immigration matters.
We do not agree. The creation of the Office of
the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution.17 The Ombudsman and his
deputies, as protectors of the people, are
mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against officers or
employees of the Government, or of any
84
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations.18 Foremost among its powers is
the authority to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officers and employees, thus:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law
on November 17, 1989 and provided for the
structural and functional organization of the
Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated
the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act
promptly on complaints but also to enforce the
administrative, civil and criminal liability of
government officers and employees in every
case where the evidence warrants to promote
efficient service by the Government to the
people.19
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations as in the present
case is settled.20 Section 19 of RA 6770
provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. – The
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of
an agency’s functions, though in accordance
with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers
but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.

The point of contention is the binding power of
any decision or order that emanates from the
Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted
its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions, and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be
given its literal meaning; that is, that the
Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature
rather than one having any binding effect,
citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman,21thus:
... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner
were administratively liable, the Ombudsman
has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner
from the government service, more particularly
from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only
"recommend" the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public
official concerned.22
For their part, the Solicitor General and the
Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word
"recommend" must be taken in conjunction with
the phrase "and ensure compliance
therewith". The proper interpretation of the
Court’s statement in Tapiador should be that the
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and compel the
head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words,
it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.
We agree with the ratiocination of public
respondents. Several reasons militate against a
literal interpretation of the subject constitutional
provision. Firstly, a cursory reading
of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the
case was the failure of the complainant therein
to present substantial evidence to prove the
85
charges of the administrative case. The
statement that made reference to the power of
the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter
dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in
this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from
judicial examination.
The provisions of RA 6770 support public
respondents’ theory. Section 15 is substantially
the same as Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution which provides for the powers,
functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We
draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an
act or discharge a duty required by law, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21 of this
Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee
who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act
or discharge a duty required by law shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against said
officer; (Emphasis supplied)
We note that the proviso above qualifies the
"order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee –
akin to the questioned issuances in the case at
bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any
officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or
employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a
strong indication that the Ombudsman’s
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in
nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority
of the head of office or any officer concerned. It
has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any
illegal act or omission of any public official is not

an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged.23 By
stating therefore that the Ombudsman
"recommends" the action to be taken against an
erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the
implementation of the order be coursed through
the proper officer, which in this case would be
the head of the BID.
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure
that it can effectively carry out its mandate as
protector of the people against inept and corrupt
government officers and employees. The Office
was granted the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court.24 It was
given disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
(with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary).25 Also,
it can preventively suspend any officer under its
authority pending an investigation when the
case so warrants.26
The foregoing interpretation is consistent with
the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission27 reveal the following:
MR. MONSOD:
Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if
we give the spirit and intendment of the
Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the
situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution
arm. We wanted to give the idea of the
Ombudsman a chance, with prestige and
persuasive powers, and also a chance to really
function as a champion of the citizen.
However, we do not want to foreclose the
possibility that in the future, The Assembly, as it
may see fit, may have to give additional powers
to the Ombudsman; we want to give the concept
of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the
Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is if
we create a constitutional body which has
neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only
persuasive powers, we might be raising the
86
hopes of our people too much and then
disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
legislature, why not leave this to the
legislature?28
MR. MONSOD:
Yes, because we want to avoid what happened
in 1973. I read the committee report which
recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions
for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman,
but notwithstanding the explicit purpose
enunciated in that report, the implementing law
– the last one, P.D. No. 1630—did not follow the
main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan,
...
...
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of
Commissioner Blas Ople):
May we just state that perhaps the honorable
Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an
absolutist position, The Ombudsman is seen as
a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens
against the bureaucracy, not against the
President. On one hand, we are told he has no
teeth and he lacks other things. On the other
hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
competitor to the President, as if he is being
brought up to the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a
toothless animal, we would like to say that we
are promoting the concept in its form at the
present, but we are also saying that he can
exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction
of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We did
not think that at this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to Congress at some
future time if it feels that it may need to designate
what powers the Ombudsman need in order that
he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
 87
So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a
eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.
(Emphasis supplied)29

It is thus clear that the framers of our

Constitution intended to create a stronger and
more effective Ombudsman, independent and
beyond the reach of political influences and
vested with powers that are not merely
persuasive in character. The Constitutional
Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which
it did when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case
of Uy v. Sandiganbayan,30 it was held:

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs

from the classical Ombudsman model whose
function is merely to receive and process the
people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive
government personnel. The Philippine
Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is
armed with the power to prosecute erring public
officers and employees, giving him an active role
in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses that
may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with
broad powers to enable him to implement his
own actions. ...31

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court

of Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the service and reducing petitioner’s
period of suspension to six (6) months and one
(1) day without pay, taking into account the
education and length of service of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision dated August 28, 2003 and the
Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149375 November 26, 2002
MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel
Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and
Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and
convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which
he and his co-accused were sentenced to a
prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.1
The case before us concerns only the petition for
review of accused Marvin Mercado where he
assails his conviction, and arguing that the Court
of Appeals having increased the penalty
imposed by the court a quo to a prison term
of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
thirty (30) years, should have certified the case
to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years
was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the
last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,2 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead
with the Court of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec.
13, Rule 124, relied upon by petitioner, was
applicable only when the penalty imposed was
reclusion perpetua or higher as a single
indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at least
reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed
by the appellate court on the accused was
clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA
6538,3 which is not considered reclusion
perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.4
The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution
relied on People v. Omotoy5 where the Regional
Trial Court found the accused guilty of arson and
sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The case
reached this Court on automatic appeal. In
Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed -
88
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for
the reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision
mayor in its maximum period in accordance with
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the
appeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals
since strictly speaking, this Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where "the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher"
(Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the
penalty is at least reclusion perpetua (or life
imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse
will be overlooked so as not to delay the
disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been
imposed on the accused, and causes no
prejudice whatsoever to any party.
Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph
of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant
case considering that the penalty imposed was
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls
within that range, reclusion perpetua
nevertheless is a single indivisible penalty which
cannot be divided into different periods. The
thirty (30)-year period for reclusion perpetua is
only for purposes of successive service of
sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal
Code.6
More importantly, the crime committed by
petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or
The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a
special law and not under The Revised Penal
Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special
penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to
designate it with terms provided for in The
Revised Penal Code since those terms apply
only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code,
and not to the penalty in special penal
laws.7 This is because generally, special laws
provide their own specific penalties for the
offenses they punish, which penalties are not
taken from nor refer to those in The Revised
Penal Code.8
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months under RA 6538 is essentially within the
range of the medium period of reclusion
temporal. However, such technical term under

The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or
applied to the penalty for carnapping. Also, the
penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstance of violence against or intimidation
of any person or force upon things, i.e.,
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
thirty (30) years, does not correspond to that in
The Revised Penal Code.9 But it is different
when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof,
since this is penalized with reclusion perpetua to
death.10
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose
the penalty of "x x x imprisonment of TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of reclusion temporal as
maximum."11For these reasons the use of the
term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of
its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no
basis for the trial court to set the minimum
penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day
since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty for
carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months.
We see no error by the appellate court in relying
on a Footnote in Omotoy12 to affirm the
conviction of the accused. The substance of the
Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the
case, but it still constitutes an important part of
the decision since it enunciates a fundamental
procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That
this rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is
of no consequence as it is merely a matter of
style.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours
with the instant case since the former involves
an appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the
Supreme Court while the case at bar is an
appeal from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the
Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal
cases only where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this
doctrine is the Constitution itself which
empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of
lower courts in all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.13
89
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the
imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to
it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death
or life imprisonment, then it should impose such
penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon,
certify the case and elevate the entire records to
this Court for review.14 This will obviate the
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting
shuttling of criminal cases between this Court
and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court
will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the
very inception and can, without bothering the
Court of Appeals which has fully completed the
exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the
case.15
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals
imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua,
a review of the case may be had only by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 4516 where
only errors or questions of law may be raised.
Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the
issue of whether there was indeed a violation of
The Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue is factual,
as we shall find hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo
Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in
front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato
St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was
owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by
Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their joint
venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper
was nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani
to report its disappearance to the Makati Police
Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR)
Division which immediately issued an Alarm
Sheet.17
On 31 May 1996 Bhagwani’s neighbor, fireman
Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from
his daughter, a common-law wife of accused
Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel
Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and
Michael Cummins himself stole the Isuzu
Trooper. Alvarez’s daughter however refused to
issue any statement regarding the incident.18
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 "Miling"
Flores brought to his house Michael Cummins,
Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, Rommel
Flores, and complaining witness Bhagwani. In
that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen
and Flores admitted that they took the vehicle
and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and
Baguio.19 They claimed however that it was with

the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They
alleged that on the night they took the vehicle,
they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing
to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they
asked him instead if they could borrow the Isuzu
Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even
turned over the keys to them.20
Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during
that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 "Miling"
Flores but his co-accused narrated his
participation in the crime.21
The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction
but increased the penalty imposed on the four
(4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.22
90
The evidence in this case shows that the
accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu
Trooper to gain access to it, thus demonstrating
that force was used upon the vehicle;
nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit
the imposition of the full penalty. With the
application of The Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an
indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22)
years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals denying the Motion and
Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado
dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is
reduced to an indeterminate prison term of
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
twenty-two (22) years. No costs.

Petitioner insists that the accused were more SO ORDERED.

motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the
Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely took the
vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing
it. If they were really thieves, according to
petitioner, they would have sold the vehicle
outright instead of simply abandoning it in
Baguio.23

Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this

is a petition for review on certiorari where only
questions of law, and not questions of fact, may
be raised. The issue before us being factual, a
reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may
not be entertained in this appeal. Besides,
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the
Supreme Court.24 This rule may be disregarded
only when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or are not
supported by the evidence on record. But there
is no ground to apply this exception to the instant
case. This Court will not assess all over again
the evidence adduced by the parties particularly
where as in this case the findings of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.25

However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals

on its imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No.
6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment
for seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
thirty (30) years when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things.

[G.R. No. 142947. March 19, 2002]
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA,
JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ROQUE
VILLADORES, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235
reversing the two (2) Orders dated August 27,
1998[2] and December 4, 1998[3] of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 which denied
respondent Roque Villadoress motion for
disqualification of Rico and Associates as
private prosecutor for petitioner Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr., and the motion for
reconsideration thereof, respectively.
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in
the amended informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-138744 and 94-138745 entitled, People
of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo,
Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano and Rolando
Advincula, for Falsification of Public Document
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 41.
It appears that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against several
parties, among them, IBC 13. When the labor
arbiter[4] ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva,
Jr., IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).[5] As an appeal
bond, IBC 13 filed Surety Bond No. G (16) 00136
issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc.
(BF) with the Confirmation Letter dated
September 20, 1993 supposedly issued by BFs
Vice-President. However, both documents were
subsequently found to be falsified.
Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of
public document were filed before the Manila
City Prosecutors Office. The charges against
respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III
were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office
which, however, found probable cause against
the other respondents. Nonetheless, on a
petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the latter affirmed the dismissal
against Diaz but ordered the inclusion of
respondent Villadores as an accused in the two
91
(2) criminal cases. Accordingly, the original
informations were amended to include
respondent Villadores among those charged.
Following the arraignment of respondent
Villadores, the private prosecutor, Rico and
Associates, filed anew a Motion to Admit
Amended Informations alleging damages
sustained by private complainant, herein
petitioner Villanueva, Jr., as a result of the
crimes committed by the accused. The incident
was referred to the City Prosecutors Office by
the trial court. In compliance, the fiscals office
submitted a Motion to Admit Amended
Informations with the following amendment: to
the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr., and
of public interest and in violation of public faith
and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
The Motion was granted by the trial court and the
amended informations were admitted in an
Order dated October 10, 1997. Respondent
Villadores subsequently filed a Manifestation
and/or Motion for Reconsideration but the same
was denied in an Order dated October 24, 1997.
Thus, respondent Villadores interposed on
November 26, 1997 a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. Said petition, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, sought to
annul the Order of the trial court dated October
10, 1997 which admitted the second amended
informations, as well as the Order dated October
24, 1997 denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof.[6]
In a Decision dated June 22, 1998, the appellate
court, acting thru its Eleventh Division, found
that the trial court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in admitting the amended informations
and dismissed the petition of respondent
Villadores.[7] The decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
46103 became final and executory on July 18,
1998.[8]
Subsequently, before Branch 41 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, respondent Villadores
moved for the disqualification of Rico and
Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner
Villanueva, Jr.,[9]in line with the following
pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103, to wit:[10]
Incidentally, We are one with the petitioner when
it argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not
the offended party in these cases. It must be
underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the

falsified surety bond for the purpose of the
appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of
the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva,
Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed. We
see no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification
of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation
letter when it could have even redounded to his
own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as
a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who
was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased
a fake surety bond.
Rico and Associates opposed said motion on the
ground that the above-quoted pronouncement of
the appellate court is a mere obiter dictum.[11]
In an Order[12] dated August 27, 1998 the trial
court denied the motion for disqualification
ratiocinating, thus:
A reading of the aforecited decision of the Court
of Appeals clearly shows that the aforecited
reason for the motion is a mere obiter dictum. As
held by the Supreme Court, an obiter
dictum lacks force of adjudication. It is merely an
expression of an opinion with no binding force
for purposes of res judicata (City of Manila vs.
Entote, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA, 508-509).
What is controlling is the dispositive portion of
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals
which denied due course and ordered dismissed
the petition of the movant questioning the Order
of this Court granting the Motion to Admit
Informations and admitting the Amended
Informations that include the name of Francisco
N. Villanueva, Jr. as the private offended party,
which in effect upheld and/or affirmed the
questioned Order of this Court admitting the
amended informations.
Reconsideration[13] was sought by respondent
Villadores but the same was denied by the trial
court in its Order dated December 4, 1998.[14]
Thus, on January 7, 1999, respondent Villadores
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No.
50235, seeking the annulment of the trial courts
Order dated August 27, 1998 denying the Motion
for Disqualification as well as its subsequent
Order dated December 4, 1998 denying
reconsideration.[15]
On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered
its now challenged decision which reversed and
set aside the two (2) Orders of the trial court
92
dated August 27, 1998 and December 4, 1998.
The appellate court directed that the name of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
138744-45 be stricken out from the records.[16]
Hence, this petition anchored on the following
grounds:[17]
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ENJOINING RICO & ASSOCIATES
FROM APPEARING AS PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR AND/OR AS COUNSEL FOR
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., IN
CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94-138744-45.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT
THE MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR. IS AN
OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
94-138744-45 HAD BEEN RESOLVED WITH
FINALITY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE IN CA-G.R.
SP NO. 46103 WHERE THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS UPHELD THE AMENDMENT OF
THE INFORMATIONS IN SAID CASES TO
STATE THAT THE CRIMES WERE
COMMITTED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA, THE SAME COULD NO LONGER
BE RELITIGATED IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 50235.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
PRONOUNCEMENT IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103
THAT FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR. IS
NOT AN OFFENDED PARTY, AS A MERE
OBITER DICTUM.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., WAS IN
FACT AN AGGRIEVED PARTY.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ORDERING THE NAME OF
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUVEVA, JR.,
APPEARING AS THE OFFENDED PARTY BE
STRICKEN FROM THE RECORDS, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103, IT
UPHELD THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATIONS SO AS TO STATE THAT THE
CRIMES CHARGED WERE COMMITTED TO
THE PREJUDICE OF FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUEVA, JR.

All the foregoing issues boil down to the issue of
whether or not the pronouncement of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 to the
effect that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
138744-45 is obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion
expressed by a court upon some question of law
which is not necessary to the decision of the
case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a
cause, by the way, that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question
before him, or upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[18]
Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of
the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 is
not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter
clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his
petition assailing the admission of the Amended
Informations. Among the issues upon which the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103
was anchored, was whether Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. is the offended party.[19] Argument
on whether petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was the
offended party was, thus, clearly raised by
respondent Villadores. The body of the decision
contains discussion on that point and it clearly
mentioned certain principles of law.
It has been held that an adjudication on any point
within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule
applies to all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and led up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on
which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a
point expressly decided does not lose its value
as a precedent because the disposition of the
case is, or might have been, made on some
other ground, or even though, by reason of other
points in the case, the result reached might have
been the same if the court had held, on the
particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision
which the case could have turned on is not
regarded as obiter dictummerely because,
owing to the disposal of the contention, it was
necessary to consider another question, nor can
an additional reason in a decision, brought
forward after the case has been disposed of on
one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also,
93
where a case presents two (2) or more points,
any one of which is sufficient to determine the
ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all
such points, the case as an authoritative
precedent as to every point decided, and none
of such points can be regarded as having the
status of a dictum, and one point should not be
denied authority merely because another point
was more dwelt on and more fully argued and
considered, nor does a decision on one
proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta.[20]
The decision of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103 allegedly show a conflict
between the pronouncements in the body of the
decision and the dispositive portion thereof.
However, when that decision is carefully and
thoroughly read, such conflict is revealed to be
more illusory than real. In denying the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, the
appellate court had this to say:
At the centerfold of this controversy is Section 14
of Rule 110, 1st paragraph, which is quoted
hereunder:
SEC. 14. Amendment. - The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused pleads, and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at
the discretion of the court, when the same can
be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
Needless to state, amendment of a criminal
charge sheet depends much on the time when
the change is requested. If before arraignment it
is a matter of right, no leave of court is necessary
and the prosecution is free to do so even in
matters of substance and in form. On the other
hand, the more complicated situation involves
an amendment sought after the accused had
already been arraigned. This time amendment
can only be made by a prior leave and at the
discretion of the court, only as to matters of form
when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the accused [Draculan vs. Donato;
140 SCRA 425 (1985); Teehankee vs.
Madayag, 207 SCRA 134 (1992)].
Relative to the second instance, the primary
consideration is whether the intended
amendment is only as to matter of form and
same could be done without prejudice to the
rights of the accused. Substantial amendment

as a consequence is proscribed. In essence,
substantial matters in the complaint or
information is the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form [Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38
(1975); Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra].
In other words, even if the amendment is only as
to matter of form, one other criteria must
accompany it for its admission, which is, that it
should not be prejudicial to the accused.
Conformably, the test as to when the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is, when a defense
under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have, would no
longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused
might have, would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information as amended [People
vs. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236 (1988);
Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra].
Given the above aphorisms, the inclusion of the
name of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as the
prejudiced complainant in the cases appears to
be not substantial. It did not change, alter or
modify the crime charged nor any possible
defense. Likewise, any evidence the accused
might have under his defense in the original
informations is still very much available to him
and applicable to the amended informations. In
sum, accused petitioner is not in any way
prejudiced in his rights with such amendment
which, in Our considered opinion, is only a
matter of form under the standards laid down in
the cases above-cited.
What seems to be more crucial here is the fact
that the crime charged in the two informations is
falsification of public document committed by a
private individual defined and penalized under
Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, the evil sought to be
punished and sanctioned by the offense of
falsification of public document is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the trust as
therein solemnly proclaimed [People vs.
Pacana, 47 Phil 48, citing Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain of December 23, 1886;
People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324, Po Giok To, 96
Phil. 913; see Revised Penal Code, Luis B.
Reyes, 13th Division, p. 211 and Aquino, 1976
ed., Vol. 2, p. 984]. Apropos, the crime of
94
falsification of public document does not require
for its essential elements damage or intent to
cause damage. In the final analysis. the
inclusion of the name of Francisco N. Villanueva.
Jr. would then be merely a superfluity in the
information, a meaningless surplusage therein.
In fact. it is even highly doubted if civil damages
may be awarded in such transgression of the
law.
Viewed from the above ratiocinations, We find
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
lower court in admitting the second amended
informations albeit such amendment is totally
irrelevant and unnecessary to the crime
charged. The mere fact that the court decides
the question wrongly is utterly immaterial to the
question of jurisdiction [Estrada vs. Sto
Domingo, 28 SCRA 891 (1969)]. And writs of
certiorari are issued only for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. It
cannot be legally used for any other purpose
[Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527
(1986)].
Incidentally, We are in one with the petitioner
when it argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr.
is not the offended party in these cases. It must
be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured
the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the
appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of
the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva,
Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed. We
see no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification
of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation
letter when it could have even redounded to his
own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as
a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who
was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased
a fake surety bond.[21]
Clearly then, while the appellate court in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46103 admitted that the addition of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. as an offended party is
not necessary, it held that the admission of the
amended informations due to the amendment to
include petitioner Villanueva, Jr. did not by itself
amount to grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise
stated, there is an error of judgment but such did
not amount to an error of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari, which was
availed of respondent Villadores, is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of
 95
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a
court exercised its jurisdiction an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed by
a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. Thus, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original
special civil action of certiorari.[22] In effect, the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 merely
held that respondent Villadores chose the wrong
remedy.

It is significant to mention that the intervention of

petitioner Villanueva, Jr. in the criminal cases as
an offended party is apparently predicated[23] on
the reduction by the NLRC, in IBCs appeal of the
illegal dismissal case, of the monetary award to
which he is entitled, despite finding the appeal
as not perfected due to the posting of the
spurious appeal bond.[24] However, such alleged
error should have been brought by petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. to the appropriate forum,[25] and
not raised in criminal cases before the trial court
as a ground for his inclusion as a prejudiced
party.

In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition,

being devoid of merit, must fail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
50235 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 96
G.R. No. 147097 June 5, 2009 Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28)
Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. 26087 to 26114 were filed against herein
MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
ANGELITO A. PELAYO, Petitioner,
vs. Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as filed their respective Motions for
OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions
THIRD DIVISION, Respondents. were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
DECISION prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against
petitioners.
PERALTA, J.:
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Ombudsman its Resolution3 dated September
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the 18, 2000. It recommended the dismissal of the
Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency
Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated of evidence.
September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal
of the criminal cases filed against herein The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office
petitioners, be reversed and set aside. of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP
Resolution. In a Memorandum4 dated October
The antecedent facts are as follows. 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP
Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and directed to proceed with the trial of the cases
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated
petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as September 18, 2000 and ordering the
defined and penalized under Article 220 of the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases.
Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, The cases were then returned to the
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
3019, as amended. proceedings.

The complaint alleged that there were Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
irregularities in the use by then Congressman
Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Petitioners allege that:
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year
1996, i.e., he was both proponent and I.
implementer of the projects funded from his
CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE
pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED
Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
(18) checks amounting to ₱4,868,277.08. Thus, JURISDICTION.
petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners
Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and II.
Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert
his CDF into cash. THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS
BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary CONJECTURES.5
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending Amplifying their arguments, petitioners
the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen asseverate that the Ombudsman had no
(14) counts each of Malversation of Public authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution
Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. dismissing the cases against petitioners
3019. Said Resolution was approved by the because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only
with the power to watch, investigate and
recommend the filing of proper cases against
erring officials, but it was not granted the power
to prosecute. They point out that under the
Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to
the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was
intended by the framers to be a separate and
distinct entity from the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as
provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a
separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman
should have no power and authority over the
OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which
made the OSP an organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck
down for being unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be
absolved from any liability because the checks
were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as
reimbursement for the advances he made from
his personal funds for expenses incurred to
ensure the immediate implementation of
projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo
victims.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled
that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the
Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers
and placing the OSP under said office have no
constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the
Constitution had been fully dissected as far back
as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial
powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with
the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall
"exercise such other functions or duties as may
be provided by law." Elucidating on this matter,
the Court stated:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial
powers from the Ombudsman was indeed
present, the Commission [referring to the
Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not
hesitate to recommend that the Legislature
could, through statute, prescribe such other
powers, functions, and duties to the
Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the
Commission after several amendments, this is
97
now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions, and duties:
xxxx
Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise
such other functions or duties as may be
provided by law.
Expounding on this power of Congress to
prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to
the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners
Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by
Commissioner Rodrigo:
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the
enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: "to
exercise such powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law." So, the
legislature may vest him with powers taken away
from the Tanodbayan, may it not?
MR. COLAYCO:
Yes.
MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The
Tanodbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as provided by law."
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No.
1630.
MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away
by law, I suppose.

MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO:
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among
the functions that can be performed by the
Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as
may be provided by law." The sponsors admitted
that the legislature later on might remove some
powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer these
to the Ombudsman.
MR. COLAYCO:
Madam President, that is correct.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if
we create a constitutional body which has
neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only
persuasive powers, we might be raising the
hopes of our people too much and then
disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
xxxx
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of
Commissioner Blas Ople):
xxxx
With respect to the argument that he is a
toothless animal, we would like to say that we
are promoting the concept in its form at the
present, but we are also saying that he can
exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction
of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do
not think that at this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to Congress at some
future time if it feels that it may need to designate
98
what powers the Ombudsman need in order that
he be more effective.1awphi1 This is not
foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a
eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.7
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No.
6770, which subsumed the OSP under the
Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld
by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among
the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman
in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing
for the Functional and Structural Organization of
the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other
Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
xxxx
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides
that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforth known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently
refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D.
No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation.
It follows then that Congress may remove any of
the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers
under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers,
except those powers conferred by the
Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when
one considers that by express mandate of
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise
such other powers or perform functions or duties
as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then
that Congress has the power to place the Office
of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may
remove some of the powers granted to the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them
to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the
Special Prosecutor such other powers and
functions and duties as Congress may deem fit
and wise. This Congress did through the
passage of R.A. No. 6770.8

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been
reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on
its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that
the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of
the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No.
6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that
the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute
based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the
Constitution was also made the foundation for
the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where
it was held that the power to prosecute carries
with it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which power had not been
delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond
cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was
not proscribed from legislating the grant of
additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing
the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on
the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No.
6770 should be revisited and the principle
of stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention
deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as
follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence
to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a
decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on
the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further
argument.141avvphi1
99
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of
the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Corporation,15 the Court expounded on the
importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating
that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty
and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a
very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it
to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non
quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where
the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue.16
The doctrine has assumed such value in our
judicial system that the Court has ruled that
"[a]bandonment thereof must be based only
on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise,
the becoming virtue of predictability which is
expected from this Court would be
immeasurably affected and the public's
confidence in the stability of the solemn
pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only
upon showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine
of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in
setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any
strong, compelling reason to convince the Court
that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be
applied to this case. They have not successfully
demonstrated how or why it would be grave
abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who
has been validly conferred by law with the power
of control and supervision over the OSP, to

disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by
the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that
the Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP
Resolution recommending dismissal of the
cases is based on misapprehension of facts,
speculations, surmises and conjectures. The
question is really whether the Ombudsman
correctly ruled that there was enough evidence
to support a finding of probable cause. That
issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a
remedy meant to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has
been emphasized in First Corporation v. Former
Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,18 to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review
of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does
not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof. It does not include
an inquiry as to the correctness of the
evaluation of evidence. Any error committed
in the evaluation of evidence is merely an
error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where
the act complained of was issued by the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of
the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings
and its conclusions of law. It is not for this
Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or
substitute the findings of fact of the court a
quo.19
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence
indeed supports a finding of probable cause
would necessitate an examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence upon which the
Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP
Resolution. Hence, the Petition
for Certiorari should not be given due course.
100
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court
in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto,20 imparting the
value of the Ombudsman's independence,
stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of
a public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling
of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers as long as his
rulings are supported by substantial
evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the
people and preserver of the integrity of public
service, he has wide latitude in exercising his
powers and is free from intervention from the
three branches of government. This is to
ensure that his Office is insulated from any
outside pressure and improper influence.21
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is
imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that
said public official acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated
on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's
exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. x x x23
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate
that the Ombudsman acted in a manner
described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was
acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and
properly exercised its power of control and
supervision over the OSP when it disapproved
the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not
question any order or action of the
Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should
not have been included as a respondent in this
petition.
 101
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

EN BANC
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 176951
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO,
CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x-----------------------------x
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 177499
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
102
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,
PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL;
and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN,
PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 178056
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President Present:
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by CORONA, C.J.,
 103
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CARPIO, al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for
CITY OF CALBAYOG CARPIO MORALES, reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-
represented by MAYOR VELASCO, JR., intervention Batangas City, Santiago City,
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, NACHURA, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and
and JERRY P. TREAS in his LEONARDO-DE Oroquieta City.
CASTRO, On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En
personal capacity as taxpayer, BRION, Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject
Petitioners, PERALTA, 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10,
BERSAMIN, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal
DEL CASTILLO, protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the
- versus - ABAD, Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority
VILLARAMA, JR., vote, denied the respondents first motion for
PEREZ, reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme
MENDOZA, and Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SERENO, JJ. respondents second motion for reconsideration.
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN became final and executory and was recorded,
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY in due course, in the Book of Entries of
OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF Judgments on 21 May 2009.
CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF
EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS However, after the finality of the 18 November
ORIENTAL, 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and
Respondents. compelling reason, the Court En
Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18
November 2008 Decision by upholding the
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, Decision of 21 December 2009.
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF Constitution
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF Section 10, Article X of the 1987
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, Constitution provides:
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF No province, city, municipality, or
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, barangay shall be created,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF divided, merged, abolished or its
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF boundary substantially
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, altered, except in accordance
CITY OF CADIZ, and Promulgated: with the criteria established in
CITY OF TAGUM, the local government code and
Petitioners-In-Intervention. August 24, 2010 subject to approval by a majority
x---------------------------------- of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
----------------x the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)

RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for
reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the
Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by
petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local
government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law. There is only one
Local Government Code.[1] The Constitution
requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for

the creation of a city, including the conversion of
a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write
such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure
that the creation of cities and other political units
must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the
Local Government Code. Any derogation or
deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the creation of a city. This took effect on 30
June 2001. Hence, from that moment
the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city
must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
does not contain any exemption from this
income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any
exemption to respondent municipalities, even
though their cityhood bills were pending in
Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The
Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity
of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income
requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA
9009. Such exemption clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and
is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid,
such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local
Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009
pertinently provides: Section 450 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows: x x x. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, embodies the
new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. Considering the
Legislatures primary intent to curtail the mad
rush of municipalities wanting to be converted
into cities, RA 9009 increased the income
104
requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat,
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local
Government Code, as it expressly amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and
clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not
a single word or phrase admits of two or more
meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing
the income requirement for the creation of cities.
There are no exemptions from this income
requirement.Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to
convert into a city must meet the increased
income requirement, there is no reason to go
beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the
law does not make an exemption, the Court
should not create one.[2]
B. Operative Fact Doctrine
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is
recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of
the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration
of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
operative fact doctrine is an admission that the
law is unconstitutional.
However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking
the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment
of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the
16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of
officials and employees operate to
contitutionalize the unconstitutional
Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies
the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely
dangerous precedent.
Under the minoritys novel theory, an
unconstitutional law, if already implemented
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by
the Court, can no longer be revoked and its
implementation must be continued despite being
unconstitutional. This view will open the
floodgates to the wanton enactment of
unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their
immediate implementation before the Court can
declare them unconstitutional. This view is an
open invitation to serially violate the
Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the
violation be stopped by the Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As
such, it must be applied as an exception to the
general rule that an unconstitutional law

produces no effects. It can never be invoked to
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional
act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation,[3] the Court stated:
The general rule is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It
produces no rights, imposes no
duties and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect.
It is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative as if it has not been
passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not
required to pay the levy. All levies
paid should be refunded in
accordance with the general civil
code principle against unjust
enrichment. The general rule is
supported by Article 7 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are
repealed only by
subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-
observance shall not be
excused by disuse or
custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a
law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the
former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact,
as an exception to the general
rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies
the effects of an
unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence
of a statute prior to a
determination of
unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the
invalid law. Thus, it was applied to
a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by
105
a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it. (Emphasis
supplied)
The operative fact doctrine never validates or
constitutionalizes an unconstitutional
law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the
unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional,
but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior
to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional
law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the
present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section
10, Article X of the Constitution.However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood
Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity,
such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
the new cities or their issuance of licenses or
execution of contracts, may be recognized as
valid and effective. This does not mean that the
Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain
void. Only the effects of the implementation of
these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed
as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent
people who may have relied on the presumed
validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.
C. Equal Protection Clause
As the Court held in the 18 November 2008
Decision, there is no substantial distinction
between municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that
did not have pending bills. The mere pendency
of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not
affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even
have lower annual income than municipalities
that did not have pending cityhood bills. In
short, the classification criterion − mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress − is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent
fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities.

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill
in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage
of RA 9009. That specific condition will never
happen again. This violates the requirement
that a valid classification must not be limited
to existing conditions only. In fact, the
minority concedes that the conditions (pendency
of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer
be repeated.
Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood
Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing
of their cityhood bills before the end of the
11th Congress as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity
of RA 9009.
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into
cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities
can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision
found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were
written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation
of the equal protection clause.
D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration
Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is
equally divided. Where the
court en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority
cannot be had, the case shall
again be deliberated on, and if
after such deliberation no decision
is reached, the original action
commenced in the court shall be
dismissed; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from
shall stand affirmed; and on all
incidental matters, the petition
or motion shall be
denied. (Emphasis supplied)
The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
A MOTION FOR THE
CONSIDERATION OF A cases were left undecided because there remain
DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF
106
THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A
DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED
UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY
OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN
BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS
THE CASE MAY BE, WHO
ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE
DELIBERATION OF THE
MOTION.
IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A
TIE, THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS
DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis
supplied)
The clear and simple language of the
clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no
further explanation. If the voting of the Court en
banc results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts
prior majority action on the main decision
stands affirmed.[4] This clarificatory Resolution
applies to all cases heard by the Court en
banc, which includes not only cases involving
the constitutionality of a law, but also, as
expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of
the Constitution, all other cases which under
the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc.
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the
second motion for reconsideration necessarily
resulted in the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly
divided, there could be no reversal of the 18
November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot
result in any court order or directive.[5] The
judgment stands in full force.[6]Undeniably, the
6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior
majority en banc Decision of 18 November
2008, as well as the prior majority en
banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second
motion for reconsideration is not the same as a
tie-vote on the main decision where there is no
prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies
that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18
November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009
Resolution, and thus the second motion for
reconsideration must be denied.
Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for
reconsideration did not mean that the present
the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the

Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of
the Court en banc concurred in declaring the
unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood
Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008
Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution,
which were both reached with the
concurrence of a majority of the Court en
banc, are not reconsidered but stand
affirmed.[7] These prior majority actions of
the Court en banc can only be overruled by a
new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a
tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative
action.
The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion
for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18
November 2008 Decision final. In fact, in its
Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second
motion for reconsideration, the Court en
banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be
entertained and stated that entry of judgment be
made in due course.
The dissenting opinion stated that a deadlocked
vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority
does not constitute a rule with precedential
value.[8]
Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-
majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative
action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision
striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18
November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And
assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential
value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which
was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the
respondents second motion for reconsideration,
nevertheless remains binding on the parties.[9]
107
Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution.
Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution does not cripple
Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress
is not prohibited from amending the Local
Government Code itself, as what Congress did
by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of
amending laws comprises an integral part of the
Legislatures law-making power. The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in
the fact that Congress provided an exemption
contrary to the express language of the
Constitution that [n]o x x x city x x x shall be
created except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code. In
other words, Congress exceeded and abused its
law-making power, rendering the challenged
Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for
reconsideration of the 21 December 2009
Decision and REINSTATE the 18 November
2008 Decision
declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood
Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390,
9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405,
9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the
Decision of 21 December 2009.
SO ORDERED.

Conclusion

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution

expressly provides that no x x x city shall be
created x x x except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government
code. This provision can only be interpreted in
one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of
cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local
Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood
Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than
the Local Government Code, provided an
exemption from the increased income
requirement for the creation of cities under
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood

G.R. No. 191475 December 11, 2013
PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, MR.
PATRICIO LIM and MR. DAVID
LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON,PABLITO L. LUNA,
FE B. BADA YOS, GRACE B. MARCOS,
ROGELIO C. NEMIS, ROBERTO B. ILAO,
ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ and CYNTHIA L.
COMANDAO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated July 7, 2009
and Resolution2 dated February 26, 2010 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 105236. The assailed decision
granted the petition for certiorari filed by
respondents Ignacio B. Tagyamon (Tagyamon),
Pablito I. Luna (Luna), Fe B. Badayos
(Badayos), Grace B. Marcos (Marcos), Rogelio
C. Nemis (Nemis), Roberto B. Ilao (Ilao), Anicia
D. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), and Cynthia L.
Comandao (Comandao), the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate
the petitioners with full backwages less the
amounts they received as separation pays. In
case reinstatement would no longer be feasible
because the positions previously held no longer
exist, the private respondent shall pay them
backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pays equal to one (1) month pay, or
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In addition, the
private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the
petitioners moral damages in the amount of
₱20,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.3
The Facts
Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing
Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered
in the Philippines engaged in the business of
manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and
108
rugs.4 Respondents were its regular and
permanent employees, but were affected by
petitioner’s retrenchment and voluntary
retirement programs.
On March 15, 2004,
Tagyamon,5 Luna,6 Badayos,7 Dela Cruz,8 and
Comandao9 received a uniformly worded
Memorandum of dismissal, to wit:
This is to inform you that in view of a slump in
the market demand for our products due to the
un-competitiveness of our price, the company is
constrained to reduce the number of its
workforce. The long-term effects of September
11 and the war in the Middle East have greatly
affected the viability of our business and we are
left with no recourse but to reorganize and
downsize our organizational structure.
We wish to inform you that we are implementing
a retrenchment program in accordance with
Article 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations.
In this connection, we regret to advise you that
you are one of those affected by the said
exercise, and your employment shall be
terminated effective at the close of working
hours on April 15, 2004.
Accordingly, you shall be paid your separation
pay as mandated by law. You will no longer be
required to report for work during the 30-day
notice period in order to give you more time to
look for alternative employment. However, you
will be paid the salary corresponding to the said
period. We shall process your clearance and
other documents and you may claim the
payables due you on March 31, 2004.
Thank you for your services and good luck to
your future endeavors.10
As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that
they were dismissed effective March 31, 2004,
together with fifteen (15) other employees on the
ground of lack of market/slump in
11
demand. PCMC, however, claimed that they
availed of the company’s voluntary retirement
program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their
respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and
Quitclaim.12
Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMC’s
decision to terminate their employment,

respondents filed separate complaints for illegal
dismissal against PCMC, Pacific Carpet
Manufacturing Corporation, Mr. Patricio Lim and
Mr. David Lim. These cases were later
consolidated. Respondents primarily relied on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Philippine
Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v.
Hon. Sto. Tomas (Philcea case),13 as to the
validity of the company’s retrenchment program.
They further explained that PCMC did not, in
fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior to and
subsequent to their termination.14 They also
insisted that their acceptance of separation pay
and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit
of illegal dismissal case.15
PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to
terminate the services of respondents being a
necessary management prerogative. It pointed
out that as an employer, it had no obligation to
keep in its employ more workers than are
necessary for the operation of his business.
Thus, there was an authorized cause for
dismissal. Petitioners also stressed that
respondents belatedly filed their complaint as
they allowed almost three years to pass making
the principle of laches applicable. Considering
that respondents accepted their separation pay
and voluntarily executed deeds of release,
waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the
principle of estoppel on the part of respondents
to question their separation from the service.
Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC
emphasized that they were not dismissed from
employment, but in fact they voluntarily retired
from employment to take advantage of the
company’s program.16
On August 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA) Donato
G. Quinto, Jr. rendered a Decision dismissing
the complaint for lack of merit.17 The LA found
no flaw in respondents’ termination as they
voluntarily opted to retire and were subsequently
re-employed on a contractual basis then
regularized, terminated from employment and
were paid separation benefits.18 In view of
respondents’ belated filing of the complaint, the
LA concluded that such action is a mere
afterthought designed primarily for respondents
to collect more money, taking advantage of the
2006 Supreme Court decision.19
On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) sustained the LA
decision.20 In addition to the LA ratiocination, the
NLRC emphasized the application of the
109
principle of laches for respondents’ inaction for
an unreasonable period.
Still undaunted, respondents elevated the matter
to the CA in a petition for certiorari. In reversing
the earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the
CA refused to apply the principle of laches,
because the case was instituted prior to the
expiration of the prescriptive period set by law
which is four years. It stressed that said principle
cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of
the prescriptive period.21 Citing the Court’s
decision in the Philcea case, the CA applied the
doctrine of stare decisis, in view of the similar
factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao,
Nemis and Marcos, while acknowledging their
voluntary resignation, the CA found the same
not a bar to the illegal dismissal case because
they did so on the mistaken belief that PCMC
was losing money.22 With the foregoing findings,
the CA ordered that respondents be reinstated
with full backwages less the amounts they
received as separation pay. In case of
impossibility of reinstatement, the CA ordered
PCMC to pay respondents backwages and in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to
one month pay or ½ month pay for every year of
service whichever is higher, plus moral
damages.23
The Issues
Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court in
this petition for review on certiorari based on this
ground, to wit:
IN RENDERING ITS DISPUTED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION, THE COURT A QUO HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
a) Res Judicata should not be followed if to
follow it is to perpetuate error (Philippine Trust
Co., and Smith Bell & Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil.
30, 36 (1933). The (Supreme) Court is not
precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if
blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the
sacrifice of justice for technicality (Heirs of
Maura So vs. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082,
January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406)
b) Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as
against public policy. Waivers that represent a
voluntary and reasonable settlement of the
laborer’s claims are legitimate and should be

respected by the Court as the law between the
parties (Gamogamo vs. PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corp., G.R. No. 141707, May 2,
2002; Alcasero vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 129)
Where the persons making the waiver has done
so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as valid and binding undertaking
(Periquet vs. NLRC, 186 SCRA 724
[1990]; Magsalin vs. Coca Cola Bottlers Phils.,
Inc. vs. National Organization of Working Men
(N.O.W.M.], G.R. No. 148492, May 2, 2003).24
Petitioners contend that the Philcea
case decided by this Court and relied upon by
the CA in the assailed decision was based on
erroneous factual findings, inapplicable financial
statement, as well as erroneous analysis of such
financial statements.25 They, thus, implore the
Court to revisit the cited case in order to
dispense with substantial justice.26 They explain
that the Court made conclusions based on
erroneous information. Petitioners also insist
that the doctrines of res judicata and law of the
case are not applicable, considering that this
case does not involve the same parties as
the Philcea case.27 They likewise point out that
not all respondents were involuntarily separated
on the ground of redundancy as some of them
voluntarily availed of the company’s Voluntary
Separation Program.28They further contend that
respondents are guilty not only of laches but also
of estoppel in view of their inaction for an
unreasonable length of time to assail the alleged
illegal dismissal and in voluntarily executing a
release, quitclaim and waiver.29
The Court’s Ruling
Laches
Laches has been defined as the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
or declined to assert it.30 It has been
repeatedly31 held by the Court that:
x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while
prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus,
laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x
Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound
110
by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion
to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of
Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in
upholding the rules of procedure. We said
therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as
a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in
the absence of, and never against, statutory law
or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit
legis. The pertinent positive rules being present
here, they should preempt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-
year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot
be barred by laches. Courts should never apply
the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration
of time limited for the commencement of actions
at law."32
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal
dismissal is one based on an injury to the
complainants’ rights which should be brought
within four years from the time of their dismissal
pursuant to Article 114633 of the Civil Code.
Respondents’ complaint filed almost 3 years
after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well
within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot,
therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure, laches
may be applied only upon the most convincing
evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of
laborers are protected under the social justice
provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil
Code.35
Stare Decisis
The main issue sought to be determined in this
case is the validity of respondents’ dismissal
from employment. Petitioners contend that they
either voluntarily retired from the service or
terminated from employment based on an
authorized cause. The LA and the NLRC are one
in saying that the dismissal was legal. The CA,
however, no longer discussed the validity of the
ground of termination. Rather, it applied the
Court’s decision in the Philcea case where the
same ground was thoroughly discussed. In other
words, the appellate court applied the doctrine
of stare decisis and reached the same
conclusion as the earlier case.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that

principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different.36 Where the
facts are essentially different, however, stare
decisis does not apply, for a perfectly sound
principle as applied to one set of facts might be
entirely inappropriate when a factual variant is
introduced.37
The question, therefore, is whether the factual
circumstances of this present case are
substantially the same as the Philcea case.
We answer in the affirmative.
This case and the Philcea case involve the same
period which is March to April 2004; the issuance
of Memorandum to employees informing them of
the implementation of the cost reduction
program; the implementation of the voluntary
retirement program and retrenchment program,
except that this case involves different
employees; the execution of deeds of release,
waiver, and quitclaim, and the acceptance of
separation pay by the affected employees.
The illegality of the basis of the implementation
of both voluntary retirement and retrenchment
programs of petitioners had been thoroughly
ruled upon by the Court in the Philcea case. It
discussed the requisites of both retrenchment
and redundancy as authorized causes of
termination and that petitioners failed to
substantiate them. In ascertaining the bases of
the termination of employees, it took into
consideration petitioners’ claim of business
losses; the purchase of machinery and
equipment after the termination, the declaration
of cash dividends to stockholders, the hiring of
100 new employees after the retrenchment, and
the authorization of full blast overtime work for
six hours daily. These, said the Court, are
inconsistent with petitioners’ claim that there
was a slump in the demand for its products
which compelled them to implement the
termination programs. In arriving at its
conclusions, the Court took note of petitioners’
net sales, gross and net profits, as well as net
income. The Court, thus, reached the conclusion
that the retrenchment effected by PCMC is
invalid due to a substantive defect. We quote
hereunder the Court’s pronouncement in
the Philcea case, to wit:
Respondents failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence to prove the confluence of
the essential requisites for a valid retrenchment
111
of its employees. We believe that respondents
acted in bad faith in terminating the employment
of the members of petitioner Union.
Contrary to the claim of respondents that the
Corporation was experiencing business losses,
respondent Corporation, in fact, amassed
substantial earnings from 1999 to 2003. It found
no need to appropriate its retained earnings
except on March 23, 2001, when it appropriated
₱60,000,000.00 to increase production capacity.
xxx
xxxx
The evidence on record belies the
₱22,820,151.00 net income loss in 2004 as
projected by the SOLE. On March 29, 2004, the
Board of Directors approved the appropriation of
₱20,000,000.00 to purchase machinery to
improve its facilities, and declared cash
dividends to stockholders at ₱30.00 per share. x
xx
xxxx
It bears stressing that the appropriation of
₱20,000,000.00 by the respondent Corporation
on September 16, 2004 was made barely five
months after the 77 Union members were
dismissed on the ground that respondent
Corporation was suffering from "chronic
depression." Cash dividends were likewise
declared on March 29, 2004, barely two weeks
after it implemented its "retrenchment program."
If respondent Corporation were to be believed
that it had to retrench employees due to the
debilitating slump in demand for its products
resulting in severe losses, how could it justify the
purchase of ₱20,000,000.00 worth of machinery
and equipment? There is likewise no justification
for the hiring of more than 100 new employees,
more than the number of those who were
retrenched, as well as the order authorizing full
blast overtime work for six hours daily. All these
are inconsistent with the intransigent claim that
respondent Corporation was impelled to
retrench its employees precisely because of low
demand for its products and other external
causes.
xxxx
That respondents acted in bad faith in
retrenching the 77 members of petitioner is
buttressed by the fact that Diaz issued his

Memorandum announcing the cost-reduction
program on March 9, 2004, after receipt of the
February 10, 2004 letter of the Union president
which included the proposal for additional
benefits and wage increases to be incorporated
in the CBA for the ensuing year. Petitioner and
its members had no inkling, before February 10,
2004, that respondent Corporation would
terminate their employment. Moreover,
respondent Corporation failed to exhaust all
other means to avoid further losses without
retrenching its employees, such as utilizing the
latter's respective forced vacation leaves.
Respondents also failed to use fair and
reasonable criteria in implementing the
retrenchment program, and instead chose to
retrench 77 of the members of petitioner out of
the dismissed 88 employees. Worse,
respondent Corporation hired new employees
and even rehired the others who had been
"retrenched."
As shown by the SGV & Co. Audit Report, as of
year end December 31, 2003, respondent
Corporation increased its net sales by more than
₱8,000,000.00. Respondents failed to prove that
there was a drastic or severe decrease in the
product sales or that it suffered severe business
losses within an interval of three (3) months from
January 2004 to March 9, 2004 when Diaz
issued said Memorandum. Such claim of a
depressed market as of March 9, 2004 was only
a pretext to retaliate against petitioner Union and
thereby frustrate its demands for more monetary
benefits and, at the same time, justify the
dismissal of the 77 Union members.
xxxx
In contrast, in this case, the retrenchment
effected by respondent Corporation is invalid
due to a substantive defect, non-compliance
with the substantial requirements to effect a valid
retrenchment; it necessarily follows that the
termination of the employment of petitioner
Union's members on such ground is, likewise,
illegal. As such, they (petitioner Union's
members) are entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages.38
We find no reason to depart from the above
conclusions which are based on the Court’s
examination of the evidence presented by the
parties therein. As the respondents here were
similarly situated as the union members in
the Philcea case, and considering that the
questioned dismissal from the service was
112
based on the same grounds under the same
circumstances, there is no need to relitigate the
issues presented herein. In short, we adopt the
Court’s earlier findings that there was no valid
ground to terminate the employees.
A closer look at petitioners’ arguments would
show that they want the Court to re-examine our
decision in the Philcea case allegedly on the
ground that the conclusions therein were based
on erroneous interpretation of the evidence
presented.
Indeed, in Abaria v. National Labor Relations
Commission,39 although the Court was
confronted with the same issue of the legality of
a strike that has already been determined in a
previous case, the Court refused to apply the
doctrine of stare decisis insofar as the award of
backwages was concerned because of the clear
erroneous application of the law. We held
therein that the Court abandons or overrules
precedents whenever it realizes that it erred in
the prior decision.40 The Court’s pronouncement
in that case is instructive:
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon
a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine
of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it
aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the
land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a
new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly
a particular decision that it determines, after re-
examination, to call for a rectification.41
The Abaria case, however, is not applicable in
this case.1âwphi1 There is no reason to
abandon the Court’s ruling in the Philcea case.
Do we apply the aforesaid decision to all the
respondents herein? Again, we answer in the
affirmative.
Just like the union members in the Philcea case,
respondents Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela
Cruz, and Comandao received similarly worded
memorandum of dismissal effective April 15,
2004 based on the same ground of slump in the
market demand for the company’s products. As
such, they are similarly situated in all aspects as
the union members. With respect to respondents
Marcos, Nemis and Ilao, although they applied
for voluntary retirement, the same was not
accepted by petitioner. Instead, it issued notice

of termination dated March 6, 2004 to these
same employees.42 And while it is true that
petitioner paid them separation pay, the
payment was in the nature of separation and not
retirement pay. In other words, payment was
made because of the implementation of the
retrenchment program and not because of
retirement.43 As their application for availing of
the company’s voluntary retirement program
was based on the wrong premise, the intent to
retire was not clearly established, or rather that
the retirement is involuntary. Thus, they shall be
considered discharged from
employment.44 Consequently, they shall be
treated as if they are in the same footing as the
other respondents herein and the union
members in the Philcea case.
Waivers, Releases and Quitclaims
"As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot
bar employees from demanding benefits to
which they are legally entitled or from contesting
the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of
those benefits would not amount to
estoppel."45 To excuse respondents from
complying with the terms of their waivers, they
must locate their case within any of three narrow
grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit
in obtaining the waivers; (2) the consideration
the employer paid is incredible and
unreasonable; or (3) the terms of the waiver are
contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.46The
instant case falls under the first situation.
As the ground for termination of employment
was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal as
the employees’ consent had been vitiated by
mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor
upon quitclaims and releases by employees
pressured into signing by unscrupulous
employers minded to evade legal
responsibilities.47 The circumstances show that
petitioner’s misrepresentation led its employees,
specifically respondents herein, to believe that
the company was suffering losses which
necessitated the implementation of the voluntary
retirement and retrenchment programs, and
eventually the execution of the deeds of release,
waiver and quitclaim.48
It can safely be concluded that economic
necessity constrained respondents to accept
petitioners’ monetary offer and sign the deeds of
release, waiver and quitclaim. That respondents
113
are supervisors and not rank-and-file employees
does not make them less susceptible to financial
offers, faced as they were with the prospect of
unemployment. The Court has allowed
supervisory employees to seek payment of
benefits and a manager to sue for illegal
dismissal even though, for a consideration, they
executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their
employers from liability.49
x x x There is no nexus between intelligence, or
even the position which the employee held in the
company when it concerns the pressure which
the employer may exert upon the free will of the
employee who is asked to sign a release and
quitclaim. A lowly employee or a sales manager,
as in the present case, who is confronted with
the same dilemma of whether [to sign] a release
and quitclaim and accept what the company
offers them, or [to refuse] to sign and walk out
without receiving anything, may do succumb to
the same pressure, being very well aware that it
is going to take quite a while before he can
recover whatever he is entitled to, because it is
only after a protracted legal battle starting from
the labor arbiter level, all the way to this Court,
can he receive anything at all. The Court
understands that such a risk of not receiving
anything whatsoever, coupled with the
probability of not immediately getting any gainful
employment or means of livelihood in the
meantime, constitutes enough pressure upon
anyone who is asked to sign a release and
quitclaim in exchange of some amount of money
which may be way below what he may be
entitled to based on company practice and policy
or by law.50
The amounts already received by respondents
as consideration for signing the releases and
quitclaims should be deducted from their
respective monetary awards.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 7, 2009 and Resolution
dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
105236 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 102737. August 21, 1996]
FRANCISCO A. VELOSO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AGLALOMA B.
ESCARIO, assisted by her husband
GREGORIO L. ESCARIO, the REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
This petition for review assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1991, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
appellant.[1]
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner Francisco Veloso was the owner of a
parcel of land situated in the district of Tondo,
Manila, with an area of one hundred seventy
seven (177) square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 49138 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Manila.[2] The title was
registered in the name of Francisco A. Veloso,
single,[3] on October 4, 1957.[4] The said title was
subsequently canceled and a new one, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 180685, was issued in the
name of Aglaloma B. Escario, married to
Gregorio L. Escario, on May 24, 1988.[5]
On August 24, 1988, petitioner Veloso filed an
action for annulment of documents,
reconveyance of property with damages and
preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 88-45926, was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 45, Manila. Petitioner alleged
therein that he was the absolute owner of the
subject property and he never authorized
anybody, not even his wife, to sell it. He alleged
that he was in possession of the title but when
his wife, Irma, left for abroad, he found out that
his copy was missing. He then verified with the
Registry of Deeds of Manila and there he
discovered that his title was already canceled in
favor of defendant Aglaloma Escario. The
transfer of property was supported by a General
Power of Attorney[6] dated November 29, 1985
and Deed of Absolute Sale, dated November 2,
1987, executed by Irma Veloso, wife of the
petitioner and appearing as his attorney-in-fact,
114
and defendant Aglaloma Escario.[7] Petitioner
Veloso, however, denied having executed the
power of attorney and alleged that his signature
was falsified. He also denied having seen or
even known Rosemarie Reyes and Imelda
Santos, the supposed witnesses in the
execution of the power of attorney. He
vehemently denied having met or transacted
with the defendant. Thus, he contended that the
sale of the property, and the subsequent transfer
thereof, were null and void. Petitioner Veloso,
therefore, prayed that a temporary restraining
order be issued to prevent the transfer of the
subject property; that the General Power of
Attorney, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 180685 be
annulled; and the subject property be
reconveyed to him.
Defendant Aglaloma Escario in her answer
alleged that she was a buyer in good faith and
denied any knowledge of the alleged
irregularity. She allegedly relied on the general
power of attorney of Irma Veloso which was
sufficient in form and substance and was duly
notarized. She contended that plaintiff (herein
petitioner), had no cause of action against her. In
seeking for the declaration of nullity of the
documents, the real party in interest was Irma
Veloso, the wife of the plaintiff. She should have
been impleaded in the case. In fact, Plaintiffs
cause of action should have been against his
wife, Irma. Consequently, defendant Escario
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the
payment to her of damages.[8]
Pre-trial was conducted. The sole issue to be
resolved by the trial court was whether or not
there was a valid sale of the subject property.[9]
During the trial, plaintiff (herein petitioner)
Francisco Veloso testified that he acquired the
subject property from the Philippine Building
Corporation, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale
dated October 1, 1957.[10] He married Irma
Lazatin on January 20, 1962.[11] Hence, the
property did not belong to their conjugal
partnership. Plaintiff further asserted that he did
not sign the power of attorney and as proof that
his signature was falsified, he presented Allied
Bank Checks Nos. 16634640, 16634641 and
16634643, which allegedly bore his genuine
signature.
Witness for the plaintiff Atty. Julian G. Tubig
denied any participation in the execution of the
general power of attorney. He attested that he

did not sign thereon, and the same was never
entered in his Notarial Register on November
29, 1985.
In the decision of the trial court dated March 9,
1990,[12] defendant Aglaloma Escaro was
adjudged the lawful owner of the property as she
was deemed an innocent purchaser for
value. The assailed general power of attorney
was held to be valid and sufficient for the
purpose. The trial court ruled that there was no
need for a special power of attorney when the
special power was already mentioned in the
general one. It also declared that plaintiff failed
to substantiate his allegation of fraud. The court
also stressed that plaintiff was not entirely
blameless for although he admitted to be the
only person who had access to the title and other
important documents, his wife was still able to
possess the copy. Citing Section 55 of Act 496,
the court held that Irmas possession and
production of the certificate of title was deemed
a conclusive authority from the plaintiff to the
Register of Deeds to enter a new
certificate.Then applying the principle of
equitable estoppel, plaintiff was held to bear the
loss for it was he who made the wrong
possible. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds for the
defendants and against plaintiff-
a. declaring that there was a valid sale of the
subject property in favor of the defendant;
b. denying all other claims of the parties for want
of legal and factual basis.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner Veloso
filed his appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
respondent court affirmed in toto the findings of
the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review before us.
This petition for review was initially dismissed for
failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy
of the petition on the counsel for private
respondent.[13] A motion for reconsideration of
the resolution was filed but it was denied in a
resolution dated March 30, 1992.[14] A second
motion for reconsideration was filed and in a
resolution dated Aug. 3, 1992, the motion was
115
granted and the petition for review was
reinstated.[15]
A supplemental petition was filed on October 9,
1992 with the following assignment of errors:
I
The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in
not finding that the forgery of the power of
attorney (Exh. C) had been adequately proven,
despite the preponderant evidence, and in doing
so, it has so far departed from the applicable
provisions of law and the decisions of this
Honorable Court, as to warrant the grant of this
petition for review on certiorari.
II
There are principles of justice and equity that
warrant a review of the decision.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court which misapplied the
principle of equitable estoppel since the
petitioner did not fail in his duty of observing due
diligence in the safekeeping of the title to the
property.
We find petitioners contentions not meritorious.
An examination of the records showed that the
assailed power of attorney was valid and regular
on its face. It was notarized and as such, it
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution. While it is true
that it was denominated as a general power of
attorney, a perusal thereof revealed that it stated
an authority to sell, to wit:
2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or
otherwise hypothecate lands, tenements and
hereditaments or other forms of real property,
more specifically TCT No. 49138, upon such
terms and conditions and under such covenants
as my said attorney shall deem fit and proper.[16]
Thus, there was no need to execute a separate
and special power of attorney since the general
power of attorney had expressly authorized the
agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the
subject property. The special power of attorney
can be included in the general power when it is

specified therein the act or transaction for which
the special power is required.
The general power of attorney was accepted by
the Register of Deeds when the title to the
subject property was canceled and transferred in
the name of private respondent. In LRC
Consulta No. 123, Register of Deeds of Albay,
Nov. 10, 1956, it stated that:
Whether the instrument be denominated as
general power of attorney or special power of
attorney, what matters is the extent of the power
or powers contemplated upon the agent or
attorney in fact. If the power is couched in
general terms, then such power cannot go
beyond acts of administration. However, where
the power to sell is specific, it not being merely
implied, much less couched in general terms,
there can not be any doubt that the attorney in
fact may execute a valid sale. An instrument may
be captioned as special power of attorney but if
the powers granted are couched in general
terms without mentioning any specific power to
sell or mortgage or to do other specific acts of
strict dominion, then in that case only acts of
administration may be deemed conferred.
Petitioner contends that his signature on the
power of attorney was falsified. He also alleges
that the same was not duly notarized for as
testified by Atty. Tubig himself, he did not sign
thereon nor was it ever recorded in his notarial
register. To bolster his argument, petitioner had
presented checks, marriage certificate and his
residence certificate to prove his alleged
genuine signature which when compared to the
signature in the power of attorney, showed some
difference.
We found, however, that the basis presented by
the petitioner was inadequate to sustain his
allegation of forgery. Mere variance of the
signatures cannot be considered as conclusive
proof that the same were forged. Forgery cannot
be presumed.[17] Petitioner, however, failed to
prove his allegation and simply relied on the
apparent difference of the signatures. His denial
had not established that the signature on the
power of attorney was not his.
We agree with the conclusion of the lower court
that private respondent was an innocent
purchaser for value. Respondent Aglaloma
relied on the power of attorney presented by
petitioners wife, Irma. Being the wife of the
owner and having with her the title of the
116
property, there was no reason for the private
respondent not to believe in her
authority. Moreover, the power of attorney was
notarized and as such, carried with it the
presumption of its due execution. Thus, having
had no inkling on any irregularity and having no
participation thereof, private respondent was a
buyer in good faith. It has been consistently held
that a purchaser in good faith is one who buys
property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in such
property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he
has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property.[18]
Documents acknowledged before a notary
public have the evidentiary weight with respect
to their due execution. The questioned power of
attorney and deed of sale, were notarized and
therefore, presumed to be valid and duly
executed. Atty. Tubig denied having notarized
the said documents and alleged that his
signature had also been falsified. He presented
samples of his signature to prove his
contention. Forgery should be proved by clear
and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it
has the burden of proving the same. Just like the
petitioner, witness Atty. Tubig merely pointed out
that his signature was different from that in the
power of attorney and deed of sale. There had
never been an accurate examination of the
signature, even that of the petitioner. To
determine forgery, it was held in Cesar vs.
Sandiganbayan[19] (quoting Osborn, The
Problem of Proof) that:
The process of identification, therefore, must
include the determination of the extent, kind, and
significance of this resemblance as well as of the
variation. It then becomes necessary to
determine whether the variation is due to the
operation of a different personality, or is only the
expected and inevitable variation found in the
genuine writing of the same writer. It is also
necessary to decide whether the resemblance is
the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or is
the habitual and characteristic resemblance
which naturally appears in a genuine
writing. When these two questions are correctly
answered the whole problem of identification is
solved.
Even granting for the sake of argument, that the
petitioners signature was falsified and
consequently, the power of attorney and the
deed of sale were null and void, such fact would
 117
not revoke the title subsequently issued in favor
of private respondent Aglaloma. In the case of
Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals,[20] it was
held, viz.:

The right of an innocent purchaser for value

must be respected and protected, even if the
seller obtained his title through fraud. The
remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an
action for damages against those who caused or
employed the fraud, and if the latter are
insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the
Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages
against the Assurance Fund.

Finally, the trial court did not err in applying

equitable estoppel in this case. The principle of
equitable estoppel states that where one or two
innocent persons must suffer a loss, he who by
his conduct made the loss possible must bear
it. From the evidence adduced, it should be the
petitioner who should bear the loss. As the
court a quo found:

Besides, the records of this case disclosed that

the plaintiff is not entirely free from blame. He
admitted that he is the sole person who has
access to TCT No. 49138 and other documents
appertaining thereto (TSN, May 23, 1989, pp. 7-
12). However, the fact remains that the
Certificate of Title, as well as other documents
necessary for the transfer of title were in the
possession of plaintiffs wife, Irma L. Veloso,
consequently leaving no doubt or any suspicion
on the part of the defendant as to her
authority. Under Section 55 of Act 496, as
amended, Irmas possession and production of
the Certificate of Title to defendant operated as
conclusive authority from the plaintiff to the
Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate.[21]

Considering the foregoing premises, We found

no error in the appreciation of facts and
application of law by the lower court that will
warrant the reversal or modification of the
appealed decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148126. November 10, 2003]
GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA,
AURORA M. BONDOC and RONNIE C.
FERNANDEZ, and their Respective
Spouses, petitioners, vs. Spouses ANTONIO
C. CHAVEZ and NOEMI MARCOS-CHAVEZ
and CARLITA C. CHAVEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Stare decisis simply means that a judgment
reached in one case should be applied to
successive ones in which the facts are
substantially identical, even though the parties
may be different. Like cases ought to be decided
alike.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May
9, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR SP No. 58329. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment dated March 29,
2000 of Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles City is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
judgment entered in favor of the petitioners,
ordering the respondents and all persons
claiming rights under them to vacate from the
subject lots and to remove their houses and/or
any other structures or constructions thereon.[3]
The overturned Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch
56,[4] affirmed in toto the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Angeles City, Branch II.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA
in this wise:
In a Complaint for Illegal Detainer with Damages
filed on October 15, 1998, the [respondents]
alleged that they are the owners of four (4)
parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 164, 165,
166, and 167 of the Cadastral Survey of Angeles
City, and covered, respectively, by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 83247, 83246, 83248
and 83249, all issued by the Register of Deeds
of Angeles City. These four (4) parcels of land
118
have been consolidated and subdivided into
several blocks and lots, and are now collectively
designated as Bagong Silang Phase III-C. By
mere permission and tolerance of the
[respondents], the [petitioners] have occupied
and erected their homes on four (4) of the said
lots, as follows:
George T. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 14
Carlos N. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 13
Aurora M. Bondoc and husband = Block 2, Lot 4
Ronnie C. Hernandez and wife = Block 3, Lot 5
All the [petitioners] are members of
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners
Association, Inc., with office address
at Cutud, Angeles City. The [respondents]
allowed the [petitioners] and other members of
the said homeowners association to continue
occupying the subject lots and ultimately to
acquire ownership of the lots occupied, in
consideration of a certain amount to be paid to
the [respondents] as equity.
The [respondents] further alleged that the other
members of the said homeowners association
paid to the [respondents] their respective equity
for their right to continue occupying and
ultimately acquiring ownership of the occupied
lots. However, notwithstanding repeated
demands made upon the [petitioners], they have
refused and failed without any justifiable ground
to pay their respective equity. In view of such
failure to pay, the [petitioners] have forfeited
their right to continue occupying the lots in
question. Formal demand letters were then sent
by registered mail to the [petitioners], wherein
they were given a period of thirty (30) days from
receipt within which to vacate and remove their
houses from the subject lots. The period given to
the [petitioners] lapsed on April 11, 1998, but up
to the present time, the [petitioners] refused and
failed without any justifiable reason or ground to
vacate and remove their houses from the said
lots.
The [respondents] then prayed in their
Complaint that the [petitioners] be ordered to
vacate and remove their houses from the lots
currently occupied; that each of the [petitioners]
be ordered to pay the [respondents] P1,000.00
a month as reasonable rental for the use and
occupation of the lots starting from April 11, 1998
until they have finally vacated and removed their

houses from said lots; and that the [petitioners]
jointly and severally pay the [respondents]
P25,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, P2,000.00 as appearance fee per
hearing, exemplary damages, and the costs of
the suit.
In their answer with compulsory counter-claim
filed on November 3, 1998, the [petitioners]
countered that the [respondents] have no cause
of action to institute the present action,
considering that the properties in question are
under the community mortgage program
implemented by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation. Moreover, the [petitioners]
claimed that they are lawful tenants of the
premises, and that they have been paying their
equity to their originator, the Urban Land and
Development Foundation[,] Inc. However, they
were not issued the corresponding receipts
evidencing payment and a copy of their contract.
The [petitioners] further averred that they were
willing to continue paying their equity until the
same shall have been fully paid, but their
originator, without justifiable reason, refused to
accept the tender of payment made by them.
The [petitioners] subsequently agreed with their
originator that the payment of equity should be
continued only upon the release of a Purchase
Commitment Line (PCL).
In addition, the [petitioners] alleged that they are
qualified beneficiaries under Republic Act No.
7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992; hence,
they cannot be summarily evicted and their
dwelling houses demolished unless and until
they have been relocated. According to the
[petitioners], they are also builders in good faith
and should be indemnified for the improvements
they constructed on the properties in question.
The [petitioners] prayed in their answer that the
complaint be dismissed; that they be declared
lawful tenants and qualified beneficiaries under
R.A. 7279; that the [respondents] be ordered to
sell the lots in question to them, and to pay
attorneys fees and the costs of suit.
After the pre-trial conference, both parties
submitted their position papers. On September
15, 1999, MTC Branch II of Angeles City
rendered a decision dismissing both the
[respondents] complaint and the [petitioners]
counter-claim, on the ground that the filing of
an ejectment case based on the alleged violation
of the parties agreement which has not yet been
119
rescinded is premature, and that it is beyond the
competence of the said court to act on the case,
as rescission or specific performance is beyond
the jurisdiction of the said court.
The [respondents] appealed such adverse
judgment to the RTC of Angeles City, which
appeal was raffled to Branch 56 of the said court.
On March 29, 2000, RTC Branch 56 of Angeles
City rendered a decision affirming in toto the
MTC judgment.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the right of petitioners to
continue occupying the subject properties
hinged on their continued payment of the agreed
amount as equity.[7] Even after formal letters of
demand to vacate the premises had been sent
to them, however, they still did not make any
effort to pay their equity to protect their right to
continue occupying those lots. Thus, the
appellate court ruled that their failure to pay
made their occupancy unlawful, in consequence
of which they became subject to
an ejectment suit.
The CA rejected the contention of petitioners
that they were protected by RA 7279. According
to the appellate court, there was no express
declaration by the local government unit that the
parcels of land owned by respondents were to
be used for socialized housing. Neither was
there proof of the allegation that they had
applied therefor under the Community Mortgage
Program of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation under Section 31 of RA
7279. Besides, even granting that petitioners
were protected under RA 7279, they were still
liable to pay amortization or face eviction.
Likewise debunked was the allegation of
petitioners that respondents were not the real
parties in interest. Being the owners of the lots
occupied by the former, the latter had a material
interest in the suit and stood to be benefited or
injured by any judgment affecting those parcels
of land.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:

I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and
setting aside the Decisions of the Municipal Trial
Court, Branch II and of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56 both of Angeles City[;]
II. Whether or not the Honorable Municipal Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the case;
III. Whether or not the non-inclusion of
the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association
Inc., is fatal to respondents[] cause of action[;]
IV. Whether or not ejectment is proper in the
case at bar;
V. Whether or not the absence of contractual
relation[s] between the respondents and the
petitioners bar[s] the filing of any action by the
respondents against the petitioner.[9]
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether
unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve
this case. If it is, then the MTC indeed had
jurisdiction over the case, and the CA was
correct in overturning the RTCs ruling that the
MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Unlawful Detainer
The CA ruled that petitioners possession or
occupancy of the subject premises was by mere
tolerance of respondents. Hence, once
petitioners failed to pay the agreed amount as
equity, their right to continue occupying the lots
was lost.
We disagree. Contradictory were the statements
of the appellate court that, on the one hand,
there was no contract between the parties; and
yet, on the other, that petitioners failed to pay
the agreed equity. The fact that the CA found
that there was failure to pay the equity was an
indication of an agreement. To be sure,
petitioners possession of the subject premises
was not by mere tolerance of respondents.
In the Complaint[10] of respondents, filed before
Branch II of
120
the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, they
themselves alleged the presence of an
agreement between the parties as follows:
10. That in consideration of a certain amount to
be paid to the [respondents] by each of the
[petitioners] as equity for their right to continue
occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
the lots that they occupy, the said homeowners
association has made arrangements with the
[respondents] to allow the [petitioners] and other
members of the said homeowners association to
continue occupying and ultimately acquire
ownership of the lots that they occupy[.][11]
Further, in the Special Power of
Attorney[12] annexed to their Complaint, they
constituted and appointed Teodorico B.
Sanchez and/or Arturo M. Yadan as their
attorneys-in-fact to do, among others, the
following:
1. To collect and receive any amount or amounts
as equity for the sale thereof to them from the
occupants or any other interested buyer or
buyers of any portion or portions of the following-
described parcels of land:
xxx xxx xxx
of which we are the absolute and exclusive
owners, and which comprise the parcels of land
being acquired by the members or beneficiaries
of the BAGONG SILANG PHASE III-C
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
at Brgy. Cutud, Angeles City[.][13]
Based on the admissions of respondents
themselves, they entered into an agreement with
petitioners. Necessarily, the latters occupancy of
the lots in question was not based merely on
the formers tolerance or permission. Thus,
petitioners were not necessarily bound by an
implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment would
have become proper.
The MTCs findings of fact on this point are
instructive:
About the only thing that the parties have met on
a common ground is that: [Respondents] have
entered into an arrangement/agreement
with Bagong Silang Homeowners Association,
Inc. that called for the payment of certain
amounts as equity for [petitioners] right to
continue occupying the lots with the end in view

of eventually becoming the owners thereof, that
pursuant to such agreement [petitioners] have
paid certain amounts as acquisition fees or as
equity but later discontinued making payments
in view of the non-issuance of the so-called
purchase commitment line/loan, and as a
consequence, [respondents] are now accusing
[petitioners] for violating the agreement and on
the basis of such breach of the agreement by
[petitioners], demands for the latter to vacate the
lots were made by [respondents].[14]
When respondents alleged that
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners
Association made arrangements with them to
allow petitioners and other members of the
association to continue to occupy and ultimately
to acquire ownership of the lots in question,
respondents explicitly admitted that a contract
had indeed been entered into. The eventual
transfer of ownership of real property evidenced
that obligation. What is clear is that in their
Complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners
had violated the stipulations of their agreement
as follows:
11. That the other members of
the Ba[g]ong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners
Association, Inc., paid to the [respondents] their
respective equity for their right to continue
occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
the lots that they occupy, but notwithstanding
repeated demands made on them, up to the
present time, the [petitioners] have refused and
failed without any justifiable ground or reason to
pay their respective equity to the [respondents],
and, in view of such refusal and failure, the
[petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue
occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
the lots that they occupy[.][15]
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied any
breach on their part and argued that the principal
issue was one of interpretation, enforcement
and/or rescission of the contract. Under these
circumstances, proof of violation of the
provisions of the contract is a condition
precedent to resolution or rescission.[16] The
contract can be declared rescinded only when its
nature has been clarified and the eventual
violation thereof, if any, has been
established. Upon such rescission, in turn,
hinges a pronouncement that the possession of
the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic
issue is not possession but interpretation,
enforcement and/or rescission of the contract --
121
a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court to hear and determine.
An allegation of a violation of a contract or
agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by
the presentation of competent evidence, upon
which an MTC judge might make a finding to that
effect. But certainly, that court cannot declare
and hold that the contract is rescinded, as such
power is vested in the RTC.[17]
The rescission of the contract is the basis of, and
therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality
of a partys possession of a piece of
realty.[18] Without judicial intervention and
determination, even a stipulation entitling one
party to take possession of the land and building
in case the other party violates the contract
cannot confer upon the former the right to take
possession thereof, if that move is objected to.[19]
To be sure, the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint.[20] Thus, in ascertaining whether or
not an action is one for unlawful detainer falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior
courts, the averments of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought should be
examined.
Also, as correctly pleaded by petitioners, a
similar case had been decided by the CA in CA-
GR SP No. 58679, in which it ruled that the
proper action should have been a complaint for
rescission or specific performance, not for
illegal detainer. In that case, the same plaintiffs
filed the same charges against a different but
similarly situated set of defendants.
The appellate court ruled therein that there was
an existing agreement or contract that
determined the nature of the parties
relationship.[21] Thus, it held that the proper
action should have been for rescission of
contract or specific performance, not
unlawful detainer.[22] When the CA Decision was
elevated, this Court denied the appeal for failure
to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the appellate court. Thereafter, the
Decision became final and executory on April
23, 2002.[23]
Said the appellate court in the previous case:
Inasmuch as the relationship existing between
the parties is not a lessor-lessee relationship but
one that emanated from the agreement between
 122
appellants and the Urban Land and
Development Foundation, Inc., the so-called
originator of the Bagong Silang Homeowners
Association, Inc., the relief being sought then by
appellants appears to be improper. If ever there
was no payment of equity as provided for under
the said agreement, the same cannot be
considered as non-payment of rentals. Thus, it
cannot be a sufficient basis for filing
an ejectment case against appellees, the proper
remedy being an action for rescission of contract
or specific performance.[24]

We stress that when a court has laid down a

principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it
to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same.[25] Stare decisis et
non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties may be different.[26] It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike.[27]

Having ruled that the MTC had indeed no

jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case in the
first place, we see no more need to address the
other issues raised by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is

hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals
is OVERTURNED. Consequently, the Decisions
of the MTC and the RTC of Angeles City
are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.