People v.
Hipona SPO1 Bladimir Agbalog of the local police thus called for a meeting of AAA’s
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Michael A. Hipona (appellant) was convicted by Decision of September 10,
20021 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18 with
"Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" [sic]. His conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals by Decision of January 28, 2008. 2
The Second Amended Information charged appellant together with Romulo
Seva, Jr. and one John Doe with Robbery with Rape and Homicide as follows:
That on or about June 12, 2000 at 1:00 o’clock dawn at District 3, Isla Copa,
Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together, and mutually helping one another, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the offended party (AAA) who is the Aunt of accused Michael
A. Hipona, she being the younger sister of the accused’s mother and against
her will, that on occasion of the said rape, accused, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, and dwelling, with intent to kill and
pursuant to their conspiracy, choked and strangulated said AAA which
strangulation resulted to the victim’s untimely death. That on the said occasion
the victim’s brown bag worth P3,800.00; cash money in the amount of no less
than P5,000.00; and gold necklace were stolen by all accused but the gold
necklace was later on recovered and confiscated in the person of accused
Michael A. Hipona.3 (emphasis and underscoring in the original)
The following facts are not disputed.
AAA4 was found dead on the morning of June 12, 2000 in her house in Isla
Copa, Consolation, Cagayan de Oro City. She was raped, physically
manhandled and strangled, which eventually led to her death. Her furniture
and belongings were found strewn on the floor. AAA’s necklace with two heart-
shaped pendants bearing her initials and handbag were likewise missing.
Upon investigation, the local police discovered a hole bored into the lawanit
wall of the comfort room inside AAA’s house, big enough for a person of
medium build to enter. The main electrical switch behind a "shower curtain"
located at the "back room" was turned off, drawing the police to infer that the
perpetrator is familiar with the layout of AAA’s house.
relatives during which AAA’s sister BBB, who is appellant’s mother, declared
that her son-appellant had told her that "Mama, I’m sorry, I did it because I did
not have the money," and he was thus apologizing for AAA’s death. BBB
executed an affidavit affirming appellant’s confession. 5
On the basis of BBB’s information, the police arrested appellant on June 13,
2000 or the day after the commission of the crime. He was at the time wearing
AAA’s missing necklace. When on even date he was presented to the media
and his relatives, appellant apologized but qualified his participation in the
crime, claiming that he only acted as a look-out, and attributed the crime to his
co-accused Romulo B. Seva, Jr. (Seva) alias "Gerpacs" and a certain
"Reypacs."
A day after his arrest or on June 14, 2000, appellant in an interview which was
broadcasted, when asked by a radio reporter "Why did you do it to your aunt?,"
answered "Because of my friends and peers." When pressed if he was
intoxicated or was on drugs when he "did it," appellant answered that he did it
because of his friends and of poverty.
Appellant’s co-accused Seva was later arrested on July 9, 2000, while
"Reypacs" remained at large.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty while Seva refused to enter a plea,
hence, the trial court entered a "not guilty" plea on his behalf.
Post mortem examination of AAA revealed the following findings:
Rigor mortis, generalized, Livor mortis, back, buttocks, flanks, posterior aspect
of neck and extremities (violaceous).
Face, markedly livid. Nailbeds, cyanotic. With extensive bilateral
subconjunctival hemorrhages and injections. Petecchial hemorrhages are
likewise, noted on the face and upper parts of neck.
ABRASIONS, with fibrin: curvilinear; three (3) in number; measuring 1.1x0.4
cms., 0.8x0.3 cms., and 0.6x0.1 cm.; within an area of 2.8x1.1 cms. at the left
side of the neck, antero-lateral aspect.
HEMATOMAS, violaceous; hemispherical in shapes, highly characteristic of
bite marks: 3.5 x 0.4 cms. and 4.1x1.4 cms.; located at the right lower buccal
region, lateral and medial aspects, respectively.
SOFT TISSUE DEFECT, with irregular edges; 2.5 x 2.7 cms.; left thigh,
distal 3rd, medial aspect; involving only the skin and underlying adipose
tissues; with an approximate depth of 1.6 cms.
ABRASIONS, with fibrin, curvilinear in shapes; 0.6x0.3 cm. and 0.5x0.3cm.,
right upper eyelid; 0.4x0.2 cms. and 0.3x 0.2 cms, right upper arm, distal 3rd,
medial aspect; 0.5x0.3 cm., right forearm, proximal 3rd, medial aspect;
0.7x0.3 cm., left elbow; 0.5x0.2 cm., left forearm, middle 3rd, posterior
aspect.
HEMATOMA, violaceous: 2.2x2.5 cms., right upper arm, middle 3rd, medial
aspect
DEPRESSED FRACTURE, body of thyroid cartilage, lateral aspects,
bilateral.
PETECCHIAL HEMORRHAGES, subpleural, bilateral, and sub-epicardial.
GENITAL FINDINGS:
Subject is menstruating. Pubic hairs, fully grown, abundant. Labiae majora and minora,
both coaptated. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish, smooth. Hymen, short, thin with
COMPLETE, FRESH HYMENAL LACERATION (with fibrin and fresh reddish soft blood
clot) at 6:00 o’clock position, and extending to the posterior aspect of vestibular mucosa
up to the area of fourchette. Hymenal orifice originally annular, admits a glass tube of
2.5 cms. diameter with moderate resistance. Vaginal rugosities, prominent. Cervix, firm.
Uterus, small.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by strangulation (manual).
REMARKS: Genital injury noted, age of which is compatible with sexual intercourse(s)
with man/men on or about June 11-12 2000.6 (underscoring supplied)
Albeit appellant’s mother BBB refused to take the witness stand, SPO1 Agbalog and
Consuelo Maravilla, another relative of appellant, testified on BBB’s declaration given
during the meeting of relatives.
Appellant refused to present evidence on his behalf while Seva presented evidence to
controvert the evidence on his alleged participation in the crime.
By Decision of September 10, 2002, the trial court, after considering
circumstantial evidence, viz:
Based on the foregoing circumstances, specially of his failure to explain why
he was in possession of victim’s stolen necklace with pendants, plus his
confession to the media in the presence of his relatives, and to another radio
reporter "live-on-the-air" about a day after his arrest, sealed his destiny to
perdition and points to a conclusion beyond moral certainty that his hands
were soiled and sullied by blood of his own Aunt.7 (underscoring supplied),
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of "Rape with Homicide (and
Robbery)." [sic]. It acquitted Seva. Thus the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused MICHAEL HIPONA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of a special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
(and Robbery) punishable under Articles 266-A and 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 8353, and after taking into account the generic aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, without a mitigating circumstance, accused MICHAEL
HIPONA is hereby sentenced and SO ORDERED to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH by lethal injection, plus the accessory penalties. He is hereby SO ORDERED
to pay the heirs the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, as indemnity.
Another One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages. In order to
further give accused Michael Hipona a lesson that would serve as a warning to others,
he is also directed and SO ORDERED to pay another Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos, as exemplary damages.
For failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
Romulo Seva, Jr., beyond reasonable doubt, it is SO ORDERED that he
should be acquitted and it is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, and
is hereby released from custody unless detained for other legal ground.
Pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. 7659, and Section 10 of Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court, let the entire record be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review."8 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
On elevation of the records of the case, the Court, following People v. Mateo,9
referred the same to the Court of Appeals.
Appellant maintains that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 10
As stated early on, the Court of Appeals sustained appellant’s conviction. It,
however, modified the penalty11 imposed, and the amount of damages
awarded by the trial court. Thus the appellate court, by the challenged
Decision of January 28, 2008, disposed:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. That the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua;
2. That appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of AAA the
following: the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as
moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.12 (underscoring supplied)
The records of the case were elevated to this Court in view of the Notice of
Appeal filed by appellant. Both the People and appellant manifested that they
were no longer filing any supplemental briefs.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
For circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.13
The confluence of the following established facts and circumstances sustains
the appellate court’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction: First, appellant was
frequently visiting AAA prior to her death, hence, his familiarity with the layout
of the house; second, appellant admitted to his relatives and the media that
he was present during commission of the crime, albeit only as a look-out; third,
appellant was in possession of AAA’s necklace at the time he was arrested;
and fourth, appellant extrajudicially confessed to the radio reporter that he
committed the crime due to his peers and because of poverty.
Appellant argues that he should only be held liable for robbery and not for the
complex crime of "Rape with Homicide (and Robbery)" [sic]. He cites the
testimony of prosecution witness Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, DNA expert of the
National Bureau of Investigation, that she found the vaginal smears taken from
AAA to be negative of appellant’s DNA.
Appellant’s argument fails. Presence of spermatozoa is not essential in finding
that rape was committed, the important consideration being not the emission
of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. 14 As
underlined above, the post-mortem examination of AAA’s body revealed fresh
hymenal lacerations which are consistent with findings of rape.
Not only does appellant’s conviction rest on an unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence. It rests also on his unbridled admission to the media.
People v. Andan instructs:
Appellant’s confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by
the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.15 (underscoring
supplied)
Appellant argues, however, that the questions posed to him by the radio
broadcaster were vague for the latter did not specify what crime was being
referred to when he questioned appellant. But, as the appellate court posited,
appellant should have qualified his answer during the interview if indeed there
was a need. Besides, he had the opportunity to clarify his answer to the
interview during the trial. But, as stated earlier, he opted not to take the witness
stand.1avvphi1
The Court gathers, however, that from the evidence for the prosecution,
robbery was the main intent of appellant, and AAA’s death resulted by reason
of or on the occasion thereof. Following Article 294(1) 16 and Article 62(1)117
of the Revised Penal Code, rape should have been appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance instead.18
A word on the amount of exemplary damages awarded. As the Court finds the
award of ₱100,000 exemplary damages excessive, it reduces it to ₱25,000,
in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, the Decision of January 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant, Michael A. Hipona is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. He is accordingly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. And the award of exemplary damages is reduced to ₱25,000. In all
other respects, the Decision is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
People v. Evangelio
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00109, affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellant Joseph
Evangelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape
in Criminal Case No. 2001-12-773.
Appellant Joseph Evangelio (Joseph), accused Edgar Evangelio y Gallo
(Edgar), Atilano Agaton y Obico (Atilano) and Noel Malpas y Garcia (Noel) are
charged with the crime of Robbery with Rape in an Information, which reads:
The undersigned City Prosecutor of the City of Tacloban accuses EDGAR
EVANGELIO y GALLO, JOSEPH EVANGELIO, ATILANO AGATON y
OBICO, and NOEL MALPAS y GARCIA of the crime of Robbery with Rape,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 2001, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
each other, with intent to gain and armed with a handgun and deadly/bladed
weapons forcibly enter the inhabited house/residence of BBB and while inside,
by means of violence and intimidation using said arms on the latter and the
other occupants therein, and without the consent of their owners did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, and carry away from said
residence the following personal properties belonging to:
(a) BBB:
*Two Saudi-gold necklace with pendant with a combined value of ₱25,000 more or
less;
* Saudi-gold bracelet valued at ₱25,000.00;
* Leather wallet containing ₱1,500.00 cash; and -
* Two shoulder bags with a combined value of ₱2,000.00.
(b) CCC:
* One tri-colored gold necklace (choker) valued at ₱50,000.00;
* One yellow-gold necklace (choker) valued at ₱5,000.00;
* One gold necklace with Jesus Christ head pendant valued at ₱12,000.00;
* One gold necklace with star diamond pendant valued at ₱8,000.00;
* One gold necklace, tri-colored cross diamond valued at ₱13,000.00;
* Three tri-colored bracelet (gold) with diamond valued at ₱18,000.00;
* Three tri-colored bracelet (twisted) valued at ₱15,000.00;
* One gold bracelet with diamonds valued at ₱6,000.00;
* One gold bracelet (dangling) valued at ₱4,000.00;
* One gold bracelet (chain) valued at ₱7,000.00;
* Five sets earrings and rings valued at ₱45,000.00;
* One set earrings and rings (diamond Solitaire) valued at ₱45,000.00;
* Two black-colored wristwatch (Pierre Cardin) valued at ₱25,000.00; and
* Two gold-plated wristwatch (Pierre Cardin) valued at ₱25,000.00; and -
* One gold bracelet (chain) valued at ₱4,000; and -
(c) Josefina Manlolo:
* Instamatic Camera, Olympus brand.
to the damage and prejudice of said owners to the extent of the value of their
respective properties above indicated.
That on the occasion of the said robbery and in the same house/residence,
accused, by means of force and intimidation and using the said handgun and
deadly/bladed weapons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA,2 a 17-year-old minor, against her
will and consent and at the time when the latter lost consciousness after her
head was banged on the bathroom floor.3
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On December 18, 2001, a Warrant of Arrest was issued against the four
accused. On February 8, 2002, appellant Joseph, accused Edgar and Atilano
were arrested, while accused Noel remained at-large.
On May 21, 2002, appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Accused Edgar and Atilano, who at that time were detained at the
Bacolod City Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), were ordered
to be brought to Tacloban City for trial. However, they were not brought to
Tacloban City by the Bacolod City BJMP for the reason that they were
criminally charged in the courts of Bacolod City.
The evidence of the prosecution follows:
On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a 17-year-old
househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house of BBB situated in
Tacloban City, four persons, one of whom was armed with a handgun while
the other three with knives, suddenly barged inside the house through the
open kitchen door. The four men accosted her, warned her to keep quiet, and
brought her to the living room. There, they herded all the other members of
the household whom they caught and bound their hands and feet, and
thereafter, placed masking tapes over their captives’ eyes. With her eyes
partially covered by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside the
comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers stripped off AAA's
clothes and removed her panty. AAA resisted and fought back but they
slammed her head twice against the concrete wall, causing her to lose
consciousness. When she regained her senses, appellant and the other
robbers were already gone, and she found herself lying on the side on the
floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands still tied behind
her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side. She suffered pain
in her knees, head, stomach, and her vagina, which was bleeding. Later on,
AAA was freed from the comfort room by the other occupants of the house,
who were earlier freed.
Prosecution witness Evelyn4 was in the living room when the incident
happened. She was tutoring her nieces when the four men barged inside the
house. She testified that she could not be mistaken as to the identity of the
accused Edgar, who was armed with a handgun, because he is a friend of her
husband and who used to work for him. Appellant and accused Noel are also
familiar to her because they previously stayed in Sampaguita, Tacloban City,
where she lives. Upon the instruction of accused Edgar, Edelyn was divested
of her earrings, bracelet, watch, and ring. Thereafter, appellant tied her hands
and feet, and blindfolded her with masking tape. She was hit on the head with
a firearm, causing a cut and her losing consciousness. When she regained
her senses, she found herself in the maids' room. She heard accused Edgar
ask her nieces where their father kept their pieces of jewelry and firearm.
When her nieces told him that the valuables were kept upstairs, accused
Edgar brought one of them there.
BBB came home around 7:00 in the evening and when he entered the sliding
door facing the garage, he saw the four accused inside, three of them armed
with knives and the other one with a gun. When he entered, he was
immediately accosted and warned to keep quiet. He recognized their faces,
particularly the leader of the group, whom he identified as accused Edgar, who
previously worked for him as a laborer in the construction of the extension of
his house. Upon accused Edgar's command, the other three accused, one of
whom he identified in open court as appellant, tied him up. Accused Edgar,
then struck him with the gun on his head, causing him to fall face down on the
floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. After a while, appellant and the
three accused went out of the house, through the kitchen door, carrying two
traveling bags and the jewelry box of his wife.
CCC, the wife of BBB, came home from the office in the early evening of
October 3, 2001. Upon arriving thereat, she tried to open the door but was not
able to do so. She then called out the names of her children, but nobody
responded. She peeped through the window screen and saw people inside
the house with whom she did not recognize. One of the accused then poked
a gun at her head and told her to come inside, otherwise, he would kill her
children. She ran away from their house, and cried out for help from the
neighbors. They called the police. Shortly thereafter, the policemen arrived.
They found the house in complete disarray, the cabinets were forcibly opened,
CCC's jewelry box and her pieces of jewelry stolen, and the members of the
household traumatized. An inventory was taken of the stolen valuables which
amounted to PhP336,000.00, more or less. Some of the stolen items were
later recovered from the house of accused Edgar.
The following day, AAA was examined by Dr. Angel Cordero, a medico-legal
officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp
Ruperto Kangleon, Palo, Leyte. Dr. Cordero found that AAA sustained "deep
healing lacerations at the 6 o'clock, 9 o'clock, and 3 o'clock positions and
shallow healed lacerations at the 1 o'clock and 11 o'clock positions." He
concluded that AAA was in a "non-virgin state physically" and that "findings
are compatible with recent loss of virginity" and with "recent sexual
intercourse."
In his defense, appellant denied having committed the crimes charged and
interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on
October 3, 2001, at about 6:30 in the evening, he was sleeping in his house
at Diit, Tacloban City with his mother and sisters. No other witness was
presented by the appellant.
On August 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch
7, rendered its Decision5 dated May 16, 2003, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Article 293 in relation to
294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and the amendatory
provisions of R.A. No. 8353, (the Anti-Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law), the Court found accused, JOSEPH EVANGELIO,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of ROBBERY
WITH RAPE charged under the information and sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH, and pay actual damages in the amount of Three
Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand (₱336,000.00) Pesos to spouses BBB and CCC
and moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos; pay
civil indemnity to AAA, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (₱75,000.00)
Pesos, and moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00)
Pesos; pay Edelyn the amount of Three Thousand (₱3,000.00) Pesos as
actual damages and moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(₱20,000.00) Pesos; and pay the costs. SO ORDERED.6
An appeal was made and the records of the case were forwarded to this Court.
However, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo, 7 the case was
transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. The CA rendered
a Decision dated August 10, 2007 affirming with modification the decision of
the trial court. In view of the abolition of the death penalty, pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, which was approved on June 24, 2006, the
appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
The CA did not consider the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
unlawful entry in the commission of the crime. The CA deleted the awards of
PhP3,000.00, as actual damages, and PhP20,000.00, as moral damages, in
favor of Edelyn, because they were not charged in the Information.
On August 28, 2007, appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
appealed the decision of the CA to this Court. Appellant had assigned the
following error in his appeal initially passed upon by the CA, to wit:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME,
COMMITTED BY A BAND, DWELLING AND UNLAWFUL
ENTRY IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY AGAINST
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 8
In his Brief, appellant denied having committed the crime charged and
interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the incident on
October 3, 2001, at about 6:30 in the evening, he was sleeping in his house
at Diit, Tacloban City, together with his mother and sisters. On the other hand,
the appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of
the perpetrators of the crime of robbery with rape. Both the trial court and the
CA found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. The Court
gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness
because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and
tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus making it in a better position to
determine whether a witness is lying or telling the truth. 9
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand,
and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must perforce
prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony
especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and
denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with
suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are
inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and
concocted. 10 Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution
witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the
appellant.11
As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant that he was
in Diit, Tacloban City at the time of the incident, the defense was unable to
show that it was physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the
crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was
when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as
the facility of access between the two places. 12 Where there is the least
chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi
must fail.13 The appellant testified during trial that Diit is only a one-hour ride
away from Tacloban City.14 Thus, it was not physically impossible for the
appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. In addition,
positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent,
especially where such identification is credible and categorical. 15
Further, appellant insists that he was at home at the time of the incident with
his mother and sisters. The defense, however, failed to put them on the
witness stand. Neither did they execute any statement under oath to
substantiate appellant's alibi.
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1)
the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is
accompanied by rape.16
In this case, the prosecution established that appellant and his three co-
accused took the pieces of jewelry and valuables of the spouses BBB and
CCC by means of violence and intimidation. Appellant and his co-accused
barged into the house of the victims armed with a handgun and knives and
tied the hands and feet of the members of the household. The perpetrators
then asked for the location of the pieces of jewelry and valuables. BBB was
also tied and was struck in the head with a gun causing him to fall face down
on the floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. He was able to see the
perpetrators going out of the house carrying bags and the jewelry box of his
wife. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery,
is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things.17
Having established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully
taken by the appellant, intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Thus, the first
three elements of the crime were clearly established.
As regard the last requirement. Although the victim AAA did not exactly
witness the actual rape because she was unconscious at that time,
circumstantial evidence shows that the victim was raped by the appellant and
the other accused.
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence,
refers to proof of collateral facts and circumstances whence the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. 18
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.19 A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. 20
The following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when
analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellant raped AAA: first, while two of the robbers were stealing, appellant
and one of the robbers brought AAA inside the comfort room; second, inside
the comfort room, AAA was stripped off her clothes and her panty; third, when
AAA resisted and struggled, appellant and the other robber banged her head
against the wall, causing her to lose consciousness; fourth, when she
regained consciousness, the culprits were already gone and she saw her
shorts and panty strewn at her side; and fifth, she suffered pain in her knees,
head, stomach and, most of all, in her vagina which was then bleeding.
In the following decided cases, the victim was unconscious and was not aware
of the sexual intercourse that transpired, yet the accused was found guilty on
the basis of circumstantial evidence.
In People v. Gaufo,21 the victim was hit on her head by the accused but she
fought back and asked for help. The accused then punched her abdomen
causing her to lose consciousness. Upon regaining her bearings, she noticed
that she had no more underwear, her vagina was bleeding and her body was
painful. The combination of these circumstances, among others, led the Court
to adjudge the accused guilty of rape.
In People v. Pabol,22 the accused hit the victim on her face causing her to fall.
Accused then hugging the victim from behind, sat the victim on his lap, and
stroke her breast with a piece of stone. When she shouted for help, accused
covered her mouth and later she fell unconscious. When she had woken up
some two hours later, she discovered that her ears had been sliced, her
blouse opened and her underwear stained with her own blood. She also
experienced pain in her private part after the incident. Given the foregoing
circumstances, the Court found that the accused raped the victim.
The Court notes that AAA was examined by Dr. Angel Cordero, a medico-
legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Camp
Ruperto Kangleon, Leyte the following day23 and found that she sustained
deep healing lacerations and shallow healed lacerations. He concluded that
AAA was in a "non-virgin state physically" and that "findings are compatible
with recent loss of virginity" and with "recent sexual intercourse."24
Prosecution witness Dr. Cordero on direct examination stated that:
Q. Now in your examination were you able to conduct a personal
examination on the person of the victim?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And what was your finding?
A. I had my findings in my report and it is all reflected in this particular report
that I have made.
Q. Now in your report in the second page of your report there is here a
conclusion and remarks, No. 3 of which states that finding compatible with
recent sexual intercourse. What do you mean by that Doctor Cordero?
A. That there was a sexual connection between the victim and that of the
offender and it was manifested on the findings that I have made and
reflected in my report.25
Although Dr. Cordero's report stated that AAA's lacerations were deep healing
and healed lacerations, this finding does not negate the commission of rape
on October 3, 2001. The Court held that the absence of fresh lacerations does
not prove that the victim was not raped.26 A freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape. 27 Hence,
the presence of healed hymenal lacerations the day after the victim was raped
does not negate the commission of rape by the appellant when the crime was
proven by the combination of highly convincing pieces of circumstantial
evidence. In addition, a medical examination and a medical certificate are
merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape
case.28
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown
that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery
and not the other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent
of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to
another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying
crime.29 In the case at bar, the original intent of the appellant and his co-
accused was to rob the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the
robbery.
The trial court also found the presence of conspiracy between the
perpetrators. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would
be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy
is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. 30 To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need
not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator
may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their
common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 31
In the instant case, conspiracy was shown by the coordinated acts of the four
persons. From the time they gained entry into the victims’ residence, they tied
and blindfolded the members of the household; inflicted physical injuries on
some of the victims; some went upstairs and proceeded to ransack the house;
the others brought AAA in the comfort room and sexually abused her; they
then left the house together carrying the loot. With the foregoing
circumstances, there can be no other conclusion than that the successful
perpetration of the crime was done through the concerted efforts of the four
armed men.
In People v. Suyu, we ruled that once conspiracy is established between
several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be
equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of
the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the
others from committing rape.32 There is no showing that the other accused
prevented appellant from sexually abusing AAA. In view, however, that the
accused Edgar, Atilano and Noel were not brought for arraignment and trial,
judgment cannot be rendered against them.
THE PENALTY
We now come to the imposition of the proper penalty. The crime of robbery
with rape is a special complex crime punishable under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659.33 Article 294 provides for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when the robbery was accompanied
by rape. The provision reads as follows:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties.
- Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation
of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion
of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson; x x x
The CA correctly ruled in not considering the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and unlawful entry.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:
x x x [T]he aggravating circumstances of nighttime and unlawful entry cannot
be considered. Under the law, specifically Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as jurisprudence, it is required
that qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances must be expressly and
specifically alleged in the Complaint or Information; otherwise, the same will
not be considered by the court against the appellant, even if proved during the
trial. And, this principle is applicable to all criminal cases.
The information merely stated that the crime took place "on or about the 3rd
day of October 2001," without specifying the time of its commission. Also
nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is
deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure
escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the
commission of the crime, and that the accused took advantage of it to insure
his immunity from captivity. Here, there is a paucity of evidence that nighttime
was purposely, deliberately, and especially sought by the accused. The mere
fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain a finding
of nocturnity.
Further, the phrase, "forcibly enter the inhabited house" does not comprise the
aggravating circumstance of "unlawful entry." Verily, evidence showed that all
the accused freely entered the [victims'] residence through the open kitchen
door, which is clearly intended for ingress and or egress. 34
The trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance
of the commission of a crime by a band.35 In the crime of robbery with rape,
band is considered as an aggravating circumstance. 36 The prosecution
established that one of the accused was armed with a handgun, while the
other three had knives when they committed the crime. 37
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling38 was also attendant in the present
case. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the
dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given
provocation therefor.39 In this case, robbery with violence was committed in
the house of the victims without provocation on their part. In robbery with
violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in
this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of
trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house. 40 It is considered an
aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the
law accords to the human abode.41 He who goes to another’s house to hurt
him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 42
Since the aggravating circumstances of band and dwelling were alleged in the
Information and proven, the imposable penalty upon the appellant is death,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
x x x In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. x x x
In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346,43 prohibiting the imposition
of the death penalty, the CA correctly reduced the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua,44 without eligibility for parole.45
THE DAMAGES
The trial court did not order the appellant to return the items taken from the
victims but, instead, directed the payment of actual damages amounting to
PhP336,000.00. The said amount is the value of the items taken from the
spouses BBB and CCC.
Under Article 10546 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellant is obliged to
return the items he took from the spouses BBB and CCC. If appellant can no
longer return the articles taken, he is obliged to make reparation for their value,
taking into consideration their price and their special sentimental value to the
offended parties.47 Hence, the Court modifies the decision of the trial court, as
affirmed by the CA, and directs the appellant to return the pieces of jewelry
and valuables taken from the spouses BBB and CCC as enumerated in the
Information48 dated December 3, 2001 and proven during trial. Should
restitution be no longer possible, appellant shall pay the spouses BBB and
CCC the value of the stolen pieces of jewelry and valuables as determined by
the trial court in the amount of PhP336,000.00.
The trial court's award of moral damages in the amount of PhP50,000.00 to
the spouses BBB and CCC is not proper. In order that a claim for moral
damages can be aptly justified, it must be anchored on proof showing that the
claimant experienced moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation or
similar injury.49 The victim spouses BBB and CCC, however, did not present
any evidence of their moral sufferings as a result of the robbery. Thus, there
is no basis for the grant of moral damages in connection with the robbery.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled to civil indemnification.
Upon the finding of rape, the victim is entitled to civil indemnity. 50 Thus, AAA
is entitled to PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity.51
In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code,52 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than
the fact of rape.53 Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.54 Such award is separate
and distinct from the civil indemnity.55 However, the amount of PhP50,000.00
awarded as moral damages, is increased to PhP75,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.56
The award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP30,000.00 should also
be imposed. Exemplary damages are awarded when the crime is attended by
an aggravating circumstance, or as a public example, in order to protect
hapless individuals from molestation.57 Furthermore, interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the
date of finality of this judgment, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 58
The CA was also correct in deleting the award of actual damages amounting
to PhP3,000.00 and moral damages amounting to PhP20,000.00 in favor of
Edelyn. Verily, it is a rule that the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. 59 The information for robbery
with rape filed against the accused shows that Edelyn is not one of the
complainants therein and there is no description of the pieces of jewelry and
valuables allegedly taken from her. Simply put, the appellant was not informed
that he was being charged of robbery in so far as Edelyn is concerned. Hence,
the CA correctly deleted the award.
On a final note, records reveal that accused Edgar and Atilano, who were
charged with the appellant, were not brought for arraignment and trial, despite
the fact that they are detained in Bacolod City.
Records show that the RTC of Tacloban City directed the BJMP of Bacolod
City to transfer the accused Atilano and Edgar to the BJMP of Tacloban City
in order for them to stand trial for the crime of robbery with rape. 60 In a letter61
dated June 26, 2002, the Jail Warden of Bacolod City informed the trial court
that Edgar and Atilano are being charged with several offenses in the courts
of Bacolod City.62 Thus, the Jail Warden of Bacolod City requested that Edgar
and Atilano be transferred from the BJMP Bacolod City to the BJMP Tacloban
City only after their pending criminal cases in Bacolod City shall have been
terminated. However, the records are bereft of any information as to the status
of this case, i.e., Criminal Case No. 2001-12-773, insofar as accused Atilano
and Edgar are concerned.1avvphil1
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00109 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant Joseph Evangelio is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Robbery with Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, without eligibility of parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. He is
ordered to return the pieces of jewelry and valuables taken from the spouses
BBB and CCC as enumerated in the Information63 dated December 3, 2001.
Should restitution be no longer possible, appellant shall pay the spouses BBB
and CCC the value of the stolen pieces of jewelry and valuables in the amount
of PhP336,000.00. He is further directed to pay AAA the amounts of
PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000.00 as moral damages and
PhP30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby DIRECTED to determine the
status of the case against the accused Edgar Evangelio and Atilano Agaton
who, despite being under the custody of the BJMP Bacolod City, were not
brought for trial at the RTC, Tacloban City for the crime of robbery with rape.
The said office is further directed to investigate and ascertain the possible
liability of the person(s) concerned who caused the delay in the prosecution
of accused Edgar Evangelio and Atilano Agaton for the said offense. SO
ORDERED.
ROBBERY IN BAND *** People v. Lumiwan
HIGHWAY ROBBERY; Art. 306-307; Art. 296; PD 532
People v. Puno
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants
committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or
the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof,
appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in
the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being
then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each
other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA
DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the
purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which
ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding
them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO
PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with
extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are
both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual
damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1)
in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not
expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is
not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which
is necessarily included in the offense charged. 4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following
counter-statement of facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the established
findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the
transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13,
1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue,
Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just
as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo
Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then
away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the
bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to
Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will
temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got
into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After
the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-
10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and
went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at
her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm,
you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her
bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained
P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro
agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in
Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa
area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun
was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He
said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy
as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma.
Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30
thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but
she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind
and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her,
jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and,
after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish
vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her
dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p.
27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash
Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp.
10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative
of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car
at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He
even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer
had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her
toe while running across the highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to
Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police
outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8 Much later,
when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate
his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication
of his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three
theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants.
The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could
not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise
agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the
same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances
thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of
are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate
conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or
essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether
a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter
absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for
committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate
offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who
was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the
offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the
previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime
would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts
against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification.
Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament
on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way
Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I
know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her
"Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been
getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale
(sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they
had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient
respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an
incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently
reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible
taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of
time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the
offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not
constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive
the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the
P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was
(sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not
allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money
and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks
we will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she
is (sic) already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we
reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be
apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her
"Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or
in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof
from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the
money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be
assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded
from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can
be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping.
These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants.
Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in
Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that
the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by
Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the
allegation in the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for
more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from
Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that
along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she
had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash,
drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed
is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974) under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by
extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the
repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission
consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and
the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive
pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No.
532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and
synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This
is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law,
that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to
put our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that
a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than
a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during
the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against
robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the
Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are
succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to
prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The
heart of the offense consists in the formation of a
band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution
under it, that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any
other purpose attainable by violent means. The
crime is proven when the organization and
purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if
robbery is committed by a band, whose members
were not primarily organized for the purpose of
committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime
would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of
more than three armed persons, it would not follow
that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the
Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band
"sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22
(Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway
robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery,
or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial
law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for
the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that
distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no
indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and
the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the
law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately
against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular
victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless
elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation
and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular
person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of
"stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people, " such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated
and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the
ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306
and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting
its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways
and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore,
the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming
a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are
brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree.
But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code
as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only
against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all
prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may
potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained
in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its
aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old
Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that
the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said
amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from
what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite
elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the
purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to
adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on
our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to
the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the
elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument
goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal
justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would
be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would
not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus
of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad
absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory
adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation
of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either
stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the
accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the
vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one
where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are
incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are
impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the
robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural
course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the
situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms.
Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway
robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of
robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not
constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple
robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in
conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities,
the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both
appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against
appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At
any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the
penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of
the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of
appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them
with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved
is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For
the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with
intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or
possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to
gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is
charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by
the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed
against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication,
clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks
(inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through
intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for
ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any of the elements
of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE
and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno
y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph
5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and
IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria
del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs. SO ORDERED.
People v. Sandoval
Paulino Pat seeks the reversal of the May 18, 1990 decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, convicting him and Raul Sandoval of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code and highway robbery as defined under Presidential
Decree No. 532, hereinafter to be known as P.D. No. 532. Said decision also
imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of
the heirs of Franklin Baguio in the amount of P30,000, for robbery with
homicide, and the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and one (1) day, for
highway robbery (Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-8728 & CBU-8732).
These criminal cases were spawned by an incident occurring at around 1:30
in the early morning of May 31, 1986, in Cebu City. The prosecution proved
that at that time, a group of young men composed of Romeo Laurente,
Franklin Baguio, Amelito Undalok, Dirk Padilla, Erwin Tabaque and Nemesio
Dakay, together with a young woman named Judith Pabular, had decided to
spend the night in the house of Dakay after attending an amateur singing
contest in Pasil. Four of them, headed by Dakay, walked ahead to the latter's
house while Laurente, Baguio and Undalok lagged behind. They then took
their snacks at the Balaga store.
While walking along the street, Undalok noticed by the light of the mercury
lamp of the electric post two persons whom he later identified as Paul
Sandoval and Paulino Pat, following them about a fathom away. 2 Panicking,
the three walked faster but Sandoval and Pat told them not to run. Although
they nevertheless walked faster, the two overtook them. Hastily, Sandoval
went through Baguio's pocket. Pat, who was armed with a hunting knife,
frisked Laurente and divested him of his wallet and wrist watch.
Pat then joined Sandoval who was with Baguio. Pat was around a foot away
from Sandoval when he obstructed Undalok's view. Baguio offered his
wristwatch to Sandoval but the latter kept on searching Baguio's pockets.
However, Baguio covered one of his pockets with his hands so that his wallet
could not be taken.3 At this juncture, Laurente walked slowly away and then
broke into a run. Undalok started retreating to follow Laurente, when he saw
Sandoval stab Baguio in the chest with a knife by a downward thrusting of his
right hand, sending the latter staggering back.4
Subsequently, when Baguio was autopsied by Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-
legal officer of the PC-INP Metrodiscom, the latter found that he sustained two
abrasions each on the right elbow and on the left leg, and two stab wounds:
one on the left side of the chest which penetrated the thoracic cavity and
incised the upper lobe of the left lung, and another on the right chest which
incised the right lung.5 The victim died of severe hemorrhage secondary to
stab wounds.6
On June 5, 1986, Undalok went to the police station where, after giving his
statement to the police,7 he was made to peep inside a room with a policeman
and Sandoval inside. He then pointed to Sandoval as one of the perpetrators
of the crimes.8 Later, the police brought Pat inside the same room. Undalok
was asked by the police whether Pat was Sandoval's companion, which fact
he confirmed.9
As a result of the identification of Sandoval and Pat as the authors of the
crimes, the following informations were filed against them on June 6, 1986:
Criminal Case No. CBU-8728 for robbery with homicide —
That on or about the 31st day of May, 1986, at about 1:30 o'clock dawn, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, armed with a knife, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and
by means of intimidation upon person, to wit: by pointing a knife at one
Franklin Baguio and ordering him to yield his wallet and upon refusal of said
Franklin Baguio to yield his wallet, said accused stabbed said Franklin Baguio,
thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries:
HEMORRHAGE, ACUTE, SEVERE SECONDARY TO STAB WOUNDS,
CHEST, ANTERIOR ASPECT
as a consequence of which said Franklin Baguio died instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 for violation of PD 532 —
That on or about the 31st day of May, 1986, at about 1:30 o'clock dawn, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, armed with a knife, conniving and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and
by means of violence and intimidation upon persons, to wit: by threatening
one Romeo Laurente with said knife and without the consent of said Romeo
Laurente, did then and there take, steal and carry away the following:
one (1) wristwatch
one (1) wallet
Cash in the amount of P10.00
valued in all at P710.00, while the latter was walking along A. Lopez St., a
public highway, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount
aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, accused Sandoval and Pat pleaded not guilty to the charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the aforegoing version of the
commission of the crimes based on the testimonies of three witnesses:
Undalok, Dr. Cerna and Saturnino Baguio.
The defense, on the other hand, contended that another person or group of
persons perpetrated the crimes, interposing denial and alibi. Thus, while
defense witness Vicente Cana, a member of the San Nicolas Police Sub-
station who was on duty at dawn of May 31, 1986, admitted that Pat and
Sandoval were "picked up right on that day,10 he affirmed that there were "so
many suspects" and one of them was a certain "Roland." 11 Cpl. Liberato P.
Lozano added that Pat and Sandoval could not have been picked up on May
31, 1986 as it was only from June 1 to June 5 or 6 that the police began
"simultaneous(ly) picking up suspects."12
Enrique Restauro, a barangay tanod, testified that at early dawn of May 31,
1986, he was on his way home after conducting a roving patrol when, at a
distance of 200 meters, he saw a person being stabbed.13 From that distance,
he noticed that the assailant had a "flat nose and . . . high cheek bones." 14
Notably, the defense counsel himself elicited from Restauro the fact that he
"only heard that that person was stabbed. 15 He also heard from people
gathered in the area that the assailant was one Poland Sobrevilla, who was
notoriously known as a violent person.
For his part, Virgilio Nacion, a driver-mechanic, testified that he was then
repairing the carburetor of his taxicab when he saw a homosexual being
stabbed. The two assailants, whom he could identify if he sees them, ran away
when the barangay police and people arrived. One of the assailants even
asked him for a ride on his cab but he declined, saying that it was still out of
order. He, too, heard from people around that a certain "Roland" was the
culprit. He admitted having known Pat and Sandoval as they were his
neighbors, clearly implying that they could not have been the felons.
Like Nacion, Wilfredo Gonzaga testified that he knew Pat and Sandoval and,
without going into specifics, declared that he knew where the two were at the
time of the commission of the crimes.16
To buttress its theory that they did not commit the crimes, the defense
presented Manuel Gatis, the father of Wilfredo Gatis or Gates who was a
"police character" known by the aliases "Allan," "Roland" and "Tawilwil
Ninja."17 According to Manuel Gatis, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning of
May 31, 1986, Wilfredo arrived at their home in A. Lopez St., Cebu City, with
two companions. He overheard one of them ask the other why he stabbed a
person. The other person replied that he stabbed their victim because of his
refusal to surrender his watch and wallet.18 Manuel clarified that it was his son,
Wilfredo or Tawilwil, who said that he killed the hardheaded victim. 19 However,
Tawilwil was himself killed by policemen in a shootout on March 11, 1988. 20
Bruno Zafra, erstwhile chief investigator at the San Nicolas Police Sub-station
on May 31, 1986, supported the defense theory by testifying that although it
was Cpl. Aballe who was the duty investigator, he was at the police station
when a homosexual ("bayot") who was being investigated, named a certain
"Roland" and two unidentified persons as the suspects in the crimes, and
revealed that the scene of the crime was dark because the bulb at the electric
post was busted.21
Having shifted the blame on others, the defense presented the accused to
prove their respective alibis. Raul Sandoval, a 27-year-old laborer at the
Seaman Trade Center who resided in 35 A. Lopez St., Cebu City, claimed that
in the evening of May 31, 1989, he slept with his friend Paulino Pat to help the
latter in his rice-and-assorted-goods store. He clarified that he slept with Pat
that Saturday night. When told that the crime for which he was being accused
transpired early in the morning of May 31, 1986, he denied having participated
therein, asserting that at that time, he was sleeping with his friend, Pat. 22
Sandoval admitted having learned of the crimes on Sunday morning and that
he was investigated by the police on June 5, 1986. He denied that at the police
station, someone had pointed him out as the person responsible for the
crimes. He was made to "pose and turn around" in order that the police could
verify that "the persons who killed the homosexual was of the same build as
me and had curly hair."23
On cross-examination, Sandoval admitted that the last time he slept in Pat's
house was when he was arrested, adding that he had slept there for seven
nights before May 31.24 He also admitted that the Balaga Store was about
thirty (30) meters away from the house of his relatives with whom he was
staying and that Pat's house was around twenty (20) meters away from his
relatives' house and about fifty (50) meters away from the Balaga store. 25 He
claimed having learned of the involvement of Tawilwil in the crimes but he did
not report the matter to the police because of fear of retaliation from Tawilwil
and because he "had no authority to tell."26
Paulino Pat gave the same address as Sandoval's — 35 A. Lopez St.
According to Pat, he was in his store at said address, sleeping with Sandoval,
when the crimes occurred. Sandoval went to his store at around 8:30 o'clock
in the evening of May 30, 1986. Upon waking up at 5:00 o'clock in the morning
of May 31, he opened his store. From then on until around 11:00 o'clock in the
morning of June 5, 1986, he was in the store.
Pat claimed that neither he nor Sandoval was known by the nicknames
"Roland" or "Alan".27 He admitted that the distance between his house and
that of Sandoval was sixty (60) meters and that between his store and
Balaga's Store was also sixty (60) meters, while that between Sandoval's
house and Balaga's Store was 120 meters. 28 He also admitted that in the
evening of May 30, 1988 until dawn the following day, A. Lopez was well-
lighted. During that night, while Sandoval was his guest, he did not offer him
anything, not even beer. After talking about Sandoval's girlfriends, they slept
at around 8:30 p.m.29
From what Pat heard about the crime, Tawilwil, whom he only knew by face,
was involved. It was Tawilwil's father who used to pass by his store, who
approached him and volunteered to testify. Neither had he met nor known
Amelito Undalok and therefore, he could not possibly have had any
misunderstanding with him.30
On May 18, 1990, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE —
In Criminal Case No. CBU-8728 — finding accused RAUL SANDOVAL and
PAULINO PAT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Franklin Baguio the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 — finding accused RAUL SANDOVAL and
PAULINO PAT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway
Robbery, each is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of from Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years, Ten (10) Months and Twenty
(20) Days, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
The two accused filed a common notice of appeal. 31 On June 6, 1989, Pat
was ordered released from detention upon filing a cash bond in the amount of
P20,000.00.32 On the other hand, counsel for Sandoval filed a manifestation
and motion stating that he was availing of the provision of the new Rules on
Criminal Procedure that the original bail bond shall continue to be considered
as such until the final determination of the case, and praying that should said
manifestation not be favorably considered, that he be given a 30-day period
within which to put up an appeal bond.33 On June 11, 1990, the trial court gave
Sandoval until June 20, 1990 within which to post an appeal bond.34
On June 15, 1990, counsel for Sandoval filed a motion stating that, upon
receipt of the Order of June 11, 1990, he called up the Seaman Trade Center
where Sandoval worked and learned that Sandoval "ha(d) been absent the
last few days," and praying that said Order be served on Sandoval himself. 35
Granting said prayer, the court tried to serve the Order on him but it turned out
that Sandoval had resigned from the Seaman Trade Center a month before. 36
Consequently, the private prosecutor filed an ex-parte manifestation and
motion stating that in all probability, Sandoval would evade service of his
sentence and prayed for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. 3 7
Accordingly, on July 9, 1990, the trial court ordered the issuance of a warrant
of arrest against Sandoval.38 Thereafter, a new counsel appeared for Pat with
his conformity39 and his former counsel, Atty. Gregorio Escasinas, withdrew
his appearance.40
Hence, the instant appeal of Paulino Pat raising the following as errors of the
trial court: (a) appellant should have been charged only with the complex crime
of robbery with homicide and imposed only the penalty of reclusion perpetua
plus indemnity and costs; (b) motive should have been established because
both accused were gainfully employed; (c) the testimony of Amelito Undalok
was unreliable because it was full of fallacies, contradictions and biases; and
(d) accused should be acquitted due to reasonable doubt.
In contending that only the crime of robbery with homicide should have been
charged, appellant reasons out that "the other charge is already absorbed and
the penalty to be imposed should be in the maximum" of Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code.41
It is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many
crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident.
Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes
a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or
by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution against one is
not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other. 42 Such crimes should be
alleged in separate informations pursuant to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court which provides that a complaint or information "must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses."
In this case, the fiscal or prosecutor, upon whose direction and control the
filing of criminal cases rests, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 110, 43 exercised
his discretion and determined that appellant and Sandoval violated two distinct
penal laws in robbing Laurente and Baguio, and killing the latter on a city
street. Indeed, because the City Fiscal considered the two accused to have
been in conspiracy, he charged them both with the complex crime of robbery
with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code with respect to the robbing and killing of Baguio and, in a separate
information, also charged them with violation of P.D. No. 532, the 1974 law
against highway robbery, as regards the robbing of Laurente. The
informations filed, however, indicate that the filing by the fiscal of two separate
charges was impelled by the fact that in the same incident, there were two
victims.
This Court finds, however, that only the crime of simple robbery, not violation
of P.D. No. 532, should have been charged in Criminal Case No. CBU-8732
regarding the robbing of Laurente. In People v. Puno,44 the Court explicitly
held that P.D. No. 532 is a modification of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage"45 which is committed by more than three persons. According to
the late Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, as it is committed by a cuadrilla,
brigandage is "sometimes confounded with the robo en cuadrilla in Art. 295 of
the same Code."46 The clear implication is that the number of offenders, as
well as the frequency with which they perpetrate robbery, may determine
whether a crime is simple robbery or highway robbery as defined in P.D. No.
532.4 7
Thus, in the Puno case, the Court explained that P.D. No. 532 treats of
"highway robbery/brigandage" or "indiscriminate highway robbery" and,
therefore, "(I)f the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants." 48
Citing the perambular clauses of P.D. No. 532,49 the Court said:
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of
robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be
considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and
social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,"
and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to
the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people," such that said isolated act
would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said
decree.
This would be an exaggeration bordering on the
ridiculous.50
From the information in criminal Case No. CBU-8732, it is apparent that
violation of P.D. No. 532 was charged simply because the crimes transpired
while the victim, Romeo Laurente, "was walking along A. Lopez St., a public
highway." In this regard, in the same Puno case, the Court said:
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by
the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the
amendatory decree just because it was committed
on a highway. Aside from what has already been
stressed regarding the absence of the requisite
elements which thereby necessarily puts the
offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would
be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our
highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the
spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may
appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of
an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning,
and the fundamental rule that criminal justice
inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in
case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was
committed on a highway would be the determinant
for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532,
it would not be far-fetched to expect mischievous,
if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort
to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we
apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by
the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in
the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid
absurdities and conflicts. . . 51
Prescinding from the Court's elucidation on the crime of highway robbery
under P.D. No. 532, the unavoidable conclusion is that, while the information
in Criminal Case No. CBU-8732 is for violation of P.D. No. 532, appellant may
only be held liable for simple robbery as defined in Article 293 considering that
it alleges facts which correspond to the elements of the latter crime. We need
not belabor the rule that in interpreting an information, what controls is not the
designation but the description of the offense charged.52
The elements of robbery as defined in Article 29353 of the Revised Penal Code
are the following: (a) that there be personal property belonging to another; (b)
that there is unlawful taking of that property; (c) that the taking is with intent to
gain; and (d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.54 These elements alleged in the information are present in
Criminal Case No. CBU-8732. A wristwatch and a wallet valued at P710.00
belonging to Romeo Laurente were proven beyond reasonable doubt to have
been taken by appellant by intimidating the victim with a hunting knife.
Appellant's intent to gain or animo lucrandi is presumed in the allegation, duly
proven, that the appellant appropriated to himself the things taken. 55
With respect to Criminal Case No. CBU-8728, this Court cannot agree with
the lower court that appellant and Sandoval committed robbery with homicide.
By the testimonial account of eyewitness Undalok, Baguio was killed by
Sandoval because he resisted the latter's efforts at searching his pockets.
Undoubtedly, as shown by their overt acts, the intent of both Sandoval and
appellant was to rob Franklin Baguio. However, under the same account of
the said eyewitness, it is not clear whether appellant or Sandoval succeeded
in taking Baguio's wallet. What has been indubitably proven is that Sandoval
stabbed Baguio to death because of the latter's refusal to surrender his wallet.
Worth emphasizing is the fact that even the information does not allege that
Sandoval succeeded in taking Baguio's wallet. It merely alleges that Sandoval
pointed a knife at Baguio, ordered the latter "to yield his wallet and upon
refusal of said Franklin Baguio to yield his wallet, said accused stabbed"
Baguio resulting in injuries which caused his death. Moreover, not even the
victim's father, Saturnino Baguio, had testified that any personal item was
missing from the body of his son. While it was conclusively proven by their
overt acts that their intention was to rob Baguio, it was not shown that Baguio's
wallet was taken. From the evidence presented, the crime committed was
attempted robbery with homicide.
Since only Sandoval stabbed Baguio and committed the crime of homicide,
appellant may be held responsible therefor only upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of conspiracy between them. In a long line of cases, the
court has held that when homicide is committed as a consequence of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery
will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless
it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 56 In the case
at bench, appellant showed unity of purpose with Sandoval in attempting to
rob Baguio when, even after he had taken Laurente's wristwatch and wallet,
he still searched Baguio with a clear purpose of asporting personal property
from him. Having conspired with Sandoval in the attempt to rob Baguio,
appellant may not escape liability for the resulting homicide because he was
not shown to have prevented its commission.
In an attempt at exoneration, appellant contends that he cannot be convicted
of the crimes charged because he had no motive to commit them, considering
that he had a means of livelihood and that, by the nature of the crimes
committed, only young drug addicts with a string of criminal records could
have perpetrated them. As this Court has time and again held, proof of motive
is not indispensable to conviction57 especially if the accused has been
positively identified by an eyewitness58 and his participation therein has been
definitely established.59 Ordinary human experience shows that even a normal
person who is perceived by others to have no reason at all to commit a crime
may, in fact, commit an act violative of the law and be held liable therefor, as
long as he is identified beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the
crime.
What is pivotal in this case is the credibility of the sole eyewitness to the
crimes, Amelito Undalok. The jurisprudentially-embedded rule in this regard is
that when the issue of credibility of a witness is concerned, appellate courts
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court.60 In this case,
notwithstanding his gruelling eight days at the witness stand which were
punctuated by snide remarks on his sexuality by defense counsel, 61 Undalok
remained unswerving about his story and, according to the trial court,
"maintained his frank and open manner (and) straightforward declaration" 62
on appellant's culpability.
Appellant's contention that Undalok's testimony should not merit credence
because of certain inconsistencies therein deserves scant consideration, it
appearing that such "inconsistencies" concerned minor
details. Moreover, the absence of evidence to show any improper motive why
Undalok should testify falsely against appellant and implicate him in such
grave crimes, indicates that there is no such motive and that his testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit. 64
Parenthetically, appellant's identity as one of the perpetrators of the crimes is
bolstered by the affidavit of Romeo Laurente65 which corroborates Undalok's
positive identification of appellant. While said affidavit was not offered by the
prosecution as an exhibit, and Laurente himself was not presented as a
witness, the sole testimony of Undalok on appellant's identity and culpability,
being clear and straightforward and found worthy of credence by the trial court,
suffices to convict.66 Laurente's affidavit and testimony would have served no
more purpose than to corroborate Undalok's testimony.67
Appellant's complicity in the crimes having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, in criminal case No. CBU-8728 for attempted robbery with
homicide under Art. 297, he shall serve the indeterminate penalty within the
range of prison mayor in its maximum period and reclusion temporal in its
maximum period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances,68
and indemnify the heirs of Franklin Baguio in accordance with law. In Criminal
Case No. CBU-8732 for the crime of robbery under Arts. 293 and 294(5) of
the Revised Penal Code where no aggravating and mitigating circumstances
likewise attended its commission, he shall be imposed the indeterminate
sentence within the range of prison correccional in its medium period and
prison mayor in its minimum period.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City in Criminal case Nos. CBU-8728 and CBU-8732 is hereby modified.
Appellant Paulino Pat is hereby found guilty of the following crimes and
imposed the corresponding penalties:
(a) In Criminal Case No. CBU-8728, he is convicted of the crime of attempted
robbery with homicide for which he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prison mayor maximum, as minimum, to
eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one day (1) of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum penalty.
(b) In Criminal Case No. CBU-8732, he is convicted of the crime of simple
robbery and accordingly imposed the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years
of prison correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prison mayor
minimum, as maximum penalty and shall reimburse Romeo Laurente the
amount of seven hundred ten pesos (P710.00).
The indemnity for the death of Franklin Baguio is hereby increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Service of these sentences shall be in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised
Penal Code.
A copy of this Decision shall be served upon the Philippine National Police
and the National Bureau of Investigation to immediately effect the arrest of
Raul Sandoval so that he may serve the penalties imposed upon him by Law.
Costs against accused-appellant Paulino Pat. SO ORDERED.
CARNAPPING; RA 6539, 7569, 10883, Art. 310
Izon v. People
Petitioners were charged, together with Pedro Divino, in the Circuit Criminal
Court, Third Judicial District, Olongapo City, with Robbery with Violence
Against Person, under an information reading as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of September, 1977, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another and by means of violence and intimidation applied upon the person of
Reynaldo Togorio committed by the accused Jimmy Milla y Castillo and Pedro
Divino y Batero who were armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to
one Reynaldo Togorio and used in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon
y Bartulo who helped in mauling him thereby inflicting upon said Reynaldo
Togorio the following physical injuries, to wit:
Incised wound 2 cm. long and 2 cm. deep
lateral aspect upper third arm right.
Incised wound 2 inches long between
thumb and index finger left Abrasion
sternoclavicular function along 6 rib left.
Linear abrasion 3 cm. long level of 7th rib,
anterior axillary line right
which injuries shall require medical attendance for a period of less than nine
(9) days, barring complications, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) motorized tricycle with motor
No. B100-25-648 with Chasis No. B120-05589 and Plate No. MCH Q4102 or
with a total value of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency belonging to Reynaldo
Togorio to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned
amount of Pll,000.00. However, the motorized tricycle Zukurmi 120, Motor No.
B1OO-25-648 with Chasis No.B-120-05589 was recovered. 1
Pleading guilty upon arraignment, petitioners were sentenced to the penalty
provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Car-napping Act of 1972
which defines motor vehicle as follows:
Motor vehicle is any vehicle propelled by any power other
than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public
highways, vehicles which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
 number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be
propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be
classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating. 2
(Emphasis supplied).
Contending that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty prescribed in
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead of that prescribed in the Revised
Penal Code for simple robbery with violence, because the information did not
allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway, so as
to make it a motor vehicle as the term is defined in the carnapping law, and
therefore failed to inform them that they were being charged under the cited
statute, in violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against the petitioners came to this Court with the
instant petition for review.
The principal issue thus raised is whether a motorized tricycle is a motor
vehicle within the definition given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972.
As a consequence of their contention that the motorized tricycle is not a motor
vehicle under the definition of the aforecited Act, petitioners also claim that
they are not properly informed of the cause and nature of the accusation
against them in violation of their constitutional right.
Petitioners maintain that the tricycle in question is not a "motor vehicle" as the
anti-carnapping law defines the term because it is not licensed to operate on
the "public highways." The Solicitor General contends otherwise with the
following argument:
The word "public" means "common to all or many; general;
open to common use" (Black's Law Dictionary 1393
[Revised 4th Ed.]. On the other hand, 'highway' refers to a
'free and public road way, or street; one which every person
has the right to use (idem. at p. 862). lt is clear that a street
within a town is a public highway if it is used by the public.
To limit the words "public highways" to a national road
connecting the various towns, as petitioners' suggest
(Reply dated January 25, 1980) would create a distinction
which the statute itself does not make. Under petitioners'
proposition, a distinction should be made between motor
vehicles operating within a town like the motorized tricycle
involved herein, and those using roads connecting towns.
This, however, goes against the well known maxim that
where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be
made (Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Co., 104 PhiL
688). It is also to be pointed out that to limit the application
of the Act to motor vehicles travelling between different
towns, may lead to absurd results. For example, privately
owned motorcycle used by its owner in travelling from one
province to another would be covered by the law. Upon the
other hand, a motorized tricycle (with sidecar) which is more
expensive than the former but operated within towns would
not be protected by the law. No unreasonable intendment
should be read into a statute so that an injustice may be
worked or an absurb result produced (In re Moore's Estate,
N.Y.S. 2nd 281, 165 Misc. 683). It can be concluded,
therefore, that the motorized tricycle involves in this case is
a 'motor vehicle' within the ambit of section 2 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972. The lower court correctly imposed
the penalty for violation of said Act on herein petitioners. 3
We perceive no reason not to accord full validity of the Solicitor General's
argument, not even on the petitioner's submission that a motorized tricycle,
not having licensed to use a public highway, is not a motor, vehicle under the
provision of the anti-carnapping act.
From the definition cited by the Government which petitioners admit as
authoritative, highways are always public, free for the use of every person.
There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to
make the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the anti-
carnapping law. If a vehicle uses the streets with or without the required
license, same comes within the protection of the law, for the severity of the
offense is not to be measured by what kind of streets or highway the same is
used; but by the very nature of the vehicle itself and the use to which it is
devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still unlicensed or unregistered
as when they have just beet bought from the company, or only on test runs,
may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anti-carnapping statute, but
only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of the Revised Penal
Code. This obviously, could not have been the intention of the anti-carnapping
law.
Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted
that any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not
exclusively for private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A
tricycle which is not included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind
of motor vehicle as defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its
penal sanction.
In any event, it is a matter of judicial notice that motorized tricycles are running
in droves along highways admittedly public, as those going to the north like
Baguio City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within the definition of
the law, even under the restricted construction that petitioners would want
given to it. If these tricycles are "motor vehicles" then, there is no cogent
reason to treat the tricycle in question differently.
With the foregoing discussion, it would logically follow that the petitioners
complaint of not having been informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them and for which they were convicted upon their plea of
guilty, is unfounded, legally and factually.
Again, on tills point, We find the observation of the Solicitor General valid, We
have no other course than to sustain it. Thus —
A perusal of the information (Annex 1 of respondent
People's Comment dated November 16, 1979) readily
shows that petitioners were not thereby informed that they
were being accused for violation of the Revised Penal
Code. The charge merely designated the offense as one
for: "ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSON."
The facts alleged in the information make out a case of
"carnapping". This offense is defined in section 2 of
Republic Act No. 6539 as 'the taking, with intent to gain, of
a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things The information
clearly specified that what was taken and carried away was
"one (1) motorized tricycle." Herein petitioners cannot claim
that they were misled by the information into pleading guilty.
It is not necessary for the protection of the substantial right
of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his defense,
that he be informed of the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged
(People vs. Cosare, 95 PhiL 656; U.S. vs. Lim San 17 Phil.
275).
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
People v. Mejia
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla,
Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney
driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio
Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was
pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the
attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown
out to the middle of the road when the jeepney started to move away.
Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he sustained. Catugas
survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro
Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril,
one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were
taken into police custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan, the following
day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead three days after
the incident in question, while the others have remained at large. Three
separate criminal complaints for murder,1 frustrated murder,2 and violation of
R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended)3 were filed against
them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter-
affidavits, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito and did not submit their
counter-affidavits.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order4 declaring the accused
"to have waived their right to be heard in preliminary investigation"; finding a
prima facie case against the accused; recommending that they be charged
with and prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation
of R.A. No. 6539, as amended; and ordering that the records of the cases be
forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three
separate informations for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, against the aforenamed persons. The
informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D, 94-00619-
D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The first was later amended. The accusatory
portions of the informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO LANDINGIN inflicting
upon him stab wounds which caused his instant death to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659.5
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y
CASTAÑEDA inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, the accused having
then performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Catugas y
Castañeda which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.6
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with knives by means of violence against person by
stabbing to death TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a passenger jeep
bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely and thereafter with intent to
gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away said passenger
jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely owned and driven by
Teofilo Landingin without the latter's consent, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.
Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended.7
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided
by Judge Crispin C. Laron (hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter
consolidated and jointly tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the said
court presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of
innocence in each case.
I. THE CASE IN THE LARON COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-
D (Frustrated Murder) in the LARON court, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Virgilio Catugas, policemen Dominguillo Gulen and
Bernardo Clemente, Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma. Nora Landingin, and Dr. Roberto
Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was recalled as rebuttal witness. In their defense,
accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand. They also
presented as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot, Shirley Lomboy, Conrado
Benito, policeman Bernardo Clemente, and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence
in chief and Julia Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized as
follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front of the CSI
Supermarket in Dagupan City waiting for a transportation to take him to his
home at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Later, a passenger jeepney plying
the Dagupan City — Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo Landingin arrived.
He boarded it and occupied that portion of the passengers' seat behind the
driver's seat. There were already some passengers inside the jeepney, but
they disembarked before the jeepney reached the boundary of Dagupan City
and Calasiao, leaving behind Landingin, Catugas, and two other passengers.8
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel, Calasiao,
nine persons flagged down the jeepney and boarded it. One of them, whom
Catugas identified to be accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the driver; the rest
took the passenger seats behind the driver's seat. Catugas fully recognized
Benito because there was light at the ceiling of the jeepney and at the
"signboard" portion of the jeepney and the latter sometimes turned his face
toward the back where Catugas was seated. Catugas had further observed
Benito's face, ears, and eyes.9 He also recognized accused Mejia, Fabito, and
Paraan.10
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for Pangasinan
Village Inn (PVI) in Bued, Calasiao. But when they reached PVI, one of them
said that his companions did not know where they were going, and informed
Landingin that he would take care of the fare upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon reaching Nansangaan, one of the nine
passengers asked Landingin to drive a little farther. Later, Mejia asked
Catugas whether he was Landingin's companion; Catugas answered in the
affirmative. Mejia then announced: "[T]his is a hold-up"; while Benito said:
"[N]obody will be able to be saved his life [sic]." Another companion of Mejia
said: "Proceed." All of the nine drew their daggers and stabbed Landingin and
Catugas.11
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who conducted an
autopsy on Landingin's cadaver, found three stab wounds — two of which
were fatal. According to him, the cause of Landingin's death was
cardiorespiratory arrest resulting from hypovolemic shock due to internal
hemorrhage.12 Nora Landingin, wife of Teofilo Landingin, spent P1,500 daily
during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for his burial; and P16,000 for the
tomb. Nora felt sad because of his death.13
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and landed
on the road, was brought by some people to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital.14
Dr. Roberto Valenzuela performed on Catugas exploratory laparatomy
debridement and found three multi-lacerations in the right upper extremities
and several others on the left upper extremities which could have been caused
by bladed instruments.15 Catugas survived and was confined for seven days.
He spent more than P50,000 for his hospitalization and medical expenses.
The hospital billed him in the amount of P44,667.25. 16
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of
the Mabini Police Station, Mabini, Pangasinan, was approaching his residence
at the poblacion in Sual, Pangasinan, on board a police patrol car, he saw six
men walking in front of his house. When he stopped the car, the men ran
away. He gave chase and caught two of them, namely, accused Mejia and
Benito. Gulen thought that they belonged to an "akyat-bahay gang." When
asked what they were doing, the two answered that they were not doing
anything and that they were not robbers. They told Gulen that they were from
Sta. Barbara. Benito even showed his driver's license and told Gulen that he
did not commit any crime and that he was willing to go to the police station.
Gulen then brought the two and turned them over to the police station in Sual,
Pangasinan.17
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11
March 1994, entered in the police blotter this turn-over and talked to the two.
In the course of their conversation, Benito reported that they rode on a
jeepney, which was abandoned somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided to
make a follow-up of this report. With Benito as their guide, Clemente and three
other policemen were able to find the jeepney with the marking LOVELY in
Sitio Nipa, Barangay Baguioen, Sual, Pangasinan. The jeepney had
bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought it to the police station
and had the matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente then instructed
the radio operator to call the police station of Sta. Barbara and inform it of the
turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m. of 11 March 1994, the PNP
elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and received the two, as well
as the passenger jeepney.18
Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of Sual
apprehended Joseph Fabito in Sitio Looc, Poblacion Sual, as a murder
suspect. He was turned over to the Sual Police Station. After having been
informed of this arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police Station took him into its
custody. These facts were entered in the Sual Police Station blotter.19
The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingin's
jeepney that fateful evening of 10 March 1994, but denied having committed
the crimes. They claimed that it was Romulo Calimquim and his companions
who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and drove away the jeepney. The
following is a summary of their version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, was
the driver of the Elf truck of Lito Lomboy of Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which
was used in hauling sand and gravel. His co-accused Mejia Paraan and Fabito
were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering sand
and gravel, the accused returned the truck and went to the house of Fabito's
brother-in-law in San Miguel, Calasiao. After two hours of waiting in vain for
the brother-in-law, Paraan suggested that they go to the house of his future
brother-in-law in Bacayao Norte, Calasiao. After some snacks they proceeded
to the town proper and strolled for a while. Then, Benito thought that it was
time to go home to Sta. Barbara and suggested that they should. They
proceeded to a waiting shed near the National High School to wait for a
transportation for Sta. Barbara. At the waiting shed, they saw Romulo
Calimquim with three other companions, who were also waiting for a
transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged down an approaching
passenger jeepney. He and his companions boarded it. So did Benito and his
companions. Calimquim sat beside the driver. The rest took the back seat. 20
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a "huge body," who
sat beside the driver.21
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta. Barbara and
that leading to the national highway, the man who sat beside the driver
(Calimquim, according to Benito; Mamaril, according to Paraan) ordered the
driver to proceed to the national highway; the driver did. But after reaching the
highway, in Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, the former ordered the latter to stop,
announced that "this is a hold up," then stabbed the driver several times,
pulled his body out of the jeepney, took over the wheel, and drove the
jeepney.22 In the meantime, at the back seat, one of the companions of
Calimquim pointed a knife at Benito; while the others told Benito's companions
to lie on their belly. It was when Catugas attempted to fight back that he was
stabbed.23 Catugas was then thrown out of the jeepney.24
Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim from
alighting from the jeepney. Upon reaching a mountain in Sual,
Pangasinan, 25 the man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and
Fabito to alight from the jeepney. The group of Calimquim pointed knives 26
and a 4338 of Page 260 of the Police Blotter.35
gun 27 at them. Then suddenly there was a light coming from below. They ran
away from the group of Calimquim. 28
Benito and Mejia were together.29 Later, a policeman saw them. The two told
the policeman that they are not "troublesome persons." The policeman
brought them to the Police Station of Sual. There, Benito reported what had
happened and accompanied the policemen to the place where the jeepney in
question was located.30 Afterwards, the two were detained at Sta. Barbara
Police Station. While in detention, they were informed that Calimquim was
killed and his body was found in Alaminos.31
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March 1994 and
went to the house of Roland, his brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him
to request a barangay councilman to accompany him to the police station. It
was the barangay captain who accompanied him the following day to the
police station. There, the police authorities told him that he was among the
assailants of Landingin and that he was the one who stabbed Catugas in the
night of 10 March 1994 and one of the suspects in the carnapping of the
jeepney of Landingin.32 Paraan was forthwith placed inside the jail.
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, he
was by the seashore. He stayed there until 6:00 a.m. and inquired from
someone the location of the police station. He went to that station which
happened to be Sual Police Station. There, he narrated to the policemen what
had happened. When a policeman asked him whether he was the killer, he
answered in the negative. At around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to the Sta.
Barbara Municipal Jail, where he was detained for three months. Then, he
was committed to the Provincial Jail.33
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was already
driving a tricycle, the parents of the accused met with him and informed him
that the accused told them that they (the accused) did not commit any wrong.
Catugas answered that he had suffered several wounds and spent much for
his hospitalization and that since the accused were the ones apprehended, he
would just tell a lie so he could recover the amounts he spent. Catugas then
asked P20,000 from each of the accused, or a total of P80,000, and repeated
this demand five to six times.34
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente, also
proved that Romulo Calimquim died due to a gunshot wound on 13 March
1994 in Barangay Paitan West, Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced by Entry No.
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed
Landingin and that accused Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones who
stabbed him. He further declared that it was the parents of the accused who
offered to pay him, but he refused because such an offer could not "be
accepted by [his] conscience."36
The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She
denounced as untrue the testimony on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of
accused were the ones who offered to pay him money. Julia declared that
they visited Catugas to ask him whether it was true that their children
committed the crime. On their first visit, Catugas told them that he could not
yet answer that question; but when they returned, Catugas told them that they
had to pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the
accused.37
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied
heavily on the identification of the accused by Catugas, the absence of ulterior
motive on the part of the latter, and the offer of the parents of the accused to
compromise the cases.
In its decision dated 17 November 1994, 38 the LARON court convicted
accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of the crime of murder and of
frustrated murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and nighttime
and band as aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, it sentenced the first
three accused to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder; and ten
years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years, four months, and one
day of reclusion temporal for the crime of frustrated murder. It credited Paraan
with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, he being only
seventeen years old at the time of the commission of the crimes charged; and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder, and six years of prision
correccional to ten years an one day of prision mayor for frustrated murder.
The Court also ordered the four accused to pay the heirs of Teofilo Landingin
the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb;
and P12,000 for funeral expenses; and to pay Catugas the amount of
P44,687.25 for hospital expenses, plus costs.
II. THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act) in the
CASTILLO Court, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas
and Nora Landingin. The former was recalled as rebuttal witness. The
accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand and
presented as additional witnesses Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito. Their
testimonies were substantially the same as those they made in the murder
and frustrated murder cases in the LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed,
he was thrown out of the jeepney to the shoulder of the road and that one of
the culprits took the wheel of the jeepney, started off its engine, and drove
off.39 He further declared that while he was confined at the hospital, the
policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated him, showed him pictures of the
suspects, supplied the suspect's names,40 and took his statement.41 After he
was discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with the father of accused
Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization expenses and asked P80,000,
as a settlement of the case, to be paid by the parents of the accused on an
agreed date; but before that date came, he had already testified against the
accused.42
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin, further
testified that her husband owned the passenger jeepney in question, as
evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 19253856, 43 and Official Receipt
No. MVRR 91354948.44 The jeepney was worth P140,000.45
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It
debunked the version of the defense on account of the following "inculpating
evidence," which, according to it, bolstered its finding that the accused were
the authors of the crime charged:
1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan
speak of innocence and fear for their lives during the ruthless incident,
unfortunately they never sustained any bodily injury on their bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt anybody, they could
not have concentrated on the persons of Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio
Catugas only but they should have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their
persons (accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did not do anything
except to passively stay at the back seat of the jeepney motionless from the
place of stabbing incident in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in
Sual, Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to carnapp [sic] the
passenger jeepney of Teofilo Landingin then the logical conclusion that can
be had in the instant situation is for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver
and all passengers for that matter, including the four (4) accused to eliminate
the presence of eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok in going to Sual,
Pangasinan without offering any slight resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that, Mok and company
belonged to the group of the four (4) accused who were responsible in
perpetrating the offense charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are the real offenders,
why is it that during the long span of travel from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they
never made any attempt to jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they
show positive signs to invite the attention of PNP members stationed along
the long route starting in Dagupan City, Binmaley, Lingayen, Bugallon,
Labrador, Pangasinan.
4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly claim innocence of
the crime charged. In fact, they averred that upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan,
they reported to the responding peace officers what happened to them and
that their reports was recorded in the Police Blotter of Sual Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with absolute falsity and
is debunked by the entry in the Police Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G);
the subject certification negates accused's statement of innocence. The
subject entry which is contained in the Book of Events of Sual Police Station
belies any complaint/report made by accused Edwin Benito/Gregorio Mejia
that they were kidnapped or deprived of their liberty with the use of guns and
bladed weapons. Upon the other hand, the Certification squarely bespeaks of
the incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at Sual Police
Station for they were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney
involved in the above case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan, they likewise
vehemently denied the accusation lodged against them. Unfortunately, their
conclusion of innocence crumbled when they joined the group from the crime
scene starting in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to their destination in Sual,
Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual, Pangasinan they scampered
and run away to different directions to avoid apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making any report to the
nearest authority i.e. Barangay Captain of the place they decided to escape
which they did with impunity. The records in the Police Blotter of Sual is
negatived (sic) of any entry about the whereabouts of accused Paraan and
Fabito.46
The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro
Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty of the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972, as amended. It sentenced the first three accused to death; and
Paraan, to reclusion perpetua on account of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. It also ordered them to pay the costs.
III. THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court
is automatic pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659,47 the convicted accused
filed with this Court their notices of appeal from the decision of the LARON
court and of the CASTILLO court on 18 November 1994 and 22 February
1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in this Court
as G.R. Nos. 118940-41, and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed
as G.R. No. 119407.
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellant's Briefs in G.R. Nos.
118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407, the appellants filed a motion for the
consolidation of these cases, which we granted on 27 February 1996.
In their Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants impute upon
the trial court the following errors: (a) in giving full faith and credence to the
unsubstantiated testimony of prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas relative to
the incident in question; (b) in holding them as the persons who stabbed the
jeepney driver and Virgilio Catugas in the evening of 10 March 1994 despite
the fact that clear and convincing evidence were proffered to point at the real
culprits, Romulo Calimquim and his companions; (c) in rendering a verdict of
conviction notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; and (d) in convicting them of the crimes charged
instead of the crimes homicide and frustrated homicide — on the assumption
that they are guilty.
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned errors.
They submit that:
(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the identification of the
appellants leaves much to be desired. He should not be believed, for he could
not even remember who among the appellants were wearing short pants, hat,
and shoes at that time. If policeman Gulen could not even identify in court
appellant Mejia whom he apprehended in the evening of 10 March 1994 and
brought to the Sual Police Station, it was with more reason that Catugas could
not have identified the assailants since it was nighttime. The possibility that
Catugas got confused, if not mentally and physically drained, as a result of the
shocking incident is not far-fetched. There is then a very strong and compelling
reason to believe that Catugas mistook the appellants as the real hold-uppers.
(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their children did
not commit any wrong, but Catugas "vacillated and testified falsely against
accused-appellants when they were not able to produce the amount of
P20,000.00 each as earlier demanded from them." Catuga's denial of their
testimony is self-serving and cannot overcome the positive testimony of
Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin Benito augurs well
with their claim of innocence," when they were apprehended. Benito readily
showed his driver's license, answered questions propounded by policeman
Clemente, and without hesitation he helped or guided the policemen in
locating the jeepney at the place where it was abandoned. He did not try to
hide or conceal anything when he was confronted about the incident.
Moreover, when Benito and Mejia were picked up by a policeman on that
fateful night, they were not "tainted with blood."
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be liable for
homicide and frustrated homicide, since treachery was not established.
In their Appellants' Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following
assignment of errors: (a) the facts charged in the information do not constitute
violation of the crime of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended; (b) The
court a quo erred in convicting them of the crime charged on the basis of
surmises and conjecture; and (c) the court a quo erred in convicting them by
relying fully on the evidence of the prosecution and completely disregarding
the evidence of the defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an essential
ingredient of the crime of carnapping, was not proved. They claim that from
the evidence adduced "it is very clear that the incident was only a hold-up and
that the jeepney was taken to Sual as escape vehicle."
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they discussed
jointly, the appellants submit that:
(1) The trial court's conclusion on their culpability was based on mere
surmises and conjectures and contradicted by the evidence on the record. The
fact that the group of Calimqium did not hurt any of the four appellants and
that the latter offered no resistance does not prove appellant's membership in
Calimquim's group. That they did not even jump off the passenger jeepney or
show positive signs to invite the attention of the PNP stationed along the route
from Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of fear since Calimquim's group
pointed knives at each of them and ordered them to lie down in stooping
position. The absence of conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after
they were released as hostages, they ran in separate directions and did not
join the group of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that Benito and Mejia
were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney does not bind
them, for it was made by a police officer and was contrary to what they had
reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and Fabito had escaped.
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of Catugas whose
identification of the appellants was based only on the pictures and on the
information of the policemen. It was impossible for Catugas to narrate in detail
the participation of each accused, considering that the light in the jeepney was
dim and his principal attention was concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellant's reporting of the incident disproved their membership in the
group of Calimquim. If they were members, their natural course would have
been to hide from the authorities. Their voluntary submission to the police
immediately after the incident should have been given credence as part of the
res gestae.
In the Consolidated Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
urges us to affirm in toto the challenged decisions for failure of the appellants
to show that the trial court committed error in finding the prosecution evidence
clear, sufficient, and convincing to convict. Catugas, who made an eyewitness
account, had the opportunity to observe the appellants during the commission
of the crime and had no ill-motive to implicate the appellants falsely. As to the
charge that he perjured because the appellants were not able to produce the
amount of P80,000 which he allegedly demanded from them, the same should
not be believed. The truth is, it was the parents of the appellants who
approached Catugas and offered him P80,000 in order that he would not
testify against the appellants. Catugas did not accept the offer, as it was
against his principles to tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence, the trial
court was correct in convicting the appellants of murder for the death of Teofilo
Landingin and frustrated murder for stabbing Virgilio Catugas. Their conviction
for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act is also proper, since their main purpose
was to get the jeepney and they killed Landingin in order that they could get
it. They presented to evidence to prove that they ran away with the jeepney
for any lawful purpose.
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the
identification made by prosecution witness Catugas cannot be denominated
as clear, positive, and convincing; for, while it may be true that he "could have
taken glimpse or glance at the faces of all the accused-appellants, this fact
alone is not adequate and fell short of the required test of 'positive
identification'." They strongly suggest that Catugas had ill-motive to testify
falsely against them in that he was not paid the P80,000 he demanded.
 IV. THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE
ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS
Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in order.
The crimes charged in the informations filed before the LARON court and
CASTILLO court are irretrievably linked with or related to one another. They
arose out of the same incident, are founded on the same factual milieu, and
would be proved by testimonies of the same witnesses. The three cases then
should have been consolidated and jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of
Dagupan City. What were jointly tried were only the cases for murder and
frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges
for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a
series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at
the court's discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard
against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify
the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short,
the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties
litigants.48 In Raymundo v. Elipe,49 we held that although consolidation of
several cases involving the same parties and the same subject matter is one
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a
matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even
filed with the different branches of the same court, provided one of such cases
has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO
court nor any of the parties caused, or moved for, a consolidation of the case
for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act (which has the higher docket number)
with the cases for murder and frustrated murder in the LARON court (which
have lower docket numbers). It was only after the filing of their separate
Appellant's Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407 that the
appellants moved to consolidate the latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could
contribute some difficulty in the appreciation of the evidence. The principal
witnesses of the parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of
their testimony and credibility in the LARON court must not be influenced by
their testimonies in the case before the CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In
the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was unclear in some details
of the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other hand, there
were details he disclosed in one of the courts which were not given in the other
court. The same observation may be had on the testimonies of the appellants
before both courts. As one reads the transcripts of the testimonies of these
witnesses in both cases, it would be quite difficult to avoid forming impressions
in light of the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our minds and mental
processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the
rules on evidence and the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
the appellants dictate that we resolve the appeals in the cases before the
LARON court and the case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of
the evidence presented before such courts, respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of murder in
Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No.
94-00619-D are absorbed in the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act in
Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 199350 is applicable to these
cases because the crimes were committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of
the Anti-Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 and
now imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner,
driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. This
Section, as amended, reads in full as follows:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is
found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section
Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or
force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty
years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof . (Emphasis supplied).
In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:
 and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be
imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the
carnapping. (emphasis supplied).
Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty
of life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3)
the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." The
latter makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the crime of
carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form. In short, considering the
phraseology of the amended Section 14,51 the carnapping and the killing (or
the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special
complex crime which, however, is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words "IS KILLED," no distinction
must be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other
which is committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof"
makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin — whether it be
homicide or murder — cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should
only be considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form, the prosecution had still to
prove the essential requisites of the homicide or murder of Landingin and that
of carnapping. This should have been another reason for the consolidation of
the carnapping case in the CASTILLO court with the cases before the LARON
court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539,
as amended, include the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little
differently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify
carnapping if it is committed "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof"? The answer must be in the negative
in light of the use in said Section 14 of the words "IS KILLED". The
unmistakable import thereof is that it refers only to the consummated felony of
either murder or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed "in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof," then it must be
deemed to fall under the clause (of Section 14) "when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person."
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt the carnapping of Teofilo Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a
motor vehicle under the definition in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539. 52 The
passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of gain, from Landingin by means
of violence against him which caused his death and against a passenger,
Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of the
appellants? The LARON and the CASTILLO courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.53 To overcome the presumption, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. 54
Save in certain circumstances as where, for instance, the accused admits the
commission of the acts alleged to constitute a crime but interposes justifying
circumstances, the burden is never shifted to the accused or diminished by
the weakness of his defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully
discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf.55
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the
accused is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny
of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent of
whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the
accused's innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the
accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. 56 If the
prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused's right
to be freed; it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty to acquit him.57
After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses in the cases before the
LARON court and the CASTILLO court, we are not convinced with moral
certainty that the appellants committed the crimes charged. Reasonable doubt
burdens our conscience; our minds cannot rest easy on a verdict of conviction.
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants and the
five others, namely, Romulo Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a
certain Mondragon, and another described as John Doe. All nine were
forthwith charged with the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and
carnapping in Criminal Cases Nos. 3310,58 3313,59 3311,60 respectively, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and then in the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D,61 and 94-00619-D62 of the
LARON court and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D63 of the CASTILLO court,
respectively.
The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the group of
Romulo Calimquim. The prosecution has no proof to prove otherwise; but the
LARON and the CASTILLO courts, through inferences from certain facts,
concluded that the appellants were. The conclusion is rather tenuous. While
the rigorous cross-examination of the appellants in all these cases has
established close relationship among the appellants by reason of their
residence and work, (Benito, as sand-and-gravel truck driver and Mejia,
Fabito, and Paraan as his keepers), it miserably failed to establish any
relationship between them and the five others headed by Calimquim. What
then looms large in our minds is that the appellants and the five others
happened to be passengers of Landingin's jeepney by accident, not by design.
If the appellants were with the five others until Sual, Pangasinan, it was
because they were intimidated and made to lie down on their belies inside the
jeepney.
Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not belong to the
group of Calimquim. Upon arrival in the mountains of Sual, they fled from the
Calimquim group when the first opportunity to do so came. We find to be
absolutely without basis the statement of the CASTILLO court that the
appellants abandoned Landingin's jeepney in Sitio Nipa, Baquioen, Sual,
Pangasinan, "upon seeing the arrival of concerned citizens and members of
the Sual Police Station; the responding peace officers effected the recovery
of the subject jeepney sans the accused/culprits." No prosecution witness so
testified. In the CASTILLO court, no policeman was presented as witness for
the prosecution. The evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense reveal that after appellants Benito and Mejia were picked up by
Policeman Gulen on the latter's suspicion that they were members of an akyat-
bahay gang, they voluntarily informed the police authorities of the Sual Police
Station of what happened. It was this information that brought the policemen
to where the subject jeepney was located. Benito even accompanied the
policemen. This resulted in the recovery of the jeepney by the policemen.
Appellant Paraan also presented himself later to the Police Station of Sta.
Barbara. Appellant Fabito, although apprehended by concerned citizens of the
place to where he had fled, voluntarily reported what he knew to the police
authorities of Sual and Sta. Barbara.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police
blotters of the police stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the
entries on what the appellants had declared in court is not conclusive evidence
that they did not report the incident to the police authorities. They had no
participation in the preparation of the entries. Entries in the police blotters
should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are
normally incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion
of for want of suggestion or inquiries.64 The entries in question are sadly
wanting in material particulars. At the very most, they only recorded the
impression that the appellants were "suspects."
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the
crimes, the prosecution had to rely solely on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas.
The totality of his testimony in the cases before the LARON court leaves much
to be desired. The prosecutor who conducted the direct examination was
unable to propound sensible questions to elicit clear answers bound to
reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the commission of the alleged
crimes. This deficiency thus tempted the trial judge to ask more questions.
Despite the latter's participation, the testimony of Catugas fails to convince us
that the appellants indeed participated in the commission of the crimes. On
cross-examination in the LARON court, Catugas categorically admitted that
he did not know the names of the appellants and that he could recognize only
three of the nine accused. Thus:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you mentioned the
names of the person and I will now read:
Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you know them?
A In fact I do not know, however, based on the police investigation of Sta.
Barbara PNP, they were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito,
Pedro Paraan, Mok Calimquim, alyas Dennis, Alex Mamaril, Dennis Abrigo
alyas Mondragon and one unidentified person.
can you tell this Court why these persons were written in your statement? Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?
A I cannot remember, sir.
A Because of the police investigation. Q You can't remember also whether one of these accused was wearing a
Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not able to identify hat at that time?
the accused, is that correct? A I cannot remember, sir.
A I can recognize the others, sir
Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize? In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was stabbed by
A Three (3) of them, sir. the nine persons. Thus:

COURT: COURT:

Q What you do mean when you said that that you can recognize three (3) of Q Who were involved in stabbing?
them? A All of them, sir.
A I can remember those persons who sat near me. Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed?
Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you? A The 9 persons, sir.
A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the four accused. Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who participated in the
Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] persons who is [sic] wearing stabbing incident and who were the victims?
in [sic] red T-shirt? A Me and the driver, sir.
A I saw his face, sir.
Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring to Edwin PROS. MARATA:
Benito)?
A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir.65
Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons, four of whom
were inside the courtroom?
Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the following A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed wounds, sir. 66
admissions on cross-examination: Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the
appellants inflicted any of the stab wounds on his body. Further
Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat besides [sic] the driver, compounding the uncertainty and unreliability of Catuga's testimony, he
is it not? candidly admitted on cross-examination that only one person stabbed him.
Thus:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Please point to him?
Q How many times were you stabbed by them?
A He was wearing a dark color. A Twice, sir.
Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt? Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your?
A I cannot tell, sir. A I can identify him, sir.
Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you pointed to this Q How many persons stabbed you then?
person wearing in red T-shirt? A Only one (1) person, sir.67
A I can no longer remember, sir.
Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do you remember Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the nine
his shirt? stabbed him:
A I don't know, sir.
COURT: COURT:

Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?
A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.
Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab blows with
respect to the other stab blow who delivered this stab blow?
A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.
Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo Landingin, can you
inform the Court if the four (4) accused now or these two persons are among
the four (4) accused now?
A They are not here, sir.70

COURT: Proceed.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are you referring to
the five (5) other persons as the companions of Gregorio Mejia who
participated in stabbing you?
A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir.68
Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating
the appellants. He admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of
the appellants, but before they could give the money on the agreed date, he
testified against the appellants in the LARON court. The following exchanges
between him and counsel for the defense before the CASTILLO court are
revealing:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:

He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab wound, Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able to talk with the
and then declined to point to anyone of the herein four appellants as the father of Edwin Benito?
person who did it. Thus: A Yes, sir.
Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is that correct?
COURT: A Yes, sir.
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that correct?
A I was asking P80,000.00, sir.
Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you anymore?
A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness showing his
scar near the shoulder.) COURT:
Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who stabbed you Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?
among these nine (9) persons? A Because he pleaded to me, sir.
A I could not remember anymore, sir. Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are settling the case
Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this Court whether it with Edwin Benito the amount of P80,000.00?
was one among the four (4) accused in this case who stabbed you on your A Yes, sir.
right upper arm?
A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my shoulder because COURT: Proceed.
that is the last stab wound, sir.69
ATTY. TIMANAYA:
It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from Catuga's
testimony in the CASTILLO court that the appellants had inflicted any of the Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that P80,000.00 because
stab wounds on Catugas. they are poor?
A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have agreed of another
Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court, Catugas date for them to pay, sir.
categorically admitted that none of the appellants participated in the stabbing
of Landingin. Thus:
COURT:
Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?
A That is already their counter proposal, sir.
Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you agreed to pay you
P80,000.00 but he cannot pay you at that very moment?
A Yes, sir.
COURT: Proceed.
In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the
impact of Catugas' demand for payment of P80,000 in consideration of his
exculpatory testimony. It wanted to prove that the parents of the appellants
were in fact the ones who proposed. But the testimony of Conrado Benito,
which the prosecution failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to
see him to verify whether their children had indeed committed the crimes; but
Catugas replied that since the appellants were the ones apprehended, he
would just pinpoint them so that he could recover what he had spent. He then
demanded P80,000, which he equally apportioned among the parents of the
four appellants. Conrado Benito testified as follows:

ATTY. TAMINAYA: Q What did you tell him?

A I told him that our children telling us that they did not commit any wrong
Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00? and I told them to tell the truth and we are not consenting them to whatever
they have done if they done something wrong.
COURT: That is the settlement money. Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?
A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so much for his
hospitalization, and he said also that they were the persons who were
ATTY. TAMINAYA: apprehended and so, I will just tell a lie for the same because how could I
collect for the amount I spent if I will not tell a lie?
Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you should not have
testified in this case? COURT:

A PROSECUTOR MARATA: Improper, your honor. Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a liar?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA: As follow-up question, you Honor.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
COURT: Sustained. Hypothetical.
Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that expenses?
ATTY. TAMINAYA: A I said, "then we can at least help you", because he is saying that he
suffered several wounds.
Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?
Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened on the agreed
A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give P20,000.00 each.
date?
A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, sir.
COURT:
COURT:
Q How many times did he tell your?
A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him.72
Q When you said you have already testified, you are referring to your
testimony in RTC Branch 44?
A Yes, sir.71 But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for they could
not afford it. Conrado so declared, thus:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can you tell this court
if he made mention to the wife of Teofilo Landingin?
A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us that we would not
tell the same to Mrs. Landingin.
Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?
A No sir, not even a single centavo.
Q Why?
A We cannot pay because even payment for attorney's fees, we cannot
afford.73
The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even
took the incident as offer of compromise, which may be considered an implied
admission of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.74 There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants
authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of
P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation of Catugas that the
amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his
hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible
in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 27 of Rule 130.
On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the
participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes charged.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D
(for Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of
Branch 44 and in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City are
REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro
Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt
therefor has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt or with moral certainty.
Their immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful
and valid grounds for their further detention exist. No costs. SO ORDERED.
People v. Ellasos
This is an appeal by Sonny Obillo from the Decision 1 dated February 4, 1999
of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No.
SJC-64 (92), finding Carlo Ellasos alias Rommel Reyes and Sonny Obillo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping with Homicide.
On May 20, 1992, accused Carlo Ellasos alias Rommel and Sonny Obillo were
charged with the crime of violation of R.A. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act,
with Homicide in an Information which reads, to wit:
"That on or about April 2, 1992, in the City of San Jose, Republic of
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take and carry away a motor tricycle with Plate No. CV-1275 owned
by and belonging to Miguel de Belen, against the will of the latter;
that on the occasion thereof and for the purposes of enabling them
to take and carry away the motor tricycle above mentioned, the
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, with evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength and
with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and shoot the
aforesaid Miguel de Belen with an unlicensed firearm, thereby
inflicting wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous
death. That as a consequence of the death of said Miguel de Belen,
his heirs sustained actual compensatory and moral damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW, and committed at nighttime, which facilitated
its commission."2
On July 21, 1992, Sonny Obillo was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charges. Trial proceeded against him. Carlo Ellasos escaped from the jail
before arraignment and was only arrested four (4) years thereafter when the
prosecution had already rested its case.3 Ellasos was thereafter arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charges. While the counsel of Ellasos was still
reviewing the evidence presented by the prosecution against Obillo, Ellasos
was convicted of another crime of robbery by the RTC of Roxas, Isabela,
Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. 23-654, and was committed to the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa.4 Accused Sonny Obillo took the witness stand, after
which the defense rested its case.5 On July 10, 1997, the lower court issued
an Order separating the trial of the case against the two accused, and
transferring the trial of the case against Carlo Ellasos to the RTC of Muntinlupa
while maintaining that against Sonny Obillo in the RTC of San Jose City. 6
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) SPO2
Edgardo Santos and SPO1 Apolinario Agustin of the San Jose City Police
Station; (2) Edgardo Galletes, the caretaker of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in
Muñoz; (3) Fernando de Belen, the brother of the victim; (4) Elena de Belen,
the widow of the victim; (5) Antonio de Belen, another brother of the victim
who testified as to the damages sustained by the carnapped tricycle; and (6)
Dr. Raul Agliam who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim. The
testimonies of these witnesses were summarized by the trial court as follows: 7
"SPO2 EDGARDO SANTOS testified that on April 3, 1992, P/Lt.
Agustin of the Muñoz Police Station called by telephone to inform the
San Jose City Police Station that the [probable] suspects in the killing
of a tricycle driver at Tayabo, San Jose City were in the vicinity of the
Iglesia Ni Cristo chapel at Muñoz, Nueva Ecija; that he together with
his co-policemen went to the Iglesia Ni Cristo compound in Muñoz
and coordinated with Jaime Dionisio, the Head Minister thereat; that
Minister Jaime Dionisio turned over to them the persons of Sonny
Obillo and Carlo Ellasos together with a .38 caliber revolver paltik
with two (2) live ammunitions; that they brought Sonny Obillo and
Carlo Ellasos to the Muñoz Police Station, then later on to the San
Jose City Police Station where they endorsed said persons to the
Investigator; that Lt. Agustin was the one who actually received the
firearm from Minister Dionisio; that the gun is a police positive,
colored black with rust, about six (6) inches barrel bearing the
marking Smith & Wesson; that he positively identified the gun which
was shown to him as the same gun that was turned over to them by
the Minister.
SPO1 APOLINARIO AGUSTIN testified that on April 3, 1992, while
he was at the police headquarters of San Jose City, the Chief of
Police of the Muñoz Police Station informed the police of San Jose
City that two unidentified persons who [might have something to do
with] the killing of the tricycle driver on the night of April 2, 1992 at
Tayabo, San Jose City were at the Iglesia Ni Cristo chapel in Muñoz,
Nueva Ecija; that he together with SPO3 Renato Bautista, SPO2
Edgar Santos and PO3 Edmundo Afable responded and Muñoz
Chief of Police Lt. Agustin and Minister Dionisio turned over to them
the persons of Sonny Obillo and Carlo Ellasos; that Minister Dionisio
also turned over to them a .38 caliber revolver bearing the mark
Smith & Wesson which was taken from Ellasos.
EDGARDO GALLETES testified that he was one of those who
actually apprehended Carlo Ellasos and Sonny Obillo in the
compound of the Iglesia Ni Cristo at Muñoz, Nueva Ecija; that at
about 3:00 o’clock in the morning of April 3, 1992, he saw Ellasos
and Obillo sleeping at the gate of the church reeking with the smell
of liquor;8 that he noticed that Carlo Ellasos had a .38 revolver; that
his companions Mario Cabotaje and Manolo Cabotaje roused Obillo
and Ellasos, thereafter, apprehended them and brought them inside
where they were interrogated;9 that he summoned the police and
informed them about the two persons; that he asked Ellasos why he
was in possession of a gun and Ellasos told him that it was for his
defense; that he asked also Obillo why he was in possession of a
tricycle wheel and Obillo replied that he took the wheel from Muñoz;
that they turned over the apprehended persons to the policemen and
.38 caliber revolver with three (3) live ammunition.
FERNANDO DE BELEN testified that the deceased Miguel de Belen
is his elder brother; that he does not know Ellasos, but he knows
Sonny Obillo; that on April 2, 1992 at about 9:00 P.M., while he was
a backrider of a tricycle driven by his cousin, Edgardo Camps, he
saw the tricycle of his elder brother Miguel refueling at the Caltex
Station; that he approached the said tricycle and he saw inside the
sidecar Sonny Obillo seated with his elder brother Miguel while
Ellasos was driving the tricycle; that he talked to his brother, who told
him they were bound to [sic] Malasin; that he was not able to ask why
somebody else was driving his tricycle; that Obillo was seated at the
outer place of the side of the sidecar and did not notice anything
unusual about his motion; that his brother and the two (2) accused
proceeded towards the direction of Malasin and he waited for them
at the station; that at about 12:00 o’clock that same evening, the
tricycle of his elder brother passed by without his elder brother and it
was only Obillo and Ellasos who were in the tricycle; that he and his
other elder brother Leonardo de Belen followed the tricycle driven by
Ellasos and Obillo; that they followed them up to the City Plaza,
where they observed the tricycle pick up a passenger, and then sped
towards the direction of Metrobank, then turned right to the direction
of Sto. Niño; that they stopped at Tierra Hotel where they waited and
when the accused passed by their place, they confronted Ellasos and
Obillo about the whereabouts of their brother Miguel; that Ellasos told
them that their brother was left behind in Malasin where he was in a
drinking session with his (Ellasos’) father; that they proceeded to
Malasin but they were not able to find Miguel; that the following
morning, they reported the disappearance of their brother Miguel at
the police station; that while they were at the police station, a certain
policeman arrived and informed them that they were able to recover
a cadaver at Tayabo and he might be their brother Miguel; that he
together with the uncle of his wife and some policemen went to the
area, where he saw his brother Miguel tied to a tree already dead;
that the cadaver of his brother was brought to a funeral parlor.
 ELENA DE BELEN testified that she is the widow of Miguel de Belen,
who died on April 2, 1992; that the total expenses incurred with
respect to the death of her husband is P30,000.00.
ANTONIO DE BELEN testified that the tricycle cab10 of Miguel was
damaged, both wheels were disaligned, the windshield, the
headlight, the flasher, and the shock absorbers were all broken, the
engine block was disaligned and the cover of the carburetor was
missing; that the expenses incurred for the repair of the tricycle was
P5,000.00 which was covered by receipts, while the repairs
amounting to P400.00 for the body repair and P800.00 for the
upholstery and P300.00 for labor were without receipts.
DR. RAUL AGLIAM testified that on April 3, 1992, he conducted [an]
autopsy of the body of Miguel de Belen upon the request of the Chief
of Police of San Jose City; that he prepared an autopsy report, one
copy of which was given to the requesting party, another attached to
the death certificate and another one used as file copy; that the
cadaver was in the state of rigor mortis which meant that the
deceased had been dead for more than five (5) hours; that there was
a gunshot wound with point of entry on the left temporal region which
was positive for gun powder burns around the wound; that there was
abrasion on the skin and accumulation of blood clots around the neck
caused by a rope; that there was a 3 x 4 cm. abrasion on the left
subscapular region and a 2 x 3 cm. abrasion on the left lumber
region; that the cause of death was irreversible shock due to gunshot
wound which damaged the vital center of the brain; xxx."
For his part, accused-appellant Sonny Obillo interposed the defense of denial
and proffered the following testimony:11
"xxx on April 2, 1992 at about 6:05 P.M., he arrived at their house at
Julia Street, Abar I, San Jose City and was invited by Rommel Reyes
to a drinking session at the house of Lito del Rosario and Joey Igna
also at Julia street; that Rommel Reyes bought three (3) bottles of
Ginebra San Miguel and he together with Lito del Rosario, Joey Igna
and Rommel Reyes consumed the three (3) bottles of Ginebra up to
8:00 P.M.; that when Joey Igna went home, Rommel Reyes invited
him to Adela street where they continued drinking and consumed
four (4) bottles of Red Horse beer; that he and Rommel proceeded
to Tanibong and thereafter they proceeded to the city plaza where
they stayed up to 10:00 P.M.; that after he invited Rommel to go
home, they took a tricycle; that while in the tricycle, Rommel who was
seated at the back of the driver poked a .38 caliber handgun at the
driver and ordered him to get down; that the tricycle driver complied
and sat beside him (Obillo) inside the sidecar; that Rommel Reyes
drove the tricycle to the Caltex Station near the Catholic church for
gasoline; that while the motorcycle was being refueled, the tricycle
driver alighted and talked to somebody whom he did not recognize;
that the tricycle driver returned and sat beside him without asking any
help from anyone in that gasoline station; that Rommel Reyes drove
the tricycle towards the direction of Tanibong; that instead of going
to Tanibong, they proceeded to Tayabo; that when they reached the
vicinity of Tayabo, Rommel Reyes told him to wait because Rommel
Reyes and the tricycle driver would go somewhere; that while waiting
for them to return, he fell asleep inside the tricycle because he was
drunk; that when he woke up, they were already at the Iglesia Ni
Cristo in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija; that the Security Guards of the Iglesia
Ni Cristo woke them up with their guns pointed at them; that he and
Rommel Reyes were the only ones there and the tricycle driver was
no longer with them; that they were brought to the Minister inside the
compound and when they were alone he asked Rommel the
whereabouts of the tricycle driver; that Rommel told him that he killed
the tricycle driver; that he was surprised about the disclosure by that
Rommel Reyes; that the Minister brought with him policemen from
Muñoz Police Station and then they were transported to the Muñoz
Municipal jail; that they were manhandled by the policemen; that they
were brought to the San Jose City jail where they were again
manhandled; that they were investigated, however, they were not
informed of their constitutional rights and were not given a lawyer to
assist them; that Rommel Reyes was tortured by the police officers,
thereafter he confessed responsibility in the killing of the tricycle
driver; that Rommel Reyes is the true name of Carlo Ellasos the latter
being an alias used by the accused while inside the jail; that he met
Rommel Reyes at Julia street through a gay named Odessa Ellasos
and was acquainted with him for only a month; that it was only during
that incident that they two of them were together; that he denied any
participation in the killing of the tricycle driver."
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment dated February 4, 1999, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused
Sonny Obillo and Carlo Ellasos alias Rommel Reyes12, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping with Homicide
and hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of
 Reclusion Perpetua and to pay to the heirs of Miguel de Belen the
following:
1. P50,000.00 compensatory damages for the death of Miguel de Belen;
2. P30,000.00 as indemnification for funeral expenses;
3. P6,500.00 for damages incurred on the tricycle; and
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED."13
Only the accused Sonny Obillo filed the instant appeal which raises the
following errors:
I THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME OF CARNAPPING WITH
HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED.
II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT SONNY
OBILLO CONSPIRED WITH CARLO ELLASOS ALIAS ROMMEL REYES.
III THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SONNY
OBILLO DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the trial judge gravely erred in
rendering a judgment of conviction against both accused Sonny Obillo and
Carlo Ellasos, despite the fact that he had ordered a separate trial of the case
against them, and transferred the trial of accused Ellasos to the RTC of
Muntinlupa. In his Order14 dated July 10, 1997, the trial judge stated:
"As Carlo Ellasos, a co-accused in this case is presently detained at
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, the Court is constrained to
transfer the trial of accused Carlo Ellasos at the RTC, Muntinlupa
and shall decide the case of accused Sonny Obillo separately from
said accused. The records of these cases to be transmitted forthwith
after the decision is rendered in these cases relative to accused
Sonny Obillo.
Considering that the prosecution needs a period of time to study
whether or not to present rebuttal evidence in these cases, he is
given a period of fifteen days within which to inform the Court
regarding the matter and if the prosecution fails to comply within the
fifteen-day period granted them, these cases shall be deemed
submitted for decision as against accused Sonny Obillo."
Hence, since the trial of Ellasos did not take place the trial court should have
rendered a decision only against Sonny Obillo.
Upon a review of the records, we affirm the judgment against Obillo.
Upon the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the
essential element of intent to gain was not proven by the prosecution; that had
the purpose of the accused been to appropriate the tricycle, they could have
taken the said vehicle to a place where it could not be easily found; that the
taking of the wheel of the tricycle can. under the circumstances, be
conclusively presumed to be a mere afterthought, and if indeed a crime has
been committed it can only be theft of the wheel of the tricycle.
The contentions are unmeritorious.
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping", defines carnapping, thus:
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things."[Ibid., sec. 2]
Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of carnapping,
is an internal act and hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the
vehicle.15 Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the vehicle
without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete
from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has
no opportunity to dispose of the same.16
In the case before us, when the victim, Miguel de Belen, who is the registered
owner of the tricycle subject of this carnapping case, 17 was last seen by his
brother Fernando at the Caltex station at 9:00 p.m. on April 2, 1992, he
(Miguel) was seated beside the accused Sonny Obillo inside the sidecar of his
tricycle which was being driven by the other accused Carlo Ellasos. Three (3)
hours later, Fernando again saw the two accused with the tricycle, but this
time without his brother. When Fernando finally asked the accused about the
whereabouts of his brother, Ellasos answered that Miguel was in a drinking
session with his (Ellasos’) father in Malasin. The following morning, the lifeless
body of Miguel de Belen, with a gunshot wound on the head, was found in
Tayabo. In the same morning, the two accused were found sleeping at the
gate of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in Muñoz, and in possession of a gun and
the wheel of Miguel’s tricycle. The rest of the tricycle was later recovered in a
culvert.
The chain of proven circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the
tricycle was unlawfully taken by the two accused from its owner, Miguel de
Belen, and the latter was killed on the occasion thereof. Miguel was last seen
with the two accused; three hours later, the two were again spotted riding the
tricycle without Miguel. The following morning, the two accused were found in
possession of a wheel of the tricycle. Such possession, which remained
without any satisfactory explanation, raises the presumption that the two
accused authored the carnapping.18 This presumption remains unrebutted. In
fact, the possession of the wheel of the tricycle subject of this carnapping case
is not denied by the accused-appellant who, in his Brief, even argued thus:
"The fact that part of the tricycle was found in possession of Sonny Obillo
would not alter our theory [that the element of intent to gain is wanting]
because considering all the circumstances, it could be conclusively presumed
that the taking of the wheel was merely an afterthought. xxx If indeed a crime
has been committed, it can only be theft of the wheel of the tricycle." 19 That
only the wheel was found in possession of the accused and was intended to
be appropriated by the latter is of no moment. The unlawful taking of the
tricycle from the owner was already completed. Besides, the accused may be
held liable for the unlawful taking of the whole vehicle even if only a part
thereof is ultimately taken and/or appropriated while the rest of it is
abandoned. In the case of People vs. Carpio 20, this Court convicted the
accused Carpio of theft of a car which was found abandoned one day after it
was stolen but without three (3) of its tires, holding thus:
"xxx The act of asportation in this case was undoubtedly committed
with intent on the part of the thief to profit by the act, and since he
effectively deprived the true owner of the possession of the entire
automobile, the offense of larceny comprised the whole car. The fact
that the accused stripped the car of its tires and abandoned the
machine in a distant part of the city did not make the appellant any
less liable for the larceny of that automobile. The deprivation of the
owner and the trespass upon his right of possession were complete
as to the entire car; and the fact that the thieves thought it wise
promptly to abandon the machine in no wise limits their criminal
responsibility to the particular parts of the car that were appropriated
and subsequently used by the appellant upon his own car."21
Anent the second and third assignments of error, the accused-appellant
argues that there was no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that
Sonny Obillo conspired with Carlo Ellasos who admitted responsibility for the
killing of the victim. He points out that the evidences of the prosecution merely
show that Obillo was seen with Ellasos on the night of April 2, 1992 and in the
morning of April 3, 1992; and that Obillo made no attempt to refute the false
statements of Ellasos regarding the whereabouts of the victim Miguel de
Belen. He also stresses that there is no evidence on record to prove that he
(Obillo) performed an overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 22 Conspiracy
need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct
of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,23 which
are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.24
The following circumstances enumerated in Appellee’s Brief provide sufficient
basis from which it can be inferred that the two accused, Carlo Ellasos and
Sonny Obillo, acted in concert in the series of events that took place on April
2 to April 3, 1992.
1. In the evening of April 2, 1992, accused flogged down the tricycle
of Miguel de Belen. Accuses Ellasos rode behind him while accused-
appellant stayed inside the sidecar.
2. Around 9 o’clock, Fernando de Belen saw Miguel’s tricycle at the
Caltex Station. Accused Ellasos was at the driver’s seat while Miguel
was seated inside near the driver and accused-appellant at the outer
side of the sidecar.
3. They left together to the direction of Malasin, but they went to
Tayabo, where Miguel’s body was later found.
4. At midnight, Fernando and Leonardo de Belen saw accused using
Miguel’s tricycle, but Miguel was not with them.
5. Upon inquiry by Leonardo, accused told them that Miguel was left
behind at Malasin having a drinking spree with Ellasos’ father.
Accused-appellant who was awake at that time joined in the
 conversation but did not correct the wrong information given by
accused Ellasos.
6. Fernando and Leonardo de Belen went to Malasin but did not find
Miguel.
7. At 3:00 in the early morning, accused who were both drunk
stopped in front of the Iglesia ni Cristo Church in Muñoz where they
fell asleep.
8. Around 6:00 in the morning, the INC security guards roused
accused from their sleep as they were blocking the gate.
9. The INC guards found that accused Ellasos was carrying a gun
and accused-appellant had a wheel of a tricycle.
10. Accused were brought inside the compound where they were
interrogated. They admitted to be residents of 1st Abar, San Jose
City where the de Belen’s likewise reside.
11. The San Jose City Police found a dead male person tied hanging
to a tree with a gunshot wound in the head.
12. Fernando and his wife’s uncle reported the disappearance of
Miguel.
13. The dead person at Tayabo was identified by Fernando to be his
missing brother Miguel.
14. Miguel’s badly damaged tricycle was found in a culvert. 25
The testimony of the accused-appellant that he fell asleep while waiting for
Ellasos and Miguel inside the tricycle and that when he woke up he was
already in front of the guards at the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel deserves scant
attention in light of the positive testimonies of two witnesses, namely: (1)
Fernando de Belen testified that he saw Ellasos and Obillo riding the tricycle
of his brother Miguel at about midnight of April 2, 1992, and even asked them
regarding the whereabouts of his brother, to which Ellasos answered that
Miguel was still in Malasin having a drinking session with his (Ellasos’)
father;26 and (2) Edgardo Galletes testified that at about 3:00 in the morning
of April 3, 1992, he saw Ellasos and Obillo arrive by foot at the Iglesia ni Cristo
compound; when he asked the two where they came from, they answered
"Munoz".27 Between the self-serving testimony of the accused-appellant and
the positive testimonies of the two witnesses negating the former, we have no
cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s finding giving more credence to the
latter.
On the matter of conviction of the accused based on circumstantial evidence,
the following requisites need to be satisfied: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.28 Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only
if the circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the defendant, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that
of guilty."29
A careful perusal of the transcript of the testimonies of witnesses for both the
prosecution and the defense shows adequate evidentiary bases to establish
the aforementioned circumstances. The unbroken chain of these proven
circumstances inevitably point to only one conclusion--that the accused Obillo
and Ellasos are guilty of unlawfully taking the tricycle from its owner, Miguel
de Belen, and of killing the latter. This Court has held that "[i]n the absence of
an explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen effects
belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily
be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person and
of the robbery committed on him."30 The court a quo, thus, committed no error
in convicting the accused beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, taking advantage of
superior strength and nighttime cannot be appreciated as no evidence was
presented to prove the same. To establish the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, it must be shown that there was a period sufficient to
afford full opportunity for reflection and a time adequate to allow the
conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will as well as
outward acts showing the intent to kill.31 Abuse of superior strength is
appreciated when the aggressors purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 32 As
aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not that there are 3,
4 or more assailants as against one victim but whether the aggressors took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense.33
With respect to nighttime as an aggravating circumstance, this circumstance
must have specially been sought to consummate the crime, facilitate its
success or prevent recognition of the felon.34
The circumstance of treachery was also not proven. Treachery exists when
the offender commits a crime against persons, employing means or methods
which directly and specially insure its execution without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. 35 It must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself. 36
When the body of the victim was found, it was loosely tied by the neck to a
tree.37 However, no one saw the killing, and there is no proof that the victim
was tied to the tree prior to the killing. Neither is there proof that the act of
tying was consciously and deliberately done by the accused to ensure the
execution of the crime without affording the victim any opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate. The hands and feet of the victim remained free and untied.
At any rate, we can only surmise as to what actually transpired during the
killing of Miguel de Belen, and thus cannot appreciate treachery which cannot
be based on mere presumption.38
In connection with the penalty imposed, the Solicitor-General invites our
attention to the erroneous imposition by the trial court of the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua upon the accused.
Section 14 of R.A. 6539 provides for the penalty for Carnapping, to wit:
"Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the
commission of the carnapping." [Emphasis supplied]
This was amended by R.A. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law, which took effect
on December 31, 1993, thereby changing the penalty contained in the last
clause to read: "and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof". [Section 20, Ibid.]
The crime was committed before the effectivity of R.A. 7659. Therefore, we
have to apply the original provision prescribing the penalty of "life
imprisonment to death" where the "owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping". As there is no
aggravating circumstance present in this case, the maximum penalty
imposable for the crime is life imprisonment. 39 Hence, the trial court erred in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Time and again, we have
emphasized that life imprisonment is not synonymous to reclusion perpetua.
Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent and duration. 40
Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by
special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code.41
With regard to the indemnification for funeral expenses in the amount of
P30,000.00, records show that the same is only partially supported by
evidence. The receipt presented by the prosecution reflects only the amount
of P15,000.00.42 Hence, we should limit the award to the latter amount in
accordance with the well-settled rule that only expenses supported by
documents such as receipts and which appear to be expended in connection
with the death of the victim are allowed to be recovered.43 Bare allegations of
witnesses as to the expenses incurred are not sufficient. As for the
indemnification for the damages sustained by the recovered tricycle, this has
no factual basis on record and therefore should be deleted.44 The award of
exemplary damages should likewise be deleted as no aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime.45
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that only Sonny Obillo is convicted of Carnapping with
Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of Miguel de Belen. The indemnification for funeral
expense is reduced to P15,000.00, while the awards of P6,500.00 for the
damages on the carnapped tricycle and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
are deleted.
The judgment convicting Carlo Ellasos in the same case is set aside. Upon
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa so that the criminal
prosecution of Ellasos can proceed with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
NOTE: People v. Bustinera – checked earlier case. Failed to return one
Daewoo taxi
ANTI CATTLE RUSTLING; PD 533
Pil-ey v. People
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing
the November 29, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 19810, which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First
Judicial Region, Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province.
On May 27, 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC charging petitioner
Ernesto Pil-ey and his two co-accused, Constancio Manochon and Waclet
Anamot, with violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 533, or the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law, committed as follows:
That on or before April 15, 1994, in the evening thereof at [S]itio Ta-
ed, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping one another and with intent to gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
load on a Ford Fierra one (1) male cow, and thereafter butchered the
same, against and without the consent of the owner, Rita Khayad,
resulting to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine
currency.
That the use of a motor vehicle attended and facilitated the
commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On arraignment, the three pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.4 Thereafter,
the RTC proceeded to try the case.
From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the facts are as follows.
On April 16, 1994, private complainant Rita Khayad of Bontoc, Mt. Province
discovered that her 3-year-old white and black-spotted cow,5 which was
grazing at Sitio Taed with her 4 other bovines, was missing.6 She and her
children searched for it but to no avail. She was later informed by her
grandson, Ronnie Faluyan, that in the afternoon of April 15, 1994, while the
latter was with his friends at the 156 Store at the back of the market, he saw
a cow similar to that of his grandmother’s 7 loaded in a blue Ford Fiera driven
along the national highway by accused Manochon. 8 With Manochon in the
Fiera was his helper, petitioner Pil-ey.9 Manochon was a butcher and meat
vendor.10
After having ascertained from people in the market that the cow was already
slaughtered,11 Rita reported the matter to the police.12 Tagged as the primary
suspects were petitioner Pil-ey, his co-accused, Manochon and Anamot. The
3 accused were invited by the authorities to the Bontoc Municipal Police
Station for questioning.13 On April 17, 1994, Rita, Annie and Ronnie went to
the station to file their respective affidavits.14 During the confrontation between
the parties, petitioner Pil-ey admitted that they were the ones who took the
cow. Since they were relatives, Pil-ey asked for a settlement of the case.15
Rita, however, rebuffed the request.16 On separate occasions, Anamot and
Manochon went to the house of Rita,17 to offer a compromise, but again, Rita
refused. 18
Traversing the prosecution evidence, accused Manochon and Pil-ey testified
that on April 12, 1994, Anamot went to Manochon’s house and offered his cow
for sale and butchering19 for P7,000.00. Manochon agreed and gave him
P1,000.00 as advance payment; the balance of P6,000.00 shall be paid after
the cow’s meat had been sold.20 At 7:00 a.m. of April 15, 1994, Anamot went
to the market and requested Pil-ey to ask Manochon, who was then busy
chopping meat for sale, if his cow could be scheduled for butchering on the
following day.21 Manochon consented so Anamot described the white and
black-spotted cow and instructed Pil-ey to get the same above the road at Sitio
Taed.22
Hence, at 2:00 p.m. on that day, while Manochon was in Sagada buying pigs, 23
Pil-ey went to Sitio Taed, found the subject cow, tied it to a tree within the
area, and then went home to wait for Manochon.24 When the latter came back
from Sagada, they proceeded back to Sitio Taed at around 4:00 p.m. to load
the cow in the blue Ford Fiera.25 Passing along the national road,26 they then
went back to Manochon’s house in Caluttit.27 At 11:00 p.m., they butchered
the cow at Manochon’s house and readied it for sale.28
In the afternoon of April 16, 1994, they were surprised when they were invited
by the Bontoc Police for investigation in view of the complaint of Rita Khayad
who claimed to be the owner of the cow.29 Manochon further stated that only
Pil-ey and Anamot answered the questions of the police officers and the
private complainant, and that he was not able to explain his side as they were
forced and sent immediately to jail. 30 He denied offering a settlement and
explained that he went to Rita Khayad’s house to deliver the P6,000.00.31
Petitioner Pil-ey denied asking forgiveness from private complainant and
insisted that the cow they took was Anamot’s.32
For his part, Anamot denied having conspired with his co-accused in taking
the subject cow.33 He testified that in 1993, he and Rita co-owned a white
female cow, which was hacked and sold for butchering to Manochon. 34 On
April 12, 1994, he went to see Manochon at his house in order to collect his
share of the payment.35 He further claimed that, aside from the cow he co-
owned with Rita, he had three other cows grazing near the road going to
Guina-ang but he had nothing at Sitio Taed;36 hence, he denied seeing and
talking to Manochon and Pil-ey on April 15, 1994 and instructing them to get
a cow at Sitio Taed. He stated that after the meeting on April 12, 1994, he saw
his co-accused again when they were already behind bars. 37 He further
alleged that he went to Rita’s place not to ask for a settlement but only to ask
from the latter why he was included in her complaint. 38
On March 22, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision39 finding the three accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. The fallo of the RTC’s decision reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in the process, sentencing each of the above-named
accused to indeterminate imprisonment of ten (10) years, and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5)
months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal as maximum –
the statute violated being a special law; ordering the said accused to
pay jointly and severally the sum of P10,000.00 to the offended party;
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.40
Individual notices of appeal41 were, then, filed by the accused. On November
29, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and disposed of
the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment of
conviction dated March 22, 1996, rendered by Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, in Criminal Case No. 1025 entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Constancio Manochon, Waclet Anamot and
Ernesto Pil-ey," the same is AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against accused-appellants. SO ORDERED.42
The separate motions for reconsideration43 were denied; thus, the three
accused interposed their respective but separate appeals before this Court.
On November 11, 2002, Constancio Manochon’s petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 155234 was denied by the Court for failure to
submit a certified true copy of the assailed decision; and for raising factual
issues.44 Likewise, on December 16, 2002, the Court denied Waclet Anamot’s
petition for review on certiorari (UDK-13174) for failure to pay the docket
fees.45
Thus, only the instant petition for review on certiorari46 filed by Ernesto Pil-ey
is left for resolution.
In this petition, Pil-ey reiterates his and Manochon’s narration of the incident, 47
and raises the following issues:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
OFFER OF COMPROMISE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER IS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF
GUILT [IN SPITE] OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS MADE DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
WHERE THE PETITIONER’S [RIGHTS] WERE NOT OBSERVED, HENCE, THE SAME IS
INADMISSIBLE.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING IN THIS
CASE THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER SECTION 7 IN RELATION TO SECTION
5 OF PD NO. 533, THE ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974.
III WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT [IN SPITE] OF THE FACT THAT EVIDENCE ON RECORD
COULD NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION.48
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not, based on the evidence on
record, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the provisions
of P.D. No. 533 or the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
We rule in the affirmative.
Cattle-rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without
the consent of the owner or raiser, of any cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass or
other domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or
gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of
any person or force upon things; and it includes the killing of large cattle, or
taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser.49
Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is
done without the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any
means, method or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain;
and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation
against persons or force upon things.50 Considering that the gravamen of the
crime is the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its meat or hide without
the consent of the owner or raiser,51 conviction for the same need only be
supported by the fact of taking without the cattle owner’s consent.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Rita
Khayad’s white and black-spotted cow was taken from Sitio Taed where it was
grazing; that its taking was without Rita’s consent; and that the said cattle was
later seen in the possession of the petitioner and his co-accused. Thus, the
foregoing elements of the crime of cattle-rustling are present.
Its takers have not offered a satisfactory explanation for their possession of
the missing bovine. It is the rule that when stolen property is found in the
possession of one, not the owner, and without a satisfactory explanation of his
possession, he is presumed to be the thief. 52 This is in consonance with the
disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. 53
Indeed, petitioner’s defense of mistake of fact, i.e., he and his employer
Manochon were of the erroneous belief that the cow was owned or raised by
Anamot, is unacceptable. This defense crumbles in the light of Anamot’s
testimony that his purpose in going to Manochon’s house on April 12, 1994
was to exact payment of a white female cow sold for butchering in 1993, and
not to sell the white and black-spotted cow subject of this case. He further
stated that he did not have cows grazing at Sitio Taed.
Petitioner’s admission in the course of the trial that he and his co-accused
took the cow is buttressed by the testimony of prosecution witness Ronnie
Faluyan that he saw Manochon and Pil-ey with the subject cow in a blue Ford
Fiera. This judicial admission, which binds the declarant and which does not
need any further presentation of evidence,54 reinforces petitioner’s conviction.
Thus, petitioner’s argument that his alleged offer of settlement during the
informal confrontation at the police station is inadmissible in evidence because
it was made without the presence of counsel, is no longer material. After all,
the crime of cattle-rustling and the fact that petitioners and his co-accused are
the perpetrators thereof had been established by ample evidence other than
the alleged inadmissible extrajudicial confession. The same holds true even if
we do not apply the presumption of guilt under Section 755 of P.D. No. 533.
All told, we hold that the evidence on record sufficiently prove the unanimous
findings of the RTC and the CA that the petitioner and his co-accused are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the provisions of P.D. No. 533.
There is no cogent reason to reverse the said rulings.
Be that as it may, we, however, find that the penalty imposed by the trial court
is erroneous. While it correctly imposed reclusion temporal in its minimum
period as the maximum penalty, it erred in imposing prision mayor in its
maximum period as the minimum penalty. As in Canta v. People,56 the RTC
in this case considered P.D. No. 533 as a special law and applied the latter
portion of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 57 However, as we
have declared in Canta, the computation of the penalty should be in
accordance with our discussion in People v. Macatanda,58 which we quote
herein for emphasis, thus:
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. No. 533 is a
special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal
Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of
the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily
imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall
be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with
respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise
to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision
which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been
intended to be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of
the same Code should, likewise, be applicable x x x. 59
Hence, in the instant case, considering that neither aggravating 60 nor
mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the penalty to
be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. We, thus, modify the minimum
penalty imposed by the trial court to be four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional.
Furthermore, we note that the separate appeals interposed by Manochon and
Anamot were denied by this Court on November 11 and December 16, 2002,
respectively. As their convictions were affirmed earlier, they were already
made to suffer the erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court. Nevertheless,
they shall benefit from the favorable modification of the minimum penalty
made herein. Section 11, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that "an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter." 61
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner Ernesto Pil-ey
and his co-accused Constancio Manochon and Waclet Anamot are hereby
SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum. SO ORDERED.
THEFT; Art. 308-311
Valenzuela v. People xx done
Worldwide Web Corporation v. People
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
set aside the Decision1 dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution 2 dated 27
November 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the
search warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special
Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications
for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office
premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) 4 located at the
11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as
well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet
Internet)5 located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners
were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of
Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and
prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). 6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications
for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and
Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of
PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass
through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to
the toll center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the
Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice
circuits, either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio using
satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the
destination country. The toll center would then meter the call, which will pass
through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In contrast,
petitioners were able to provide international long distance call services to any
part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This
scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or
frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities
of the originating country or the country where the call is originated."9
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and
registered to WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an
internet-based international call service, which can be availed of via prepaid
or billed/post-paid accounts."10 During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed
the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a
voice prompt required him to enter the user code and personal identification
number (PIN) provided under a GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then
requested to enter the destination number, which included the country code,
phone number and a pound (#) sign. The call was completed to a phone
number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed that the
call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that the
international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to
WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald
Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.11 However, upon an ocular
inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant
of the unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to
WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and used as
dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally
connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international
calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
401 as amended,13 on unauthorized installation of telephone connections.
Petitioners also committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone
lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole
business and revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted
contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in
bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and bypass
charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities
and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long
distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum
Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first
securing type approval license from the latter.
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed
a monthly revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners
deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes,
license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office
premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location
of particular computers and servers that would be taken. 14
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search
warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued against the office
premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items:
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1)
of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto,
III, Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto,
Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with
business address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City,
Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:
a) Computers or any equipment or device capable
of accepting information, applying the process of
the information and supplying the results of this
process;
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or
device used for recording or storing information;
and c) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
billing statements, receipts, contracts,
communications and documents relating to
securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against
Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S.
Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with
business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device
that enables data terminal equipment such as
computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable
of accepting information applying the prescribed
process of the information and supplying the
results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or
device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that
enables two or more signals from different sources
to pass through a common cable or transmission
line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or
equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or
device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease
and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to
 securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1)
of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki
S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with
business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device
that enables data terminal equipment such as
computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable
of accepting information applying the prescribed
process of the information and supplying the
results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or
device capable of transmitting air waves or
frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that
enables two or more signals from different sources
to pass through a common cable or transmission
line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or
equipment or device capable of connecting
telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or
device used for recording or storing information;
and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes,
billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks,
orders, communications and documents, lease
and/or subscription agreements or contracts,
communications and documents relating to
securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the
National Capital Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15 central processing units
(CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop
computer.20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its
employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of
international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk,
were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers,
were also seized. Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet Internet22
filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the
same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause,
since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act
complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general
warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the
poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls
alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of
Eastern Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital
Wireless (Capwire).24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both
provided international direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed
by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the
first phase of the call; but for the second phase, it used the IGF of either
Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT for its domestic
phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage. None of these
contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued
were in the nature of general warrants.25 Thus, the properties seized under
the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the ground
that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
THE CA RULING
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and
declared the search warrants valid and effective. 28
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.29Among
the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather
than an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The
appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.30
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,31
and Planet Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court
consolidated the two Petitions.33
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite the
following procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public
prosecutor, had no personality to question the
quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal
rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause,
considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants
were not general warrants.
OUR RULING
I 1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of
the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They
argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has
direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced
by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by
the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 35 an application for
a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for
and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a
criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special
criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order
in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely
as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to
its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as
formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein. 36
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.
Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of parties to question
orders quashing those warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that
the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved
party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search
warrants.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was
interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT
should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for
their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The Court held therein as follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search
warrant and to return the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is
it merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American
jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods
seized, the order of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence,
not appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of defendant's
petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant is such an
interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order
is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the
search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory
character because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal
case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein. 39
Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as
an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of
one yet to be filed.40 Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant
is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the
purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion
to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case,
as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory.
There is still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein."41
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of
a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a
motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is
nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here,
the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings
and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants
issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be
done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final
orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
II. Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their
judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the
search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be searched."42
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause 43 in the issuance
of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges
in the process of exercising their judicial function. 44 They determine probable
cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed" by the offender. 45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made
by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,
absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.
Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects
in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to
be searched.46
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for
search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap
Lopez asked searching questions to the witnesses and particularly sought
clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well
as the pieces of evidence presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the
finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for the
application for the search warrants.
However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable
cause necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense
was committed in the first place. In support of their contention that there was
no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put
forward the adage nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime
when there is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law
punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was
committed that would justify the issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local
calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of
access, termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the
government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements.
PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives "legitimate
telephone operators, like PLDT… of the compensation which it is entitled to
had the call been properly routed through its network." 47 As such, toll bypass
operations constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are
present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no
theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake
of the nature of "future earnings and lost business opportunities" and, as such,
are uncertain, anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT
cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings and opportunities because
these do not belong to it in the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of
Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for the search warrants
charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass perse, but of theft of
PLDT’s international long distance call business committed by means of the
alleged toll bypass operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown
to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with
intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon
things.48
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the
earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v.
Abrogar,49 we have already held that the use of PLDT’s communications
facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and
business:
x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the
instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such
international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT
since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT
merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using
its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the
owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such
telephone calls were taken without its consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT
that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said
article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as,
"international long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the
business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the
accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be
remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the
Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are
the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this
amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense,
which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110,
Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The
purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and
sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and
thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally
accepted concept of personal property in civil law as "anything susceptible of
appropriation."50 It includes ownership of telephone services, which are
protected by the penal provisions on theft. We therein upheld the Amended
Information charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT
inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international
simple resale (ISR) or "the unauthorized routing and completing of
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave
frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the country where destined."51 We reasoned that since
PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls
using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of
these communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is
the unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded
that the business of providing telecommunications and telephone services is
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the
act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished
without the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT
telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D.
401, to wit:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped
gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case
may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters,
jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen;
steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or
telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen
or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water,
electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon
conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis
supplied)
The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further
on the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash
the search warrants, the test calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were
shown to have connected to the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire to complete
the international calls.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search
warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person
against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence
that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a
deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are
essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the
finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally
misled by the witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of
witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant. 54 In this case, the
testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass
through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the
possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the
Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses
did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the
conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made
"carelessly and haphazardly."55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be
noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack
of probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in
reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general warrants.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to
be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general
warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so
broad and all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide
discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets
of the search warrants were not illegal per se, and that they were "innocuous
goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority to determine
whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact even pieces of computer
equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet service were
confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the
requirement of particularity of description when it is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal,57
in which the Court allowed leeway in the description of things to be seized,
taking into consideration the effort and the time element involved in the
prosecution of criminal cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed with the CA,
likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view
of the OSG’s position that the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that
the items sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated precision.
According to the OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for
other legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the
commission of an offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." 59 It is
one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another"
and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to
take.60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the
warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses.1âwphi1 Our Constitution guarantees
our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have
been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only
for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.In furtherance of this
constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched
under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants,
the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers
in describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are
technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely
unknown to them. Vallejo v. Court of Appeals61 ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical
precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving
commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must
be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the
part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually
impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know QUALIFIED THEFT
exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to
be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable People v. Bayon
certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)
This an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the in CA-G.R. CR No. 28161. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 in Criminal Case No.
"wherever and whenever it is feasible."62 A search warrant need not describe Q-03-116291, finding appellant Reynaldo Bayon guilty beyond reasonable
the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.63 The warrant is valid when doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and
leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized. 64
On March 31, 2003, appellant Reynaldo Bayon was charged with theft in an
Information2 that reads:
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were
being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law
enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were Criminal Case No. Q-03-116290
required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In
That on or about the 29th day of March 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent
the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far- steal and carry away the following, to wit:
fetched judicial interference."65
one (1) Rado Diastar wrist watch worth ---- ₱12,000.00
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of
the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that one (1) Seiko Diver’s watch worth ----------- ₱ 2,000.00
bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 66
one (1) bolo of undetermined value
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to
be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone Total ----------------- ₱14,000.00
services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able
to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications equipment
consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, belonging to EDUARDO CUNANAN Y CANDELARIA to the damage and
multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of ₱14,000.00 Philippine
software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support Currency.
the illegal toll bypass operations."67
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT, 68 we upheld a s milady
worded69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search warrants, On the same day, appellant was also charged with qualified theft in another
because these items had been sufficiently identified physically and s own to lnformation3 that reads:
bear a relation to the offenses charged. WHEREFORE, the petitions are
DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated 20 August 2003 and Resolution
Criminal Case No. Q-03-116291
dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
That on or about the 29th day of March 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, being, then a stay-in helper of ARTURO LIMOSO Y LOOT at
his residence located at No. 45 Belmonte Street, New Manila, this City, and
as such has free access to the different rooms of the said house, with grave
abuse of confidence, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following items, to wit:
one (1) white gold Rolex wrist watch worth ------ ₱300,000.00
one (1) Jordan gold wrist watch worth ------------- 65,000.00
five (5) pcs. gold ring worth ------------------------ 125,000.00
two (2) pcs. gold necklace worth ₱25,000.00 each 50,000.00
Total ------------------------- ₱540,000.00
all in the total amount of ₱540,000.00 Philippine Currency, belonging to
ARTURO LIMOSO Y LOOT, to his damage and prejudice in the amount
aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on May 6, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.4
The pre-trial was terminated without stipulations. Thereafter, joint trial of the
cases ensued.1avvphi1
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, private complainants
Atty. Arturo Limoso and Eduardo Cunanan, and Police Officer Paul Greg
Esparta. It dispensed with the testimonies of Police Officers Marmando
Pallasigue and Edmund Rizon, in view of the stipulation of the parties as
follows: (1) the police officer recovered a Rolex watch from a person in
Bulacan; (2) the complainant was never present in all the stages of the search
for the watch; (3) the police officer turned over the watch to the complainant;
and (4) the accused was not assisted by counsel during the search for the
watch.5 The parties also stipulated on the existence of the Affidavit 6 of Police
Officer Marmando Pallasigue.
The defense presented the appellant as its lone witness.
The evidence of the prosecution established that on February 10, 2002,
private complainant Atty. Arturo Limoso, after suffering a stroke, hired
appellant as his masseur and stay-in helper in his house located at No. 45
Belmonte Street, San Jose Compound, New Manila, Quezon City. 7
At about 7:30 a.m. of March 29, 2003, private complainant Eduardo Cunanan,
who was a tenant in one of the rooms of Atty. Limoso's house, reported to
Atty. Limoso the loss of his two wristwatches: a Seiko Diver's watch worth
₱2,000.00 and a Rado Diastar watch worth ₱12,000.00. Atty. Limoso assured
Cunanan that he would investigate the matter. Thereafter, Atty. Limoso asked
his household helpers, including appellant, regarding the missing
wristwatches. When confronted by Atty. Limoso, appellant denied any
involvement in the loss of Cunanan's wristwatches.8
A few hours later, Atty. Limoso suspected that he could also be a victim of
theft. So he went to his locker, and discovered that the key to his vault was
missing. He placed the said key on the wall with his other keys. However, he
was able to open his vault using his duplicate key. He then found that his Rolex
watch worth ₱300,000.00, Jordan gold watch worth ₱65,000.00, five gold
rings worth ₱125,000.00 and two pieces of gold necklace worth ₱50,000.00
that were all kept inside the vault were missing.9
Atty. Limoso became suspicious that appellant was the one responsible for
the theft after he made an inquiry from the security guards of the compound.
He was informed that appellant used to leave his house at 10:00 p.m. and
returned at around 4:00 a.m. the following day; that appellant used to borrow
money from the household helpers of the neighboring houses; and that most
of the time appellant was nowhere to be found. Moreover, as the one
massaging him (Atty. Limoso), appellant had access to his room.10
Atty. Limoso again confronted appellant and told him to just return the stolen
things with no questions asked. Appellant replied that he was not the one
responsible for the theft. Atty. Limoso then reported the incident to the police. 11
At about 4:00 p.m. of March 29, 2003, the police arrived at Atty. Limoso's
house. Appellant could not be found, and all his clothes were gone. The police
stayed in the house until the evening. At about 10:00 p.m., the police were
tipped off that appellant was at the guardhouse. They immediately proceeded
to the guardhouse, apprehended appellant, and brought him to the police
station.12
At the police station, appellant was investigated without the assistance of a
counsel. Through the investigation, the police was able to trace Atty. Limoso’s
Rolex watch to a sidewalk jeweler, who, upon being investigated, told the
police that the watch was already sold to another person. Atty. Limoso
recovered the stolen Rolex watch after paying ₱20,000.00 to the buyer who
lived in Bulacan. Atty. Limoso, however, did not recover his Jordan gold watch,
rings and necklaces.13
Appellant interposed the defense of denial. He testified that, at about 7:00 p.m.
of March 29, 2003, he was at the house of his employer, private complainant
Atty. Arturo Limoso, at No. 45 Belmonte Street, San Jose Compound, New
Manila, Quezon City. At about 8:00 p.m., while he was at the guardhouse of
the compound and talking to the security guards assigned there, he was
suddenly arrested by the police and was brought to the police station. He did
not know the reason for his arrest. Although he was informed of his rights, he
did not know what they meant.14
On February 17, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision 15 finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft in Criminal Case
No. Q-03-116291, but he was acquitted of the same crime in Criminal Case
No. Q-03-116290 on the ground of reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, REYNALDO BAYON Y RAMOS,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q03-116291 of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT defined and penalized in Article 310, in relation to
Article 309, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, as well as orders him
to return the Jordan gold watch worth ₱65,000.00, the five gold rings worth
₱125,000.00 and two pieces of gold necklace worth ₱25,000.00 [each] to Atty.
Arturo Limoso or pay the value thereof.
In Criminal Case No. Q03-116290, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting
Reynaldo Bayon y Ramos of the offense charged on ground of reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.16
The trial court stated that the prosecution did not offer any direct evidence that
appellant stole the missing items belonging to complainants Eduardo
Cunanan and Atty. Limoso. It held that appellant’s statement of admission
during the custodial investigation was inadmissable against him, because he
was not assisted by counsel; hence, there is doubt as to appellant’s guilt in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-116290 for theft of the watches and bolo owned by
private complainant Eduardo Cunanan.
However, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-116291 for theft of the valuables of Atty.
Limoso, the trial court found that appellant’s culpability was proven by the
prosecution through the following pieces of circumstantial evidence: (1) as a
stay-in helper of Atty. Limoso, appellant had access to Atty. Limoso's room,
where his vault containing the missing pieces of jewelry were kept, and where
the key to the vault was placed; and (2) upon discovery of the loss of the
missing items, the police could no longer find appellant’s clothes in Atty.
Limoso’s house.
Appellant appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals,
contending that the trial court erred in convicting him in Criminal Case No. Q-
03-116291. He asserted that the circumstantial evidence presented against
him by the prosecution was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and that there was nothing whatsoever that would link him to the
commission of the crime of theft.17
In its Decision18 dated May 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification in the penalty imposed. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the Decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessories of the penalty imposed under Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code.19
Hence, this appeal by appellant.
The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding
appellant Reynaldo Bayon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft in Criminal Case No. Q-03-116291.
The petition is granted.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's
consent.
The elements of the crime of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done
with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.20
Under Article 31021 of the Revised Penal Code, theft becomes qualified "if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond
or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance."
In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conviction of
appellant based on circumstantial evidence.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for conviction, the following
conditions must be satisfied:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the circumstances are derived are proven;
and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.22
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 23
In this case, appellant was convicted of the crime of qualified theft based on
these pieces of circumstantial evidence:
(1) As a stay-in helper of Atty. Arturo Limoso, the [accused-
appellant] had access to the latter's room where his vault containing
the missing items was kept and where the key to the vault was
placed;
(2) Upon discovery by Atty. Limoso of the loss of the missing items,
the police could no longer find in Atty. Limoso's house the clothes
of the [accused-appellant.]24
The Court finds that the pieces of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the
appellate court are insufficient to convict appellant of the crime of qualified
theft. In the first circumstance, the Court notes that appellant was not the only
stay-in helper of Atty. Limoso, as the latter testified that he had two
housemaids.25 Although Atty. Limoso testified that only appellant, as his
masseur, had access to his room, this is doubtful, considering the Filipino
lifestyle, in which a household helper is normally tasked to clean the room of
his/her employer. Further, in the second circumstance, the disappearance of
appellant’s clothes from Atty. Limoso’s house after the discovery of the loss of
the aforementioned valuables cannot be construed as flight by appellant,
since appellant was talking with the guards in the compound where Atty.
Limoso’s residence was located when he was arrested by the police.
The two pieces of circumstantial evidence cited by the trial court and affirmed
by the appellate court do not form an unbroken chain that point to appellant
as the author of the crime; hence, their conclusion becomes merely
conjectural. Notably, the prosecution failed to establish the element of
unlawful taking by appellant. Since appellant’s statement during the custodial
investigation was inadmissible in evidence as he was not assisted by
counsel,26 the prosecution could have presented the person to whom
appellant allegedly sold the pieces of jewelry as witness, but it did not do so.
It could have been the missing link that would have strengthened the evidence
of the prosecution.
The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are not to be disturbed by this Court. However, the Court
may disregard such findings of the trial and appellate courts (1) when they are
grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (3) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they
are based or are premised on the absence of evidence. 27
The Court finds the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial and
appellate courts in convicting appellant to be insufficient in proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt absent any substantial evidence of unlawful taking
by appellant.
The burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests on the prosecution; the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.28 The constitutional
mandate of innocence prevails, unless the prosecution succeeds in proving
by satisfactory evidence the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused. 29
It failed to do so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28161, convicting appellant Reynaldo
Bayon y Ramos of the crime of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Reynaldo Bayon is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
reasonable doubt. The City Warden of the Quezon City Jail, EDSA, Kamuning,
is DIRECTED to cause the release of Reynaldo Bayon from confinement
without DELAY, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to
INFORM the Court of his release or the reasons for his continued confinement
within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision. No costs. So ordered.
THEFT & ESTAFA
Santos v. People
The factual findings of the lower courts are as a matter of policy not disturbed
by this Court in the absence of any of the recognized exceptions that will justify
reversal. As none of these exceptions appears in the case at bar, the
petitioner's conviction, based on such findings, must be affirmed.
The evidence of the prosecution is, in the view of the Court, conclusive of the
petitioner's guilt.
Sometime in November 1980, the complaining witness, Encarnacion
Peñalosa, entrusted her car, a 1976 Ford Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro
Santos for repair of the carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A week
later, Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00,
within a period of two months. 1
After two months, Peñalosa went to the petitioner's repair shop at MacArthur
Highway, Malabon, to retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle
unless she paid him P634.60 for the repairs. As she did not have the money
then, she left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return, she could
not find Santos although she waited five hours for him. She went back to the
shop several times thereafter but to no avail. 2
Peñalosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in Malabon.
Unable to recover her car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against Santos
with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case was
dismissed when the petitioner convinced the military authorities that the
complainant had sold the vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed
of Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor. 3
This notwithstanding, an information for estafa on Peñalosa's complaint was
filed against Santos in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on October
26,1982. After trial, the accused was found guilty as charged and sentenced
to "an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months as maximum, both of prision
correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P38,000.00
which is the value of the car without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and with costs." 4
On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but Santos was held guilty of qualified
theft and not estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent
court 5 read:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED: the
offense committed by the appellant is qualified theft and he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify Encarnacion Peñalosa the sum
of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and, to pay the costs.
In his defense, the petitioner now quibbles about the supposed inconsistences
of the complaining witness that he says make her testimony questionable. Our
ruling is that such inconsistencies are minor lapses and do not impair
Peñalosa's credibility as a whole. Santos also wonders why, if it is true that
she had asked him to repair and repaint her car, she had not even made an
advance payment. One reason could be that he himself did not ask for such
advance, considering that they were members of the same bowling team.
There is even the suggestion that he was smitten with her although she says
she rejected his suit. 6
The petitioner's main reliance, though, is on the Deed of Sale with Right of
Repurchase which he submitted at the trial to prove that Peñalosa had sold
the car to him and now had no claim to it.
The lower courts were correct in rejecting this shoddy evidence. It is a wonder
that it was even considered at all when the case filed in Camp Crame was
dismissed.
A cursory look at this alleged document will show that it is spurious. There are
alterations and deletions that are not even initialed to authenticate the
changes. Two entire paragraphs are cancelled. The name and address of the
supposed original vendee are crossed out and those of the petitioner are
written in place of the deletions. Moreover, the so-called deed is not notarized.
It would have been so easy to re-type the one-page document to express
clearly and indubitably the intent of the parties and then have it properly
acknowledged. But this was not done. The petitioner insists that the document
was originally intended to be concluded between Peñalosa and Domingo
Corsiga but was hastily changed to make Santos the buyer and mortgagee. 7
Surely a vendee would not be so rash as to depend for his title to the thing
purchased on such a shabby and dubious deed of sale.
The petitioner also makes much of the fact that Peñalosa did not even sign a
job order or get a receipt when she delivered her car to him for repairs. In fact,
she did not even check where his repair shop was. He forgets that he was no
less trusting either. He himself does not explain why the amount of P6,000.00
he allegedly gave for the car was not acknowledged by Peñalosa in the Deed
of Sale or in a separate instrument. There was no proof at all of such payment.
Given these circumstances, we find it easier to believe that Peñalosa had
signed the original document with the intention of selling her car to Domingo
Corsiga, the party first named therein, but later changed her mind. She left the
unused document in her car and Santos, chancing upon it when the vehicle
was delivered to him, decided to modify it to suit his purposes.
Besides, as the respondent court correctly observed, why would Santos still
demand from Peñalosa the cost of the repairs on the car if he claims he had
already bought it from her? And there is also the glaring fact that Santos was
unable to register the car in his name despite the lapse of all of two years after
his alleged purchase of the vehicle.
In his supplemental memorandum, the petitioner says he could not register
the car because it had merely been mortgaged to him and he had to wait until
the expiration of the period of repurchase. 8 Yet, during his cross-examination
on March 5, 1984, Santos repeatedly declared that the car belonged to him
and that the right of repurchase expired after two months from November or
December 1980. He also said that rather than register it, he could cannibalize
the car and sell the spare parts separately at greater profit. 9
The Court also notes that, according to Santos, he accompanied Peñalosa to
redeem her car from Corsiga and that he himself gave her the money for such
redemption in Corsiga's presence. 10 Having made that allegation, it was for
the petitioner himself to present Corsiga as his witness to corroborate that
statement. Santos did not, and so failed to prove what was, to begin with, an
improbable defense. Ei incumbit probatio ui dicit.
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime
committed was theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of
the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. 11 And as
described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential
elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that
said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that
the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.12
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon
C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction
between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the
accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit.
However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the
property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de
facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes
theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa." 13
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking
of the vehicle and so no crime was committed.1âwphi1 In U.S. v. De Vera, 14
we held that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing earlier
delivered to him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead
of estafa.
Illustrating, the Court declared:
 ... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan, agrees
to sell B a certain quantity of rice at a certain price per picul. A ships
several sacks of the grain which B receives in his warehouse. If, prior
to the measuring required before the payment of the agreed price, B
takes a certain quantity of rice from the different sacks, there can be
no doubt that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now, it may be asked:
Did not B receive the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes. And
did A voluntarily deliver the sacks of rice which he owned by shipping
them to B?-Yes Was the taking of the rice by B from the different
sacks done with A's consent?- No.
This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable,
according to which, when the thing is received and then appropriated
or converted to one's own use without the consent of the owner, the
crime committed is not that of theft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of
qualified theft because the fact that the object of the crime was a car was not
alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. 15 Santos would have
had reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same
circumstance may be considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial.
16 Hence the imposable penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying
circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.
According to the Solicitor General:
The value of the car is P38,000.00. Under Article 309 of the Revised
Penal Code, if the value of the thing stolen exceeds P22,000.00, the
penalty should be the maximum period of the prescribed penalty plus
one year for each additional P10,000.00. Thus the imposable penalty
is the maximum of prision mayor with a range of TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY to TWELVE (12) YEARS plus an additional ONE
(1) YEAR for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, raising the
maximum penalty into Reclusion Temporal in the minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being one
aggravating and no mitigating circumstance the imposable penalty
recommended is from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS of reclusion temporal.
We approve the above observations and sentence the petitioner accordingly,
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as herein modified. The
petitioner is declared guilty of theft and sentenced to from six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal. He is
also ordered to restore the car in question to the private respondent, or if this
is no longer possible, to pay her the value thereof in the amount of P38,000.00,
SO ORDERED.
OTHER THEFT; ANTI FENCING; PD1612, A. 19 RPC
Ong v. People
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted
accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential
Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said
accused, with intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person
involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth ₱65, 975.00, belonging to
FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing
the same to have been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits
ensued, and the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has
established the guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-
Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary
disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the
records, the RTC’s finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a
Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires,
described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total
amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of
Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales
Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List
acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial
numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before
storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina
St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative
Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in
charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995,
thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal
that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of
which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker
Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from
numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On
February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a
store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private
complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by
14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant
brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized
as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and
the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any
more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative.
Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief
Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct
a buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was
composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised
by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza
was appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination
with the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco,
Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-
buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494
1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately
produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for ₱5,000.00.
Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from
his warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck
tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them
and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based
on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal
to the buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the
same tires stolen from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust
team went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest
and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives
from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00
in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the
police station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was
able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by
poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant
as stolen from his warehouse.5
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had
been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24)
years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires
in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain
Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from
Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for ₱3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for
₱45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995
and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold
Link).6
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12)
others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store
and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside
the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items
were stolen tires.7
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all
thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie
evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere
denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D.
1612.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing
the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of
prision correcional.9
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner
deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should
be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal
or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys
and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain
for oneself or for another.10
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite
quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in
this case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar),
whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the
warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen – testified that the
crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able
to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10
November 1994 and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution
likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang
Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14 The report
led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila
on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the
robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught
in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal
nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight
(38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. 15
Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in
the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980. 16
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance
of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such
fact exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past
twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business
in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and
offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of
ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until
the delivery of tires happened in just one day. 20 His experience from the
business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the
tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner
it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant
buyer that the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of
robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale,
both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The
nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not
regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the
illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies
the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of
any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a presumption
that is, according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical
inference can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand
tires.1âwphi1 Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or
entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or
anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof
to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of
the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store,
establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public.
In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the
police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular
transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should
have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by
Go.1âwphi1 Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales
invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a
defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this
case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. 24
Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to
prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima
facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the
buy-bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his
store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie
presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any
good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of
robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the 25
property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on
₱5,075 for each tire recovered, or in the total amount of ₱65,975. Records
show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total
amount of ₱223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been
fair and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of
business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the
regularity of the transaction between Azajar, and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the
parties, we do not find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming
the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the
minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision
correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30213 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Dimat v. People
This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused
knew or ought to have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of
theft or robbery.
The Facts and the Case
The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law1 before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in
Criminal Case 02-202338.
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo
Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000
Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari
bearing plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the
vehicle’s engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as
CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management
Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon
City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the
vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136
and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular
Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp
Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen from its
registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate
number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons
Galleria’s parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the
1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino
under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado.
He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the
one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number,
they were not actually the same vehicle.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law and sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day
of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him
to pay ₱850,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, as well as the costs of suit.
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR
297942 the RTC decision but modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum,
thus, the present appeal.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled
that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari
that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.
The Ruling of the Court
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3)
the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another.3
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two
years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00.
Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later
sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number
CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those
transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand,
had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from
him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have
the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla.
This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the
vehicle’s engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But
Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is
regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent.4 Of
course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known
that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from
theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his
acts.1âwphi1
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter
gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly
showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle
and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official
receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat
insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice
him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of
registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought
was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old
certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true
because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to
show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce
new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came
from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who
apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That
she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand
accused in the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR 29794. SO ORDERED.
Capili v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals1 in CA G.R. CR No. 19336 entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Gabriel Capili, et. al." affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court2 of
the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 34, finding Gabriel Capili guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Presidential Decree 1612.
Gabriel Capili y Recto (GABRIEL) together with his wife Ferma Capili y Inot
were charged with violation of Presidential Decree 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information that reads:
"That on or about November 5, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other. With intent to gain for themselves or for another, did then and
there willfully and knowingly receive, possess, keep, acquire and sell or
dispose of the following, to wit:
Assorted pieces of jewelry
Several pieces of old coins (U.S. dollar)
all valued at ₱3,000,000.00, which they knew or should have known to have
been derived from the proceeds of a (sic) crime of theft.
Contrary to law."3
On December 3, 1993, both accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged with the assistance of counsel.4 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
Christine Diokno testified that at 4:00 P.M. on November 4, 1993, when she
went home from her office, she discovered that some of her (sic) items at (sic)
her closet and the jewelries (sic) and money at (sic) her mother’s room were
taken. Upon call, two Makati police responded and surveyed the room where
the robbery took place. The police officer took her statement (Exhs. "F", "F-1"
and "F-2") and then investigated the theft case. Police prepared the police
report and concluded that Michael Manzo, her former houseboy, committed
the offense so a case against Manzo was filed. She described all the
properties that were taken as those reflected in the police report because
according to her she gave the police a list of the items and is part of her
statement (tsn, p. 11, May 11, 1994). Allegedly the value is about 3 Million
pesos, some were of 20 years and some were of 30 years vintage, acquired
by her parents since their wedding in 1945. Some from abroad, States or
Hongkong acquired during trips.
On November 27, 1993, Quiapo sub-station informed her that Michael Manzo
was there. She talked to Michael Manzo who admitted the commission of the
stealing and that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili and his wife for
₱50,000.00. Likewise Michael Manzo admitted that on two occasions Gabriel
Capili returned some of the items. The first was before he went to Isabela.
That Capili returned to him (Manzo) the memorabilia taken from her room
consisting of (sic) school ring, bracelets, key chain and some custom jewelries
(sic) and some other items. That three days before the apprehension Gabriel
returned the Raymond Wiel watch and two cast rings with diamonds. The first
ring is valued at ₱3,000.00 the second watch was (sic) cost ₱20,000.00 to
₱60,000.00 and the two cast rings about P80,000.00. Then Manzo informed
her that he sold those items returned to other buyers, near Claro M. Recto,
who paid ₱1,500.00 and ₱1,000.00 for the ring which police officer (sic) failed
to recover because the stand was no longer there. She was shown by the
police officer the items recovered from Gabriel Capili and his wife which she
identified as her property. Shown with Exhs. "A", "B", "C", she said those are
her properties and that the coins (sic) were acquired during the trips to the
States. She kept John F. Kennedy dollar coins contained in a small box. She
further relayed that the coins, Exh. "A" came from a brooch owned by her
mother. The chain with medal of our Lady was bought by her mother and was
given to her together with other belongings.
That before the discovery of the incident her mother had the list of all the items
by counting them physically because her mother used to check the jewelry
every week in her presence. That all is worth three (3) Million Pesos because
the jewelries (sic) were sometimes brought to a jeweler for a change or for
removal of stones or replacement that is why she considered that all the
jewelries (sic) were appraised. She does not know, however, what exactly
were brought by her mother. That she was present during the last inventory of
the items and the land titles by her mother, presenting the alleged inventory
on August 1, 1993 (Exh. "S"), after her father died on July 15, 1993. While her
mother was checking them, she was in the room writing the description of the
jewelries (sic), the cost and date when bought. That the corresponding value
stated came from her mother kept inside the vault.
That on November 2, 1993, she took out all the items because November 9
was her mother’s birthday and would like to select the items she and her
mother were going to wear for the occasion then check the jewelries (sic)
against the prepared list. The list included the items lost but did not include
the box of memorabilia which was taken from her room. She claimed that the
records including the receipts from where the list was taken were lost together
with the jewelries (sic) that were taken.
To support the allegation in the Information Michael Manzo testified that after
he asked his friend Emilio Benitez where he can sell his jewelries (sic) he was
brought to Boy Recto’s (accused) house at 1260 Carola St., Sampaloc,
Manila, to whom he gave one bag of jewelries (sic) with the information that
he stole them while he was a house boy. Recto agreed to pay him ₱50,000.00
(p. 3, tsn, March 3, 1994). He left and went back after a week or on November
5, as he needed the money. He was paid ₱1,500.00. He left again and went
back after two weeks and was paid again ₱6,000.00. He left again but in his
return he was not paid anymore.
When he visited his friend Emilio Benitez at the precinct, having been charged
with vagrancy, he was caught by the police asking him where he brought the
jewelries (sic), so he pointed to Boy Recto, who was picked-up and brought to
the station and investigated. During the frisking and searching at the station,
police officers found pearls and old coins from Gabriel Capili. The following
day, Mrs. Ferma Capili was investigated at sub-station 3, Quiapo, WPD.
He identified the pearl earring with copper (sic) with diamond (Exh. "A"). He
likewise identified the old coin 4 pieces of dollars marked as Exhs. "B-1", "B-
2", "B-3" and "B-4"; "B-1", "B-2" dimes, "B-3" and "B-4" quarter cents; pendant
with inscription Boy Recto, Exh. "C". He admitted that the statement marked
as Exh. "D" and sub-markings is his.
Describing the contents of the bag, he said that there were more or less 20
pieces of rings, some with pearls and some with diamonds and birthstones;
more or less 20 pairs of earrings, diamond with pearls; more or less 10 pieces
of necklaces of plain gold with pendant with the replica of God and cast with
diamond. There were Quartz watches; 3 pieces Bulova watches; 5 pieces of
Seiko watches, Raymond Wiel. That per complainant’s information, all of them
costs (sic) 3 Million Pesos which he merely gave to the accused without
counting them. He however, claims that they will cost only one to two million
pesos. Despite which value, he entrusted them to Boy Recto without counting
the pieces.
Defense adopted Exhibit "B" as Exhibit "1" and sub-markings, Exhibit "D" as
their Exhibit "2" and "2-a".
That during the investigation, when he was given another lawyer, he stated
that he told the accused to sell the jewelries (sic) he stole. (p. 6, tsn, March
16, 1994)
That witness explained that only the fancy ones were returned to him.
That three days after he left the jewelries (sic) to (sic) Recto, they had drinking
session somewhere at Recto, on which occasion, he did not ask for the
jewelries (sic).
That the ₱1,500.00 was given to him near the bus terminal at Sampaloc near
UST and when the fancies (sic) were returned, which he came to know as
such because he had it appraised in a pawnshop when they arrived from
Roxas, Isabela. When the jewelries (sic) were returned contained in the bag,
he accepted, opened (sic) for a couple of minutes without counting. That
Emilio Benitez glanced on (sic) them because the bus was about leave. Recto
gave the instruction that he can come back within two weeks because Boy
Recto will pay.
The witness admitted that he is facing a charge of Qualified Theft in Makati
pending before a court where he posted his bail. That he is testifying before
this Court out of his own volition. He explained that they went to Isabela per
instruction of Gabriel Capili that they should lie low because the police were
hunting for them and that Emilio Benitez is from Roxas, Isabela.
After more or less two weeks when (sic) they arrived from Isabela, he was
requested by Boy Recto (Gabriel Capili) to sign a blank document somewhere
at Espana (Document Exh. "3" to "3-A"). He was not, however, forced. That
upon arrival from Isabela, they went to the house of the accused then
proceeded to wait at a hotel in Sta. Cruz. After three hours of waiting, the
accused arrived and gave him ₱6,000.00 in the presence of Emilio Benitez
without receipt. He declared that he himself is not sure whether all the
jewelries (sic) inside the bag are (sic) genuine or not.
Having admitted to the police that he is Michael Manzo, he was asked where
he brought the jewelries (sic) so he pointed to Boy Recto. He admitted to have
signed a blank document, Exhibit "4" and "3", his signature, Exh. "4-1" and
Exh."3-A", but do (sic) not know where the originals were, but later said that
the originals are in the hands of the police officers.
SPO3 Ernesto Ramirez testified that as police officer of Station 3, on
November 27, 1993 he investigated Michael Manzo who was accused of
Qualified Theft at Makati and who admitted to him having committed said
offense and pointed to the house of Gabriel Capili at Sampaloc, Manila where
he sold the jewelries (sic). Thereafter, he and his companions SPO2 Reyes,
SPO3 Salalia and SPO3 Fuentes with Michael Manzo went to the place and
saw the wife of Gabriel Capili wearing the pair of earrings, one of the jewelries
(sic) stolen. They were allowed by Gabriel Capili to get (sic) inside the
residence where Gabriel Capili showed him the signed document of Michael
Manzo, Exh. "4" and said he returned the jewelries (sic). It was however,
denied by Manzo although he admitted the signature. Gabriel Capili went with
them to the police precinct where he (Gabriel Capili) was referred to the
investigator and found (sic) from his pockets 4 pieces of coins. Allegedly while
the wife was then being investigated, Manzo pointed to the earrings worn by
the (sic) wife as part of those stolen properties. The same was taken by the
investigator. He pointed to both accused inside the courtroom.
SPO1 Eduardo San Diego also from Station 3, Quiapo, Manila, investigator,
investigated the case of Qualified Theft that happened at the house of Cristine
Diokno. Both accused were positively identified by Michael Manzo so he took
the latter’s statement. That during his investigation he recovered a necklace
with pendant, US dollar coins with different denominations and one pair of
earrings (Exh. "A", "B" and "C"). In their investigation they tried to recover the
other items but failed because the establishment of the other buyer pointed to
them by Michael Manzo was no longer existing. He prepared the booking
sheet and arrest report Exhs. "D" and "E" and sub-markings.
Gabriel Capili denied any knowledge about the charge against him and
declared that what Michael Manzo stated in court that he agreed to pay
₱50,000.00 but paid only ₱1,800.00 is not true. He was at home on November
10, 1993 selling junk foods (sic) when he was called by Emil, companion of
Michael Manzo, through the phone which number he gave to Emil when the
latter bought something on credit from him a week before that date. Emil asked
him if he would like to buy jewelry to whom he relayed if he will see the jewelry.
Emil arrived at 2:00 o’clock P.M. together with Michael Manzo, the first time
he saw the latter and showed him two (2) pieces of jewelry, one birthstone
and an old coin with a price of ₱2,000.00. He inquired from (sic) where the
jewelries (sic) came from and was answered by Michael Manzo that it came
from and (sic) being sold by his mother. He declined because he cannot pay
for it. Michael Manzo handed to Emil something wrapped of which he was
asked to appraise. Michael Manzo asked him if he knew somebody who can
buy. He said he has but hard to see because he seldom see the man already
but was invited to see the person at Recto. After boarding the taxi they did not
proceed immediately to the place. Michael Manzo ordered the taxi cab to go
back to Sta. Mesa Love Hotel where he was told to wait. Michael Manzo went
up the hotel while Emil went towards Aurora Boulevard walking carrying some
items but did not know what happened. After one hour of waiting at the taxicab
and worried about the taxi fare, he went inside the hotel and after inquiring
from the counter where his companion was, Michael Manzo went down with
two women companions. Fifteen minutes after the two women left, Emil
arrived and said he went to Cubao selling the jewelries (sic). Thereafter, they
went to Recto at (sic) a business establishment near the Galaxy Theater. He
was offered to drink from almost dark until dawn asking him if he had already
find (sic) his friend buyer. They parted ways and went home.
On November 15, Manzo and Emil called him up again asking if it was possible
to see him which he positively answered. He went to UST somewhere near
Mambusco station where he saw Emil with Michael Manzo about 5 meters
from Emil standing talking to someone. He asked Emil if he was able to sell
the jewelries (sic) and was answered "not yet". Emil was borrowing ₱700.00
but he has no such amount, so Emil gave him the jewelries (sic) formerly
offered to him, the birthstone and watch allegedly as a gift from Michael
Manzo. Emil informed him that he and Michael Manzo together with two others
were going to Isabela so he gave the ₱700.00. After they (Emil and his friend)
boarded the bus he went home.
On November 21, he was fetched by Emil, brought to a place near the UST
along Dapitan Street where he found Michael Manzo retrieving the gift given
to him. Because of Manzo’s insistence, he returned them but asked Manzo to
sign Exh. "3". They failed to return his ₱700.00 so he asked Manzo to sign
another documents (sic), Exhs. "4" and "4-A", the original of which was given
to the policeman and which was not returned to him.
After several days Pat. Ramirez arrived informing him that Michael Manzo sold
him jewelries (sic). Invited (sic) he went to the police at the Hidalgo sub-station
3. Michael Manzo was not immediately investigated but Michael Manzo and
Emil were incarcerated. After fifteen (15) minutes from the second floor he
was brought to the ground floor inside the cell and detained for several days.
He alleged that on the same day he was brought in a room at the second floor
where he was mauled by Pat. Ramirez (sic) not convinced with what he said
about the paper (Exh. "4"), he gave them then brought back to the cell. He told
the police that the jewelries (sic) they are looking for are in the possession of
Michael Manzo. He further claimed that Michael Manzo talked to a certain Go
and pointed to some other buyers who were brought to the precinct. He,
however, did not know if they were released. On November 27 when his wife
visited him at 7:00 P.M. she was likewise incarcerated because Michael
Manzo pointed to the earrings of his wife.
He further declared that prior to his wife’s arrival, policeman and Michael
planned that when his wife arrived, Michael will point to her earrings, allegedly
because Emil gave ₱500.00 to the police officer while planning to include his
wife. His wife was then brought to the second floor but did not know what
happened, thereafter was incarcerated.
He testified that the earrings of his wife was given by her brother and that the
old coin, Exh. "B" is his acquired when he helped, per order of Pat. Nick
Golahan, in carrying dead body (sic) when MV Nucnucan sank in Cebu where
the son of one he carried gave him coin. The other coin belongs to him which
he picked up in Cebu. That the necklace with print Boy Recto on the pendant
belongs to him and which was taken at the precinct from the dancer to whom
he gave it. Further stating that the same came from Pat. Alex Aguirre when he
was still single.
That upon inquest, the Fiscal told the police that they should be released but
were not and (sic) brought back to the cell. The following morning they were
brought to the City Hall. There again, the Fiscal ordered that they be released
but were not and (sic) brought back to the cell once more. On the third time
when he was brought to the Fiscal, the latter allegedly told him that San Diego
altered the testimony that is why they will be incarcerated.
He denied that Manzo signed Exh. "3" without any writing and pointed to the
typewritten statement therein as his relaying that the same was thru Michael’s
suggestion at the time when they were already quarreling while accusing
Manzo to have stolen the properties subject matter of this case and even
questioned that there is something wrongly written, the giving as a gift.
That although they did not know the accused Michael Manzo and did not know
of any reason why he pointed to him and his wife as buyers of the jewelries
(sic) worth 3 Million Pesos, he believed that it was because of the quarrel when
he started accusing Manzo of stealing of which he was being blamed.
He now claims that the he came to know Emilio Benitez only on November 5,
the same time he came to know Michael. (tsn, p. 22, Aug. 8, 1994), hence,
there is no reason why Benitez will approach him selling the property. There
is no quarrel with the police officers and so he has no knowledge why these
people would like to implicate him and his wife. He likewise did not know of
any reason why the police officer stated in their affidavit of arrest that the items
"US Dollars" were recovered from him at the time of the investigation. He
admitted that only one of the coins belongs to him, picked-up from Cebu (Exh.
"B-4") and his two (2) LRT coins are still missing so with P20.00 and two more
Abraham Lincoln coins. Although he claimed that San Diego did not release
them after the Fiscal’s order he did not file any action against San Diego. That
on December 1, 1993, the Prosecutor ordered the police to release them and
was present asking the Fiscal if he can be allowed to go home but since they
did not have any document, the Fiscal said the policemen will take care of
them. They did not execute any statement because according to him he was
not given any chance.
SPO1 Beinvenido Inot testified that he is a member of the National Police
Force of Precinct 1, Olongapo City and that the accused Ferma Capili, wife of
Gabriel, is his sister. He was asked by his sister to testify about the pair of
earring (sic) that he gave Ferma on June 24, 1990, a U. S. Fancy jewel which
was given by her sister from abroad. It has brillantitos which is the same as a
base of the glass. The same was confiscated from Ferma by the police.
The last time he saw the pair of earring was on the date his sister celebrated
her birthday. Showing all the exhibits of the prosecution to the witness, at first
he answered "There are no brillantitos pair of earrings, sir.". And later witness
answered: "Ay ito pala." (holding the pair of earrings marked as Exh. "A-1",
tsn p. 5, Oct. 14, 1994). He later claimed that the pair of earrings is actually
for his wife sent by her sister abroad to Olongapo. He cannot remember
having seen Ferma Capili on December 1993 to September 9, 1994, they saw
each other two times and that they talked about those jewelries (sic) thru the
phone at that time when the accused was apprehended and incarcerated.
However, despite the information of Ferma Capili that she was apprehended
because of the pair of earrings he did not do anything because allegedly he
was too busy and they have operation. He admitted that this is the first time
he declared that the earrings came from him without executing any written
statement. (Defense marked Exh. "A-1" pair of earring (sic) as their Exh. "8")
(Decision, pp. 1-15; Rollo, pp. 31-45)."5
On August 17, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting Ferma
Capili but finding the accused, Gabriel Capili, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the prosecution’s evidence to be sufficient to support
a conviction beyond moral certainty, for violation of P.D. 1612 in relation to
Sec. 3 par. A of the same law which required that the penalty to be imposed
shall be in the maximum period if the value of the property is more than
₱22,000.00, adding one (1) year for its additional ₱10,000.00, the total penalty
of which shall not exceed twenty (20) years, further considering that the
consideration of the purchase is ₱50,000.00, accused Gabriel Capili is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of said law. Without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to its commission, but
granting the accused with the benefit of the indeterminate sentence law, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium and to suffer the additional penalty of three years
(one for every ₱10,000.00) and to further suffer the accessory penalty thereof.
The accused shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive
imprisonment in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the claim of P3 Million has not been sufficiently proven but the agreed
price between the seller and herein accused is only ₱50,000.00, the accused
is hereby directed to indemnify the complainant Christined Diokno the sum of
₱50,000.00, less the value of the jewelries (sic) presented in Court, Exhibits
"A". "B" and "C" and its sub-markings, to be returned to the owner upon proper
receipt and photograph.
The bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
The body of the accused is hereby committed to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, through the City
Warden of Manila.
Considering that there is no evidence to show complicity and/or that Ferma
Capili conspired and confederated with her husband Gabriel Capili, she is
hereby acquitted from the offense charged in the Information.
The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED."6
GABRIEL appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
RTC the dispositive portion of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated August 17, 1995
convicting the appellant for violation of P.D. 1612 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED."7
Motion for reconsideration was denied8 , hence this appeal where the accused
assigns the following error:
"THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT REMANDING THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS DESPITE OF (SIC) THE FAVORABLE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
CONSIDERING THAT THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FENCED ARTICLES
WERE NOT CORRECTLY ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION."9
The petitioner maintains that even for the sake of argument that the
prosecution has established that the petitioner committed the crime of fencing
(violation of P.D. 1612) beyond reasonable doubt, there is no legal basis for
him to suffer the entire penalty imposed by the trial court. Petitioner claims
that the Office of the Solicitor General, in its appellee’s brief filed with the Court
of Appeals, agrees that basis of the penalty for the offense of fencing is the
value of the property actually involved and not the agreed selling price of the
stolen item. The petitioner also maintains that since the prosecution failed to
prove the value of the stolen goods, the guilt of the petitioner has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner therefore prays that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and a new one be issued either
acquitting the petitioner or remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.10
The respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters
that on April 25, 1997, it filed a Manifestation/Clarification modifying the
recommendation it made in its appellee’s brief to the effect that a remand of
the case would unduly delay the disposition of the case. Therefore, to expedite
the final resolution of the case, the OSG recommended that as an alternative
to a remand that the assessment and findings of the trial court on the value of
the subject articles, which is ₱50,000.00 be adopted and used instead. 11 It is
therefore the contention of the OSG that there is no merit in the petitioner’s
claim that the OSG agreed to the remand of the case for further reception of
evidence to determine the value of the stolen goods inasmuch as this would
be prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. The OSG also opines that the
petitioner is not entitled to an acquittal since the value of the stolen property
is not determinative of the guilt of the accused and is not an element of the
crime but is only determinative of the penalty therefor.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. 12 The essential
elements of the crime of fencing are:
"1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything
of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article,
item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another."13
All these elements are present in the case at bench.
The first element or the fact of theft was proved by prosecution witness,
Christine Diokno (DIOKNO) who testified that several pieces of jewelry,
watches and money were stolen from her mother’s bedroom. She reported
the theft to the police who after conducting an investigation, concluded that
her houseboy, Michael Manzo (MANZO), committed the offense.
Consequently, a criminal case was filed against MANZO. In her testimony,
DIOKNO stated that the major items that were taken consisted of two diamond
rings each having a diamond solitaire of three (3) carats each, a pair of
diamond earrings each having a diamond solitaire of two point five (2.5)
carats, a diamond cross with twelve (12) half (1/2) carat diamond, her mother’s
wedding band, an emerald set consisting of an emerald ring set with diamonds
with a pair of matching earrings, a sapphire set consisting of two sapphire
rings set with diamonds and matching earrings, a South Sea pearl set
consisting of a ring and two pairs of matching earrings also set with diamonds,
three cultured pearl necklaces with matching cultured pearl earrings set with
diamonds, a topaz set consisting of two rings with diamonds and one with
rubies with a set of matching earrings, a cameo set consisting of a ring,
matching earrings and a brooch all set with diamonds and four solid gold
watches, a Rolex, Piaget, Universal Geneve and a Gabriel Peregaux. She
alleged that the total value of the items amounted to approximately three
million (₱3,000,000.00) pesos. In court, DIOKNO identified some of the
recovered stolen items consisting of a set of pearl earrings with two small
diamonds (Exhibit "A"), a gold chain with pendant (Exhibit "B") and old United
States dollar coins (Exhibit "C").14
DIOKNO’s testimony is corroborated by MANZO, who admitted that he stole
the jewelry from DIOKNO. And that after stealing the jewelry, he delivered
them to the petitioner, GABRIEL with the information that the jewelry was
stolen and for the purpose of selling the same. He identified GABRIEL in court
as the person to whom he delivered the stolen jewelry. 15 MANZO testified that
GABRIEL was not a participant in the theft of the jewelry and that he told
GABRIEL that the jewelry was stolen. He also established the fact that the
petitioner agreed to pay fifty thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos for the stolen
jewelry which clearly manifests intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
Consequently, MANZO’s testimony proves the second, third and fourth
elements of the crime of fencing.
At any rate, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles
by the accused as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a
presumption of fencing.16 GABRIEL, who was in possession of at least two of
the stolen items, has not rebutted this presumption.
We also disagree with the petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the
value of the stolen items.
Although DIOKNO’s testimony is hearsay and is inadmissible for purposes of
determining the value of the stolen items inasmuch as her testimony was not
based on her own personal knowledge but on the appraisals made by jewelers
and what her mother told her, MANZO’s testimony remains unrebutted.
MANZO established that he sold the stolen items to GABRIEL for ₱50,000.00
and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, said amount is presumed
to be the value thereof as it is the only value established by the prosecution.
Besides, the valuation of the stolen items made by the trial court is a factual
issue and factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and generally should not be
disturbed on appeal.17
We note however that the trial court was mistaken in imposing the penalty. A
person found guilty of fencing property the value of which exceeds ₱22,000.00
is punished under Presidential Decree 1612 as follows:
"Sec. 3. Penalties – Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as
hereunder indicated:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more
than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such
property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided for in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal
and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal
Code shall also be imposed."
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law18 , the court shall sentence an
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other
law, the court shall sentence an accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and
the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.19
Applying the foregoing, the petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of prision mayor maximum. The fact that the value of the fenced items
exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not, like in cases of estafa, be considered in the
initial determination of the indeterminate penalty. 20 In the absence of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, this should be imposed in its medium period
which ranges from ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eleven
(11) years and four (4) months. Adding the additional two (2) year sentence,
one for each ₱10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is anywhere within ten (10) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal21 . On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower which
is prision correcional maximum22 which ranges from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals finding the petitioner, Gabriel Capili guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Presidential Decree 1612 otherwise known as the Anti-
fencing law is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correcional as minimum to thirteen (13)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. SO ORDERED.
USURPATION. Art. 312-313
Quinao v. People
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision,
dated 14 January 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial
Region, Branch 21, Laoang, Northern Samar finding herein petitioner
Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real
Property. Likewise sought to be reversed is the Resolution, dated 30 June
1999, of the appellate court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Information filed against petitioner and Cases read as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of February, 1993, at about 9:00 o'clock
in the morning, more or less, at Sitio Bagacay, Bgy. Petong, Lapinig,
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent to gain, with the
use of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously usurped [sic] and occupied [sic] a real property
owned by FRANCISCO F. DEL MONTE, and while there gathered
12,000 coconuts and converted it into copra [sic] and sold the same
in the amount of P14,580, to the damage and prejudice to the said
owner in the total amount of FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED EIGHTY (P14,580.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
At the arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The facts
established during the trial are as follows:
As borne out by the evidence, both the accused and private
complainant are claiming ownership over the land in question.
Private complainant Francisco Delmonte submitted and offered in
evidence Tax Declaration No. 1202 (Exh. "D") in the name of Petre
Delmonte, the predecessor-in-interest of complainant. This Tax
Declaration No. 1202 cancels Tax Declaration No. 18612 which
shows that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1202 is the same
land litigated and awarded to the predecessor-in-interest of the
complainant in Civil Case No. 3561. The decision in Civil Case No.
3561 shows that the land being claimed by the accused was already
litigated and awarded to the parents of the complainant in Civil Case
No. 3561.
The accused-appellant, on the other hand, presented Tax
Declaration No. 1195 (Exh. "1") in the name of Lorenzo Cases
Leoniso dated January 25, 1993. He alleged that the land being
claimed by the complainant in the present criminal case is different
from the land litigated in Civil Case No. 3561 and that the land subject
of Civil Case No. 3561 which came from Angel Pelison is now in the
possession of the complainant.
The parties presented witnesses during the hearing of the case to
buttress their claims. Complainant's witness Bienvenido Delmonte
declared that on February 2, 1993 at around 9 o'clock in the morning
while he was busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in
common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador
Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives
suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence
and intimidation, usurped and took possession of their landholding,
claiming that the same is their inheritance from their ascendants and
while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them
into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from
their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the
land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was
thus forced to seek assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National
Police.
Complainant's witness further declared that the actual primitive
owner of the land in question was Angel Pelison but the land was
purchased by his grandfather Petre Delmonte. The land is situated
at Sitio Bagacay, Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, N. Samar with an area of 9
½ hectares, bounded on the East by the properties of Roman Vernas
and Marcelino Delmonte; on the North by Dimas Moscosa; on the
West by Alcantara and on the South by Bagacay group (tsn, pp. 31-
32, April 20, 1994)
Accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao testified for the
defense. They claimed that they are the grandchildren of Lorenzo
Cases; that during the lifetime of their grandfather, he acquired the
real property in question and declared the same in his name under
Tax Declaration No. 1195 (Exh. "1"); that the land has an area of 6
hectares, 34 centares and 28 ares and is devoted to rice and
coconut; that they are in actual possession of the land and paid realty
taxes thereon; that the father of accused Conchita Quinao was Pedro
Cases, the son of Lorenzo Cases; that the land is located in Brgy.
Potong, Lapinig, Northern Samar; and that the boundaries are as
follows: on the North: Dimas Moscosa; on the East: Petre Delmonte;
on the South: Ananias Delmonte; and on the West: Bagacay River.2
The trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds both
accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property,
defined and penalized under Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code,
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences both of them jointly
and severally, to pay a fine in the amount of One Hundred Seventy
Four Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty (P174,960.00) Pesos which
amount is equivalent to the gain which said accused have obtained
in a period of almost three (3) years from the time they forcibly took
possession of this land belonging to Francisco Delmonte computed
at the rate of P14,580.00 per quarter proceeds from the produce of
the land as alleged in the Information.
The accused are further sentenced not to enter or intrude upon this
property rightfully adjudged to belong to Francisco Delmonte, private
complainant herein and they are ordered under pain of imprisonment
for Contempt of Court, to Cease and Desist forever from disturbing
or molesting the peaceful and quiet possession and ownership of the
herein private offended party over the property subject of litigation.
The Chief of Police of the PNP, Lapinig, Northern Samar, is hereby
ordered to assist the private offended party in his possession of the
herein property and see to it that he is not disturbed or molested in
such state, and in implementing this directive, the Chief of Police
may, in his discretion, use reasonable force necessary to carry out
this decision. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chief of
Police of Lapinig, N. Samar.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3
Upon a notice of death filed only on 25 September 1997, it was learned that
accused Cases died on 9 April 1995.
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the CA. The appellate court, however,
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof but the CA denied the same.
Before this Court, petitioner assails the decision of the CA raising the following
issues:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO IS A WOMAN OF
AN ADVANCE AGE COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF THE CRIME OF
USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY ON THE BASIS OF THE BARE
ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY AND WHICH CONCLUSION WAS BASED
ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES;
II WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH
TOOK PLACE SUBSEQUENT TO THE ALLEGED ENTRY INTO THE
PROPERTY WILL SUFFICE TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER
OF THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY;
III WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHO CLAIMS TO BE
OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION COULD BE HELD LIABLE OF
USURPATION OF HER OWN PROPERTY.4
The petition is bereft of merit.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court
convicting her of the crime of usurpation of real property was not based on
"speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the evidence on
record and in accordance with the applicable law. Article 312 of Revised Penal
Code defines and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real property as follows:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property. - Any person who, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or
shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in
addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by
him shall be punished by a fine from P50 to P100 per centum of the
gain which he shall have obtained, but not less than P75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to
P500 pesos shall be imposed.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's
real property or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession
or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that the
accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion
de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or
usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person,
and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation
or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.5 1avvphi1
More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo,6 the Court stated that the elements
of the offense are (1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a
real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be
employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3)
the accused should be animated by the intent to gain.7
Thus, in order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner insists
that the elements of the crime are not present in this case. Specifically, she
maintains that she owns the property involved herein. The matter on the
ownership of the lot in question, however, had long been settled when, in Civil
Case No. 3561 (ownership of real property) involving the predecessors-in-
interest of private complainant and that of accused Cases, the Court of First
Instance of Samar, Branch III, Thirteenth Judicial Region, adjudicated said lot
to private complainant's predecessors-in-interest.8
Further, as established by the commissioner appointed by the trial court to
look into petitioner's defense, i.e, she owns the lot subject of this criminal case,
the area being claimed by petitioner is the same area adjudicated in Civil Case
No. 3561. Deputy Sheriff A. Anacta, as commissioner, made the following the
report:
Taking the matter in relation to the order of the Honorable Court
dated February 1, 1994 which is the basis of this commission, which
merely directs the undersigned to find out if the area claimed by by
the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs, then, based from
the above findings and the herein sketch, it is indeed very clear that
the area claimed by the accused encroached the area of the
plaintiffs.9
The foregoing findings of the commissioner was adopted by the trial court and
the latter subsequently convicted petitioner for the crime of usurpation of real
property. This findings of the commissioner was affirmed by the CA stating,
thus:
 Based on the above findings and the sketch maps submitted, it is
clear that the disputed land which is the red shaded area (Exh. "B-
2") is within the boundary of the land awarded to the complainant in
Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561]. The issue of ownership over
the land in question having been decided in Civil Case No. 3516
[should be 3561] in favor of the complainant in 1949, the same will
not be disturbed. The accused has to respect the findings of the
court.10
We fully agree with the findings of both the trial court and the CA on the issue
of the ownership of the lot involved in this case. The evidence on record
sufficiently refuted petitioner's claim of ownership.
The next issue that needs to be resolved is whether the other requisites of the
usurpation of real property are attendant in this case. These two (2) other
requisites are: the employment of violence in acquiring possession over the
real property or in usurping the real right and accused was animated by intent
to gain.11 On this point, the trial court and the CA ruled in the affirmative citing
the testimony of prosecution witness Bienvenido Delmonte as follows:
x x x Complainant's witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on
February 2, 1993 at around 9 o'clock in the morning while he was
busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in common with
complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases and
Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives suddenly
appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, usurped and took possession of their landholding,
claiming that the same is their inheritance from their ascendants and
while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them
into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from
their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the
land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was
thus forced to seek assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National
Police.12
It is well settled that "factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties
and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of
the trial court."13 Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for this Court to
deviate from this salutary principle.
Finally, the fact that the judge who tried the case was different from the judge
who penned the decision does not in any way taint the same. Indeed, "the
efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there
is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by
him."14 There is no such showing in this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19412 is
affirmed in toto.
CULPABLE INSOLVENCY Art. 314
SWINDLING & OTHER DECEITS. Art. 315-318
Brokmann v. People
We review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the decision 1 and the
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31887 which
denied the appeal of Carmina G. Brokmann (petitioner). The CA affirmed the
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 132, Makati City,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
As borne by the records, the criminal charge stemmed from the failure of the
petitioner to return or remit the proceeds of jewelries amounting to
₱1,861,000.00. The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of Anna
de Dios (private complainant), and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
executed between the private complainant and the petitioner. The gist of the
MOA provides: (1) the petitioner’s acknowledgment and receipt, on various
dates, of jewelries from the private complainant amounting to ₱1,861,000.00;
(2) the petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the subject
jewelries; and (3) the private complainant filed the estafa case against the
petitioner for the non-remittance of the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries.
The petitioner asserted in defense her lack of bad faith and intention to
deceive the private complainant. She narrated that she and the private
complainant had been engaged in the buy and sell of jewelries for 15 years.
She admitted receiving the subject jewelries on a consignment basis but she
averred that not all the jewelries were sold. The petitioner emphasized that
she made partial payments of her obligation and had no intention of
absconding. With respect to the MOA, she insisted that there was no period
in the agreed terms as to when the remittance of the proceeds for the sale of
the jewelries or the return of the unsold jewelries should be made.
The RTC found the petitioner liable for estafa, and sentenced the petitioner to
imprisonment of six (6) years and six (6) months of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.4 The RTC
also ordered the petitioner to restitute the private complainant ₱1,047,720.00
as actual damages.
The petitioner appealed the judgment of the RTC to the CA which affirmed the
petitioner’s conviction. The CA held:
As to the first element, without a doubt[,] appellant acquired material
possession of the jewelry. She admitted that she received the subject pieces
of jewelry from De Dios.
Additionally, by the terms and conditions of the memorandum of agreement,
Brokmann agreed to hold in trust the said pieces of jewelry for the purpose of
selling them to the customers and with the obligation to remit the proceeds of
those sold and return the items unsold. What was created was an agency for
the sale of jewelry, in which Brokmann as an agent has the duty to return upon
demand of its owner, herein appellee.
On the second element, misappropriation was clearly evident. Appellee sent
a demand letter to appellant, reminding the latter of her subsisting obligation,
however, it was simply ignored. x x x. The demand for the return of the thing
delivered in trust and the failure of the accused-agent to account for it are
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. x x x
The third element, it is apparent that appellee was prejudiced when appellant
did not return the pieces of jewelry upon her demand. x x x. Damage as an
element of estafa may consist in – 1) the offended party being deprived of his
money or property as a result of the defraudation; 2) disturbance in property
right; or 3) temporary prejudice.
Lastly, the fourth element, it has duly been established that appellee
demanded for the payment and return of the pieces of jewelry, however, the
same was unheeded.5 (Emphases supplied.)
The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
The Issue
The petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA committed a reversible
error in affirming the judgment of the RTC finding her guilty of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt.
The petitioner prays for her acquittal for the prosecution’s failure to prove the
element of deceit. She argues that her actions prior to, during and after the
filing of the estafa case against her negated deceit, ill-motive and/or bad faith
to abscond with her obligation to the private complainant. She cites the cases
of People v. Singson6 and People v. Ojeda7 where the Court acquitted the
accused for the failure of the prosecution to prove the element of deceit.
The Court’s Ruling
Except for the penalty imposed, we find no reversible error in the CA’s
decision.
First, the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of
confidence or (b) means of deceit.8 The acts constituting estafa committed
with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa
committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa by
abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or
deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.9 In this case, the charge
against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa committed
by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the prosecution to
prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was
charged with.
Second, the cases cited by the petitioner are inapplicable. Our
pronouncements in Singson and Ojeda apply to estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) where the element of deceit was necessary to be proven.
Nevertheless, we find the modification of the penalty imposed to be in order
to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence. The second paragraph of Article
315 provides the appropriate penalty if the value of the thing, or the amount
defrauded, exceeds ₱22,000.00:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
The minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the CA and the RTC does not
conform with the Court’s ruling in People v. Temporada, 10 where we held that
the minimum indeterminate penalty in the above provision shall be one degree
lower from the prescribed penalty for estafa which is anywhere within the
range of prision correccional, in its minimum and medium periods, or six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In this case, the
minimum term imposed by the CA and the RTC of six (6) years and six (6)
months of prision mayor is modified to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence.1âwphi1
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the
decision dated May 4, 2011 and the resolution dated October 26, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31887. We find petitioner Carmina G.
Brokmann GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
We MODIFY the penalty imposed and sentence her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum term, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum term.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 315 (1a) –
People v. Manansala
The appellants Galicano Alon (alias Grego), and Ricardo Cabrales (alias
Maning), together with Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro
Mendoza, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February, 1932, in the municipalities
of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal, within two and a half miles
from the city limits and within the jurisdiction of this court, and in the
City of Manila proper, Philippine Islands, the said accused conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud one Perfecto
Abordo in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means
of false and fraudulent representations which may made to the said
Perfecto Abordo to the effect that they had for sale six hundred (600)
tins of opium, a prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the same
to him upon paying them P600 in advance and by means of other
similar deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver
to them, as in fact he gave and delivered to them, the said sum of
P600, in consideration of which the accused gave him a gasoline can
which they represented to contain the 600 tins of opium, when in truth
and in fact, as the said accused well knew, the said can contained
only six small tin cans containing a black substance which was not
opium, the accused thereby wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
defrauding the said Perfecto Abordo in the sum of P600 to his
damage and prejudice in said amount.
That the accused Tomas Manansala y Velasco and Galicano Alon y
Ponce (alias Grego) have each once been convicted of the crime of
estafa; and the accused Ricardo Cabrales y Pelorina (alias Maning)
and Isidro Mendoza y Santos Sollo are habitual delinquents, the first
having been convicted once for robbery, once for theft and three
times for estafa, having served his last sentence on February 4,
1927, and the second having been convicted one of estafa and once
of robbery, having served his last sentenced on October 30, 1922,
all of said convictions having been rendered by virtue of final
judgments of competent courts.
After the prosecution had rested, the information was dismissed as to the
defendants Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza for
lack of evidence to show that they had taken part in the commission of the
crime. Upon the termination of the trial, Judge Pedro Concepcion found the
defendants Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in
accordance with the provisions of article 354, No. 2, of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 3244, and sentenced each of them to suffer four months
and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
to indemnify the offended party, Perfecto Abordo, in the sum of P600, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the proportionate
part of the costs.
The trial judge's findings as to the facts as follows:
With respect to the other accused, Galicano Alon and Ricardo
Cabrales, the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently shows that
about a week prior to February 19, 1932, the former who gave his
name as "Grego" and the latter known by the name of "Maning" in
company with another person whom they called "Pepe" offered to
sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50 each
telling him that he could sell them for P10 a tin. Tempted with the
prospect of an enormous profit, Mr. Perfecto Abordo agreed to buy
the merchandise, and the accused agreed to sell it to him in lots of
1,000 tins at P600 lot. It was agreed that the delivery of P1,000 tins
would take place at P5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft Avenue
Extension and Vito Cruz within the jurisdiction of this city. Attorney
Perfecto Abordo accordingly went to the place indicated with the
money, and there waited for them. The accused Galicano Alon
arrived alone in an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to
the place where the 1,00 tins of opium were kept. trusting Gallicano
Alon, who always called Abordo "brother" because he claimed to be
a Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter went with him in his automobile
to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay
was at the wheel. It was already twilight when they arrived at the
rotunda, and there they met Maning, or the accused Ricardo
Cabrales, who, in company with others, was waiting for Abordo in
another automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly
thereafter appeared Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to get the
tins of opium. Pepe got from a lot nearby the can Exhibit A, the top
of which was ordered by Cabrales in order to show Abordo the six
tins of opium contained in a wooden box, Exhibit B, which Abordo
saw when the top of said Exhibit A was opened. Finding that said tins
really contained opium, Abordo believed that the rest of the contents
of the can also consisted of tins of opium. He handed the six hundred
pesos to Maning, who, after receiving the money, immediately went
to the automobile where his companions were waiting. At the same
time Abordo returned to his car with the accused Galicano Alon and
the person named Pepe, carrying the can. While proceeding towards
Taft Avenue Extension Abordo noticed that the accused Cabrales
was following in his automobile, and that when they were nearing the
corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which
Cabrales was riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Galicano
Alon told Attorney Abordo that those in the other automobile were
constabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the can Exhibit
A. The accused Cabrales, whom Attorney Abordo was able to
recognize very well, and the companions of the former whom Abordo
was not able to identify because it was already dark, approached his
car saying that they were constabulary agents and told Abordo that
he was under arrest. Knowing that they were not constabulary agents
and that their purpose was to get possession of the can Exhibit A,
Abordo drew his revolver and ordered his chauffeur to proceed.
Cabrales and his companions again followed him in their car and for
the second time tried to head off Abordo somewhere before the
intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but Abordo
proceeded until he arrived at his house. There he opened the can
Exhibit A and inside he found the wooden box Exhibit B, but the rest
of the contents of the can was sand. He bore a hole in one of the tins
and found that it only contained molasses.
The accused tried to give, by their testimony and that of Miguel
Rosales, who had been convicted twelve times of estafa, a long story
to the effect that Abordo engaged the accused Cabrales, through the
intervention of Miguel Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses
resembling tins of opium, that on the afternoon agreed upon for the
payment of the value of said tins, Abordo refused to deliver the
money on the pretext that the purchaser of said tins had not arrived,
and invited the accused to his house in Pasay in order to make the
payment inasmuch as they insisted upon collecting from him; but
before arriving in Pasay Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and
required the latter to hand over the money, at the same time placing
at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he said contained
the 1,000 tins of molasses asked for by Abordo.
It is hardly necessary to state that this story is a sheer fabrication.
The attorney for the appellants makes the following assignments of error:
I. El Juzgado incurrio en error al declarar que las pruebas demuestran que Ricardo
Cabrales y Galicano Alon, en compañia de otro individuo llamado "Pepe", vendieron al
abogado Perfecto Abordo mil latas de opio falsificado por el precio de P600.
II. El Juzgado incurrio en eror al no declarar que el supuesto ofendido, Perfecto Abordo,
por medio de Miguel Rosales, encomendo a Ricardo Cabrales la confeccion de mil latas
de opio al precio de P0.60 cada lata poniendo como contenido melaza, para venderlas
como opio legitimo.
III. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no declarar que aun en el supuesto de que realidad
Ricardo Cabrales vendio a Perfecto Abordo dichas mil latas de opio por el precio de
P600, el acusado Galicano Alon nada tiene que ver con dicha venta.
IV. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no absolver a los acusados apelantes, apreciando
cuando menos en favor de los mismos y sobre todo en favor del apelante Galicano Alon,
el beneficio de la duda racional.
The assignments of error raise only questions of fact, depending on the
credibility of the witnesses. No reason has been adduced that would justify us
in disturbing the findings of the trial judge. As to the contention of the
appellants, the trial judge found it to be a mere fabrication and worthy of no
credit. The witnesses for the defense were Miguel Rosales and the appellants
themselves. The evidence shows that Miguel Rosales had been convicted of
the falsification of commercial documents in twelve cases. The appellant
Galicano Alon had been convicted of estafa, and the other appellant, Ricardo
Cabrales, had been convicted once of robbery, once of theft, and three times
of estafa. The trial judge was fully justified in disbelieving the improbable story
of said witnesses.
The crime committed by the appellants is that of estafa as defined in article
315, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that any
person who shall defraud another through unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value
which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though
such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration. The amount
of the fraud being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prison correccional in its minimum period, and it appearing
that the appellant Galicano Alon has already been convicted of estafa, he is
therefore a recidivist, and the penalty applicable to him should be imposed in
the maximum degree.
It was alleged in the information that Ricardo Cabrales was a habitual
delinquent because he had been convicted once of robbery, once of theft, and
three times of estafa, and that the last penalty for estafa was extinguished by
him on February 4, 1927. These prior convictions were admitted by him in
open court. He is therefore a habitual delinquent, but his prior convictions can
not be taken into consideration also as an aggravating circumstance for the
purpose of increasing the principal penalty, which should therefore be
imposed in the medium degree.
As the additional penalty, the Solicitor-General recommends the medium
degree of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or from six years
and one day to seven years and four months. This is erroneous. It is
apparently based upon the mistaken idea that only the prior convictions of this
appellant for estafa are to be taken into account. The correct interpretation of
the law is that all prior convictions of any of the crimes of theft, robbery, estafa,
or falsification should be taken into account when a person is convicted of any
one of these crimes and of being habitual delinquent. To hold otherwise, a
person might be twice convicted of each of these four crimes, and still not be
a habitual delinquent.
For the foregoing reasons, the appellant Galicano Alon is sentenced to suffer
one year, eight months, and one day of prision correccional, and the appellant
Ricardo Cabrales is sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision
correccional, and said defendants are jointly and severally sentenced to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P600, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The appellant Ricardo
Cabrales having been previously convicted five times of theft, robbery, or
estafa, he is sentenced as a habitual delinquent to suffer an additional penalty
of eleven years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision mayor.
As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
against the appellants.
Separate Opinion
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part:
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed in so far as it requires
the appellants to indemnify the offended party, Perfecto Abordo, in the sum of
P600 I take this stand for the same reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion
in People vs. Aglahi (G.R. No. 37421) 1, wherein I said:
The right of the injured party in a criminal case, to be indemnified, is
predicated on article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
"Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (U.S.
vs. Guy-sayco, 13 Phil., 292; U.S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil., 600.) It
requires no demonstration that the civil liability thus created is subject
to the same conditions, limitations, and exceptions affecting
obligations in general. It presupposes the existence of a good cause
of action in favor of the injured party.
In the instant case, whether we regard the liability as arising ex
contractu or ex delicto, no recovery by way of damages or
indemnification should be allowed the complaining witness. On the
one hand, we have the legal maxim, "Ex turpi causa non oritur actio";
on the other, "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio," and also "In pari delicto
potior est conditio defendentis." The rule is that an agreement
contrary to law or morals can give rise to no right of action in any
party to it, either for the enforcement of it, or for the recovery of
property parted with in pursuance of it.
In McMullen vs. Hoffman (174 U.S., 639, 654; 19 sup. Ct., 839; 43
Law ed., 1117), the Supreme Court of the United States, after
reviewing the authorities on the subject, said: "There are several old
and very familiar maxims of the common law which formulate the
result of the law in regard of illegal contracts. They are cited in all law
books upon the subject, and are known to all of us. They mean
substantially the same thing and are founded upon the same
principles and reasoning. They are: Ex dolo malo non aritur actio; Ex
pacto illicito non oritur actio; Ex turpi causa non oritur actio. ... The
authorities from the earliest time to the present unanimously hold that
no court will led its assistance in way towards carrying out the terms
of an illegal contract. In case any action is brought in which it is
necessary to prove the illegal contract in order to maintain the action,
courts will not enforce it, not will they enforce any alleged rights
directly springing from such contract."
In Abbe vs. Marr (14 Cal., 210, 212), an action was brought against
the members of a gang of swindlers who, by false representation and
promises that they had arranged to fix a horse race so that the
plaintiff's horse would surely win, induced the latter to bet their
horses, cows, wood, and money on the race, then they fixed the race
that the plaintiffs lost. The action was to recover back plaintiff's
property. In passing upon the case, the Supreme Court of California
said: "No Court of Justice can listen to such a case. When the plaintiff
asserts his own turpitude in his way, he sends his case out of court.
If, in attempting, by way of reprisal or otherwise, to swindle another,
he becomes the victim of his own arts, it may become a question in
morals or in honor, which party is the more culpable; Courts of Law
entertain no discussion on the subject, but terminate the controversy
by shutting their doors in the face of the intruder."
In Babcock vs. Thompson (20 Mass., 446, 449; 15 Am. Dec., 235),
the plaintiff brought an action to recover from the defendant money
lost in gaming by foul play. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
through Chief Justice Parker, said: "Here is a case of gaming
accompanied with cheating. Clearly if the gaming had been fair, the
law would give no remedy. The only question then is, whether the
fraud will alter the case. We think it will not. If a man thus voluntarily
puts himself in a condition to be cheated, through his illegal act he
cheats the government, and the other person cheats him, and they
must be left to settle the affair between themselves."
In Holman vs. Johnson (1 Cowp., 343), a leading English case, Lord
Mansfield said: "The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the
mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of
policy, which the defendants has the advantage of, contrary to the
real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so
say. The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio.
No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action
upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or
otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the
transgression of a positive law of this country, there court says he
has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the court goes; not
for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid
to such a plaintiff. So if the plaintiff and defendant were to charges
sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff,
the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are
equally in fault, potior est conditio defendentis.
In the jurisdiction, the rule that an agreement contrary to law or morals can
give to no right of action, is expressly sanctioned in article 1306 of the Civil
Code, which reads as follows:
"ART. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit
consideration is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, the
following rules shall be observed:
"1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover
what he may have given by virtue of the contract, or enforce
the performance of the undertaking of the other party;
"2. When only one of the contracting parties is guilty he
cannot recover anything which he may have given by virtue
of the contract, or enforce the performance of any
undertaking in his favor. The other party, if he has had
nothing to do with the illicit consideration, may recover
anything which he may have given without being obliged to
perform any undertaking he may have assumed."
Commenting on this article, this court in Perez vs. Herranz y Caceres (7 Phil.,
693, 695, 696), said: "It is a familiar principle that the courts will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it finds them;
but where the plaintiff can establish a cause of action without exposing its
illegality, the vice does not effect his right to recover. The American authorities
cited by the plaintiff fully sustain this doctrine. The principle applies equally to
a defense. The law in these Islands applicable to the case is found in articles
1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code, shutting out from relief either of the two guilty
parties to an illegal or vicious contract."
Again, in Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol (40 Phil., 209, 216),
this court said: "It is rudimentary that contracting parties may not establish
pacts, clauses, and conditions, which conflict with the laws, morals, or public
order; "public order" signifies "the public weal" public policy. (Article 1255, Civil
Code; Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil, Vol., 8 p. 574.) It is further well
settled, that a party to an illegal objects carried into a court of law and ask to
have his illegal objects carried out. The rule is expressed in the maxims: "Ex
dolo malo non oritur actio," and "In pari delicto potior est canditio defendentis."
The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them. (Article 1306, Civil Code; Perez vs. Herranz [1907], 7 Phil.,
693.) Where, however, the parties to an illegal contract are not equally guilty,
and where public policy is considered as advanced by allowing the more
excusable of the two to sue for relief against the transaction, relief is given to
him. Cases of this character are, where the a conveyance was wrongly
induced by the grantee through imposition or overreaching, or by false
representations, especially by one in a confidential relation. (13 C.J., 497-499;
Pride vs. Andrew [1894], 51 Ohio State, 405.)"

The principles above discussed apply with singular force to the facts of the
present case. The offended party, Perfecto Abordo, is an attorney-at-law —
an officer of the court. He was in duty bound to depend and uphold the law.
As stated by Justice Malcolm, in his standard work on legal ethics, page 209;
"One point which is repeatedly emphasized and reenforced in the ethical
summary of a lawyer's duties, is to the effect that an attorney as such is
obliged to follow and defend the law. He should act and advise action only in
accordance with the law and due process of law, and in not in violation thereof.
`Of all classes and profession,' the Supreme Court of the United States has
said, 'the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law.'"

Instead of keeping faith with his profession and in flagrant violation of his oath
of office, the offended party conspired with the appellants in this case to cheat
the law. As a result of his iniquitous acts, he lost some money which he now
seeks to recover. I know of no principle, either legal or moral, that would justify
a court of justice to grant him aid under such circumstances.