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Mujahed Al-Sumaidaie
MA Intelligence and Secutrity Studies
Brunel University
22 September 2017
1
General View
The attack on 9 September 2001 led the countries all around the world to review their
and In September 2006, the UN adopted the Global Counter-Terrorist Strategy1. The
September 20022. The global move against terrorism enhanced the international
efforts to combat terrorism. The US and the UK represent a significant part in the
global movement against terrorism. The main steps were taken in 2002 when the UK,
Germany, France Spain and Italy looked very closely at their legislation on terrorism
and updated the offences related to terrorism including threating the public as well as
recruiting and training terrorists. In the same year, the EU established the Europe
updated and new measures for combating terrorism were implemented. However, this
was not enough to prevent attacks in Europe and the UK. The lack of executive
authority and the reduction of the institutional work at the coordinators’ level meant
1
United Nations, “UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, Counter Terrorism Implementation Task
Force (CTITF). https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.
[Accessed 21/06/2017].
2
The White House,” The National Security strategy”, Septeber, 2002.
file:///C:/Users/ps16mma/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/W0FLIUAH/63562.pdf. [Accessed
21/06/2017].
3
Sajjan Gohel, “the challenge of EU Counter-Terrorism cooperation”, Debating Security Plus, Security Europe,
12 December, 2016. http://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/challenges-eu-counter-terrorism-
cooperation
2
that there was no direct involvement in the internal security of the EU members and
its institutions4.
The new security pillars were adopted by the EU countries in 2005. The major problem
countries5. Some of the members were unwilling to share the intelligence information
with the other countries, while others preferred the bilateral agreements. The other
problem was that Europol did not have the power to make arrests, they could only
exchange information with the EU police regarding criminals. There was no exchange
of intelligence information with the other EU intelligence agencies and it was limited
power inside the EU. Also, there was not a strong executive mandate which could lead
the fight against terror in the EU and the contiguous region. There were bureaucratic
therefore the EU adopted the “Focal Point Travellers Scheme” 6 which was responsible
for the terrorists who were traveling outside of the EU to join the fight in Syria. The
European Union Counter-Terrorism Centre was very slow at producing results and
became more active only when there was a serious attack or straight afterwards 7.
4
ibid
5
ibid
6
Council of the European Union, “Improving information and Intelligence exchange in the area of counter-
Terrorism across the EU”, Eropol, Brussel, 16 March 2015. http://statewatch.org/news/2015/apr/eu-council-
europol-exchange-of-intelligence-7272-15.pdf.
7
Peter Chalk, “West European Terrorism and counter terrorism”, the Evolving Dynamic, Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1996, p.123-127. https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780333654613.
3
Historical Overlooking of the EU Counter-Terrorism Development
The internal and external security of the European Union are intimately connected8. It
regards the free movement of people between all of the 28 countries who share the
same principles.9 Despite Europe combating terrorism for a long time, since the 1960s,
the EU did not prioritise Counter-Terrorism and did not consider it a national security
threat. This was the case until the catastrophic terrorist attack in the United States
roles which have been deliberated before the 9/11 attack 11.
In the past, the European Union regarded terrorism as being serious or organized
crime12. Later on, the terrorism classification came after the political rationale. Despite
terrorist threats towards the national security did not change even after 9/11 events.
Most European countries did not accept the concept of “War on Terrorism”. They
started dealing with the terrorist phenomenon using different methods to track it, such
8
Alistair J. K Shepherd, “The European Security Continuum and the EU as an International Security Provider”,
Global Society, Routledge, 09 March 2015, pp156-160.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1018146.
9
Ottavio Marzocchi, “Free Movement of persons”, Fact sheet on the European Union, European Parliament,
June 2017. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html.
10
Javier Argominaz, “Post-9/11 institutionalisation of European Union Counter-Terrorism: Emergence,
Accelaration, and Inertia, School of politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK, 2009.
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/1ddc130d-e5fd-4cb9-aeae-cccad4d91e98.pdf.
11
European Parliament, “the European Union’s policy on Counter-Terrorism” Relevence, coherence, and
Effectiveness, Policy Department, 2017, p15.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583124/IPOL_STU(2017)583124_EN.pdf.
12
Brian M. Jenkins, “Inernational Terrorism: A new kindof warfare”, the Rand cooperation, Santa Monica,
California, USA, June 1974. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P5261.pdf.
13
Therese Delpech, “International Terrorism and Europe”, Chaillot Papers, n56, Institute of security studies,
December, 2002, pp,13-31. https://peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/chai56e.pdf [Accessed 22 June, 2017].
4
Since 9/11, the European Union took several important decisions in regards to the
the lack of the executive power of the EU, which was necessary for the current terrorist
threat, rose the question whether the EU was a proper institution, able to lead and
about the ability of the EU to work out and facilitate the implementation of coherent,
between the EU countries. To do so, we can address some difficulties facing the
leading the fight against terror in the EU and contiguous regions. There is a
multilateral forum for individual governments instead of being the decision maker
After the New York attack, Counter-Terrorism became a priority on the EU political
agenda. The EU considered the attack on the US as an attack on the West. At the
same time, the EU leaders regarded the war on terrorism more than just a war between
the US and the terrorists. It was a war necessary to defend the Western values of
freedom and democracy against radicalisation. The 9/11 attack followed by Madrid in
2004 and London in 2005 showed the amount of challenges the EU had to face. The
attacks shifted the threat from domestic terror to international threat. Therefore, the
14
Peter Chalk, “West European Terrorism and counter terrorism”, the Evolving Dynamic, Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1996, p.123-127. https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780333654613.
5
requirement was to implement a new Counter-Terrorism strategy to fight against
international terrorism. At the same time, given the structure of the terrorist
a real challenge to the world and to Europe and the fight against terrorism will be the
primary objective of the European Union.”16 This announcement was followed by the
The legislation framework response to combat terrorism was agreed by the “Justice
and Home Affairs” 17 Department on 6-7 December 2001. In December 2003, the EU
adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS). This was a major step towards framing
well as build and maintain the security around the EU borders. It was meant to support
the international order and provide effective multilateralism. This was the first
document adopted for the long-term strategy of the EU foreign policy. It developed
15
Von Hippel K., “Introduction: Europe Confronts Terrorism”, in Von Hippel K. (ed.), Europe Confronts
Terrorism, pp. 1-4. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-0-230-52459-0%2F1.pdf. [Accessed
30/06/2017].
16
Council of the European Union, Extraordinary Council Meeting: Justice, Home Affairs and Civil Protection,
Brussels, 20 September 2001: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload /12019.en1.pdf. [Accessed 30/06/2017].
17
Council of the European Union, “Justice and Home Affairs Council Configuration (JHA)”,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/jha/.
18
Ruprecht Polenz, “The E Security Concept - Implications for NATO and the EU,” Report from 2004 Annual
Session, Brussels, Belgium: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2004. [Accessed 14/07/2017]. http://www.nato-
6
rhetoric and promising policy were difficult to follow with action because the EU
member states became quiet. For instance, the European Arrest Warrant was adopted
in 2001, but it only became active almost four years after it was issued. This indicates
that the framework of the EU Counter-Terrorism was waiting for another attack before
After the attack in Madrid on 25 March 200420, the Council of the European Union
reacted very quickly and on 24-26 April 2004 it declared war on terrorism. Also, it
requested the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS). At the same
time, it established that the EU coordinator will assist the EU Council with the work on
Terrorism, combating the financial funds of the terrorist groups, maximizing the
and prosecuting terrorists, controlling the borders and protecting the infrastructure
members to deal with terrorist attacks and the consequences resulted from the attack.
the terrorists, supporting the third countries through the EU external relations and
pa.int/default.asp?CAT2=471&CAT1=16&CAT0=2&COM=490&MOD=0&SMD=0&SSMD=0&STA=&ID=0&PAR=0
&PRINT=1.
19
Max-Peter Ratzel, In, Oldrich Bures,”EU Counterterrorism Policy”, A Paper Tiger? , Metropolitan University
Prague, Czech Republic, Routledge, Oxon, UK, 2016, p 2. https://www.book2look.com/embed/9781317140405
20
Council of European Union, “Extraordinary Council Meeting”, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussel, 25 March,
2004; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/JAI19.03.04.pdf. [Accessed 04/07/2017].
7
was adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Minister of the European Council in order
to combat terrorism.
On 18 June 2004, the EU Council issued a revised Action Plan for Counter-Terrorism.
Also, the EU Council took an important decision to revise and approve the Action Plan
twice a year. The Action Plan should contain an “Updated Matrix containing all of the
measures of the action plan and an annex showing an overview of the implementation
November 2004, the EU Council adopted the Hague “Declaration for Strengthening
2004, a conceptual framework, the “EU Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)”, was
prevent conflicts23.
The London attack proved that the EU Counter-Terrorism response implied waiting for
the event to happen and reacting swiftly afterwards. That is exactly what happened
after the Madrid attack when the EU Council held a meeting and condemned the
terrorist events. On 13 July 2005, during the extraordinary meeting of the EU Council,
the Justice and Home Affairs Minister promised an “Accelerated implementation of the
21
Council of the European Union, “EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism – Update, December 7, 2004”
,Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 07 December, 2004.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU_PlanOfAction10586.pdf. [Accessed 15 July, 2017].
22
Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council 4/5 November 2004, Presidency Conclusions,”
Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 8 December, 2004.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/82534.pdf. [Accessed 14 July,
2017].
23
Council of the European Union, “Conceptual Framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight against
terrorism,” Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 22 November, 2004.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/14797Conceptual_Framework_ESDP.pdf. [Accessed 14
July, 2017].
8
EU Action Plan on combating terrorism and other existing commitments” 24 It was very
important after the London events in July to investigate the terrorists’ capabilities and
improve the capacity of the EU to combat terrorism. Also, it was paramount to prevent
the recruitment of more people and turn them into terrorists. The declaration also
included information about the protection of the infrastructure and the EU citizens. In
addition,the EU member states had to improve their strategies in order to minimize the
result of terrorist attacks and manage the consequences. The EU Council requested
Counter-Terrorism25.
such as setting up the European Arrest Warrant, developing and strengthening the
the new EU Counter- Terrorism strategy focusing on four pillars: Protect, Prevent,
Pursue, and Response27. The security strategies were updated in 2008. In 2010,
terrorism was a key element of the internal security strategy. The review of all the EU
24
Council of the European Union, “Press Release: Extraordinary Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs”,
Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 13 July, 2005.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/85703.pdf. [Accessed 14 July,
2017].
25
Ibid.
26
Council of European Union, “Extraordinary Council Meeting”, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussel, 13 July
2005; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/85703.pdf. [Access 04 July,
2017].
27
Council of European Union, “EU counter-Terrorism Strategy”, 2697th Council Meeting, Brussel 1-2
December, 2005, doc. 14390/05.
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204. [Accessed
04/07/2017].
9
measures was only for combating terrorism and taking the initiative28. The EU Counter-
Terrorism strategy did not depend on the four pillars mentioned above. There have
been many attempts to set out a comprehensive policy for fighting terrorism and make
It is not a secret that the response of the European Union to the terrorist threats has
been widely criticised. Despite the developments in the legal and operational
measures since 2001 and the adoption of the new EU strategy for counter-terrorism
in 2005 (followed by more than 200 set measures), the cooperation between all of the
EU state members could not stop the terrorists’ ability to launch attacks in different EU
countries. From 9/11 until 2005, there was not a long-term Counter-Terrorism policy
available for the EU citizens which they could understand easily. The lack of executive
authority and the reduction of the institutional work at the coordinators’ level meant
that there was no direct involvement in the internal security of the EU members and
its institutions30.
The new EU strategy could not stop the fear growing inside the EU society. Therefore
it was important to evaluate the terrorism and determine the threat to the society.
Europol, as a law enforcement agency, put a lot of effort into determining the objectives
of terrorism. The Europol figures showed the upsurge of terrorist activities not only in
reached 1,000 marks, 60% incidents, and 80% fatalities concentrated in five countries:
28
European Comission, “Comission staff Working Paper” Taking stock of EU counter –Terrorism Measures,
COM(2010)386 final, 20 July 2010. https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/news/intro/docs/sec_2010_911_en.pdf. [Accessed 04/07/2017].
29
Den Boer M., “The EU Counterterrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound Policy Transformation?”
in Van Leuween M. (ed.), Confronting Terrorism. European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, 2003,
p. 189
30
Europe Union Terrorism situation and trend report: TE-SAT 2016, The Hague, Europol 2016.
file:///C:/Users/Haider/Downloads/europol_tesat_2016.pdf
10
Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria. The terrorist attacks increased in the
last few years as the European Union witnessed the attacks in Paris in 2015 and 2016,
in Belgium in 2016 and in London in 2017. All of these attacks were claimed by ISIS
or inspired by them31. The development of terror and jihadist cells in North Africa and
the declaration of the Islamic State (ISIS) in northern Iraq and Syria in June 2014 led
to an increase of jihadist cells in Europe. More than 211 terrorist attacks were foiled
during 2016. These terrorist attempts increased by 39% from 2013. In 2015 the
number of arrests related to terrorism reached 1,077- this increased by twofold from
2013. This was the highest number of arrests according to the annual assessment
The EU Council set up a great number of legal institutions to combat terrorism since
the London attack in 2005. The EU coordinator for CT reports twice a year on the
between 2001-201232.
The table shows the measures taken between 2001 and 2012. It indicates the seven
updates on Counter-Terrorism measures and the action taken within this period. It
shows that it started off with 41 CT measures and it grew to 64 measures. Straight
31
Ibid.
32
Council of the European Union Public Register, “EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism,”
11
after the Madrid attack, the number of measures were taken moved up to 164. In 2005,
after the London attack, the number of measures taken grew to 203 CT. In 2006, after
the new EU strategy was adopted by the EU Council, the Action Plan measures
reached 138 CT. Between 2007-2009, 139 Action Plan measures were executed.
From 2010 until 2012, the amount of the Action Plan measures was steady because
On the operational level, after 9/11 the EU war on terrorism strengthened Europol as
a law enforcement agency. This consolidated the cooperation between the authorities
inside the EU in order to combat terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime and people
smuggling34. Eurojust was established and its purpose was to enhance the operation
levels between the EU members, improve the coordination between the judicial
authorities and the EU state members and ensure the ongoing collaboration between
all EU members35. Establishing the European Border and Coast Agency (FRONTEX)
helped the EU and the Schengen countries to get control over and manage their
external borders36.
33
Council of the European Union, “The European Union Action Plan for Combating Radicalization.” Brussel, 8
December, 2004. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/82534.pdf.
[Accessed 15 July, 2017].
34
The Council of European Union, “Acts adopted under EU treaty”; establishing the European Police Office
(Europol) (2009/371/JHA), Official Journal of the European Union, 15 May, 2009.
file:///C:/Users/ps16mma/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/0CEBI55T/council_decision.pdf.
[Accessed 05/07/2017].
35
The Council of European Union, “Acts adopted under EU treaty”; on the strengthen of Eurojust and
amending decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime,
Official Journal of the European Union, 04 June, 2009.
file:///C:/Users/ps16mma/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/12UKUK11/Eurojust-Council-
Decision-2009-426-JHA-EN.pdf. [Accessed 05/07/2017].
36
The Council of European Union, “Regulation”, Regulation EU 2016/1624 of the European parliament and of
the council of 14 Septmber, 2016. Official Journal of the European Union, 16 September, 2016.
file:///C:/Users/ps16mma/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/E2P80SKT/European_Border_a
nd_Coast_Guard.pdf. [Accessed 05/07/2017].
12
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy Pillars
The Madrid attack accelerated the EU institutionalization. The impact of the Madrid
attack on the EU Counter-Terrorism was greater than 9/11 due to the differences in
the EU public space. After the London attack in July 2005, the immediate response
was to accelerate the work on the existing framework. At the same time, the UK
the “EU Evidence Warrant”. The new EU Counter-Terrorism strategy was adopted in
the terrorism inside and outside of the EU and it contained four new pillars : Prevent,
1. Prevent
Preventing is the most challenging pillar of the Counter-Terrorism Policy and it is
important because it represents the main aim of all the intelligence agencies: to
prevent the threat on the country. Since December 2005, when the EU adopted the
four new pillars for combating terrorism, the Action Plan implemented more than 25
measures based only on the Prevention pillar. This contains seven approaches which
are the key priorities of the EU foreign and domestic policy. The aim of the new
measures and key approaches is to limit the radicalisation of people by turning them
into ISIS or Al-Qaeda terrorists (or any other group inspired by the terrorist ideology).
It also aims to combat the causes of terrorism, radicalisation and recruitment, and
prevent the justification of terrorism as there is no excuse for terrorism. The majority
of the EU community, no matter what sort of belief they follow, refuse the fundamental
combat the terrorist propaganda and the circumstances that lead people to get
13
The difficulties that arise when preventing terrorism are linked to determining the circle
of people inside the Muslim society. The society is one of the important factors of
radicalisation and that is how terrorists are recruited inside and outside of the EU.
states only. It is the responsibility of all of the EU countries. They need to contribute to
the combat of terrorism as it has been agreed by the EU Council. Some of the member
states refuse or do not contribute enough to the sharing of information about their
internal security with the EU Council. The EU member states represent the main
produced by the EU legal framework on both regional and local policies. This
challenge requires a full engagement from the EU population, not only the
governments.
strategy projects. It is important to mention that the Preventing strategy was criticised
strategy was completely reviewed. The soft approach for preventing radicalisation was
inconclusive and it was a negative reflection of the community relations38. The former
of citizens turning into “vigilantism” due to fear induced by terrorism39. They found that
37
Secretary of state for Home department, ”Prevent Strategy,” Command of her majesty, UK, June, 2011, p17.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011. [Accessed 16 July, 2017].
38
House of Commons, House of Lords Joint Committee on National Security Strategy (2012), First Review of
the National Security Strategy 2010. London: Great Britain Parliament House of Commons.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtnatsec/265/265.pdf. [Accessed 16 July, 2017].
39
“Tony Blair’s anti-Jihadist programme has failed” Says ex-MI5 Chief, the Telegraph, 14 January, 2015.
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11344281/MI5-chief-Blairs-anti-jihadist-programme-
hasfailed.html. [Accessed 16 July, 2017].
14
implementing the prevent strategy created a suspicious atmosphere between the
One of the recruitment methods used by terrorists is the internet and in particular social
media. They use it to turn people into terrorists who then operate in Europe or they
transfer them to fighting areas such as Iraq and Syria. The EU Commission built a
partnership with the internet service provider in Europe as all the ISP companies are
private. It is necessary for the EU to build a partnership with the private companies
and share the information with the intelligence communities to prevent the recruitment
through the social media41. In December 2016, the main social media networks such
as Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft announced that they had developed technologies
which allowed them to track extremist behaviour. This announcement came after the
EU Council criticised the social media in the USA for not making sufficient efforts to
track down the terrorist recruitment videos. The new technologies were implemented
2. Protect
Protecting the infrastructure and strengthening the defence strategy against terrorism
is the main aim of the Protection pillar. Thus the impact of terrorist attacks is reduced
and the cooperation between the internal and external borders of the EU is improved.
Also, the exchange of information between the police and the judiciary inside EU
member states is done more efficiently. The EU Action plan listed thirty measures that
40
D. Bigo, L. Bonelli, E. Guittet and F. Ragazzi, “Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU”,
European Parliament Study, Brussels, 2014.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/509977/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2014)509977_EN.pdf. [Accessed 16July, 2017].
41
European Commission, “The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges,”
Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, COM (2010)386 final, July 20, 2010. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0386:FIN:EN:PDF.
42
Madhumita Murgia, “Social media group join forces to counter online terror content,” Financial Time,
London, UK, 05 December, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/ff15c750-bafd-11e6-8b45-
b8b81dd5d080?mhq5j=e2.
15
Counter-Terrorism needed to achieve. The level of exchange of information between
the EU countries is still one of the obstacles of the Action Plan measures. The key
(including the identity, the biometric information and the passport details of the
passengers). It is also important to reinforce the efforts and develop methods to protect
the soft targets. At the international level, the EU member states must collaborate and
exchange information about travellers through civil aviation and navy. They must also
evaluate the existing legislation and implement the Action Plan measures. The Euro
borders. The EU introduced new civil aviation rules and changed many regulations
3. Pursue
The main objective of the Pursue pillar of the EU Counter-Terrorism strategy is the
pursuit of terrorism around the world and across the EU borders including preventing
networks, blocking terrorist funding and bringing the terrorists to justice. The EU Action
Plan has more than 60 measures and the pursuit of eight of these measures is a
priority for the Action Plan. These measures include strengthening the EU capabilities
for counter terrorism, blocking terrorist financing and money laundry, blocking the
biological and radiological materials, reinforcing the law enforcement and changing
the information between the EU member states and other countries outside of the EU.
In addition, the Action Plan includes measures regarding the evaluation of the current
43
European Commission, “The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges.”
16
legislation and the ratification of international treaties as well as the facilitation of the
cooperation between the police and the judicial professionals using Europol and
Eurojust. All the measures used in the pursuit of terrorism are for enhancing, gathering
states like Europol and Eurojust. These measures focused on training support and
exchange of information between all EU intelligence communities and not limit it only
to Europol, the police and the other criminal institutions. In addition, it must activate
the Action Plan and implement the measures related to the pursuit of terrorism legally,
4. Response
The objective of the Response pillar is to improve the capability, coordination and
developed the “EU Community Civil Protection Mechanism” (CCPM) and today this
represents one of the best efforts of the EU response45. CCPM continually reinforced
that there should be a fast response in case of any disasters, not only in the case of a
terrorist attack. There should be a similar response in terms of other disasters such as
earthquakes, forest fires and floods. Each EU member should respond to the crisis
within their own country and look after their citizens living abroad as well. Another task
44
European Commission, “The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future challenges” 8; See
more in Chapter II, Section D.
45
Bundesministerium fur Inneres, “Civil Protection,”
http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Zivilschutz/more_on_topic/european_union.aspx. [Accessed 18 July, 2017].
17
of the Response pillar is to link the political response and the emergency management,
to make sure the elements are integrated to a high degree and the conformity takes
significant challenge still remains. The strategy has not reached its full potential yet47.
the European Arrest Warrant in 2002 which became operational in 200748. This was
set up in order to help the extradition procedure of suspected terrorists between the
cooperation between the EU members. Some of the members were unwilling to share
intelligence information with the other members through EAW and Europol49. Some of
these countries still prefer to share information based on bilateral agreements outside
of the EU member states 50. The cooperation problem between the EU members
affects Europol as well, as they do not have the power to arrest any suspects. They
are only responsible for exchanging intelligence information between the EU countries.
The restriction of Europol is reflected in the EU institutions and its influence is limited51.
In 2014, the “Focal Point Travellers Scheme” was established by Europol to collect
and analyse the information regarding the terrorists travelling abroad to join the fight.
46
Council of European Union, “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to
Terrorism”, document No. 14781/1/05, Brussel, 24 November, 2005.
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/nov/eu-radicalisation-nov-05.pdf. [Accessed 20 July, 2017].
47
Sajjan Gohel, “the challenge of EU Counter-Terrorism cooperation”, Debating Security Plus, Security Europe,
12 December, 2016. http://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/challenges-eu-counter-terrorism-
cooperation
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
18
However, only 14 countries of the 28 EU member states responsed on the day of the
Paris attack and registered their own people on the scheme. Another problem of
Europol was that it collaborated only with the police (national or federal) and it did not
involve the intelligence agencies. This caused problems in terms of accessing specific
information about certain terrorists. To solve this issue, in 2016 Europol launched the
“European Counter-Terrorism Centre” (ECTC) which represents the main hub for
intelligence information for combating terrorism inside the EU. The success of the
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy was criticised due to the slow
bureaucratic process and for the fact that it became active only after the terrorist
there is a high level of cooperation and coordination between the EU member states
Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the so called ISIS, rose concerns for the EU
governments. The reason for this was because the terrorist group succeeded in
recruiting people holding European citizenship to join the fight in Iraq and Syria. In fact,
ISIS managed to attract and recruit fighters and sympathisers from all over the world.
More than 5,000 fighters from Europe joined the fight in Iraq and Syria and this number
52
Sajjan Gohel, “the challenge of EU Counter-Terrorism cooperation”, Debating Security Plus,
Security Europe, 12 December, 2016. http://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/challenges-eu-
counter-terrorism-cooperation.
19
represents a challenge for the EU when they return to their home countries53. This can
give an indication of the capability of the terrorist group to inspire people born and
raised in the west to join the fight in countries out of the EU or launch attacks inside
the EU, like the Paris attacks in January and November 201554, and Brussels in March
when sharing the information between the EU countries and having open borders
between the EU and other countries. The new estimation regarding the number of the
EU citizens who joined the fight in Syria is approximately 5,000 fighters. 30% of them
have returned to their country of origin in Europe which represents a direct threat to
the European community. In addition, we must take into consideration the “Lone Wolf”
individuals who are self-motivated by the jihadist propaganda. They did not join the
fight in Syria and Iraq. They may have no connection with any terrorist groups, but
they commit mass crimes in their own country as it happened in Nice, July 201656.
strengthen the external borders of the EU and support the existing measures for
Counter-Terrorism. The reason for this was because the initiatives related to the view
of the intelligence, judicial operations and police were considered at the centre of a
country’s sovereignty. Also, the balance between the EU security, human rights and
53
David Malet, “Foreign fighters: transitional identity in civil conflicts”, New York, Oxford university press,
2013.
54
“Paris and Brussels: The Links Between the Attackers,” The Guardian, April 20, 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2016/mar/24/paris-and-brussels-the-links-between-the-
attackers. [Accessed 21 July, 2017].
55
“Idle Swede Charged with Brussels Terrorist Murders”, The Local (Sweden),
https://www.thelocal.se/20160409/swede-arrested-in-connection-with-brussels-attacks. [Accessed 21 July,
2017].
56
. Riccardo Dugulin, “Responding to the”Lon Wolf” threat in western Europe”, Global Risk Insights, 13 April,
2017. http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/04/lone-wolf-threat-western-europe/. [Accessed 21 July, 2017].
20
EU policy analysts suggested that the differing views between the EU countries
constrained them to use the force to fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This led some
other EU countries to participate in the fight by joining the US in their fight against ISIS
After the attack, the EU started focusing on the mobility surveillance through a large
between the police and the intelligence communities of the EU member states58.
Europol did not participate in the day-to-day work within the Counter-Terrorism
institutions and the information coming from Schengen Visa did not provide any
between the EU states. This led to major weaknesses in the Schengen freedom of
movement within the EU and the external borders through the immigration waves. The
easy penetration of the EU borders caused a free movement of firearms between the
EU external borders. Also, it is important to consider the fact that a limited number of
police officers, who had little intelligence information, had to engage with the minority
57
Christian Molling, “France Makes the Case for European Défense”, a la Francaise, German Marshal Fund of
the united states, 18 November, 2015. http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2015/11/18/france-makes-case-european-
defense-a-la-francaise. [Accessed 21 July, 2017].
58
S. Carrera and N. Hernanz (2015), “Re-Framing Mobility and Identity Controls: The Next Generation of the EU
Migration Management Toolkit”, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 02 April, 2015.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/08865655.2015.1012737?needAccess=true. [Accessed 22 July,
2017].
59
Richard Walton, “Being in the EU doesn’t keep us safe from terrorist”, the telegraph, 26 Feb, 2016.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12175207/Being-in-the-EU-doesnt-keep-us-
safe-from-terrorists.html. [Accessed 22 July, 2017].
21
Record (PNR) to “prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute” any terrorist activities
and serious crimes. Under the new regulations, the airline companies were obliged to
provide full details PNR of the departure and arrival to the EU state authority. Also,
they needed to provide them with PNR for selective flights inside the EU under no
The challenge with implementing the PNR data lies on the fact that it may go against
unfairly. PNR database focuses more on the “person-centric approach” and the
individual. This system represents a security risk as it does not focus on the nationality
or migration status of the person, but rather on the personal profile. Focusing on
is combating the financing of the terrorists. The terrorists and their supporters always
use a different way to move and collect money and they have access to the funds. The
EU takes punitive actions to stop the funding, fight the terrorist financing and freeze
the terrorists’ assets. These measures have been successful when infiltrate in the
terrorists’ structures in the EU. The EU needs more measures of financial surveillance-
this will help to uncover the hidden network of organizations. Despite many measures
60
S. Carrera and N. Hernanz (2015), “Re-Framing Mobility and Identity Controls: The Next Generation of the EU
Migration Management Toolkit”, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 02 April, 2015.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/08865655.2015.1012737?needAccess=true. [Accessed 22 July
2017].
22
being implemented to prevent terrorist financing, some of these measures are still
facing implementation difficulties due to Eurojust and Europol. This is because some
of the EU countries are still facing the problem of matching the EU measures or legal
framework61.
Conclusion
Despite the great developments of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy since 2001, a
significant challenge still remains. The strategy has not reached its full potential yet62.
the European Arrest Warrant in 2002 which became operational in 2007 63. This was
set up in order to help the extradition procedure of suspected terrorists between the
cooperation between the EU members. Some of the members were unwilling to share
intelligence information with the other members through EAW and Europol. Some of
these countries still prefer to share information based on bilateral agreements outside
of the EU member states. The cooperation problem between the EU members affects
Europol as well, as they do not have the power to arrest any suspects. They are only
responsible for exchanging intelligence information between the EU countries 64. The
2014, the “Focal Point Travellers Scheme”65 was established by Europol to collect and
61
Migration and Home Affairs, “Financing”, European Commission, updated 25 July 2017.
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/financing_en. [Accessed 22 July,
2017].
62
Sajjan Gohel, “the challenge of EU Counter-Terrorism cooperation”, Debating Security Plus, Security Europe,
12 December, 2016. http://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/challenges-eu-counter-terrorism-
cooperation.
63
Ibid.
64
ibid
65
Council of the European Union, “Improving information and Intelligence exchange in the area of counter-
Terrorism across the EU”, Eropol, Brussel, 16 March 2015. http://statewatch.org/news/2015/apr/eu-council-
europol-exchange-of-intelligence-7272-15.pdf.
23
analyse the information regarding the terrorists travelling abroad to join the fight.
However, only 14 countries of the 28 EU member states responsed on the day of the
Paris attack and registered their own people on the scheme. Another problem of
Europol was that it collaborated only with the police (national or federal) and it did not
involve the intelligence agencies. This caused problems in terms of accessing specific
information about certain terrorists. To solve this issue, in 2016 Europol launched the
“European Counter-Terrorism Centre”66 (ECTC) which represents the main hub for
intelligence information for combating terrorism inside the EU. The success of the
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy was criticised due to the slow
bureaucratic process and for the fact that it became active only after the terrorist
there is a high level of cooperation and coordination between the EU member states
66
Europol, “European Counter Terrorism Centre”, Europol, 2016. https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-
europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc.
67
Sajjan Gohel, “the challenge of EU Counter-Terrorism cooperation”, Debating S. ecurity Plus,
Security Europe, 12 December, 2016. http://europesworld.org/2016/12/12/challenges-eu-counter-
terrorism-cooperation/#.WUkrh2aGOUk. [ Accessed on 20 July 2017].
24